2022/1204/D3

COUNCIL OF THE INNS OF COURT

BAR TRIBUNALS ADJUDICATION SERVICE

BAR STANDARDS BOARD

– and –

DR CHARLOTTE PROUDMAN

_______________________________________________

DR PROUDMAN’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

FOR APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT CHARGES
_______________________________________________

Table of Contents1
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 2
B. THE CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DR PROUDMAN .......................... 3
C. DR PROUDMAN’S ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE ....................... 4
D. PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS UNDER THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 ................. 6
E. DIRECT DISCRIMINATION CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 ............... 7
(1) The law ........................................................................................................................ 7
(a) General principles .................................................................................................... 7
(b) ‘On grounds of’ or ‘because of’: the reason for the less favourable treatment ....... 8
(c) Not the sole reason .................................................................................................. 9
(d) Comparators and the burden of proof .................................................................... 10
(2) Submissions on direct discrimination ....................................................................... 14
(a) The Bar Standards Board decided not to investigate comments about HHJ Robert
Linford made by nine male barristers on twitter .............................................................. 15
(b) The Bar Standards Board did not refer male barrister Mr Jolyon Maugham KC to a
disciplinary tribunal in respect of comments he made about Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven
19
(c) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at
a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr Marshall
KC directed at Dr Proudman............................................................................................ 21
(d) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at
a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr Mark George
KC directed at her ............................................................................................................ 27
(e) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at
a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate a vast number of offensive
tweets by numerous male barristers directed at her ......................................................... 29

1
Items in the Table of contents are hyperlinked to the sections below.
 (f) The Bar Standards Board took into account Dr Proudman’s ‘pursuit of the cause of
campaigning for women’s rights’ in deciding to refer her to a disciplinary tribunal ....... 47
F. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 ......... 47
(1) The law ...................................................................................................................... 47
(2) Submissions............................................................................................................... 50
G. HARASSMENT CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 .................................. 54
(1) The law ...................................................................................................................... 54
(2) Submissions............................................................................................................... 56
H. BREACH OF PUBLIC SECTOR EQUALITY DUTY................................................ 57
(1) The law ...................................................................................................................... 57
(2) Submissions............................................................................................................... 59
I. BREACH OF ARTICLE 6 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................................... 60
J. BREACH OF LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007 ................................................................ 63
K. ABUSE OF PROCESS .................................................................................................... 63
L. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 64

A. INTRODUCTION

1. These are the written submissions of Dr Charlotte Proudman in support of her

application dated 8 March 2024 under rule rE127.2 of the Bar Handbook to strike out
all charges against her. They are accompanied by an Appendix.

2. The grounds for the application to strike out the charges are that the proceedings brought
by the Bar Standards Board against Dr Proudman are an abuse of the Bar Tribunals and
Adjudication Service process:

a. It is an abuse of process to initiate and pursue proceedings which are an

affront to justice/the public conscience: see R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48,
[2011] 1 WLR 1837 and Hamilton v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577.

b. Under s 28(2)(a) of the Legal Services Act 2007, the Bar Standards Board is
required, so far as reasonably practicable, to act in a way which is compatible
with the regulatory objectives under s 1 of the 2007 Act. The regulatory
objectives include protecting and promoting the public interest.

c. Public policy/the public interest requires the preservation of the integrity of

the justice system: see Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467.

d. The Bar Standards Board is a public authority within the meaning of s 6 of

the Human Rights Act 1998. Under s 6 of the 1998 Act it is unlawful for the
Bar Standards Board to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention
right. The Convention rights include articles 6 and 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: s 1(1)(a) of the 1998 Act.

2
2. As explained below, the proceedings against Dr Proudman were initiated and pursued
by the Bar Standards Board:

a. In breach of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in

conjunction with article 14; and/or

b. In breach of the Equality Act 2010:

i. The Bar Standards Board has directly discriminated against Dr

Proudman in breach of s 53(2)(c) and s 13 of the Equality Act 2010;

ii. The Bar Standards Board has indirectly discriminated against Dr

Proudman in breach of s 53(2)(c) and s 19 of the Equality Act 2010;

iii. The Bar Standards Board has harassed Dr Proudman in breach of s

53(3)(a) and s 26 of the Equality Act 2010;

iv. The Bar Standards Board has, in the exercise of its public functions,
acted in breach of the public sector equality duty under s 149 of the
Equality Act 2010.

3. For the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service Disciplinary Tribunal to be asked to
hear proceedings against Dr Proudman which were initiated and pursued by the Bar
Standards Board in breach of article 6 in conjunction with article 14 and/or in breach
of the Equality Act 2010 would be an affront to justice/the public conscience and
contrary to public policy/the public interest. All charges against her should be struck
out.

B. THE CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DR PROUDMAN

4. The Bar Standards Board has referred Dr Proudman to a three-person disciplinary

tribunal and brought five disciplinary charges against her. As set out in the letter dated
1 August 2024 from Morgan Wiseman, Dr Proudman’s solicitors, to the Bar Standards
Board, three of those charges are defective and should be amended or withdrawn. The
defects in the charges are not the subject of this strike out application, and the charges
are therefore addressed in their current form.

5. If convicted and sentenced by a three-person disciplinary tribunal, Dr Proudman could

face a range of sanctions including suspension from practice as a barrister for up to 12
months or a fine of up to £50,000 (see the Disciplinary Tribunal Regulations, rE210.1,
Annex 1 to the Disciplinary Tribunals Regulations – Sentencing Powers Against
Barristers, and the BTAS Sentencing Guidance (6th edition, 2022), section J, ‘Use of
social media and other communications’).

6. Charges 1 to 3 allege that two tweets, in a 14 part thread about the case of Traharne v
Limb sent from Dr Proudman’s twitter account2 on 6 April 2022, were ‘misleading’ and

2
Dr Proudman did not write the tweets but approved their publication from her twitter account. The tweets
will therefore be referred to in these submissions as her tweets.

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 ‘inaccurate’. It is Dr Proudman’s case that the tweets are a fair summary of the facts as
set out in the judgment and/or the evidence.

7. Charges 4 and 5 allege that seven posts, in the same 14 part thread 3 about the case of
Traharne v Limb, ‘individually and/or cumulatively were without a sound factual basis
and contained seriously offensive, derogatory language which was designed to demean
and/or insult the judge’. It is Dr Proudman’s case that the tweets, which set out her
sincerely held concerns about the minimisation of domestic abuse by the family courts4,
had a sound factual basis and did not contain seriously offensive, derogatory language
which was designed to demean and/or insult the judge.

8. The tweets upon which the Bar Standards Board relies are set out, in context (ie with
the surrounding tweets and the materials which were quoted or linked to in the tweets
– omitted by the Bar Standards Board when quoting the tweets in the charges), in the
appendix to these submissions at section B.

9. Initially, in respect of Dr Proudman, the Bar Standards Board also investigated (putting
a formal allegation to her and requiring her to respond):

a. six tweets she sent on 2 and 3 March 2022, alleging that the tweets ‘were
directed at a fellow member of the bar, and were seriously offensive, gender-
based, derogatory comments, designed to demean and/or insult.’

b. five tweets she sent on 3 March 2022, alleging that they were sent between the
hours of 12.30pm and 4.50pm.5

10. These additional tweets, with context, are set out in the appendix to these submissions
at section A.

11. The allegations at a. and b. have since been withdrawn.

12. The decision to refer Dr Proudman to a disciplinary tribunal was taken by an

Independent Decision-Making Panel of the Bar Standards Board on 28 February 2023
and the reasons for the decision were recorded in a decision sheet dated 2 March 2023.

C. DR PROUDMAN’S ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE

13. A brief summary of Dr Proudman’s academic and professional expertise is set out
below.

a. Dr Proudman is ranked as a leading junior in ‘Family: children and domestic

abuse’ by Legal 500;

3
The tweets about the Traharne v Limb case in fact comprised an initial 14 part thread and then a single
tweet at the end: see the Appendix to these submissions, Section B, where all the tweets are set out.
4
See Dr Proudman’s Response dated 20 October 2022 at p. 16, para 8 onwards.
5
The original allegation dated 1 August 2022 also alleged, inexplicably, that Dr Proudman had used
‘gender-critical’ language in her tweets about the judgment in Traharne v Limb. This aspect of the
allegation was withdrawn after Dr Proudman asked for an explanation.

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b. she was highly commended in 2024 for the award for ‘Woman of the Year’ at
the Women and Diversity in Law Awards;

c. she won the award in 2023 for ‘Advocate of the Year’ at the Women and
Diversity in Law Awards;

d. she was highly commended in the ‘Family Law Junior Barrister of the Year’
awards in 2022;

e. she won ‘case of the year’ at the Family Law Awards 2021;

f. Dr Proudman was called to the bar in 2010 and has practised as a barrister since
2011 (13 years);

g. she is experienced in family law and represents victims in family law cases
which have a cross-jurisdiction dimension in immigration and the criminal
justice system;

h. she has an MPhil in Criminology from Queen’s College, Cambridge;

i. she has a doctorate from King’s College, Cambridge, having completed a PHD
on the subject of female genital mutilation law and policy in England and Wales;

j. Dr Proudman’s book, ‘FGM: When Culture and Law Clash’, was published by
Oxford University Press in 2022;

k. she was a Junior Research Fellow at Queen’s College, Cambridge from 2018 to
2021;

l. Dr Proudman is a Senior Research Associate at the Intellectual Forum, Jesus

College, Cambridge and in the Department of Sociology, Cambridge;

m. Dr Proudman researches and teaches feminist legal theory at the University of

Cambridge;

n. she has written and spoken widely on the impact of criminalising male violence
against women and girls;

o. she carries out policy work with Parliament and international NGOs: for
example, she worked on drafting amendments to the Domestic Abuse Bill; and
she worked with a pro bono team of lawyers to introduce Female Genital
Mutilation Protection Orders, increase the age of marriage from 16 to 18 in
England and Wales and criminalise child marriage, sexual harassment and
virginity testing;

p. she is a Gender-based Violence expert for the European Institute for Gender
Equality;

q. she collaborates with women’s charities and represents them pro bono: see, for
example, Re P (Service on Parent in a Refuge) [2023] EWHC 471 (Fam) before

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 the President of the Family Division where she was instructed by Rights of
Women to represent Women’s Aid, Latin American Women’s Aid and Refuse;

r. she has appeared in more than 65 cases with judgments reported and/or
published online, including in the CJEU, the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal
and the High Court, some of which have set precedent including defining rape
and consent, coercive and controlling behaviour and gaslighting in the family
courts, expanding jurisprudence on special measures for victims and
complainants, publicly naming sex offenders and rapist parents, referring
domestic abuse judgments to perpetrator’s regulatory bodies, and challenging
parental alienation in domestic abuse cases and challenging the presumption of
abusive parents’ involvement in a child’s life;

s. ‘She is a fearless and impressive advocate for victims of domestic abuse and a
specialist in women’s rights and often works pro bono’ (see reference from
Anthony Metzer KC, until recently Head of Chambers, Goldsmith Chambers,
and Deputy High Court Judge);

t. ‘There is no doubt that Charlotte is one of the rising stars of the Family Bar. I
know of no other junior at the Family Bar who has made such a contribution
recently to the development of the law, particularly from a human rights and
victim-sensitive perspective’ (see reference from Dexter Dias KC, Garden Court
Chambers, and Deputy High Court Judge).

14. Dr Proudman is therefore an expert in the field of legal policy and practice in relation
to domestic abuse and violence against women and girls.

D. PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS UNDER THE EQUALITY ACT 2010

15. Sex is a protected characteristic.

16. Religion and belief is a protected characteristic. Belief means ‘any religious or
philosophical belief’. In respect of a ‘belief’, the criteria are set out in Grainger plc v
Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4:
a. the belief must be genuinely held;
b. it must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of
information available;
c. it must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and
behaviour;
d. it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance;
and
e. it must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with
human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

17. This has been held to include beliefs in respect of climate change (see Grainger) and to
include gender-critical views (see Forstater v CGD Europe and others [2021] IRLR
706). It clearly includes feminism.

18. The law protects both the holding of a belief and the expression or manifestation of that
belief (see Higgs v Farmor's School (No.3) [2023] IRLR 708 in respect of the latter).

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E. DIRECT DISCRIMINATION CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010

(1) The law

19. Section 54 of the Equality Act 2010 provides, so far as relevant:

‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 53.

(2) A qualifications body is an authority or body which can confer a relevant

qualification.

(3) A relevant qualification is an authorisation, qualification, recognition,

registration, enrolment, approval or certification which is needed for, or facilitates
engagement in, a particular trade or profession.’

20. The Bar Standards Board is a body which can confer a relevant qualification because it
can confer an authorisation which is needed for engagement in the profession of
barrister. It is therefore a ‘qualifications body’ for the purposes of s 53 of the Equality
Act 2010.

21. Section 53(2)(c) of the Equality Act 2010 provides:

‘(2) A qualifications body (A) must not discriminate against a person (B) upon
whom A has conferred a relevant qualification—

(a) …

(b) …

(c) by subjecting B to any other detriment.’

22. Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 provides:

‘13 Direct discrimination

(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.’

23. Direct discrimination occurs when, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less
favourably than it treats or would treat others.

(a) General principles

24. In London Borough of Islington v Ladele [2009] IRLR 154, [2009] ICR 387, EAT;
upheld by CA: [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, [2010] IRLR 211, [2010] ICR 532, the EAT
gave helpful overall guidance in relation to direct discrimination, stating (at [40]):

‘The following propositions with respect to the concept of direct discrimination… seem
to us to be justified by the authorities:

7
 (1) In every case the tribunal has to determine the reason why the claimant was treated
as he was. As Lord Nicholls put it in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport
[1999] IRLR 572, 575—“this is the crucial question”. He also observed that in most
cases this will call for some consideration of the mental processes (conscious or
subconscious) of the alleged discriminator.

(2) If the tribunal is satisfied that the prohibited ground is one of the reasons for the
treatment, that is sufficient to establish discrimination. It need not be the only or
even the main reason. It is sufficient that it is significant in the sense of being more
than trivial: see the observations of Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan (p 576) as explained
by Peter Gibson LJ in Igen v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ 142, [2005] ICR 931, [2005]
IRLR 258 paragraph 37.

(3) As the courts have regularly recognised, direct evidence of discrimination is rare
and tribunals frequently have to infer discrimination from all the material facts. The
courts have adopted the two stage test, which reflects the requirements of the
Burden of Proof Directive (97/80/EEC). These are set out in Igen v Wong.

(4) The explanation for the less favourable treatment does not have to be a reasonable
one; it may be that the employer has treated the claimant unreasonably. That is a
frequent occurrence quite irrespective of the race, sex, religion or sexual orientation
of the employee. So the mere fact that the claimant is treated unreasonably does not
suffice to justify an inference of unlawful discrimination to satisfy stage one. …

(5) It is not necessary in every case for a tribunal to go through the two-stage procedure.
In some cases it may be appropriate for the tribunal simply to focus on the reason
given by the employer and if it is satisfied that this discloses no discrimination, then
it need not go through the exercise of considering whether the other evidence,
absent the explanation, would have been capable of amounting to a prima facie case
under stage one of the Igen test: see the decision of the Court of Appeal in Brown v
Croydon LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 32, [2007] IRLR 259 paragraphs 28–39. …

(6) It is incumbent on a tribunal which seeks to infer (or indeed to decline to infer)
discrimination from the surrounding facts to set out in some detail what these
relevant factors are: see the observations of Sedley LJ in Anya v University of Oxford
[2001] EWCA Civ 405, [2001] IRLR 377 esp paragraph 10.

(7) As we have said, it is implicit in the concept of discrimination that the claimant is
treated differently than the statutory comparator is or would be treated. The proper
approach to the evidence of how comparators may be used was succinctly
summarised by Lord Hoffmann in Watt (formerly Carter) v Ahsan [2008] IRLR
243, [2008] 1 All ER 869 … paragraphs 36–37) …’.

(b) ‘On grounds of’ or ‘because of’: the reason for the less favourable treatment

25. In Amnesty International v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884, [2009] ICR 1450, EAT, Underhill
P (as he then was) explained the test in the following way, emphasising the importance
of the drawing of inferences, and the distinction between the reason and the motive of

8
 the alleged discriminator (a ‘benign’ motivation does not render a discriminatory act
non-discriminatory):

‘32. … The basic question in a direct discrimination case is what is or are the “ground”
or “grounds” for the treatment complained of. That is the language of the definitions of
direct discrimination in the main discrimination statutes and the various more recent
employment equality regulations. It is also the terminology used in the underlying
Directives …
33. In some cases the ground, or the reason, for the treatment complained of is inherent
in the act itself. If an owner of premises puts up a sign saying “no blacks admitted”,
race is, necessarily, the ground on which (or the reason why) a black person is excluded.
James v Eastleigh is a case of this kind. There is a superficial complication, in that the
rule which was claimed to be unlawful—namely that pensioners were entitled to free
entry to the council's swimming-pools—was not explicitly discriminatory. But it
nevertheless necessarily discriminated against men because men and women had
different pensionable ages: the rule could entirely accurately have been stated as “free
entry for women at 60 and men at 65”. The council was therefore applying a criterion
which was of its nature discriminatory: it was, as Lord Goff put it …, “gender based”.
In cases of this kind what was going on inside the head of the putative discriminator—
whether described as his intention, his motive, his reason or his purpose—will be
irrelevant. The “ground” of his action being inherent in the act itself, no further inquiry
is needed…

34. But that is not the only kind of case. In other cases—of which Nagarajan is an
example—the act complained of is not in itself discriminatory but is rendered so by a
discriminatory motivation, ie by the “mental processes” (whether conscious or
unconscious) which led the putative discriminator to do the act. Establishing what those
processes were is not always an easy inquiry, but tribunals are trusted to be able to draw
appropriate inferences from the conduct of the putative discriminator and the
surrounding circumstances (with the assistance where necessary of the burden of proof
provisions). Even in such a case, however, it is important to bear in mind that the subject
of the inquiry is the ground of, or reason for, the putative discriminator's action, not his
motive: just as much as in the kind of case considered in James v Eastleigh, a benign
motive is irrelevant … The distinctions involved may seem subtle, but they are real…

35. …

36. … There is thus, we think, no real difficulty in reconciling James v Eastleigh and
Nagarajan. In the analyses adopted in both cases, the ultimate question is—
necessarily—what was the ground of the treatment complained of (or—if you prefer—
the reason why it occurred). The difference between them simply reflects the different
ways in which conduct may be discriminatory.’

26. This approach was confirmed by the Supreme Court in R (on the application of E) v
Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] IRLR 136.

(c) Not the sole reason

27. The protected characteristic in question need not have been the sole reason for that
conduct: Owen and Briggs v James [1982] IRLR 502, CA. The question is whether it

9
 was an ‘effective cause’, see O'Donoghue v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council
[2001] EWCA Civ 701, [2001] IRLR 615. In Nagarajan v London Regional Transport
[1999] IRLR 572, HL, Lord Nicholls said:

’19. Decisions are frequently reached for more than one reason. Discrimination may be
on racial grounds even though it is not the sole ground for the decision. A variety of
phrases, with different shades of meaning, have been used to explain how the legislation
applies in such cases: discrimination requires that racial grounds were a cause, the
activating cause, a substantial and effective cause, a substantial reason, an important
factor. No one phrase is obviously preferable to all others, although in the application
of this legislation legalistic phrases, as well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so
far as possible. If racial grounds or protected acts had a significant influence on the
outcome, discrimination is made out.’

(d) Comparators and the burden of proof

28. Martin v The Board of Governors of St Francis Xavier 6th Form College [2024] EAT
22 is a recent authority which contains a useful summary of the extensive body of case
law on the role of comparators in direct discrimination claims:

‘54. Section 13 of the EqA requires that two matters be established for there to be a
finding of direct discrimination. The first is that there has been treatment of the claimant
(A) which is less favourable than the treatment that was meted out, or would have been
meted out, to a comparator (B). The second is that the less favourable treatment was on
the ground of the protected characteristic. Whilst it is open to an Employment Tribunal
to go straight to the second question, the “reason why” question (see Shamoon v Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11; [2003] ICR 337, at
paragraph 8, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) it is common for a Tribunal to consider
the “comparator” question as the Tribunal did in the present case.

55. There are three potential types of comparator: an actual (or statutory) comparator,
an evidential comparator, and a hypothetical (statutory) comparator.

56. An actual comparator exists when there is no material difference between the
circumstances relating to the claimant’s case and the comparator’s case. Express
statutory provision is made for such a comparator in section 23(1) of the EqA, which
states,

“(1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13…. there must be
no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.”

57. A comparison with an actual comparator (also known as a statutory comparator)

may support or undermine a claimant’s case.

58. However, it is clear that, even where the circumstances of a proposed comparator
are not materially the same as those of the claimant, a Tribunal may take account of the
way in which the respondent treated that person if there are some relevant similarities
between their circumstances. A tribunal may be assisted by seeing how unidentical,
though not wholly dissimilar, comparators had been treated in relation to other
individual cases. See Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Vento [2001] IRLR

10
124 (EAT), at paragraph 7, per Lindsay J. Such comparators are known as evidential
comparators.

59. Furthermore, a Tribunal may consider whether it is assisted by considering how a

hypothetical comparator in a similar (i.e. not materially different) position to the
claimant, but who does not have the protected characteristic, would have been treated.
Such a hypothetical comparator will be a statutory comparator, for the purposes of
section 23.

60. It should be borne in mind, however, that the purpose of a Tribunal’s consideration
of comparators is to use it as an evidential tool to see whether an inference of
discrimination is justified. It is not an end in itself…

61. We mention in passing that, at paragraph 109 of the passage cited above, Lord Scott
was using the phrase "actual comparator” in a different way from the way in which the
Tribunal in the present case, and we, have been using it. Lord Scott used the phrase
“actual comparator” to mean a real person, as opposed to a wholly hypothetical person,
whether that real person satisfied the statutory test in s23 or was an evidential
comparator. The Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal have been using the phase “actual
comparator” to mean a real person who is a statutory comparator for the purposes of
s23, and the phrase “evidential comparator” to mean a real person who is not a statutory
comparator. Nothing rests on this difference of terminology. We should add that a
hypothetical comparator will be a statutory comparator, because of the words “or may
treat” in section 23 (see, Shamoon, at paragraph 108): when looking at a hypothetical
comparators, a tribunal will be looking at someone who is in the identical circumstances
as the claimant, but who does not possess the protected characteristic.

62. For practical purposes, it may not make a great deal of difference as to whether a
comparator is an actual comparator or an evidential comparator. In Watt (formerly
Carter) v Ahsan [2007] UKHL 51; 2008 2 AC 296, Lord Hoffman, with whom all of
the other Lords agreed, said:

“37. It is probably uncommon to find a real person who qualifies under section
3(4) as a statutory comparator. Lord Rodger's example at para 139 of Shamoon
of the two employees with similar disciplinary records who are found drinking
together in working time has a factual simplicity which may be rare in ordinary
life. At any rate, the question of whether the differences between the
circumstances of the complainant and those of the putative statutory comparator
are “materially different” is often likely to be disputed. In most cases, however,
it will be unnecessary for the tribunal to resolve this dispute because it should
be able, by treating the putative comparator as an evidential comparator, and
having due regard to the alleged differences in circumstances and other
evidence, to form a view on how the employer would have treated a hypothetical
person who was a true statutory comparator. If the tribunal is able to conclude
that the respondent would have treated such a person more favourably on racial
grounds, it would be well advised to avoid deciding whether any actual person
was a statutory comparator.”

63. The question, in direct discrimination cases, as to whether the situations of the
claimant, on the one hand, and the proposed comparator, whether actual or evidential,

11
on the other, are comparable is a question of fact and degree: Hewage v Grampian
Health Board [2012] UKSC 37; [2012] ICR 1034…

64. In order for a comparator to be an actual or statutory comparator, is not necessary

that the circumstances are the same in every particular. In Vento, above, Lindsay J said,
at paragraph 12:

“…. it is all too easy to become nit-picking and pedantic in the approach to
comparators. It is not required that a minutely exact actual comparator has to be
found.”

65. In Kalu, at paragraph 24, Langstaff P said, “The purpose of making the comparison
… needs to be understood before a comparator may properly be identified.” In our
judgment, this is of central importance. Whether a point of difference has any
significance or not depends on the nature of the less favourable treatment about which
complaint is made. So, for example, if the complaint is about the claimant not being
selected for a job, whilst the comparator was selected, the fact that the claimant and
comparator have similar academic qualifications may well be relevant if the job
required developed intellectual skills, but it is not relevant if the job requires solely
manual labour or (to use one of Langstaff P’s examples) is to model clothing.

The burden of proof

66. Section 136 of the EqA provides for what is colloquially called the shifting burden
of proof. The burden ordinarily rests with a claimant to prove on the balance of
probabilities that he or she has suffered direct discrimination. However, this is subject
to section 136, which provides, in relevant part:

“(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this

Act.
(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any
other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the
court must hold that the contravention occurred.
(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the
provision.”

67. The interrelationship between the use of comparators and the shifting burden of
proof has recently helpfully been considered by the EAT (HHJ Tayler) in Virgin Active
v Hughes [2023] EAT 130; [2024] IRLR 4, at paragraphs 61-69,

“61. In many direct discrimination claims the claimant does not rely on a
comparison between his treatment and that of another person. The claimant
relies on other types of evidence from which it is contended that an inference of
discrimination should be drawn, the comparison being with how the claimant
would have been treated had he had some other protected characteristic.

62. In other cases, the claimant compares his treatment with that of one or more
other people. There are two ways in which such a comparison may be relevant.
If there are no material differences between the circumstances of the claimant
and the person with whom the comparison is made (the person is usually

12
referred to as an actual comparator), this provides significant evidence that there
could have been discrimination. However, because there must be no material
difference in circumstances between a claimant and a comparator for the
purpose of section 23 EQA it is rare that a claimant can point to an actual
comparator. The second situation in which a comparison with the treatment of
another person may provide evidence of discrimination is where the
circumstances are similar, but not sufficiently alike for the person to be an actual
comparator. The treatment of such a person may provide evidence that supports
the drawing of an inference of discrimination, sometimes by helping to consider
how a hypothetical person whose circumstances did not materially differ to
those of the claimant would have been treated (generally referred to as a
hypothetical comparator). Evidence of the treatment of a person whose
circumstances materially differ to those of the claimant is inherently less
persuasive than that of a person whose circumstances do not materially differ to
those of the claimant. That distinction is not always sufficiently considered
when applying the burden of proof provisions in section 136 EQA:
…

63. Probably the most regularly quoted passage concerning section 136 EQA is
from the judgment of Mummery LJ in Madarassy v Nomura International
plc [2007] I.C.R. 867 at paragraph 56:

“56. The court in Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] ICR 931 expressly rejected
the argument that it was sufficient for the complainant simply to prove
facts from which the tribunal could conclude that the respondent “could
have” committed an unlawful act of discrimination. The bare facts of a
difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a
possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient
material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of
probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of
discrimination.”

64. It is worth noting that in Madarassy the Employment Tribunal did not
analyse the treatment of the claimant in comparison to actual comparators. Ms
Madarassy’s claim was not analysed on the basis that there were men who were
actual comparators, but that the scoring of men in a redundancy exercise could
help establish how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

65. Where there is an actual comparator, it might be said that there is more than
the bare fact of a difference of status and a difference of treatment. In Laing v
Manchester City Council and another [2006] I.C.R. 1519 Elias J noted:

“65. In our view, if one considers the burden of proof provision in the
context of what a claimant needs to establish in a discrimination claim,
what it envisages is that the onus lies on the employee to show
potentially less favourable treatment from which an inference of
discrimination could properly be drawn. Typically this will involve
identifying an actual comparator treated differently or, in the absence of
such a comparator, a hypothetical one who would have been treated

13
 more favourably. That involves a consideration of all material facts (as
opposed to any explanation).”

66. Laing was approved by the Court of Appeal in Madarassy, which itself
was approved by the Supreme Court in Hewage v Grampian Health Board
[2012] UKSC 37; [2012] ICR 1034 and Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2017]
UKEAT 0203/16, [2018] ICR 359; see the analysis of Underhill LJ in Base
Childrenswear Limited v Nadia Otshudi [2019] EWCA Civ 1648 at
paragraphs 16-18.

67. If anything more is required to shift the burden of proof when there is an
actual comparator it will be less than would be the case if a claimant compares
his treatment with a person whose circumstances are similar, but materially
different, so that there is not an actual comparator.

68. For example, if two people who differ in a protected characteristic attend a
job interview and one is appointed but the other is not, that, of itself, would not
be enough to shift the burden of proof, but if they scored the same marks in the
assessment, so there is an actual comparator, the difference of treatment would
seem to call out for an explanation. As Elias J noted in Laing at paragraph 73:

“As I said in Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Griffiths-Henry

(unreported) 23 May 2006, para 17, it may be legitimate to infer that a
black person may have been discriminated against on grounds of race if
he is equally qualified for a post which is given to a white person and
there are only two candidates, but not necessarily legitimate to do so if
there are many candidates and a substantial number of other white
persons are also rejected.”

69. Accordingly, where a claimant compares his treatment with that of another
person, it is important to consider whether that other person is an actual
comparator or not. To do this the Employment Tribunal must consider whether
there are material differences between the claimant and the person with whom
the claimant compares his treatment. The greater the differences between their
situations the less likely it is that the difference of treatment suggests
discrimination.”

68. We respectfully agree with this analysis, but it is important to emphasise that HHJ
Tayler did not say that in every case in which the claimant has been treated less
favourably than an actual (statutory) comparator, the burden of proof will shift. It is
more likely that the burden of proof will shift, but it does not follow that in every case
the burden of proof will shift. The Tribunal must apply the statutory test as set out in
section 136(1), when deciding, in a particular case, whether the burden of proof has
passed to the respondent.”

(2) Submissions on direct discrimination

29. Dr Proudman is a woman. She holds and manifests a belief, namely feminism.

14
30. In initiating and pursing these disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Standards Board has
discriminated against Dr Proudman in that, because of her sex, it has treated her less
favourably than it treated or would have treated others.

31. Further and in the alternative, the Bar Standards Board has discriminated against Dr
Proudman in that, because of her belief in feminism, it has treated her less favourably
than it treat or would have treated others.

32. Dr Proudman relies on the following matters, each of which is addressed further below:

a. the Bar Standards Board decided not to investigate comments about HHJ Robert
Linford made by nine male barristers on twitter;

b. the Bar Standards Board did not refer male barrister Mr Jolyon Maugham KC
to a disciplinary tribunal in respect of comments he made about Mrs Justice
Natalie Lieven;

c. the Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed

at a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr
Marshall KC directed at Dr Proudman;

d. the Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed

at a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr
Mark George KC directed at her;

e. the Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed

at a male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate a vast number
of offensive tweets by numerous male barristers directed at her.

f. the Bar Standards Board took into account Dr Proudman’s ‘pursuit of the cause
of campaigning for women’s rights’ in deciding to refer her to a disciplinary
tribunal.

33. Dr Proudman relies on the barristers put forward in these sections as actual and/or
hypothetical comparators and/or evidential comparators. Dr Proudman was treated less
favourably than these individuals and/or than a male barrister in her position and/or
someone who did not hold or manifest her belief in feminisim would have been treated.
The less favourable treatment was because of her sex and/or her belief; this is apparent
from the starkly different treatment of Dr Proudman and these comparators. Dr
Proudman also relies on the evidence set out below, separately and in the round, as
evidence of discrimination.

(a) The Bar Standards Board decided not to investigate comments about HHJ Robert
Linford made by nine male barristers on twitter

34. The Bar Standards Board investigated comments about the case of Traharne v Limb
made by Dr Proudman on twitter and has referred her to a three-person disciplinary
tribunal. The Bar Standards Board alleges that the comments contained ‘seriously
offensive, derogatory language which was designed to demean and/or insult the judge’.

15
35. Following an initial assessment, the Bar Standards Board did not even investigate
comments about HHJ Robert Linford made by nine male barristers on twitter. These
barristers were not holding or manifesting a belief in feminism. Ms Allison Quinlan
made a complaint about the comments to the Bar Standards Board. Dr Proudman
understands (the Bar Standards Board can confirm) that the complaint was made on 5
December 2023. The Bar Standards Board decided not to investigate the nine male
barristers who were the subject of Ms Quinlan’s complaint.6

36. The nine male barristers who made the comments are7:
a. Mr Faisel Sadiq, Gatehouse Chambers;
b. Mr Michael Polak, Church Court Chambers;
c. Mr Benjamin Knight, Central Chambers Manchester;
d. Mr Gerard McDermott KC, Kings Chambers;
e. Mr James Norman (tweeting as ‘The Cat From Greece’8), 5 Paper Buildings;
f. Mr Simon Spence KC, Red Lion Chambers;
g. Mr Philip Sinclair, formerly Maidstone Chambers and now unregistered;
h. Mr Rajiv Sharma, 36 Group;
i. Mr Neil Baki, Millennium Chambers.

37. The nine male barristers commented on HHJ Robert Linford’s ‘unlawful conduct and
abuse of power’ and ‘astonishing and unlawful conduct’, and referred to his approach
to bail applications as ‘unfathomably stupid’, ‘particularly stupid’, ‘idiotic’, ‘pretty
bonkers’, ‘unlawful’ and ‘illegal’.

38. It is unfathomable that the Bar Standards Board should investigate, and bring charges,
in respect of Dr Proudman’s tweets about Traharne v Limb and yet decide not even to
investigate these extreme comments by male barristers about HHJ Robert Linford.

39. The tweets of the nine male barristers9 are set out below.

a. Mr Faisel Sadiq, Gatehouse Chambers

- ‘Hey Siri, please show me an example of unlawful conduct and abuse of power
by a holder of judicial office.’

- ‘I agree.
My apologies for not being clear.

6
Ms Quinlan also complained about a Michael Taylor, whom she believed to be a barrister, but the Bar Standards
Board did not consider this complaint as they could not trace a barrister corresponding to the description which
Ms Quinlan provided. Ms Quinlan did not receive a response to the complaint about Simon Spence KC and it
appears that the Bar Standards Board failed to register that complaint and did not therefore consider it. For the
purposes of these written submissions, it is assumed that the Bar Standards Board would have made the same
decision in relation to Mr Spence KC as it made in relation to the other eight male barristers had it considered Ms
Quinlan’s complaint about him: there is no reason to think that the decision would have been different.
7
Dr Proudman believes that these are the current chambers of the nine male barristers based on their respective
profiles on their chambers websites on 26 August 2024.
8
Dr Proudman has discovered the identity of this barrister through investigative journalists and other interested
parties (see page 41 of Dr Proudman’s Response). The Bar Standards Board has not suggested that this information
is incorrect or otherwise relied on the anonymous nature of the account as a basis for its decision in relation to
this male barrister.
9
Provided to the Bar Standards Board in screenshot form by Ms Quinlan.

16
 I am not proposing that Parliament censures judges/this judge.
I’ve seen some pretty bonkers “policies” that resident judges threatened to
impose – I think there is a public interest in Parliament looking into the resident
judge system.’

- ‘Judges are and have always been subject to oversight by Parliament. Puisne
Judges can only be removed on an address by both Houses of Parliament. If a
senior judge is abusing his power that seems to me ripe for consideration by the
House of Commons.’

- ‘Is this astonishing and unlawful conduct by His Honour Judge Robert Linford
something that the House of Commons Justice Select Committee can look into
@neill_bob?’

b. Mr Michael Polak, Church Court Chambers

- ‘Policy unlawful here…nice for him to set it out’

c. Mr Benjamin Knight, Central Chambers Manchester

- ‘“It is certainly not a case of defendants attending and finding witnesses have
shown up and so have pleaded.”
“There are other causes”
So, what are they? Spit it out, then!
What are they? Who are you accusing?
What is the evidence for your certainty?’

d. Mr Gerard McDermott KC, Kings Chambers

- ‘But this surely calls his judgment into question?’

e. Mr James Norman (tweeting as ‘The Cat From Greece’), 5 Paper Buildings

- ‘This is

(a) awful in itself; and

(b) unfathomably stupid.

Why, with a huge backlog, would any Judge want to encourage *more” trials?’

- ‘The system cannot work without pleas, late or otherwise, because it hasn’t got
the capacity to try anything like every case.

Anything that deliberately increased the number of trials is therefore idiotic.’

f. Mr Simon Spence KC, Red Lion Chambers

- ‘Quite extraordinary! Perhaps His Honour should remind himself of the terms
of the Bail Act!!’

17
 - ‘I don’t think pre-determining a bail application that hasn’t yet been made is
going to survive scrutiny.’

g. Mr Philip Sinclair, formerly Maidstone Chambers and now unregistered

- ‘Sadly, this isn’t a parody.

This is illegal (in that it is contrary to the Bail Act) & is also particularly
stupid.
Some people shouldn’t be made Judges.
And some good Judges forget their priorities after being made Resident.’

h. Mr Rajiv Sharma, 36 Group

- ‘It should be remarkable that a member of the Judiciary thinks that they can get
away with issuing such a policy. I imagine if the policy had been implemented
but not committed to writing, no-one would have known.’

i. Mr Neil Baki, Millennium Chambers

- ‘I’d be surprised if this is a lawful approach to bail. Defendants have a right to

plead not guilty and their penalty for doing so on day of trial is a reduction in
credit to 10%. The court can’t say they were perverting justice by exercising
their rights simply be their is’.

40. There is a direct contrast between the Bar Standards Board’s approach to Dr Proudman
and its approach to the nine male barristers listed above. Dr Proudman’s tweets were
investigated, and disciplinary action has been brought in respect of them, whereas the
tweets by the nine male barristers have not even been investigated.

41. In respect of each of the nine male barristers, the Bar Standards Board decided not to
investigate on the grounds that the tweets were not even a potential breach of the Code
of Conduct (see letters to Ms Quinlan):

‘I viewed the Twitter post as an expression of views in an area of much debate in the
court system, which may draw criticism from others. I concluded that the post did not
have the potential to diminish trust and confidence in the professional requirements of
the BSB Handbook…

I also considered the Twitter posts in the context of Mr [name’s] rights under Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to freedom of expression.’

42. This decision is in direct contrast to the Bar Standards Board’s decision in respect of
Dr Proudman. Why were Dr Proudman’s tweets not considered ‘an expression of views
in an area of much debate in the court system, which may draw criticism from others’?

43. It follows that the Bar Standards Board accorded Dr Proudman’s article 10 right to
freedom of expression less respect than it accorded to the male barristers’ article 10
right to freedom of expression.

18
44. Furthermore, where the Bar Standards Board has dismissed complaints about Dr
Proudman, the manner in which it has done so is in direct contrast to the manner in
which it dismissed complaints about the nine male barristers.

45. In the case of complaints about Dr Proudman, it made supportive comments to the
complainants which, considered objectively, encouraged them to make further
complaints about Dr Proudman and thereby exposed her to additional regulatory risk.
To take one example of a letter from the Bar Standards Board to a complainant dated
12 February 2024: ‘We acknowledge your concern…’, ‘Whilst it is appreciated that
some people may find Dr Proudman’s views controversial…’, ‘Although we are not
taking further action at this time, your information is important to us. Please be assured
that it has been kept on record’.

46. In its response to Ms Quinlan about the nine male barristers, there were no such
supportive comments. The Bar Standards Boards did not ‘acknowledge’ Ms Quinlan’s
concern. It did not indicate an appreciation that some people may find any of the male
barristers’ views about a senior judge ‘controversial’; nor did it assure Ms Quinlan that
her report would be ‘kept on record’.

Dr Proudman has been treated less favourably than the nine male barristers by the Bar
Standards Board in that (1) it investigated her comments and brought charges against
her but did not even investigate the comments of the nine male barristers; and (2) it
encouraged further complaints against her but not the male barristers. In the alternative,
Dr Proudman has been treated less favourably than a man or someone not holding or
manifesting a belief in feminism would have been treated and she relies on the manner
in which the Bar Standards Board has treated the nine male barristers listed above as
evidence in support of this.

(b) The Bar Standards Board did not refer male barrister Mr Jolyon Maugham KC to a
disciplinary tribunal in respect of comments he made about Mrs Justice Natalie
Lieven

47. The Bar Standards Board has brought charges against Dr Proudman in respect of
comments about the case of Traharne v Limb made on twitter. The Bar Standards Board
alleges that the comments contained ‘seriously offensive, derogatory language which
was designed to demean and/or insult the judge’.

48. The Bar Standards Board did not refer male barrister Mr Jolyon Maugham KC to a
disciplinary tribunal in respect of comments he made about Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven.
A complaint was made to the Bar Standards Board. Following an investigation, no
action was taken against Mr Maugham KC.

49. Given the nature of Mr Maugham KC’s comments about Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven, it
is incomprehensible that the Bar Standards Board has decided not to refer the matter in
respect of Mr Maugham KC to a disciplinary tribunal but has done so in the case of Dr
Proudman.

50. Mr Maugham KC’s comments about Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven KC, made in an article
published on a website, ‘The Wazzocks Review’, are set out below. Mrs Justice Natalie

19
 Lieven is one of the judges who heard the case of AB v The Tavistock and Portman
Foundation Trust and others (case no. CO/60/2020).

51. Mr Maugham KC’s comments about the judge were (Mr Maugham KC did not dispute
that he had made these comments):

‘And the judge who is believed to have written that judgment – a judge called Natalie
Lieven…doesn’t come from that background.

She is simultaneously a hero amongst the Good Law Project’s overwhelmingly female
staff team for the work that she’s done as a judge protecting the right to an abortion.
And now, a sort of fallen hero for what we all regard as the work she’s done to roll back
trans right, to empower transphobia and transphobes in domestic public discourse. She
comes from a very particular place, and I don’t know whether this is mirrored around
the world, but in England there is a very, very dominant…strand of feminism. Not
dominant numerically but dominant because it’s a feminism of privilege that is deeply
opposed to trans rights. And that demographic is the demographic that she fits perfectly
in. I’m not saying she’s a transphobe. I’m just saying that she is in that demographic’.

52. There is a direct contrast between the Bar Standards Board’s approach to Dr Proudman
and its approach to Mr Maugham KC.

53. The Bar Standards Board has alleged that Dr Proudman’s tweets about Traharne v Limb
were ‘without a sound factual basis and contained seriously offensive, derogatory
language which was designed to demean and/or insult the judge’. Dr Proudman denies
this characterisation of the tweets. But this is the Bar Standards Board’s allegation, and
that being so, how can this not be said, with equal force, against Mr Maugham KC in
respect of his comments about Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven? Mr Maugham KC has called
the judge ‘a sort of fallen hero’ and says that she has done work to roll back trans rights,
and to empower transphobia and transphobes in public discourse. He then asserts that
she belongs to a strand of feminism which is deeply opposed to trans rights.

54. In respect of Mr Maugham KC, the Bar Standards Board concluded as follows (see
letter dated 26 January 2022 to Mr Maugham KC):

‘You accepted that you had made the comments and you set out your explanation as to
why you made those comments. The Panel finds that you did make the comments about
Mrs Justice Natalie Lieven QC. The Panel bore in mind the provisions of Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
incorporated into the law of England and Wales by the provisions of the Human Rights
Act 1998, and the importance of people to be able to express views on controversial
topics, including reasoned criticisms of public judgments, without fear of punishment.
The Panel decided that the comments, whatever the merits of the reasoning or
conclusion, represented your sincerely held view and did not amount to gratuitous
abuse. For these reasons, the Panel was satisfied that you were entitled to make those
comments and therefore the conduct alleged and admitted did not amount to a breach
of Core Duy 5.

However, the Panel expresses no view as to the merits of your comments’.

20
55. Dr Proudman’s tweets represented her ‘sincerely held view’ and ‘did not amount to
gratuitous abuse’. Why, bearing in mind the provisions of article 10 and ‘the
importance of people to be able to express views on controversial topics, including
reasoning criticisms of public judgments, without fear of punishment’ did the Bar
Standards Board not consider that Dr Proudman’s tweets, ‘whatever the merits of the
reasoning or conclusion, represented [her] sincerely held view and did not amount to
gratuitous abuse’? The same reasoning applied in the case of Mr Maugham KC applies
squarely in the case of Dr Proudman.

56. It follows that the Bar Standards Board accorded Dr Proudman’s article 10 right to
freedom of expression less respect than it accorded to the article 10 right to freedom of
expression of Mr Maugham KC, a male barrister.

57. If the Bar Standards Board attempts to argue that the Independent Decision-Making
Panel is independent of it and that this is a relevant factor, this is unsustainable:

a. The Panel is not independent in any real sense of the word. It exercises decision-
making functions on behalf of the Bar Standards Board and its members are
appointed and trained by the Bar Standards Board.

b. Further and in any event, the Bar Standards Board is responsible under the
Equality Act 2010 for the decisions made by the Independent Decision-Making
Panel.

58. The Bar Standards Board has treated Dr Proudman less favourably than Mr Maugham
KC, a male barrister, in bringing charges against her but not him. In the alternative, she
has been treated less favourably than a man or someone not holding or manifesting a
belief in feminism would have been treated and she relies on the manner in which the
Bar Standards Boards has treated Mr Maugham KC as evidence in support of this.

(c) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at a
male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr Marshall
KC directed at Dr Proudman

59. Originally, the Bar Standards Board investigated other tweets sent by Dr Proudman in
March 2022. They were said to be ‘directed at a fellow member of the bar [Mr Philip
Marshall KC], and were seriously offensive, gender-based, derogatory comments,
designed to demean and/or insult.’ The allegation has since been withdrawn. It is
unclear why the Bar Standards Board ever alleged that Dr Proudman’s tweets were
‘gender-based’.

60. It is striking that the Bar Standards Board decided to investigate the tweets sent by Dr
Proudman allegedly directed at Mr Marshall KC but did not – despite seeing an
abundance of offensive tweets by Mr Marshall KC about Dr Proudman – take any action
whatsoever in respect of Mr Marshall KC. Dr Proudman relies upon this as evidence of
the Bar Standards’ Board’s less favourable treatment of her because of her sex and/or
belief.

61. On 3 January 2022, Mr Marshall KC had tweeted about Dr Proudman.

21
- On 3 January 2022, Mr Marshall KC tweeted as follows, in reply to a tweet by Dr
Proudman:
‘The answer to your question is probably the many other totally dedicated specialist
barristers who just quietly get on with their job representing highly vulnerable and
needful clients, day in day out, year after year, without much financial reward or
publicity or attention.’

- Dr Proudman then blocked Mr Marshall KC.

- Other barristers then interacted with Mr Marshall on twitter, in public, making

offensive comments about Dr Proudman, including:

- Mr Fabian Krougman, Lamb Buildings, retweeted the post.

- Mr Colm Nugent, Gatehouse Chambers, replied to Mr Marshall KC:

‘I think Charlotte has perhaps confused being a barrister, with being Spider-
Man.’

- Mr Ben Edwards, Crucible Law, replied to Mr Marshall KC:

‘What you have said it extremely unfair to so many barristers who work
tirelessly for their clients. A sweeping generalisation with no support to it. Dr
Proudman should correct you.’

- Mr Simon Myerson KC, Bryom Street Chambers, replied to Mr Marshall KC:

‘Aren’t you a leading member of the patriarchy against which St Charlotte is
single handedly waging a struggle for good by attacking other barristers and
offering inexpert views in national radio?’

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘I used to be the chair of @FamilyLawBar so who knows [shrug emoji]’

- Mr Myerson KC replied to Mr Marshall KC:

‘I’m sure she had a constant stream of ideas calculated to improve the position
of clients and regularly communicated them to do to ensure that something was
achieved.
After all, there’s no way she’d just whine on social media but do nothing.’

- Mr James Turner KC, 1KBW, replied:

‘Congratulations on the recognition given to you by the blocking Phillip.’

- Mr Marshall KC also received responses from members of the public (e.g. ‘It’s quite
an achievement, at so young an age, to have got her hubristic head jammed so far
up her own fundament’, ‘“Proudman is unique” that I think we can all agree’). He
did not attempt to call a halt to any of the tweeting by his followers.

- Approximately one hour after his initial posts, Mr Marshall tweeted:

‘I’ve deleted my screen shot of Dr Proudman’s tweet as she has now deleted it.
Although I’ve now been blocked by her, in fairness to her, if she has reflected on her
tweet and thought better of it, I don’t intend to publicise it further’.

22
- He also tweeted:
‘And I am happy to report I am now no longer blocked. For which I am grateful.’

- In fact, Mr Marshall KC remained blocked throughout.

- A member of the public tweeted:

‘3 act play.’

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘It seems like it’

- A member of the public replied, sending a photograph with the caption ‘flowers for
you’.

- Mr Marshall replied with a smiling emoji.

- One member of the public, tweeting as ‘Misandry Examples’, criticised Dr

Proudman’s removal of the post, another said ‘You were right to call it out’ and
another posted a photograph of someone eating a bucket of popcorn.

- An anonymous barrister tweeted:

‘What have I missed’ with a meme of a man wearing a wig, eating popcorn.

- Mr Marshall then tweeted:

‘Nope, I’m blocked again [shrug emoji, shrug emoji]

*forgive me if I too can’t keep up…’.

- Mr Lister, a solicitor who called Dr Proudman a ‘narcissist’ in March 2022, replied:

‘Be proud. Be a Proud Man. Be Proudman.’

- Mr Marshall KC replied to the solicitor:

‘I’m mystified. Blocked, unblocked, blocked again [shrug emoji]

- A member of the public suggested that Dr Proudman was trying to test the water.

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘possibly’

- Mr Turner KC replied:
‘Is this what is known as a ‘blockchain’? [thinking emoji]

- A member of the picture tweeted a photograph of the detective character Angela

Lansbury from the television programme, ‘Murder She Wrote’.

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘I’m exhausted’

- A member of the public replied:

‘PTSD Philip’ followed by a laughing emoji.

23
 - Mr Ben Edwards, Crucible Chambers replied:
‘Ha! What were you blocked for now?! It’s crazy!’

- To which Mr Marshall KC replied:

‘I have absolutely no idea’

- Mr Ben Edwards replied:

‘It’s ridiculous.’

- Mr David Marusza, Harcourt Chambers, belittled the blocking, tweeting:

‘Sorry, I’ve been neglecting your tweets – who has done this and was it because of
the socks?’

- Mr Marshall KC replied, posting a picture of his socks:

‘Not because of the socks. That really would alarm me.’ With a photograph of shoe
and socks pulled up.

- Mr Myerson KC replied:
‘It’s like the Hokey Cokey.
Do you have to shake it all about now?’

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘I hesitate to think’

- Mr Myserson KC replied:
‘Wise. Considered. Sensible. Reflective.’

- Members of the public replied, one calling Dr Proudman ‘weird’, another sending
an image of children’s characters performing the Hokey Cokey, to which someone
replied, ‘This is worse than the Hokey-Kokey!’, followed by, ‘do the Hoke Coky’
with a laughing emoji.

- Someone sent a hidden tweet and Mr Marshall KC replied:

‘At least at the moment’

- Another hidden tweet was sent and Mr Marshall replied with a winking emoji.

- A member of the public tweeted:

‘Watching this has made my day [laughing emoji laughing emoji]’

- Mr Meir Cohen, a solicitor, replied to Mr Marshall KC, referring to Dr Proudman

as ‘the Proudman’, and posting Dr Proudman’s legal aid fees, commenting on the
gender split of her client base and writing ‘puzzled’.

62. Mr Marshall KC has remained blocked by Dr Proudman from 3 January 2022 up to the
present day.

63. The tweets which were investigated by the Bar Standards Board were, in context, as
follows.

24
- On 2 March 2022, Dr Proudman sent a tweet setting out her concerns about the
treatment of matrimonial domestic abuse in the family courts. It was not sent to Mr
Marshall KC, nor was it about him. Dr Proudman had blocked Mr Marshall KC,
who tweets under the name ‘pjm1kbw’, some time prior to 2 March 2022. She did
not know that ‘pjm1kbw’ was Mr Marshall KC.

- Dr Proudman’s tweet said:

‘If I hear one more time that a shove, a slap, screaming in her face is just part and
parcel of matrimonial life, I may actually scream. If this is true, never ever get
married. But it’s not true. It’s a myth peddled by perpetrators & the courts to
undermine the gravity of abuse.’

- She then added:

‘Abuse in marriage is definitely not normal. So why is it normalised?’

- On 3 March 2022, despite being blocked since 3 January 2022, Mr Marshall KC

posted a screenshot of the first of Dr Proudman’s tweets and tweeted as follows,
publicly belittling and dismissing Dr Proudman’s views:
‘In 32 years of practicing in the family courts I have never (ever) heard any court
or judge say or even suggest this’.

- At some point, Dr Proudman became aware that Mr Marshall KC had been posting
about her tweet.

- She tweeted:
‘In 32 years I have no idea where you’ve been. It’s surprising that a family law
barrister has not bothered to read the MOJ Harm Report or H-N and others or
every single successfully appealed domestic abuse & rape case. This is gaslighting
and I won’t stand for it.’

- One of her followers had posted comments supportive of Dr Proudman in response

to Mr Marshall KC’s tweet. Dr Proudman replied to her:
‘I have no idea where he’s been for 32 years. I wouldn’t fancy my chances as his
client’.

- Dr Proudman then sent several tweets, setting out detailed evidence in support of
her original tweet on 2 March 2022 (see the appendix).

- Mr Neil Baki, Millennium Chambers, tweeted Mr Marshall KC:

‘Proudman’s response to your tweet is impudent.’

- Mr Marshall KC sought a copy of the message, even though Dr Proudman had

blocked him. Mr Marshall KC replied to Mr Baki:
‘I’m blocked so can’t see it.
Can you screen save for me please.’
Followed by, ‘Thanks: I found it’ with a thumbs up emoji.

- Mr Marshall KC then tweeted, posting a screenshot of the message.

25
 ‘I have no idea where he’s been for 32 years. I wouldn’t fancy my chances as his
client’.

- He did not post screenshots of the rest of Dr Proudman’s tweets setting out detailed
evidence in support of her original tweet on 2 March 2022.

- Instead, he tweeted:
‘Others will form their own opinion as to whether this is an appropriate response.
In fact, I spent my first 15 years at the Bar doing precisely the same kind of work as
Dr Proudman. But the fact she has blocked me and chooses to reply in this manner
probably speaks volumes.’

- In reply to a member of the public, who replied to Mr Marshall KC, ‘So because
this hasn’t happened in your experience it hasn’t happened at all? How many family
court judgments do you read?’, he tweeted:
‘I didn’t say that and I don’t know why you would suggest that I did. I said I have
never encountered any judge ‘peddling a myth’ to undermine the gravity of domestic
violence. In my experience judges rightly take allegations of domestic violence
extremely seriously. 1/2’

‘As a past Chair of @FamilyLawBar I spent first 15 years of my practice

representing legally aided and pro bono clients in domestic violence and child care
cases. Of course judges get it wrong sometimes. But no judge ‘peddles a myth’
seeking to reduce the gravity of DV allegations’

- In reply to a different member of the public, Mr Marshall KC tweeted:

‘I was blocked sometime ago. It’s a free world. She is free to block me if she wishes.
But that’s not an excuse for rudeness or a lack of curtesy. Less less for questioning
my professional ability. That just seemed gratuitously offensive. At least in my
opinion.’

- In reply to a member of the public, who replied to Mr Marshall KC, ‘Unless you &
Dr Proudman have been working on the same cases, I’m not sure what point you’re
trying to make here. If you have a problem with something she was Tweeting it might
have been better, and more professional, to contact her privately about it.’, he
tweeted:
‘Twitter is a public platform. I note your suggestion that I have behaved
unprofessionally. I respectfully disagree.’

- Mr Marshall KC tweeted about Dr Proudman again, for no apparent reason,

approximately three months later, on 29 May 2022. The original tweet has been
deleted. He had sought information, to which Mr Greg Callus (a barrister) replied,
‘Oh there have been some. Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17 was ex-husband
suing wife over allegation of strangulation. Lachaux [2019] UKSC was ex-husband
suing newspapers that published ex-wife’s allegations of DV. Also alleged abuse:
Reay v Beaumont [2018] EWHC 2172 (QB).’

- Mr Marshall KC replied:
‘Thank you that’s helpful. Is this a common phenomenon (Dr Proudman suggests
she see many)?’

26
64. The Bar Standards Board’s decision to investigate the 2 and 3 March 2022 tweets by
Dr Proudman ‘directed at’ Mr Marshall KC is in direct contrast to its decision not to
investigate the tweets by Mr Marshall KC directed at Dr Proudman. The tweets by Mr
Marshall KC, in the form of initial tweets and/or replies to other tweets, were seriously
offensive, derogatory comments, designed to demean and/or insult Dr Proudman. Mr
Marshall KC was the aggressor. He started the whole interaction, he sought out copies
of her tweets, he made unpleasant, snide, jeering comments about her and carried on
during the course of 3 March 2023. Through his interactions he encouraged similar
comments from his followers.

65. The inference is clear: If a woman makes comments directed at a man, they will be
investigated. If a man makes comments directed at a woman, they will not be
investigated. It is ‘fair game’. Further, these men were not manifesting feminist beliefs.

66. Dr Proudman has been treated less favourably than Mr Marshall KC by the Bar
Standards Board by its decision to investigate and bring charges against her but not
even to investigate the comments made by Mr Marshall KC. In the alternative, Dr
Proudman has been treated less favourably than a man would have been treated or
someone not holding or manifesting feminist beliefs and she relies on the manner in
which the Bar Standards Boards has treated Mr Marshall KC as evidence in support of
this.

(d) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at a
male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate tweets by Mr Mark
George KC directed at her

67. As above, the Bar Standards Board decided to investigate Dr Proudman’s tweets
allegedly directed at Mr Marshall KC.

68. This decision is in direct contrast to its decision in respect of a tweet by Mr Mark George
KC, formerly of Garden Court Chambers,10 which was directed at Dr Proudman. Dr
Proudman relies upon this as evidence of the Bar Standards’ Board’s less favourable
treatment of her because of her sex and/or her belief.

69. Mr George KC posted an offensive reply to Dr Proudman in response to a tweet by her.

Dr Proudman complained about the tweet to the Bar Standards Board. The Bar
Standards Board took no action whatsoever. It did not even investigate it.

70. The offensive reply was in response to the following tweet by Dr Proudman on 4 March
2022:
‘Why do 40% of women withdraw from rape cases? Why is rape becoming
decriminalised?

Going to “court was said to be more traumatic than the rape and led some to wish they
had never reported the incidents”.

10
Sadly, Mr George KC died on 20 December 2022. No disrespect is intended to Mr George KC or his family or
former colleagues by the references to him in these submissions.

27
 “In court, brutal cross-examination were common.”
telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/02/2….’

71. The tweet included a link to a Telegraph article by the Home Affairs Editor, entitled,
‘Rape victims ‘more traumatised by inadequate trials’ than original attack’. It reported
that, according to a joint investigation report by the police and the CPS, ‘more than 40
per cent of victims were withdrawing from [rape] cases amid inadequate support from
police and prosecutors, courts delays on average of 706 days from offence to trial, and
“overwhelmingly negative” experiences of court’. It said that, ‘[i]n court, brutal cross-
examinations were common.’ Court was said to be ‘more traumatic than the rape in
some cases and led some to wish they had never reported the incidents.’

72. In response to Dr Proudman’s tweet about the article, which directly quoted the article
and linked to it, Mr George KC tweeted on 4 March 2022:

“This is irresponsible. Nothing is more likely to put off complainants than a lawyer
spouting false nonsense about the court experience. If brutal xx ever existed it was many
years ago and simply isn’t allowed by judges today. Dr P doesn’t do criminal cases, I
do.”

73. Dr Proudman made a complaint to the Bar Standards Board about Mr George KC’s
tweet on 20 March 2022. The Bar Standards Board concluded as follows (see letter
dated 16 September 2022 to Dr Proudman, the complainant):

‘… The decision made… was that there was no breach….

It may help if I explain that for the purpose of our assessment, it was accepted that your
comments on the matter were true and therefore appropriate weight was given to them.
It was further accepted for the purposes of the assessment, that Mr George KC was
referring to you personally, as opposed to The Telegraph article in his tweet. The BSB’s
Social Media Guidance was considered and taken account of.

However, as part of the assessment process, we then have to consider whether Mr

George KC’s statement to the effect that it was “false nonsense” implies that you were
lying. Having considered the content of Mr George’s post and your own comments on
the matter, we do not consider that the use of “false” necessarily equates to lying and/or
“knowingly false”.

We also consider that there is no evidence to suggest that Mr George KC did not
genuinely hold the belief that the comments were not true.’

74. Why has the Bar Standards Board concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that
Mr George KC did not genuinely hold the belief that his comments were true, even in
the face of the link to the article in The Telegraph which shows his comments were
wholly misplaced, but has not reached the same conclusion about Dr Proudman? She
genuinely held the beliefs expressed in her tweets, and at the point where the Bar
Standards Board decided to investigate her tweets, there was no evidence to suggest
that she did not.

28
75. It follows that the Bar Standards Board accorded Dr Proudman’s article 10 right to
freedom of expression less respect than it accorded to the article 10 right to freedom of
expression of Mr George KC, a male barrister.

76. Again, the Bar Standards Board has treated Dr Proudman less favourably than a man
or someone not holding or manifesting feminist beliefs. In the alternative, she has been
treated less favourably than a man or someone not holding or manifesting feminist
beliefs would have been treated and she relies on the manner in which the Bar Standards
Boards has treated Mr George KC as evidence in support of this.

(e) The Bar Standards Board investigated Dr Proudman’s tweets allegedly directed at a
male barrister, Mr Philip Marshall KC, but did not investigate a vast number of
offensive tweets by numerous male barristers directed at her

77. As above, the Bar Standards Board decided to investigate Dr Proudman’s tweets
allegedly directed at Mr Marshall KC.

78. The Bar Standards Board’s decision to investigate those tweets is in direct contrast to
its decision not to investigate numerous tweets by numerous barristers directed at Dr
Proudman11.

79. The tweets by barristers directed at Dr Proudman included, by way of a single example,
a barrister (Mr Philip Sinclair) calling Dr Proudman a ‘cunt’.

80. In context, Mr Sinclair’s comment about Dr Proudman was seriously offensive and
derogatory.

81. Further and in any event, it is difficult to understand how one barrister calling another
a ‘cunt’ publicly on social media is not conduct which is ‘likely to diminish public trust
and/or confidence in you or the profession’ (the allegation against Dr Proudman).

82. A number of examples of tweets about Dr Proudman by the following male barristers
are set out below.
a. Mr Daniel Sawyer, 3 Paper Buildings (tweeting as ‘Yet Another Tweeting
Barrister’)
b. Mr James Norman (tweeting as ‘The Cat From Greece’), 5 Paper Buildings
c. Mr Damian Warburton (tweeting as ‘Reluctantly Anonymous), Libertas
Chambers
d. Mr Andrew Fitch-Holland, 187 Fleet Street
e. Mr Philip Sinclair, formerly Maidstone Chambers and now unregistered
f. Mr Neil Baki, Millennium Chambers
g. Mr Matthew Scott, Pump Court Chambers

11
All of these tweets are set out in Dr Proudman’s Response dated 20 October 2022 and/or in evidence she sent
to the Bar Standards Board on 16 November 2022, 1 February 2023, 29 March 2023 and 20 September 2023.
Some accounts are anonymous or pseudonymous; Dr Proudman has discovered the identities of the posters
through investigative journalists and other interested parties (see page 41 of Dr Proudman’s Response). Dr
Proudman believes that these are the correct identities, based on her own research and information provided to
her from journalists, and that, if they are not the correct identities, the information provided to the Bar Standards
Board was that those tweets were by male barristers, and Dr Proudman relies on them in the alternative as
hypothetical comparators.

29
 h. Mr Carl Kingsley, barrister at Kingsley Brookes Solicitors
i. Mr John Vater KC, Harcourt Chambers
j. Mr Jerry Hayes, Goldsmith Chambers
k. Mr Tony Wyatt (tweeting as Tony Kent), barrister at Ewing Law
l. Mr James Vine, now retired and unregistered
m. Mr Simon Myerson KC, St Pauls Chambers
n. Mr John Richards, Kenworthy’s Barristers
o. Mr Richard Huw Jones, 4BB
p. Mr Edward Levey KC, Fountain Court
q. Mr Henry Dickson, 25 Bedford Row
r. Mr Michael Polak, Church Court Chambers
s. Mr Fabian Krougman, Lamb Buildings
t. Mr Colm Nugent, Gatehouse Chambers
u. Mr Ben Edwards, Crucible Law
v. Mr James Turner KC, 1KBW
w. Mr David Marusza, Harcourt Chambers
x. Mr Faisel Sadiq, Gatehouse Chambers
y. Mr Graham King, barrister at Lakeland Law
z. Adam Lewis, Kenworthy’s Chambers
aa. Imran Mahmood, 5 Pump Court
bb. Chris Elderwood, Park Square Chambers

83. These barristers have tweeted about Dr Proudman together on twitter, replying to each
other’s tweets. Their comments have provoked replies from followers, which are also
offensive, directed at Dr Proudman. Being ‘blocked’ by Dr Proudman has been
conveyed to others as a badge of honour and a source of mirth. Her title, ‘Dr’, has often
been omitted. Her name (‘Proudman’) has frequently been ridiculed.

a. Mr Daniel Sawyer, 3 Paper Buildings (tweeting as ‘Yet Another Tweeting

Barrister’)

Mr Sawyer was one of the two complainants to the Bar Standards Board in this
matter.

He tweeted about Dr Proudman:

- ‘I assume that Dr Proudman is referring here till12 the Family Court, in which
she has experience. If she is in any way referring to the Crown Court, of which
she has no experience, then she is utterly wrong.

As ever, please do not let this falsehood put you off reporting crime.’

- ‘As @BarristerRF points out in a reply comment, Dr Proudman knows nothing

of the criminal courts and therefore seems ignorant of the fact that juries are
told very clearly and at length that there is no typical rapist or rape victim and
no typical response to abuse or assault.’

12
Assumed to be a typographical error (should say ‘to’ rather than ‘till’).

30
- ‘If anybody reading this is a victim of abuse and is wondering how the criminal
justice system works, please please ignore anything that this person tweets. She
may be a very fine family practitioner for all I know but she knows nothing about
the criminal courts.’

- ‘This is not to say that the criminal justice system is perfect or that going
through it as a victim is easy but it is nothing like the way Dr Proudman
sometimes seems to think.’

- ‘I don’t for a moment think that judges in the Family Court do think that way!’

- ‘A well known family barrister with a penchant for making grossly misleading
claims about the criminal courts (where she has never practised) has put out
another offering. Like the rest of the legal profession who have the slightest idea
what they are talking about, I disagree.’

- ‘Let us trot quickly past the more flagrantly obvious parts: if there is a trial
going on then the parties at that point at “complainant” and “defendant”, not
“victim” and “abuser”. The poster knows this. The average GCSE student
knows this.’

- ‘Imagine the outrage if a jury were prevented from seeing a defendant nodding
and grinning while his offence was recounted. It doesn’t happen often but I
suspect that the barrister posting this nonsense would be scandalised if her idea
were put into practice.’

- ‘Allow me to conclude in the words of what I think is a popular song, but might
be something else: the criminal justice system has at least 99 problems but the
fact that rape complainants can choose to be screened from the defendant ain’t
one.’

- Note that that original lyric is: ‘I got 99 problems but a bitch aint one’. Mr
Sawyer’s followers understood him to be referring to Dr Proudman as a bitch.

- ‘I have just had a message telling me that in the original version, the thing that
ain’t a problem is “a bitch”.

I didn’t know that (I’m still only half sure it’s a song). I’ve only ever seen it in
joking adapted versions.

I want to make it clear that that was not my intention.’

- ‘I understand that some people are criticising this person in a personal way.
I’ve certainly seen one person denigrating her university and another her
doctorate.

I criticise only the things she posts, and I had not idea that the joking song (?)
reference could be taken that way.’

31
- ‘I utterly reject any personal attack on Dr P, any childish insults and any attack
on her university or qualifications.

Keep it clean, please.’

- In reply to a member of the public asking, ‘Is there a barristers’ version of the
SRA?’, Mr Sawyer said, ‘Yes, the Bar Standards Board.’ A member of the public
asked Mr Sawyer, ‘Has she been reported to the bar yet?’ and another said,
‘About time her chambers and @barstandards reigned her in.’

- ‘If I’m talking or writing about a case in which I was a led junior (i.e. there was
a senior barrister or QC running the case while I helped), I am always very
keen to point that fact out, rather than simply saying that I prosecuted X case or
defended Mr Y

Is that just me?’

- He then engaged with Mr Edward Levy KC, making it clear that this comment
was directed at Dr Proudman.

- He then engaged with Mr Roddy Dunlop KC, who wrote:

‘Watching this from afar, but as a Member of both the Bars of Scotland and of
E&W, this debacle concerns me. On the one hand, I see the concerns at the
misinformation. On the other, I agree it is “sub-optimal” for colleagues to be
fighting so publicly.has anyone/

/spoken to her chambers or tried to introduce an intermediary? When I step over

the line on here, I usually get a quiet word from a colleague and that does the
trick…’.

- Mr Sawyer replied:

‘Somebody has certainly suggested previously that somebody have a word with
Head of Chambers. I forget the exact wording but Dr P made it quite clear that
this would have no effect.’

- ‘Like most lawyers, I was long ago blocked by Dr Proudman, after pointing out
one of her more egregious misstatements. I suspect SB [the Secret Barrister] is
the same.

But yes, she does tend to use “I represented” when led. Technically she’s right
but I think most of us would mention being the junior.’

- Mr Sawyer liked a tweet by Mr Richard Huw Jones suggesting that Dr

Proudman stay off Twitter.

32
b. Mr James Norman (tweeting as ‘The Cat From Greece’), 5 Paper Buildings

- ‘Hopefully someone will complain in a way that sticks and she can at least stop
embarrassing the profession as well as herself.’

- ‘She is [a barrister], and I think that [the governing body intervening] would
be an excellent development.’

- ‘You can tell [it isn’t true], because she said it.’

- ‘This is, for the avoidance of doubt, absolute bullshit.’

- ‘No, you seem to have a firm grip on this particular ornament of our profession.’

- ‘Tell me your concern for victims of sexual violence comes a distant second to
raising your personal media profile without etc etc’

- ‘I remain unblocked. What am I doing wrong?’ and ‘And yet I am unblocked!

The injustice!’

- ‘But does not include me [as unblocked], which I’m inclined to take personally.’

- Mr Norman liked a tweet by Mr Richard Huw Jones suggesting that Dr

Proudman stay off Twitter.

- ‘It takes a particularly monstrous ego to think that, ‘Do you know who I *am*?
makes you anything other than an insufferable wanker.

Repellent person.’

- By way of context, Mr Norman posts nasty tweets about women (e.g. ‘She’s still
a dick, mind’ and ‘And if I thought that was genuinely her motivation, I wouldn’t
find her so revolting.’)

c. Mr Damian Warburton (tweeting as ‘Reluctantly Anonymous), Libertas Chambers

- Against a photograph of members of Goldsmith Chambers posted by Goldsmith

Chambers:
‘No @DrProudman though?
And I thought she loved a good protest. Or were there just so many people at
the Bailey that she couldn’t be sure she’d be the centre of attention?’

- When Dr Proudman objected to the use of the word ‘cunt’ by someone:

‘Seriously, @barstandards how much more of this intolerable individual do we
have to tolerate?’

- ‘When you’re screaming into the wind on a stormy night, how long does it take
for people in white coats to come and escort you back to your padded room?’

- Against a photograph of Dr Proudman and two friends:

33
 ‘Do you three sit there sniping at every man who happened to walk past:
“bet he’s a rapist; him too, rapist; definitely a rapist. Look, eyes too close
together; must be a rapist. He’s got his mum with him, what a weirdo. There’s
one holding a child’s hand. Probably a peadophile”?’

- With reference to one of his trials, ‘58 year old man of good character with
reputation intact’, he tagged Dr Proudman:
‘The allegations were sexual assault, not rape, but it is a shame that
@DrProudman did not see this trial run its course…’

- Commenting on one of Dr Proudman’s tweets:

‘@barstandards it really is long overdue for you to do something about the
dangerous @DrProudman. @GoldsmithChambers, you too.’

- ‘It might be thought that @DrProudman should remember that the Bar is a very
small place.’

- ‘Proudman bangs on as if she’s just thought of it. It’s only been the law for like,
oooh 22 years or so.’

- ‘Not in Proudman’s world [i.e. innocent until proven guilty]. All men are rapists
until they die without having raped anyone. Ditto wife-beaters.’

- ‘ME ME ME’

- ‘Such an unfortunate coincidence that it just happened to be a case of massively

high profile getting huge media coverage at the moment. No connection there
at all, I am sure.’

d. Mr Andrew Fitch-Holland, 187 Fleet Street

- In response to Dr Proudman appearing on ‘Woman’s Hour’:

‘why have you invited a barrister who does not practice in defamation here or
in the US to discuss Depp v Heard? When it comes to offences against women
& girls Dr P consistently misrepresents what takes place in our criminal courts
( an area in which she does not practice)’

- ‘I’d respond directly but La Proudman blocks any dissent from her World
view… Yet more narcissistic nonsense.’13

- ‘Good job GFB* changed her name from Bailye then, otherwise this little
declamation wouldn’t really work…..’

*”glam feminist barrister “ per instagram & other profiles.”’

- ‘It’s not her real surname. She adopted it supposedly to honour her
grandmother. Her surname at birth was Bailye or some such.’

13
Bold type in the original.

34
 - ‘She blocks all those who challenge her and thus lives in an echo chamber of
adoration…’

- ‘This is simply irresponsible. Rape is not “becoming decriminalised”. Cross

examination in rape cases is rightly controlled by experienced Judges. Yet
another tweet which merely serves to frighten complainants & perpetuates
myths about the trial process.’

- ‘Blocked years ago! Badge of honour in my book.’

e. Mr Philip Sinclair, formerly Maidstone Chambers and now unregistered

- ‘This is, in fact, a qualified person correcting your ignorance.’

- ‘[Regarding her name:] I bet she can’t wait to get married.’

- ‘The three certainties of life.

Death.
Taxed.
And being blocked by Jolyon ‘Good Law’ Maughan QC & Dr Charlotte
‘Clickbait’ Proudman.’

- ‘Dr Proudman is the equivalent of the worst, fat, chauvinist bloke down the
pub.’

- ‘Arghhh..
The BBC is interviewing Clickbait Charlotte (Proudman).’

- ‘A self-publicist.’

- ‘I call her ‘Clickbait’ Charlotte because she Tweets to provoke, but never seems
to respond to challenges or engage in debate. Also it is (sort of) alternative.’

- ‘What is Proudman on?

If you want to be a shock jock, apply to a radio station.
If you want to be a barrister, stop being a cunt.’

- ‘These self-publicising social media lawyers (Maugham, Proudman & Wilson)

love to dish it out. Can’t take it though.

- ‘Clickbait Charlotte. A certifiable idiot who gets off on Tweeting provocative

shite.’

- Mr Sinclair posted a laughing emoji in response to a nasty tweet from a member

of the public:
‘She must be great fun at a party.
“Can I take your coat Charlotte?”
“Stop trying to undress me!!”
“Ok, can I get you a drink then?”
“Are you saying I’m not capable of pouring my own drink?”

35
 “Ok ok – get your own drink”
“Oh that’s right – send the woman to the kitchen”
[Facepalm emoji, facepalm emoji, facepalm emoji]’

- ‘I’d love to ask Dr Proudman how she thinks these ‘actions [of a rapist] are
partially excused’, but I can’t. Because she’s blocked me for asking something
else. Don’t ask, don’t get (blocked).’

- ‘She’s at it again. Carefully worded, of course. But the implication is that the
police don’t act where the crime is in a ‘domestic’ setting. This is dishonest.
Please, victims of domestic abuse, do not be fooled and discouraged by this
deliberately misleading Tweet.’

- ‘Nope. She has never engaged with me. I have politely questioned / challenged
her on several occasions. I’ve only ever seen her respond to women or praise.’

- Mr Sinclair liked a tweet by Mr Richard Huw Jones suggesting that Dr

Proudman stay off Twitter.

- ‘It’s time she was taken down, I’m afraid.’

- In reply to the question, ‘What is her doctorate in?’: ‘Idiocy.’

f. Mr Neil Baki, Millennium Chambers

- ‘Proudman’s response to your tweet is impudent.’

- ‘She is trying to achieve something. Promotion of self.’

- ‘So, it’s finally happened…’ with an image showing that Dr Proudman had
blocked him.

- ‘I truly despair at Proudman’s tweets. She must know what she is doing is
gaslighting. What law has failed VG [Virginia Giuffre]? What law has failed to
keep [Prince] Andrew accountable? It rather sounds like Proudman is
disappointed there was no sensationalist public trial to satisfy her own
gratification.’

- ‘I drawn to the conclusion Proudman is truly ignorant, blinded by ideology or

cynically spinning this story for her own brand’

- ‘It shouldn’t. What a shame Dr P has to be constantly corrected’

- ‘Sadly, another set of highly misleading tweets from Dr Proudman, that either
she knows are misleading or her lack of knowledge demonstrates her ignorance.
This was a civil claim for damages ie monetary compensation, NOT a criminal
prosecution.’

- ‘To suggest “if there had been a civil trial” is misleading when Proudman must
know Giuffre settled the New York claim and then to link that to the UK

36
 investigation, claiming “no justice” is gaslighting of the worse kind. Justice has
been served bc Giuffre got what she claimed= [money emoji]’

- ‘Indeed. A very bizarre set of tweets’

- ‘She’s the new “blocked by Jolyon” meme. “Block by Proudman” will widely
be seen as a rite of passage for all sensible people’

- ‘I don’t think mentioning “civil” trial absolves Proudman of the misleading

nature of what is said in her tweets.’

- ‘Proudman has a regrettable history of misleading tweets.’

- ‘Proudman’s tweet is offensive’

- ‘Proudman has set up a straw man for click bait.’

- ‘… What I’m not prepared to do is mislead like Proudman.’

- ‘No offence, but it rather sounds like your following a cult. Proudman isn’t my
Dear Leader I’m afraid’

- ‘I think it is rather telling that Dr P judges everyone else by her low standards.’

- ‘Proudman is a self publicist who cynically uses women’s suffering to promote

herself. She misrepresents the law and opines on matters she has no experience.’

- ‘It’s such a bizarre tweet. If I am asked what case I am doing at a particular

time, I say “it’s a fraud trial/a murder/a rape”. I don’t understand what silly
point is being made by Dr Proudman.’

- ‘Misrepresenting the law isn’t what barristers are trained to do… She also
misrepresents the cases she has been in, their importance and indeed, whether
she has been involved at all.’

g. Mr Matthew Scott, Pump Court Chambers

Mr Scott tweeted first in 2015 about Dr Proudman:

- ‘Charlotte Proudman has over-reacted to her sexist suitor’

- ‘Charlotte #Proudman: Victim or ninny?

…’

- ‘I’ve just seen that [Mr Sawyer] has done an excellent thread on that ridiculous
Proudman tweet.’

- ‘Some people have been blocked by @DrProudman, so here’s a screenshot of

her tweet.’

37
 - ‘This thread is a useful corrective to Dr Proudman’s potentially misleading
tweet.’

h. Mr Carl Kingsley, barrister at Kingsley Brookes Solicitors

- ‘Its already happened Charlotte Proudperson spilling her disinformation on

CH4 news!!!’

i. Mr John Vater KC, Harcourt Chambers

‘… Those seeking self serving publicity fail to understand the irony that the cult of
the individual is the enemy of the equality and justice they purpose to promote.’

‘… It is not about ‘building a brand’ or launching campaigns.’

‘… I worry about the way publicised cases have been hijacked by those with ulterior
motives over the last year…’

j. Mr Jerry Hayes, Goldsmith Chambers

- ‘I was suggesting that the proposition that a complainant is disadvantaged when

special measures are granted is weird. I should have said it is nonsense. And
you are correct to say that special measures can be applied for in most criminal
cases’

- ‘I agree.what about a mud wrestling match between Katie Hopkins and

Charlotte Proudman [winking face with tongue emjoi]’

- ‘Sarah Vine has a great piece on the feminist barrister.worried about being seen
in public with a copy of MAIL? hide it behind porn [winking face with tongue
emoji’

- ‘I am quite appalled…..’

k. Mr Tony Wyatt (tweeting as Tony Kent), barrister at Ewing Law

- ‘Dr Proudman does NOT ‘know her onions’. Dr Proudman is NOT a criminal
lawyer. She has no practical or professional expertise or experience on the
subject whatsoever. She just has a lost of opinions – almost all of which are not
founded on fact – and a knack for self promotion.’

- ‘How many rape trials has Dr Proudman conducted, I wonder? Because if she’s
routinely letting the defence get away with the stuff she tweets about, she should
really get better acquainted with the rules of evidence.’

- ‘… If you or I started claiming sole headline credit for winning cases as led
juniors, the silks would be VERY pissed!!’

- He jokes that he is not blocked: ‘Nor me, despite her actually replying to be
once to accuse me of defaming her!!’

38
 - ‘…The self-promotion and the deliberate misleading of an ignorant following…
has reached an unacceptable level.’

- ‘I believe she is TRYING to be sanctioned by the BSB, in order to paint it as an

attack by ‘the patriarchy’. In furtherance of the media career she so obviously
wants.’

l. Mr James Vine, now retired and unregistered

‘THIS.

IS.

NOT.

TRUE.’

m. Mr Simon Myerson KC, St Pauls Chambers

- ‘Aren’t you a leading member of the patriarchy against which St Charlotte is

single handedly waging a struggle for good by attacking other barristers and
offering inexpert views in national radio?’

- ‘I’m sure she had a constant stream of ideas calculated to improve the position
of clients and regularly communicated them to do to ensure that something was
achieved.

After all, there’s no way she’d just whine on social media but do nothing.’

- ‘It’s like the Hokey Cokey.

Do you have to shake it all about now?’

- In reply to Mr Marshall KC’s comment (‘I hesitate to think’):

‘Wise. Considered. Sensible. Reflective.’

- ‘I have come to the unhappy conclusion that the most likely answer is that she
prefers the personal publicity it brings to the interests of those the justice system
(and Barristers) exist to serve. Which is very depressing.’

- ‘Jomo levels of “I’m a lawyer so I know everything about the law” on display
here.’

- ‘Yet again, Proudman is wrong…’

n. Mr John Richards, Kenworthy’s Barristers

- ‘In 20 years of practicing criminal law. I’ve never heard this once.’

- ‘How on earth can you say that?’

39
 - ‘And blocked’

- ‘I have been blocked as have a lot of other barristers’

o. Mr Richard Huw Jones, 4BB

- ‘The Proudman show continues to wilfully misinform the public. Is this a

conduct issue?’

- ‘[Re a complaint to the Bar Standards Board:] At last! Her behaviour is

potentially very damaging, not only to her and court users, but to all of use at
all the Bar.’

- In reply to someone within ‘Legal Twitter’ who posted an image showing that
he had been blocked by Dr Proudman, with the comment ‘Legal Twitter badge
of honour… How many CPD points is this worth now?’:
‘Many congratulations. You join a proud band.’

- In reply to another blocked user:

‘Welcome to the club’

- ‘She blocked me, I only suggested she consult Archbold and perhaps took a
break from Twitter.’

- ‘May I suggest a New Year’s resolution to stay off Twitter?’

p. Mr Edward Levey KC, Fountain Court

- ‘Leaving aside the fact that her tweets about the criminal justice system are,
imo, unfair and misleading, my suspicion is that they have the effect of positively
dissuading victims – which is the exact opposite of what I assume she’s trying
to achieve.’

- Replying to Mr Sawyer, ‘If you are referring to a certain junior barrister who
is active on Twitter, I imagine her leaders are not necessarily disappointed not
to be mentioned ;)’ (to which Mr Sawyer replied, ‘Might be…’)

- Mr Levey liked a tweet by Mr Richard Huw Jones suggesting that Dr Proudman

stay off Twitter.

- ‘Well, colour me shocked – I’ve been blocked by @DrProudman.

I’m sorry to be so blunt, but how utterly pathetic.’

- ‘The only thing I’m genuinely surprised about is that I wasn’t accused of
mysogny or male privilege as a parting shot.’

- ‘I’m surprised I lasted as long as I did… I was met with the inevitable block. It
says a lot about someone when they block you for daring to disagree with them.”

40
 - ‘I can’t believe that someone has not tried speaking to her already, but it seems
that she’s more focused on campaigning. This time, it might be out of her hands.’

- ‘I admire your optimism! She blocked me long ago for daring to disagree with
one of her inflammatory tweets.’

- ‘Oh for goodness sake! Accused by whom?! She’s a prominent barrister with a
huge following who posted an inflammatory thread about one of her cases. It’s
hardly surprising that this has prompted adverse comment from a number of
people on “legal twitter”.

- ‘That’s interesting. I’m blocked by her (of course), but – out of interest – did she
delete the tweet about the judge turning a blind eye to certain evidence?’

- ‘And I wonder what credibility she has amongst the judiciary, which would also
be a serious concern to me if I were an instructing solicitor.’

q. Mr Henry Dickson, 25 Bedford Row

- ‘Narcissist… Her analysis is wrong and self-serving. Ignore her.’

- ‘Erm. Are you okay?

…’

r. Mr Michael Polak, Church Court Chambers

- Mr Polak retweeted Mr Norman’s ‘particular ornament’ tweet.

s. Mr Fabian Krougman, Lamb Buildings

- Mr Krougman retweeted Mr Marshall KC’s ‘32 years of practicing’14 tweet.

- Mr Krougman retweeted Mr Norman’s ‘particular ornament’ tweet.

- Mr Krougman retweeted Mr Fitch-Holland’s ‘La Proudman… narcissistic

nonsense’ tweet.

- Mr Krougman retweeted Mr Fitch-Holland’s tweet about Dr Proudman’s name.

- ‘Oh and of course Proudman and Jolyon’ [on the subject of blocking].

t. Mr Colm Nugent, Gatehouse Chambers

- ‘I think Charlotte has perhaps confused being a barrister, with being Spider-
Man.’

14
Error in the original.

41
 - ‘A former member of our own chambers found there was a huge audience for
this sort of thing and as a consequence they attracted many follows. Not the sort
you’d necessarily want, either.

- ‘The habit of certain lawyers to portray themselves as some kind of lone warrior
for justice; explicitly undermining the very profession of which they are a
member and the professionalism of colleagues; just for clicks, likes and
comment; is cynical, self-indulgent narcissism.’

u. Mr Ben Edwards, Crucible Law

- ‘What you have said it extremely unfair to so many barristers who work
tirelessly for their clients. A sweeping generalisation with no support to it. Dr
Proudman should correct you.’

- ‘Ha! What were you blocked for now?! It’s crazy!’

- On the subject of the blocking: ‘It’s ridiculous.’

v. Mr James Turner KC, 1KBW

- ‘Congratulations on the recognition given to you by the blocking Phillip.’

- On the subject of the blocking: ‘Is this what is known as a ‘blockchain’?

[thinking emoji]

w. Mr David Marusza, Harcourt Chambers

- On the subject of the blocking: ‘Sorry, I’ve been neglecting your tweets – who
has done this and was it because of the socks?’

x. Mr Faisel Sadiq, Gatehouse Chambers

- ‘I find it very depressing.

It seems to be a regular occurrence that @DrProudman tweets something that
is likely to undermine confidence in the courts…’

y. Mr Graham King, barrister at Lakeland Law

- Mr King posted an image of a man dressed in a purple wig, pink sunglasses,

heavily applied red lipstick and a fur coat, with the comment:

‘Thinking of briefing Dr Proudman in my case against Baron Hardup who

ejected me and my daughters from marital home on Saturday night just so he
could have a “happy ending”’

z. Adam Lewis, Kenworthy’s Chambers

- ‘Reckon the @barstandards should block her….’

42
 aa. Imran Mahmood, 5 Pump Court

- ‘Some people are more interested in self-publicity than responsible reporting.

It’s a disgrace.’

bb. Chris Elderwood, barrister at Park Square Chambers

- ‘“irresponsible and unprofessional”

I think you just aptly summed her up!’

84. The tweets set out above, by male barristers, encouraged members of the public to send
offensive tweets directed at Dr Proudman (e.g. in reply to Mr Sawyer, ‘Nah, fuck her.
Don’t backtrack. Personally, I wouldn’t attack but U brought it to the world so whatever
happens now it is what it is. Good thread btw. I’m debating doing some research to find
out who this annoying cow of a solicitor actually is lol’).

85. The Bar Standards Board has taken no action in respect of any of these tweets.

86. It said that the language used by barristers about Dr Proudman was ‘unpleasant and
inflammatory’ but was not even a potential breach of the Code of Conduct (see the letter
from Laura Franks, Head of the Contact and Assessment Team at the Bar Standards
Board, dated 23 October 2023):

‘We took the view that some of the tweets posted by the barristers you reported were
unpleasant and inflammatory in the way they related to you and your posts. We
acknowledged that some of the tweets were particularly inflammatory and I appreciate
that these would have been unpleasant and difficult for you to read.

We balanced this against individuals’ right of expression under Article 10 of the

European Convention on Human Rights, a qualified right which includes the right to
hold and express opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. This right
can extend to expressing views in strong, controversial terms and even to using
unpleasant language. Expressing views in these ways does not automatically mean that
that the barristers concerned may be acting in breach of Article 10 or the BSB
Handbook.

Taking everything into account, CAT decided that the barristers you reported to us had
not potentially breached the BSB Handbook on these occasions.’

87. How can the Bar Standards Board make a decision to investigate Dr Proudman for
sending the six tweets set out above but not investigate Mr Sinclair for sending a tweet
calling Dr Proudman a ‘cunt’; Mr Jerry Hayes for tweeting about ‘a mud wrestling
match between Katie Hopkins and Charlotte Proudman [winking face with tongue
emjoi]’; Mr Fitch-Holland for referring to Dr Proudman as ‘La Proudman’; Mr
Norman referring to Dr Proudman as a ‘particular ornament’ (these last three being
gendered comments and therefore intrinsically discriminatory15) and (also Mr Norman)

15
In Fischer v London United Busways Limited, case number 2300846/2021, unreported (28 July 2023), the
employment tribunal decided that the insult ‘wanker’ was not a gender-neutral term: ‘… the Tribunal does not
consider the insult “wanker” to be a gender-neutral term. The panel members’ own experiences of use of that
term is that it is applied to men, and that there are equivalent but different swear words that are specifically used

43
 an ‘insufferable wanker’ and ‘repellent person’; or any of the other barristers listed
above for their egregious tweets?

88. It follows that the Bar Standards Board accorded Dr Proudman’s article 10 right to
freedom of expression less respect than it accorded to the article 10 right to freedom of
expression of the other, overwhelmingly male, barristers.

89. It is particularly egregious that the Bar Standards Board did not investigate these male
barristers given:

a. these individuals have often tweeted about Dr Proudman together, in the form
of a twitter ‘pile on’. These were not isolated one-off tweets;

b. the discrimination, bullying and harassment of Dr Proudman by barristers

individually and collectively on social media is substantial, relentless and
ongoing;

c. these comments and tweets by barristers inherently encourage the wider public
to make similar highly offensive comments about and to Dr Proudman;

d. on 20 November 2023, Inspector Phil Grimwade was dismissed from his

employment by Nottinghamshire Police and banned from policing for life for
carrying out a ‘deliberate and targeted’ six-year sustained social media
campaign of hate against female MPs, lawyers and fellow senior police officers,
including Dr Proudman 16 . He was found to have engaged in misogynistic,
abusive, unprofessional and gross misconduct at a police standards hearing. On
15 April 2022, Mr Grimwade wrote to Dr Proudman, ‘FFS’ and accused her of
‘spouting drivel.’ On 3 June 2022, he wrote, ‘Proudman is a vile narcissist…’
in reply to a tweet by Mr Andrew Fitch-Holland, barrister, about Dr Proudman.
These tweets formed part of the evidence against him, and Dr Proudman gave a
victim impact statement;

e. in January 2024, a judge imposed a five year restraining order on David

Mottershead, following twitter posts by Mr Mottershead, which required him
not to approach or contact Dr Proudman17. He was also referred to ‘Prevent’,
the government-led, multi-agency programme, which aims to address extremist
ideology. He also made videos encouraging people to complain about Dr
Proudman to the Bar Standards Board and the University of Cambridge, where
she is a Senior Research Associate, about her to try to get her sacked. The Bar
Standards Board is aware of this matter as Dr Proudman informed it of the
police investigation and prosecution while it was taking place;

in common parlance to insult women.’ (paragraph 78). See also Niccolini v Algebris, case number 2201916 and
others, unreported (12 May 2023), the employment tribunal found that comments about a woman’s ‘hormone
tempest’ were related to sex: ‘Mr Serra’s comments that he had seen how the Claimant reacted when overtaken
by a hormone tempest were unacceptable comments which had the effect of both violating the Claimant’s dignity
creating a humiliating and offensive environment for her. They were related to sex.’ (paragraph 175).
16
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12788221/vile-troll-unmasked-police-inspector-targeted-women-
campaigning-sarah-everard-sacked.html
17
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12814993/Mens-rights-activist-sent-snap-gun-barrister-guilty-knife-
possession.html

44
 f. as the Bar Standards Board is aware, these comments and tweets have had a
very significant adverse impact on Dr Proudman’s professional life and
wellbeing;

g. there is an extremely high likelihood of continued abuse.

90. The Bar Standards Board’s decision to investigate Dr Proudman’s tweets is in direct
contrast to its decision not to investigate the numerous tweets by numerous male
barristers directed at Dr Proudman including those set out above.

91. The Bar Standards Board’s decision also sits at odds with its own public position and
wider commentary about these matters:

a. the Bar Standards Board has noted the gendered nature of bullying at the Bar
by male barristers towards female barristers:

‘In 2016, we published Women at the Bar, in which 40% of female barristers
reported experiencing harassment during their career’ (see the Bar Standards
Board’s report, ‘Addressing Bullying and Harassment at the Bar’ dated 6
October 2022, paragraph 2);

b. ‘Data from “Barristers’ Working Lives 2017: Barristers’ experience of

harassment, bullying and discrimination” report, released by the Bar Council,
indicate that the most common form of bullying/harassment reported was based
on gender (53% – up 5% from 2013 data). 33% of women reported personal
experiences compared with just 12% of men…’ (see ‘Bullying, Discrimination
and Harassment at the Bar’, a qualitative study by YouGov for the Bar Standards
Board published in October 2020, page 6);

c. the then Chair of the Bar Council, Mr Nick Vineall KC, made a supportive
public statement in response to an article by Dr Proudman in Counsel Magazine
in July 2023 which summarised a tiny fraction of the tweets seen by the Bar
Standards Board. His statement includes:

‘“Some of the comments made on Twitter and recorded in Dr Proudman’s article

go far, far beyond what could possibly be thought to be acceptable. It is not
appropriate for the Bar Council to comment on any individual complaints or
allegations: those tasks are for the BSB. But the Bar ought to be a profession
where everyone is capable of maintaining civil discourse.

“There is absolutely no place at the Bar for misogynistic, sexist, or bullying

behaviour, whether online, verbal or in any other form.

“We all have a duty to report serious misconduct, and when this behaviour is
reported to the Bar Standards Board it is essential that it is dealt with promptly.
Whilst we understand that some investigations are complex, we share Dr
Proudman’s frustration with the pace with which the BSB has dealt with some
complaints…”’

45
d. a letter dated 16 May 2024 from four special rapporteurs appointed by the
United Nations’ Human Rights Council to the UK government includes:

‘While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of the above-mentioned

allegations, we are concerned that the ongoing harassment of Dr. Proudman,
combined with the BSB’s decision to take disciplinary proceedings may send a
disconcerting message that legal professionals who dare to challenge alleged
systemic gender bias against mothers in custody cases and women who are
survivors of domestic violence, will be punished. It may also lead to fear within
the community of women human rights defenders, academics and practicing
lawyers and Barristers who are working to defend the rights of women within
the UK, that such decisions will significantly deter victims further from
reporting and/or voicing their abuse; thus placing women and children at
further risk of significant harm.

We are further concerned at reports that disciplinary proceedings against Dr.

Proudman are directly related to her professional activities as a lawyer. If
confirmed, these facts would be in breach of the guarantees that lawyers are
entitled to in order to perform their professional functions without any threat,
intimidation, harassment or interference, and without suffering, or being
threatened with, prosecution or any administrative or disciplinary sanctions for
actions undertaken in accordance with professional duties and ethical
standards. Furthermore, international standards provide that lawyers, as all
other people living in the United Kingdom, are entitled to freedom of
expression.
…
The continued exposure of Ms. Proudman to threats or actual violence online
is facilitated by the absence of specific references to misogyny and sexism, as
well as gender-based discrimination perpetrated by Barristers, within the BSB’s
code of conduct is concerning. There is a similar gap in the BSB social media
guidance of 20 September 2023. It is concerning that such gaps exist despite the
objectives outlined in the Legal Services Act of 2007 which aims to protect and
promote the public interest and improve access to justice. …
We express our deep concern about the misogynistic and sexist nature of the
alleged attacks that Dr. Proudman is being subjected to online. The insulting
and degrading remarks to which she has allegedly been subjected underline the
gender dimension of the discrimination to which women who are active and
visible in the public sphere, such as lawyers, women judges and women
politicians, are disproportionately victims.’

e. a letter dated 20 June 2024 from the Legal Services Board to the Bar Standards
Board includes:

‘Dr Proudman has previously raised with us her concerns around the lack of
action taken by the BSB in respect of the comments made on social media about
her by fellow barristers, and we have discussed these with the BSB in the context
of a wider discussion around its threshold for regulatory invention in cases like
this.’

46
(f) The Bar Standards Board took into account Dr Proudman’s ‘pursuit of the cause of
campaigning for women’s rights’ in deciding to refer her to a disciplinary tribunal

92. The Independent Decision-Making Panel’s decision sheet dated 2 March 2023 includes
the following reasoning:

a. that Dr Proudman ‘allowed her pursuit of the cause of campaigning for women’s
rights to obscure the findings of fact by the judge in this case to the detriment
of the judge and the husband’ and that she ‘conflat[ed] her campaign for victims
of domestic abuse with the facts of her client’s case’;

b. that the tweets relied on by the Bar Standards Board contained ‘seriously
offensive, gender-based, derogatory language which was designed to demean
and/or insult the judge’, including the following:

i. that in the tweets relied on by the Bar Standards Board Dr Proudman

‘insinuates that the judge is part of or influenced by “the boys club which
still exists amongst men in powerful positions” because he too is a man’;

ii. that in the case of two of the tweets, these ‘together would be understood
by the ordinary reasonable twitter user to infer that the judge was biased
in favour of the husband because he too was a part-time judge and male’;

iii. that in one of the tweets Dr Proudman ‘accuses the judge of

“undermining ... W’s mental health and wellbeing as a woman”’’;

iv. that in one of the tweets Dr Proudman ‘accuses the judge of misogyny
in finding that W “has set her sights too high [financially]”’.

93. It is obvious from this reasoning that Dr Proudman has been treated less favourably
because of her sex and/or feminist belief.

F. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010

(1) The law

94. Sections 53(2)(c) and 54(1) to (3) of the Equality Act 2010 in respect of qualifying
bodies are set out above.

95. Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 provides, so far as relevant:

‘19 Indirect discrimination

(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision,

criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected
characteristic of B’s.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is

discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if—

47
 (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the
characteristic,

(b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not
share it,

(c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and

(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate

aim.

(3) …’

96. In R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] IRLR
136, Lady Hale said (at paragraph 56 to 57):

56. The basic difference between direct and indirect discrimination is plain: see
Mummery LJ in R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA 1293, [2006]
1 WLR 3213, para 119. The rule against direct discrimination aims to achieve formal
equality of treatment: there must be no less favourable treatment between otherwise
similarly situated people on grounds of colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national
origins. Indirect discrimination looks beyond formal equality towards a more
substantive equality of results: criteria which appear neutral on their face may have a
disproportionately adverse impact upon people of a particular colour, race, nationality
or ethnic or national origins.

57. Direct and indirect discrimination are mutually exclusive. You cannot have both at
once. …’

97. In Essop v Home Office; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27,
[2017] IRLR 558, at paragraph 25, Lady Hale set out an outline of how indirect
discrimination law works, identifying a number of ‘salient features’:

‘The first salient feature is that [… there …] is no requirement in the Equality Act 2010
that the claimant show why the PCP puts one group sharing a particular protected
characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with others. It is enough that
it does. Sometimes, perhaps usually, the reason will be obvious: women are on average
shorter than men, so a tall minimum height requirement will disadvantage women
whereas a short maximum will disadvantage men. But sometimes it will not be obvious:
there is no generally accepted explanation for why women have on average achieved
lower grades as chess players than men, but a requirement to hold a high chess grade
will put them at a disadvantage.

A second salient feature is the contrast between the definitions of direct and indirect
discrimination. Direct discrimination expressly requires a causal link between the less
favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination does not.
Instead it requires a causal link between the PCP and the particular disadvantage
suffered by the group and the individual. The reason for this is that the prohibition of
direct discrimination aims to achieve equality of treatment. Indirect discrimination

48
assumes equality of treatment – the PCP is applied indiscriminately to all – but aims to
achieve a level playing field, where people sharing a particular protected characteristic
are not subjected to requirements which many of them cannot meet but which cannot
be shown to be justified. The prohibition of indirect discrimination thus aims to achieve
equality of results in the absence of such justification. It is dealing with hidden barriers
which are not easy to anticipate or to spot.

A third salient feature is that the reasons why one group may find it harder to comply
with the PCP than others are many and various […]. They could be genetic, such as
strength or height. They could be social, such as the expectation that women will bear
the greater responsibility for caring for the home and family than will men. They could
be traditional employment practices, such as the division between “women's jobs” and
“men's jobs” or the practice of starting at the bottom of an incremental pay scale. They
could be another PCP, working in combination with the one at issue, as in Homer v
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2012] IRLR 601, where the requirement of a law
degree operated in combination with normal retirement age to produce the disadvantage
suffered by Mr Homer and others in his age group. These various examples show that
the reason for the disadvantage need not be unlawful in itself or be under the control of
the employer or provider (although sometimes it will be). They also show that both the
PCP and the reason for the disadvantage are “but for” causes of the disadvantage:
removing one or the other would solve the problem.

A fourth salient feature is that there is no requirement that the PCP in question put every
member of the group sharing the particular protected characteristic at a disadvantage.
The later definitions cannot have restricted the original definitions, which referred to
the proportion who could, or could not, meet the requirement. Obviously, some women
are taller or stronger than some men and can meet a height or strength requirement that
many women could not. Some women can work full time without difficulty whereas
others cannot. Yet these are paradigm examples of a PCP which may be indirectly
discriminatory. The fact that some BME or older candidates could pass the test is
neither here nor there.

The group was at a disadvantage because the proportion of those who could pass it was
smaller than the proportion of white or younger candidates. If they had all failed, it
would be closer to a case of direct discrimination (because the test requirement would
be a proxy for race or age).

A fifth salient feature is that it is commonplace for the disparate impact, or particular
disadvantage, to be established on the basis of statistical evidence. That was obvious
from the way in which the concept was expressed in the 1975 and 1976 Acts: indeed it
might be difficult to establish that the proportion of women who could comply with the
requirement was smaller than the proportion of men unless there was statistical
evidence to that effect. Recital (15) to the Race Directive recognised that indirect
discrimination might be proved on the basis of statistical evidence, while at the same
time introducing the new definition. It cannot have been contemplated that the
“particular disadvantage” might not be capable of being proved by statistical evidence.
Statistical evidence is designed to show correlations between particular variables and
particular outcomes and to assess the significance of those correlations. But a
correlation is not the same as a causal link.

49
 A final salient feature is that it is always open to the respondent to show that his PCP
is justified – in other words, that there is a good reason for the particular height
requirement, or the particular chess grade, or the particular CSA test. Some reluctance
to reach this point can be detected in the cases, yet there should not be. There is no
finding of unlawful discrimination until all four elements of the definition are met. The
requirement to justify a PCP should not be seen as placing an unreasonable burden upon
respondents. Nor should it be seen as casting some sort of shadow or stigma upon them.
There is no shame in it. There may well be very good reasons for the PCP in question
– fitness levels in fire-fighters or policemen spring to mind. But, as Langstaff J pointed
out in the EAT in Essop, a wise employer will monitor how his policies and practices
impact upon various groups and, if he finds that they do have a disparate impact, will
try and see what can be modified to remove that impact while achieving the desired
result.’

98. A court or tribunal is entitled to take into account matters of common knowledge: see
London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No 2) [1999] ICR 494, CA. In that case, the
industrial tribunal had taken into account ‘the fact that it is common knowledge that
females are more likely to be single parents and caring for a child than males’. This
approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal, Potter LJ (Swinton Thomas LJ
agreeing) saying at paragraph 24: ‘The high preponderance of single mothers having
care of a child is a matter of common knowledge’.

(2) Submissions

99. In initiating and pursuing these proceedings, the Bar Standards Board has indirectly
discriminated against Dr Proudman in breach of s 53(2)(c) and s 19 of the Equality Act
2010.

100. The Bar Standards Board has a practice or policy of initiating and pursuing proceedings
against barristers who make gender-based criticisms of judges and/or their judgments.

101. The Bar Standards Board would, in theory at least, apply that practice or policy to men
as well as women.

102. The practice or policy of initiating and pursuing proceedings against barristers who
make gender-based criticisms of judges and/or their judgments puts women at a
particular disadvantage when compared with men. This is because women are
overwhelmingly more likely than men to make gender-based criticisms of judges (who
are predominantly male) and/or their judgments, especially in certain types of cases
such as family law cases involving domestic abuse. Women are more likely than men
to have concerns about the judiciary being predominantly male, about the metaphorical
‘boys’ club’ and about its literal equivalent: membership of high profile, exclusive, all
male private members clubs (such as, until recently, the Garrick Club). Women are more
likely than men to have direct or indirect experience of domestic abuse or similar
behaviour by men (such as sexual harassment).

103. The theme of Dr Proudman’s tweets is encapsulated in tweet 2/14:

50
 ‘Demeaning the significance of domestic abuse has the [e]ffect of silencing victims and
rendering perpetrators invisible. This judgment has echoes of [t]he “boys club” which
still exists among men in powerful positions.’

104. It is far more likely that a woman would send this tweet than a man, and therefore that
proceedings would be initiated or pursued against a woman.

105. This is illustrated by the fact that, in recent years, a number of high profile individuals,
predominantly women, have raised concerns about the ‘boys’ club’ in the judiciary and
judges being members of high profile, exclusive, all male private members’ clubs such
as the Garrick Club:

a. The Guardian reported as long ago as 6 July 201518 that membership of the
Garrick Club by members of the judiciary had been criticised by Baroness Hale:

‘But there has been growing antipathy among women in the legal profession
towards a club that welcomes so many male QCs and judges, yet excludes
women. Baroness Hale, Britain’s most senior female judge, the first and only
woman among 12 supreme court judges (several of whom are Garrick club
members), has expressed outrage at the club’s continued exclusion of women.
“I regard it as quite shocking that so many of my colleagues belong to the
Garrick, but they don’t see what all the fuss is about,” she told a law diversity
forum. She said judges “should be committed to the principle of equality for
all”.’;

b. The Guardian reported on 3 December 202319 that membership of the Garrick

Club by members of the judiciary had been criticised in similar terms by Dinah
Rose KC:

‘The large number of senior lawyers who are Garrick members has caused
persistent unease within the profession. At the time of the last vote20, the human
rights lawyer Dinah Rose KC said: “If you’re a judge, publicly committed to
the principle of equality, it is incompatible with that, to be a member of that type
of club.”’;

c. since the BSB began its investigation into Dr Proudman’s conduct, and since
the charges were served, there have been many high profile contributions to the
public debate on membership by judges of the all male Garrick Club. By way
of example, Helen Mountfield KC and Karon Monaghan KC were both quoted
in an article in The Guardian newspaper on 20 March 2024:21

18 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/06/garrick-club-votes-to-continue-with-ban-on-women-
members
19 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/dec/03/most-garrick-club-members-favour-
admitting-
women-poll-reveals
20 The ‘last vote’ is the 2015 vote on whether the Garrick Club should change its rules to admit women: see
the Guardian article dated 6 July 2015.
21
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/mar/20/mi6-chief-resigns-garrick-membership-after-criticism

51
 ‘The publication of the names of judges who are members has triggered unease
from female barristers.

Helen Mountfield KC, a specialist in equality law, said: “I would not feel that
a client of mine was getting a fair hearing in a case concerning sex
discrimination which was heard by a judge who was a member of the Garrick
Club.”

She added: “Deciding to be a member of a club, open to members on the basis

of professional attainment, and in which informal connections are made, seems
to suggest that a person is prepared to tolerate discrimination and bias.”

Karon Monaghan KC, a senior barrister, said she had long felt uncomfortable
when she had to appear in front of judges who were rumoured to be members
of the Garrick. While she was not calling for judges to resign from the club, she
said transparency about membership was important and warned that there were
some cases where it would be inappropriate for a Garrick member to appear as
judge.

“Garrick members should consider recusing themselves if they are hearing a

sex discrimination case, rape case or a case involving sexual violence. In a rape
case, you’re having to direct a jury in relation to things like sex stereotyping
and how you should approach the evidence of a victim. Do we want a male
judge who thinks it’s appropriate to exclude his female peers from a club to be
making judgments on sex stereotyping?

“In a sex discrimination case you might be arguing that a woman has been
excluded from certain benefits or opportunities within a professional context, in
front of a judge who is a member of a club, along with his judicial peers, in
which female members of his profession are excluded. It’s completely
unacceptable; in these cases it should be argued that a judge who’s a member
of the Garrick club should recuse himself.”

The US federal code of conduct for judges states that they “should not hold
membership in any organisation that practises invidious discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin”, adding that such membership
“gives rise to perceptions that the judge’s partiality is impaired”.’

d. the Telegraph reported on 26 March 2024, in article entitled ‘Four senior judges
resign from Garrick Club after men-only membership row’, that one member of
the Court of Appeal and three puisne judges had resigned as members of the
Garrick Club, and quoted Helena Kennedy KC:22

‘Helena Kennedy, a barrister and Labour member of the House of Lords,

suggested that a US-style system barring judges from holding membership to
organisations that practise discrimination should be imposed.

22
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/03/26/four-senior-judges-resign-garrick-club-men-only-membership/

52
 The US federal code of conduct for judges states that they “should not hold
membership in any organisation that practises invidious discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin”, adding that such membership
“gives rise to perceptions that the judge’s partiality is impaired”.’

e. the Chair of the Bar Council, Sam Townend, quoted in an article in The
Guardian on 28 March 202423, which also includes a reference to the Lady Chief
Justice, Sue Carr:

‘Exclusive members’ clubs “create the potential for unfair advantage” for
lawyers seeking to become judges, the Bar Council has warned, responding to
growing unease about senior legal practitioners who are members of the men-
only Garrick club.

The professional body for barristers set its comments about “closed doors and
exclusionary spaces” against the background of wider concerns over the
underrepresentation of women in the judiciary, and persistent gender
disparities in female lawyers’ career progression and earnings.

Sam Townend KC, the chair of the Bar Council, the organisation that represents
18,000 barristers in England and Wales, indicated that views on the
acceptability of barristers’ membership of private members’ clubs were
evolving.

“For now, it is a matter for individuals to determine whether or not membership

of an institution, such as the Garrick Club, is compatible with the views they
espouse in their professional lives, but this may change,” Townend said.

“As a profession it is vitally important that we retain the trust and confidence
of the public.”

The Bar Standards Board is responsible for publishing a code of conduct for
barristers. It sets out that practitioners “must not behave in a way which is
likely to diminish the trust and confidence which the public places in you or in
the profession”.

…
On Monday it emerged that at least four judges had tendered their resignations
from the Garrick.

Townend’s comments follow a statement made on Monday by the lady chief

justice, Sue Carr, the president of the courts and head of the judiciary of
England and Wales, noting that the revelations about judges’ membership of
the Garrick underlined the need to continue work to improve inclusivity in the
profession.’

f. An open letter from legal professionals dated 21 March 2024 expressing

concerns about news reports naming senior members of the judiciary as current

23
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/mar/28/garrick-club-bias-selecting-judges-bar-council-warning

53
 or former members of the male-only Garrick Club was signed by 76 women and
35 men24. More than two-thirds of the signatories were therefore women.

g. According to an article in The Standard dated 2 December 2020, an earlier

petition calling for an end to the Garrick Club’s men-only membership policy
was signed by over 100 QCs and over 100 other legal professionals, and of these
156 were women and 75 were men. Again, more than two-thirds of the
signatories were therefore women.

h. Proceedings have in fact been initiated and pursued against Dr Proudman, a

woman.

106. This practice or policy has put Dr Proudman at a disadvantage.

107. Further and in the alternative, the Bar Standards Board has a practice or policy of
initiating and pursuing proceedings against barristers who make gender-based
criticisms of judges and/or their judgments.

108. This practice or policy is reflected in the language of the Independent Decision-Making
Panel’s decision, as set out below. It said that Dr Proudman:

‘allowed her pursuit of the cause of campaigning for women’s rights to obscure the
findings of fact by the judge in this case to the detriment of the judge and the husband’
and that she ‘conflat[ed] her campaign for victims of domestic abuse with the facts of
her client’s case’;

109. The Bar Standards Board would, in theory at least, apply that practice or policy to
someone who holds or manifests a belief in feminism and to someone who does not.

110. The practice or policy of initiating and pursuing proceedings against barristers who
make gender-based criticisms of judges and/or their judgments puts someone who holds
or manifests a belief in feminism at a particular disadvantage when compared with
someone who does not. This is because such a person is overwhelmingly more likely
to make gender-based criticisms of judges (who are predominantly male) and/or their
judgments, especially in certain types of cases such as family law cases involving
domestic abuse.

111. If the Bar Standards Board argues that initiating and pursuing these proceedings, in
these circumstances, is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, Dr
Proudman will respond either orally at the hearing or by way of further brief
submissions in reply once the substance of the argument has been put forward.

G. HARASSMENT CONTRARY TO THE EQUALITY ACT 2010

(1) The law

112. Section 53(3) of the Equality Act 2010 provides:

24
Based on an analysis of their names. The signatories included Dr Proudman. The letter was also signed by
‘Scottish legal professionals’: these signatories were not named in the published version and are not therefore
included in these figures.

54
 ‘(3) A qualifications body must not, in relation to conferment by it of a relevant
qualification, harass—

(a) a person who holds the qualification, or

(b) a person who applies for it.’

113. Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 provides, so far as relevant:

‘26 Harassment

(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if—

(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected

characteristic, and

(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of—

(i) violating B’s dignity, or

(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or
offensive environment for B.

(2) …

(3) …

(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b),
each of the following must be taken into account—

(a) the perception of B;

(b) the other circumstances of the case;

(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

(5) …’

114. Harassment occurs when A engages in unwanted conduct related to a protected

characteristic, and that conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for
B.

115. There are three elements to the definition25:

a. unwanted conduct;
b. having the purpose or effect of either: (i) violating the claimant’s dignity; or (ii)
creating an adverse environment for him/her;

See Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336 and Bakkali v Greater Manchester (South) t/a Stage
25

Coach Manchester [2018] ICR 1481.

55
 c. related to a protected characteristic;

116. Unwanted conduct can be a single one-off act. It includes a range of conduct, from
comments about a colleague on social media (see Teggart v TeleTech [2012 NIIT
00704/11IT) to a suspension (see Prospects for People with Learning Difficulties v
Harris, UKEAT/0612/11) to a dismissal (see Urso v Department for Work and Pensions
[2017] IRLR 304).

117. The words ‘related to’ have a broad meaning. ‘Conduct can be “related to” a relevant
characteristic even if it is not “because of” that characteristic. It is difficult to think of
circumstances in which unwanted conduct on grounds of or because of a relevant
protected characteristic would not be related to that protected characteristic of a
claimant. However, “related to” such a characteristic includes a wider category of
conduct. A decision on whether conduct is related to such a characteristic requires a
broader inquiry. In my judgment the change in the statutory ingredients of harassment
requires a more intense focus on the context of the offending words or behaviour.’
(paragraph 31 of Bakkali).

118. As to the requisite purpose or effect, the EAT has made clear that the alternative bases
in element (c) above must be respected so that, for example, a respondent can be liable
for effects even if they were not his purpose (Dhaliwal). In deciding whether the
conduct has had the requisite effect, the perception of B, the other circumstances of the
case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect must be taken into
account.

(2) Submissions

119. In initiating and pursing these proceedings, the Bar Standards Board has harassed Dr
Proudman in that it has engaged in unwanted conduct related to her sex and/or her
belief, and the conduct has had the effect of violating Dr Proudman’s dignity and/or
created an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and/or offensive environment
for her.

120. Initiating and pursuing these proceedings is unwanted conduct.

121. That conduct is related to her sex and/or belief. The tweets that are the subject of the
ongoing prosecution contained gender-based criticisms of the judge and his judgment
(e.g. ‘This judgment has echoes of [t]he “boys club” which still exists among men in
powerful positions’).

122. It is also related to her sex and/or belief because male barristers and/or barristers who
are not holding or manifesting a belief in feminism are not being treated in the same
way (as described above).

123. The prosecution has had the effect of violating her dignity and creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating and/or offensive environment for her. This is an inherent
effect of being prosecuted by a regulatory body.

124. That effect is amplified when other barristers have been treated more favourably. This
includes, as set out above:

56
 a. The Bar Standards Board not investigating the tweets about HHJ Linford by
nine male barristers;

b. the Bar Standards Board not investigating tweets by Mr Marshall KC directed

at Dr Proudman;

c. the Bar Standards Board not investigating tweets by Mr George KC directed at

Dr Proudman;

d. the Bar Standards Board not bringing charges against male barrister Jolyon
Maugham KC;

e. The Bar Standards Board not investigating tweets by male barristers directed at
Dr Proudman;

f. The Bar Standards Board taking into account Dr Proudman’s ‘pursuit of the
cause of campaigning for women’s rights’ in deciding to refer her to a
disciplinary tribunal.

125. The prosecution of Dr Proudman, especially when coupled with the lack of any action
in respect of any male barristers making comments about judges and the lack of
equivalent treatment of barristers commenting on Dr Proudman, has had the effect of
violating Dr Proudman’s dignity. It has also had the effect of creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading and offensive environment for her.

H. BREACH OF PUBLIC SECTOR EQUALITY DUTY

(1) The law

126. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 provides, so far as relevant:

149 Public sector equality duty

(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the
need to—

(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other

conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant

protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected
characteristic and persons who do not share it.

(2) A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions
must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters mentioned
in subsection (1).

57
(3) Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between
persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not
share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

(a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a

relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic;

(b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected
characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;

(c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to

participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such
persons is disproportionately low.

(4) …

(5) Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who
share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves
having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

(a) tackle prejudice, and

(b) promote understanding.

(6) Compliance with the duties in this section may involve treating some persons
more favourably than others; but that is not to be taken as permitting conduct
that would otherwise be prohibited by or under this Act.

(7) The relevant protected characteristics are—

1. age;
2. disability;
3. gender reassignment;
4. pregnancy and maternity;
5. race;
6. religion or belief;
7. sex;
sexual orientation.

(8) A reference to conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act includes a

reference to—

(a) a breach of an equality clause or rule;

(b) a breach of a non-discrimination rule.

(9) Schedule 18 (exceptions) has effect.

58
(2) Submissions

127. In initiating and pursuing these proceedings, the Bar Standards Board has, in the
exercise of its public functions, acted in breach of the public sector equality duty under
s 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

128. Dr Proudman’s tweets set out her concerns about the minimisation by judges of
domestic abuse. She is exceptionally well-placed to offer comment in this area given
her academic and professional expertise.

129. By initiating and pursuing proceedings about tweets setting out a female barrister’s
sincerely held concerns about the minimisation by judges of domestic abuse, the Bar
Standards Board has not had due regard to:

a. the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other

conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010;

b. the need to advance equality of opportunity between men and women, and for
those who hold and manifest a belief in feminism and those who do not. This
entails having due regard, in particular to the need to (i) remove or minimise
disadvantages suffered by women that are connected to being women and/or
persons holding or manifesting feminist beliefs; (ii) take steps to meet the needs
of women that are different from the needs of men and/or persons holding or
manifesting feminist beliefs; (iii) encourage women to participate in public life
or in any other activity in which participation by women is low and/or persons
holding or manifesting feminist beliefs;

c. the need to eliminate and foster good relations between men and women, and
between those holding or manifesting feminist beliefs and those who do not.
This entails having due regard, in particular, to the need to (i) tackle prejudice;
and (ii) promote understanding.

130. The Bar Standards Board is sending the wrong message – and breaching the public
sector equality duty – by bringing and continuing the prosecution against Dr Proudman
and not even investigating seriously offensive, gender-based, derogatory comments,
designed to demean and/or insult, made by barristers and directed at Dr Proudman. This
is particularly so given the comments by the then Chair of the Bar Council about the
tweets by barristers and the misogynistic, sexist and bullying behaviour directed at Dr
Proudman, the gendered nature of bullying at the Bar by male barristers towards female
barristers, the comments by the Legal Services Board and the comments by the four
special rapporteurs appointed by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council to the UK
government in their letter dated 16 May 2024 (as set out above).

131. Compliance with the duties in s 149 of the Equality Act 2010 may involve treating
women more favourably than men. The Bar Standards Board has done the exact
opposite.

59
I. BREACH OF ARTICLE 6 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

132. Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides:

‘(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with
a Convention right.’

133. The Convention Rights include (see s 1(1) to (3) of the Human Rights Act 1998):

a. Article 6(1):

‘Right to a fair trial

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal

charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may
be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.’

b. Article 10:

‘Freedom of expression

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and

responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’

60
 c. Article 14:

‘Prohibition of discrimination

The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’

134. In DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3, the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights said at para 175:

‘The Court has established in its case law that discrimination means treating differently,
without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar
situations.58 However, Art.14 does not prohibit a Member State from treating groups
differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them; indeed in certain
circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may
in itself give rise to a breach of the Article.59 The Court has also accepted that a general
policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group
may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at
that group,60 and that discrimination potentially contrary to the Convention may result
from a de facto situation.61

58 Willis v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 21 at [48]; and Okpisz v Germany (2006) 42 E.H.R.R.
32 at [33].
59 Belgian Linguistic Case (1979–80) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at [10]; Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 E.H.R.R.
15 at [44]; and Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 47 at [51].
60 Jordan (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 2 at [154]; and Hoogendijk (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. SE22.
61 Adami (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 3 at [76].’

135. The Grand Chamber said at para 177:

‘As to the burden of proof in this sphere, the Court has established that once the
applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it
was justified.64

64 See, among other authorities, Chassagnou v France (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 615 at [91]–[92]; and
Timishev (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 37 at [57].’

136. In O’Connor v Bar Standards Board [2014] EWHC 4324 (QB), Warby J said at para
62 in relation to indirect discrimination (there being no claim of direct discrimination
in that case) (point not considered on appeal):

‘The decision in DH does appear to me to support the proposition that a prima facie
case of indirect discrimination contrary to Article 14 can be made out by proving that,
in a case where the facts are within the ambit of another Convention right, the applicant
is a member of a group which has been treated differently in practice from others in a
comparable situation, in a way which is disproportionately prejudicial to members of
that group. DH also shows that in an appropriate case statistics may be relied on to
establish the difference in treatment, and thereby shift the onus to the state (or, in

61
 domestic proceedings, the public body concerned) to provide evidence of an objective
and reasonable justification for the difference.’

137. In Orsus v Croatia (2011) 52 EHRR 7, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights said in relation to article 14 at para 181:

‘…whenever discretion capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a Convention right

is conferred on national authorities, the safeguards available to the individual will be
especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the
regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation.45

45 See Buckley (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 101 at [76], and Connors (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 9 at [83].’

138. In Horvath v Hungary (No 11146/11) (2013), the European Court of Human Rights said
in relation to article 14:

‘107. When it comes to assessing the impact of a measure or practice on an individual

or group, statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant
will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to
produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved
without statistical evidence (see D.H. and Others, cited above, § 188).

108. Where an applicant alleging indirect discrimination establishes a rebuttable

presumption that the effect of a measure or practice is discriminatory, the burden of
proof shifts to the respondent State. The latter must show that the difference in treatment
is not discriminatory (see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others, loc. cit.). Regard
being had in particular to the specificity of the facts and the nature of the allegations
made in this type of case (see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others, cited above, §
147), it would be extremely difficult in practice for applicants to prove indirect
discrimination without such a shift in the burden of proof.’

139. In initiating and pursuing these disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Standards Board has
discriminated against Dr Proudman contrary to article 6 in conjunction with article 14
in that:

a. because of her sex (a protected characteristic under article 14), it has treated her
less favourably than it treated male barristers in relevantly similar situations.
The less favourable treatment includes according Dr Proudman’s article 10
rights less respect than is accorded to the article 10 rights of male barristers. Dr
Proudman relies on the matters set out above in relation to direct discrimination
contrary to the Equality Act 2010.

b. she is a member of a group (female barristers) which has been treated differently
in practice from others in a comparable situation (male barristers) in a way
which is disproportionately prejudicial to members of that group. The prejudice
includes according the article 10 rights of female barristers less respect than is
accorded to the article 10 rights of male barristers. Dr Proudman relies on the
matters set out above in relation to indirect discrimination and breach of the
public sector equality duty contrary to the Equality Act 2010. These matters are

62
 sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the Bar Standards Board to show that
the difference in treatment is not discriminatory.

J. BREACH OF LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007

140. Under s 28(2)(a) of the Legal Services Act 2007, the Bar Standards Board is required,
so far as reasonably practicable, to act in a way which is compatible with the regulatory
objectives under s 1 of the 2007 Act. The regulatory objectives include protecting and
promoting the public interest.

141. A fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts set out above, would
expect the Bar Standards Board to take disciplinary action against the barristers who
have been bullying, harassing and abusing Dr Proudman on twitter. They would not
expect the Bar Standards Board to decline to act in relation to the conduct of those other
barristers. They certainly would not expect the Bar Standards Board to decline to act,
and instead to bring disciplinary proceedings against Dr Proudman for drawing
attention to a matter of significant public importance within her field of expertise as a
barrister and academic.

142. Further, for the reasons set out above, by bringing and continuing the prosecution
against Dr Proudman, the Bar Standards Board is putting itself on the wrong side of an
important public debate which is directly relevant to its regulatory objectives under the
Legal Services Act 2007 including protecting and promoting the public interest and
encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession.

K. ABUSE OF PROCESS

143. For the reasons set out above, the disciplinary proceedings against Dr Proudman were
initiated and pursued by the Bar Standards Board:

a. In breach of the Equality Act 2010:

v. The Bar Standards Board has directly discriminated against Dr

Proudman in breach of s 53(2)(c) and s 13 of the Equality Act 2010;

vi. The Bar Standards Board has indirectly discriminated against Dr

Proudman in breach of s 53(2)(c) and s 19 of the Equality Act 2010;

vii. The Bar Standards Board has harassed Dr Proudman in breach of s

53(3)(a) and s 26 of the Equality Act 2010;

viii. The Bar Standards Board has, in the exercise of its public functions,
acted in breach of the public sector equality duty under s 149 of the
Equality Act 2010; and/or

b. In breach of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in

conjunction with article 14.

144. The proceedings brought by the Bar Standards Board against Dr Proudman are an abuse
of the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service process:

63
 a. It is an abuse of process to initiate and pursue proceedings which are an
affront to justice/the public conscience: see R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48,
[2011] 1 WLR 1837 and Hamilton v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577.

b. Under s 28(2)(a) of the Legal Services Act 2007, the Bar Standards Board is
required, so far as reasonably practicable, to act in a way which is compatible
with the regulatory objectives under s 1 of the 2007 Act. The regulatory
objectives include protecting and promoting the public interest.

c. Public policy/the public interest requires the preservation of the integrity of

the justice system: see Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467.

d. The Bar Standards Board is a public authority within the meaning of s 6 of

the Human Rights Act 1998. Under s 6 of the 1998 Act it is unlawful for the
Bar Standards Board to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention
right. The Convention rights include arts 6 and 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: s 1(1)(a) of the 1998 Act.

145. For the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service Disciplinary Tribunal to be asked to
hear proceedings against Dr Proudman which were initiated and pursued by the Bar
Standards Board in breach of article 6 in conjunction with article 14 and/or in breach
of the Equality Act 2010 would be an affront to justice/the public conscience and
contrary to public policy/the public interest.

L. CONCLUSION

146. For the reasons set out above, all charges against Dr Proudman should be struck out
under rE127.2 of the Bar Handbook, and Dr Proudman asks the Directions Judge to
direct accordingly.

ALISON PADFIELD KC
SOPHIE BELGROVE

28 August 2024

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 2022/1204/D3
COUNCIL OF THE INNS OF COURT
BAR TRIBUNALS ADJUDICATION SERVICE

BAR STANDARDS BOARD

– and –

DR CHARLOTTE PROUDMAN

_______________________________________________

APPENDIX:
DR PROUDMAN’S TWEETS IN CONTEXT1
_______________________________________________

A. Dr Proudman’s tweets sent between 2 and 4 March 2022 (in context)

The Bar Standards Board investigated these tweets (putting a formal allegation to Dr
Proudman to which she was required to respond) and then decided to withdraw the
allegation

1. On 2 March 2022, Dr Proudman sent a tweet setting out her concerns about the
treatment of matrimonial domestic abuse in the family courts. It was not sent to Mr
Phillip Marshall KC, nor was it about him. Dr Proudman had blocked Mr Marshall KC,
who tweets under the name ‘pjm1kbw’, on 3 January 2022. She did not know that
‘pjm1kbw’ was Mr Marshall KC.

2. Dr Proudman’s tweet said:

‘If I hear one more time that a shove, a slap, screaming in her face is just part and
parcel of matrimonial life, I may actually scream. If this is true, never ever get
married. But it’s not true. It’s a myth peddled by perpetrators & the courts to
undermine the gravity of abuse.’

3. A little later that day she added:

‘Abuse in marriage is definitely not normal. So why is it normalised?’

4. The following day, on 3 March 2022, despite being blocked, Mr Marshall KC posted a
screenshot of the first of Dr Proudman’s tweets and tweeted as follows, publicly
belittling and dismissing Dr Proudman’s views:
‘In 32 years of practicing in the family courts I have never (ever) heard any court or
judge say or even suggest this’.

5. When Dr Proudman became aware of Mr Marshall posting a screenshot of her tweet

and his reply, she sent the following tweet:

1
Ie with the surrounding tweets and the materials which were quoted or linked to in the tweets – omitted
by the Bar Standards Board when quoting the tweets in the charges).

i
 ‘In 32 years I have no idea where you’ve been. It’s surprising that a family law
barrister has not bothered to read the MOJ Harm Report or H-N and others or every
single successfully appealed domestic abuse & rape case. This is gaslighting and I
won’t stand for it.’

6. Mr Faisel Sadiq, Gatehouse Chambers, replied to Mr Marshall and tagged Dr

Proudman:
‘I find it very depressing.
It seems to be a regular occurrence that @DrProudman tweets something that is
likely to undermine confidence in the courts…’

7. A female Family Law barrister and former client of Dr Proudman (@counselconf)

replied to Mr Sadiq and tagged Dr Proudman:
‘This happened to me. All DA allegations were struck out except for one serious
physical by Magistrates. I appealed. I won. Then had a shit show of a fact-finding
hearing. I appealed again. I won (again).’

‘I was advised not to appeal the outcome of the FFH by a very well regard QC.
@DrProudman gave me the courage to appeal – and won it. Because of Charlotte’s
work there are a flood of FFH that are currently being appealed and reheard.’

8. Dr Proudman replied to @counselconf, who had had a traumatic experience in the

family court, with the aim of supporting her. She wrote:
‘I despair’

9. Dr Proudman further replied to @counselconf:

‘He hasn’t even bothered to read by appeal win in GK. The judge said verbal abuse
was stuff of a “MATRIMONIAL ROW”. How embarrassing.

[Link to the case of GK v PR and a screenshot of a quote from the judgment as

follows:
‘A number of specific allegations were grouped together by counsel for GK, and that
approach was adopted by the judge. GK’s allegations against PR included words or
phrases such as: “dirty”, “fat”, “a tramp”, “fucking stupid”, “worthless”, “fat bitch”,
“fucking die”… The judge found that unkind things were said, but concluded that
none of them, whether individually or collectively, amounted to coercive control. In
one passage of his judgment, he refers to them as “shouting, name-calling,
accusations of ungratefulness, asking [GK] to leave the home and so on. They are
the stuff of many a “matrimonial row”. Again, I tend to the view that the judge was
underplaying the significance of such words…’].

10. Dr Proudman further replied to @counselconf:

‘I have no idea where he’s been for 32 years. I wouldn’t fancy my chances as his
client’.

11. A survivor of domestic abuse, @KeiraSharp18, wrote several replies to people

commenting on Mr Marshall KC’s tweets. She tweeted:
‘@DrProudman is the one person who helps fight the family courts when they make
appalling decisions and horrendous remarks against victims who have already been

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 traumatised. Just because two MEN (how convenient that it’s males saying this cr@p)
doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.’

‘@DrProudman She is incredible and she sees what the victims endure with these
judges who look the other way when women have been beaten, raped and abused.
She helps victims fight and gets their voices heard. So it may appear depressing but
it’s reality of how bad these Judges are’

‘I have it in black and white where my abuser did the things listed above and the
judge called it nothing more than a ‘matrimonial row’ I’d be happy to show you the
judgement he typed it in.’

12. Dr Proudman replied to @KeiraSharp18:

‘Frankly Kiera, it says it all. How many times have the courts made victim-blaming
and minimising statements and these male layers have totally failed to see it? In fact,
they might have thought the comments were okay. It’s shameful’

13. Separately, Dr Proudman tweeted:

‘‘Daddy issues’ cropped up today. I thought about @DrJessTaylor’s tweet and went
back to find it. It needs framing. It’s worthy of a wall print.’

With this tweet, Dr Proudman reposted @DrJessTaylor’s tweet (from 17 November

2021) on the subject. It said:
‘Intrigues me that the world denies how common male violence & abuse of girls and
women is, but then created an entire phrase and genre for it and called it ‘daddy
issues’ – which weirdly isn’t seen as a problem in the dads who cause the ‘issues’, but
is a problem in the girls…’.

14. On 4 March 2022, Dr Proudman reposted her first tweet sent on 2 March 2022 and
tweeted a 13 part evidence-based thread. This was a full thread in support of her original
post. It said:

1/13 (posted as a reply to Dr Proudman’s first tweet on 2 March 2022):‘1/13. Some

lawyers seem to be struggling to comprehend that courts minimise & undermine
domestic abuse. It’s not one bad apple. The MOJ said these aren’t “rare events” in
family courts. So, I’ve put together recommended reading THREAD [below]’’

2/13: ‘MOJ ‘Harm’ Report, “Submissions highlighted a feeling that abuse is

systematically minimised, ranging from children’s voices not being heard, allegations
being ignored, dismissed or disbelieved, to inadequate assessment of risk, traumatic
court processes”. [link to justice.gov.uk and screenshot quoting the report:
‘Despite these inherent limitations, we are persuaded that the evidence gathered does
identify systemic problems with how family courts deal with domestic abuse cases and
cases raising other risks of harm in private law children cases. It is unlikely that the
panel has managed to uncover only isolated mistakes or rare events. The evidence
does point to issues affecting multiple cases across the system and with potentially
serious effects, although we were also able to identify instances of good practice.
There are a number of reasons for reaching that conclusion.]’

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3/13: ‘Re B-B (from H-N & Ors): The Judge said to the mother if you carry on with
your rape/DA allegations “the child will be taken into care and adopted”. The CoA
said, “it is hard to imagine a more serious and frightening prospect for any mother”.
[link to bailii.org]’

4/13: ‘I represented Ms B-B at a re-trial. The Judge found rape & DA so thank
goodness she did “carry on”. The High Court Judge, “She was, for much of her
evidence, extremely discussed and at times she sobbed uncontrollably. I find that her
distress was genuine” [like to bailii.org]

5/13: ‘“I am satisfied that she was truly intimidated by the family court process & in
all likelihood carried with her considerable distress from her earlier experience of a
family court hearing (August 2019) in which the judge threatened the remove of her
child” & she won the appeal.’

6/13 ‘Re T (from H-N & Ors): A Judge found that, “putting a plastic bag over her
head before saying that “this was the way she would die” could be regarded as a
“prank”. The CoA said, “This was, in our judgment, the second of two intimidating
and highly abusive incidents”.’

7/13: repost of previous thread starting, ‘1/11 This is the appeal I won last week. GK,
my client, made allegations of rape, domestic abuse & coercive control. The trial
Judge did not remotely consider the impact of his actions in failing to give her special
measures. This is the second such case. [link to bailii.org]’

8/13: repost of previous thread starting, ‘1/10 I want to share one of my recent appeals
that I won [emoji]. The mother’s allegations of rape, domestic abuse & coercive
control were not proved…so I appealed! This thread shows that the family courts still
don’t understand how vulnerable complainants are [link to bailii.org]’

9/13: ‘JH v MF. “This is senior judge, a Designated Family Judge, a leadership judge
in the Family Court, expressing a view that, in his judgment, it is not only permissible
but also acceptable for penetration to continue after the complainant has said no”.
[link to judiciary.uk]’

10/13: ‘Re A. “The judge referred to…the absence of violence during the
relationship. He wrongly gave this substantial significance…The reality is that some
injuries from physical abuse can heal. The psychological effects of emotional abuse
can last forever.” [link to bailii.org]’

11/13: ‘The family and criminal court system retraumatises victims”, according to a
new report commissioned by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner [link to
safelives.org.uk]. Centre for Women’s Justice, Rights of Women & others continue
this important work, trying to change the justice system.’

12/13: ‘I’ve seen women given evidence in rape trials in the criminal courts and they
have recounded to me how traumatic the process has been. A recent report shows
exactly that:

“The court was said to be more traumatic than the rape’.

iv
 We are failing victims.
[link to telegraph.co.uk article and screenshot of article entitled ‘Rape victims ‘more
traumatised by inadequate trials’ than original attack’]’

13/13: ‘This doesn’t detract from the many brilliant lawyers & Judges – some of them
my colleagues & closest friends. But we ALL have to do better because there’s clearly
a systemic issue that we need to recognise and address.’

15. On 4 March 2022, Dr Proudman retweeting the 13-part thread, adding:

‘Check out the evidence. This isn’t a one off. These attitudes are systemic’

B. Dr Proudman’s tweets sent on 6 April 2022 regarding Treharne v Limb

Some of these tweets form the basis of Charges 1-5

16. On 6 April 2022, Dr Proudman sent 15 tweets (a 14 part tweet and a single tweet at the
end).

17. The first tweet of the 14 part thread was sent as a reply to a Daily Mail article about the
judgment in Treharne v Limb (only the blue text quoted below is set out in the Charges):

‘1/14 I represented Amanda Traharne. She said she was coerced into signing a post-
nuptial agreement by her husband (who is a part-time Judge). I lost the case. I do not
accept the Judge’s reasoning. I will never accept the minimisation of domestic abuse.
[Link to Daily Mail article about Traharne v Limb with the title, ‘Court rips up post-
nup agreement in judge’s£4m divorce’]’

‘2/14 Demeaning the significance of domestic abuse has the affect of silencing
victims and rendering perpetrators invisible. This judgment has echoes of the “boys
club” which still exists among men in powerful positions. I dissect the judgment
below [with a link provided to the judgment].’

‘3/14 Mr Limb hit his wife with a shoe, a “forceful blow”. She confided in her priest
and told the Women’s Centre. In my view this is domestic abuse. But the Judge said,
“I do not think that H intended to hit her, but he was plainly reckless in what he did.”
Reckless??’

‘4/14 “H took hold of some books & threw them in the air. One of them hit W on the
head leaving an abrasion and bruise and at hospital she was also diagnosed with
concussion. W agrees that the books were not thrown at her but once again, I find
that H was reckless”. Reckless again?’

‘5/14 “The clear impression that I have is that this was a relationship that at times
was tempestuous and that H would on occasions lose his temper.” Tempestuous?
Lose his temper? Isn’t this the trivialisation of domestic abuse & gendered
language. This is not normal married life.’

v
‘6/14 “This screams of excusing the alleged perpetrator and blaming the wife. Oh,
he liked vigorous debate and she was quiet – what does she expect? As if his temper
and throwing things at her is permissible. IT’S NOT.

[Screenshot of the following paragraph of the judgment:

‘33. With hindsight it is not difficult to see how these arguments came about because
the parties are of very different character. H has the louder voice and speaks at length.
He loves conversation and vigorous debate. W on the other hand is quieter, she
retreats from confrontation, and bottles things up. She does not enjoy verbal jousting
but dealt with her complaints of H in long accusatory emails. Each was capable of
intensely frustrating the other.’]’

‘7/14 “I do not accept that W was in fear of physical harm. There was no reason for
her to be and she expressly told the police that she did not have such a fear. I do
accept that the arguments and H’s temper during them caused her distress.” I’d fear
physical harm, wouldn’t you?’

‘8/14 “To put it another way, her need to maintain the relationship eclipsed her
cognitive understanding.” This couldn’t be a clearer example of the pathologisation
of a victim and the blaming of a victim - how many women “fail to leave” abuse & so
are culpable? @DrJessTaylor’

‘9/14 “W’s psychological makeup and previous history of relationship breakups had
deprived her of being able to make a rational and considered decision as to what was
in her best interests, this was not caused by H’s conduct.” Judge blames W’s past
relationships & mental illness.

[Screenshot of the following paragraphs of the judgment:

‘Drawing the threads together
52. I am satisfied that at the time the PNA was negotiated and signed W was
vulnerable by reason of her past experiences. She was desperate for the relationship
to work for all sorts of reasons of which her faith was just one. She had invested a
huge amount emotionally in this relationship and could not contemplate any other
scenario. However, the pressure that she was under was self-created.

53. H’s behaviour is relevant only as to whether it led to W entering into the
agreement. I do not find that H’s behaviour can objectively be described as coercive
or controlling or that it led to her entering into the PNA. To put it another way, whilst
W’s psychological makeup and previous history of relationship breakups had
deprived her of being able to make a rational and considered decision as to what was
in her best interests, this was not caused by H’s conduct.’]’

‘10/14 The Judge is undermining not only W’s mental health & wellbeing as a
woman, but he is also throwing a Miss Havisham spin on W, as a failed unstable wife.
Despite the fact it was found that H is violent & has a temper where he drinks &
resorts to aggression.’

‘11/14 The Judge states “I very much regret that so much energy has been devoted
to exploring this subject. The emotional and financial consequences on the parties

vi
 have been considerable. It has also been entirely unnecessary”. An old notion that
women are dramatic & waste our time.’

‘12/14 Let’s move onto H’s ex partner. The Judge turns a blind eye to H’s previous
partner stating that H is controlling. The Judge unnecessarily compares W to H’s
previous partner, insinuating that if W was stronger she too could have avoided H’s
controlling behaviour.

[Screenshot of the following paragraph of the judgment:

‘Other evidence
64. In reaching my conclusions as to the evidence, I have taken into the account the
evidence of the witnesses who I did not hear as well as that of H’s former partner. I
have to say that I did not find any of the other witnesses (other than Dr Jones) to be
of material assistance. They all confirmed that there were difficulties between the
parties. H’s former partner, plainly and self admittedly a lady of very strong character,
claimed that H tried unsuccessfully to control whom she saw and what she did in the
short time that they were together between 2002-2003. Insofar as H may have
exhibited such conduct it plainly had little effect upon her. The other witnesses did
not advance the matter any further than I have mentioned.’]’

‘13/14 “I find that W “has her sights too high” [financially]. A misogynistic tale as
old as time, the woman is failing to get what she wants so she makes dramatic
allegations. This outdated notion puts women’s right & the protection of believing
survivors back years.’

‘14/14 The positives: the Judgment makes clear that coercive and controlling
behaviour (duress) is relevant when determining if a pre- or post-nuptial agreement
is valid in principle. The judgment makes clear that abuse is objectively determined
& his intention is irrelevant.’

18. The single tweet at the end said:

‘The judgment failed to even mention key definitions of domestic abuse and coercive
and controlling behaviour. It’s rather surprising given the case centered on whether
the wife was coercively controlled by the husband. See Section 1 Domestic Abuse Act
2021 & draft guidance & PD12J

[Screenshot of the definitions of ‘coercive behaviour’ and ‘controlling behaviour’

posted:

‘“coercive behaviour” means an act or pattern or acts of assault, threats, humiliation

and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim;

“controlling behaviour” means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person

subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting
their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed
for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour;’.

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