THE CHALLENGE OF

© JOEL W. ROGERS/CORBIS

Common-Pool R
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l Resources by Elinor Ostrom
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 I
n 1987, the World Commission on
Environment and Development
(WCED) released its seminal report,
Our Common Future, which created a
serious discussion about how we should
engage in sustainable development of the

© JOHN CARNEMOLLA/CORBIS
world’s future, including how to address
global resource systems, or “commons.”1
In the two decades that followed, humans
have failed to halt the tragedy of massive
overfishing of the oceans, major defores-
tation, and excessive dumping of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. However, in
Without clear property rights, fisheries can harvest as much as they want, leading to
some specific niches, such as the Maine massive overfishing of the world’s oceans.
lobster fishery, the commons are in better
condition today than they were a decade William Clark of the Harvard Ken- have been achieved at growing costs in
or two ago. nedy School of Government evaluated the the form of the degradation of many eco-
Part of the reason for the mixed results impact of the Brundtland Commission’s system services, increased risks of non-
is that most common-pool resources dif- work for Environment a decade after its linear changes, and the exacerbation of
fer vastly from one another. Many gov- release.5 Clark reflected that many disap- poverty for some groups of people. These
ernment officials and policy analysts’ pointments, resignations, and increased problems, unless addressed, will substan-
advocacy of a single idealized solution cynicism were expressed at the interna- tially diminish the benefits that future
for all of these resources has been a key tional meetings held to evaluate progress generations obtain from ecosystems.8
part of the problem instead of the solu- toward sustainable development. In addi-
tion.2 Further, many of the most pressing tion to the major disappointments of the Thus, the most recent worldwide review
problems future generations will face are decade, Clark found some more optimistic of our common future warned that major
on a global scale. Establishing effective developments. To see these, he argued, changes threatened our future. The MEA
governance arrangements on this scale also advised that policymakers search for
has proved to be more difficult than on a requires a shift in perspective from the solutions for specific niches rather than
local scale. current short-term, global view of inter- generalized problems and avoid standard-
As the WCED noted in its report, “the national environmental diplomacy to lon- ized solutions.
traditional forms of national sovereignty ger term and more local views of sustain- Looking ahead toward long-term effec-
are increasingly challenged by the realities able development. These views cannot be tive management of resource systems on
of ecological and economic dependence. found in any one spot. . . . The pictures a global scale, several important questions
Nowhere is this more true than in shared they provide are, of course, mixed, with require examination: What are “the com-
ecosystems in ‘the global commons.’”3 Yet their own share of environmental horrors, mons?” How successful have efforts been
the WCED, headed by then–Norwegian economic greed, and program failures. to sustain the world’s oceans and forests
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, But compared with 20, 10, or even 5 since the publication of the Brundtland
challenged scholars, public officials, and years ago, the extent to which notions of report? What role do international regimes
citizens to recognize that we all share a sustainability have entered mainstream play in a sustainable future? What lessons
common future. That future is severely development thinking is astounding.6 have scholars learned about adaptive gov-
threatened, however, if we do not focus ernance of common-pool resources over
on how to protect our common heritage A few years later, from 2001–2005, the past 20 years that can be applied to the
while endeavoring to achieve greater eco- the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment next 20 years and beyond?
nomic returns for the peoples of the world. (MEA) conducted a massive review of
The WCED conceived “environment” as the state of the world’s ecosystems and
where people live, and “development” their services.7 Their first major finding The Commons and
as how people try to improve their lives. was that the change to ecosystems during Common-Pool Resources
In Our Common Future, the commis- the past half-century has been more rapid
sion wrote, “Humanity has the ability to than any comparable period in human his- Scholars are still in the process of devel-
make development sustainable—to ensure tory. Their second major finding was that oping a shared language for the broad set
it meets the needs of the present without while these changes have led to substan- of things called “the commons.” Com-
compromising the ability of future genera- tial net gains in economic development mons refer to systems, such as knowledge
tions to meet their own needs.”4 and human well-being, the gains and the digital world, in which it is dif-

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 ficult to limit access, but one person’s use be roughly grouped as governmental, Continued Overharvesting
does not subtract a finite quantity from private, or community ownership. of Ocean Fisheries
another’s use.9 In contrast, common-pool Since the WCED report, a considerable
resources are sufficiently large that it is number of common-pool resources are Chapter 10 of the Brundtland report
difficult, but not impossible, to define comanaged by communities working with presents a grim picture of ocean fisheries’
recognized users and exclude other users governments.12 Depending on the setting, management. In 1979, according to data
© JOHN CARNEMOLLA/CORBIS

altogether. Further, each person’s use of government ownership, private property, cited in this chapter, the total volume of
such resources subtracts benefits that oth- community property, and comanagement fish captured (from wild fisheries and
ers might enjoy.10 Fisheries and forests may succeed or fail in sustaining resources aquaculture—cultivating fish, especially
are two common-pool resources that are and providing good economic returns.13 for food) was more than 70 million tons,
of great concern in this era of major Open-access resources—common-pool and overexploitation threatened many
ecological challenges. Others include irri- resources that anyone can enter and/or fishery stocks. “With conventional man-
gation systems, groundwater basins, pas- harvest—are likely to be overharvested agement practices, the growth era of fish-
tures and grazing systems, lakes, oceans, and potentially destroyed. In his classic eries is over,” the report predicted.15
and the Earth’s atmosphere.11 Chapter article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” The situation has not improved in the
10 of the Brundtland report primarily leading ecologist Garrett Hardin confused 20 years since the report was issued,
discusses the problematic condition of open-access commons with commons that although at first glance, the data might
common-pool resources in the late 1980s; are the joint property of a community.14 seem to indicate the WCED’s prediction
thus this update will focus on common- While Hardin correctly pointed out that was incorrect. Table 1 below presents
pool resources. valuable open-access common-pool world fish catch data in major regional
Common-pool resources may be resources would be overharvested, his fisheries from 1979 through 2005.16 The
governed and managed by a wide variety conclusion of an inevitable tragedy was total volume of fish caught in major
of institutional arrangements that can too sweeping. fisheries around the world has doubled in

Table 1. World fish catch in major fisheries, 1979–2005

Region Catch Five-year trends in total world catchb Catch
(thousand 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 (thousand
tons) tons)

1979a 2005c
North Atlantic 14,667 –3.33 –6.5 5.17 –0.15 –3.69 13,278
North Pacific 20,303 27.41 12.6 3.88 12.04 3.37 38,559
Central Atlantic 6,064 5.8 6.36 –5.22 3.34 –4.54 6,883
Central Pacific 7,536 7.28 19.06 14.07 3.54 14.73 13,800
Indian Ocean 3,541 22.42 6.12 44.4 10.77 13.43 9,231
South Atlantic 4,420 0.53 13.55 2.87 5.71 –8.61 3,682
South Pacific 7,242 33.22 43.43 44.23 –15.3 –0.56 16,188
Inland 7,240 30.96 31.24 29.44 35.82 24.01 37,921

Total world catch 71,013 14.96 16.61 19.23 8.86 7.02 141,403
SOURCES:
a
As reported in World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 267.
b
Based on data from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Fisheries and Aquaculture Information
and Statistics Service, Global Aquaculture Production, 1950–2005 and Global Capture Production, 1950–2005 (Rome: FAO,
2007), http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16073 (accessed 8 April 2008).
c
Column 2005 does not add due to rounding. Total data for 1980 to 2004 is from the WCED, Our Common Future (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 267; and FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Information and Statistics Service, Global
Aquaculture Production, 1950–2005 and Global Capture Production, 1950–2005 (Rome: FAO, 2007), http://www.fao.org/
fishery/topic/16073 (accessed 8 April 2008).

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 size from 70 million tons in 1979 to 141 a model of stock regeneration for northern of local institutions to respond.”26 Due to
million tons in 2005. A closer look reveals cod that scientists later determined was developments in the technology of fish-
that this prediction is true for developed flawed.23 Further, highly aggregated and ing, large, high-powered boats can zoom
countries, where the volume of catch has incomplete data was used in deciding into a local fishery, massively harvest it
steadily declined since 1979. As of 2005, on quotas. Even though local fishers in for a valuable species in the international
just 20 percent of the total catch is now Newfoundland feared a collapse was near, market, and then move to another location
harvested in developed-country fisheries. the Canadian DFO assured everyone that before local authorities respond. These
On the other hand, harvesting from fisher- the cod fishery was recuperating from roving bandits have depleted the sea
ies of developing countries, but not neces- earlier excessive harvests. In 1992, how- urchin fisheries in Japan, Korea, Mexico,
sarily by local fishers, has continued to ever, they reversed earlier policies and Chile, Russia, Alaska, the eastern coast of
grow and is now 80 percent of the vastly declared a moratorium on all fishing for Canada, and the northwestern and north-
increased overall total. The proportion of northern cod in Canadian waters.24 The eastern coasts of the United States.
the world’s total catch that is derived from real tragedy here is that the local fishers, While the news related to ocean fisher-
aquaculture—again largely in the devel- who had established local rules for man- ies and many coastal fisheries is bleak,
oping world—has also steadily risen.17 aging the fishery before the government’s it is not entirely grim for fishery stocks
While the harvesting volume has doubled, intervention and were the backbone of on all coasts. In the state of Maine, for
the population of many species harvested local economies, paid the cost of the col- example, local fishers and state officials
for food has declined or disappeared.18 A lapse rather than the officials who had not have successfully evolved ways to man-
basic problem leading to massive overfish- listened to them. The cod fishery has not age lobster stocks. The fishery underwent
ing in the oceans is the lack of any property yet recovered: the cod fishers have had to a major shock around 1930 when the
rights for the many commercially valuable leave local villages, find jobs elsewhere, stocks fell sharply for unknown rea-
species in the open ocean. Most of the or go on welfare. sons. Since that time, stocks have risen
ocean fisheries are truly open access. Fish- Setting scientifically recommended substantially and are now higher than
ery after fishery has been subject to massive fishing quotas for large coastal fisher- they were in the nineteenth century. This
overfishing, including the tuna and whale ies—even when official authority resurgence is due to favorable environ-
fisheries in the Pacific, the cod fishery in exists—frequently has been difficult and mental conditions combined with the
the Atlantic, and the lobster and conch fish- conflict-laden for public officials. The evolution of effective rules of diverse
eries in the Caribbean.19 2007 Fishing Quota established by the origins. State legislature passed formal
In 1982, the United Nations Confer- European Union for eastern Baltic cod, conservation laws as a first set of rules
ence on the Law of the Sea did remove for example, ignored the warning of the in response to substantial lobbying from
around one-third of the oceans from the International Council for the Exploitation fishers and their associations. These rules
international realm by establishing Exclu- of the Sea (ICES), the scientific body give effective protection to juvenile lob-
sive Economic Zones (EEZs) that extend advising the European Union on catch sters and proven breeding stock as well
200 nautical miles along the oceanic bor- sizes, which strongly advised skipping at as limit the number of lobster traps. A
ders of coastal states. EEZs assign sover- least one year in authorizing any catch.25 second set of territorial rules developed
eign powers to coastal states to manage Even the reduced catch levels set for by fishers allocate fishing locations to
these resources and assure they are not western Baltic cod remained 30 percent fishers living near and fishing from a par-
endangered by overexploitation.20 That over the level recommended by ICES. ticular harbor. These rules enable lobster
agreement was heralded by the WCED, Thus, the authority to act and the willing- fishers to monitor each other’s harvesting
which stated “not only do governments ness to make decisions that involve short- with substantial effectiveness.27
now have the legal power and the self- term costs for the fishing industry (even The evolved Maine lobster system
interest to apply sound principles of when it is in their long-term interest) are strikes a relatively delicate balance. James
resource management within this area, not equivalent. Wilson of the University of Maine and
but they have an obligation to do so.”21 A team led by Fikret Berkes of the Uni- colleagues have developed a detailed set
Instead, many governments subsidized an versity of Manitoba’s Natural Resources of simulations showing that if fishers had
expansion of their own national fleets, Institute documents another harvesting not taken substantial responsibility for
leading to increased rather than decreased process practiced by “roving bandits” that monitoring each other’s harvesting behav-
fishing in coastal regions. National gov- is sequentially devastating coastal fisher- ior, the successful fishery would have
ernments also tended to use relatively ies even within EEZs: “Roving banditry is been overharvested—and potentially may
crude models of fishery dynamics in the different from most commons dilemmas have collapsed like many others around
early years of their responsibilities and in that a new dynamic has arisen in the the world.28 In contrast, while interna-
had insufficient data to assess stocks.22 globalized world: New markets can devel- tional groups, state-level public officials,
In Canada, for example, the Depart- op so rapidly that the speed of resource and the fishers tried to regulate the lobster
ment of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) used exploitation often overwhelms the ability fisheries in the Caribbean, none of these

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 © JUDY GRIESEDIECK/CORBIS

Collaboration between state officials and local fishermen to monitor and protect the Maine lobster fishery averted overharvesting in
the region.
groups’ efforts have been able to stem the program in the mid-1980s through the 80 percent to 40 percent in about one
overharvesting of lobster in this region.29 1990s without any major conflict among year.”32 The imposition of an external,
In the November 2007 issue of Environ- participants. but unenforceable, rule destroyed the pre-
ment, Raul P. Lejano and Helen Ingram Tragically, national officials did not existing local rules. Lejano and Ingram’s
of the University of California, Irvine, recognize local rules when they passed article provides a counterargument to the
document a very successful local system the Wildlife Resources Conservation and notion that only government ownership
that evolved over a decade in the Turtle Protection Act in 2001, which prohibted or management solves the problem of
Islands of the Philippines.30 While out- hunting of threatened wildlife and banned the commons, detailing how top-down
siders were deeply involved in the effort the collection of marine turtle eggs. The rulemaking without an awareness of local
to find mechanisms that would control law was largely based on international norms, rules, and evolved institutions can
overfishing of turtle eggs, they worked conventions that stress the importance lead to disaster.
very closely with local fishers and offi- of protecting endangered species. Very With the establishment of EEZs, some
cials to develop a system, the Pawikan soon after the law was passed, “turtle egg coastal fisheries in Canada, New Zealand,
Conservation Project, which was well- conservation in the Turtle Island system and Iceland have been able to develop indi-
matched to the local economy. As can be ceased altogether, and depletion of turtle vidual transferable quota (ITQ) systems
seen in Figure 2 of their article,31 the per- eggs proceeded at an alarming rate. One that have reduced the level of harvesting in
centage of eggs conserved steadily rose preliminary assessment estimates that egg key coastal fisheries. Governments assign
from the commencement of the Pawikan conservation rates dropped from about ITQs, official harvesting quotas, to a fisher

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 that then may use them to harvest his or her of unwanted species. By comparison, ITQ in gathering data and making policies. The
assigned quantity or sell them to another systems that lack an effective monitoring system is still evolving and faces problems
fisher (hence the term “transferable”). system have suffered from considerable related to mismatches among the tempo-
In British Columbia, early governmental underreporting of catch levels. rary and spatial dimensions of the property
policies trying to control overfishing of New Zealand declared its 200-mile EEZ rights assigned to diverse groups.36
the trawl fishery for groundfish included in 1983. In 1986, New Zealand became In 1990, Iceland also introduced an ITQ
restricting the number of fishing vehicles one of the first countries to adopt a market- system after multiple crises in Icelandic
and the equipment that could be used, as based fishery regulation when it adopted a fishery stocks.37 Similar to the evolved
well as assigning total allowable catch quota management system and allocated New Zealand ITQ system, quotas do not
(TAC) and fishing trip quotas. In 1995, ITQs to a subset of domestic fisheries.34 assign fixed quantities but rather a share
of the annual authorized catch level set by
the government. The Iceland ITQ system
appears to have averted the collapse of
many valuable species for the Iceland fish-
ery but has been less successful in restoring
the Icelandic cod stocks. In his analysis of
the long and conflict-ridden road to the Ice-
landic ITQ system, New York University
professor of politics Thráinn Eggertsson38
reflects that introducing major institutional
changes is a “subtle art” compared to
using a simpler “one-size-fits-all” formula.
Designing a system in a top-down fashion
and imposing it on the harvesters is not
as successful as working with the users
of a common-pool resource over time to
develop a system that is well-matched to
the ecological system as well as to the
practices, norms, and long-term economic
welfare of the participants, as was accom-
plished in New Zealand.

Continued Overharvesting of
Forest Resources

Forest resources were not a focus of

chapter 10 of the WCED’s report, but they
have become major news of recent times,
© CORBIS

especially given the impact of deforesta-

tion on global climate change. The MEA
Farmers who clear private land for agriculture contribute to deforestation of the noted that the global area containing
Brazilian rainforest, as shown by the thousands of fields cut into this Rondônian forest. forested land has been cut in half over the
past three centuries:
the fishery was closed, however, due to New Zealand authorities found that the bio-
a major collapse. The DFO reopened the logical models underlying the initial alloca- Forests have effectively disappeared in 25
fishery several years later with new regu- tion of permanent allocation of fixed quotas countries, and another 29 have lost more
lations, including an annual ITQ system.33 needed to be adjusted over time in light of than 90% of their forest cover. Forest
Further, they established a rigorous moni- further evidence. As a result, in 1990, the systems are associated with the regula-
toring program in which onboard observ- commercial fishers received a revised ITQ tion of 57% of total water runoff. About
ers record all catches. The ITQ system has based on a proportion of the total catch 4.6 billion people depend for all or some
collected more valid data, decreased fleet assigned annually.35 Over time, the original of their water on supplies from forest sys-
overcapacity, recorded catch levels close ITQ system has evolved into a comanage- tems. From 1990 to 2000, the global area
to allocated quotas, and reduced discard ment system in which the fishers participate of temperate forest increased by almost

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 3 million hectares per year, while defores- designated protected areas are the best the local culture and history conduct par-
tation in the tropics occurred at an aver- strategy for conserving the world’s for- ticipatory, in-depth studies of the activities,
age rate exceeding 2 million hectares per ests, arguing that many such “paper norms, and rules of local users. In an analy-
year over the past two decades.39 parks” are counterproductive.43 The sis of data from 76 government-owned
International Union for Conservation forests that were legally designated as pro-
As Table 2 on this page shows, total of Nature (IUCN) estimates that about tected forests and 87 public, private, and
hectares of forested land have steadily 10–12 percent of the world’s forested community-owned forested lands that were
declined between 1990 and 2005. The lands are already in protected areas, and not protected and were used for diverse
only major increases in forested areas have the Food and Agriculture Organization purposes, no statistical difference existed
occurred in East Asia, where China has, (FAO) of the United Nations’ Global between vegetation densities of officially
taken aggressive steps to reduce deforesta- Forest Assessment estimates that 479 designated, government-owned protected
tion, and in the Caribbean, where substan- million hectares are inside protected areas and all other property regimes.48
tial urban migration has led to reforesta- areas.44 No question exists that some Monitoring by officials or users of a
tion of the highland areas of Puerto Rico protected areas are very successful in forest makes a consistent difference in
and the Dominican Republic.40 protecting local forests, such as the the forest conditions found in government
Whereas open access to oceans, com- Tikal National Park in Guatemala or the and community forests.49 In fact, findings
pounded by roving bandits and inef- Machadinho d’Oeste reserves in Rondô- from multiple studies of government- or
fective governance in EEZs, is a major nia, Brazil.45 On the other hand, defor- community-managed forests illustrate the
cause of overfishing, one cannot blame estation threatens many areas around the crucial role monitoring played in impacting
the problem of overharvested timber world that are designated as protected the cohesiveness of institutions, as well as
and deforestation on lack of ownership. but are not sufficiently budgeted or the success of diverse forest management
Governmental units own most forested staffed to actually protect the forest.46 initiatives.50 When harvesting rules are
land, while private owners and, to a less- For the past decade, colleagues from effectively monitored and enforced, they
er extent, communities own the remain- a dozen countries have been conducting prevent the spread of freeriding behavior,
ing forested land.41 Some policy analysts studies of forests as part of the Interna- thereby instilling a sense of trust in
call for massive increases in the extent tional Forestry Resources and Institutions the community.
of government-owned protected areas research program.47 At each site, an inter- While many policy analysts think that
as the only way to protect biodiversity disciplinary team measures trees, shrubs, extending private ownership of a common-
and reduce deforestation.42 Others have and groundcover for a random sample of pool resource is an assured method for
called into question whether officially forest plots. Scholars knowledgeable about long-term sustainability, private ownership

Table 2. Change in extent of forest land, 1990–2005

Region Millions of hectares Percent change
1990 2000 2005 1990–2000 2000–2005 1990–2005
Eastern and Southern Africa 252.4 235 226.5 –6.86 –3.62 –10.23
Northern Africa 146.1 136 131 –6.94 –3.61 –10.3
Western and Central Africa 300.9 284.6 277.8 –5.42 –2.38 –7.67
East Asia (including China) 208.2 225.7 244.9 +8.41 +8.51 +17.63
South and Southeast Asia 323.2 297.4 283.1 –7.98 –4.79 –12.39
Western and Central Asia 43.2 43.5 43.6 +0.79 +0.16 +0.95
Europe 989.3 998.1 1001.4 +0.89 +0.33 +1.22
Caribbean 5.4 5.7 6 +6.65 +4.7 +11.66
Central America 27.6 23.8 22.4 –13.76 –5.98 –18.92
North America 677.8 678 677.5 +0.03 –0.07 –0.05
Oceania 212.5 208 206.3 –2.11 –0.86 –2.95
South America 890.8 852.8 831.5 –4.27 –2.49 –6.65

World 4,077.3 3,988.6 3,952 –2.17 –0.92 –3.07

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Forestry Department, http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/fra/en.

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 of forests does not guarantee long-term experiment based on remote sensing and learning can be achieved from compara-
protection. Much of the deforestation across geographic information systems (GIS) tive study of their performances.
the world has occurred as farmers have found that deforestation was not sig- Peter Barnes of the Tomales Bay Insti-
cleared their private land for agricultural nificantly less in regions where large tute and colleagues have proposed an
purposes. In a study of three Amazonian allocations of PES payments had been “Earth Atmospheric Trust” where a global
states in Brazil (Acre, Pará, and Rondônia), invested.54 Hopefully, some of the initial cap-and-trade system is created for all
Indiana University professor Eduardo experiments will provide some insight greenhouse gas emissions and the funds
Brondizio and colleagues used official on how to achieve these complex goals. obtained from auctioning off the permits
deforestation data from the Brazilian-based are deposited in a “trust fund.” The fund
National Institute for Space Research would then invest in technological develop-
(Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais) International Regimes for ment to avert further carbon emissions and
to study the relative contribution of Sustainable Development would also return some of the revenues to
deforested patches of different sizes to total the peoples of the Earth.59 While this idea
deforestation in each state.51 They found Major international problems—such may not be accepted, many imaginative
that clearings associated with smaller-sized as cross-state rivers and lake pollution, concepts need to be seriously discussed in
holdings dominate the number of clearings, transmission of air pollutants across long the immediate future or dreams of sustain-
but the percent of land cleared in areas that distances, and pressures to use outer able development will be defeated by over-
are equal to or larger than 2,000 hectares space and the North and South Poles for looking the threat of carbon emissions.
exceeded 85 percent of total deforested imperial and commercial purposes—have
area in all three states (85.9 in Acre, 91.2 in challenged scholars and public officials
Pará, and 94.5 in Rondônia). Thus, policies to create international regimes for sus- What Have We Learned
to reduce deforestation by communities and tainable uses of these diverse commons.55 Since 1987?
small-scale owners may not directly affect Some large-scale resources have been
the extent of damage in this and many protected successfully through appropri- While many environmental and social
other regions affected by large-scale ate international governance regimes such problems are worse today than two decades
clearing of private land driven largely by as the Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ago, the authors of the WCED report
commodity markets. ozone, which was signed in 1987—the should be congratulated for stimulating an
Another recommendation related to same year the Brundtland report was essential dialogue among scholars, public
both reducing deforestation and decreas- released. Before then, the atmospheric officials, nongovernmental organizations,
ing global warming is payment for envi- concentrations of ozone-depleting sub- and citizens about strategies for achiev-
ronmental services (PES) for protecting stances were increasing faster than those ing sustainable development. Without an
biodiversity and forests.52 PES programs of carbon dioxide; the increases slowed active dialogue, the world would simply
charge residents of the developed world for by the early 1990s, and the concentra- continue on the path toward an unsustain-
protecting ecologically diverse sites in the tion appears to have stabilized in recent able future instead of searching for ways
developing world. The ecological services years.56 The international regime to to avert the disaster that may ensue if we
of these developing countries serve the reduce the human impact on stratospheric do not confront the massive overharvesting
entire world, while the costs of preserva- ozone is widely considered a successful of fisheries and forests around the world,
tion are borne by residents of the developed effort to protect a global commons. as well as the challenge of substantially
world. Proponents stress that PES policies The most pressing commons problem reducing carbon emissions. As a result
are strongly related to sustainable develop- at a global level is the need to reduce of extensive studies, however, we are
ment since payments could be allocated greenhouse gas concentrations substan- learning some key lessons that, if applied,
to poorer residents of tropical forests who tially. While no international regime that may enable the humans living on Earth to
have a financial, as well as a lifestyle, moti- includes all countries has been imple- improve on their past performance.60
vation to protect forests. mented yet, a variety of approaches at
Like other policies that are good in multiple levels are under way.57 One of No Cure-Alls
theory, working out arrangements that the largest regimes in geographic scope
actually achieve both protection and is the European Union Emission Trad- The most important lesson that needs
increased income to the world’s poor ing Scheme, which is a cap-and-trade wide dissemination is that simple pana-
residents has been difficult. A study program that sets an initial upper limit on ceas offered for solving problems related
of the distribution of PES payments emissions levels while assigning tradable to the commons—whether they are for
in Costa Rica, for example, found that property rights to a firm for this limit. In government, private, or community own-
payments tended to be allocated to addition, many voluntary programs have ership—may work in some settings but
large landowners with high incomes.53 been established on multiple scales and fail in others.61 As examples have shown,
A second study of the Costa Rica PES generated diverse results.58 Considerable quick fixes may cause more harm than

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 © TOM STEWART/CORBIS

Consistent monitoring and measurement of forests not only preserve their integrity, but also provide institutions with accurate, up-to-date
information on which to base future decisions.

good.62 Instead, officials and citizens need institutional arrangements fitted to local what the global community has learned
to craft institutions at multiple levels built ecosystems than to try to command it since the Brundtland report,64 Garrett
on accurate data gathered at appropriate from afar.63 Users need to perceive and Hardin’s classic article,65 and the exten-
scales given the type of resource involved. understand the rules as legitimate, or they sive research undertaken by scholars from
Scholars have learned that ecosystems are will invest heavily in illegal harvesting. multiple disciplines related to the study
diverse, complex, and uncertain, and sus- Effective monitoring by officials and users of common-pool resources on multiple
tainable management requires substantial is an essential ingredient of sustainable scales.66 Many scholars now recognize
investment in acquiring accurate data to common-pool resource institutions. The that simple “ideal” solutions imposed
learn more about patterns of interaction specific rules that facilitate low-cost and from the outside can make things worse
and adapt policies over time that are better effective monitoring vary from setting rather than better. The task of designing
fitted to particular systems. to setting depending on ecological as sustainable, complex, coupled human-
Further, policies also have to fit well as social variables. Without active resource systems is indeed always a
with the local culture and institutional monitoring, however, the incentive to struggle. Five basic requirements, how-
environments of those who depend on freeride on the cooperation of others can ever, have been identified from extensive
ecosystems for their livelihood. Thus, generate a tragedy of the commons. multidisciplinary studies of failed and
specific institutional arrangements that successful regimes for governing diverse
work best in a particular location need to Achieving Adaptive commons.67 These include
take into account the appropriate spatial Governance • Achieving accurate and relevant infor-
and temporal scales as well as the type mation. Since the ecological, technologi-
of interactions that occur on the ground. The National Research Council has cal, economic, and social factors affecting
It is better to induce cooperation with convened a series of meetings to assess the performance of any commons regime

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 change over time, information about the regimes. An overemphasis on engineered long-enduring governance regimes relat-
conditions of the resource and its users works such as highways, railways, electric- ed to common-pool resources vary sub-
also needs to be updated regularly. The ity networks, and modern irrigation sys- stantially from one another because of
challenge is combining accurate scientific tems, however, especially if these works resource system diversity, as well as the
understanding of coupled human-environ- are designed without much awareness of social and economic settings of these
mental systems and expected changes in the relevant institutional arrangements of a resources. Rather, a general set of design
these variables over time with information particular regime, may be counterproduc- principles has repeatedly been found to
available to the users about their own future tive. For example, some modern irrigation characterize small- to medium-sized insti-
and the changes they can make in gover- systems are constructed without informa- tutional regimes that were sustainable over
nance as well as use. New challenges aris- tion on farmers’ property rights and cause a long period of time.69 As the box on
ing from the increased speed and spread of considerable disruption.68 The diverse types this page shows, the design principles do
human impacts require adaptations using a of infrastructure need to work and change not specify any particular rule. In light of
combination of scientific and local knowl- together over time. extensive research on the applicability of
edge. New technologies, including remote • Encourage adaptation and change. the design principles, an updated analysis
sensing and GIS, provide more accurate Change is omnipresent. Institutional arrange- is in process.70
information to localities that can be used for ments that are intended to be sustainable
better decisionmaking. Building respectful cannot be fixed for the “long term,” because
collaborations between local users, public they need to change to address past errors The Future of the Commons
officials, and scientific experts is a vital and cope with new developments.
requisite of adaptive governance. No blueprints exist for achieving these The global community has taken a long
• Dealing with conflict. In a coupled requirements. The specific designs of journey since 1987 in its efforts to under-
system that decides how resources are allo-
cated, some conflicts over policies and their
administration are highly likely. Governance DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNING
systems that ignore the possibility of conflict
SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES
over diverse issues may increase the likeli-
hood of these conflicts, which could eventu- The following principles are frequently observed in sustainable
ally erupt into major problems. Setting up institutional regimes:
strict hierarchical systems may increase the
speed of decisions but ignore the interests of • Clearly defined boundaries. The graduated sanctions (depending on the
some participants who eventually erupt and boundaries of the resource system, such seriousness and context of the offense)
potentially destroy an operational system. as irrigation systems or fisheries, and the from other users, officials accountable to
Designing multiple tiers of arenas that can individuals or households with rights to these users, or both.
engage in rapid discovery of conflicts and harvest resource units are clearly defined. • Conflict-resolution mechanisms.
effective conflict resolution is essential. • Proportional equivalence between Users and their officials have rapid access
• Enhancing rule compliance. Passing benefits and costs. Rules specifying to low-cost, local arenas to resolve con-
formal rules should not be confused with the amount of resource products that flict among users or between users and
more informal rules that decisionmakers a user is allocated are related to local officials.
use day-to-day to manage a common-pool conditions and rules requiring labor, • Minimal recognition of rights to
resource. Formal rules may become effec- materials, and/or money inputs. organize. The rights of users to devise
tive when participants consider them legiti- • Collective-choice arrangements. Many their own institutions are not challenged
mate, fair, enforced, and likely to achieve of the individuals affected by harvesting by external governmental authorities, and
intended purposes. External arrangements and protection rules are included in the users have long-term tenure rights to the
are rarely sufficient in and of themselves group who can modify these rules. resource.
to effectively monitor a commons. Rather, • Monitoring. Monitors, who actively • Nested enterprises (for resources
the users of a commons, who are frequent- audit biophysical conditions and user that are parts of larger systems).
ly widely dispersed, need to take some behavior, are at least partially accountable Appropriation, provision, monitoring,
responsibility for monitoring. to users and/or are users themselves. enforcement, conflict resolution, and
• Providing infrastructure. Physical, • Graduated sanctions. Users who vio- governance activities are organized in
technological, and institutional infrastruc- late rules-in-use are likely to receive multiple layers of nested enterprises.
ture is an essential investment to increase
SOURCE: E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
the effectiveness of internal operations
Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 90.
within a commons as well as link any
particular resource and its users to larger

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 Ingram, Prakash Kashwan, Raul P. Lejano, Ruth 17. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the
stand how individuals cope with managing Meinzen-Dick, Ryan Peck, and Vicky Meretsky for United Nations, Fisheries and Aquaculture Information
common resources, as well as other diverse their helpful comments to improve the article; Sarah and Statistics Service, Global Aquaculture Production,
Beam for her active encouragement and comments; 1950–2005 (Rome: FAO, 2007), http://www.fao.org/
economic and ecological situations as they and Patty Lezotte for her excellent editing. This fishery/topic/16073 (accessed 8 April 2008).
try to improve their lives, the lives of their publication was made possible by the United States
18. R. A. Myers and B. Worm, “Rapid Worldwide
Agency for International Development for the Sustain-
children, and lives of their children’s chil- able Agriculture and Natural Resources Management
Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities,” Nature 423
(15 May 2003): 280–83; J. B. C. Jackson et al., “His-
dren. We are now developing better tools for Collaborative Research Support Program under terms
torical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal
of Grant No. EPP-A-00-04-00013-00 to the Office of
analyzing how changes in rules, biophysical International Research and Development (OIRED) at
Ecosystems,” Science 293, no. 5530 (27 July 2001):
629–38; and D. Pauly et al., “Towards Sustainability in
structures, and community attributes affect Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
World Fisheries,” Nature 418 (8 August 2002): 689–95.
resources over time.71 We must, however, For an alternative view stressing some successes among
the many failures, see R. Hilborn, “Reinterpreting the
be modest in our claims to understand these State of Fisheries and Their Management,” Ecosystems
NOTES
complex systems and our attemps to derive 10, no. 8 (2007): 1362–69; and for a recent spatial analy-
sis of the condition of fisheries across the world, see
the best answers. We are fallible humans B. J. Halpern et al., “A Global Map of Human Impact on
1. World Commission on Environment and Devel-
studying fallible human behavior within opment (WCED), Our Common Future (New York:
Marine Ecosystems,” Science 319, no. 5865 (15 February
2008): 948–52.
institutional structures constructed by other Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.
19. J. Sibert, J. Hampton, P. Kleiber, and M. Maunder,
fallible humans. We should not act as if we 2. L. Pritchett and M. Woolcock, “Solutions When
“Biomass, Size, and Trophic Status of Top Predators in
the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in
know for certain how to achieve sustainable Development,” World Development 35, no. 3 (2003):
the Pacific Ocean,” Science 314, no. 5806 (15 December
2006): 1773–76; A. C. Finlayson and B. J. McCay,
development. We can, however, recognize 435–61; E. Ostrom, M. A. Janssen, and J. M. Anderies,
“Crossing the Threshold of Ecosystem Resilience: The
“Going Beyond Panaceas,” Proceedings of the National
our growing capabilities and those of the Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007):
Commercial Extinction of Northern Cod,” in F. Berkes
and J. Colding, eds., Linking Social and Ecological
individuals we study to experiment with 15176–78; and T. P. Hughes, D. R. Bellwood, C. Folke,
Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms
R. S. Steneck, and J. E. Wilson, “New Paradigms
rules, learn from the experiments, and, if for Supporting the Resilience of Marine Ecosystems,”
for Building Resilience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 311–37; C. S. Baker and P. J.
the broader institutional and cultural milieu TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution 20, no. 7 (2005):
Clapham, “Modeling the Past and Future of Whales and
380–86.
facilitates, gradually improve outcomes so 3. WCED, note 1, page 261.
Whaling,” TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution 19, no.
7 (2004): 365–71; and M. Huitric, “Lobster and Conch
they are sustainable over time. 4. WCED, note 1, page 8. Fisheries of Belize: A History of Sequential Exploita-
If the global community can apply these 5. W. C. Clark, “Brundtland +10, Rio + 5,” Environ- tion,” Ecology and Society 10, no. 1 (2005), http://www
ment 39, no. 7 (September 1997): editorial. .ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss1/art21 (accessed 8
lessons, invest in adaptive governance, April 2008).
6. Ibid.
treasure institutional diversity as much as 7. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), 20. United Nations, Final Act of the Third Conference
it treasures biodiversity, and see all poli- Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis Report on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, Jamaica: United
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005), http://www Nations, 1982).
cies as experiments that need to be evalu- .milleniumassessment.org/en/index.aspx (accessed 8 21. WCED, note 1, page 273.
ated over time based on new information, April 2008).
22. C. J. Walters, Adaptive Management of Renew-
we may move toward a more sustain- 8. Ibid., page 5.
able Resources (New York: Macmillan, 1986); and
9. C. Hess and E. Ostrom, eds., Understanding J. Wilson, “Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems,
able path. Let us hope that the next two Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions,” in NRC,
decades are more congruent with sustain- (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). note 11, 327–60.
10. V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, “Public Goods and
able development than the two decades Public Choices,” in M. McGinnis, ed., Polycentric- 23. L. Harris, Independent Review of the State of
since the Brundtland report. ity and Local Public Economies (Ann Arbor, MI: the Northern Cod Stock, prepared for The Honorable
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 75–106; and E. Thomas Siddon, Minister of Fisheries (Ottawa, ON:
Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Communications Directorate, Department of Fisheries
Elinor Ostrom is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of and Oceans, 1990).
Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor, MI: University
Political Science and codirector of the Workshop in
of Michigan Press, 1994). 24. See Finlayson and McCay, note 19; and A. C.
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana Univer-
sity and founding director of the Center for the Study of 11. See National Research Council (NRC), The Finlayson, Fishing for Truth: A Sociological Analysis of
Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University. She Drama of the Commons (Washington, DC: National Northern Cod Stock Assessments from 1977–1990 (St.
is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Academies Press, 2002); and NRC, Proceedings of the John’s, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Ameri- Conference on Common Property Resource Management Research, Memorial University of New Foundland,
can Philosophical Society. She has received the Frank (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1986). 1994).
E. Seidman Prize in Political Economy, Johan Skytte 12. F. Berkes, “Community-Based Conservation in a 25. See A. Burton, “What Future for Fish,” Frontiers
Prize in Political Science, William H. Riker Prize, and Globalized World,” Proceedings of the National Acad- in Ecology and the Environment 4, no. 10 (2006): 508.
James Madison Award from the American Political Sci- emy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007):
15188–93; and C. Kumar, “Whither ‘Community-Based’ 26. F. Berkes et al., “Globalization, Roving Bandits,
ence Association, and the Sustainability Science Award
Conservation,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 52 and Marine Resources,” Science 311, no. 5767 (17
(with Thomas Dietz and Paul Stern) from the Ecological
(30 December 2006): 5313–20. March 2006): 1557–58.
Society of America. She is author or coauthor of Gov-
erning the Commons; Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 13. E. Ostrom, “A Diagnostic Approach for Going 27. J. M. Acheson, Capturing the Commons: Devising
Resources (with Roy Gardner and James Walker); Local Beyond Panaceas,” Proceedings of the National Academy Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry (New
Commons and Global Interdependence (with Robert of Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007): 15181– Haven, CT: University Press of New England, 2003); and
Keohane); The Commons in the New Millennium (with 87; R. Meinzen-Dick, “Beyond Panaceas in Water J. M. Acheson, J. A. Wilson, and R. S. Steneck, “Manag-
Nives Dolšak); The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Politi- Institutions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of ing Chaotic Fisheries,” in F. Berkes and C. Folke, eds.,
cal Economy of Development Aid (with Clark Gibson, Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007): 15200–205; Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management
Krister Andersson, and Sujai Shivakumar); and Under- and H. Nagendra, “Drivers of Reforestation in Human- Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resil-
standing Institutional Diversity. She may be reached at Dominated Forests,” Proceedings of the National ience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
ostrom@indiana.edu. Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007): 1998), 390–413.
15218–23.
The author thanks Gwen Arnold and Frank van 28. J. Wilson, L. Yan, and C. Wilson, “The Precursors
Laerhoven for their help in preparing basic statisti- 14. G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” of Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery,” Proceed-
cal materials for this article; James Acheson, Kris- Science 162, no. 3859 (13 December 1968): 1243–48. ings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (25
ter Andersson, Xavier Basurto, Eduardo Brondizio, 15. WCED, note 1, page 266. September 2007): 15212–17. The lobster fishery also has
Michael Cox, Tom Evans, Burnell Fischer, Helen 16. Ibid. evolved toward a monoculture that leaves it exposed to

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 the threat of diverse ecological problems, including an of Sciences 103, no. 51 (19 December 2006): 19224–31; MIT Press, 1997); R. O. Keohane and E. Ostrom, eds.,
epidemic among the lobster. and E. Moran and E. Ostrom, eds., Seeing the Forest and Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heteroge-
29. Huitric, note 19. the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest neity and Cooperation in Two Domains (London: Sage,
Ecosystems (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 1995); and P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane, and M. A. Levy,
30. R. P. Lejano and H. Ingram, “Place-Based Con- eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Inter-
servation: Lessons from the Turtle Islands,” Environment 47. C. Gibson, M. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds.,
People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and national Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA:
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Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000);
31. Ibid., page 22. 56. E. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer: Sci-
C. Tucker and E. Ostrom, “Multidisciplinary Research
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Cambridge University Press, 2006), 238–40. Decentralized Forest Governance,” World Development Institute, 2003); and G. J. M. Velders, S. O. Andersen,
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34. J. H. Annala, “New Zealand’s ITQ System: Have
E. Ostrom, “Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Cli-
the First Eight Years Been a Success or a Failure?”
from a Polycentric Perspective,” Policy Sciences 41, no. mate,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 6, no. 1 (1996):
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44–62.
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35. T. Yandle and C. Dewees, “Privatizing the Com- Practice (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future,
diameter at breast height or basal area across ecological
mons . . . Twelve Years Later,” in N. Dolak and 2006); and S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The
zones is misleading since these measures are strongly
E. Ostrom, eds., The Commons in the New Millennium: Strategy of Environmental Treaty Making (Oxford:
affected by precipitation, soils, elevation, and other
Challenges and Adaptations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Oxford University Press, 2003). Another urgent need
factors that dramatically vary across zones. Thus, the
Press, 2003), 101–27. is building more extensive networks of greenhouse gas
forester or ecologist who supervises the collection of
36. T. Yandle, “Understanding the Consequences forest data at a set of International Forestry Resources observation sites across the world. See M. Marquis
of Property Rights Mismatches: A Case Study of New and Institutions sites is asked after completing these and P. Tans, “Carbon Crucible,” Science 320, no. 5875
Zealand’s Marine Resources,” Ecology and Society 12, measurements to rate the forest on a five-point scale from (25 April 2008): 460–61. Further, we need to rec-
no. 2 (2007), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/ very sparse to very abundant. This generates a measure ognize the thrust of massive damage to forests from
iss2/art27 (accessed 8 April 2008). of forest condition that is comparable across different uncontrolled insect infestations. See W. A. Kurz et al.,
37. R. Arnason, “The Icelandic Individual Transfer- ecological regions. T. Hayes and E. Ostrom, “Conserving “Mountain Pine Beetle and Forest Carbon Feedback
able Quota System: A Descriptive Account,” Marine the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the Only Way?” to Climate Change,” Nature 452, no. 7190 (24 April
Resource Economics 8, no. 3 (1993): 201–18. Indiana Law Review 38, no. 3 (2005): 595–617; and 2008): 987–90.
38. T. Eggertsson, “The Subtle Art of Major Institu- T. Hayes, “Parks, People, and Forest Protection: An Insti- 58. R. Morgenstern and W. Pizer, Reality Check:
tional Change: Introducing Property Rights in the Ice- tutional Assessment of the Effectiveness of Protected The Nature and Performance of Voluntary Environmen-
land Fisheries,” in G. van Huyleborook, W. Verkeke, and Areas,” World Development 34, no. 12 (2006): 2064–75. tal Programs in the United States, Europe, and Japan
L. Lauwers, eds., Role of Institutions in Rural Policies 49. See articles cited in note 46; and C. Gibson, (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2007).
and Agricultural Models (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), J. T. Williams, and E. Ostrom, “Local Enforcement and 59. P. Barnes et al., “Creating an Earth Atmospheric
43–59; see also T. Eggertsson, Imperfect Institutions: Better Forests,” World Development 33, no. 2 (2005): 273– Trust,” Science 319, no. 5864 (8 February 2008): 724.
Possibilities and Limits of Reform (Ann Arbor, MI: Uni- 84. These findings are supported by a recent meta-analysis 60. D. Cole, Pollution and Property (Cambridge,
versity of Michigan Press, 2005). of 69 case studies of community-managed forests by MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
39. MEA, note 7, page 63. A. Pagdee, Y. S. Kim, and P. J. Daugherty, “What Makes
61. See the special feature, “Going Beyond Pana-
Community Forest Management Successful: A Meta-
40. T. A. Aide and H. R. Grau, “Globalization, Migra- ceas,” in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Study from Community Forests throughout the World,”
tion, and Latin American Ecosystems,” Science 305, no. Sciences 104, no. 39 (25 September 2007): 15176–223.
Society and Natural Resources 19, no. 1 (2006): 33–52.
5692 (2004): 1915–16. 62. T. Sterner et al., “Quick Fixes for the Environ-
50. Nagendra, note 13; R. Ghate and H. Nagendra,
41. A. White and A. Martin, Who Owns the World’s ment—Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?”
“Role of Monitoring in Institutional Performance: For-
Forests? (Washington, DC: Forest Trends, 2002); and Environment 48, no. 10 (December 2006): 20–27.
est Management in Maharashtra, India,” Conservation
A. Agrawal, “Forests, Governance, and Sustainabil- and Society 3, no. 2 (2005): 509–32; N. T. Tran, From 63. R. L. Goldman, B. H. Thompson, and G. C. Daily,
ity: Common Property Theory and its Contributions,” Legal Acts to Village Institutions and Forest Use Prac- “Institutional Incentives for Managing the Landscape:
International Journal of the Commons 1, no. 1 (2007): tices: Effects of Devolution in the Central Highlands of Inducing Cooperation for the Production of Ecosystem Ser-
111–36. Vietnam (Aachen, Germany: Shaker Verlag, 2005); D. B. vices,” Ecological Economics 64, no. 2 (2007): 333–43.
42. See, for example, T. E. Lovejoy, “Protected Areas: Bray, L. Merino-Pérez, and D. Barry, eds., The Commu- 64. WCED, note 1.
A Prism for a Changing World,” TRENDS in Ecology nity Forests of Mexico: Managing for Sustainable Land- 65. Hardin, note 14.
and Evolution 21, no. 6 (2006): 329–33; J. Terborgh, scapes (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005);
66. NRC, note 11.
Requiem for Nature (Washington, DC: Island Press, and M. Teng� et al., “Taboos and Forest Governance:
1999); and R. A. Kramer, C. P. van Schaik, and J. John- Informal Protection of Hot Spot Dry Forest in Southern 67. For an explanation of the requirements for adap-
son, eds., Last Stand: Protected Areas and the Defense Madagascar,” Ambio 36, no. 8 (2007): 683–91. tive governance, see NRC, note 11, chapter 13; and
of Tropical Biodiversity (New York: Oxford University Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, note 45.
51. Data derived from PRODES-INPE (Monitora-
Press, 1997). mento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite) 68. G. P. Shivakoti et al., eds., Asian Irrigation in
43. A. Molnar, S. J. Scherr, and A. Khare, Who deforestation mapping for 2003 for the States of Acre, Transition: Responding to Challenges (New Delhi,
Conserves the World’s Forests? A New Assessment of Pará, and Rondônia, http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/ India: Sage, 2005).
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Forest Trends, 2004). et al., “Smallholders and Deforestation,” in M. Keller, tion of Institutions for Collective Action (New York:
J. Gash, and P. S. Dias, eds., Amazonia and Global Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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Vth IUCN World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa Change: A Synthesis of LBA Research (World Scientific 70. E. Ostrom, “Design Principles for Sustainable
(Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2003); and FAO, Global Publishing, forthcoming). Institutions Related to Forests, Irrigation Systems, and
Forest Resources Assessment 2000: Main Report (Rome: 52. K. Chomitz, P. Buys, G. De Luca, T. S. Thomas, Pastoral Systems,” paper presented at the Lincoln Insti-
FAO, 2001). and S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff, At Loggerheads? Agricul- tute conference, Land Policies and Property Rights,
tural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and Environment in Boston, MA, 2 June 2008.
45. T. Dietz, E. Ostrom, and P. Stern, “The Struggle
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December 2003), supporting online material, http:// 53. S. Zbinden and D. R. Lee, “Paying for Environ- “Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems to Spatial and
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tiveness of Management in Protected Areas,” Bioscience 54. G. A. Sánchez-Azofeifa, A. Pfaff, J. A. Robalino,
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Amazon Deforestation and Fire by Parks and Indigenous ronmental Services Program: Intention, Implementation,
Lands,” Conservation Biology 20, no. 1 (2006): 65–73; and Impact,” Conservation Biology 21, no. 5 (2007):
E. Ostrom and H. Nagendra, “Insights on Linking For- 1165–73.
ests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and 55. O. Young, Global Governance: Drawing Insights
in the Laboratory,” Proceedings of the National Academy from the Environmental Experience (Cambridge, MA:

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 GRADUATE PROGRAMS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
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• Doctoral specialization in Environmental ���������������������������������� � �� ���������������������������������������
Science and Policy ����������������������������������� � � ����������
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GRADUATE
E N V I R O N M E N TA L
EDUCATION

School of the Environment Ten disciplinary and

interdisciplinary degrees offered
Master of Earth For comprehensive information about graduate
environmental education at UNC, contact your
& connection to Carolina’s environmental community –
Environmental the Institute for the Environment.
919-966-9922 • ie@unc.edu
Resources Management www.ie.unc.edu
• MEERM
• JD-MEERM Dual Degree
http://www.sc.edu/environment/
803-777-9153

Master of Studies in
Environmental Law
A unique interdisciplinary degree for
environmental professionals with full-time,
part-time, or summers-only enrollment
options. We offer 50 courses in environmen-
tal law, policy, science, and ethics.

Environmental Law Center

Vermont Law School
elcinfo@vermontlaw.edu
(800) 227-1395 x1201
www.vermontlaw.edu

Center for Energy

and Environmental Policy
• M.A. in Urban Affairs and Public Policy
• M.S. in Environmental and Energy Policy
• Ph.D. in Urban Affairs and Public Policy
• Ph.D. in Environmental and Energy Policy

John Byrne, Director

Web: http://www.udel.edu/ceep

8-21 ENV_Ostrom.indd 21 6/13/08 1:33:33 PM