Citizenry 3
Citizenry 3
Education in Zimbabwe has undergone a long and redefining journey since 1980 in the same way
the country was pursuing developmental aspirations guided by various social and economic
blueprints. Education is primed as the cornerstone of development and industrialization. It drives
industrialization processes. Social and economic development in post independent Zimbabwe has
been guided by various economic blueprints ranging from the Growth with Equity Policy in 1980
to the current National Development Strategy. These policy blueprints have remained at the center
of defining the industrialization agenda for Zimbabwe. Education has remained an important
catalytic tool in the development and industrialization matrix. This chapter examines the intricate
role of education in shaping the country’s industrialization agenda and on the other hand how the
industrialization agenda has shaped the education focus in Zimbabwe.
Although Zimbabwe has made great progress in increasing educational access since achieving
independence, further research is necessary to determine how well the educational system has
sparked industrialization. Concerns about the relevance of the curriculum, skill alignment, and
graduates' capacity to adjust to the changing needs of the industrial sector are still urgent. For
example Zimbabwe has an average skill level of 38% which differ considerably from its literacy
of over 94% (Matorevhu, 2023). Furthermore, concerns concerning the overall efficacy of
educational programs in producing a workforce capable of driving innovation and productivity are
raised by the ongoing disparity between the skills given by the school system and the skills required
by industry. To give insights that can guide policy changes and targeted interventions for a more
symbiotic relationship between education and industry, this study as highlighted above aims to
explore the opportunities and problems at the intersection of post-independence education and
industrialization in Zimbabwe.
In order to guide this discussion, the study shall be presented under the following headings: post-
independence education and industrialization in Zimbabwe, Industrialization, economic growth
and development in Zimbabwe, Social and economic development policies and frameworks 1980
to 2020 and the contribution of education towards industrialization in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe’s education is celebrated to be among the best in Africa. It boasts of a high literacy rate
among its populace, 94% of women and 96 % of men are literate. At independence Zimbabwe
inherited a two-pronged education system which was divided along racial lines between Whites
and Blacks. The government discriminately provided education priority to white children and very
few black children’s education was through mission schools (Kanyongo, 2005). The curricula
were different too, white children received academic education which prepared them to be
managers and blacks were given elementary industrial training that prepared them to be laborers.
In fact, the colonial government did not want Africans to be educated for fear of their hegemony
and legitimacy being challenged (Nherera, 2000). Soon after independence the government
embarked on social justice and equity policies such as the growth with equity. These policies aimed
at remedying the rampant inequalities in access to education and other basic needs. Hence the
education for all policy was adopted at independence which viewed education as a basic human
right. However, the quest to address imbalances created by the colonial education system, created
gaps between demand and skills relevant for the industry (Matorevhu, 2023, Chimbunde, 2023),
as we shall see in this study.
Since 1980 the education system in Zimbabwe has gone through many reforms the first being to
unify the separate education system to remove anomalies and inequalities (Kanyongo, 2005).
Government has also managed to increase the access to education through policies of free
education. In the second decade the reforms focused more on the relevance, quality of education
and training through new approaches, technologies, teaching methodologies, skills provision and
through decentralization and devolution of technical and teachers’ colleges into degree-awarding
institutions (Kanyongo, 2005). In addition, the government localized the examination board
through an act of parliament. It created Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC) which
was mandated to administer and manage the primary and secondary examinations. It is imperative
to note that before this, the examinations were managed by the University of Cambridge Local
Examination Syndicate (UCLES) in the United Kingdom. Some students in Zimbabwe especially
from the affluent families are still writing Cambridge examinations at both Ordinary and Advanced
level. In the third decade, education in Zimbabwe focused on promoting national unity, national
development, economic development through provision of trained and skilled teachers and staff.
Presently, the education system is migrating towards modernization and industrialization of
Zimbabwe through Education, Science and Technology Development. For example in 2018
Zimbabwe introduced a new curriculum in higher education lynched by heritage- based philosophy
whose focus is underpinned by production of goods and services (Chimbunde, 2023). The new 5.0
(teaching, research, community service, innovation and industrialization) teaching philosophy
acknowledges the role of higher and tertiary education institutions in economic growth, technology
transfer and generation of new knowledge (Matorevhu, 2023, Chimbunde, 2023).
There is no single cause of industrialization. The process can emerge from a variety of causes.
Similarly, the consequences of industrialization vary widely across geographical regions and
historical times (Simandan, 2009: 420). This section discusses the development trajectory of
Zimbabwe from 1980 to date from the industrialization and economic growth perspective.
Zimbabwe has a diversified economy but biased towards agriculture and mining (Saunders and
Caramento, 2018), which are by far the country’s major foreign currency earning sectors
(ZimStats, 2012). In addition to mineral processing, major industries include food processing,
construction, chemicals, textiles, wood and furniture, and production of transport equipment. In
recent years the mining industry has faced challenges such as frequent power outages, inefficient
infrastructure, flight of skilled workers, and shortages of funds for working capital and
recapitalization. The manufacturing industry has also suffered constraints such as
deindustrialization, inadequate and erratic supply of key economic enablers (namely, electricity,
fuel, coal, and water, and the high cost of establishing business (ZimStas, 2012: 1).
The fall in the share of the output of the industrial sector in the nation’s GDP (Schweibberger and
Suedekum (2009) in Zimbabwe has resulted in the domestic outsourcing of activities previously
performed in house in manufacturing to specialized service providers, and therefore, a decline in
manufacturing employment. This widespread and systematic disinvestment in the nation’s basic
productive capacity (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982) has rendered large proportions of workers
jobless due to plant shutting down. This resulted in the closure of many firms across various sub-
sectors, job losses, declining manufacturing sector capacity utilization and output as well as a
decline in the sector’s contribution to GDP and exports (GoZ, 2018: 2).
Since 1995, Zimbabwe has experienced a process of de-industrialization with the large majority
of the people becoming largely dependent on communal and resettlement agriculture, a sector
where there is high poverty prevalence. Zimbabwe had flourishing industries, but now many have
collapsed. This has been caused by negative supply shocks because of shortages of basic resources
like electricity as well as decreased foreign investment. In Zimbabwe manufacturing’s share in
Gross Domestic Product has halved from earlier peaks, and the country is currently striving to
reverse this de-industrialization.
In spite of once having a well- developed infrastructure and financial system, Zimbabwe’s
economy declined rapidly from the late 1990s as its political situation deteriorated, falling below
other developing sub-Saharan African countries. National income fell by half between 1998 and
2008; the longest, deepest economic decline seen anywhere outside a war zone (Magocha and
Mutekwe, 2021). Real GDP growth is estimated to have decelerated to 3.7% in 2013 from an
estimated 4.4% in 2012. This reflects a continued slowdown in the economy as a result of limited
sources of capital, policy uncertainty and the high cost of doing business (AfDD/OECD/UNDP,
2014:255). Total expenditure picked up as the government expanded the Command Agriculture
Program and maintained the high public sector wage bill (around 19% of GDP)
(AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2018: 179). With limited access to foreign inflows, the budget deficit
reached 8.7% of GDP in 2016, up from 2.4% in 2015. Public domestic debt almost doubled, to
25% of GDP in 2016; external debt stood at 42.6% of GDP (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2018: 1).
Total external debt was an estimated 45.3% of GDP in 2018, down from 53.8% in 2017. The
current account deficit was an estimated 3.7% of GDP in 2018, with merchandise imports
continuing to exceed exports, putting pressure on the supply of urgently needed foreign exchange
and making it critical to diversify exports (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2019: 185).
To fund some of its policies, Zimbabwe pursued and received both bilateral and multilateral aid
from various sources (Schwartz, 2001). Hence aid played a pivotal role in policies formulation as
highlighted under the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD).
In order to have a coordinated response to the rebuilding process and attract the much-needed
development aid, the government convened the ZIMCORD in March 1981 (Mazingi and Kamidza,
2010)(MoEPD, 1981). Substantial foreign aid pledges worthZ$1.9 billion over the period 1981-
1983 were made at ZIMCORD held in early1981. Zimbabwe became a favored destination for aid
Chung (2006) until the political turmoil of the early 2000s. Indeed, it was the darling of the
Western donors, who were prepared to pour in about USD300 million into the country each year
(Chung, 2006). Hence most of the celebrated cases of education delivery in the first decade of
independence were achieved in the context of partnerships between donors and the government in
socio-economic development programs (Murisa, 2010, Nyazema, 2010). Actually, Zimbabwe
recorded its strongest post-independence growth performance during the period 1980- 1990 with
gross domestic product (GDP) growing by an average around 5.5 percent.
The GWE policy (1981) was the first policy soon after independence. The new government
positioned itself in the driving seat for development strategies and prioritised socio-economic
policies to address the colonial inequities. GWE sought to “achieve a sustained high rate of
economic growth and speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of the
whole populace and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers especially
the farmers” (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). The government in its role as the driver of the
development wanted to empower the black majority to take control of the economy. But it is
argued that the government allowed large-scale white farming, industry and mining to continue
their economic dominance.
This policy is characterised by economic recovery in the early years of independence averaging
10 percent growth during 1980- 82. So many events took place which could have influenced this
recovery such as lifting of economic sanctions and opening up of external markets. In addition, it
was successful in improving the access to education and health especially to black people through
subsidies. The free for all basic education policy saw a rapid growth in schools and enrolment, in
both primary and secondary schools by 1990. Primary schooling was made tuition free, and this
resulted in gross admission rates that exceeded 100%. According to Shizha and Kariwo (2011) by
the end of the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe had achieved universal primary education
for all. The economy experienced very high growth rates of 10.7% and 9.7% in 1980 and 1981
respectively engineered by external factors on growth, fiscal driven redistributive programmes and
the return of access to external markets (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017)(Mzumara, 2012).
The government of Zimbabwe adopted trade liberalization policy which was prescribed by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund under Economic Structural Adjustment Program
(ESAP) in 1991. The government, donor community and IMF/World Bank were of the belief that
public expenditure reforms would lead to price stability and an improvement in the cost-
effectiveness of the provision of social services (Dhliwayo, 2001, Matamanda et al., 2021).
Riddell (2009) maintains that recipients were encouraged to open their markets, privatise state
assets, adopt a more-export-oriented, less protective trade regime as a quid pro quo for receiving
aid, and reduce direct government expenditures. The key policy elements incorporated in ESAP:
Fiscal and monetary policy reforms, including budgetary and monetary stabilisation measures, and
the liberalisation and deregulation of banking and finance. Trade liberalisation, including the
abolition of quantitative controls and the reduction and harmonisation of tariffs and duties was
also introduced as well as deregulation of prices, wages, interest rates and exchange rates. Public
sector restructuring, entailing the downsizing of the civil service and the reorganisation and
commercialisation of parastatals was also introduced under ESAP. A social safety net in the form
of Social Development Fund (SDF) was enacted for those vulnerable to the adverse effects of
structural adjustment (Allen, 1999, Chimanikire, 2000). ESAP’s specific targets included;
achieving an annual GDP growth rate of 5% during the period 1991-1995; increasing savings to
25% of GDP; raising investment to 25% of GDP; achieving export growth rate of 9% per annum
during the period 1991-1998; reducing budget deficit from 10% of GDP to 5% by 1995; and
reducing inflation from over 17% to 10% by 1995 (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012).
ESAP affected Zimbabwe negatively for example it led to retrenchments both in the public and
private sectors (Nherera, 2000). Hence Zhou and Zvoushe (2012) described it as the “proverbial
medicine that kills the patient”. Social safety nets such as the Social Dimension fund failed
dismally and poverty increased (Nherera, 2000). As a result, the social indicators which were
impressive in the 1980s plummeted to very low levels (ZHDR, 2003: 2). The economy stagnated
to an average growth of 1% in real terms during the ESAP period (1991-95) compared to 4%
during the pre ESAP period (1985-90) (Dhliwayo, 2001).
Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) 1996- 2000
This policy was made as follow-up to ESAP and was meant to finish some of the unmet targets of
ESAP. Some of these targets were; financial sector reforms, parastatal reforms and civil service
reform among others. This policy sought to promote private sector role in production and
distribution of goods and services with government to act as enabler while the private sector was
to lead in growing the economy and employment creation (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017).
Unfortunately, the economy further deteriorated mainly because of the government programs
which hindered the reforms of the ZIMPREST. Some of the programs which negatively impacted
this policy were payment of unbudgeted grants to war veterans resulting domestic currency crash
of 1997, involvement in the DRC war (1998) and the fast-track land reform of 2000 (Mzumara,
2012). Resultantly, depleted foreign currency reserves, inflation increased and interest rates
doubled to 80%, unemployment increased and business activity went down (Sibanda and
Makwata, 2017, Mzumara, 2012). This period also witnessed mass exodus of both skilled and
unskilled labour to other countries. Apart from government fiscal indiscipline, ZIMPREST failed
because of lack of donor participation and funding (Mzumara, 2012).
This policy was unveiled by the Inclusive Government and had 3 key goals and 3 priority areas.
The goals were to: stabilize the macro and micro economy, recover the levels of savings and lay
the basis of a more transformative mid-term to long-term program that would turn Zimbabwe into
a developmental state. The priority areas being: political and governance issues, social protection
and stabilization. This policy is associated with a relative improvement on both the economic and
social indicators such as reduction in inflation due to the adoption of the multi-currency payment
system, and health and education also were positively impacted due to the inflow of donor funding.
It had a fair share of setbacks which were as a result of political disagreements by the political
parties in the GNU.
In 2013, the government unveiled the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic
Transformation (ZimASSET, 2013-18). It focused on the exploitation of and value addition to the
country’s human and natural resources. Hence it was crafted to achieve sustainable development
and social equity underpinned by indigenization, empowerment and employment creation.
ZimASSET has a number of positive elements, such as the adoption of results-based management
and a clear implementation matrix. The policy blueprint also correctly identifies a number of key
binding constraints to development, but it does not clearly articulate the country’s institutional and
financial capacities to deal with those constraints simultaneously within the five-year period.
(AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2014: 255). ZIMASSET failed dismally because of the weak institutions
which are struggling to deal with corruption, transparency and accountability issues.
This section presents some of the policies that guided industrial development in Zimbabwe from
1980 to 2023. Industrial growth
The Zimbabwe National Industrial Development Policy 2019- 2023
The Zimbabwe National Industrial Development Policy (2019- 2023) is a blue- print for
industrialization which derives from vision 2030. The policy is underpinned by the desire to open
the country for business, modernize, industrialize and promote investment with the ultimate goal
of attaining broad-based economic empowerment, inclusive economic growth and employment
creation. The ZNIDP’s vision is technologically advanced, competitive and diversified industry
by 2030. It aims at value addition and beneficiation of resources mainly from the key sectors of
the economy such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. The Zimbabwe National
Development Policy is aligned to the Transitional Stabilization Program (October 2018- December
2020) TSP, which priorities the stimulation of economic growth and creation of employment. The
policy is also aligned with the SADC Industrialization strategy and roadmap (2015- 2063) and the
African Union’s Agenda 2063. These agendas call for countries to pursue industrialization
strategies sequentially from factor- driven to investment- driven, then to efficiency- driven and
ultimately to a high growth trajectory driven by knowledge, innovation and business
sophistication. 2018 Zimbabwe National Critical Skills Audit places a focus on bolstering science
and technology to fulfil the innovation and industrial objectives of education 5.0 (Matorevhu,
2023). In line with the vision 2030 the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) document guides
the development trajectory Zimbabwe should take until 2025 (Matorevhu, 2023). The drivers of
NDS 1 are Human capital, development and innovation and a strong emphasis on science,
technology, engineering, arts and mathematics (STEAM) (Matorevhu, 2023).
Since 1980, Zimbabwe has had a lot of opportunities for industrial and educational development
but some of these have been missed because of either the government’s failure to plan or to
implement what was planned or both. For example, in the early years, the growth in social sectors
was not matched with the growth in productive sectors. The rapid growth in civil service
employment and spending on social services, drought relief, and parastatals generated a chronic
budget deficit, a high tax regime, and a rapid increase in public debt. In education, the government
failed to transform and decolonise the system (Nherera, 2000), instead what happened was
radicalisation and “massfication” of the education system. Hence the emphasis was not so much
on quality and cost effectiveness of the education system but on accessibility to education
(Kanyongo, 2005). The government has struggled to shrug off the colonial traditional academic
education (Nherera, 2000), students and parents too still prefer traditional academic education over
practical and vocational training. At independence the government had the opportunity to
transform the practical and vocational training from elementary industrial training to a more
advanced curriculum that would meet the contemporary industrial needs of the nation. This
opportunity was squandered: in fact, the political leaders were in the lead in promoting traditional
academic education by sending their children to former elite schools. Quite understood though
because of the perception that academic education would close the social gap between blacks and
Europeans and the view that industrial education was inferior (Nherera, 2000). As a result, the
education system in Zimbabwe remains theoretically oriented with very little done so far to
produce knowledge that will translate into goods and services.
As noted by Stoneman (1990) more formal state role in industrial development was promised in
GWE in 1981 in the proposal for a Zimbabwe Development Corporation, which was not in fact
established until 1988. Stoneman adds that the slow progress was associated with the more general
failure to grapple with the problem of planning for industrial development, itself constrained by
the context of continuing private ownership of most of the industry. This was also entrenched in
the ideological dispossession whereby the government believed in the Marxist- Leninism which
means the ownership of the means of production by the state. But, the Lancaster House Agreement
for independence promoted and protected individual and company rights to property ownership.
On top of that, some scholars postulate that no coherent industrialisation plan was included, and
no instruments or institutions for such plan were processed by the government. Many industrial
projects were included but these were largely put in on an ad hoc basis, depending almost entirely
on whether they were already being considered by a company or other interest groups (Stoneman,
1990).
However, some of the miscarriages, missed opportunities and failures of the education and
industrialization in Zimbabwe are as a result of socio-political environment of the nation. For
example, the granting of unbudgeted hefty largesse to war veterans in 1997, DRC war participation
in 1998, which was unnecessary and costly too. The land expropriation program of 2000 which
was chaotic and the rapid deterioration in foreign aid and financial support (Saunders and
Caramento, 2018). Support for ‘new farmers’- through the Farm Mechanization program, high
money supply growth- expansionary quasi-fiscal activities by the Central Bank and speculative
activities (Matamanda et al., 2021). In addition, Zimbabwe has not received meaningful FDI
because of political risk, political violence, the breakdown in the rule of law, as well as violation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreements (BIPPAS). Some of the BIPPAS that were violated (through expropriation without
compensation) include that between Zimbabwe and Germany, Zimbabwe and the Netherlands,
Zimbabwe and South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malaysia. The Indigenization Act which stipulates a
51-49 percent shareholding structure (Saunders and Caramento, 2018), -investors feel that 51
percent strips them of a controlling interest in their business. Policy ambiguity and lack of policy
consistency on Indigenization (Saunders and Caramento, 2018) for example ministers make
conflicting statements on this subject. Potential mining investors complain about lack of
geological information on mineralization data that indicate the quantities and values of the
underground resources. Investors raise concerns about the security of their investments (Property
rights) and cumbersome visa regime and company registration procedures among others.
All these manifested in high inflation and unemployment as well as the fall in business activity. In
addition, the government of Zimbabwe has failed to attract meaningful investments and has no
capacity to run a complex set of programs. Henceforth, the government of Zimbabwe has
continued to be vulnerable with no balance of payments support from multilateral and bilateral
institutions or donors.
Many of the targets of the Zimbabwean Industry may be easier to reach when strong and accessible
systems of education and training are put in place, leading to stronger knowledge-based
infrastructures.
The government must be aware of the fact that there is a strong difference between coming up with
a policy and having qualified people who can drive the policy narrative. There is need for
curriculum change; in fact, it must be synchronized for the three-tier teaching levels in Zimbabwe
that is primary, secondary and tertiary levels. That transformation must equip the education system
with the necessary tools for knowledge generation which will be translated into production of
industrial goods and services. One of the low hanging fruits is to promote and transform the
practical and vocational training to meet the contemporary industrial needs.
The government must ensure that there is sufficient funding and deliberate investment in
education. Ensuring sufficient funding to invest in education is essential and a common theme
across all SDG 4 targets (Boeren, 2019). Target 4 of SDG 4 says that by 2030, substantially
increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and
vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship (SDG 4.4) (Boeren, 2019).
This also applies to the Zimbabwean situation.
The government is seized with curbing de-industrialization, attracting new investments and
generation of foreign exchange through exports of value- added goods and services. This can only
be driven by quality education and training. Today’s globalized economy requires well educated
workers to adapt to the dynamic environment. Blending of Technology is also essential to create
competitive, productive and prosperous industries in Zimbabwe which enhances efficiency in
production processes. The quality and quantity of basic education affects efficiency of workers,
ability to adapt to advanced production processes and techniques.
Check for industrial policy from 1980 to 2004 and 2010 to date
Conclusion
The relationship between education and industrialization in Zimbabwe is very difficult to
comprehend because of the lack of data for analysis. The high literacy rate in Zimbabwe has failed
to translate into high industrialization. Industry and education in Zimbabwe have been largely
affected by the socio- political environment of the country. Zimbabwe needs to transform the
quality and/or quantity of its education system to meet the industrial needs. In Zimbabwe many
people work outside the formal sector while many educational systems still provide a formal
education leading to tertiary education. Arguments so far are unidirectional, scholars think that
industrial development is influenced by curriculum reform (Chimbunde, 2023). This study argues
that both the curriculum and industrial policy have to change for both to grow and serve the needs
of the people of Zimbabwe. In its strategy document, National Development Strategy 1-2021-2025
(NDS1-2021-2025)
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