Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.

Secretary
Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al.
(G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)

Topic: Writ of Kalikasan

Doctrine: In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.

PARTIES

1. Petitioners

The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals”
which inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by
“Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and friendsseeking their protection.

In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the CentralVisayas Fisherfolk

Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region
VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu

2. Respondent

a. Department of Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes

FACTS

On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).

Surface geology, sample interpretation, and seismic and magnetic data reprocessing
were all part of the research. Geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling, were carried out in Tañon Strait.

DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) on December12,
2004, for the discovery, construction, and output of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square meters offshore the Tañon Strait.

JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a multi- channel
sub-bottom profiling spanning approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s
underwater composition. During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to
drill one exploration well.

Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other
Purposes.”

On January 31, 2007, the Tañon Strait Protected Area Management Board (PAMB)
released Resolution No. 2007-01, in which it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination commissioned by JAPEX and recommended acceptance of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).

On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.

From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the1987 Constitution.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also
impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. They
use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce
international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the
concept of stipulation pour autrui.

In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence
fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions
are:

b. According to a report conducted after the seismic survey, there is a 50-70

percent reduction in fish catch due to the loss of the “payao,” or artificial
reef.
c. The ECC received by the respondents is invalid since it was issued
without any public consultations or discussions.
d. SC-46 is declared null and void for violating Section 2, Article XII of the
1987Constitution, since there is no general law defining standard or
universal terms, conditions, and standards for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction. Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the
Jura
RegaliaProvision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constituti
on becauseJAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned
e. FIDEC claims that it was prohibited from entering and fishing within a 7-
kilometer radius of the oilrig, which is larger than the 1.5-kilometer radius
exclusion zone specified in the Initial Environmental Examination.

The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS)
as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter- allegations are:

a. The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal

standing to file the petition.
b. SC-46 is constitutional
c. The ECC was legally issued.
d. The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on
21 June 2008.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Both petitions were directly filed with the SC. They were later on consolidated.

ISSUES
a. Whether Petitioners have a legal standing
 b. Whether SC-46 is unconstitutional
c. Whether the case has become moot and academic

RULING

A. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE A LEGAL STANDING (YES)

Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:

“Section 5. Citizen suit.– Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including

minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays
copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”

Despite the fact that the petition was filed in 2007, years before the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases became effective, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure can be retroactively applied to actions that were pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and would not breach the right of an individual who may believe
that he is adversely affected, because there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Furthermore, long before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases went into
effect, the Supreme Court had taken a permissive stance on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”

It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in
the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.

B. WHETHER SC-46 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL (YES)

Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous

petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the
Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments
and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service
contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under
said statute.

The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as
a guide for the Government when executing service contracts.

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd
sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means
that no environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were
conducted.

Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such
surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586.

While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said
protected seascape.

While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

C. WHETHER THE CASE HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC (NO)

At the outset, this Court makes clear that the “‘moot and academic principle’ is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Courts
have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve
these consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this
case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental
and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’
contested actions are capable of repetition.