KLE LAW ACADEMY BELAGAVI

(Constituent Colleges: KLE Society’s Law College, Bengaluru, Gurusiddappa Kotambri Law College,
Hubballi, S.A. Manvi Law College, Gadag, KLE Society’s B.V. Bellad Law College, Belagavi, KLE Law
College, Chikodi, and KLE College of Law, Kalamboli, Navi Mumbai)

STUDY MATERIAL
for

LAW OF TORTS
Prepared as per the syllabus prescribed by Karnataka State Law University (KSLU), Hubballi

Compiled by Reviewed by

Dr. Supriya M. Swami, Asst. Prof. Dr. B Jayasimha, Principal

B.V. Bellad Law College, Belagavi

This study material is intended to be used as supplementary material to the online classes and
recorded video lectures. It is prepared for the sole purpose of guiding the students in preparation
for their examinations. Utmost care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content.
However, it is stressed that this material is not meant to be used as a replacement for textbooks
or commentaries on the subject. This is a compilation and the authors take no credit for the
originality of the content. Acknowledgement, wherever due, has been provided.
 LAW OF TORTS

Introduction-

Law is bundle of rules which regulates the external behavior of individuals in

society. Law of Torts is the branch of law controlling the behavior of people in the
society. It is a growing branch of law and its main object is to define individual rights
and duties in the light of prevalent standards of reasonable conduct and public
convenience. It provides pecuniary remedy for violation against the right of individuals.
The entire Law of Torts is founded and structured on the principle that, ‘no one has a
right to injure another intentionally or even innocently.

Meaning:-
The word ‘Tort’ is derived from latin term 'tortum' which means ‘to twist’ or a
deviation from straight or right conduct and includes that conduct which is not straight
or lawful.

DEFINITIONS BY RENOWNED JURISTS

‘Tort’ is defined by various jurists as under:

“A tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated
damages and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract, or the breach of a trust,
or the breach of other merely equitable obligation”.
– Salmond.

“A tort is an infringement of a right in rem of a private individual, giving a right of

compensation at the suit of the injured party”. – Fraser

“Tortious liability arises from the breach of duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is
towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated
damages”.–Winfield.

STATUTORY DEFINITION:-

‘Tort’ is defined in Section 2(m) Limitation Act, 1963 as:

 “Tort is a civil wrong which is not exclusively breach of contract or breach of trust”.

 Distinction Between Torts and Other branches of Law

-Distinction between 'Tort' and 'Crime'

Tort differs both in principle and procedure from a crime and there are basic differences
between a tort and a crime which are as follows,
First on the basis of nature of wrong,
Tort is a private wrong. Private wrong is the infringement of civil right of an individual.
It is comparatively less serious and labeled as civil wrong. Whereas crime is a public
wrong. Public wrong is a violation or breach of rights and duties which affect the
community, as a whole. It is a more serious wrong.
Second on the basis of nature of remedy,
The remedy in law of tort is damages where as the remedy in crime is punishment
Third on the basis of parties to suits,
In case of tort the suit is filed by injured or aggrieved party where as In case of crime
the complaint is filed in the name of State.
Fourth on the basis of withdrawal of suits,
In case of tort the suit can be withdrawn at any time and compromise can be done with
wrongdoer where as In case of crime the complaint cannot be withdrawn except in
certain circumstances.
Fifth on the basis of codification,
There is no codification in Law of Torts where as The Criminal law is codified.
Sixth on the basis of bar of limitation,
There is bar of limitation of prosecution in Law of torts where as There is no bar of
limitation of prosecution in crime.
Seventh on the basis of survival of action,
In case of death of tort-feaser his legal representative can be sued except when the
tort is defamation, personal injury not causing a death where as In case of death of
offender, the suit is put to an end.
Eighth on the basis of application of law,
There is no separate statute deals with tort. Tort is based on judicial decisions where as
the crimes are dealt in Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Ninth on the basis of intention,
In tort, Intention is important but not in all cases, for example, in cases of negligence
where as in crime, Intention is the crux of the offence Despite of these differences, the
injunction may be granted in tort as well as in crime. There are various wrongs which
fall under law of torts as well as under criminal law, for example, Assault, Defamation,
Negligence, Nuisance and Conspiracy.

Distinction between Tort and Breach of Contract

First on the basis of fixation of duty

In tort, the duty is fixed by the law itself where as In contract, the duty is fixed by the
party themselves.

Second on the basis of attribution of duty,

In tort, the duty is towards every person of the community or society where as In
contract, the duty is towards specific person or persons.

Third on the basis of violation of rights,

A tort is a violation of a right in rem (that is, a right vested in some determinate person
and available against the world at large) where as A breach of contract is an
infringement of a right in personam (that is, of a right available only against some
determinate person or party.

Fourth on the basis of need of privity,

In an action for tort, no Privity is needed or is required to be proved where as In a

breach of contract, Privity between the parties must be proved.

Fifth on the basis of motive,

In tort, motive is often taken into account where as In breach of contract motive is not
relevant.

Sixth on the basis of damages,

In tort, measure of damages is different in different circumstances which may be

nominal or exemplary where as In Breach of contract, damages are awarded in the form
of compensation for pecuniary loss suffered.
Seventh on the basis of suit by third party,

A third party can sue for tort even though there was no contract between the person
causing injury and the person injured where as A third party to a contract cannot sue for
breach of contract except in some exceptional cases.

Eighth on the basis of intention,

Intention is sometimes taken into consideration where as Intention, in case of breach of

contract, is of no relevance.

Ninth on the basis of concern,

Law of tort is concerned with losses where as Contract law is concerned with promises.

Tenth on the basis of period of limitations,

Limitation begins to run from the date when damages occurs where as Limitation
commences when the breach of obligation takes place.

Distinction between Tort and Breach of Trust

First on the basis of damages,

Damages in a tort are unliquidated where as Damages in breach of trust are liquidated.

Second on the basis of origin,

Law of torts has its origin as part of common law where as Breach of trust could be
redressed in the court of Chancery.

Third on the basis of law of property,

Law of tort is not regarded as a division of the law of property where as Law of trust can
be and is regarded as a division of the law of property.

Distinction between Tort and Quasi-Contract

When a person gains some advantage or benefit to which some other person was
entitled to, or by such advantage another person suffers an undue loss, the law may
compel the former to compensate the latter in respect of advantage so gained, even
though there is no such contract. The law of quasi-contracts covers such obligations.
Distinction between Tort and Quasi-Contract

First on the basis of damages,

A claim for damages under law of tort is always for an unliquidated sum of money
where as A claim for damages is for liquidated sum of money.

Second on the basis of attribution of duty,

Under law of torts the duty is towards persons generally where as In a quasi-contract,
the duty is always towards a particular person.

The common point between tort and quasi-contract is that the duty in each case is
imposed by the law. However, in certain cases, where a tort has been committed, the
injured party has a choice of not bringing an action for damages in tort, but of suing the
wrongdoer in quasi- contract to recover the value of the benefit obtained by the
wrongdoer. When the injured party elects to sue in quasi-contract instead of tort, he is
said to have 'waived the tort'.

Essential Elements of Torts

Wrongful act or omission

The first essential ingredient in constituting a tort is that a person must have committed
a wrongful act or omission that is, he must have done some act which he was not
expected to do, or, he must have omitted to do something which he was supposed to do.
There must have been.breach of duty which has been fixed by law itself. If a person
does not observe that duty like a reasonable and prudent person or breaks it
intentionally, he is deemed to have committed a wrongful act. In order to make a person
liable for a tort he must have done some legal wrong that is, violates the legal right of
another person for example, violation of right to property, right of bodily safety, right of
good reputation. A wrongful act may be positive act or an omission which can be
committed by a person either negligently or intentionally or even by committing a
breach of strict duty for example, driving a vehicle at an excessive speed.
The wrongful act or a wrongful omission must be one recognized by law. If there is a
mere moral or social wrong, there cannot be a liability for the same. For example, if
somebody fails to help a starving man or save a drowning child. But, where legal duty
to perform is involved and the same is not performed it would amount to wrongful act.
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Subhagwati, where the Municipal Corporation,
having control of a clock tower in the heart of the city does not keep it in proper repairs
and the falling of the same results in the death of number of persons, the Corporation
would be liable for its omission to take care. Similarly failure to provide safe system
would, also amount to omission, held in General Cleaning Corporation Limited V.
Christmas.

Legal Damage

The second important ingredient in constituting a tort is legal damage. In order to prove
an action for tort, the plaintiff has to prove that there was a wrongful act, an act or
omission which caused breach of a legal duty or the violation of a legal right vested in
the plaintiff. So, there must be violation of a legal right of a person and if it is not, there
can be no action under law of torts. If there has been violation of a legal right, the same
is actionable whether the plaintiff has suffered any loss or not. This is expressed by the
maxim, "Injuria sine damnun 'Injuria' refers to infringement of a legal right and the term
'damnum' means substantial harm, loss or damage. The term 'sine' means without.
However, if there is no violation of a legal right, no action can lie in a court despite of
the loss, harm or damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant. This is expressed by
the maxim 'Damnum sine injuria The detailed discussion of these two maxims is as
follows.

Injuria Sine Damno and Damnum Sine Injuria

Injuria Sine Damno

This maxim means infringement or violation of a legal private right of a person even if
there is no actual loss or damage. In such a case the person whose right is infringed has
a good cause of action. It is not necessary for him to prove any special damage. The
infringement of private right is actionable per se. What is required to show is the
violation of a right in which case the law will presume damage. Thus, in cases of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel etc., the mere wrongful act is actionable
without proof of special damage. The Court is bound to award to the plaintiff at least
nominal damages if no actual damage is proved.
Thus, this maxim provides for,
1) Infringement of a legal right of a person.
2) No actual loss or damage is required to prove.
3) Infringement of a private right is actionable per se.
In Ashby V. White, the plaintiff was a qualified voter at a Parliamentary election, but
defendant, a returning officer, wrongfully refused to take plaintiffs vote. No loss was
suffered by such refusal because the candidate for whom he wanted to vote won the
election. Plaintiff succeeded in his action. Lord Holt, C.J., observed as follows, "If the
plaintiff has a right he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and
a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it, and indeed it is a vain thing
to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are
reciprocal". "Every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost a party one penny
and it is impossible to prove the contrary, for the uamage is not merely pecuniary, but
an injury imports a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his right. As in an action
for slanderous words, though a man does not lose a penny by reason of the speaking of
them, yet he shall have an action. So, if a man gives another a cuff on his car, though it
costs him nothing, not so much as a little diachylon (plaster), yet he shall have his
action. So, a man shall have an action against another for riding over his ground, though
it does him no damage, for it is an invasion of the property and the other has no right to
come there."
In Municipal Board of Agra V Asharfi Lal, the facts are, the Plaintiff (Asharfi Lal)
was entitled to be entered as an elector upon the electoral roll. His name was wrongfully
omitted from the electoral roll and he was deprived of his right to vote. It was held by
the court that if any duly qualified citizen or person entitled to be on the electoral roll of
an constituency is omitted from such roll so as to be deprived of his right to vote, he has
suffered a legal wrong, he has been deprived of a right recognised by law and he has
against the person so depriving him, a remedy, that is, an action lies against a person
depriving I him of his right.
Similarly, in Bhim Singh V. State of J&K, the petitioner, an M.L.A. of Jammu &
Kashmir Assembly, was wrongfully detained by the police while he was going to attend
the Assembly session. Thus, he was deprived of his fundamental right to personal
liberty and constitutional right to attend the Assembly session. The court awarded
exemplary damages of Rs. Fifty thousand by way of consequential relief.An action will
lie against a banker, having sufficient funds in his hands belonging to the customer, for
refusing to honour his cheque, although the customer has not thereby sustained any
actual loss or damage, Marzetti V. Williams Bank

Damnum sine injuria

Damnum sine injuria means an actual and substantial loss without infringement of any
legal right. In such a case no action lies. There are many harms of which loss takes no
account and mere loss of money's worth does not by itself constitute a legal damage.
The essential requirement is the violation of a legal right.
There are many forms of harm of which the law takes no account,
1) Loss inflicted on individual traders by competition in trade,
2) Where the damage is done by a man acting under necessity to prevent a greater evil,
3) Damage caused by defamatory statements made on a privileged occasion,
4) Where the harm is too trivial, too indefinite or too difficult of proof,
5) Where the harm done may be of such a nature that a criminal prosecution is more
appropriate for example, in case of public nuisance or causing of death,
6) There is no right of action for damages for contempt of court.
Gloucester Grammer School Case, Held. The defendant, a schoolmaster, set up a
rival school to that of the plaintiff. Because of the competition, the plaintiff had to
reduce their fees. Held, the plaintiff had no remedy for the loss suffered by them.
Hanker J. said "Damnum may be absque injuria as if I have a mill and my neighbour
builds another mill whereby the profits of my mill is diminished... but if a miller
disturbs the water from going to my mill, or does any nuisance of the like sort, I shall
have such action as the law gives."

Chesmore V. Richards, The plaintiff, a mill owner was using water for over 60 years
from a stream which was chiefly supplied by the percolating underground water. The
defendants dug a well on their land deep enough to stop the larger volume of water
going to plaintiff's stream. Held, that the plaintiff has no right of action since it was a
case of damnum sine injuria.

Bradford Corporation V. Pickles, In this case, the defendant was annoyed when
Bradford Corporation refused to purchase his land in connection with the scheme of
water supply for the inhabitants of the town. In the revenge the defendant sank a shaft
over his land intentionally and intercepted the underground water which was flowing to
the reservoir of the plaintiffs. Held that the plaintiffs have no cause since the defendant
was exercising his lawful right although the motive was to coerce the plaintiff to buy his
land. The House of Lords approved the ruling in Chesmore V. Richards.

Moghul Steamship Company V. McGregor Gow &Co, A number of steamship

companies acting in combination agreed to regulate the cargoes and freight charges
between China and Europe. A general rebate of 5 per cent was allowed to all suppliers
who shipped with the members of the combination. As a result of this action, the
plaintiffs had to bring down their rates to that level which was un remunerative to them.
'Held, that there was no cause of action as the defendants had acted with lawful means
to increase their trade and profits. No legal injury was caused and the case fell within
the maxim damnum sine injuria.

Dickson V. Renter's Telegraph Company, 'A' sent a telegram to 'B' for the shipment
of certain goods. The telegraph company mistaking the registered address of 'C' for that
of 'B', delivered the telegram to 'C'. 'C', acting on the telegram sent the goods to 'A' who
refused to accept the goods stating that he had ordered the goods not from 'C' but from
'B'. ‘C’ sued the Telegraph Company for damages for the loss suffered by him. Held,
that ‘C' had no cause of action against the company for the company did not owe any
duty of care to 'C' and no legal rights to 'C' could, therefore, be said to have been
infringed.

Rogers V. Rajendera Dutt, The plaintiff owned a tug which was employed for towing
the ships in charge of Government Pilots in Hoogly. The plaintiff demanded exorbitant
price for towing the ship. Consequently, the Superintendent of Marine issued an order
prohibiting the use of that tug in future whereby the owner was deprived of the profits.
Held, that they had no legal right to have their tug employed by the Government.

Town Area Committee V. Prabhu Dayal, A legal act, though motivated by malice,
will not make the defendant liable. The plaintiff can get compensation only if he proves
to have suffered injury because of an illegal act of the defendant. The plaintiff
constructed 16 shops on the old foundations of a building, without giving a notice of
intention to erect a building under section 178 of the Uttar. Pradesh Municipalities Act
and without obtaining necessary sanction required under section 108 of that Act. The
defendants (Town Area Committee) demolished this construction. In an action against
the defendant to claim compensation for the demolition the plaintiff alleged that the
action of the defendants was illegal as it was malifide, the municipal commissioner
being an enemy of his. It was held that the defendants were not liable as no "injuria”
(violation of a legal right) could be proved because if a person constructs a building
illegally, the demolition of such building by the municipal authorities would not amount
to causing "injuria" to the owner of the property.

In Action V. Blundell, the defendants by digging a coal pit intercepted the water which
affected the plaintiff's well, less than 20 years old, at a distance of about one mile. Held,
they were not liable. It was observed, "The person who owns the surface may dug
therein and apply all that is there found to his own purposes, at his free will and
pleasure, and that in the exercise of such rights he intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in the neighbor’s well, this inconvenience to his
neighbour falls within description damnum sine injuria which cannot become the
ground of action."

Distinction between Injuria sine damnum and Damnum sine injuria

First on the basis of meaning,

Injuria sine damunm means violation of a legal right without actual loss or damages
where as Damnum sine injuria means actual or substantial Damages without
infringement of a legal right.

Second on the basis of action,

Injuria sine damunm is always actionable where as Damnum sine injuria is never
actionable.

Third on the basis of nature of wrong,

Injuria sine damunm contemplates legal wrongs where there is a remedy where as
Damnum sine injuria contemplates only moral wrongs without any remedy.

Legal Remedy

Ubi jus ibi remedium (Where there is a right there is a remedy)

Right without a remedy is of no use. Right is a person’s capacity to compel another

person to do or to abstain from doing an act, and capacity to compel means legal
capacity to compel. Unless there is a legal remedy, there cannot be legal compulsion.
Therefore, a right without a remedy would be redundant.
Therefore, right and remedy are correlated. If there is no right there will be no remedy.
In this regard there are two types of rights.

1. Absolute rights: An absolute right is a right the violation of which amounts to a

wrong and gives rise to cause of action. There is no further requirement of showing
any loss or injury. The tort which is based on the violation of an absolute right is
actionable per se.

2. Conditional rights: A conditional right is a right the violation of which by itself

does not amount to a wrong so as to give rise to cause of action. The plaintiff has to
further show that he has suffered loss due to the violation of that right. Loss is a
condition precedent for giving rise to cause of action.

MENTAL ELEMENTS IN LAW OF TORTS

As already seen, Criminal Law seeks to punish the wrong-doer, i.e., an offender.
Therefore, one of the cardinal principles of Law of Crimes is well expressed by the
Latin legal maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, which is vaguely translated as
“to constitute a crime act and intent must concur”. In other words, to hold a person
liable in Criminal Law, the prosecution has to prove both act usreus (effect of the
offender’s act) and mens rea(guilty mind on the part of the offender).

Mens rea may take any one of the following three forms:
1. Intention

2. Rashness (Recklessness)

3. Negligence.
On the other hand, Civil Law of Obligations, of which Law of Torts is a part, seeks
mainly to compensate the victim of a wrong committed by another person.
Therefore, the question as to whether the wrong-doer had committed the wrong with
a guilty mind is not relevant to Law of Torts.
The obligation to make reparation for the damage caused wrongful act arises from
the fault, and not from the intention. Any invasion of the civil rights of another
person is in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or
natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose right is
infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad, or indifferent.

It is no defence to an action in tort for the wrong-doer to plead that he did not intend
to cause damage, if damage has resulted owing to an act or omission on his part
which is actively or passively the effect of his volition. A want of knowledge of the
illegality of his act or omission affords no excuse. Every man is presumed to intend
and to know the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts (Guille v. Swan, the
balloon case. Scott v. Shepherd the lighted squib case.) But in some cases fraud or
malice are the essence of that act or omission. Only in such cases knowledge of facts
will be relevant to hold the alleged wrong-doer guilty or otherwise.

INTENTION

Where a person can foresee the natural consequences of his own act and also desires
those natural consequences, he is said to have committed that act intentionally. For
example, A shoots at B knowing full well that by doing so he may injure or even kill
B, and with a desire that B should be injured or killed. Here A has intentionally shot
at B. If the defendant must has acted consciously and of his own free will and has
intended some injury to the plaintiff’s interest, the he is said to have committed a
wrong intentionally.

1. Conduct is not intentional where it results from unconscious or involuntary

movement.
2. Nor is it intentional for the purpose of Law of Torts where although the defendant
has acted of his own free will, yet he intended no harm to the plaintiff.
Two points need to be noted, however, which diminish the importance of this rule.
1. In law a man’s intention are adjudged by objective standards.
2. A man is taken to intend to harm the plaintiff when the consequence which he
intends would constitute an injury to a legally protected interest of the plaintiff,
regardless of whether he realizes that such a consequence would constitute such
injury or not.

Thus, if A sees B sitting in front of him in the bus and taps him on the head to attract
his attention, then A commits the tort of battery25. A consciously and voluntarily
moves his hand over B’s head and taps it. A intends both the act, and the
consequence—the application of force, to B’s person. Technically, there is a tort
committed. This is equally true if A taps C’s head in mistake for B’s. If the
defendant must have acted consciously and of his own free will and must have
intended some injury to the plaintiff's interest.

RASHNESS

But where he can foresee those consequences but does not desire them, he is said to
have acted rashly or recklessly. For example, A drives a vehicle at an excessive
speed on a crowded street knowing full well that he may cause accident and injure
somebody, but without desiring that accident should take place and hoping that no
one will be injured. Here A is driving the vehicle rashly or recklessly.

NEGLIGENCE

In case of negligence, there is neither foresight nor desire of the consequences of

one’s own natural acts. However, there is failure to take adequate care as demanded
by the circumstances in which the act is done.

Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or by doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do, whereby damage has resulted to a person.

The word “negligence” is used in two senses.

1. It is the name of a tort, so that the plaintiff can sue in negligence where an
interest of his which the law protects by that tort is injured.
2. Negligence is itself sometimes an ingredient of other torts.
It is therefore both a tort and a concept of the law of torts. Here we look at
negligence as a concept. Negligence is a type of behaviour. It is distinguishable from
other behaviour by the notional mental attitude of the defendant. Negligence exists
where the defendant did not intend to injure the plaintiff, and yet he disregarded or
did not fulfill a duty imposed upon him by the law. It is akin to carelessness, but is a
vastly more complicated concept.
As observed by Lord Wright, “In strict legal analysis negligence means more than
needless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission: it properly
connotes the complex concept of duty, breach and damage thereby suffered to the
person to whom the duty was owing.”
An action for negligence proceeds upon the idea of an obligation or duty on the part
of the defendant to use care, and a breach of it to the plaintiff's injury. It is not
necessary that the duty neglected should have arisen out of a contract between the
plaintiff and defendants. However the duty may arise, whether by a statute or
otherwise, if it exists and is neglected to the injury of the plaintiff, he has a right to
sue for damages. There cannot be a liability for negligence unless there is a breach
of some duty.
Mere omission to exercise active interference on behalf of another to prevent harm,
however open to moral censure, is not a civil wrong. There is no absolute or intrinsic
negligence; it is always relative to some circumstances, of time, place, or person.

The test is not whether this particular defendant actually foresaw the possibility of
harm to the plaintiff. It is whether a hypothetical reasonable man would have
foreseen it had he been in the defendant’s position. This means that a defendant
must sometimes foresee even acts of stupidity or forgetfulness on the part of the
plaintiff.

MOTIVE

Motive is defined as ulterior intention. If we say that A has intentionally shot at and
killed B, the next question would be why did A intend to kill B? In other words,
what was the reason behind A’s intention to kill B? It may be because Was the legal
heir of B and wanted to inherit the property quickly by killing B. Or, it may be that
A had some enmity against B and due to that hatred he killed B. Or, may be A
wanted to take some revenge against B. Such intention to acquire B’s property
through inheritance, enmity or hatred, or intention to take revenge are said to be
motive behind the killing of B by A. Motive is almost always irrelevant in the
English law of tort. A man’s reasons for doing an act do not make a lawful act
unlawful, nor vice versa.

MALICE

Malice is a term with many meanings. Firstly, it is often used to mean spitefully or
with ill-will. Like other motives, malice in this sense is invariably irrelevant in Law
of Torts, and therefore, is not essential to the maintenance of an action for tort.

Bradford Corporation v. Pickles, Mr. Pickles was annoyed at the Bradford

Corporation’s refusal to purchase some land from him at the inflated price he
demanded. In order to force their hand, he sank a shaft on his land, which interfered
with water percolating from higher land belonging to the Corporation. The
Corporation unsuccessfully sought an injunction to restrain him from polluting and
diminishing their water. The House of Lords rejected the claim, Lord McNaughton
remarking that “It is the act, not the motive for the act that must be regarded. If the
act, apart from motive, gives rise merely to damage without legal injury, the motive,
however reprehensible it may be, will not supply that element.”
In this first sense, malice is occasionally relevant as a necessary element required to
establish the defendant's liability, e.g. to rebut the defence of qualified privilege in
libel or slander.
Malice has a second meaning. In this legal sense, malice means the intentional
commission of an act with any improper motive. This is much wider than the
layman's use of the word malice. Malice is usually used in this sense in the few
contexts in which it is relevant in tort. For example, in the tort of malicious
prosecution, malice is constituted by any motive other than that of simply instituting
a prosecution for the purpose of bringing a person to justice.

Sometimes malice is used in it archaic sense to mean simply an intentional

performance of a tortuous act. It is in this sense that pleaders in libel and slander
actions traditionally allege that the defendant “falsely and maliciously…” In fact,
this means merely that the defendant’s publication of the defamatory matter was
either intentional or negligent. Malice in this sense would appear to be a confusing
and unhelpful use of the word, and hence, should be avoided.

Malice in Fact and Malice in Law

It is of two kinds, ‘malice in fact’ (or express malice or actual malice) and ‘malice in
law’ (or implied malice). The first is what is called malice in common acceptation,
and means ill-will against a person. The second means a wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse where a man has a right to do an act; it is
not possible to make his exercise of such right actionable by alleging or proving that
his motive in the exercise was spite or malice in the popular sense. An act not
otherwise unlawful cannot generally be made actionable by an averment that it was
done with evil motive. A malicious motive per se does not amount to an injuria or
legal wrong.
 DEFENCES AGAINST TORTIOUS LIABILITY

Under certain conditions an act ceases to be wrongful, although in absence of those

conditions the same act would amount to be a wrong. Under such conditions the act
is said to be justified or excused. These conditions which excuse or justify an act
which would, otherwise, have been a tort may be divided into two categories. First,
those conditions which excuse or justify some specific tort but do not excuse or
justify torts generally. for example truth and fair comment are defences available for
the tort of defamation only. Second, those conditions which are applicable to all
torts equally. for example, defence of consent can excuse any tort. Thus, the second
category covers those "rules of immunity which limit the rules of liability" in
general and are called general exceptions.

A ‘defence’ is a ground on which the defendant seeks to avoid or reduce his

liability. Defences in cases of torts may be

1) General defences, or

2) Special defences

‘General defences’ are those defences which do not depend upon the nature of tort.
They are available in all types of torts.

‘Special defences’ are those defences which depend upon the nature of the tort. They
are available for that tort only.

These general exceptions, or conditions, or justification of torts are,

1) Consent or Leave and Licence. (Volenti nonfit injuria),

2) Act of God,

3) Inevitable accident,

4) Necessity,

5) Private Defence,

6) Acts causing slight harm,

7) Statutory Authority,

8) Plaintiff the wrongdoer

9) Judicial or Quasi-Judicial acts,

10) Parental and quasi parental acts,

Volenti Non fit Injuria(Consent or Leave and Licence)

The maxim is based on the principle of common sense. If I invite you to my house,
can I sue you for trespass? Answer is no, because I have consented to your entry
upon my land. But if a guest who is to be entertained in the drawing room enters into
my bedroom without my permission, he can be sued for trespass, because his entry
into the bedroom is unauthorised. A postman entering into the house for delivering a
letter cannot be sued if he remains within a permissible limit, because in such a case
the consent is inferred but if the postman crosses that permissible limit he can be
sued.

The consent may be either - (1) express, or (2) implied.

In Dr. Laxman Balkrishan v Trimbak Bapu, the Supreme Court held that if a doctor
does not apply due care during the operation, he will be liable even after the patients'
consent for suffering loss during operation. In the case the patient died because
proper primary care was not taken while giving anesthesia.

Essential Conditions of Doctrine of Volenti Non fit Injuria

For the application of the maxim the following conditions should be fulfilled,
Consent must be freely given, It is necessary for the application of this maxim that
the consent must be freely given. The consent is not free, if it has been obtained by
undue influence, coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, mistake or the like elements
which adversely affects a free consent.

In White v Blackmore, the plaintiffs husband paid for admission of his family for
witnessing a car race. During the race a car got entangled in the safety rope and the
plaintiff was catapulated some twenty feet and died consequently. It was held that
since the deceased did not have full knowledge of the risk he was running from the
faulty lay out of the ropes, he did not willingly accept the risk.

Consent cannot be given to an illegal act, No consent can legalise an unlawful act or
an act which is prohibited by law and when the tort, is of such a character as to
amount to a crime, for example, fighting with naked fists, duel with sharp swords
are unlawful, and even though the parties may have consented, yet the law will
permit an action at the instance of the plaintiff.

Knowledge of risk is not the same thing as consent to run the risk, The maxim is
volenti nonfit injuria and not the scinti non-fit injuria — knowledge of danger does
not necessarily imply a consent to bear that danger. This doctrine was for the first
time enunciated in Smith v.Baker. In this case, the plaintiff worked in a cutting on
the top of which a crane was carrying heavy stone over his head while he was
drilling the rock face in the cutting. Both he and employers knew that there was a
risk of stones falling, but no warning was given to him of the moment at which any
particular jibbing commenced. A stone from the crane fell upon him and injured.
The House of Lords held that defendants were liable.

Thus, for the maxim volenti nonfit injuria to apply two things are necessary,

1) Knowledge that risk is there, and

2) Voluntary acceptance of the risk.

Exceptions

There are three exceptions to the rule of volenti non fit injuria.

1) Employment Relations
2) Rescue cases

3) Drunk drivers

1) Employment Relations: An employee who complained of unsafe practice, but

nevertheless continued to work could not truly be said to have voluntarily agreed
to waive their legal rights.

Smith v. Charles Baker & Co. The plaintiff was employed to hold a drill in
position whilst two other workers took it in turns to hit the drill with a hammer. Next
to where he was working another set of workers were engaged in taking out stones
and putting them into a steam crane which swung over the place where the Claimant
was working. The Claimant was injured when a stone fell out of the crane and struck
him on the head. The Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that
the Claimant knew it was a dangerous practice and had complained that it
was dangerous but nevertheless continued. It was held that though the Claimant
might have been aware of the danger of the job, but had not consented to the lack of
care. He was therefore entitled to recover damages.

2) Rescue Cases: Doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply where plaintiff has
under ran exigency caused by defendant’s wrongful misconduct, consciously and
deliberately, faced a risk, even of death to rescue another from imminent danger of
personal injury or death, the defence of leave and licence is not applicable to the
plaintiff, whether the person endangered was one to whom he owed a duty of
protection as a member of his family, or was a mere stranger to whom he owed no
such duty.

For reasons of policy, the courts are reluctant to criticise the behaviour of rescuers.
A rescuer would not be considered volens if:

a. He was acting to rescue persons or property endangered by the defendant’s

negligence;

b. He was acting under a compelling legal, social or moral duty; and

c. His conduct in all circumstances was reasonable and a natural consequence

of the defendant’s negligence.

Haynes v.Harwood, The defendant negligently left his horses unattended in a

crowded street, a boy threw a stone at them and they ran helter-skelter. The plaintiff,
constable on duty, perceiving the danger to the lives of the persons, ran out and
stopped the horses but was seriously injured. It was held: That he was entitled to
recover damages, as the defendant was grossly negligent, and That the defence of
volenti non fit injuria was held not to apply to the rescue cases, the act of a third
party also intervening and the voluntarily undertaking the risk by the plaintiff were
not open to the defendant.
Baker v. T. E. Hokins and Sons, A well was filled with poisonous fumes of petrol
driven pump on account of negligence of the employer, as a result of which two
workmen were overcome by fumes. Dr. Baker was called to rescue their lives but he
was told not to enter the well in view of the risk involved. Still he preferred to enter
the well with a view to save their lives. In the attempt of saving them he himself was
overcome by the fumes and he died. The widow of Dr. Baker sued the employer to
claim compensation for her husband’s death. The defendants pleaded volenti non fit
injuria. It was held that the act of rescuer was the natural consequence of the
defendant’s negligent act which he could have foreseen and therefore, the defence of
volenti non fit injuria did not apply. The defendants were, thus, held liable.

Dr. J. N. Srivastava v. Ram Bihari Lal and Others, The doctor observed after
opening the abdomen cavity that patient’s appendix was all right but the operation of
gall-bladder was needful. He proceeded with the operation- later on the patient died.
The Court held that it was not possible to seek the consent for the Gall- bladder
operation. In such circumstances doctor was not responsible. If however, there is no
real need to rescue, the Claimant may be held volens.

Cutler v. United Dairies, A man who was injured trying to restrain a horse was
held to be volens because in that case no human life was in immediate danger and he
was not under any compelling duty to act.

3) Drunk Drivers: A person accepting a lift from a drunk driver was not to be treated
as volens unless the drunkenness was so extreme and so glaring that accepting a lift
would be equivalent of to intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or walking on
the edge of an unfenced cliff.

Dann v. Hamilton: The plaintiff was injured when she was a willing passenger in
the car driven by the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved
in a serious crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the
defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken
condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk. The defence was rejected and the
plaintiff was held to be entitled to damages.

Asquith, J. held,“There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the
material time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like
engaging in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling
with an unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not
necessary to decide whether in such a case the maxim volenti non fit injuria would
apply, for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of intoxication
fell short of this degree”.But in another case, defence of volenti non fit injuria was
accepted.

Morris v. Murray, The Claimant and Defendant had been drinking all day. The
Defendant, who had a pilot licence and a light aircraft, suggested that they took the
aircraft for a flight. The Claimant agreed and drove them both to the airfield. They
started the engine and the Defendant took off but crashed shortly after. The
Defendant was killed and the Claimant was seriously injured. An autopsy revealed
that the Defendant had consumed the equivalent of Whiskeys. In an action for
negligence, the Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria. The defence
was allowed. The actions of the Claimant in accepting a ride in an aircraft from an
obviously heavily intoxicated pilot was so glaringly dangerous that he could be
taken to have voluntarily accepted the risk of injury and waived the right to
compensation.

ACT OF GOD (VIS MAJEUR)

Act of God may be defined as “circumstances which no human foresight can

provide against any of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the
possibility, and which when they do occur, therefore, are calamities that do not
involve the obligation of paying for the consequences that result from them”.

Ex:- The falling of a tree, a flash of lightening, a tornado, storms, tempests, tides,
volcanic eruptions, or a flood.

Essential conditions for the availability of this defence are:

 Externality: There must be working of natural forces without any

intervention from human agency, and

 Unpredictability: The occurrence must be extraordinary and not one which

could be anticipated and reasonably guarded against.

 Irresistibility: The occurrence must be such that it could not have been
 avoided by any amount of precaution.

Whether a particular event amounts to an Act of God is question of fact. Today the
scope of this defence is very limited because with the increase in knowledge the
foresight also increases and it is expected that the possibility of the event could have
been visualized.

Whether a particular circumstance or occurrence amounts to an act of God is a

question of fact in each case and the criterion for deciding it "is no human foresight
and prudence could reasonably recognise the possibility of such an event." There is a
tendency on the part of courts to limit the application of the defence of act of God
not because of the fact that its application in the cases of absolute liability is
diminished but because advancement in the scientific knowledge which limits the
unpredictable.

In Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar, the Kerala High Court held that the
criminal activities of the unruly mob cannot be considered to be an Act of God.

In Saraswati Parabhai v. Grid Corporation of Orissa and Others, where an

electric pole was uprooted and fell down with live wire which caused death of a
person. Orissa High Court rejecting the defence of Act of God held that it was the
responsibility of the Grid Corporation authorities to provide protection in such
situation of storm and rain.

Nicholas v. Marshland, The defendant constructed three artificial lakes which

were fed by a natural stream. The lakes were well constructed and adequate in all
normal circumstances. An extraordinary rainfall burst the banks of artificial lakes on
the defendant’s property and the flood water destroyed a number of bridges owned
by the county council. It was held that the defendant was not negligent and the
accident was due to an act of God.

Inevitable Accident

All recent authorities support the view that 'inevitable accident'"negatives liability.
An 'inevitable accident' is that which could not possibly be prevented by the exercise
of ordinary care, caution and skill. It means an accident physically unavoidable. It
does not apply to anything which either party might have avoided. It is an accident
such as the defendant could not have avoided by use of the kind and degree of care
nece'ssary to the exigency, and the circumstances, in which he was placed. If in the
performance of a lawful act, done with all due care, damage ensues through some
unavoidable reason, such damage affords no cause of action. "People must guard
against reasonable probabilities, but they are not bound to guard against fantastic
possibilities.

In A. Krishna Patra v. Orissa State Electricity Board, the Court explained

inevitable act and held that an inevitable accident is an event which happens not
only without the concurrence of the will of the man, but in spite of all effects on his
part to prevent it.

Limitations of this defence, In trespass as well as in negligence, inevitable accident

has no place. Similarly, under the rule in Ryland v. Fletcher, the defendant is liable
even if he has taken reasonable care. In the same way the defence has no role in
cases of absolute liability.

Distinction between "inevitable accident" and "act of God", Dr. Winfield says that
"an act of God" is much older, much simpler and much more easily grasped by
primitive people than is the idea of 'inevitable accident.' A falling tree, a flash of
lightning, a tornado, or flood presents to the observer a simple and dramatic fact
which a layman would regard as an excuse for harm done without further
argument.... But the accidents which are not convulsions of nature are a very
different matter. To know whether injury from a run away horse was inevitable, one
must ask 'would a careful driver have let it run away'..,. 'Inevitable accident' differs
from the act of God in not depending on 'natural forces. All cases of 'inevitable
accident' may be divided into two classes,

1. those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with
the agency of man or other cause, and

2. those which have their origin either in whole or in part in the agency of man,
whether in the commission or omission, non-feasance or misfeasance, or in any
other causes independent of the agency of natural forces. The term "act of God"
is applicable to the former class. The latter types of accidents are termed
'inevitable accident' or "unavoidable accidents."
An act of God will be extraordinary occurrence due to natural cause, which is not
the result of any human intervention, which could not be avoided by any foresight
and care, for example, a fire caused by lighting. But an accidental fire, though it
might not have resulted from any act or omission of common carrier, cannot be an
act of God.

Leading case on this point is Brown v. Kendall. A dog owned by the plaintiff was
fighting with a dog owned by the defendant. The plaintiff stood behind the
defendant without his knowledge while the defendant was trying to separate the
dogs with a stick. The stick struck the plaintiff in his eye and caused injury. It was
held that the defendant was not liable as he had exercised reasonable care.

Nitroglycerin case, The defendants who were a firm of carriers were carrying a
wooden box sent by one of the customers, the contents of which were not reported.
When the servants of the defendants found that the box was leaking, they took it
their office to inspect. Though they tried to open it with normal care, the
nitroglycerin which was highly inflammable substance exploded. All those who
were present there were killed and the building in which the office was situated got
severely damaged and the office itself was completely destroyed. It was held that the
defendants were not liable for the loss to the building.

Stanley v. Powell, The plaintiff, who was engaged in carrying cartridges and game
for the party, was hit by a shot fired by the defendant while on an organized
pheasant shoot when the shot glanced off a tree before hitting the plaintiff. It was
held that the defendant was not liable.

National Coal Board v. Evans, In this case a colliery company preceded the
National Board, had buried an electric cable in the county council’s land. The
county council’s contractor damaged the cable while excavating land and the fact
that electric cable was buried under the land was not known to the council or
contractor. It was held that in these circumstances, neither the council nor the
contractor would be liable for damage of cable and the defence of inevitable
accident was allowed.
NECESSITY

Necessitas inducit privilegium quod jura privata (Necessity induces a privilege

because of a private right).

The act may be necessary

1. to exercise authority given by law

2. to avoid a greater harm

3. in the larger interest of public

This is intentional damage to prevent even greater destruction or in defence of the

realm. The exception of necessity is based on the maxim “Salus populi est suprema
lex” (The welfare of the people is the Supreme Law).

E.g. one arresting and restricting the movement of the drunken person who is likely
to cause danger to the people at large, can successfully plead necessity as a defence.
However, one who puts live electric wires on his land to stop the trespassers cannot
successfully avail this defence if he does not give notice, warning of such a
dangerous thing.

Cope v. Sharpe, A fire broke out on A’s land. A’s servants were busy in
extinguishing the fire, the gamekeeper of C (who had shooting rights over A’s land)
set fire to some strips of heather extinguished between the fire and some nesting
peasants of C, in a shot, while the fire was by A’s servants. A sued the gamekeeper
for trespass. The Court held that the gamekeeper was not liable for there was a real
and imminent danger to the game which justified the action taken by the defendant.

Private Defence

Private defence is another ground of immunity well known to the law. No action is
maintainable for damage done in the exercise of one's right of private defence of
person or property provided that the force employed for the purpose is not out of
proportion to the harm apprehended. And what may be lawfully done for oneself in
this regard may likewise be done for a wife or husband, a parent or child, a master or
servant. But the force employed must not be out of proportion to the apparent
urgency of the occasion. Thus it is not justifiable to use a deadly weapon to repel a
push or blow with the hand. "Honest and reasonable belief of immediate danger" is
the test. Indian Penal Code extends the benefit of this defence even in case of
causing death in certain circumstances.

In India the right of private defence has been given a statutory recognition in
Sections 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code. Though provisions of these sections are
applicable to the criminal law, the principles contained therein may profitably be
imported into the Law of Torts. Self defence as a permissible defence against an
action in torts has recently been discussed by Orissa High Court in Devendra Bhai
v. Megha Bhai, the principle extends not only to the right of person to protect
himself but also to protect others' life, his wife, his parents and his child. He is to use
only necessary force or not to use force in excess of what is necessary.

ACTS CAUSING SLIGHT HARM

De minimis non curat lex (Law does not cure minor loss): Courts generally do not
take trifling and immaterial matters into account, except under peculiar
circumstances, such as the trial of a right, or where personal character is involved.

Acts which separately would not be wrongs may amount to a wrong by a repetition
or combination.

Holford v. Bailey, A casts and draws a net in water where B has the exclusive right
of fishing. Whether any fish are caught or not, A has wronged B, because the act, if
repeated, would tend to establish or claim a right to fish in that water. Similarly, an
act, which a small incidence, may be a part of a larger transaction. In such a case
also the law will take cognizance of the act.

Statutory Authority

A person cannot complain of a wrong which is authorised by the legislature. When

a statute specially authorizes a certain act to be done by a certain person which
would otherwise be unlawful and actionable, no action will lie at the suit of any
person for the doing of that act. "For such a statutory authority is also statutory
indemnity taking away all the legal remedies provided by the law of torts for persons
injuriously affected." (Salmond) If I construct a bridge under the authority of a
statute and if anybody is denied his right of way and traffic through that way for a
specific period, no suit can be brought against me for what I have done is in
pursuance of statutory authority.

Therefore, if a railway line is constructed, there may be interference with private

land when the trains are run, there may also be some incidental harm due to noise,
vibration, smoke, emission of spark etc. No action can lie either for interference with
the land or for incidental harm, except for payment of such compensation which the
Act itself may provided.

In Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rail Company, sparks from an engine of the

respondent's Rail Company, set fire to the appellant's woods on adjoining land.
Held, that since the respondent had taken proper care to prevent the emission of
sparks and they were doing nothing more than that the statute had authorised them to
do, they were not liable. Similarly, in Hammer Smith Rail Coach v. Brand, the value
of plaintiff's property had considerably depreciated due to the noise, vibration and
smoke caused by the running of trains. The damage being vibration and smoke
caused by the running of trains. The damage being necessarily incidental to the
running of the trains authorised by the statute, it was held that no action lies for the
same.

However, when an act authorised by the legislature is done negligently, then an

action lies. In Smith v. London & South Western Railway Company, the servants of a
Railways Company negligently left trimmings of grass and hedges near a rail line.
Sparks from an engine set the material on fire. By a heavy wind the fire was carried
to the nearby plaintiff's cottage which was burnt. Since it was a case of negligence
on the part of the Railways Coch, they were held liable.

When a statute authorises the doing of an act, which would otherwise be a tort, the
injured has no remedy except the one (if any) provided by the statute itself. An
Indian case of this point is of Bhogi Lal v. The Municipality of Ahmedabad, The
Municipality of Ahmedabad demolished the wall of the plaintiff under their
statutory powers. The demolition of the wall also resulted in the falling of the roof of
the defendant on the wall. On an action by the plaintiff for the damage to his
property, it was held by the court that the defendant would not be liable. For no suit
will lie on behalf of a man who sustain a private injury by the execution of powers
given by a statute, these powers being exercised with judgment and caution.
But statutory powers are not charters of immunity for any injurious act done in the
exercise of them. The act done in pursuance of the statutory powers must be done
without negligence. If it is done negligently an action lies.

PLAINTIFF THE WRONG-DOER

Main object of the law of torts is make a person liable for the loss caused by his
fault. If the defendant's fault causes loss to the plaintiff, defendant has to bear the
loss by compensating the plaintiff. Thus, the loss suffered by the plaintiff on account
of defendant's fault is shifted to the defendant. But in many cases, though the act of
the defendant causes harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s own fault may be the
reason for the loss.

Boloch v. Smith, A person, who having occasion to come to the house of another,
strays from the ordinary approaches to the house, and trespasses upon the adjoining
land, where there is no path, has no remedy for any injury which he may sustain
from falling into unguarded wells or pits, as the injury is the result of his own
carelessness or misconduct. But occupier of a land has a duty to keep premises safe
even in respect of trespassers. If he violates this duty, then he cannot take this
defence and will be liable to the plaintiff. In such a case, there will be mutual torts
and each party may sue the other for the tort committed against him.

There are two situations where this justification can be applied

1. Plaintiff caused the wrongful act to be committed by defendant. Defendant

would not otherwise have committed the act.
2. Plaintiff alone is responsible for loss. Defendant had no duty to avoid the loss to
the plaintiff.

If both plaintiff and the defendant are at fault, the loss will have to be shared by
them in the proportion of their fault. This is called ‘distributive justice’.

Sayers v. Harlow, Mrs. Sayers found herself locked in a public lavatory. Unable to
summon help, she tried to climb out over the top of the door. She found this
impossible and, when climbing back down, allowed her weight to rest on the toilet
roll which ‘true to its mechanical requirement, rotated’. Mrs. Sayers fell and was
injured. It was held that 75% of her injury was the fault of the Council for
providing a defective lock which jammed, and 25% was her own fault.

Stapley v. Gypsum Mines Ltd., Two miners who worked, in breach of

instructions, under a dangerous roof were held 80% contributory negligent.

Froom v. Butcher, A front seat passenger injured in a car accident had his damage
reduced by 25% because he had not worn a seat belt.

JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS

No action lies for acts done, or words spoken, by a judge in exercise of his judicial
office, although they may be malicious. It is founded on the principle of public
benefit that Judges should be at liberty to exercise their function independently and
without fear of consequences.

Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 grants protection to a judicial officer for any
act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty. He is
protected even though he exceeds his jurisdiction provided that at that time he
honestly believed that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of.

Limits of such protection are;

1. No such protection is granted if a magistrate is acting mala fide and outside his
jurisdiction.

Sailajanand Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Gupta, The magistrate acting mala fide,
illegally and outside his jurisdiction, ordered the arrest of the plaintiff. The Patna
High Court held that he was not entitled to the protection given by the Judicial
Officer’s Protection Act, 1850 and was, therefore, liable for the wrong of false
imprisonment.

2. The protection of judicial privilege applies only to judicial proceedings as

contrasted with administrative or ministerial proceedings and where, a judge acts
both judicially and administratively, the protection is not afforded to the act done
in the later capacity.

State of U.P. v. Tulsi Ram: Five persons were prosecuted for certain offences.
One of them was acquitted by the Sessions Court and another by the High Court.
The High Court upheld the conviction of only three of the five persons and
authorized the issue of warrants against these three convicted persons. The judicial
magistrate acting negligently signed an order for the arrest of all the five persons. As
a result of this order, the plaintiffs, even though they had been acquitted by the High
Court, were arrested by the police.

It was held that the judicial officer was liable for the wrongful arrest of the plaintiff-
respondents as the judicial officer was not exercising any judicial function but only
an executive function while issuing warrants and therefore, the protection under the
Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 could not be available in this case.

PARENTAL OR QUASI PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Parents and persons in loco parentis (place or position of parents) have a right to
administer punishment on a child for the purpose of correction, chastisement of
training. However one must remember that such an authority warrants the use of
reasonable and moderate punishment only and therefore, if there is an excessive use
of force, the defendant may be liable for assault, battery or false imprisonment, as
the case may be.

In England, as per Section 1(7) of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, a
parent, teacher, or other person having lawful control or charge of a child or young
person is allowed to administer punishment on him.

In Fitzgerald v. North cotel, Cockburn C.J. Observed, “The authority of a

schoolmaster is while it exists, the same as that of parent. A parent, when he places
his child with a school master, delegates to him all his authority, so far as it is
necessary for the welfare of the child”.

The authority of a teacher to correct his students is not limited only to the wrongs
which the student may commit upon the school premises but may also extend to the
wrongs done by him outside the school because there is not much opportunity for
boy to exhibit his moral conduct while in school under the eye of the master the
opportunity is while he is at play or outside the school.

R v. Newport ,It has been held that if the school rules prohibited smoking, both in
the school and in the public, the school master was justified in caning a student
whom he had found smoking cigarette in a public street. Reasonable professional
behaviour, rather than perfection, is the norm.

Eisel v. Board of Education, The Maryland High Court ruled that school
counsellors were negligent in not revealing their knowledge of a student’s
threatened suicide to the child’s parents. The counsellors’ negligence was not for
failure to physically prevent the student’s suicide, but rather for not communicating
information regarding the child’s intent.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

As a general rule, a man is liable only for his own act but there are certain
circumstances in which a person is liable for the wrong committed by others. This is
called "vicarious liability", that is, liability incurred for another. The most common
instance is the liability of the master for the wrong committed by his servants. In
these cases liability is joint as well as several. The plaintiff can sue the actual wrong-
doer himself, be he a servant or agent, as well as his principal. In the words of
Salmond, "In general a person is responsible only for his own acts, but there are
exceptional cases in which the law imposes on him vicarious responsibility for the
acts of another, however, blameless himself."

The doctrine of vicarious liability is based on principles which can be summed up in

the following two maxims,

a) Qui facit per alium facit per se, The maxim means, 'he who acts through
another is deemed in law as doing it himself. The master's responsibility for the
servant's act had also its origin in this principle. The reasoning is that a person
who puts another in his place to do a class of acts in his absence, necessarily
leaves to determine, according to the circumstances that arise, when an act of
that class is to be done and trust him for the manner in which it is done,
consequently he is answerable for the wrong of the person so entrusted either in
the manner of doing such an act, or in doing such an act under circumstances in
which it ought not to have been done, provided what is done is not done from
any caprice of the servant but in the course of the employment.

b) Respondent superior, This maxim means that, the superior must be responsible
or let the principal be liable. In such cases not only he who obeys but also he
who command becomes equally liable This rule has its origin in the legal
 presumption that all acts done by the servant in and about his master's business
are done by his master's express or implied authority and are, in truth, the act of
the master. It puts the master in the same position as if he had done the act
himself. The master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant as is
committed in the course of his service, though no express command or privity is
proved. Similarly, a principal and agent are jointly and severally liable as joint
wrongdoers for any tort authorised by the former and committed by the latter.

Modern View, In recent times, however, the doctrine of vicarious liability is

justified on the principle other than that embodied in the above-mentioned maxims.
It is now believed that the underlying idea of this doctrine is that of expediency and
public policy. Salmond has rightly remarked in this connection that "there is one
idea which is found in the judgments from the time of Sir John Holt to that of
LordGoddard, namely, public policy."

Modes of vicarious liability, The liability for others wrongful acts or omissions
may arise in one of the following three ways,

a) Liability by ratification, Where the defendant has authorised or ratified the

particular wrongful act or omission.

b) Liability arising out of special relationship, Where the defendant stands to the
wrong- doer in a relation which makes the former answerable for wrongs
.committed by the other, though not specifically authorised. This is the most
important form of liability. Liability arising out of master and Servant.

In order that the master may be held liable for the tort of his servant following
conditions should be fulfilled,

1. Tort is committed by the 'servant', and

2. The servant committed the tort while acting in the course of employment of his
master.

Who is servant? Lord Thankerton has said that there must be contract of service
between the master and servant has laid down the following four ingredients.

1) the master's power of selection of his servant,

2) the payment of wages or other remuneration,
3) the master's right to control the method of doing the work, and
4) the master's right of suspension or dismissal.
Thus, a servant may be defined as any person employed by another to do work for
him on the terms that he is to be subject to the control and directions of his employer
in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done. A servant is thus an agent
who works under the supervision and direction of his employer, engaged to obey his
employer's order from time to time. Applying this test, a son is not a servant of his
father in the eye of law.

Difference between Servant and Independent Contractor

1. A servant is an agent who works under the supervision and direction of his
employer. Where as An independent contractor is one who is his own master.

2. A servant is a person employed to obey his master's directions from time to

time. Where as An independent contractor is a person engaged to do certain
works, but to exercise his own discretion as to the mode and time of doing it!

3. A servant is bound by the orders of his master but an independent contractor is

bound by the terms of his contract.

Course of employment, A servant is said to be acting in the course of employment

if,

1) the wrongful act has been authorized by the master, or

2) the mode in which the authorized act has been done is wrongful or unauthorized.
It is the general rule that master will be liable not merely for what he has
authorized his servant to do but also for the way in which he does that which he
has authorized to do.

An employee in case of necessity is also considered as acting in the course of

employment, if he is performing his employer's business. For instance, a
Government employee was travelling in a jeep to deliver medicines in the course of
his duties. He had licence to drive and had also been authorized to drive the
Government's vehicle in the case of necessity. The driver of the jeep suddenly took
ill and, therefore, he had to drive, in order to ensure the medicines reaching their
destination, While driving the jeep he negligently run over the deceased, It was held
that he was acting in the course of employment and thus the Government was liable,

The trend of the recent decisions of various High Courts is to allow compensation to
the accident victim against the owner of the vehicle and through him, the insurance
company. The aspect of the relationship of the independent contractor and employer
between the mechanic or the workshop and the owner of the vehicle has been
generally ignored, such liability has been recognised on the basis of the law of
agency by considering the owners of the workshop or the mechanic as an agent of
the owner of vehicle.

The recent trend in law to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall
within the term 'in course of employment' as ordinarily understood. The owner is not
only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the
course of the employment but also when the driver is with the owner's consent,
driving, the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes.

Thus, although the particular act which gives the cause of action may not be
authorised, yet, if the act is done in the course of employment which is authorised,
the master is liable. In other words, "to hold master liable for the wrongful act of a
servant it must be committed in the course of master's business so as to form part of
it, and not merely, coincident in time with it," but if the torts are committed in any
manner beyond the scope of employment the master is liable only if he was
expressly authorised or subsequently ratified them.

Main incidents of Master's Liability, There are six principal ways in which a master
becomes liable for the wrong done by servants in the course of their employment.

1. The wrong committed by the servant may be the natural consequence of

something done by him with ordinary care in execution of his master’s specific
orders.

In Indian Insurance Corporation, Association Pool, Bombay v. Radhabai, the driver

of a motor vehicle belonging to the Primary Health Centre of the State was required
to bring the ailing children by bus to the Primary Health Centre. The driver in the
course of driving gave the control of the steering wheel to an unauthorised person.
'this was an unauthorised mode of doing the act authorised by the master. It was held
that in such circumstances, the Government, viz., the owner of the vehicle is
vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver in permitting unauthorised person
to drive the vehicle.

2. Master will be liable for the negligence of his servant.

In Baldeo Raj v. Deowati, the driver of a Truck sat by the side of the conductor and
allowed the conductor to drive. The conductor caused an accident with a rickshaw as
a result of which a rikshaw passenger died. It was held that the act of the driver in
permitting the conductor to drive the vehicle at the relevant time was a breach of
duty by the driver, and that was the direct cause of the accident. For such
negligence of the driver his master was held vicariously liable.

3. Servant's wrong may consist in excess of mistaken execution of lawful authority.

Here two things have to be established.

In the first place, it must be shown that the servant intended to do on behalf of his
master something which he was, in fact, authorised to do. Secondly, it has to be
proved that the act if done in a proper manner, would have been lawful.

4. Wrong' may be a wilful wrong but doing on the master's behalf and with the
intention of serving his purpose.

If a servant performs some act which indicates recklessness in his conduct but which
is within the course of his employment and calculated to serve the interest of the
master, then the latter will be saddled with the responsibility for it.

5. Wrong may be due to the servant's fraudulent act.

A master is liable also for the wrongful acts of his servants done fraudulently. It is
immaterial that the servant's fraud was for his own benefit. The master is liable if the
servant was having the authority to do the act, that is, the act must be comprehended
within his ostensible authority. The underlying principle is that on account of the
fraudulent act of the servant, the master is deemed to extend a tacit invitation to
others to enter into dealings or transactions with him. Therefore, the master's
liability for the fraudulent acts of his servants is limited to cases where the plaintiff
has been invited by the defendant to enter into some sort of relationship with a
wrong doer. Consequently, where there is no invitation, express or implied, the acts
will be treated as the independent acts of his servant himself, and outside the scope
of his employment,

6. Wrong may be due to the Servant's Criminal Act.

Though there is no such thing as vicarious liability in criminal proceedings, yet in a

civil action, a master is liable in respect of the criminal acts of a servant, provided
they are committed in the course of his employment.

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN TORTS

Vicarious Liability of the State Position in England

At one time in England the maxim of the Common Law was that "the King can do
no wrong", and as such crown could not be sued for the tortious acts of its servants.
The individual wrong-doer (that is, the official) was personally liable for the wrong
committed by him, even when the wrong was actually authorised by the Crown or
was committed in the course of his employment. Obviously, the position thus
obtained was inequitable and incompatible. However, with the expansion in the
activities of the State, it became necessary that the State should shoulder liability for
the acts of its servants without claiming any special immunity. With this object in
view, the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, was passed. Now, like a private employer,
the Crown is liable for the torts committed by its servants in the course of their
employment.

Position in India

Article 300 of the Constitution of India stated the legal position of State as
regards its liability for the tortuous acts of its servants done in course of their
employment. The Article provides that the Government of India may sue or be sued
by the name of Union of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by
the name of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act
of Parliament or of the legislature of such State enacted by virtue of powers
conferred by this Constitution, sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in
the like cases as the dominion of India and the corresponding provinces or the
corresponding Indian states might have sued or been sued if this constitution had not
been enacted.
Thus, the Union of India and the states are juristic persons by virtue of Article 300
but this Article does not mention those circumstances under which the Union of
India and the State Governments can sue and be sued. This Article simply mandates
to refer to the legal position prevailing before the commencement of the
constitution. The legal position of the State before the Constitution came into force
is to be found in the Government of India Act, 1935, which again like the
Constitution, said that the position prevailing before the Act of 1935, that is, position
as obtaining under the Government of India Act, 1915, shall prevail. The Act of
1915 in a like manner made reference to the Government of India Act, 1858. The
Act of 1858 made it clear that the Government was liable for acts of its servants in
those cases in which the East India Company would have been liable.

The East India Company was held to be liable for the tortuous acts of its servants
which were done in the exercise of its non-sovereign function, that is, the function
which could have been performed by a private individual. It was held not to be liable
for a tort committed by its servants if the act was done in exercise of sovereign
power. The question of liability of East India Company was considered in the
following case,

In Peninsular & Oriented Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of State for

India, the plaintiff's horse was injured by the negligence of the servants of the
Government. These were engaged at the time of the injury in carrying along a public
road a heavy piece of iron for being placed on board a steamer. The plaintiff filed a
suit against the Secretary of State for the recovery of damages. Held, the
Government was liable as the act in question was not being done in the exercise of
any Governmental or sovereign function. Peacock C.J., observed in this case,

"There is a great and clear distinction between acts done in exercise of what are
usually termed sovereign powers and acts done in the conduct of undertakings which
might be carried on by private individuals without having such powers delegated to
them. Where the act is done or a contract is entered into, in the exercise of powers
usually called sovereign powers, no action will lie."

In State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati, the driver of a Rajasthan Government's jeep

which was meant for the use of the collector was taking it from the repair shop to the
collector's residence. On way, owing to rash and negligent driving, a pedestrian was
knocked down and killed. The widow of the victim sued the Government for
damages. Held, the State Government was vicariously liable for the tortious acts of
its servants, like any other employer.

In Fatima Begum v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, a truck belonging to the

Government Transport Undertaking knocked (town a cyclist while it was engaged in
transporting police personnel from the place of duty to barracks. The High Court
rejected plea of defence of sovereign immunity and held the State Government
liable.

In lqbal Kaur v. Chief of Army Staff, an accident occured due to the negligent
driving by a driver of the Government while he was going with a truck for imparting
training in motor driving to new recruits. Held, the act did not constitute an act in
exercise of sovereign power and the Union of India was liable for damages.

In Union of India v. Savita Sharma, soldiers were being transported in an army

vehicle. Negligence on the part of its driver resulted in an accident to a private
tempo. An occupant of ths tempo was injured in the accident. Held, the State was
liable for damages.

In State of Tamil Nadu v.M.N. Shamsuden, the death of a person was caused by an
ambulance belonging to the Government which was being used for transporting a
patient for emergency treatment. The Madras High Court disallowed the protection
of immunity on the ground that transporting of the patient to the hospital could be
done even by private individuals.

In Surjit Singh Bhatia v. Segalla Ramula, a military vehicle dashed against a motor
cycle and caused injuries to the pillion rider. The Punjab & Haryana High Court
rejected the plea of sovereign immunity.

In Indian Insurance Corporation Asson Pool v. Radhabai, it has been held that
taking ailing children to Primary Health Centre in a vehicle belonging to the State
Government is not a sovereign function and the State is liable for the accident
caused by the negligence of the driver of such vehicle. It was a case decided on the
lines of Vidyawati's case.
In Union of India v. Harbans Singh, meals were being carried from the cantonment,
Delhi for being distributed to military personnel on duty. The truck carrying the
meals belonged to the military department and was being driven by a military driver.
It caused accident resulting in the death of a person. It was held that the act was
being done in the exercise of sovereign powers, and therefore, the State was not
liable for the same.

In Pushpa Thakur v. UOI, where the truck involved in accident was engaged in
carrying ration and sepoys within the country during peace time in the course of
movement of troops after the hostilities were over, held that this is a "routine duty"
not directly connected with carrying on of war, the traditional sovereign function.

In Ram Ghulam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the police authorities recovered some
stolen property and deposited the same in the Malkhana. The property was again
stolen from the Malkhana. The Government of U.P. was held not liable for the same
to the owner of the property as the Government servants were performing
obligations imposed by law. Similar decision was given in Mohd. Murad v. Govt. of
Uttar Pradesh.

In State of U.P. v. Hindustan Lever Limited, the act of the Government servants was
in exercise of statutory powers but the powers in that case were not sovereign
powers, and therefore, the State was held liable.

In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commn, Delhi, the State was
ordered to pay compensation to victims of police firing.The police fired without any
warning on a group of poor peasants who had collected for a peaceful meeting.

Thus, from the above cases it can be concluded that sovereign powers means those
powers which can be lawfully exercised by a person by virtue of delegated
sovereign powers. It must include maintenance of the army, various departments of
the Government for maintenance of public law, order, administration of the country.
An easy test to consider that whether a function is a non-sovereign function or not is
that if a private individual can be engaged in that function it is a non-sovereign
function. Thus, functions relating to trade, business, commerce and the welfare
activities are non-sovereign functions.
 Vicarious Liability of the Government of India: Plea for Review

While in England, after the passing of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, it is no
defence for the State that the tort committed by its servants was in discharge of
obligations imposed by law, in India, the same has been considered to be a defence
in a number of cases.

However, in order to exempt the State from liability it is further necessary that the
statutory functions which are exercised by the Government servants were exercised
by way of delegation of the sovereign power of the State. In case the tortious act
committed by the servant was in discharge of non-sovereign functions die State
would be liable for the same (Kasturi Lal’s case; State of U.P. v. Hindustan Lever
Ltd.).

The palpable unjustness of the decision in Kasturi Lal case has led to its bypassing
in recent times. Today, the State has been held liable in respect of loss or damage
either to the property or to a person. Although the decision of the Supreme Court in
Kasturi Lal's case is yet to be overruled, subsequent decisions of the court have
greatly undermined its authority and reduced the strength of sovereign immunity In
Common Cause, A Registered Society v. UOI ,the court observed that "the doctrine
of sovereign immunity has no relevance in the present day context Much of
Kasturilal’s efficacy as a binding precedent has been eroded".

The present law relating to the vicarious liability of State is not satisfactory in India.
A proper legislation is lacking in this regard. It is left to courts to develop the law
according to the views of the judges. The citizens are not in a position to know the
law definitely. In Kasturi Lal case, die Supreme Court had expressed dissatisfaction
at the prevailing position. It said that the remedy to cure this position lies in the hand
of the Legislature. In T.V. Nagendra Rao's case also, the Supreme Court suggested
for enacting appropriate legislation to remove die uncertainty in this area.

The position prevailing before the commencement of the Constitution remains

unchanged though the Parliament and the State Legislature have been empowered to
pass law to change the position (Article 300 of Constitution). The unsatisfactory
state of affairs in this regard is against social justice in a welfare State. In the
absence of legislation, it will be in consonance with social justice demanded by the
changed conditions and the concept of welfare State that the courts will follow the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court rather than Kasturi Lal.

It emerges from the various decisions (barring recent ones) that the Government is
not liable for the torts committed by its servants in exercise of sovereign powers, but
for the torts committed in the exercise of non-sovereign powers. Sovereign powers
mean powers which can be lawfully exercised only by a sovereign or by a person to
whom such powers have been delegated.

There are no well defined tests to know what are sovereign powers. Functions like
maintenance of defence forces, maintenance of law and order and proper
administration of the country, and the machinery for administration of justice can be
included in sovereign functions. Functions relating to trade, business and commerce
and welfare activities (viz. running of hospital) are amongst the 'non-sovereign'
functions. Broadly speaking such functions, in which private individuals can be
engaged in, are not sovereign functions.

Routine activities, such as maintenance of vehicles of officers of the government,

also fall within the sphere of 'non-sovereign' functions.

The following are the instances of "sovereign" functions:

1. Maintenance of defence force that is construction of a military road, distribution

of meals to the army personnel on duty, checking army personnel on duty.

In Baxi Amrik Singh v. Union of India, held that the checking of army personnel on
duty was a function intimately connected with the army discipline and it could only
be performed by a member of the Armed Forces and that too by such a member who
is detailed on such duty and is empowered to discharge that function.

2. Maintenance of law and order that is if die plaintiff is injured while police
personnel are dispersing unlawful crowd (State of Orissa v. Padmalochan), or
plaintiff's loudspeaker set is damaged when the police makes a lathi charge to
quell a riot (State of M.P. v. Chironji Lal).
 The following are the instances of "non-sovereign" functions;

a. Maintenance of dockyard (P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. case).

b. A truck belonging to the public works department carrying material for the
construction of a road bridge (Rap Raw Verses The Punjab State), Famine relief
work (Shyam Sunder v. State of Rqjasthan).

c. A Government jeep car being taken from the workshop to the Collector's
bungalow for the Collector's use (State of Rajasthan v. Vidjawati).

d. Taking ailing children to Primary Health Centre in a Government carrier (Indian

Insurance Co. Assn. Pool v. Radbabai).

e. Carrying military jawans from Railway Station to the Unit Headquarters (union of
India v. Savita Sharma). Similarly, carrying ration and sepoys within the country
during peace time in the course of movement of troops after the hostilities were over
[Pushpa Tbakur v. UOI].

f. Carrying Air Force officers from one place to another in Delhi for playing hockey
and basket ball (Satya Wati Devi v.UOI), or bringing back military officers from the
place of exercise to the college of combat

g. Taking a truck for imparting training to new M.T. Recruits (Iqbal Kaur v. Chief of
Army Staff).

h. Transporting of a machine and other equipment to a military training school

(Union of India v. Sugrabai).

i. Where some military jawans found some firewood lying by river side and
carried the same away for purposes of camp fire and fuel (Roop Lal v.UOI).

j. a 'service' (facility) provided to a 'consumer' within the meaning of the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not a 'sovereign' function (Lucknow
Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta).
 NEGLIGENCE

Introduction:

In day to day usage Negligence denotes mere carelessness. In legal sense it

signifies failure to exercise the standard of care which the doer as a reasonable man
should, by law, have exercised in the circumstances.

Generally speaking there is a legal duty to take care where it was or should have
been reasonably foreseeable that failure to do so was likely to cause injury.
Negligence is, accordingly, a mode in which many kinds of harms may be caused,
by not taking such adequate precautions as should have been taken in the
circumstances to avoid or prevent that harm, as contrasted with causing such harm
intentionally or deliberately. A man may, accordingly, cause harm negligently
though he was not careless but tried to be careful, if the care taken was such as the
court deems inadequate in the circumstances.

Generally speaking one is responsible for the direct consequences of his negligent
acts where he is placed in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious
that if he does not use due care in his own conduct he will cause injury to another.

Negligence takes innumerable forms, but the commonest forms are negligence
causing personal injuries or death, of which species are employers’ liability to an
employee, the liability of occupiers of land to visitors thereon, the liability of
suppliers to consumers, of persons doing work to their clients, of persons handling
vehicles to other road-users, and so on. The categories of negligence are not closed
and new varieties such as negligence causing economic loss may be recognized.

Negligence has two meanings in law of torts:

1. Negligence as state of mind- Negligence is a mode of committing certain torts e.g.

negligently or carelessly committing trespass, nuisance or defamation. This is the
subjective meaning of negligence advocated by the Austin, Salmond and Winfield.

2. Negligence as a type of conduct- Negligence is a conduct, not a state of mind.

Conduct which involves the risk of causing damage. This is the objective meaning
of negligence, which treats negligence as a separate or specific tort.
Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill
towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care or
skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury, to his person or property
(Heaven v. Pender).

Essentials of Negligence

In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has to prove following essentials:

1. That the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

2. That the defendant made a breach of the duty i.e. he failed to exercise due care
and skill.

3. That plaintiff suffered damage as a consequence thereof.

1. Duty of care to the plaintiff

The existence of a duty situation or a duty to take care is thus essential before a
person can be held liable negligence. It means a legal duty rather than a mere moral,
religious or social duty. The plaintiff has to establish that the defendant owed to him
specific legal duty to take care, of which he has made a breach. Normally the
existence of a duty situation in a given case is decided on the basis of existing
precedents covering similar situations; but it is now well accepted that new duty
situations can be recognized.

In Donoghue v. Stevenson, the appellant plaintiff drank a bottle of ginger beer which
was brought from a retailer by her friend. The bottle which was of dark opaque glass
in fact contained the decomposed body of snail (found out by her when she had
already consumed a part of the contents of the bottle).

Held that the manufacturer of bottle was responsible for his negligence towards the
plaintiff. According to Lord Atkin: “A manufacturer of the products, which he sells
in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the
form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate
examination and with the knowledge that the absence of the reasonable care in the
preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to consumers’ life or
property, owes a duty to the customer to take that reasonable care.”
The House of Lords also rejected the plea that there was no contractual relationship
between the manufacturer and plaintiff. Lord Atkin said: “The rule that you are to
love your neighbor becomes in law ‘you must not injure your neighbor’.’’

Similarly, in Hedley Byrne &co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd, again a new duty was
recognized. It was held that the law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking
information from a party possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due care
and that a negligent, though honest, misrepresentation in breach of this duty may
give rise to an action for damages apart from contract or fiduciary relationship. Lord
Pearce in this case said: “How wide the sphere of the duty of care in negligence is to
be laid depends ultimately upon the court’s assessment of the demands of society for
protection from carelessness of others.”

Whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff or not depends on reasonable
foresee ability of the injury to the plaintiff. In Heaven v. Pender, held that the duty
arises only if a person is nearer to the person or property of another. A useful test to
decide culpability is to determine what a ‘Reasonable Man’ (i.e. a man of ordinary
prudence or intelligence) would have foreseen and behaved under the circumstances.
The standard of foresight of the reasonable man is an impersonal or objective test.
However, the standard of care of the reasonable man involves in its application a
subjective element.

In Rural Transport Service v. Bezlum Bibi, the conductor of an overloaded bus

invited passengers to travel on the roof of the bus. One of the passengers on the roof
of the bus was struck by an overhanging branch of a tree. He fell down and died.
Held that there was negligence on the part of both the driver and conductor of the
bus.

In SushmaMitra v. M.P. State Road Transport Corpn , the plaintiff was resting her
elbow on the window sill. A truck coming from the opposite direction hit her elbow
as a result of which she received severe injuries. Held that it is the duty of the driver
to pass on the road at a reasonable distance from the other vehicles.

When the injury to the plaintiff is not foreseeable, the defendant is not liable. In
Glasgow Corpn. v. Muir, the managers of the defendant corporation tearooms
permitted a picnic party to have their food in the tearoom. Two members of the
picnic party were carrying a big urn containing 6-9 gallons of tea to a tearoom
through a passage where some children were buying ice creams. Suddenly one of the
persons lost the grip of the handle of urn and six children, including the plaintiff,
were injured. Held that the managers could not anticipate such an event and,
therefore, she had no duty to take precautions. Hence neither she nor he corporation
could be held liable.

To establish negligence it is not enough to prove that the injury was foreseeable. But
a reasonable likelihood of the injury has also to be shown. The duty is to guard
against reasonable probabilities rather than bare or remote or fantastic possibilities.

In Fardon v. Harcourt, the defendant parked his car by the roadside and left a dog
inside the car. The dog jumped out and smashed a glass panel. A splinter from this
glass injured the plaintiff while he was walking past the car. Held that the accident
being very unlikely, the defendant was not liable.

In Balton v. Stone, a person on road was injured by a ball hit by a player on a

cricket ground abutting on that highway. The ground had been used for 90 years and
during the last 30 years the ball had been hit in the highway on about six occasions
but no one had been injured. Held that the defendant (committee and members of
cricket club) were not negligent.

When the defendant owed a duty of care to persons rather than the plaintiff, the
plaintiff cannot sue even if he might have been injured by the defendant’s act. Thus
the duty must be owed to the plaintiff.

In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,a passenger carrying a package was trying
to board a moving train. He seemed to be unsteady as if about to fall. A railway
guard, with an idea to help him pushed him from behind. In this act, the package (of
fireworks) fell resulting in an explosion, as a result of which the plaintiff was
injured. Held that the guard if negligently to the holder of the package was not
negligent in relation to the plaintiff standing far away (about 25 feet).

Similarly, counsel has a duty towards client. The Counsel should be careful in
performing his professional duties. If a counsel, by his acts or omissions, causes the
interest of the party engaging him, in any legal proceedings to be prejudicially
affected. He does so at his peril. On the same analogy a person engaged in some
particular profession is supposed to have the requisite knowledge and skill needed
for the purpose and he has a duty to exercise reasonable degree of care in the
conduct of his duties. The standard of care needed in a particular case dependents on
the professional skill expected from persons belonging to a particular class. A
surgeon or anesthetist will be judged by the standard of an average practitioner of
class to which he belongs or holds himself out to belong. In case of specialists, a
higher degree of skill is needed.

Explaining the nature of duty of care in medical profession, the Supreme Court
observed in Dr. LakshmanBalkrishna Joshi v. TrimbakBapu Godbole, “The
petitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and
must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest nor a very low
degree of care and competence judged in the light of the particular circumstances of
each case is what the law requires. The doctor, no doubt, has discretion in choosing
treatment which he proposes to give to the patient and such discretion is relatively
ampler in cases of emergency.”

2. Breach of Duty

After the plaintiff has shown that defendant owed a duty to him, the plaintiff to
succeed in a claim for negligence, has next to show that the defendant was in breach
of this duty. It means not taking due care which is required in a particular case.

The law requires taking of two points into to determine the standard of care
required:

(a) The importance of the object to be attained- The law does not require greatest
possible care but the care required is that of a reasonable and prudent man under
certain circumstances. The amount of care, skill, diligence or the like, vary
according to the particular case. The prudent man, ordinarily, with regard to
undertaking an act is the man who has acquired that special skill to do the act which
he undertakes; a man who has not acquired that special skill is imprudent in
undertaking to do the act, however careful he may be, and, however great his skill in
other things. The law permits taking chance of some measure of risks so that in
public interest various kinds of activities should go on.
As has been pointed in Dabron v. Bath Tramways , that if all the trains in this
country were restricted to a speed of five miles an hour, there would be fewer
accidents, but our national life would be intolerably slowed down. The purpose to be
served, if sufficiently important, justifies the assumption of the abnormal risk.

A balance has therefore to be drawn between the importance and usefulness of an

act and the risk created thereby. Thus a certain speed may not be negligent for a fire
brigade vehicle but the same speed may be an act of negligence for another vehicle.

In Latimer v. A.E.C. Ltd, due to heavy rain a factory was flooded with water, which
got mixed with some oily substances. The floors in the factory became slippery. The
factory owners spread all the available sawdust but some oily patches still remained
there. The plaintiff slipped and was injured. Held that the defendants had acted
reasonably and, therefore, they were not liable.

(b) The magnitude of risk- The degree of care which a man is required to use in a
particular situation in order to avoid the imputation of negligence varies with the
obviousness of the risk. If the danger of doing injury to the person or property of
another by the pursuance of a certain line of conduct is great, the individual who
proposes to pursue that particular course is bound to use great care in order to avoid
the foreseeable harm. On the other hand if the danger is slight only a slight amount
of care is required. Thus the driver of a vehicle has to observe a greater care when he
is passing through a school zone, or he finds a blind man, a child or an old man.
There is no absolute standard, but it may be said generally that the degree of care
required varies directly with the risk involved.

In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Suresh Kumar, a minor boy came in contact
with an overhead electric wire which had sagged to 3 feet above the ground, got
electrocuted thereby and received burn injuries. The Electricity Board had a duty to
keep the overhead wire 15 feet above the ground. The Board was held liable for
breach of its statutory duty.

Glasgow Corp. v. Taylor, is another illustration where there was lack of due care
according to the circumstances of the case. In that case poisonous berries were
grown in a public garden under the control of the corporation. The berries looked
like cherries and thus had tempting appearance for the children. A child, aged seven,
ate those berries and died. It was found that the shrub bearing the berries was neither
properly fenced nor a notice regarding the deadly character of the berries was
displayed. It was, therefore, held that the defendants were liable for negligence.

Similarly, in Bishwanath Gupta v. Munna, the driving of a truck at a speed of 10 to

12 miles per hour was held to be negligent when the children playing on a road were
visible to the driver and he could anticipate that some of them may cross the road on
seeing the approaching truck. The duty in such a case was to drive so slow that in
case of necessity the vehicle could be immediately stopped.

Good sense and policy of the law impose some limit upon the amount of care, skill
and nerve which are required of a person in a position of duty, who has to encounter
a sudden emergency. In a moment of peril and difficulty the court not expect perfect
presence of mind, accurate judgment and promptitude. If a man is suddenly put in an
extremely difficult position and a wrong order is given by him, it ought not in the
circumstances to be attributed to him as a thing done with such want of nerve and
skill as to amount to negligence. If in a sudden emergency a man does something
which he might, as he knew the circumstances, reasonably think proper, he is not to
be held guilty of negligence, because upon review of facts, it can be seen that the
course he had adopted was not in fact the best.

In Jones v. Staveley, Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd., it was held that the standard of care
owed by an employer to his workmen in his factory for the purpose of determining
his liability to them for negligence is higher than the standard to be applied in
determining whether there has been contributory negligence on the part of one of the
workmen.

3. Damages

It is also necessary that the defendant’s breach of duty must cause damage to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff has also to show that the damage thus caused is not too
remote a consequence of the defendants’ negligence.

Proof of Negligence (Res Ipsa Loquitur)

The general rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was
negligent. Initial burden of making a prima facie case against defendant is on
plaintiff, but once this onus is discharged, it will be for the defendant to prove that
the incident was the result of inevitable accident or contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff. Direct evidence of the negligence, however, is not necessary and
the same may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Though, as a general
rule, the plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proving negligence on the part of
the defendant, there are, however, certain cases when the plaintiff need not prove
that and the inference of negligence is drawn from the facts. There is a presumption
of negligence according to the Latin maxim ‘res ipsa loquitur’ which means the
thing speaks for itself. In such a case it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove accident
and nothing more. The defendant can, however, avoid his liability by disapproving
negligence on his part. Certain things regarding this maxim has to be kept in mind,
these include:

(1) The maxim is not a rule of law. It is a rule of evidence benefiting the plaintiff
because the true cause of accident may lie solely within the defendant’s knowledge.
(2) The maxim applies when- (i) the injurious agency was under the management or
control of the defendant, and (ii) the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
thing, does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. (3) The
maxim has no application when the accident is capable of two explanations. Also, it
does not apply when the facts are sufficiently known.

If a brick falls from a building and injures a passerby on the highway, or the goods
while in the possession of a bailee are lost, or a stone is found in a bun, or a bus
going on a road overturns, or death of a person is caused by live broken electric wire
in a street, a presumption of negligence is raised.

In Agyakaur v. Pepsu R.T.C., a rickshaw going on the correct side was hit by a bus
coming on the wrong side of the road. Held that the driver of bus was negligent.

In Municipal Corpn.Delhi v. Subhagwati, due to the collapse of the Clock Tower

situated opposite to Town Hall in the main bazar of Chandni Chowk, Delhi, a
number of persons died. The Clock Tower belonged to the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi. The supreme court explained the legal position as: “There is a special
obligation on the owner of the adjoining premises for the safety of the structures
which he keeps beside the highway. If these structures fall into disrepair so as to be
of potential danger to the passerby or to be a nuisance, the owner is liable to anyone
using the highway that is injured by reason of the disrepair. In such a case, the
owner is legally responsible irrespective of whether the danger is caused by patent
or latent(hidden) defect.”

In PillutlaSavitri v. G.K.Kumar, the plaintiff’s husband, who was a practicing

Advocate at Guntur, was relaxing in front of his tenanted premises on the ground
floor. Suddenly, a portion under construction on the first floor of the building
collapsed and the sun-shade and parapet wall fell down on the advocate, resulting in
his death. The principle of res ipsa loquitur was applied and there was presumed to
be negligence on the part of the defendants, who were getting the construction work
done. The defendants were held liable to pay damages.

In Mrs. Aparna Dutta v. Apollo Hospital Enterprises Ltd., the plaintiff got herself
operated for the removal of her uterus in the defendant hospital, as there was
diagnosed to be a cyst in the area of one of her ovaries. Due to the negligence of the
hospital surgeon, who performed the operation, an abdominal pack was left in her
abdomen. The same was removed by second surgery. Leaving foreign material in
the body during operation was held to be a case of res ipsa loquitur. The doctor who
performed the operation and the hospital authorities were held liable to pay
compensation of Rs. 5,80,000 to the plaintiff for their negligence.

In Wakelin v. London and South Western Railway Co., the dead body of a man was
found near a railway crossing on the defendant’s railway. The man had been killed
by a train (at the night time) bearing the usual head lights but the driver had not
sounded the whistle when he approached the crossing. In an action by the widow, it
was held that from these facts, it could not be reasonably inferred that the accident
occurred due to the defendant’s negligence.

Lord Halsburry said: “One may surmise, and it was but surmise and not evidence,
that the unfortunate man was knocked down by a passing train while on the level
crossing; but assuming in the plaintiff’s favour that fact to be established, is there
anything to show that the train ran over the man rather the man ran against the train?
Medical and Professional Negligence

In the law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and

others are included in the category of persons professing some special skill or skilled
persons generally. Any task which is required to be performed with a special skill
would generally be admitted or undertaken to be performed only if the person
possesses the requisite skill for performing that task. A surgeon does not undertake
that he will perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the highest possible degree
of skill, as there may be persons of higher education and greater advantage than
himself; but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable, and competent degree of skill;
and in a an action against him by a patient, the question is whether the injury
complained of must be referred to the want of a proper degree of skill and care in the
defendant or not. In a suit for damages the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant was negligent and that his negligence caused the injury of which the
plaintiff complained.

Dr. Laxman v. Dr. Trimbak , court held that a doctor when consulted by a patient
owes him certain duties, viz., a duty of care in deciding whether to undertake the
case, a duty of care in deciding what treatment to give and a duty of care in
administration of that treatment. A breach of any of these duties gives a right of
action for negligence to the patient.

Under English law as laid down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management

Committee, a doctor, who acts in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a
responsible body of medical men, is not negligent merely because there is a body of
opinion that takes a contrary view. MC NAIR, J., in his summing up to jury
observed: “Where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or
competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the
test of the man on the top of a Clap ham omnibus, because he has not got this special
skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing
to have that special skill….. A man need not to possess the highest expert skill; it is
well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an
ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.” At common law, a doctor
cannot lawfully operate on adult persons of sound mind or give them any other
treatment involving the application of physical force without their consent for
otherwise he would be liable for the tort of trespass. But when a patient is incapable,
for one reason or another, of giving his consent, a doctor can lawfully operate upon
or give other treatment provided that the operation or the other treatment concerned
is in the best interest of the patient if only it is carried out in order to save his life or
to ensure improvement or to prevent deterioration in his physical or mental health.
The test here also in determining liability would be whether the doctor acted in
accordance with the practice accepted at the time by a responsible body of medical
opinion skilled in the particular form of treatment. Prior consent or approval of the
court for giving the treatment is not necessary. But in case of a patient of unsound
mind, the court may entertain a petition for declaration that a proposed operation or
treatment on the patient may be lawfully performed. These principles were laid
down by the House of Lords in F v. Berkshire Health Authority.

Now coming to legal profession, till recently in England Barristers enjoyed

immunity from being sued for professional negligence which was reasoned on the
basis of public policy and in public interest. This immunity was extended to
‘solicitor advocates by section 62 of the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990. But
the House of Lords in Arthur JS Hall &CO. v. Simons, recently changed this law and
held that now neither public policy nor public interest justified the continuance of
that immunity. Thus Barristers and solicitor advocates are now liable in England for
negligence like other professionals. In India section 5 of the Legal Practitioners
(fees) Act, 1926 provides that no legal practitioner who has acted or agreed to act
shall, by reason only of being a legal practitioner, be exempt from liability to be
sued in respect of any loss or injury due to any negligence in the conduct of his
professional duties. The expression legal practitioner means “an advocate, vakil or
attorney of any High Court, a pleader, mukhtar or revenue agent.

After adverting to the provisions of the Act, the supreme Court in M.Veerappa’s v.
Evelyn Squeira, held that an advocate who has been engaged to act is clearly liable
for negligence to his is client. The Supreme Court, however, left open the question
whether an advocate who has been engaged only to plead can be sued for
negligence.

Kinds of Negligence

1. Contributory Negligence

In certain circumstances a person who has suffered an injury will not be able to
get damages from another for the reason his own negligence has contributed to his
injury; every person is expected to take care reasonable care of himself. According
to john G. Fleming, “Negligence is conduct that fails to conform to the standards
required by law for safeguarding others (actionable negligence) against
unreasonable risk of injury.” Thus, when the plaintiff by his own want of care
contributes to the damage caused by the negligence or wrongful conduct of the
defendant, he is considered to be guilty of contributory negligence It does not mean
breach of a duty towards other party but it means absence of due care on his part
about his own safety.

For example, a pedestrian tries to cross the road all of a sudden and is hit by a
moving vehicle; he is guilty of contributory negligence. In this case, the defendant
could completely escape his liability for accident. Take another case, if the
conductor of a bus invites passengers to travel on the roof of the bus, and one of the
passengers travelling on the roof is hit by the branch of a tree and falls down and
gets killed, there is not only negligence on the part of the conductor also
contributory negligence on the part of the passengers. What amounts to contributory
negligence in the case of an adult may not be so in case of a child. If, however, a
child is capable of appreciating the danger he may be held guilty of contributory
negligence.

In Yachuk v. Oliver Blis Co. Ltd, the defendant’s servants sold some gasoline to two
boys aged 7 and 9 years. The boys falsely stated that they needed the same for their
mother’s car. They actually used it for their play and one of them got injured. The
defendant was held liable in full for loss.

At Common Law, contributory negligence was a complete defense, and the

negligent plaintiff could not claim any compensation from the defendant. The court
modified this rule and introduced the rule of “Last Opportunity” or “Last Chance
The last opportunity rule may be stated as: “When an accident happens through the
combined negligence of two persons, he alone is liable to the other who had the last
opportunity of avoiding the accident by reasonable care”.

The rule was applied in Davies v.Mann, in this case, the plaintiff fettered the forefeet
of his donkey and left it in a narrow highway. The defendant was driving his wagon
too fast and the donkey was run over and killed. In spite of his negligence the
plaintiff was entitled to claim compensation because the defendant had the last
opportunity to avoid the accident.
The rule was further defined in the case of British Columbia Electric Co. v. Loach
,“a defendant, who had not in fact the last opportunity to avoid the accident, will
nevertheless be liable if he would have that opportunity but for his negligence”
(Constructive Last Opportunity). The rule of last opportunity also was very
unsatisfactory because the party, whose act of negligence was earlier, altogether
escaped the responsibility.

The law was changed in England. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act,
1945 provides that when both parties are negligent and they have contributed to
some damage, the damage will be apportioned as between them according to the
degree of their fault (According to Winfield, where the plaintiff’s negligence was so
closely implicated with the defendant’s negligence so as to make it impossible to
determine whose negligence was the decisive cause, the plaintiff cannot recover).

The same is considered to be the position in India as well. The Kerala Torts
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976 contains provisions for apportionment of
liability in case of contributory negligence. In India, contributory negligence has
been considered as a defense to the extent the plaintiff is at fault. Thus, if in an
accident the plaintiff is as much at the fault as the defendant the compensation to
which he would otherwise be entitled will be reduced to 50%.

2. Composite Negligence

When the negligence of two or more persons result in the same damage to a third
person there is said to be a ‘composite negligence’, and the persons responsible are
known as ‘composite tort-feasors’.

In case of contributory negligence there is negligence on the part of the defendant as

well as the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s own negligence contributes to harm which he has
suffered. In the case of composite negligence, there is negligence of two or more
persons towards the plaintiff, and the plaintiff himself is not to be blamed.

While contributory negligence is a defense available to the defendant to overcome or

reduce the liability in relation to the plaintiff, the composite negligence is not a
defense.
 Nuisance

Nuisance as a tort means an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment

of land, or some right over, or in connection with it. Acts interfering with the
comfort, health or safety are the examples of it. The interference may be any way,
e.g., noise vibrations, heat, smell, smoke, fumes, water, gas, electricity, excavation
or disease producing germs. Nuisance should be distinguished from trespass.
Trespass is (i) a direct physical interference, (ii) with the plaintiff’s possession of
land, (iii) through some materials or tangible object. Both nuisance and trespass are
similar in so far as in either case the plaintiff has to show his possession of land. The
two may even coincide, some kinds of nuisance being also continuing trespasses.
The points of distinction between two are as follows:

1. If interference is direct, the wrong is trespass; if it is consequential it amounts to

nuisance. Planting a tree on another’s land is trespass. But when a person plants a
tree over his own land and the roots or branches project into or over the land of
another person that is nuisance. To throw stones upon one’s neighbor’s premises is a
wrong of trespass; to allow stone from a ruinous chimney to fall upon those
premises is the wrong of nuisance.

2. Trespass is interference with a person’s possession of land. In nuisance there is

interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land. Such interference with the use
or enjoyment could be there without any interference with the possession. For
example, a person by creating offensive smell or noise on his own land could cause
nuisance to his neighbor.

Moreover, in trespass interference is always through some material or tangible

objects. Nuisance can be committed through the medium of intangible objects also
like vibrations, gas, noise, smell, electricity or smoke.

Kinds of Nuisance

Nuisance is of two kinds:

i. Public or Common Nuisance

ii. Private Nuisance or Tort of Nuisance
Public Nuisance

Public nuisance is a crime where as private nuisance is a civil wrong. Public

nuisance is interference with the right of public in general and is punishable as an
offence. Obstructing a public way by digging a trench, or constructing structures on
it are examples of public nuisance.

For example, digging trench on a public highway may cause inconvenience to public
at large. No member of the public, who is thus obstructed or has to take a diversion
along with others, can sue under civil law. But if anyone of them suffers more
damage than suffered by the public at large, e.g., is severely injured by falling into
the trench, he can sue in tort. In order to sustain a civil action in respect of a public
nuisance proof of special and particular damage is essential.

The proof of special damage entitles the plaintiff to bring a civil action for what may
be otherwise a public nuisance. Thus, if the standing of horses and wagons for an
unreasonably long time outside a man’s house creates darkness and bad smell for the
occupants of the house and also obstructs the access of customers into it, the
damage is ‘particular, direct and substantial’ and entitles the occupier to maintain an
action.

In Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal, the defendant erected a brick grinding machine
adjoining the premises of the plaintiff, who was a medical practitioner. The brick
grinding machine generated dust, which polluted the atmosphere. The dust entered
the consulting chamber of the plaintiff and caused physical inconvenience to him
and patients, and their red coating on clothes, caused by the dust, could be
apparently visible. It was held that special damages to the plaintiff had been proved
and a permanent injunction was issued against the defendant restraining him from
running his brick grinding machine there.

In Rose v. Milles, the defendant wrongfully moored his barge across a public
navigable creck. This blocked the way for plaintiff’s barges and the plaintiff had to
incur considerable expenditure in unloading the cargo and transporting same by
land. It was held that there was special damage caused to the plaintiff to support his
claim.
If the plaintiff cannot prove that he has suffered any special damage, i.e. more
damage than suffered by the other members of the public, he cannot claim any
compensation for the same.

Private Nuisance or Tort of nuisance

Its essentials: To constitute the tort of nuisance, the following essentials are required
to be proved:

1. Unreasonable interference.

2. Interference is with the use of enjoyment of land.

3. Damage.

1. Unreasonable interference.

Interference may cause damage to the plaintiff’s property or may cause personal
discomfort to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of property. Every interference is not a
nuisance. To constitute nuisance the interference should be unreasonable. Every
person must put up with some noise, some vibration, some smell, etc. so that
members of the society can enjoy their own right. If I have the house by the side of
the road I cannot bring an action for the inconvenience which necessarily incidental
to the traffic on the road. Nor can I sue my neighbor if his listening to the radio
interferes with my studies. So long as the interference is not unreasonable, no action
can be brought.

In Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prashad, Gur Prasad and another filed a suit against
Radhey Shyam and others for a permanent injunction to restrain them from
installing and running a flour mill in their premises. It was alleged that the said mill
would cause nuisance to the plaintiffs, who were occupying the first floor portion o
the same premises in as much as the plaintiffs would lose their peace on account of
rattling noise of the flour mill and thereby their health would also be adversely
affected. It was held that substantial additional to the noise in a noisy locality, by the
running of the impugned machines, seriously interfered with the physical comfort of
the plaintiffs and as such it amounted to nuisance, and the plaintiffs were entitled to
an injunction against the defendants.
In Ushaben v. Bhagya laxmi Chitra Mandir, the plaintiffs-appellants sued the
defendants-respondents for a permanent injunction to restrain them from exhibiting
the film “Jai Santoshi Maa” It was contended that exhibition of the film was a
nuisance because the plaintiff’s religious feeling were hurt as Goddesses Saraswati,
Laxmi and Parvati were defined as jealous and were ridiculed. It was held that hurt
to religious feelings was not an actionable wrong. Moreover, the plaintiffs were free
not to see the movie again. The balance of convenience was considered to be in
favor of the defendants and as such there was no nuisance.

An act which is otherwise reasonable does not become unreasonable and actionable
when the damage, even though substantial, is caused solely due to sensitiveness of
the plaintiff or the use of which he puts his property. If certain kind of traffic is no
nuisance for a healthy man, it will not entitle a sick man to bring an action if he
suffers thereby, even though the damage is substantial. If some noises which do not
disturb or annoy an ordinary person but disturb only the plaintiff in his work or sleep
due to his over sensitiveness, it is no nuisance against this plaintiff.

In Robinson v. Kilvert, the plaintiff warehoused brown paper in a building. The heat
created by the defendant in the lower portion of the same building for his own
business dried and diminished the value of plaintiff’s brown paper. The loss was due
to exceptionally delicate trade of plaintiff and paper generally would not have been
damaged by the defendant’s operations. It was held that the defendant was not liable
for the nuisance.

Does Nuisance Connote state of affairs?

Nuisance is generally continuing wrong. A constant noise, smell, vibration is a

nuisance and ordinarily an isolated act of escape cannot be considered to be a
nuisance. Thus, in Stone v. Bolton, the plaintiff, while standing on a highway, was
injured by a cricket ball hit from the defendant’s ground, but she could not succeed
in her action for nuisance. At first instance, Oliver J. said:” An isolated act of hitting
a cricket ball on to the rod cannot, of course, amount to a nuisance.

Malice: If the act of the defendant which is done with evil motive, becomes an
unreasonable interference it is actionable. A person has right to make a reasonable
use of his own property but if the use of his property causes substantial discomfort
to others, it ceases to be reasonable. “If a man creates a nuisance, he cannot say that
he is acting reasonably. The two things are self contradictory.” In Allen v. Flood,
Lord Watson said: “No proprietor has an absolute right to create noises upon his
own land, because any right which the law gives him is qualified by the condition
that it must not be exercised to the nuisance if his neighbors or of the public. If he
violates that condition h commits a legal wrong, and if he does so intentionally he is
guilty of a malicious wrong, in its strict legal sense.”

2. Interference is with the use of enjoyment of land.

Interference may cause either (A) injury to the property itself, or (B) injury to
comfort or health of occupants of certain property.

A. Injury to Property: An unauthorized interference with the use of the property of

another person through some object, tangible or intangible, which causes damage
to property, is actionable as nuisance. It may be by allowing the branches of a tree to
overhang on the land of another person, or the escape of the roots of a tree, water,
gas, smoke or fumes, etc. on to neighbor’s land or even by vibrations.

Nuisance to incorporealProperty

i. Interference with the right of support of land and buildings : A person has a
“natural” right to have his land supported by his neighbor’s and therefore removal of
support, lateral, or from beneath is a nuisance. The natural right from support of
neighbor’s land is available only in respect of land without buildings or other
structure on land.

Right to support by grant or prescription: In respect of buildings the right of

support may be acquired by grant or prescription. Regarding the right of support for
buildings it is observed in Partridge v. Scott. “Rights of this sort, if they can be
established at all, must, we think, have their origin in grant. If a man builds a house
at the extremity of a land, he does not thereby acquire any easement of support or
otherwise over the land of his neighbor. He has no right to load his own soil, so as to
make it require the support of his neighbors unless he has a grant to that effect.”

ii. Interference with Right to Light and Air England

Right to light is also not a natural right and may be acquired by grant or prescription.
When such a right has been thus acquired, a substantial interference with it is an
actionable nuisance. It is not enough to show that the plaintiff’s building is having
less light than before.

In Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores, Ltd., the construction of a building by the
defendant only diminished the light into a room on a ground floor, which was used,
as an office and where electric light was otherwise always needed. It was held that
the defendant was not liable. It was “not sufficient to constitute an illegal
obstruction, that the plaintiff had, in fact, less light than before….in order to give a
right of action, there must be a substantial privation of light.”

INDIA

In India also the right to light and air may be acquired by an easement. Sec. 25,
Limitation Act, 1963 and Sec 15, Indian Easements Act, 1882 make similar
provisions regarding the mode and period of enjoyment required to acquire this
prescriptive right.

B. Injury to comfort or health: Substantial interference with the comfort and

convenience in using the premises is actionable as a nuisance. A mere trifling or
fanciful inconvenience is not enough. The rule is De minimis non curat lex that
means that the law does not take account of very trifling matters. There should be “a
serious in convenience and interference with the comfort of the occupiers of the
dwelling-house according to notions prevalent among reasonable English men and
women…..” The standard of comfort varies from time to time and place to place.
Inconvenience and discomfort from the point of view of a particular plaintiff is not
the test of nuisance but the test is how an average man residing in the same area
would take it. The plaintiff may be oversensitive.

Disturbance to neighbors throughout the night by the noises of horses in a building

which was converted into a stable was nuisance. Similarly, attraction of large and
noisy crowd outside a club kept open till 3 a.m. and also in which entertainments by
music and fireworks have been arranged for profit, are instances of nuisance.
Smoke, noise and offensive vapour may constitute a nuisance even though they are
not injurious to health.
3. Damage.

Unlike trespass, which is actionable per se, actual damage is required to be proved in
an action for nuisance. In the case of public nuisance, the plaintiff can bring an
action in tort only when he proves a special damage to him. In private nuisance,
although damage is one of the essentials, the law will often presume it. In Fay v.
Prentice, a cornice of a defendant’s house projected over the plaintiff’s garden. It
was held that the mere fact that the cornice projected over plaintiff’s garden raises a
presumption of fall of rain water into and damage to the garden and the same need
not be proved. It was a nuisance.

Nuisance on highways: Obstructing a highway or creating dangers on it or in its

close proximity is a nuisance. Obstruction need not be total. The obstruction must,
however be unreasonable. Thus, to cause the formation of queues without
completely blocking the public passage is a nuisance. In Barber v. Penley, due to
considerable queues at the defendant’s theatre access to the plaintiff’s premises, a
boarding house became extremely difficult at certain hours. Held, the obstruction
was a nuisance and the management of the theatre was liable.

Projections: As regards projections on the highway by objects like overhanging

branches of a tree or a clock etc. from the land or building adjoining the highway, no
action for nuisance can be brought for such projections unless some damage is
caused thereby.

In Noble v. Harrison, the branch of a beech tree growing on the defendant’s land
hung on the highway at a height of about 30 feet above the ground. In fine weather
the branch of a tree suddenly broke and fell upon the plaintiff’s vehicle which was
passing along the highway. For the damage to the vehicle the plaintiff sued the
defendant to make him liable either for nuisance, or alternatively, for the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher. It was held that there was no liability or nuisance because the
mere fact the branch of the tree was overhanging was not nuisance, nor was the
nuisance created by its fall as the defendant neither knew nor could have known that
the branch would break and fall. There was no liability under the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher either, as growing a tree was a natural use of land.
Defences:

A number of defences have been pleaded in an action for nuisance. Some of the
defences have been recognized by the courts as valid defences and some others have
been rejected both the valid or effectual defenses as well as ineffectual defences
have been discussed below.

Effectual Defences

1. Prescriptive right to commit nuisance

A right to do an act, which would otherwise be a nuisance, may be acquired by

prescription. If a person has continued with an activity on the land of another person
for 20 years or more, he acquires a legal right by prescription, to continue therewith
in future also. years sec. 15, Indian Easement Act and S. 25, Limitation Act, 1963
says,a right to commit a private nuisance may be acquired as an easement if the
same has been peaceably and openly enjoyed as an easement and as of right, without
interruption, and for 20. On the expiration of this period of 20 years, the nuisance
becomes legalized ab initio as if it has been authorized by a grant of the owner of
serviant land from the beginning held in Sturges v. Bridgman.

2. Statutory Authority

An act done under the authority of a statute is a complete defence. If nuisance is

necessarily incident to what has been authorized by a statute, there is no liability for
that under the law of torts. Thus, a railway company authorized to run railway trains
on a track is not liable if, in spite of due care, the sparks from the engine set fire to
the adjoining property held in Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rail Co., & Dunney v. North
Western Gas Board,

In the absence of such an authority, the railway authority would have been liable
even though there was no negligence; Jones v. Festing Rail Co. or the value of the
adjoining property is depreciated by the noise, vibrations and smoke by the running
of trains Hammersmith Ry.Co. v. Brand, If there is negligence in the running of
trains, the railway co., even though run under a statutory authority will be liable. See
Smith v. L. and S.S. Ry. Co.
According to Lord Halsbury quoted in London Brighton and south Coast Rail Co. v.
Turman, “It cannot now be doubted that a railway company constituted for the
purpose of carrying passengers, or goods, or cattle, are protected in the use of the
functions with which parliament has entrusted them, if the use they make of those
functions necessarily involves the creation of what would otherwise be a nuisance at
Common Law.

Ineffectual Defences

1. Nuisance due to acts of others

Sometimes, the act of two or more persons, acting independently of each other, may
cause nuisance although the act of anyone of them alone would not be so. An action
can be brought against anyone of them and it is no defence that the act of the
defendant alone would not be a nuisance, and the nuisance was caused when other
had also acted in the same way.

2. Public Good

It is no defence to say that what is a nuisance to a particular plaintiff is beneficial to

the public in general, otherwise no public utility undertaking could be held liable for
the unlawful interference with the rights of individuals. In Shelfer v. City of London
Electric Lightning Co. and Thorpne v. Burmfit, during the building of an electric
power house by the defendants, there were violent vibrations resulting in damage to
the plaintiff’s house. In an action for injunction by the plaintiff, the defence pleaded
was that if the building was not constructed the whole of the city of London would
suffer by losing the benefit of the light to be supplied through the proposed power
house. The plea was rejected and the court issued an injunction against the
defendants.

3. Reasonable care

Use of a reasonable care to prevent nuisance is generally no defence. In a Rapier v.

LondonTramways Co, considerable stench amounting to nuisance was caused by the
defendants stables constructed to accommodate 200 horses to draw their trams. The
defence that maximum possible care was taken to prevent the nuisance failed and
the defendants were held liable.
4. Plaintiff coming to nuisance

It is no defence that the plaintiff himself came to place of nuisance. A person cannot
be expected to refrain from buying a land on which a nuisance already exists and the
plaintiff can recover even if nuisance has been going on long before he went to that
place. The maxim volenti non fit injuria cannot be applied in such a case. Held in
Ellostion v. Feetham; Bliss v. Hal; Sturges v. Bridgman.

STRICT LIABILITY AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

Law of torts seeks to achieve what is called distributive justice, where the person
responsible for the injury caused to the plaintiff has to bear the burden.

 If the defendant is responsible, i.e., is at fault, he has to compensate the

plaintiff, and thus bear the burden.

 If the plaintiff is responsible he should bear the burden.

 If both are at fault, they should share the burden.

 If neither of them is at fault, the plaintiff has to bear the loss.

Further, law of torts does not hold the defendant liable for any loss that may be
caused to the plaintiff on account of defendant’s act. The loss must be caused due to
breach of some legal duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff
(damnum sine injuria and injuria sine damno).

During the development of law of torts, distinction between two general classes of
duties came to be recognised:

1. Duties not to injure intentionally, recklessly or negligently. - Fault Liabilty

2. Duties not to injure simpliciter. - No Fault Liability.

When a person is engaged in a duty of normal risk, he has the duty not to injure
intentionally, etc.
But, when he is engaged in an activity which is regarded by law as inherently and
extremely dangerous, such as handling explosives, there is a duty not to injure
simpliciter.

ORIGIN

Justice Blackburn’s judgement in Rylands v. Fletcher is acknowledged to be the

first case in which strict liability was applied.

Rylands v. Fletcher: In 1860, John Rylands contemplated a new reservoir to be

constructed for supplying water to the Ainsworth mill. He appointed a competent
contractor to execute the plan. Thomas Fletcher had a mine in the neighborhood.
There were some old disused shafts which lead from defendant’s land to the
plaintiff’s mines. Though the contractor was aware of this, he did not take care in
filling them. As a result when the reservoir was filled, these shafts succumbed to the
pressure and water entered the plaintiff’s mines and damaged them It was accepted
that the defendant was not negligent, though the contractor was. But still the
defendant was held liable.

Principle: The person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there
something likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril and if he
does not do so, he is liable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape. But the use of land must be non-natural.

ESSENTIALS OF STRICT LIABILITY

In Blackburn J.’s formulation, the rule applies to bringing onto the defendant's land
things likely to do mischief if they escape, which have been described as ‘dangerous
things’.

In Hale v. Jennings Brothers, Scott, LJ, referred to the rule as “a broad principle
that the liability attaches because of the occupier of the land bringing onto the land
something which is likely to do damage if it escapes”.

In Read v. Lyons, Lord Macmillan stated that “the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher
derives from a conception of mutual duties of adjoining landowners and its
congeners are trespass and nuisance”.
In the same case, Viscount Simon aptly put the essential conditions to make one
liable under doctrine of strict liability as follows:

“Now the strict liability recognised by this House in Rylands v. Fletcher is

conditioned by two elements which I may call

1. the condition of ‘escape’ from the land of something likely to do mischief if

it escapes, and

2. the condition of ‘non-natural use of land’.

We may observe that the following are the three requirements for application of rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher,

1. Something dangerous must be brought, collected and kept on the land.

2. It must be non-natural use of land.

3. The thing must escape.

1. DANGEROUS THING

A thing which is of such nature that it has the tendency to escape and when escapes
to cause considerable damage.

e.g.,gases, liquids, animals.

2. NON-NATURAL USE OF LAND

Use of the land must be other than its ordinary use, i.e., the purpose for which it is
meant or the purpose for which it is suitable.

Illustrations of natural use of land can be: storage of water in reservoir for mill or
use, storage of one or two gas cylinder for domestic use,electricity connection to
light the house, lighting an oil lamp in house etc.

In Sochacki v. Sas, B, who was a lodger in A’s house, lit a fire in his room and
went out. While he was out, his room caught fire may be due to jumping of a spark.
It spread and damaged A’s property in the rest of the house. There was no evidence
of negligence on the part of B. It was held that B was not liable under Rylands v.
Fletcher since his use of the fire in his grate was an ordinary, natural, proper,
everyday use of a fire place in a room.

In T. C. Balkrishna Menon v. T.R. Subramanian, the Court held that the use of
explosives in an open field on the occasion of festival is a ‘non-natural’ user of
land.

In State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, due to overflow of water from a canal

damage was done to plaintiff's property. The Supreme Court held that use of land for
construction of a canal system is a normal use and thus not non natural use of land.

In Mukesh Textile Mills v. Subramanya Sastry, A was owner of a sugar factory.

B owned land adjacent to A’s sugar factory. A stored quantity of molasses and it
escaped to B’s land and damaged his crop. B sued A. Collecting molasses in large
quantities was held by the Court to be non natural use of land and if a person
collected such things on his land and escaped to neighbours land, he was liable.

3. ESCAPE

Defendant would be liable only when there is escape of the object fromland of
which he is in occupation or control.

Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd., Appellant was employed as an Inspector of

Ammunition. He was injured by the explosion of a shell while she was on
respondent's premises in the performance of her duties. Further there was no proof
of negligence on the part of the defendant. The Court held that the injury was caused
on the premises of the defendants i.e. not outside, thus no escape thereby, the
respondents were not liable.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF STRICT LIABILITY

In the following circumstances, the rule of strict liability is not applicable.

1. Act of God (Vis Majeur)

2. Act of third party

3. Plaintiff's consent

4. Common benefit of plaintiff and defendant

5. Plaintiff's own default

6. Statutory Authority

1. Act of God (Vis Majeur): The damage took place due to some happening
which was due to the force of nature and was unforeseen, beyond the control of
the defendant and extraordinary.

Nichols v. Marshland, The defendant had some ornamental lakes formed up by

damming up a natural stream. Due to unnatural rainfall “greater and more violent
than any within the memory of a witness” broke down the artificial embankments
and carried away four bridges belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that the
defendant is not liable.

Ryan v. Young, Driver of a lorry of the defendant died while driving the lorry
which thereon ran on and injured the plaintiff. The driver before dying appeared to
be in good health. Further defendant was not under duty to get the driver medically
examined. There was no fault in the lorry. The defendant was held not liable.

State of Mysore v. Ramchandra, Constructing a water storage to increase the

supply of water is natural use of land and a permitted act, subject to application of
emergency measure. One such measure is to make arrangement for outlet of water in
case of emergency. It was not done in the present case which resulted into the
damage to the property of one and great loss thereby. The defence of Act of God
was not allowed.

2. Act of Third Party: Where escape is caused by the act of the third party over
whom the defendant has no control, he will not be liable.

Box v. Jubb, The defendants were the owners of a reservoir, which was supplied
with water from a main drain, not their property, which flowed by it. There were
sluice gates properly constructed between the reservoir and main drain at both the
inlet and out let. Owing to an obstruction in the main drain at a point below the
defendants' reservoir, caused by a third party over whom the defendants had no
control, and without their knowledge, the water in the drain forced open the sluice
gates and caused the reservoir to overflow on to the plaintiff’s land. Held, that the
defendants were not liable for the damage caused by the overflow.
Rickards v. Lothian, The plaintiff was tenant of the defendant on the second floor.
On the fourth floor of defendant’s building a third party maliciously plugged up the
waste pipes and opened the water taps. As a result, the plaintiff's goods were
damaged by the flow of water from the lavatory on the fourth floor. The defendant
was held not liable as it was an act of third party beyond his control and no proof of
negligence on his part.

3. Plaintiff's Consent: Where the plaintiff has given consent to the defendant in
respect of the thing stored, there is no liability. This is similar to volenti non fit
injuria.

In Balakh Glass Emporium v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., the

defendant was held not liable when water escaped from upper floor and damaged the
lower floor because there was an implied consent by the occupier of lower floor to
the normal use of water by the occupier of the upper floor.

4. Common benefit of plaintiff and defendant: Where the artificial work is

maintained with the plaintiff's consent and for the common benefit of the
defendant, this rule does not apply.

In Carstairs v. Taylor, Taylor, the landlord, rented his upper story to the plaintiff.
Taylor, for the benefit of both maintained a rain water box for the benefit of both.
Some rats gnawed the water box which resulted into escape of water and damaging
the goods of the plaintiff. The defendant was held not liable as there was plaintiff's
consent and no negligence on the part of the defendant.

5. Plaintiff's own fault: If the injury caused to the plaintiff is due to his own
fault, the defendant is not liable.

Pointing v. Noakes, Plaintiff’s horse reached over defendant’s boundary and

nibbled some poisonous tree and died. It was held that the death of the horse was
caused by the plaintiff's own negligence and that the defendant was not liable.

6. Statutory Authority: Where the defendant is authorised or required under the

law to accumulate, keep or collect the dangerous things which escape or cause
mischief and injures the plaintiff, the rule of strict liability does not apply.
Green v. Chelsea Waterworks, The defendants were authorised by statute to store
water for the purposes of supply to the city. Owing to some accidental cause the
water escaped and caused injury to the plaintiff. The Court held that where the
accumulation of water by the defendant was not for their own purpose, and where
they had been authorised by statute to accumulate and keep it, they would not be
responsible for any escape, unless it is result of the negligent act of the defendants.

APPLICABILITY OF STRICT LIABILITY IN INDIA

Rule of strict liability has been applied by the Indian Courts. But it is rarely applied.
In India, storing of water for agricultural use or irrigation purpose is not held to be
non natural use of land.

In the oleum leak disaster case of 1985 liability was made further stringent by the
introduction of the rule of absolute liability.

M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leakage Case or Sriram Industries Case),
Oleum gas leaked from one of the units of Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries
in New Delhi. It resulted into death of one of the advocate and caused serious
injuries to several others. A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was
brought by way of public interest litigation.

The Supreme Court of India felt that the application of the rule of strict liability is
inadequate to deal such serious problems, holding that

“Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep
abreast with the economic developments, taking place in this country Law cannot
allow our judicial thinking to be constrained by reference of the law as it prevails in
England or for the matter of that in any other foreign legal order.”

The Court also observed:

“This rule evolved in the 19th Century at a time when all these developments of
science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving
any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norm and the needs of the
present day economy and social structure.”

It further held that, “Application of exceptions to this rule is inapplicable.”

Bhagwati, C.J. assertively announced the entry of the rule of absolute liability and
held the Defendant liable in the following words,

“An enterprise, which is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industry

which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in
the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-
delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account
of hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken.”

Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, In this case, the rule of absolute
liability applied in the oleum gas leak disaster case was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court. In December, 1984 methyl iso-cyanate and other toxic gases leaked from the
Union Carbide Corporation India Ltd. at Bhopal. About 2660 people died, several
thousand suffered serious injuries which did not die with that generation but also in
cases got transferred to their next generation. The Court on applying the principle of
absolute liability held the defendant liable to pay US $470 Million dollars by way of
compensation to the victims or relatives of the victims.

Arun Kumar v. Union of India, In this case, a tigress chewed the hand of a three
year old child. While holding the Zoo authorities liable the Court held that the zoo
authorities being under absolute responsibility did not perform their part of duty and
thus should be answerable to pay compensation.

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

(Innovation of the Supreme Court of India)

Decision of the Supreme Court of India in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India

(Oleum Gas Leakage Case) is innovative in the sense that it gave rise to a new
kind of liability called ‘absolute liability’. Absolute liability is strict liability without
exceptions.SC held that the rule in Ryland’s case decided in the nineteenth century
is inadequate to meet the needs of the modern scientific world with hazardous and
dangerous activities being common.

In Charan Lal Sahu v. UOI, It was held that this duty was ‘absolute non-delegable’
and the defendant cannot escape liability by showing that he had taken reasonable
care and that there was no negligence on his part.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRICT AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITIES

Apart from the difference that in case of strict liability certain defences are admitted
whereas in case of absolute liability no defence is admitted, the following are the
other differences:

a. In case of strict liability, what is brought on land is dangerous, but not inherently
dangerous. In case of absolute liability it is inherently dangerous, and hence no
exceptions admitted.

b. Strict liability is based on non-natural use of land, absolute liability does not
envisage such a user.

c. In case of strict liability, the thing must escape. Hence, there is no liability in
respect of persons on the premises. Absolute liability is available also to the
persons on the premises.

d. In case of strict liability ordinary damages are awarded. In M. C. Mehta it was

observed that in such cases exemplary damages may be awarded and that the
more prosperous or affluent the enterprise, the more damages should be
awarded.

This observation was treated as obiter dictum in Charan Lal Sahu case, while was
treated as ratio decidendi in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. UOI.

LEGAL REMEDIES

Remedies (reliefs available to the aggrieved person) may be classified as under:

1. Legal Remedies

a) Judicial Remedies

Damages, Injunction, Specific Restitution of Property

b.) Extra Judicial Remedies

i) Using ADR methods

ii) Self Help provided by law

Expulsion of trespasser, Re-entry on land, Recapture of goods, Distress of damage
feasant, Abatement of nuisance.

2. Extra Legal Remedies

Self Help not provided by law

Judicial Remedies

1. Damages

2. Injunction

3. Specific Restitution of Property

1. DAMAGES

Damages which law presumes to be the natural consequences of the defendant’s acts
are general damages, whereas damages the law will not infer unless proved at the
trial are special damages.

e.g. medical expenses incurred by plaintiff due to defendant’s negligent driving will
give general damages, whereas if he claims nervous shock, then he has to prove and
will get special damages.

Types of Damages

Damages are of the following five kinds

1) Nominal Damages

2) Contemptuous Damages

3) Real or Substantial Damages

4) Exemplary Damages

5) Prospective Damages

1. Nominal Damages: Damages which are awarded by the Court to the plaintiff
not by way of compensation but by way of recognition of some legal rights of
plaintiff which the defendant has infringed are nominal damages.
Nominal damages are available for torts which are actionable per se.

Ashby v. White, Where a rightful voter’s right to vote was wrongfully and
maliciously denied at an election, he was awarded damages nominal in nature,
though the candidate in whose favour he wanted to cast his vote won the elections.

Constantine v. Imperial London Hotels Ltd, The owner of a hotel wrongfully

refused a West Indian Cricketer entry in their hotel. Although he suffered no loss,
the wrongful exclusion was held to be tortuous, was given nominal damages.

2. Contemptuous Damages: Contemptuous damages are an indication of the

law court expressing an opinion of the claim of the plaintiff or its disapproval of
is conduct in the matter. They differ from nominal damages as they may be
awarded for any tortuous act whether actionable per se or not.

3. Real or Substantial Damages: Damages which are assessed and awarded as

compensation for damage actually suffered by the plaintiff, and not simply by
way of mere recognition of a legal right violated are called real or substantial
damages.

4. Exemplary Damages: Exemplary damages are awarded where there has been
great injury by reason of aggravating circumstances accompanying the wrong.
Exemplary damages are awarded not by way of compensation for the plaintiff,
but by way of punishment for the defendant.

In Rookes v. Barnard, the Court laid down that exemplary or punitive damages
can be awarded in three cases:

a. Oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the

Government.

In Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, Bhim Singh, MLA of J & K was arrested when
he was going to attend Assembly session. The Supreme Court considered it to be
appropriate case to award exemplary damages.

b. Cases where the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make
a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to
the plaintiff.
 In Manson v. Associated News Papers Ltd., the court held that if a person who is
possessed of material which would be defamatory if published, and who does to
really believe it to be true at all, decides to publish it simply because he can make a
profit from publishing it and because he reckons that any damage she might have to
pay would be so small that it would be well worth it, then that is a man, and that is
the only man, against whom an award of exemplary damages can be made.

c. Where exemplary damages are expressly authorized by the statute.

5. Prospective Damages: Damages which are likely to result from the wrongful
act of the defendant but they have not actually resulted at the time when the
damages are being decided by the Court.

In Subhas Chandra v. Ram Singh, appellant was hit by a bus driver. He suffered
several injuries resulting in his permanent disability to walk without a surgical shoe.
Because of the disability he could not take employment in certain avenues. The
Motor Claims Tribunal awarded him compensation amounting to Rs. 3,000 under
the heading probable further loss. The amount of compensation on appeal was
increased to Rs.7000 by the Delhi High Court.

2. INJUNCTIONS

An injunction is an order of the court directing the doing of some act or restraining
the commission or continuance of some act.

Injunctions are of classified in two ways:

1. Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction

2. Permanent and Temporary Injunction

1. Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction: An injunction is an order of a

court directing a person to do or to forbear from doing an act.

If the injunction is an order to do an act, it is called mandatory injunction. e.g., order

to remove a structure illegally built by defendant on the plaintiff’s land, order to
remove the obstruction violating plaintiff’s right to enter upon his own land.

If the order is to forbear from doing an act, it is called prohibitory injunction. e.g.
order not to encroach upon the plaintiff’s property, order not to cause nuisance. It is
also called ‘preventive injunction’, ‘perpetual injunction’ or ‘prohibitory injunction’.

2. Permanent and Temporary Injunctions: To obtain an injunction, the

plaintiff has to institute a suit against the defendant, and after hearing the same,
the court will grant injunction in deserving cases. This order is permanent.

In case of an order for mandatory injunction, once the act ordered is done, the order
is discharged. But in case of a prohibitory injunction, the act prohibited cannot be
done at any time. Hence, prohibitory injunction is also called permanent injunction
or perpetual injunction.

Section 37, Specific Relief Act, 1963 defines temporary and perpetual injunction as
follows:

“A temporary injunction is such as is to continue until a specified time, or until the

further order of the court. A perpetual injunction is one by which the defendant is
perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act,
which could be contrary to the right of the plaintiff”

Temporary Injunction: It is also called as ‘interlocutory injunction’. It does not

mean determination in favour of the plaintiff but simply shows the concern of the
Court that there is a substantial question requiring consideration.

E.g. A and B have a dispute regarding title over a plot of land, which is in A’s
possession. B also claims to have the title of the same plot. Case is pending before
the court; A wants to begin with construction on the said plot. B may obtain
temporary injunction by filing an interlocutory application in the suit pending before
the court.

Perpetual Injunction: If the court after going into the matter, finds that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief, the temporary injunction will be replaced by a
perpetual injunction. A perpetual injunction is a final order and is issued after the
full consideration of the case.
3. SPECIFIC RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY

When one is wrongfully dispossessed of his movable or immovable property, the

court may order that the specific property should be restored back to the plaintiff.

e.g. action for ejectment, the recovery of chattels by an action for detinue etc.

As per section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a person who is wrongfully
dispossessed of immovable property is entitled to recover the immovable property.

As per section 7 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a person who is wrongfully
dispossessed of movable property is entitled to recover the movable property.

EXTRA-JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Following extra-judicial remedies can be availed by the plaintiff.

1. Expulsion of trespasser

2. Re-entry on land

3. Recapture of Goods

4. Abatement of Nuisance

5. Distress Damage Feasant

1. EXPULSION OF TRESPASSER

A person can resort to legitimate force in order to repel an intruder or trespasser

provided the force used by him does not transgress the reasonable limits of the
occasion i.e. he must not use disproportionate force.

In Scott v. Mathew Brown & Co., the rightful owner of property of is entitled to
use force in ejecting a trespasser so long as he does him no personal injury.

In Edwick v. Hawkes, while ejecting a trespasser, the rightful owner of property

should not resort to violence.
2. RE-ENTRY ON LAND

A man wrongfully disposed of his land may retake its possession, if he can do so
in a peaceful manner and without the use of force.

Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, If an owner of landed property finds a

trespasser on his premises, he may enter the premises and turn the trespasser out,
using no more force than is necessary to expel him, without having to pay damages
for the force used.

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that if one in possession of
immovable property is disposed, otherwise than by due course of law, he may,
within six months, sue to recover possession without reference to any title set up by
another, which is left to be determined in a separate action.

3. RECAPTURE OF GOODS

A person entitled to the immediate possession of chattels may recover them from
any person who has then been in actual possession and detain them, provided that
such possession was wrongful in its inception.

4. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE

Abatement means removal of the nuisance by the party injured. It is justifiable

provided it must be peaceable, without danger to life or limb and after notice to
remove the same, if it is necessary to enter another’s land to abate a nuisance, or
where the nuisance is a dwelling house in actual occupation or a common, unless it
is unsafe to wait.

In Lemmon v. Webbs, The occupier of land may cut off the overhanging branches
of his neighbour’s trees, or sever roots which have spread from these trees into his
own land.

Someshwar v. Chunilal: One cannot cut the branches if the trees stand on the land
of both parties.

In Edwick v. Hawkes, while ejecting a trespasser, the rightful owner of property

should not resort to violence.
5. RE-ENTRY ON LAND

A man wrongfully disposed of his land may retake its possession, if he can do so
in a peaceful manner and without the use of force.

Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, If an owner of landed property finds a

trespasser on his premises, he may enter the premises and turn the trespasser out,
using no more force than is necessary to expel him, without having to pay damages
for the force used.

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that if one in possession of
immovable property is disposed, otherwise than by due course of law, he may,
within six months, sue to recover possession without reference to any title set up by
another, which is left to be determined in a separate action.

6. RECAPTURE OF GOODS

A person entitled to the immediate possession of chattels may recover them from
any person who has then been in actual possession and detain them, provided that
such possession was wrongful in its inception.

7. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE

Abatement means removal of the nuisance by the party injured. It is justifiable

provided it must be peaceable, without danger to life or limb and after notice to
remove the same, if it is necessary to enter another’s land to abate a nuisance, or
where the nuisance is a dwelling house in actual occupation or a common, unless it
is unsafe to wait.

In Lemmon v. Webbs, The occupier of land may cut off the overhanging branches
of his neighbour’s trees, or sever roots which have spread from these trees into his
own land.

Someshwar v. Chunilal: One cannot cut the branches if the trees stand on the land
of both parties.
DEFAMATION

Introduction:

Man’s reputation is considered to be his property, more precious than any other
property. Defamation is an injury to reputation of a person.

Defamation is customarily classified into, (a) libel and (b) slander.

Broad distinction between the two is that libel is addressed to the eye while as
slander to the ear. Slander is the publication of defamatory statement in a transient
form.

An example of it is spoken words. Libel is a representation made in some permanent

form e.g. writing, printing, picture, effigy or statute. In a cinema film not only the
photographic part of it is considered to be libel but also the speech which
synchronizes with it is also a libel.

In Youssoupoff v. M.G.M. Pictures Ltd., a film produced by an English Company, a

lady, Princess Natasha, was shown as having relations of seduction or rape with the
man Rasputin, a man of worst possible character. It was observed that so far as
photographic part of the exhibition is concerned, that is the permanent matter has to
be seen by the eye, and it is proper subject of an action for libel, if defamatory.

Under English Law, the distinction between libel and slander is material for two
reasons; 1. Under criminal law, only libel has been recognized as an offence.
Slander is no offence. 2. Under Law of torts, slander is actionable, save in
exceptional cases, only on proof of special damage. Libel is always actionable per se
i.e. without the proof of any damage.

Slander is also actionable per se in the following four exceptional cases-

1. Imputation of criminal offence to the plaintiff

2. Imputation of contagious or infectious disease to the plaintiff which has effect of

preventing others from associating with the plaintiff

3. Imputation that the person is incompetent, dishonest, or unfit in regard to the

office, profession, calling, trade or business carried on by him
4. Imputation of unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl.

Requisites of Defamation

The constituent elements of defamation are;

a. the words must be defamatory

b. the defamatory words, should directly or indirectly refer to the person defamed,
and

c. publication of the words by any medium should take place

(a) Defamatory Words: The defamatory words or statements are those which
cause an injury to reputation. Reputation is injured when one is lowered in the
estimation of members of the society generally or when one is avoided by others or
others shun his company. In short, an imputation which exposes the aggrieved
person to disgrace, humiliation, ridicule or contempt, is defamatory. The criterion to
determine whether a statement is defamatory or not, is “how do the right thinking
members of the society think”? If they consider the statement as disgraceful,
humiliating, ridiculous or contemptuous, the statement is defamatory. If the
statement is likely to injure the reputation of the aggrieved person, it is no defence
on the part of the defamer that he never intended to do so. Words which merely hurt
feelings or cause annoyance but in no way cast reflection on reputation or character,
are not libelous. Vulgar abuses uttered as mere abuse and not understood by the
person who hears them as defamatory, though they hurt one’s pride. Many a time,
people do not directly use defamatory words, but utter defamatory words in
innuendoes. Innuendoes are those words, which appear innocent but contain some
secondary or latent meaning which is defamatory.

Thus, if A says to B in the presence of P that ‘P is very honest man, he could never
have stolen anything.’ The statement will be defamatory if from this, B understood
that P was a dishonest man. If the words or statements are defamatory, it is
immaterial with what intention they are uttered or circulated.

In Morrison v. Ritetise, one R in good faith published a mistaken statement that M a

lady, had given birth to twins. The fact of the matter was that M was married only
two months back. The statement was held defamatory.
(b)Words Must Refer To The Person Defamed: In any action for defamation, the
person defamed must establish that the defamatory words or the statement referred
to him. In other words, defamatory statement was such that the defamed person
would reasonably infer that the statement was directed against him. In Jones v.
Holton & Co., it was observed that if libel speaks of a person by description without
mentioning the name, in order to establish a right of action, the plaintiff must prove
to the satisfaction of the jury that ordinary readers of the paper, who knew him,
would have understood that it referred to him.

A good illustration is provided by Newstead v. London Express Ltd., in the

newspaper a news item appeared thus: ‘Harold Newstead, a Camberwell man, has
been convicted for bigamy.’ The news was true to Harold Newstead, Camberwell
Barman. Another Harold Newstead, Camberwell barber and his friend thought that it
referred to him and brought a suit for defamation. As the statement was understood
as referring to Harold Newstead, Camberwellbarber, the statement was held
defamatory, though newspaper never intended him to be the person.

The state of English Law was considered unsatisfactory as it led to the conviction of
innocent person. Consequently the Defamation Act,1952 was passed under which it
was established that the publisher of the statement did not intended to publish it
concerning the other man, or the words were not defamatory on the face of them and
he did not know the circumstances under which they were understood to be
defamatory. He would not be liable. Ordinarily there cannot be a defamation of a
class of persons. If a person says: ‘lawyers are liers’ or ‘all doctors are incompetent’,
no lawyer or doctor can sue for defamation unless he shows that these words were in
reference to him.

In Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., Lord Atkin observed, “There can be
no law that a defamatory statement made of a firm, or trustee, or the tenants of a
particular building, is not actionable, if the words would reasonably be understood
as published of each member of the firm or each trustee or each tenant. The reason
as to why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described
by some general name fails to be actionable, is the difficulty of establishing that the
plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement.”
(c)Publication: No defamation will be constituted unless defamatory statement or
material is published. Publication does not mean publication in press or by leaflets.
If it is brought to the notice or knowledge of persons or even to a single person other
than the defamed person, amounts to publication.

If a defamatory matter enclosed in an envelope is not publication. Dictating a

defamatory letter to stenographer or typist is publication, but not to the private
secretary. If a third person opens the letter not meant for him wrongly, for instance
father reads the latter meant for his son or servant reads letter meant for his master,
there is no publication. But if defamatory letter is written on a post card or telegram,
it will amount to communication of defamation, irrespective of the fact whether
someone has read it or not. If a letter is written in a language which the defamer
does not understand and, therefore has to be read by someone else, it amounts to
communication. If one spouse writes a defamatory letter to the other, there is no
defamation, as there is no publication.

In T.J. Ponnam v. M.C. Verghese, the husband wrote number of defamatory letters
to his wife about his father-in-law. The wife passed on these letters to his father. The
father-in-law sued for defamation. The husband claimed privilege, under section
122, Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court took the view that if such letters fall
into the hands of the defamed person, he can prove them in any other manner and if
proved, the action for defamation will lie. If a third person writes a defamatory letter
about one spouse to the other in such a manner that the former is most likely to read
it, there is sufficient communication.

Defences to Defamation

1. Justification or truth

2. Fair comment

3. Privilege

1. Justification or truth

In defamation there cannot be better defence than that of truth, as the law will
not permit a man to recover damages in respect of any injury and character which he
either does not or ought not to possess. The deference is still available even though
the statement is made maliciously. Defence is available if the statement is
substantially correct though incorrect in respect of certain minor details. In
Alexender v. North Eastern Rly., a news was published in the newspaper that X has
been sentenced to a fine of pond of 1 or three weeks imprisonment. In the
alternative, while in fact X was sentenced to a fine of pound 1 or 14 days
imprisonment. It was held that the statement in the press was substantially correct
and no action lied. Obviously, if defamer fails to prove the truth of statement, he is
liable.

2. Fair Comment

The second defence to an action for defamation is that the statement was a fair
comment in public interest. Comment means expression of an opinion.

The essentials of this defence are; a. It must be a comment, i.e. expression of

opinion b. Comment must be fair c. Comment must be in public interest Comment
and statement of facts are different. Comment is an expression of opinion on certain
facts and circumstances, and not statement of fact.

For instance, after reading A’s book, B says ‘it is a foolish book.’ ‘It is an indecent
book.’ ‘’A’ must be a man of impure mind.’ These are comments. But if he says, ‘I
am not surprised that A’s book is foolish and indecent and he is weak and of impure
mind.’ In former case, it is a comment and in the latter case, it is a statement of fact.
Since comments are always made on facts, it is necessary that facts commented
upon should be generally known or the commentator should make them known
before comments upon them. A says ‘B is guilty of breach of trust.’ This is a
statement of fact and must be true. A then adds, ‘B is, therefore, a dishonest man.’
This is a comment. But if audience or public do not know the fact that B has been
convicted for breach of trust, the latter statement will be statement of fact. Comment
should be fair. No comment can be fair which is based on untrue facts. Thus, when
commenting on play, it was stated that, ‘play potrays vulgarity as it contents a scene
of rape’, while in fact there is no such scene, the comment is not fair.

3. Privilege

This is also one of the fundamental principles that there are circumstances when
freedom of speech has privilege and even if it is defamatory it is protected. The
individual’s right to reputation is subordinate to the privilege of freedom of speech.
This privilege may be; absolute or qualified.

TRESPASS TO THE PERSON

There are three main wrongs which fall under the umbrella of trespass to the person:
assault, battery and false imprisonment. They are intentional torts, meaning they
cannot be committed by accident. Although these descriptions sound like they are
crimes, and indeed do share their names with some crimes, it is important to
remember that these are civil wrongs and not criminal wrongs. A person liable in
tort for assault, battery or false imprisonment will not face a sentence. Instead, they
will be ordered to pay damages to their victim.

Assault

Assault means physical contact. But in tort, an assault occurs when a person
apprehends immediate and unlawful physical contact. In other words, fearing that
you are about to be physically attacked makes you the victim of an assault. It is also
necessary that an attack can actually take place. If an attack is impossible, then
despite a person’s apprehension of physical contact there can be no assault. So a
person waving a stick and chasing after another person who is driving away in a car
would not be an assault. It is also generally thought that words alone cannot
constitute an assault, but if accompanied by threatening behaviour the tort may have
been committed.

Battery

If the physical contact that is apprehended in an assault actually takes place, then the
tort of battery has been committed. It is not necessary for the physical contact to
cause any injury or permanent damage to the victim, or even be intended to do so.
The only intention required is that of making physical contact. It is also not
necessary for the tortfeasor, that is, the wrongdoer, to actually touch the victim, so
battery may be committed by throwing stones at someone or spitting on them.
 False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person which restricts that person’s
freedom of movement. The victim need not be physically restrained from moving. It
is sufficient if they are prevented from choosing to go where they please, even if
only for a short time. This includes being intimidated or ordered to stay somewhere.
A person can also be restrained even if they have a means of escape but it is
unreasonable for them to take it, for example, if they have no clothes or they are in a
first floor room with only a window as a way out. False imprisonment can also be
committed if the victim is unaware that they are being restrained, but it must be a
fact that they are being restrained.

Defences to Trespass to the Person

1. Consent

If a person consents to being physically contacted, then no tort of battery exists.

Consent may be given expressly by words or implied from conduct. A patient can

give express medical consent to their doctor before undergoing an operation which
in other circumstances might amount to a battery. Similarly, certain sports, such as
rugby, on the face of it comprise a continuous series of assaults and batteries.
Clearly it would be absurd if the law allowed a rugby player to sue the opposing
team for trespass to the person. So a person who consents to being physically
contacted within the rules of a particular game is not a victim of a tort. Deliberate
acts of violence on the playing field, though, do not fall within this defence.

2. Necessity

A wrongdoer may have a successful defence if they can show that it was necessary
to act in the way they did. In other words, there must be a sound justification for
breaking the law. A person who grabs another and drags them by force from the path
of an oncoming vehicle, and who by doing so prevents them from serious injury or
death, is not liable in tort. Similarly, a doctor who performs emergency surgery on
an unconscious patient, who naturally cannot consent, in order to save their life, may
successfully argue that the battery was necessary if the surgery performed was
limited to that which was required to save the patient’s life.
3. Self-Defence

The defence of self-defence will only succeed if the force used was not excessive
and was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances to prevent personal injury.
Each case must be considered on its own facts. For example, if a person is attacked
with a knife it may be reasonable for them to defend themselves also with a knife,
but not necessarily with an automatic pistol. It will be for the courts to decide what
is reasonable.

4. In Defence of Others

Similarly to self-defence, a wrongdoer may successfully argue that their actions

were justified in order to assist a third party who they reasonably believe is in
immediate danger of being attacked. Most commonly this occurs when a parent is
protecting a child or one spouse is protecting another.

5. Defence for False Imprisonment

If the victim was restrained under legal authority or justification, or if the

perpetrator was exercising their legal rights or duties, then there is a complete
defence to false imprisonment.

Malicious Prosecution

Malicious prosecution is a mode of abuse of legal process. Malicious prosecution

consists of institution of criminal proceedings in a court of law maliciously and
unreasonably and without a proper cause of action. If a person can show actual
damage, he can file an action for damages under the law of torts.

Essentials:

i. The proceedings were instituted without any probable or reasonable cause

ii.Proceedings were filed maliciously and not to book a criminal in a court of

law/not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect

iii. Termination of Proceedings in favour of the Plaintiff

iv. As a result of such prosecution, the plaintiff has suffered damage.

Example: P informed police that a theft has been committed in his house and he
suspected that it has been committed by A. A was consequently arrested but was
discharged by the magistrate as the final police report showed that A was not
connected with the theft. When A prosecuted P for malicious prosecution, the court
dismissed the suit as there was no prosecution in a court of law. To prosecute is to
set the law in motion.

Prosecution is not deemed to have commenced before a person is summoned to

answer a complaint.

Reasonable and probable cause means, an honest belief in the guilt of the accused
person upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of
circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any prudent
man placed in the position of the accused to the conclusion that the person charged
was probably guilty of the crime imputed.

There is a reasonable and probable cause when one has sufficient ground for
thinking that the other person has committed the offence. In Abrath v. N.E.Railway
Co.,one ‘M’ had recovered compensation for his injury in a railway collision from
the railway Co. Latter on the railway Co. came to know that those injuries were not
suffered in the collision but were artificially created by him in collision with one
doctor ‘P’. The railway Co. made inquiries and on legal advice sued P for conspiring
with M to defraud the railway Co. ‘P’ was acquitted and he filed an action for
malicious prosecution against the railway. It was held that railway Co. had
reasonable and probable cause.

Another essential ingredient is malice. Malice means presence of some improper or

wrongful motive, intent to use the legal process in question for some other purpose
e. g. a wish to injure the other party rather than to vindicate law or justice. Mere
acquittal of the plaintiff is no proof of malice. It may be malice if the person acted in
undue haste, recklessly or failed in making proper and due inquiries or in sprit of
retaliation or on account of long standing enmity.

The last essential ingredient is that the person has been acquitted or the conclusion
of proceeding is in favour of the plaintiff and consequent to it the plaintiff has
suffered damage. If proceedings terminate in favour of the plaintiff but he has not
suffered any damage, then no action for malicious prosecution lies. On account of
the prosecution one must suffer damage, the damage may be injury to ones fame,
reputation. It may also put in danger his life or liberty, or it may result in damage to
his property.
 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986

INTRODUCTION

The expression ‘consumer’ in the common sense, means ‘all of us may be called
consumers, when we purchase some movable or immovable property or hire
services for various purposes.’ But in the present socio economic scenario, we find
that the consumer is a victim of many unfair and unethical tactics adopted in the
market place. The untrained consumer is no match for the businessman marketing
goods and services on an organized basis and by trained professionals. He is very
often cheated in the quality, quantity and price of goods and services. The consumer
who was once the 'King of the market' has become the victim of it. He is not
supplied adequate information so as to the characteristics and performance of many
consumer goods and suffer due to unfairness of many one sided standard forms of
contracts. The modern economic, industrial and social development have made the
notion of 'freedom of contract' largely a matter of fiction and an empty slogan so far
as many consumers are concerned.

The caveat emptor- 'let the buyer beware' doctrine of the law concerning the sale of
goods, assumed that the consumer was responsible for protecting himself and would
do so by applying his intelligence and experience in negotiating the terms of any
purchase. That principle may have been appropriate for transactions conducted in
village markets. In early times, the consumer may have been able to protect himself
since the products were less sophisticated and could be inspected before purchase.
But now the conditions have changed. Many modern goods are technological
mysteries. The consumer knows little or nothing about these highly sophisticated
goods. In real life, products are complex and of great variety and consumers and
retailers have imperfect knowledge. The principle of caveat emptor, thus, has ceased
to be appropriate as a general rule. The consumers need protection by law when
goods fail to live up to their promises or indeed cause injury.

With globalisation and development in the international trade and commerce, there
has been substantial increase of business and trade, which resulted in a variety of
consumer goods and services to cater to the needs of the consumers. In recent years,
there has been a greater public concern over consumer protection issues all over the
world. Taking into account the interest and needs of consumers in all countries,
particularly those in developing countries, the consumer protection measures should
essentially be concerned with- (i) the protection from hazards to health and safety;
(ii) the promotion and protection of economic interests; (iii) access to adequate
information; (iv) control on misleading advertisements and deceptive representation;
(v) consumer education; (vi) effective consumer redress. The consumer deserves to
get what he pays for in real quantity and true quality.

BASIC CONCEPTS: CONSUMER, SERVICE, GOODS

CONSUMER

The expression consumer is defined in S. 2(1)(d) of the Act. The primary purpose
of the definition is to restrict the availability of consumer remedies only. The
method adopted is to confine the Act to non-business buyers from business sellers.

According to Section 2(d), 'Consumer' means any person who-

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly
paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any
user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid
or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not
include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose;
or

(ii) [hires or avails of] any services for a consideration which has been paid or
promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who
[hires or avails of] the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payments, when such services are
availed of with the approval of the first-mentioned person;

[Explanation: For the purposes of sub-clause (i), “commercial purpose” does not
include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the
purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment;]

The definition of the term 'consumer' given in clause (d) of section 2(1) of the Act is
comprehensive one so as to cover not only consumer of goods but also consumer of
services. The definition is wide enough to include in consumer not only the person
who buys any goods for consideration but also any user of such goods with the
approval of the buyer. Similarly, it covers any person who hires or avails of any
services for consideration and also includes any beneficiary of such services, when
availed with the approval of the hirer.

Thus, any user of goods or any beneficiary of services. other than the actual buyer or
hirer, is a consumer for the purpose of this Act and he is competent to make a
complaint before the Consumer Redressal Forum under this Act. The Act aims to
protect the economic interest of a consumer as understood in commercial sense as a
purchaser of goods and in the larger sense of user of service. The important
characteristic of goods and services under the Act is that such goods are supplied at
a price to cover the costs which consequently result in profit or income to the seller
of goods or provider of services. It includes anyone who consumes goods or services
at the end of the chain of production.

The Supreme Court in its decision in Luck now Development Authority v. M. K.

Gupta noted that the word 'consumer' is comprehensive expression. It extends fro
am person who buys any commodity either as eatable or otherwise from a shop,
business house, corporation, store, fair-price shop to use it for private use or
consumption and not for a commercial purpose. The term 'consumer' also includes
any person who uses the goods with the permission of the buyer though he is not
himself buyer.

CONSUMER OF GOODS

Under sub-clause (i) of section 2(1)(d), a consumer for the purpose of goods means
any person, who-

a. buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly
paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, and

b. includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys them, when such
use is made with the approval of the buyer, but

c. does not include any person who obtains such goods for resale or for any
commercial purpose. Commercial purpose does not include use by a person of goods
bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by
means of self- employment.

The above provision reveals that a person claiming himself as a consumer should
satisfy that- (i) there must be a sale transaction between the seller and the buyer; (ii)
the sale must be of goods; the buying of goods must be for consideration; (iv) the
consideration has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment; and (v) the user of the goods may also be a
consumer when such use is made with the approval of the buyer.

However, the term consumer does not include a person who obtains any goods for
resale or for any commercial purpose. It is obvious that the parliament intended to
restrict the benefits of the Act to ordinary consumers purchasing goods wither for
own consumption or even for use in some small venture which they may have
embarked upon in order to make a living as distinct from large scale manufacturing
or processing activity carried on for profit.

CONSUMER OF SERVICES

The second category of consumer laid down under the act is that of hirer or user of
services. Under sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, a consumer for the
purpose of services means any person, who-

a. hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or
promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment, and

b. includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails
of them when such services are availed of with the approval of the hirer; but.

c. does not include a person who avails of such services for nay commercial
purpose. Commercial purpose does not include a person of services availed by him
exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self employment.

In order to be a consumer for the purpose of services, it is necessary that the services
must have been hired or availed of for consideration. But it is not necessary to pay
the consideration immediately, it may be paid afterwards or in installments. A
student is hiring the services of the university on payment of fees for appearing at
the examination; or passenger getting railway reservation after payment is hiring
service for consideration, is a consumer of services.

SERVICE

The term services according to sec. 2(1)(o) means service of any description which
is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in
connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of
electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, entertainment, amusement or the
purveying a news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any
services free of charge or under a contract of personal service.

In R.C. Dixit v. Principal, St. Paul School, the complainant's daughter was admitted
in school on payment of various fees and security deposits. Since there was no
proper arrangement in the school for teaching economics, the complainant withdrew
daughter and put her in another school. The complainant sought full refund of the
fees. The State Commission held that since the withdrawal from the school was
voluntary, admission fees and monthly tuition fees were not refundable, whereas the
annual maintenance, support fees and library fees were refundable after
proportionate deduction on account of deficiency in services.

AUTHORITIES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION

Introduction

The consumer movement in India arose out of dissatisfaction of the consumers as

many unfair practices were being indulged in by the sellers. There was no legal
system available to consumers to protect them from exploitation in the marketplace.
For a long time, when a consumer was not happy with a particular brand product or
shop, he or she generally avoided buying that brand product, or would stop
purchasing from that shop. It was presumed that it was the responsibility of
consumers to be careful while buying a commodity or service. It took many years
for organizations in India, and around the world, to create awareness amongst
people. Because of all these efforts, the movement succeeded in bringing pressure
on business firms as well as government to correct business conduct which may be
unfair and against the interests of consumers at large. A major step was taken on
24th of December 1986 by the Indian government to safeguard the interest of the
consumer by enacting a comprehensive legislation- the Consumer Protection Act,
1986. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is a social benefit oriented legislation and
the provisions of the Act have to be construed as broadly as possible in favour of the
consumer to achieve the purpose of the enactment but without doing violence to its
language.

It may be mentioned at the outset that anyone interested in the task of consumer
protection movement has to be well versed in various laws and not merely with the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. He should have knowledge of laws relating to
Contract, Tort, Railways, Telegraphs, Telephones, Post, Air Travel, Insurance,
Electricity, Water, Housing, Medicine, Banking, Finance, Engineering, Motor
Vehicles, Hotel Industry, Entertainment, Cooperative Societies, Tourism Agencies,
Sales Tax, Central Excise, Limitation, Transport etc. There is no limit to subjects,
which may come before a Consumer Forum / Commission for decision. In addition,
one should also be well versed with the

Laws relating to unfair trade practice and restrictive trade practices. Be it as it may.
In India various Acts intended to protect the consumers against different forms of
exploitation were enacted.

According to the Preamble, the purpose of the Act is: To provide for the better
protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for
the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of
consumers disputes and for matters connected therewith.

The object and purpose of enacting the Act is to render simple, inexpensive and
speedy remedy to the consumers with complaints against defective goods and
deficient services and for that a quasi-judicial machinery has been sought to be set
up at the District, State and Central levels. These quasi-judicial bodies are required
to observe the principles of natural justice and have been empowered to give relief
of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers.
Penalties for non-compliance with the orders given by the quasi-judicial bodies have
also been provided.
Authorities for Consumer Protection

Prior to the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for any consumer complaint one had to
go to an necessary Court fee and he was harassed for years before any outcome,
positive or negative, was there in that litigation. Under the Consumer Protection Act,
no Court fee has to be paid and the decision on the complaint is more quicker, as the
court can evolve a summary procedure in disposing of the complaint. Under the Act,
the Consumer Disputes Redressal agencies, which have been set up are:

1. Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum to be known as District Forum.

2. Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be known as State Commission and

3. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission known as National

Commission.

DISTRICT FORUM

Composition of the District Forum (Section 10)

Each District Forum shall consist of the following:

(a) a person who is, or has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge, who shall be
its President;

(b) two other members, one of whom shall be a woman, who shall have the
following qualifications, namely :-

(i) be not less than thirty-five years of age, (ii) possess a bachelor’s degree from a
recognized university, (iii) be persons of ability, integrity and standing, and have
adequate problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry
public affairs or administration:

Provided that a person shall be disqualified for appointment as a member, if he-

(a) has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which, in the
opinion of the State Government, involves moral turpitude; or (b) is an
undischarged insolvent; or (c) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court; or (d) has been removed or dismissed from the service of the
Government or a body corporate owned or controlled by the Government; or (e) has,
in the opinion of the state Government, such financial or other interest as is likely to
affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions as a member; or (f) has
such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by the State Government.

Method of Appointment

Every appointment under sub-section (I) shall be made by the State Government on
the recommendation of a selection committee consisting of the following, namely:-

(i) the President of the State Commission- Chairman.

(ii) Secretary, Law Department of the State - Member.

(iii) Secretary, in charge of the Department - Member dealing with consumer affairs
in the State

Provided that where the President of the state Commission is, by reason of absence
or otherwise, unable to act as Chairman of the Selection Committee, the State
Government may refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court for
nominating a sitting Judge of that High Court to act as Chairman.

Terms of Office and Salary

Every member of the District Forum shall hold office for a term of five years or up
to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. Provided that a member shall be
eligible for re-appointment for another term of five years or up to the age of sixty-
five years, whichever is earlier, subject to the condition that he fulfils the
qualifications and other conditions for appointment and such re-appointment is also
made on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Committee.

Provided also that a person appointed as the President or as a member, before the
commencement of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, shall continue
to hold such office as President or member, as the case may be, till the completion of
his term.

The salary or honorarium and other allowances payable to, and the other terms and
conditions of service of the members of the District Forum shall be such as may be
prescribed by the State Government.
Jurisdiction of the District Forum (Section 11)

Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction
to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the
compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees 20 lakhs.

A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction,-

(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one,
at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, or

(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the
institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business
or has a branch office, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not
reside, or carry on business or have a branch office, or personally work for gain, as
the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

In Kurukshetra University v. Vinay Prakash Verma, it was held that objection &
regarding territorial jurisdiction should be taken at the earliest opportunity or the
same deemed to have been waived. Further in Consumer Education and Research
Society v. Canara Bank, it has been held a petition of complaint can be filed against
corporation carrying on business within the territory of District Forum or
Commission even though its sole or principal office is situated outside state limits.

Manner in which complaint shall be made (Section 12)

(1) A complaint in relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or

delivered or any service provided or agreed to be provided may be filed with a
District Forum by-

(a) the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or
delivered or such service provided or agreed to be provided;
(b) any recognised consumer association whether the consumer to whom the goods
sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or service provided or agreed to
be provided is a member of such association or not;

(c) one or more consumers, where there are numerous consumers having the same
interest, with the permission of the District Forum, on behalf of, or for the benefit of,
all consumers so interested; or

(d) the Central or the State Government, as the case may be, either in its individual
capacity or as a representative of interests of the consumers in general.

(2) Every complaint filed under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied with such
amount of fee and payable in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) On receipt of a complaint made under sub-section (1), the District Forum may,
by order, allow the complaint to be proceeded with or rejected:

Provided that a complaint shall not be rejected under this sub-section unless an
opportunity of being heard has been given to the complainant: Provided further that
the admissibility of the complaint shall ordinarily be decided within twenty-one days
from the date on which the complaint was received.

(4) Where a complaint is allowed to be proceeded with under sub-section (3), the
District Forum may proceed with the complaint in the manner provided under this
Act:

Procedure on receipt of complaint (Section 13)

(1) The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, if it relates to any goods,-

(a) refer a copy of the complaint to the opposite party mentioned in the complaint
directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such
extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum;

(b) Where the opposite party on receipt of a complaint referred to him under clause
(a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to
take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the
District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute.
For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as
are vested in Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in
respect of the following matters, namely:-

(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and
examining the witness on oath,

(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object
producible as evidence,

(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits,

(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the
appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source.

(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness, and

(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.

Every proceeding before the District Forum shall be deemed to be a judicial

proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860), and the district Forum shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes
of section'" 195, and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974).

It has been held in Sagli Ram v. General Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
that a consumer knocking at the door of the redressal agencies under the Act for
relief in a consumer dispute must do so with clean hands.

Finding of the District Forum (Section 14)

If, after the proceeding conducted under section 13, the District Forum is satisfied
that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the
complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services
are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do one or
more of the following things, namely:- .

(a) to remove the defect pointed but by the appropriate laboratory from the goods in
question;
(b) to replace the goods with new goods of similar description which shall be free
from any defect;

(c) to return to the complainant the price, or, as the case may be, the charges paid by
the complainant;

(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer

for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite
party; Provided that the District Forum shall have the power to grant punitive
damages in such circumstances as it deems fit:

(e) to remove the defects in goods or deficiencies in the services in question;

(f) to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to
repeat them;

(g) not to offer the hazardous goods for sale;

(h) to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered for sale;

(ha) to cease manufacture of hazardous goods and to desist from offering services
which are hazardous in nature;

(hb) to pay such sum as may be determined by it, if it is of the opinion that loss or
injury has been suffered by a large number of consumers who are not identifiable
conveniently:

Provided that the minimum amount of sum so payable shall not be less than five per
cent of the value of such defective goods sold or services provided, as the case may
be, to such consumers:

Provided further that the amount so obtained shall be credited in favour of such
person and utilized in such manner as may be prescribed;

(hc) to issue corrective advertisement to neutralize the effect of misleading

advertisement at the cost of the opposite party responsible for issuing such
misleading advertisement;)

(i) to provide for adequate costs to parties.

Appeal (Section 15)

Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal
against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the
date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days If it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
it within that period.

In General Manager. Telecom v. Jyantilal Hemchand Gandhi, it was held that the
appellate forum constituted under the Act should not dismiss the appeal merely on
the ground of default of appearance of the appellant but the merits of the case should
be considered on the basis of the material available before them and thereafter pass
appropriate order in the appeal.

COMPOSITION OF THE STATE COMMISSION (SECTION 16)

Each State Commission shall consist of:

(a) a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, appointed by the State
Government, who shall be its President: Provided that no appointment under this
clause shall be made except after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High
Court;

(b) not less than two, and not more than such number of members, as may be
prescribed, and one of who shall be a woman, who shall have the following
qualifications, namely:-

(i) be not less than thirty-five years of age; (ii) possess a bachelor’s degree from a
recognized university; and (iii) be persons of ability, integrity and standing, and
have adequate knowledge and experience of at least ten years in ealing with
problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public
affairs or administration:

Provided that not more than fifty per cent of the members shall be from amongst
persons having a judicial background. Every appointment under Sub-section (1)
shall be made by the State Government on the recommendation of a Selection
Committee consisting of

The following members, namely:-

(i) President of the State Commission -Chairman.

(ii) Secretary of the Law Department of the State -Member.

(iii) Secretary, in charge of Department dealing with consumer affairs in the State -
Member.

Provided that where the resident of the State Commission is, by reason of absence or
otherwise, unable to act as Chairman of the Selection Committee, the State
Government may refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court for
nominating a sitting Judge of that High Court to act as Chairman.

The salary or honorarium and other allowances payable to, and the other terms and
conditions of service of, the members of the State Commission shall be such as may
be prescribed by the State Government.

Every member of the State Commission shall hold office for a term of five years or
up to the age of sixty-seven years, whichever is earlier: Provided that a member
shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term of five years or up to the age of
sixty-seven years, whichever is earlier, subject to the condition that he fulfills the
qualifications and other conditions.

Jurisdiction of the State Commission (Section 17)

Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have
jurisdiction-

(a) to entertain- (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and
compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees exceeds rupees 20 lakhs but does not
exceed one crore ; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any District Forum within
the State; and

(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which
is pending before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where
it appears to the State Commission that such District Forum has exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested
or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose

jurisdiction–

(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one,
at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or

(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the
institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business
or has a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not
reside or carry on business or have a branch office or personally works for gain, as
the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.) In Kashyap Constructions (Pvt.)
Ltd.v. Delhi Development Authority, It was held that the State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding the
transactions of shops/kiosks having been purchased in auction from the Delhi
Development Authority;

Appeals (Section 19)

Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its
powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal
against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from
the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of
the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
filing it within that period.
 COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION (SECTION 20)

The National Commission shall consist of-

(a) a person who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court, to be appointed by the
Central Government, who shall be its President; - Provided that no appointment
under this clause shall be made except after consultation with the Chief Justice of
India;

(b) not less than four, and not more than such number of members, as may be
prescribed, and one of whom shall be a woman, who shall have the following
qualifications, namely :-

(i) be not less than thirty-five years of age;

(ii) Possess a bachelor’s degree from a recognized university; and

(iii) be persons of ability, integrity and standing and have adequate knowledge and
experience of at least ten years in dealing with problems relating to economics, law,
commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration:

Provided that not more than fifty per cent of the members shall be from amongst the
persons having a judicial background.

Provided further that a person shall be disqualified for appointment, if he –

(a) has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which, in the
opinion of the Central Government, involves moral turpitude; or

(b) is an undischarged insolvent; or

(c) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or

(d) has been removed or dismissed from the service of the Government or a body
corporate owned or controlled by the Government; or

(e) has, in the opinion of the Central Government, such financial or other interest as
is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions as a member; or

(f) has such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by the Central Government:
Provided that every appointment under this clause shall be made by the Central
Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of the
following, namely ;-

(a) a person who is a Judge of the Supreme Court, to be nominated by the Chief
Justice of India -Chairman.

(b) the Secretary in the Department of Legal Affairs in the Government of India -
Member

(c) Secretary of the Department dealing with consumer affairs in the Government of
India -Member.

Salary and Term of Office

The salary or honorarium and other allowances payable to and the other terms and
conditions of service of the members of the National Commission shall be such as
may be prescribed by the Central Government.

Every member of the National Commission shall hold office for a term of five years
or up to the age of seventy years, whichever is earlier and shall not be eligible for re-
appointment.

Provided that a member shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term of five
years or up to the age of seventy years, whichever is earlier, subject to the condition
that he fulfills the qualifications and other conditions for appointment.

Jurisdiction of the National Commission (Section 21)

Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have
jurisdiction- (a) to entertain- (i) complaints where the value of the goods or
services and compensation, if any claimed exceeds one crore; and (ii) appeals
against the orders of any State Commission; and

(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which
is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to
the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction
not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted
in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
Appeal (Section 23)

Any person, aggrieved by an order made by the National Commission in exercise of

its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 21, may prefer an
appeal against such order of the Supreme Court within a period of thirty days from
the date of the order:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said
period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it
within that period.

Limitation Period (Section 24A)

The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not
admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the
cause of action has arisen.

A complaint may be entertained after the period if the complainant satisfies the
District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may
be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period:

Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National

Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be,
records its reasons for condoning such delay.

Dismissal of Frivolous or Vexatious Complaints (Section 26)

Where a complaint instituted before the District Forum, the State Commission or, as
the case may be, the National Commission is found to be frivolous or vexatious, it
shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing, dismiss the complaint and make an order
that the complainant shall pay to the opposite party such cost, not exceeding ten
thousand rupees, as may be specified in the order.

REMEDIES

The main objective of the Act is to provide simple, speedy and inexpensive redressal
to the consumer’s grievances. To provide this, a three-tier quasijudicial machinery
at the national, state and district level has been envisaged under the Act; National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission).; State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (State Commission); District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Forum (District Forum).

The District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of
the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees
20 lakhs. A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction:- • The opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where
there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business, or has a branch office or personally works
for gain; or

• Any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the
institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business
or has a branch office or personally works for gain. In such a case, it is necessary
that there should be either the permission of the District Forum, or the acquiescence
in the institution of the suit, of such of the opposite parties who do not reside or
carry on business or have a branch office, or personally work for gain, as the case
may be, or

• The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Smt. Amita Bhargava, the registered office of the O.P. was
at Kanpur. Payment was made through a bank in Delhi. Complaint filed in Calcutta
was held to be outside the territorial jurisdiction of the District Forum. The order
passed by the Calcutta District Forum was set aside.

Complaint can be filed by consumer, any voluntary organization representing

consumers registered under Companies Act/Societies Act, Central Government,
State Government or Union Territory, and a group of consumers having common
dispute.

Remedies:

The District Forum / State Commission / National Commission may pass one or
more of the following orders to grant relief to the aggrieved consumer:
• to remove the defects pointed out by the appropriate laboratory from goods in
question

• to replace the goods with new goods of similar description which shall be free
from any defect to return to the complainant the price, or, as the case may be, the
charges paid by the complainant

• to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for

any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to negligence of the opposite party;

• to remove the defects or deficiencies in the services in question

• to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to
repeat them

• not to offer the hazardous goods for sale

• to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered for sale

• to provide for adequate costs to parties.

By the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993, the District Forum has
been specifically empowered to order that the defects or deficiencies in the services
in question be removed, or to discontinue or not to repeat any unfair or restrictive
trade practice, not to offer for sale, or to withdraw the hazardous goods from the
market, or to provide adequate costs to the parties.

The term ‘service’, according to sec. 2(1)(o) means service of any description
which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in
connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of
electric or other energy, board or lodging or both, entertainment, amusement or the
purveying a news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any
service free of charge or under a contract of personal service. Deficiency, according
to sec. 2(1)(g), means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the
quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained to be
performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any
service.
 In Dist. Engineer Telecom., Sriganganagar v. Dr. Tej Narain Sharma, the dues of
the telephone bill had been deposited by the complaint after the due date, 22 days
after this deposit the telephone was disconnected without even remaining the
complaint on phone. The phone remained disconnected for 15 days. The
disconnection was held to be due to the negligence and same amounted to deficiency
in services. The compensation was awarded for mental distress, agony and loss of
reputation.

In Union of India v. Nathmal Hansaria, the daughter of the complainant, fell down
and died while passing through inter-connecting passage in the Tin sukhia Mail
going from Delhi to Guwahati. The passage was not protected by any grills, etc. The
State Commission awarded compensation of Rs. 2 lacs for death of girl and Rs.
25,000/- for mental agony, etc. to the parents of the deceased on account of
deficiency in service by the opposite party, Railways. The decision was upheld by
the National Commission.

In a significant ruling in Vasantha P. Nair v. Smt. V.P. Nair, the National

Commission upheld the decision of the Kerala State Commission which said that a
patient is a consumer and the medical assistance was a service and therefore, in the
event of any deficiency in the performance of medical service, the consumer courts
can have the jurisdiction. It was further observed that the medical officers’ service
was not a personal service so as to constitute an exception to the application of the
Consumer protection Act.

Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Indian Medical Association v. V.P.

Shantha and others, has held that patients aggrieved by any deficiency in treatment,
from both private clinics and Govt. hospitals, are entitled to seek damages under the
Consumer Protection Act.

Procedure on Admission of Complaint by District Forum:

District forum shall refer a copy of the admitted complaint within 21 days from the
date of admission to the opposite party (i.e admissibility of the complaint shall be
decided within 21 days from the date on which the complaint was received),
directing him to give his version of the case within 30 days or such extended period
not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the district forum.
After giving due opportunity to the opposite party to represent his case, the district
forum shall proceed to settle the case. If the opposite party omits or fails to represent
his case within the given time, the district forum can pass ex parte order.

An endeavour shall be made to decide the complaint within 3 months from the date
of receipt of notice by the opposite party where the goods does not require any
testing; and within 5 months, where any testing or analysis of the goods is needed.
No adjournments shall be ordinarily allowed unless sufficient cause is shown and
reasons for adjournments have been recorded in writing by the forum.

District forum can pass interim order as may be deemed just and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case. There is also a provision (sub sec 7 to sec 13) for
substitution of the representative on the death of a party in the event of death of a
complainant who is consumer or of the opposite party.

In Balbir Singh Makal v. Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, there was a complaint against a
surgeon for medical blunder which resulted in the death of the complainants’ son.
While the complaint was pending the surgeon died. It was held by the national
Commission that on the death of the surgeon the cause of action had come to an end.
Hence, the legal heirs of the surgeon could not be made liable for the surgeon’s
negligence.

Under the law of torts, the rule is ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’, which
means that the personal action against the defendant dies with the death of the
defendant. That the rule has been recognized in respect of the consumer cases.

Appeal to State Commission shall be made within a period of 30 days and shall be
disposed of within a period of 90 days.

The district forum, the state commission or the national commission shall not admit
a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of
action has arisen. However it may be extended after prescribed period, if the
complainant satisfies the forum, or commission, as the case may be, that he has
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within such period. Reasons for condoning
delay must be recorded.
The delay in filing an appeal may be condoned if the appellant is able to show that
there was sufficient cause for such delay. In Vice Chairman, D.D.A. v. O.P. Gauba,
there was delay of 38 days by the Delhi Development Authority in making the
appeal. The grounds for delay were the xamining of the case from all its aspects at
different levels. It was held that delay caused by inter office consultations is not
sufficient cause and hence the delay was not condoned.

In Delhi Development Authority v. I.S. Narula, certified copy of the order of the
District Forum was received by the appellant on 13-7-94. The appeal was filed on
27-9-94. The alleged reason for the delay was public holidays on 14th and 15th
August, 1994, strike in Tis Hazari Court, and procedural delay in obtaining sanction
of D.D.A. by the Counsel for filing the appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the
power of condonation should be exercised liberally. There was held to be sufficient
cause, and, hence, the delay was condoned.

If the opposite party fails to appear and contest, the District Forum may proceed and
pass an ex parte order. If sufficient cause is shown for not appearing in the case, an
ex parte order may be set aside. The District Forum, which has the right to pass an
ex parte order has also the power to set aside the same.

In Maya Mitra v. K.P. Equipments, it has been held that the District Forum, which
has the right to decide the case ex parte if the opposite party or his agent fails to
appear on the date of the hearing, has also the right to set aside the order if sufficient
cause is shown provided that such a prayer is made early, without any undue delay.

If the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing, the District Forum may
dismiss the complaint in default. Such a dismissal of the complaint may be set aside
and the complaint may be restored.

In Kamlesh Bansal v. Balaji Land Traders, the complainant filed a complaint and
failed to appear on the date fixed by the District Forum for ex parte evidence. Within
23 days of dismissal of complaint, the complainant applied for the restoration of the
complaint. The said application was rejected on the ground that the District Forum
could not restore the complaint. It has been held by the Delhi State Commission that
the Commission, while excising appellate jurisdiction, can set aside the order of the
District Forum dismissing the said application for restoring the complaint.
It is necessary that the Forum should take into account the evidence and the
documents produced by the parties and the order of the forum should be speaking
order, i.e., it should give reasons for the order.

In K.S. Sidhu v. Senior Executive Engineer, the complaint filed before the District
Forum was dismissed by a non-speaking Order. The order did not discuss the
evidence and the documents submitted before it. It was held that such an order was
unjust and arbitrary and was liable to be set aside on that ground.

Similarly complaints can be made to State Commission and National Commission if

the pecuniary value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed
exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs and below one crore. National Commission can entertain
complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any,
claimed exceed one crore, and it can entertain appeals against the orders of any State
Commission.

Every order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National
Commission may be enforced by the District Forum, the State Commission or the
Nation Commission as the case may be, in the same manner as a decree or order
made by a civil court. If the said authorities are not able to execute their orders
themselves, they may forward the same for execution to the Court, in the following
manner:

i. If the execution is sought against a company, it may be sent to a court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the registered office of the company is situated,
and

ii. If the execution is sought against any person, it may be sent to the Court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the place where the person concerned
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for him, is situated.

The court to which the order is to sent, shall then execute the order as if it were a
decree or order sent to it for execution. The procedures under the Act and under the
Commissions are relatively simpler and more informal than under normal litigation.
In fact any consumer can appear before the commission and need not even hire a
lawyer to argue one’s case. Despite the simple procedures there have not been too
many consumer cases in India unlike the United States where the courts are filled
with consumer grievances. One of the reasons for this fact has been the lack of
adequate consumer awareness of their rights in India and the seemingly intimidating
structure of courts and the legal profession. However to its credit, it must be said the
Consumer Protection Act remains one of those rare laws which allows for a speedy
and simple protection of the rights of ordinary people, and judicious use of the same
would foster a greater consumer movement in India in this age where the market is
flooded with more products but not necessarily more information.

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

Introduction
In this Unit general overview of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 will be given.

First of all I would like to acquaint you with the basic aim of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a comprehensive enactment in respect
to various matters relating to traffic safety on the roads and minimization of road
accidents. The Act came into force from 1 july 1989. It replaced Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, which earlier replaced the first such enactment Motor Vehicles Act,1914.

The Act provides in detail the legislative provisions regarding licensing of drivers/
conductors, registration of motor vehicles, control of motor vehicles through
permits, special provisions relating to State transport undertakings, traffic
regulations, insurance, liability, offences and penalties etc.

There are various rights created for claiming compensation in case of any death or
bodily injury caused in an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles.

By the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, inter alia, amendments were made
for make special provisions under sections 66 & 67 so as to provide that vehicles
operating on eco–friendly fuels shall be exempted from the requirements of permits
and also the owners of such vehicles shall have the discretion to fix fares and
freights for carriage of passengers and goods. The intention in bringing the said
amendments was to encourage the operation of vehicles with such eco- friendly
fuels.

Over the years, judiciary has not only been called upon time to time to interpret these
statutory provisions and apply them to different facts and situations, but also to lay
down various legal principles for assessing compensation. The Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, does not provide any guidelines for the identification of the items of loss to be
compensated, nor does it lay down any criteria for the compilation of the quantum of
compensation for each item of loss.

This is an Act to make a comprehensive review of all aspects of Motor Accident

Compensation law. An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor
vehicles.

Liability rule deal with the unintended accidents and related issues. A suit under liability
rules is generally a private suit (over injuries) as opposed to a criminal prosecution. If
the legal requirements are fulfilled, the injurer is required to compensate the victim.

COMPENSATION UNDER MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988

Rules for payment of compensation can be discussed under two sub-headings;

a. Fault based liability and

b. no fault liability

Fault based liability and no fault liability

The cases of motor accidents constitute a major bulk of tort cases in India. To
prevail in a suit generally, a victim must also demonstrate that the injurer has
breached a duty he owe to the victim. When an injurer breaches a legal duty he is
said to be “at fault’or negligent. Breach of a duty is caused by doing something
which a reasonable man should do under the circumstances.

The rule of negligence with the defence of contributory negligence holds injurer liable
if and only if he was negligent and the victim was not. In India, this rule requires
proportional sharing of liability when both parties were negligent. That is, the
compensation the victim receives gets reduced in proportion to his or her negligence.

The rule of strict liability always holds the injurer liable irrespective of the care taken
by the two parties.
Before 1988 for motor vehicle accidents liability of injurer was predominantly fault
based liability. However, the 1988 amendment to the Act brought in an element of
strict liability. The following provision (section. 140) was introduced in the amendment:

“where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident
arising out of the use of the motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle
shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be
liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance
with the provisions of this section.”

In simple terms, this amendment implied that the injurer or the insurance company of
the injurer has to pay a certain amount as compensation to the victim irrespective of whose
fault it is.

The Act was further amended in 1994. As a result of this amendment, liability of injurer
became even stricter. According to section 163-A:

“Notwithstanding anything containing in this Act or any other law for the time being
in force, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authored insurer shall be liable to pay
in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use
of the motor vehicle, compensation as indicated in the second schedule, to legal heirs
or the victim s the case may be.”

The claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent
disablement was due to any wrong full act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle
or the vehicles concerned or any other person.

While filing the damage awards (i.e the liability payments to be made by the injurer
to the victim), courts should take into account the entire loss suffered by victim. A court
may entitle the victim to over or under compensation. Such court errors can cause
various effects depending upon the liability rule in force.

Motor Vehicles Act,1988, however, recognizes limited ‘no fault liability’ but only in
the cases of death and permanent disablement. While deciding on compensation,
courts have applied rule of negligence with defence of contributory negligence. For
instance, if the liability is limited to Rs. 50.000 in the case of death and Rs.25,000 in the
case of permanent disablement. Such compensation can be claimed without
establishing any negligence on the part of owner or the driver of the vehicle. The
compensation claimed exceeding the amount can prevail only if negligence is proved.

Liability without Fault in Certain Cases

Liability without fault in certain cases is dealt under Chapter X of the Act.

Section 140 provides Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle
of no fault. – It runs as

1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicles shall,
or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to
pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the
provisions of this section.

2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under subsection (1) in respect
of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of 85[fifty thousand rupees] and the
amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent
disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of 86[twenty – five thousand rupees].

3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required
to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the
claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or
owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of
any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or
permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation
recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis
of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent
disablement.

5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily

injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give
compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the
time being in force :
Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law shall be
reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section or under section
163 – A.”

In Teethi v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, it was observed that under section
140 of the Act, the liability of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles is joint
and several. In accidents involving two Motor vehicles, liability to pay
compensation is upon both the owners. If only one owner is identified, he is liable to
pay compensation.

These provisions apply in cases where the claimant suffers death or permanent
disablement, as defined in the Act. The object behind no-fault principle is to give
minimum relief expeditiously to the victim of the road accident or his legal
representative. To that extent, these provisions constitute a measure of social justice.

The right to claim compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent
disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right to claim
compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law
for the time being in force. Thus the claims for death or permanent disablement can also
be persuade under other provisions of the Act on the basis of negligence.

It was held in Ashok v. Ashok Singh, to claim interim award under no fault liability
certificate from a medical practitioner regarding permanent disablement is
sufficient.

Similarly in New India Insurance Co. Ltd.v. Mithakhan, it was held that where
compensation is claimed in respect of death or permanent disablement under section
140 of the Act, the claim for compensation is required to be disposed of in the first place
in view of section 140(2) of the Act.

Section 141: Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or

permanent disablement – The section runs as:

1) The right to claim compensation under section 140 in respect of death or

permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to 88[any other right,
except the right to claim under the scheme referred to in section 163 – A (such
other right hereafter] in this section referred to as the right on the principle of
 fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act
or of any other law for the time being in force.

2) A claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent

disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where
compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under
section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for
compensation under section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.

3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of the

death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay
compensation under section 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance
with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first-
mentioned compensation and -

if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-
mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first-mentioned
compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the
amount by which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;

a. if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or more than the

amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second-
mentioned compensation.”

For instance if the first mentioned compensation is Rs. 25,000, and second
mentioned is Rs.30,000, then the person liable is to pay an extra amount of Rs.5000
in total.

Section 141 makes provision to claim compensation for death or permanent

disablement besides the claim for compensation for no fault liability.

For the purposes of this Chapter, under section 142 permanent disablement of a person
shall be deemed to have resulted from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section
(1) of section 140 if such person has suffered by reason of the accident, any injury or
injuries involving :-

a. permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, or privation
of any member or joint; or
b. destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any members or joint; or

permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

LIABILITY OF INSURER

Motor Vehicles Act makes the insurance of Motor Vehicles compulsory. The owner
of every motor vehicle is bound to insure his vehicle against third party risk. The
insurance Company covers the risk of loss to the third party by the use of the motor vehicle.

Thus if there is insurance against the third party risk, the person suffering due to the
accident (third party) caused by the use of motor vehicle may recover compensation
either from the owner or the driver of the vehicle, or from the insurance company, or
from them jointly.

The policy of Insurance issued by an authorized insurer is;

1) To insure the person or class of person’s specified in the policy.

2) Insurer is liable to the extent specified in section 147(2)

3) Liable for death, or bodily injury to any person, or damage to property of third
party, or bodily injury to any passenger of a Public Service Vehicle.

1. Insurer’s liability for third party risks—liability for injury to certain

persons or class of persons (other than gratuitous passenger and pillion
rider):

It is well settled that where the contract of insurance covers the risk of third party
but not that of the owner or pillion rider of a two wheeler, the liability of the
insurance company, in case of this nature, is not extended to a pillion rider of the
vehicle.

In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sudhakaran ,the deceased was travelling as a

pillion rider on a scooter, when she fell down and succumbed to the injuries
sustained by her. In terms of section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988, it is
imperative for the owner of the vehicle to take a policy of the insurance in regard to
reimbursement of the claim to third party while it is from other risks.. The question
involved here was, whether the pillion rider on a scooter would be a third party
within the meaning of section 147.

Holding that the pillion rider in a scooter was not to be treated as a third party when
the accident had taken place owing to rash and negligent riding of the scooter and
not on the part of the driver of another vehicle, the apex court held that the legal
obligation arising under section 147, could not be extended to injury or death of the
owner of the vehicle or the pillion rider.

The observations made in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, it

was held would equally apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers (who pays
no fare) in any other vehicle.[United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tilak Singh]

According to Section 2(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle
stands registered and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and
in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or
an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of
the vehicle under that agreement.

In M/s. Godavari Finance Co. v. Degala Satyanarayanamma, referring to the

opening words “unless the context otherwise requires”, in section 2(30) of 1988 Act,
the Apex Court ruled: “In case of motor vehicle which is subject to a Hire-Purchase
Agreement, the financer cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner. The person in
possession of the vehicle, and not the financer being the owner, would be liable to
pay damages for the motor accident.”

Liability is transferred with the transfer of certificate of insurance, as mentioned

under section 157 of Motor Vehicles Act,1988. It reads as:

“Trasnfer of certificate of insurance. –

1. Where a person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter transfer to another person the
ownership of the another vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken
together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, the certificate of insurance and
the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in
favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the
date of its transfer.
[Explanation. – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that such deemed transfer
shall include transfer of rights and liabilities of the said certificate of insurance and
policy of insurance.]

2. The transferee shall apply within fourteen days from the date of transfer in the
prescribed form to the insurer for making necessary changes in regard to the fact of
transfer in the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate in his
favour and the insurer shall make the necessary changes in the certificate and the
policy of insurance in regard to the transfer of insurance.”

1. Extent of Liability of the Insurer under the Act

Section 147(2) of the 1988 Act reads as:

“Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-

section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the
following limits, namely :-

a) Save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred.

b) In respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six

thousand:

Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force,
immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for
a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such
policy whichever is earlier.”

Insurer’s liability for persons on the roof of a bus:

Section 123 says “(1) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall carry
any person or permit any person to be carried on the running board or otherwise than
within the body of the vehicle.

2) No person shall travel on the running board or on the top or on the bonnet of a
motor vehicle.”

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Samandari Roadways Co., it was held that no
person should be carried on the running board or otherwise than within the body of
vehicle. In such cases Insurance Co. not liable to pay any compensation.

Hit and run case:

Section 161 deals with the cases where the identity of the vehicle or vehicles
involved in the accident cannot be ascertained in spite of reasonable efforts in that
behalf. It reads as

Section 161(2): (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the General Insurance

Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (57 of 1972) or any other law for the time
being in force or any instrument having the force of law, the General Insurance
Corporation of India formed under section 9 of the said Act and the insurance
companies for the time being carrying on general insurance business in India shall
provide for paying in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the scheme,
compensation in respect of the death of, or grievous hurt to, persons resulting from
hit and run motor accidents.

161(3) reads as: Subject to the provisions of this Act and the scheme, there shall be
paid as compensation –

a. in respect of the death of any person resulting from a hit and run motor accident, a
fixed sum of [twenty-five thousand rupees];

b. in respect of grievous hurt to any person resulting from a hit and run motor
accident, a fixed sum of [twelve thousand and five hundred rupees].

Insurer’s liability beyond the limits of the Act:

There is no limitation on Insurer to undertake liability beyond the limits of the Act,
was held in Sheihhpura Trpt. Co. v. NIT Ins. CO., AIR 1971 SC 1624.

1. Insurer’s liability for use of vehicle in a public place

Vehicle can be said to be in use even when it cannot run e.g. taking out battery, when car
is parked. In a private place owner or driver of vehicle may be liable but insurer not
liable. Private place is a place where visitors can go only after permission.

Clause (34) of Section 2 defines “public place”. It means a road, street, way or other
place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and
includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage
carriage.

CLAIMS TRIBUNALS

Sections 165-175 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, deals with;

a. Setting up of a Claims Tribunals

b. Procedure to be followed

c. Award of compensation

A .Claims Tribunals

Section 165(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter
referred to as Claim Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for
the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents
involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor
vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Constitution:

Section 165(2) A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the
State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more
members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof.

Section 165 (4) Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area,
the State Government, may by general or special order, regulate the distribution of
business among them.

Qualification:

Section 165 (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims
Tribunal unless he –

a. is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or

b. is, or has been, a District Judge, or

c. is qualified for appointment as a High Court Judge[or as a District Judge.]

Matters of adjudication by MACT

Section 165 says that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals are constituted for the purpose
of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages
to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury
to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles” includes claims for
compensation under section 140 and section 163-A.

B. Procedure to be followed

Application for Compensation

Section 166 reads as

(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature

specified in sub-section

1) of section 165 may be made –

a. by the person who has sustained the injury; or

b. by the owner of the property; or

c. where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased; or

d. by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased, as the case may be :

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in
any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or
for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal
representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the
application.
On the Receipt of Application

Section 166(2) says that; every application under sub - section (1) shall be made, at
the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the
area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides, or carries on business or within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides.

Section 166(4): The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to
it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this
Act. (i.e report filed by the police will be treated as application).

Simply the MACT,

1. holds an enquiry.

2. summons the parties and

3. fixes the liability as per the procedure and passes an award.

Award of Claims Tribunal

The finding of MACT, fixing the liability and order for compensation is called
award. It is final order. The award should;

a. Determine the amount of compensation, which appears to it to be just.

b. Specify the persons to whom compensation shall be paid, and

c. Specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer, or the owner, or the driver
of the vehicle involved in the accident, or by all or any of them, as the case may be.

MACT can in special circumstances review its own award on the application made
by a party.

Subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount
of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons
to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal
shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the
vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be (section
168).

The Claim Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties
concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the
date of the award (section 168).

When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any
amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the
award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as
the Claims Tribunal may direct.

An appeal against the award lies to a High Court. Before going for appeal the
appellant has to deposit Rs.25000/- or 50% of the amount of award, whichever is
less in the MACT. Then appeal is allowed.

Section 173 reads as: “(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person
aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date
of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court :

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of
such award shall be entertained by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it
twenty-five thousand rupees of fifty per cent, of the amount so awarded, whichever
is less, in the manner directed by the High Court :

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the
said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

2. No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in
the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.”