NAME: Bhoomi Jignesh Shah

SRN NO. 202200107

SUBJECT: Law Of Crimes I

COURSE CODE: BBAL505

Semester 5

COURSE TEACHER: Prof. Divyanshu Priyadarshi

DAY & DATE: 26.09.2024, THURSDAY

TOPIC: Case analysis of Inder Singh Bagga Singh v. State of Pepsu, 1954

PROJECT 1
 INDER SINGH BAGGA SINGH V. STATE OF PEPSU ON 6 AUGUST, 1954

CITATION:

AIR1955SC439

JUDGMENT:

Bhagwati, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In this case, the appellant is contesting a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Penal
Code, which was upheld by the High Court of PEPSU. The appellant was sentenced to life
imprisonment by the Sessions Judge. The incident in question occurred on the night of March 13,
1952, when the appellant attacked Bachittar Singh, the deceased, with a lathi.

The attack happened in front of the appellant's house during a local marriage celebration. The
appellant delivered a total of six blows to the deceased's head and neck. Following the assault,
the deceased lost consciousness but revived after receiving first aid from nearby witnesses.

On March 15, 1952, the deceased, feeling increasingly unwell, was taken to the police station
and subsequently admitted to the hospital. His condition deteriorated over time, and he became
unconscious on March 28, 1952. The deceased ultimately passed away on April 2, 1952, due to
brain compression resulting from the injuries sustained during the attack. Despite an initial delay
in police action, a formal case was registered on March 28, 1952, after further medical reports
and the deceased's death. The appellant was arrested on April 14, 1952, and the lathi used in the
assault was recovered from his possession.

In his defense, the appellant denied the charges, asserting an alibi and suggesting that the injuries
may have occurred on March 14, 1952, rather than March 13, 1952. He also claimed that the
deceased had previously injured his brother.
The prosecution's case relied on the deceased's first information report, which was treated as a
dying declaration, along with witness testimonies. Although witness Pearey Singh’s testimony
was inconsistent, his earlier statement was used to support the prosecution’s case.

Both the Sessions Judge and the High Court found the appellant guilty of murder under Section
302. The Sessions Judge imposed a life sentence, which was affirmed by the High Court. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, it was determined that while the appellant was responsible for the
injuries, there was no intention to cause death.

Consequently, the Supreme Court reclassified the offense to culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 Part I and reduced the appellant’s sentence to 10 years of rigorous
imprisonment.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:

1) Whether the conviction under Section 302 (murder) was justified, or if the offense committed
by the appellant should have been classified under Section 304 Part I (culpable homicide not
amounting to murder)?

2) Did the delay in police action and the registration of the case affect the fairness of the trial and
the credibility of the prosecution’s case?

3) Was the appellant’s defense, including the claim of an alibi and the assertion that injuries
might have occurred on a different date, adequately considered and disproven by the courts?

4) Was the sentence of transportation for life appropriate given the nature of the appellant’s
intent and the medical evidence regarding the injuries inflicted on the deceased?
RULE OF LAW IN THIS CASE:

Section 302 IPC (Murder): This section defines the punishment for murder. If a person
intentionally causes the death of another, or causes such bodily injury as is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to result in death, the offense is classified as murder. The punishment is
death or imprisonment for life.

Section 304 Part I IPC (Culpable Homicide not Amounting to Murder): This section applies
when a person commits an act that results in death but without the intention to cause death,
though the person knows that the act is likely to cause death. The punishment is rigorous
imprisonment, which may extend up to 10 years or a fine, or both.

The difference between Sections 302 and 304 lies in the intention and knowledge of the person
causing death. Under Section 302, there must be an intention to cause death or bodily injury that
is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to result in death. Under Section 304 Part I, the act is
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without the intention to specifically
cause death.
APPLICATION:

The deceased, Bachittar Singh, had allegedly made advances toward the appellant’s sister-in-law.
The appellant, Chaman Lal, had warned the deceased through his cousin Sunder Singh. On the
night of the incident, Bachittar Singh was struck by the appellant with a lathi (a heavy stick)
multiple times, primarily on his head. After the assault, the deceased initially survived for about
three weeks but eventually succumbed to the injuries on April 2, 1952, due to brain hemorrhage
caused by the blows.

The appellant claimed an alibi and suggested that the injuries were caused on a different day
(March 14, 1952) and by someone else. However, the evidence presented by eyewitnesses
Sunder Singh and Pearey Singh, along with the medical reports, showed that the deceased was
assaulted by the appellant on March 13, 1952.

The Sessions Court and the High Court rejected the defense’s argument regarding the date of the
assault, as there was no evidence to support the claim of a separate incident on March 14, 1952.
Both courts found that the appellant had inflicted the injuries on March 13, 1952, based on the
testimonies of witnesses and medical evidence.

Both courts convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, concluding that the blows to the
head, especially injury No. 1 (the abrasion on the right parietal region), were fatal and inflicted
with the intention to cause death.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court noted that while the appellant inflicted six blows on the
deceased, including blows to the head, the weapon used was not iron-shod, and the appellant
may not have intended to cause the death of the deceased. The Court acknowledged the severity
of the injury but found that the appellant's actions could not be classified as murder with the
intent to kill, given that the deceased was young and survived for three weeks, suggesting that
the injuries were not immediately fatal.

The Court also considered that the appellant may not have known that the injuries would
ultimately result in death, particularly since the injury worsened gradually due to brain
hemorrhage. The appellant was found to have known that the injuries could likely cause death,
but not that they were certain to do so.

The Supreme Court agreed that the appellant inflicted the injuries, but disagreed with the
conclusions of the lower courts on the issue of intent. The Court considered several factors:

 The nature of the weapon (a lathi, which was not iron-shod),

 The fact that the deceased was a strongly built young man, and
 The medical evidence, which showed that the injury was not immediately fatal and that
such an injury was not necessarily incurable.

The Court reasoned that while the blows were severe and resulted in death, they were not
delivered with the clear intention to kill. The appellant's knowledge that the blows would cause
serious harm was acknowledged, but the Court found that the injuries, while grievous, did not
immediately lead to death, and that the appellant likely did not intend to kill.

Discrepancy in the Timeline: The appellant argued that the events might have occurred on the
14th of March instead of the 13th, as stated by the prosecution. However, the Court dismissed
this argument, noting that it was raised for the first time during the appeal and that the
prosecution's case had consistently relied on the events of the 13th.
CONCLUSION:

In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the appellant's actions
did not meet the threshold for a conviction under Section 302 IPC (murder). While the appellant
delivered six blows to the deceased, including severe blows to the head, the Court noted that the
weapon used was a lathi (a wooden stick) that was not iron-shod, indicating that the appellant
may not have intended to cause fatal injuries. Furthermore, the fact that the deceased, Bachittar
Singh, survived for nearly three weeks after the attack suggested that the injuries, although
serious, were not immediately life-threatening and did not conclusively demonstrate a direct
intent to cause death.

The Court also recognized that the appellant inflicted the blows in a situation where there had
been an ongoing dispute between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant’s actions, though
reckless and violent, did not exhibit premeditation or the kind of deliberate intent typically
associated with murder under Section 302 IPC. Instead, the Court found that the appellant likely
acted with knowledge that his actions could lead to death, but without the explicit intention to
kill the deceased.

The medical evidence further supported this interpretation. Dr. Bhagwant Singh testified that the
fatal injury to the head caused a gradual brain hemorrhage, which worsened over time, leading to
death on April 2, 1952. This slow progression indicated that, while the injury was serious, it was
not necessarily fatal in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Additionally, the doctor noted that
such injuries, while dangerous, could sometimes be treated, further implying that the appellant
might not have been fully aware of the gravity of the harm he was causing.

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court held that the appellant did not possess the mens rea
(criminal intent) required for a murder conviction under Section 302 IPC. The Court determined
that the appropriate charge was culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304
Part I IPC, which applies when a person causes death with the knowledge that their actions are
likely to cause death but without the specific intent to do so. The distinction between murder and
culpable homicide lies in the degree of intent, and in this case, the Court concluded that the
appellant’s knowledge of the likely consequences of his actions was insufficient to convict him
of murder.

Consequently, the Court modified the appellant’s conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC
to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC. The sentence of life
imprisonment was reduced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, taking into account the fact
that the appellant had not acted with premeditated intent to kill and that the circumstances of the
case did not warrant the more severe punishment of life imprisonment.

In conclusion, while the appellant’s actions were violent and resulted in the tragic death of the
deceased, the Supreme Court recognized the need to balance the evidence of the appellant’s
intent and the circumstances of the assault. By reclassifying the offense as culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, the Court emphasized that although the appellant’s conduct was reckless
and dangerous, it did not rise to the level of murder, as there was no clear intent to cause death.
Therefore, the appellant’s sentence was appropriately adjusted to reflect the gravity of his actions
while acknowledging the absence of a murderous intent.