PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Final
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Final
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Final
PYQs
1. Characteristics of a good lawyer. “Seven Lamps of Advocacy” as laid down by Judge
Edward Abott Parry.
2. Duties of an Advocate towards his Client/court/collegues in the light of Standards of
Professional Conduct and Etiquettes Rules.
3. Define contempt of Court? What are the types of Contempt of Court? Discuss about
contempt of court jurisdiction of courts of law in India in the light of recent judgments
of Supreme Court of India.
4. nature of Professional Misconduct Proceedings against an advocate? Discuss the
nature and characteristics of Professional Misconduct cases and the procedure to be
followed by the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of States or Bar Council of
India as laid down under the Advocates Act, 1961 and judicial precedents.
5. Elaborate the evolution and development of Legal Profession in India.
6. Whether an advocate has right of lien on case files entrusted to him by his client?
Discuss in the light of case of P. D. Gupta v. Ram Murti.
7. Write a short note on Admission and Enrolment of Advocates in India.
8. Discuss the policy/composition/various functions of Bar Council of India.
9. short note on Legal Education in India.
10. short note on the various punishments mentioned under the Advocates Act, 1961 in
cases of professional misconduct.
11. Salient features of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
12. short note on Strikes and Boycott of Courts by Lawyers. Ex-Captain harish Uppal v.
Union of India.
13. difference between Civil and Criminal Contempt.
14. a short note on the relationship between Ethics and Dharma.
15. Defences available to contemner.
16. Appeal against DC’s decision.
17. The credibility and reputation of the profession depends upon the manner in which the
members of the profession conduct themselves. Discuss this statement keeping in
mind Shambhu Ram Yadav v Hanuman Das Khatry.
Who is a lawyer?
As per Oxford Black’s Law Dictionary: A lawyer is:
A person learned in the law as an attorney, councillor, or solicitor; a person who is
practicing law.
“One versed in the law; a member of the legal profession, one whose business it is to
conduct suits in the courts, or to advise clients, in the widest sense embracing every
branch of the profession, though in colloquial use often limited to attorneys and
solicitors.”
A Lawyer is a person who has a degree in law and has got himself enrolled in the bar.
Well conversant with the provisions of the law.
What is the duty of a lawyer?
When a client comes to a lawyer, he has to understand the issue, apply the relevant legal
provisions, and then suggest the client the possible legal remedies that can be availed by the
client. A lawyer is also supposed to help his client in seeking justice before the court of law
while also assisting the court in reaching the decision by advancing the arguments for and
against the issue.
Profession
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Maxse 1919 KB 647 Justice Scrutton defines,
“profession” in the present use of language involves the idea of an occupation
requiring either purely intellectual skill or manual skill controlled, as in painting and
sculpture, or surgery, by the intellectual skill of the operator as distinguished from an
occupation that is substantially the production or sale or arrangements for the
production or sale of commodities.
Rupert and Jackson and John L Powell—“Jackson and Powell on Professional
Negligence”— 4 imp. characteristics of a profession:
1. Nature of the work, i.e., skilled and specialised, intellectual, the major work is
mental rather than manual.
2. Commitment of moral principles which go beyond the general duty of honesty
and wider duty to the community which may transcend the duty to a particular
client or patient.
3. Professional association which regulates admission and seeks to uphold the
standards of the profession through professional courts on matter of conduct and
ethics.
4. Every profession receives high status in the community.
Examples: Architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, surveyors, accountants,
solicitors, barristers, medical practitioners, and insurance brokers.
Indian Medical Association v. VP Shantha, AIR 1996 SC 550—The distinguishing
feature of being a professional is that the professional man should possess a certain
min. degree of competence, and they should exercise a certain level of care in
discharge of their duty.
Regulatory Authorities wrt the Legal Profession- Chapter II- BAR COUNCILS
STATE BAR COUNCILS – S. 3
Composition – s. 3
S. 3(2)(a)
o In the State Bar Council of Delhi, the Additional Solicitor-General of India, ex
officio;
o In the case of the State Bar Councils of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram
and Nagaland, the Advocate-General of each of the States of Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland ex officio.
o In the case of the State Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, the Advocate-
General of each of the States of Punjab and Haryana, ex officio.
o In the case of any other State Bar Council, the Advocate-General of the State,
ex officio.
S. 3(2)(b)
o if electorate is upto 5000—15 members.
o if electorate is 5000-10000—20 members.
o if electorate is >10000—25 members.
o one-half of such elected members shall be persons who have for at least ten
years been advocates on a State roll, and in computing the said period of ten
years in relation to any such person, there shall be included any period during
which the person has been an advocate enrolled under the Indian Bar Councils
Act, 1926.
S. 3(3)
o Chairman and Vice-Chairman of each State Bar Council elected by the
Council.
S. 3(4)
o advocate shall be disqualified from voting at an election under sub-section
(2) or for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a State Bar Council,
unless he possesses such qualifications or satisfies such conditions as may be
prescribed in this behalf by the Bar Council of India, and subject to any such
rules that may be made, an electoral roll shall be prepared and revised from
time to time by each State Bar Council.
o Guilt of the delinquent advocate proved, does not have valid license, license
has been suspended.
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEES – s. 9
One or more disciplinary committee consisting of 3 persons - two shall be persons
elected by the Council from amongst its members and the other shall be a person co-
opted by the Council from amongst advocates who possess the qualifications
specified in the proviso to s. 3(2) and who are not members of the Council.
the senior-most advocate amongst the members of a disciplinary committee shall be
the Chairman.
Constitution of legal aid committees – s. 9A
Bar Council may constitute one or more legal aid committees consisting of 5-9
persons.
Constitution of committees other than disciplinary committees – s. 10
Standing committees
State Bar Council shall constitute-
o Executive Committee – 5 members elected by the council from amongst its
members.
o Enrolment Committee – 3 members elected by the council from amongst its
members.
BCI shall constitute-
o Executive Committee – 9 members elected by the council from amongst its
members.
o Legal Education Committee – 10 members, 5 elected by the council from
amongst its members, other 5 co-opted by the council who are not members.
SBC and BCI can constitute any other committee as it deems necessary for carrying
out the provisions of this Act.
APPEAL PROVISIONS
Appeal to the BCI – s. 37
Aggrieved by the order of the DC of SBC or the AG of State appeal within 60 days of
receipt of order to the BCI.
Appeal is heard by the DC of BCI—can vary the punishment awarded by the DC of
SBC.
Proviso- decision should not be varied to the prejudice of the affected advocate
without giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Appeal to the Supreme Court – s. 38
Aggrieved by the order of the DC of BCI, within 60 days of receipt of order, appeal to
the SC, SC will pass order as it deems fit, can also vary the punishment.
No variation in order to the prejudice of the advocate without giving him reasonable
opportunity of being heard.
Application of s. 5 & 12 of Limitation Act, 1963
5 Condonation of delay if the court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause.
12 computation of limitation period.
Stay of order – s. 40
Appeal doesn’t mean stay of the order appealed against.
But the DC of BCI or the SC can direct the stay of such order for sufficient cause on
some T&C. (Interlocutory application for the stay of the order has to be filed before
the DC of BCI or the SC, asking for status quo to be maintained).
Review of order by the DC – s. 44
DC of a BC may suo moto or otherwise, review any order w/i 60 days of that order.
Review by DC of SBC shall not have affect unless approved by the BCI.
Power of revision - 48A
The BCI may, at any time, call for the record of any proceeding which has been
disposed of by a SBC or a committee, and from which no appeal lies, for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such disposal and may pass such
orders in relation thereto as it may think fit.
No order which prejudicially affects any person shall be passed under this section
without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Review- 48AA
The BCI or any of its committees, other than its disciplinary committee, may of its
own motion or otherwise review any order, within 60 days of the date of that order.
POWERS OF COMMITTEES
Powers of Disciplinary Committee – s. 42
same power as vested in a civil court under CPC 1908.
i. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on
oath;
ii. requiring discovery and production of any documents;
iii. receiving evidence on affidavits;
iv. requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office;
v. issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
vi. any other matter which may be prescribed.
Powers of BCI and other committees – s. 42A
provisions of s. 42 shall apply to BCI, the enrolment committee, the election
committee, the legal aid committee, or any other committee of a Bar Council as they
apply in relation to the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council.
Reciprocity – s. 47
If foreign country has allowed Indian advocates, the advocates of that country shall be
allowed in India.
Kaushal Kishor Awasthi v. Balwant Singh Thakur & Ors. AIR 2018 SC 199
In a family dispute between the complainant and his brothers, with respect to their
father’s property.
On his death the said property was divided by the three brothers equally.
However, it transpired that before his death, one of the brothers of the complainant
influenced his father and got registered the said property in the name of the
complainant's nephew, without the consent of other brothers vide sale deed.
The complainant had approached the Appellant (Advocate), for filing the Suit for
declaration to declare that the sale deed was null and void as it was prepared
fraudulently.
The Appellant acted as his Advocate and filed the Suit.
In the said Suit, the parties settled the matter as they agreed for declaring the sale deed
as ineffective and requested the Court for division of the property.
This resulted in passing of decree dated 24.10.1994 by the Court in which the
complainant was declared owner of 0.03 acres along with kutcha house out of the
disputed property.
However, the complainant suffered some financial crunch in April, 2003, and he
decided to sell his share of land to Mr. Narsinghmal, for a sum of Rs. 30,000/- and for
the purpose of registration of sale deed, he produced the earlier sale deed before the
office of the Deputy Registrar.
The Appellant produced objection letter against the proposed sale deed and objected
for registration of the said sale deed on the ground that the complainant did not have
full ownership of the proposed land and the market value was also shown less in the
said sale deed.
This act of the Appellant in appearing before the office of the Deputy Registrar and
objecting to the registration of sale deed was labelled as professional misconduct by
alleging that the Appellant had paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the complainant in the
year 1996 and another sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the son of the complainant in the year
1999 and for repayment of the said amount, the complainant had offered half share of
the subject land as security.
His justification for raising objection, therefore, was that since the land was being
sold without clearing his debt, it could not be done.
Compliant before BC of Chhattisgarh against KKA.
SBC suspended his license for 2 years. Appealed to BCI, it reduced punishment to one
year suspension + Rs. 25000 fine.
Rule 22 under Chapter II of the Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette -
“An advocate shall not, directly or indirectly, bid for or purchases, either in his own
name or in any other name, for his own benefit or for the benefit of any other person,
any property sold in the execution of a decree or order in any suit, appeal or other
proceeding in which he was in any way professionally engaged.”
The said property was not being sold in execution of any decree, in which
proceedings the Appellant was engaged, as noted above. Insofar as the filing of the
Suit by the Appellant on behalf of the complainant is concerned, that had resulted into
passing of decree and the proceedings had concluded.
Even as per the complainant's own admission, it is much thereafter that the
complainant intended to sell the property in question when he found himself in need
of money.
It is this sale which the Appellant tried to interdict. He was not doing so in the
capacity of an Advocate.
As per him, the complainant was not authorised to sell the property without repaying
his debt.
Whether the Appellant was right in this submission or not, is not relevant. What is
relevant is that this act has nothing to do with the professional conduct of the
Appellant.
Therefore, the very initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant by the
State Bar Council was improper and without jurisdiction. Set aside the BCI’s order.
PC Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram 1999 (3) SCC 614
The appellant claims to be the power-of-attorney holder of a couple (husband and
wife) living in Kuwait.
He sought permission of the Sessions Court, Trivandrum to appear and plead on
behalf of the said couple who are arrayed as respondents in a criminal revision
petition filed before the said Sessions.
The Permission was declined by the Sessions Judge and even by High Court and now
the appeal before the Supreme Court to seek the same permission.
“2.(q) ‘pleader’, when used with reference to any proceeding in any court, means a
person authorised by or under any law for the time being in force, to practise in such
court, and includes any other person appointed with the permission of the court to act
in such proceeding;”
As per above definition if the pleader is “any other person ”, it is essential requisite
that such person should have been appointed with the permission of the court to act in
such proceedings.
An agent cannot become a “pleader” for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the
party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings.
The respondent-couple have not even moved for such a permission and hence no
occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect.
RD Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma (2000) 7 SCC 264- Advocates right of lien on case
files
The appellant was appointed as a legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co-
operative Bank Ltd. (herein referred to as ‘Bank’) in 1990. He used to conduct cases
on behalf of the said bank. Subsequently, on 17.7.1993 the bank terminated the
retainers of the appellant; and requested him to return his files related to the bank.
Instead of returning the files, he informed the bank that only after dues amounting to
rupees 97,100/- were paid will he return the files.
Hence, the Bank filed a complaint before the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh
on 3.2.1994; wherein the appellant contended that he has a right of lien on those files;
whereas the respondent contended that the appellant is guilty of professional
misconduct by not returning the files to his client.
Subsequently, the matter got transferred to the disciplinary committee of Bar Council
of India; wherein the appellant was held guilty of professional misconduct and was
imposed a fine of rupees 1000/-; and also debarred him from practicing for 18
months; and was directed to return all the case bundles of the client without any
delay.
In appeal before SC- Whether the advocate can have a lien on the litigation papers
entrusted to him by his clients for pending fees?
SC emphasised on s. 171 of Indian Contract Act- General lien of bankers, factors,
wharfingers, attorneys and policy brokers- Bankers, factors, wharfringers, attorney of
a High Court and policy brokers may, in the absence of a contract to the contrary,
retain as a security for a general balance of account, any goods bailed to them, but no
other persons have a right to retain, as a security for such balance, goods bailed to
them, unless there is an express contract to that effect.
Section 148 of the Contract Act defines the bailment which states that; if the goods
are transferred from one person to another for some purpose; and after completion of
the purpose the goods have to be returned to; or otherwise disposed of according to
the directions of the person delivering them then such transfer can be termed as a
bailment.
But in this case, the goods are not bailed to the appellant/advocate as there was no
delivery of the goods; because the advocate owned paper on his account.
The term ‘goods’ has to be understood in the sense of the Goods and Sales Act, 1930
wherein section 2(7) states “every kind of movable property other than actionable
claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things
attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or
under the contract of sale.”
Thus the goods which fall in the purview of section 171 should have marketability
i.e. they should be saleable.
The case files in the present case are neither saleable nor can be converted into
money; hence section 171 is of no merit.
The divisional bench of Madras High Court in the case of P. Krishnamachariar Vs.
The Official Assignee of Madras; held that an advocate could not have such a lien;
unless there was an express agreement to the contrary; and the same view was held
by the Patna High Court in In RD SAXENA Vs BALRAM PRASAD.
After the enactment of Advocates Act, 1961 the Bar Council of India framed the rules
in which Rule 28 and 29 explicitly states that ‘if any sum is remaining in the hands of
an advocate then he is at liberty to appropriate the same after the termination of
proceeding’ & ‘if the fees have been unsettled then the advocate can deduct it from
the client’s money in his hand and rest should be refunded to the client’s’
respectively.
Section 35 of the Advocates Act pertains to misconduct; and accordingly, the refusal
of an advocate to return the file of the client comes under the ambit of professional
misconduct. Therefore, he is liable for the same punishment. However, here the
appellant had a bona fide belief that; he did have a lien and such presumption pertains
to restricting harsh punishment on the appellant.
Held - Punishment will be altered to reprimanding the appellant. However, if any
person commits this type of professional misconduct in the future; then Bar Council
will determine respective punishment; and the lesser punishment imposed in this case
should not be taken under the ambit of precedent.
As a rule, an Advocate shall not do anything whereby he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his client. In the conditions prevailing in India with
lots of illiterate people among the litigant public it may not be advisable also to
permit the counsel to retain the case bundle for the fees claimed by him. Any such
lien if permitted would become susceptible to great abuses and exploitation.
There is yet another reason which dissuades us from giving approval to any such lien.
We are sure that nobody would dispute the proposition that the cause in a
court/tribunal is far more important for all concerned than the right of the legal
practitioner for his remuneration in respect of the services rendered for espousing the
cause on behalf of the litigant.
If a need arises for the litigant to change his counsel pendente lite, that which is more
important should have its even course flowed unimpeded.
Retention of records for the unpaid remuneration of the advocate would impede such
course and the cause pending judicial disposal would be badly impaired.
No professional can be given the right to withhold the returnable records relating to
the work done by him with his clients matter on the strength of any claim for unpaid
remuneration.
The alternative is that the professional concerned can resort to other legal remedies
for such unpaid remuneration.
For initiation of lien, there is a requirement of possession that ought to happen in the
case of bailment.
For a bailment, there should be a transfer of goods, now a lien on the case file is not
considered as a good; because it does not have marketability in the legal sense.
A person cannot sell one client’s case files to another client for the sake of
marketability.
Hence, it will be considered bad in law and which would ultimately lead to
professional misconduct.
Anish Ahmad v. DU AIR 2002 Del 440- Full time teacher enrolment as advocate
PIL filed by advocates before Del HC, question- whether permanent faculty of law
faculty of DU could continue their practice simultaneously with the teaching
profession in the city civil courts, HC, SC?
Lecturers to professors. Some enrolled themselves with the BC of Delhi.
Complaint to BC of Delhi, law teacher cannot simultaneously practice in the court.
Accepted by the BC. Cancelled the enrolment of those teachers.
PIL filed.
Rule made by govt as per S. 49A of Advocates Act 1961, s. 3- an advocate while
teaching law can take up practice so long as teaching does not exceed three hours.
SC held- The plea by the law teachers that after adaptation of the rules, a lawyer could
take up full time law teaching in regular scale of pay and, therefore, a Law teacher
could also be enrolled as an Advocate would not be tenable. As such an interpretation
is not only fallacious but also absurd.
It is settled law that an interpretation which leads to absurdity should always be
avoided.
The wordings used in the Notification issued by the Central Government make it
explicit that under the said notification a right is given to practising advocate to take
up law teaching but no such parallel right is given to teachers of law to be enrolled as
advocates.
The wording used in the provisions is plain and unambiguous and requires no addition
of words to the said statute.
The intention of the legislature is also clear and apparent and, therefore, the Court
would not proceed to reframe the legislation by giving a meaning which the
respondent teachers seek to give.
The plea by the law teachers that they are in fact not required to teach for more than
three hours in a day and that they are, therefore, eligible to practice in the Courts and
to retain their membership of the Bar Council would not be tenable.
When the statute does not by itself permit such a situation and when R. 103 has
specifically prohibited full time law teachers from enrolling as advocate, no such
permission could be granted to a full-time law teacher to be enrolled as an advocate.
The aforesaid interpretation is also in consonance with Statutes, Ordinance and the
Resolutions adopted by the Delhi University and the University Grants Commission.
Furthermore, it is the specific stand of the Delhi University that no full-time teacher
of the Delhi be he or she is in the Law Faculty or in any other Faculty of the
University is not entitled to practice as a lawyer as long as he is a full time teacher in
the University.
The directions of the University Grants Commission are based on the aforesaid
analogy when it conveyed the decision that in order to promote quality education full
time law teachers would not be permitted to enroll as members of the Bar entitling
them to full time practice in law.
Even the permission granted to such teacher to appear and represent in social
action/public interest litigation is in the nature of legal aid and social activity and not
as a lawyer.
The same would not by itself empower or enable a full-time teacher of the Delhi
University to practice as a Lawyer.
Even in a case where enrolment is granted by the Bar Council and thereafter the
advocate seeks to take up law teaching, the same could be permitted only within the
parameter of the 1979 Rules read with the University Statutes and Ordinance.
The Resolution 108 of 1996 adopted by the Bar Council of India correctly lays down
the law and the practice and no objection could be taken as against the said
Resolution.
By adopting the said Resolution the Bar Council of India has tried to rectify the
mistake by removing the names of such persons who are full time salaried law
teachers and who were enrolled as Advocates overlooking the specific provisions of
R.103 of Bar Council of Delhi Rules and by misinterpreting the provisions of the
1979 Rules.
CONTEMPT OF COURT
Scandalizes or compromises the reputation of the court of law- criminal contempt.
Wilful disobedience of court’s order- civil contempt.
All persons- natural and artificial as well.
Court of record has power to punish for contempt.
In contempt case, in lower courts, there should be separate court.
When it is a constitutional court, the bench whose contempt has been committed
should decide the matter.
Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
the superior courts (Supreme Court and High Courts) derive their contempt powers
from the Constitution.
Article 129 declares the Supreme Court to be a "Court of Record," with all of the
powers of a court of record, including the authority to punish itself for contempt.
Article 142 – SC in addition to passing any such order to do complete justice also has
the power to punish for contempt.
142 supplements the substantive power under a. 129 by conferring the power of
investigation and punishment through procedure prescribed by law.
Article 215 – Grants every High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself.
The Act only outlines the procedure in relation to investigation and punishment for
contempt.
Therefore, deletion of the offence from the Act will not impact the inherent
constitutional powers of the superior courts to punish anyone for its contempt. These
powers will continue to remain, independent of the 1971 Act.
Definition, nature, scope, characteristics, what is not contempt, what words, actions.
An Act to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of
courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto.
2(b) civil contempt- means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a
court.
“wilful disobedience”- party intentionally did not comply with the directions of the
court, of order, decree, judgment, writ, direction.
Reasonable time is provided by the court to comply with the order.
Order has to be complied in letter and spirit. Partial compliance will result in CoC.
Wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court - In court, whatever you say, you say
on affidavit, if it is found to be false, you may be penalised under the penal code.
If govt. does not comply with the undertaking, contempt proceedings may be initiated.
Ask for extension of time, if not able to comply within time.
“Wilful” or not is a question of fact. Has to be proven by party in favour of whom the
j/o/d etc was passed.
2(c) criminal contempt- means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written,
or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
any other act whatsoever which—
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.
scandalizes the reputation of the court. Courts may pass judgment that is against the
people at large, govt, NGO, etc. tough decisions are taken by the court. You can make
fair criticism of the judgment.
Anyone can’t defame anyone.
Justice Karnan- grievance with the judiciary should not be brought to public like
justice did. In camera proceedings could have been done.
HCs and SC are independent and free and fair in their working. HC and SC judges are
equivalent.
Fair criticism is allowed, personal remarks about the judges in not allowed.
Puspaben & Ors. v. Narayandas V. Badiani & Anr. 1979 AIR 1536- fine is the rule
Appeal petition before SC.
Resp gave loan of 50000 to petitioner (appellant).
Default in loan.
Suit for recovery filed in HC.
Suit pending, compromise.
Agreed that the resp will return the loan by 21st July 1972.
Application in court that case should be decided as settled.
Court passed decree accordingly.
Could not repay.
Resp. initiated contempt proceeding as undertaking was given before the court.
HC found the appellant guilty. Sentenced civil contempt, punished.
SC had to decideWhether in civil contempt cases, corporal punishment can be
inflicted?
Only in exceptional circumstances shall punishment be inflicted. The fine is the rule.
A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt
that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in
normal circumstances.
The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of
imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require.
Thus, before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give
special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment
alone is called for in a particular situation
Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule.
Ordered fine of 1000- and 15-days simple imprisonment.
Daroga Singh & Ors. v. B.K. Pandey 2004 (5) SCC 26- ADJ beaten up by policemen
AD&S Judge – D.M. Barai in Bhagalpur, Bihar.
Trial in case of 1992, one policeman, Joku Singh, being examined as witness, was IO
of that case.
JS’s statement was recorded. He was the prime witness as he collected the evidences
and prepared the case.
Summons were issued, he did not appear. Again issued, he did not appear.
When this happened, bailable warrant was issued, did not appear. Finally, non-
bailable warrant was issued, he appeared.
Court asked why not contempt proceedings be initiated against him. Sent to judicial
custody.
Office bearer of the policemen’s association, K.D. Chaudhari approached the court to
get JS’s release. ADJ refused.
DJ also refused to give bail.
1997 bail application was withdrawn by the advocate.
18-20 policemen in civil dress approached the ADJ court.
ADJ absconded from the chair and went to his chamber. Peon was beaten up by the
policemen.
Door to chamber was broken, judge also beaten up.
HC took cognisance. Asked other ADJ to submit a report. Contempt proceedings
initiated in HC.
All high officials of police summoned in court.
Some people were identified. Others were asked to be disclosed.
Summary manner trial held, 6 months’ imprisonment on all the 20 policemen.
Appealed before SC, charges were not framed, right of being heard not given, etc.
SC said in contempt proceedings, court is bound by NJ. However, to provide speedy
justice and revive the repute of the court, immediate decision needs to be taken.
SC dismissed the appeal. No merit in the contentions.
S. 228 of IPC was attracted and criminal proceedings were going on simultaneously.
Contempt or professional misconduct proceedings can go on simultaneously with
criminal proceedings.
Praveen C. Shah v. K.A. Mohammad Ali 2001 (8) SCC 650- purging
Question was- Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be
allowed to practise?
Ernakulam District Court- resp. advocate guilty of criminal contempt.
Fine was imposed.
Purging process has not been provided but in all contempt cases, two things have to
be done:
Guilt of the contemner proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Fine has to be imposed.
How can one purge himself?
If civil contempt, comply with the further directions of the court, tender an apology to
the court. After that he can start practicing.
Without purging, he can’t continue practice.
Court held that an advocate found guilty of contempt cannot be allowed to act or
plead in any court till he purges himself of contempt. This direction was issued having
regard to Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section
34(1) of the Advocates Act and also referring to the observations in para 80 of the
judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC
409. It was explained that debarring a person from appearing in court was within the
purview of the jurisdiction of the Court and was different from suspending or
terminating the licence which could be done by the Bar Council and on failure of the
Bar Council, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the
contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that
is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise
as an advocate.
In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an
Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court
Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because
that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes
the power to revoke or suspend it.
The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or
revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or tribunals.
Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 33535 also refers to R.K. Anand v.
Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 to the effect “even if there was no rule framed
under Section 34 of the Advocates Act disallowing an advocate who is convicted of
criminal contempt, is not only a measure to maintain dignity and orderly function of
courts, it may become necessary for the protection of the court and for preservation of
the purity of court proceedings.
Thus, the court not only has a right but also an obligation to protect itself and save the
purity of its proceedings from being polluted, by barring the advocate concerned from
appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.
This Court noticed the observations about the decline of ethical and professional
standards of the Bar, and the need to arrest such trend in the interests of
administration of justice.
It was observed that in the absence of unqualified trust and confidence of people in
the Bar, the judicial system could not work satisfactorily.
Merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is not sufficient to complete
the process of purging himself of the criminal contempt.
Purging oneself of contempt can be only by regretting or apologising in the case of a
completed action of criminal contempt.
Unless a person purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the Court conviction
results in debarring an advocate from appearing in court even in absence of
suspension or termination of the licence to practice.
A mere statement made by a contemnor before court that he apologises is hardly
enough to amount to purging himself of the contempt. The court must be satisfied of
the genuineness of the apology.