INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE GROUNDING OF

MV PASHA BULKER AND NEAR GROUNDING OF MV

SEA CONFIDENCE AND MV BETIS OFF NEWCASTLE
ON 8 JUNE 2007

Pasha Bulker aground on Nobbys Beach on 1 July 2007. Photograph © NSW Maritime 2007

5 DECEMBER 2007

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 CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................4

2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS........................................9

3. TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ON 8 JUNE 2007 ..........................12

4. JURISDICTION ...........................................................................................13

5. DETAILS OF VESSELS INVOLVED...........................................................16

6. GENERAL NARRATIVE .............................................................................17

6.1 Overview of the Weather and the Anchorage .......................................17
6.2 Pasha Bulker ........................................................................................20
6.3 Sea Confidence ....................................................................................23
6.4 Betis .....................................................................................................25
6.5 Tugs Watagan and Wickham................................................................26

7. DISCUSSION POINTS ................................................................................27

7.1 Weather ................................................................................................27
7.2 Weather Warnings and Coastal Radio Network ...................................29
7.4 The NPC Port Safety Operating Licence (PSOL) .................................31
7.5 Responsibility of the Master of a Ship ..................................................32
7.6 Newcastle Anchorage...........................................................................33
7.7 Ballasting Issues...................................................................................33
7.8 Port Waratah Coal Services (PWCS) ...................................................34
7.9 Anchoring in Gale Conditions ...............................................................36
7.10 Svitzer Australasia ................................................................................38

8. FINDINGS....................................................................................................39
8.1 General Remarks ................................................................................39
8.2 Term of Reference 1.............................................................................39
8.3 Term of Reference 2.............................................................................42
8.4 Term of Reference 3.............................................................................43
8.5 Term of Reference 4.............................................................................44
8.6 Term of Reference 5.............................................................................45
8.7 Term of Reference 6.............................................................................47
8.8 Term of Reference 7............................................................................47

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 8.9 Term of Reference 8.............................................................................48
8.10 Term of Reference 9.............................................................................49
8.11 Cumulative List of Recommendations ..................................................52

9. APPENDICES .............................................................................................53
9.1 Terms of Reference ..............................................................................53
9.2 Chart of Ship Tracks.............................................................................54
9.3 Weather ................................................................................................55
9.4 Primary Sources of Information ............................................................59

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 On Friday 8 June 2007 a strong gale passed through the Newcastle
region, producing winds from the south-east of up to nearly 50 knots
(93km/h) and waves of about 7 metres. The gale created dangerous and
untenable conditions in the anchorage off Newcastle, particularly for lightly
ballasted large bulk ships with limited manoeuvrability.

1.2 On 7 June 2007, there were 56 ships at anchor waiting to enter the Port of
Newcastle. In response to the forecast south-easterly gale two ships
departed the anchorage late on 7 June. From about 0200 on 8 June,
ships began to put to sea and at 0400 there were 41 ships remaining at
anchor. The Officer on Duty at the Vessel Traffic Information Centre
(VTIC) at the Port of Newcastle estimates that by 0600 about 39 ships had
departed and 17 remained.

1.3 By 0700 only nine ships (including the Pasha Bulker) remained in the
anchorage. All vessels, except the Pasha Bulker, eventually put to sea
during Friday 8 June. At least three ships experienced difficulties in
manoeuvring or dragging anchors during the morning.

1.4 One ship, the Pasha Bulker, was driven ashore by the weather and
grounded on Nobbys Beach. Another, the Sea Confidence, had difficulty
manoeuvring and closed the coast to 0.7nM (1.3km) off Stockton Beach
and nearly ran aground. A third ship, the Betis, was unable to weigh
anchor and dragged towards the coast.

1.5 The grounding of the Pasha Bulker created a very public spectacle with
much interest. Fortunately there was no loss of life and no lasting damage
to the environment. All costs associated with the ship’s salvage, its
repairs and the contingency preparations which were put in place in the
event of an oil spill are the subject of a claim on the ship’s insurers.

Pasha Bulker

1.6 The Pasha Bulker had been in the Newcastle anchorage since 23 May
and anchored about 2.5nM (4.6km) off the coast. This was towards the
inner edge of the anchorage, closest to the coast and potentially
dangerous in the forecast conditions. The Master was receiving weather
reports by Inmarsat and VHF radio while at anchor.

1.7 These weather reports included at least 16 separate warnings for the
Hunter Coast on 7 June and prior to the Pasha Bulker weighing anchor on
8 June. In addition the crew of the Pasha Bulker would have observed
and heard on VHF radio 47 vessels leave the Newcastle anchorage
between 2200 on 7 June and 0700 on 8 June.

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1.8 The Master did not ballast the Pasha Bulker for heavy weather but did
veer an extra two shackles of cable in preparation for the gale.

1.9 The ship was dragging its anchor at 0650 on 8 June, in a north-westerly
direction and closing the coast. The Master decided to put to sea and
commenced weighing anchor at 0710. While weighing anchor the Pasha
Bulker closed to within 1.2nM (2.2km) of the shore. The ship attempted to
depart the anchorage on a heading of 110˚ but had difficulty making way,
with the ship pitching violently. This caused the engine to over-speed as
the propeller broke the sea surface. The Pasha Bulker was making good a
track to the north-east at about 1 to 1.5 knots (1.9 to 2.8 km/h) and very
slowly opening from the coast.

1.10 After 0815, the Master ordered an increase in engine revolutions to

Emergency Full Ahead and altered course to between 140 and 160 to
counter the northerly drift. In doing so the wind and waves were placed on
the port bow and the ship had insufficient steerage to prevent the bow
from swinging to the south-west and closing the coast. The Master was
unable to regain control and the weather conditions prevented the crew
attempting to anchor. The Pasha Bulker grounded on Nobbys Beach at
about 0950.

Sea Confidence

1.11 The Sea Confidence arrived at the anchorage on 27 May and on 7 June
was anchored about 2nM (3.7km) off the coast. This anchorage was on
the inner boundary of the Newcastle anchorage and potentially dangerous
in the forecast conditions. The Master was receiving weather forecasts
and was aware of the gale warning. The ship was in a normal fair weather
ballast condition. The Master did not take on extra ballast or veer more
cable in light of the forecast.

1.12 After being informed of the deteriorating weather the Master commenced
weighing anchor at 0500 and the anchor was aweigh 30 minutes later.
While weighing anchor the ship dragged and was set to the north-north-
east.

1.13 Once underway the Sea Confidence had difficulty gaining steerage way.
Due to the ship’s pitching, the engine was over-speeding and shut down
25 times throughout the incident. At 0850 the Master commenced taking
on extra ballast into Number 3 Cargo Hold but this was not completed until
1638.

1.14 By 1205 the vessel had drifted 10nM (18.5km) from its original anchorage
but had not been able to open from the coast and was within 1nM (1.9km)
of Stockton Beach. The Master let go the port anchor with six shackles of
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 cable and later the starboard anchor with three shackles. The cables later
became twisted.

1.15 At about 1230 there was a remarkable change in the weather with the
wind dropping to around 20 knots (37 km/h) and shifting direction to the
west (offshore). The Sea Confidence was holding its position 0.7nM
(1.3km) off the beach. A tug, the Watagan, was directed to assist the ship
but was unable to successfully connect a tow.

1.16 Under its own power, the Sea Confidence very slowly opened from the
coast, manoeuvred to untwist its cables, weighed both anchors and put to
sea without further incident.

Betis

1.17 The Betis arrived at the anchorage on 7 June and anchored about 4nM
(7.4km) off the coast, with more sea room than the Pasha Bulker and Sea
Confidence. The Master was receiving weather forecasts and was aware
of the gale warning but did not take on extra ballast or veer more cable in
light of the forecast.

1.18 At about 0500 on 8 June the Master used the ship’s engine to steam onto
the anchor and reduce the strain on the cable. At 0610 the Master
commenced weighing anchor but at 0630 the windlass failed, with seven
shackles of cable remaining and the anchor unable to be weighed.

1.19 The Master continued to use the engine but the ship dragged very slowly
to the north-west and closed to about 3.1nM (5.7km) from the coast. The
Master requested assistance and a tug, the Wickham, was despatched.
By 1400, with a respite in the weather, the Master was better able to
control the situation and cancelled the request for assistance. The cable
was then cut and at 1610 the Betis put to sea, increasing its ballast load.

Investigation

1.20 The Investigation comments on a number of points relevant to the

incidents on 8 June and then discusses its findings under each of the
Terms of Reference.

1.21 The Investigation assessed that the grounding of the Pasha Bulker
resulted from a series of judgements and decisions made by the Master.
The most significant being:

• his failure to realise the potential impact of the weather forecast for the
anchorage on 7/8 June;
• an initial decision to ride out the gale at anchor; and
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 • a decision not to ballast the ship for heavy weather.

1.22 In addition, the handling of the ship while weighing anchor and when trying
to depart the anchorage contributed to the Pasha Bulker’s dire situation
and the eventual outcome.

1.23 In general the standard of seamanship and decision making displayed by

the Master of the Pasha Bulker is assessed as being poor.

1.24 The Masters of the three ships each had ultimate responsibility for the
safety of their ships and the safety of their crew. Each Master is
accountable for making similar poor decisions but the consequences for
the Master of the Pasha Bulker were the most significant.

1.25 The Investigation finds there is evidence that the Master of the Pasha
Bulker may have committed the offence of Negligent Navigation under the
Water Traffic Regulations – NSW.

1.26 On examining the evidence and the elements of the offence that must be
proved to the criminal standard, that is; “beyond reasonable doubt”, the
likelihood of a successful prosecution is low.

1.27 Following this conclusion and in applying the Prosecution Guidelines of

the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales,
NSW Maritime will not proceed to a prosecution.

1.28 The Investigation made the following recommendations:

i) No prosecution action is taken against the Master of the Pasha

Bulker.
ii) NSW Maritime forwards this report to the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority with a recommendation that the report and concerns over
the Master’s performance be forwarded to the Flag State Authority
which issued the Master’s certificate, seeking that his qualification be
reviewed.
iii) Svitzer Australasia (the Port of Newcastle towage contractor) reviews
its risk assessment procedures for conducting emergency towing
operations in adverse weather conditions.
iv) Newcastle Port Corporation introduces a procedure where all
communications recording equipment is checked as serviceable at
the commencement of each shift.
v) NSW Maritime reviews the requirements of Clause 12 of the Port
Safety Operating Licences to ensure that performance standards and
other matters are adequately defined.

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vi) NSW Maritime investigates the need to develop and promulgate
standard operating procedures for taking vessels in tow in adverse
weather conditions.
vii) The Marine Safety Act 1998 be amended to provide for a higher level
of penalties for offences involving seagoing ships.
viii) NSW Maritime, in conjunction with the three NSW Port Corporations,
reviews the port limits and the requirements of the Port Safety
Operating Licences with regard to the management of anchorages off
NSW ports and provides recommendations to the Minister for Ports
and Waterways.

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2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Aweigh When an anchor becomes broken out of the ground

and the ship is underway, the anchor is said to be
aweigh.

Anchorage An area where ships anchor.

Backs When the wind changes direction in an anti-clockwise

fashion.

Cable The term given to the anchor chain.

Catenary When a towing hawser sags under its own weight

instead of pulling taut, the resulting sag or curvature
of the hawser is known as a catenary.

Drag A ship is said to drag if the anchor will not hold it in

position.

Heaving Line A light line that can be thrown (heaved) to another

vessel for the purpose of being connected to another
heavier line such as a messenger which can then be
hauled across, usually by hand.

IMO International Maritime Organisation – specialised

United Nations agency established to set minimum
safety and environmental standards of safety for
ships.

Inmarsat C EGC The satellite communications system which allows

ships to receive fax and email, including weather
faxes. The EGC denotes that the ship is part of a
group calling facility where weather faxes are
automatically received by the ship from the nearest
weather broadcasting facility.

km and km/h Kilometres and kilometres per hour.

Knot A unit of measurement of speed equating to one

nautical mile per hour and equal to 1.85 kilometres
per hour.

Lee Shore When a wind is blowing from a direction such that the
ship would be blown toward the shore.

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Leeway The amount of drift of a vessel to leeward of the
course steered, due to the action of the wind.

Messenger A line of intermediate strength between a heaving line

and a stronger line (such as a towing hawser). A
messenger has the strength to withstand mechanical
loading (winching).

Nautical Mile (nM) Unit of distance at sea equating to 1.852 km.

Newcastle Port A NSW State Owned Corporation established to

Corporation (NPC) manage the operations of the Port of Newcastle.

NSW Maritime The Maritime Authority of NSW – the marine

regulatory authority for NSW State waters.

Pitch Angular motion of a ship in a fore and aft direction

(i.e. the bow and stern pitches up and down).

PSOL Port Safety Operating Licence – issued to NSW Port

Corporations pursuant to the Ports and Maritime
Administration Act 1995. It sets out performance
standards for a range of safety functions, which the
Port Corporation must comply with.

Roll Angular motion of a ship in a sideways direction (i.e. it

rolls from side to side).

RPM Revolutions per minute of machinery.

RVCP Royal Volunteer Coastal Patrol.

Sailing Directions Admiralty Sailing Directions – Australia Pilot Volume

III, 10th Edition 2005.

Shackle Unit of measurement for anchor cable (1 Shackle is

equal to 15 fathoms or 27.5 metres).

State Marine Pollution A position under the NSW State Waters

Controller Marine Oil and Chemical Spill Contingency Plan and
appointed by the Minister for Ports and Waterways.
The Chief Executive of NSW Maritime currently
occupies this position.

State Waters For the purposes of this investigation, State Waters

can be considered to be the territorial sea of Australia
that is within 3 nautical miles (5.6 kilometres) of the
coast of NSW.
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Sydney Ports A NSW State Owned Corporation established to
Corporation (SPC) manage the operations of the Ports of Sydney and
Botany.

Towing Hawser A heavy rope used for towing purposes.

VDR Voyage Data Recorder. A computer fitted to ships to

record data such as course, speed, engine and
rudder movements.

Veer (cable) To let out more anchor cable (which is technically but
not exclusively under the control of a windlass).

Veer (wind) When the wind changes direction in a clockwise

fashion. See also Backs.

VHF Very High Frequency marine radio used for line-of

sight communications. Commonly used by Coastal
Stations and ships for clear ship to ship and ship to
shore communications. Channel 16 is the
international distress and calling channel. Each port
in NSW uses a specified channel for port operations
so as to leave Channel 16 clear for emergencies.
NPC uses Channel 9 for port operations.

VTIC Vessel Traffic Information Centre – provides vessel

traffic management services for Newcastle Port
Corporation, including VHF radio communications.

Weigh anchor To lift the anchor clear of the seabed.

Windlass The anchor winch.

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 3. TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ON 8 JUNE 2007
0200 Ships start to depart the anchorage (2 sailed 7 June)

0400 Sea Confidence (SC) Master roused due to weather

Estimated 40 ships at anchor – 16 departed anchorage
Wind speed 34-40 kts from 0448
south-south–east 0500 SC commenced weighing anchor, Betis uses engine to
control movement of the ship while at anchor

0530 SC weighs anchor

0600 Estimated 17 ships at anchor – 39 departed anchorage

0610 Betis commences weighing anchor

0630 – 0635 Betis windlass fails & commences dragging anchor

0700 9 ships at anchor – 47 departed anchorage

Wind 41-47 kts from south-east 0710 Pasha Bulker (PB) commenced weighing anchor.

0748 PB anchor aweigh

0850 SC commences ballasting #3 hold

0950 PB grounds

1058 PB crew report fuel escaping bunker breather pipe

1150 PB crew evacuation by helicopter commenced

1200 NPC advise Betis its anchor dragging

1205 SC lets go port anchor & Betis requests assistance.

Wind begins to decrease to 1230

20 kts and veers to the west. 1240 SC lets go STBD anchor & holding 7 cables offshore

1330 PB crew evacuation by helicopter completed

1400 Betis cancels assistance request when weather abates

1500 Tug Watagan attends SC

1610 Betis cuts anchor free and proceeds to sea

1640 Watagan returns to port

Wind strength increases 1700

1954 SC starboard anchor aweigh

2006 SC port anchor aweigh and proceeds to sea

Wind gusting to 48 kts from 2100

south-east

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4. JURISDICTION

4.1 NSW Maritime is the regulatory authority for maritime safety in New South
Wales (NSW). Pursuant to section 41 of the Ports and Maritime
Administration Act 1995, the principal functions of NSW Maritime as they
pertain to this investigation are:

(a) to exercise such maritime or other functions of the Minister under the
marine legislation and other legislation as are delegated to it by the
Minister; and
(b) to provide advice to the Minister in relation to maritime and ports
matters.

4.2 This Investigation was conducted specifically under section 103 of the
Marine Safety Act 1998 (the Act) and generally under the marine
legislation as defined in section 4 of the Act.

4.3 Section 94(1) of the Act defines a marine accident.

4.4 “marine accident means any of the following events involving a vessel
operating in navigable waters:

(a) the loss of life of, or injury to, any person on board the vessel,
(b) the loss of a person from the vessel,
(c) the loss of life or injury to a person that is caused by the vessel,
(d) the loss, or presumed loss, of the vessel (including the sinking or
abandonment of the vessel),
(e) the capsizing, grounding or flooding of the vessel,
(f) the collision of the vessel with another vessel or with any object,
(g) the vessel being disabled at sea (in any case in which it requires
assistance),
(h) any fire on board the vessel,
(i) any damage being caused to the vessel (including any structural
failure),
(j) any damage to the environment caused by the vessel or by any
substance on, or discharged from, the vessel,
(k) any incident that causes danger of any of the above,
but does not include anything excluded from this definition by the
regulations.”

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4.5 The Investigation was conducted by NSW Maritime under the Terms of
Reference reproduced at Appendix 9.1.

4.6 The Port of Newcastle’s port boundaries are defined under Schedule 1 of
the Ports and Maritime Administration Regulation 2007 as follows;

4.7 “The waters of Newcastle Harbour and of all bays, rivers and their
tributaries connected or leading to Newcastle Harbour (but excluding
Fullerton Cove) bounded by mean high water mark and by, as upstream
boundary, the eastern side of the Hexham Bridge together with that part of
the South Pacific Ocean below mean high water mark enclosed by the arc
of a circle of radius 3 sea miles having as its centre the navigation light at
Nobbys Head.” (Refer to Figure 1 on next page).

4.8 The Pasha Bulker was anchored within NSW state waters, but not within
port limits, at the time it first experienced difficulties. Subsequently, the
grounding of the Pasha Bulker occurred within NSW state waters and
within the limits of the Port of Newcastle and is considered a marine
accident pursuant to section 94(1)(e) of the Act.

4.9 The Sea Confidence was anchored within NSW state waters, but not
within port limits, at the time it first experienced difficulties. Subsequently,
the ship came to anchor within the limits of the Port of Newcastle where it
was attended by the tug Watagan. The Sea Confidence was involved in a
marine accident pursuant to section 94(1) (k) of the Act.

4.10 The Betis was initially anchored 4nM (7.4km) from the nearest point of
land and dragged anchor to a position 3.15nM (5.8km) from the nearest
point of land. Some sources suggest that the Betis dragged to a position
2.8nM (5.2km) from land, but these are considered less reliable. Since the
Betis was outside state waters, it does not come under the jurisdiction of
the Act. Notwithstanding this, the Betis was included in this Investigation in
the interest of preventing future incidents.

4.11 Both tugs involved on 8 June were operating in NSW state waters and
with the exception of the Wickham’s transit to assist the Betis, within the
port limits of Newcastle.

4.12 Newcastle Port Corporation (NPC) is a NSW State Owned Corporation

established by the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 and
operates under the provisions of that Act and the State Owned
Corporations Act 1989. NPC operates under a Port Safety Operating
Licence issued pursuant to section 12(2) of the Ports and Maritime
Administration Act 1995.

14
Figure 1 – Port of Newcastle Anchorage and Port Limit (AUS 809)

15
 5. DETAILS OF VESSELS INVOLVED

Length
Over
Summer All Summer
Name Operator Owner Year Flag Vessel Type DWT (LOA) Draft

Lauritzen Fukujin Kisen

Pasha Bulker 2006 Panama Bulk Carrier 76,781 T 225m 14.22m
Bulkers Co.

NYK Global
Sea Greenfield
Bulk 2005 Panama Bulk Carrier 52,677 T 188.5m 12.163m
Confidence Shipholding Co
Corporation

Anglo Eastern
Ship White Lauan
Betis 2004 Hong Kong Bulk Carrier 76,801 T 225m 14.22m
Management Shipping
Ltd

Svitzer Svitzer
Watagan 1985 Australia Tug - 32.1m -
Australasia Australasia

Svitzer Svitzer
Wickham 1990 Australia Tug - 36m -
Australasia Australasia

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6. GENERAL NARRATIVE
6.1 Overview of the Weather and the Anchorage

6.1.1 Over the period Thursday 7 and Friday 8 June 2007 a strong gale passed
through the Newcastle region, producing winds from the south-east of up
to nearly 50 knots (93 km/h) and waves of about 7 metres. The gale
created dangerous and untenable conditions in the anchorage off
Newcastle, particularly for lightly ballasted large bulk ships with limited
manoeuvrability.

6.1.2 Throughout the afternoon of 7 June conditions within the Newcastle

anchorage were light to moderate with 5 - 18 knot (9 to 33 km/h) winds
from the east to south-east and a wave height of just over 2 metres. A
gale warning was in place, forecasting south to south-east winds of 30 –
40 knots (55 – 74 km/h) with seas of 3 - 4 metres and a swell of 3.5
metres producing a total wave height of up to 7.5 metres.

6.1.3 The forecast weather produced dangerous conditions in the Newcastle

anchorage. The weather forecasts included a caveat that wind gusts may
be a further 40 percent stronger than the averages forecast, and
maximum waves may be up to twice the forecast height.

6.1.4 The forecast direction of the gale, from the south-east, would create a lee
shore and any ship that was disabled or unable to manoeuvre could be
forced onto the shore. The Sailing Directions (a navigation reference
publication) for this area of the coast (see appendix 9.3) provide cautions
about the extreme weather condition which pass through the area plus the
need to remain alert and be prepared to put to sea. Furthermore the
Sailing Directions state:

“During S (southerly) weather, sea and swell conditions can become

confused, if so, it is recommended that vessels weigh anchor and proceed
to sea until the weather moderates.”

6.1.5 The forecast conditions would be particularly challenging for a bulk carrier,
with a low power to displacement ratio and generally poor
manoeuvrability. This challenge would be increased in a light ballast
condition with considerable windage and sail area produced by large
areas of the hull above the waterline. Additionally, with the ship pitching in
a light ballast condition, there exists an increased likelihood of portions of
the propeller and rudder being exposed above the surface of the sea and
losing efficiency.

6.1.6 Early in the evening of 7 June, at about 1900, the weather began to
deteriorate with the wind strength increasing and the seas rising. By 0400
on 8 June the wind strength was 35 – 49 knots (65 – 91 km/h), classified
as a strong gale (Beaufort Force 9) and the wave height was approaching
17
 5 metres. The wind direction was from the south-east. The wind
continued from this direction and remained at this strength until about
1230 on 8 June. The strongest gust of 49 knots (91 km/h) was recorded
at about 0700 on 8 June and the wave height (combined sea and swell)
continued to rise reaching about 7 metres at about midday on 8 June.

6.1.7 At about 1230 on 8 June there was a remarkable change in the weather,
with the wind speed dropping dramatically to about 20 knots (37 km/h) and
shifting direction (veering) to come from the west, blowing offshore and
reducing the danger created by a lee shore. The wave height remained
around 6 metres from the south-east. This provided a period of respite
until about 2100 when the wind shifted direction (backing) to the south-
east and increased with gusts up to 48 knots (89 km/h).

6.1.8 On 7 June 2007, there were 56 ships at anchor waiting to enter the Port of
Newcastle (see Figure 2 for anchorage positions). Two ships put to sea
late on 7 June. From about 0200 on 8 June, when the wind started to gust
over 30 knots (56 km/h), many of these ships began to put to sea in
response to the forecast south-easterly gale and the weather being
experienced. At 0400 there were still 41 ships at anchor and the VTIC
Officer on Duty at the time estimates that by 0600 about 39 ships had
departed leaving 17 ships at anchor.

6.1.9 By 0700 only nine ships (including the Pasha Bulker) remained in the
anchorage. All vessels, except the Pasha Bulker, eventually put to sea
during Friday 8 June. At least three ships experienced difficulties in
manoeuvring or dragging anchors during the morning.

6.1.10 Of particular note were the Pasha Bulker, which grounded on Nobbys
Beach, the Sea Confidence which closed to within 0.7nM (1.3km) of the
shore at Stockton Beach and the Betis which was unable to weigh its
anchor. The approximate tracks taken by these ships are at appendix 9.2.

6.1.11 There was no evidence from any person involved in the events of 8 June
that the English language proficiency of the ships’ officers (Chinese,
Filipino and Korean) was an issue or in any way a contributory factor.

18
Figure 2 – Ships in the Newcastle Anchorage on 7 June 2007 (provided by
NPC VTIC) 1

1
Note that some vessels were anchored further south and are not represented on this chart.
19
6.2 Pasha Bulker

6.2.1 The Pasha Bulker arrived at the Newcastle anchorage on 23 May 2007.
The ship anchored in 33 metres of water at position 33° 00’S and 151°
46’E in accordance with the standard advice provided by the Newcastle
Vessel Traffic Information Centre (VTIC). The vessel was anchored about
2.5nM (4.6km) off the coast, in NSW state waters but outside the port
limits.

6.2.2 The ship was receiving regular weather forecasts via Inmarsat C ECG
faxes and VHF radio. As early as 3 June, the Master noted that there was
a gale forecast. On 7 June, the Master read the weather forecast and
assessed that the centre of the gale was “very far….never affecting our
ship.” 2 Nevertheless, the Master ordered that two additional shackles of
cable be veered (to a total of 11 shackles on deck) in preparation for the
gale. The Master considered that, as a new vessel, the anchor holding
power of the Pasha Bulker was excellent 3 .

6.2.3 The ship has a specific heavy weather ballast condition for rough weather
but the Master did not adopt that ballast condition in response to the gale
forecast and the possibility of having to put to sea. The ship remained
ballasted for normal conditions in a light ballast condition with the propeller
fully underwater at 50% immersion 4 .

6.2.4 The first indication that the Pasha Bulker was dragging its anchor was at
0650, moving in a north-westerly direction. At this time, the ship was
2.3nM (4.3km) from land. At 0710, the ship commenced weighing anchor.
The anchor was aweigh at 0748, by which time the ship had closed to
1.2nM (2.2km) of the shore and was in a precarious position very close to
a lee shore. With the engine full ahead, the Master attempted to steer a
course of 110° and open from the coast.

6.2.5 The Pasha Bulker was not able to achieve the required revolutions for Full
Ahead as the ship’s motion, in combination with the relatively shallow draft
of the ship, was causing the propeller to break out of the water and the
engine to over-speed. Although the course steered was 110°, the course
made good was roughly north-easterly (about 045°). The vessel was
making good a speed of 1 to 1.5 knots (1.9 to 2.8 km/h). The Master was
satisfied that, although the situation was not ideal, the ship was safe and
he proceeded to breakfast.

6.2.6 The exact time that the Master returned to the bridge and the length of his
absence are unclear. In the Master’s evidence he states that he took
2
Extracted from Masters’ Statement.
3
Ibid.
4
A propeller is fully underwater at 50% immersion. At 50% immersion, the propeller is submerged
by one propeller radius with the upper propeller blades being just submerged. 100% immersion is
when the propeller is submerged by two radii.
20
 breakfast with the Chief Engineer for about 10 to 15 minutes from 0800.
Other reports indicate this may have been later, possibly between 0830
and 0845. The Master had been on the bridge all of the night using a
camp bed at the rear of the bridge to sleep when he could.

6.2.7 After returning from breakfast the Master noted that the course made good
was now to the north. The Master contacted the Chief Engineer and
ordered critical RPM. 5 Again the ship was unable to achieve the required
revolutions due to the engine over-speeding when the propeller broke the
surface of the water with the ship’s pitching. To try to maximise the
revolutions and prevent a shut down due to engine over-speed, the Chief
Engineer was manually retarding the revolutions every time the propeller
broke the surface.

6.2.8 From this point onwards, the deck officers have different versions of the
exact timing of events and of the courses that were steered. NSW
Maritime has been unable to access the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR 6 )
records to corroborate the versions provided by the officers. What has
been established is that the Pasha Bulker altered course to between 140°
and 160° in an effort to negate some of the northerly drift.

6.2.9 In doing so the bow passed through the direction from which the wind was
coming and on this new course, the wind and the sea were forcing on the
port bow turning the ship to starboard and onto a heading of about 240°.
On this course, the Pasha Bulker was heading towards the coast. At this
point the ship was in an extremely perilous position and in the prevailing
circumstances was unlikely to avoid running ashore and grounding.

6.2.10 The helm of the Pasha Bulker was put hard over to port but the ship had
very little steerage way or control. After a period of about 5 minutes the
ship responded to the helm and managed to alter course to 180°. By this
stage the ship was within 0.6nM (1.1km) of the shore and being set to the
north-west towards the shore. Video footage (courtesy of Channel 7
News) shows the Pasha Bulker lying almost parallel to the coast,
apparently unable to be steered or controlled and being set onto the
shore.

6.2.11 During this period, the Master considered whether to attempt to anchor the
ship. However, the crew made no attempt to anchor as they were unable
to proceed forward due to the dangers posed by the excessive rolling of
the ship, combined with the gale force wind and waves breaking over the

5
The Master used the term Critical RPM rather than the more customary Emergency Full Ahead.
6
NSW Maritime does not have the equipment to decipher the VDR data. The Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has the necessary equipment but would not release their
interpreted data. NSW Maritime tested its analysis with the ATSB within the extent permitted by
the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 to verify the broad conclusions reached by this
investigation.
21
 ship. It was claimed that at times the Pasha Bulker rolled to angles up to
43°; an extreme roll for a ship of this size.

6.2.12 There is evidence which indicates that in the final stages prior to
grounding, when the ship was experiencing difficulty in turning to port and
into the wind, the Master attempted to turn the vessel to starboard and
went astern on the main engine. The ultimate effect was to bring the
weather broad onto the Pasha Bulker’s port beam and allow the ship to be
set downwind onto Nobbys Beach with the ship on a south-westerly
heading.

6.2.13 From the time the Pasha Bulker was swung towards the coast by the wind
and the sea, the actions of the crew had little effect. Nor was it possible
for any external assistance, such as tugs, to intervene in the prevailing
conditions and save the ship from grounding.

6.2.14 The Pasha Bulker grounded on Nobbys Beach at about 0950.

6.2.15 At 1150, the officers and crew commenced being transferred ashore by
helicopter, this being completed at 1330. The evacuation of the officers
and crew was at the direction of the NSW Police Incident Commander and
it is unclear if it was with the approval of the Master or Owners of the
Pasha Bulker. Clearly safety of life was of paramount importance at this
point.

6.2.16 Between 0720 and 0930 there were at least five separate radio
communications between the Pasha Bulker and the VTIC. In each of
these communications the VTIC expressed concern that the ship
appeared to be dragging its anchor or drifting into the restricted zone,
within 2nM (3.7km) of the coast. The ship was asked if it needed
assistance. The Pasha Bulker indicated it was weighing anchor and
proceeding to sea and did not require any assistance.

6.2.17 At some stage during the half hour period immediately prior to the
grounding, the Pasha Bulker informed the VTIC on VHF Channel 9 that
assistance was required. In reality there was nothing that could be done
to assist the ship at this stage as tugs could not put to sea in the prevailing
conditions.

6.2.18 Following the grounding, at about 1058, the crew of the Pasha Bulker
reported that fuel was escaping from a bunker tank breather pipe on deck.
This is likely to have occurred as the ship’s outer hull was striking and
bouncing on the sea bottom after grounding and fuel was forced out from
the double bottom fuel oil tanks. Any fuel vapour or spray that escaped
from the ship would have been quickly dispersed in the prevailing weather
conditions. There was no evidence of oil pollution.

22
6.3 Sea Confidence

6.3.1 The Sea Confidence arrived at the Newcastle anchorage during the
morning of 27 May 2007, initially anchoring in about 50 metres of water.
On 5 June, the Sea Confidence put to sea to conduct some sea trials and
subsequently re-anchored in about 34 metres of water in position 33°
02’S, 151° 46’E, with six shackles of cable in the water. This anchorage
was about 2nM (3.7km) off the coast and within NSW state waters but
outside of the port limits.

6.3.2 The Sea Confidence had received weather forecasts from the Bureau of
Meteorology via Inmarsat and coastal weather forecasts on VHF radio.

6.3.3 The Sea Confidence was in normal, fair weather ballast condition, carrying
about 15,760 tonnes of water ballast. The propeller was completely
underwater (over 50% immersion) 7 and the rudder was about half under-
water in this condition.

6.3.4 At 0400 on 8 June 2007 the Master was informed by the Officer of the
Watch that the weather was deteriorating. The Master directed that the
engine be started and subsequently at 0500 rang down “stand-by” engine
and commenced weighing anchor. The anchor was aweigh at 0530.

6.3.5 While weighing anchor, the Sea Confidence began to drag and drifted
before the wind and sea to the north-north-east. When the anchor was
weighed, the Sea Confidence was unable to develop enough water flow
over the rudder to gain steerage way and to turn into the wind. The
propeller was frequently breaking free of the sea, causing the engine to
over-speed. The engine shut down 25 times throughout the incident due to
over-speed alarms.

6.3.6 At 0850, in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of the rudder and

propeller, the Master commenced filling the Number 3 Cargo Hold with
ballast water. Ballasting Number 3 Hold took until 1638 to complete and
added another 13,960 tonnes to the Sea Confidence’s displacement.

6.3.7 By 1205, the vessel had drifted about 10nM (18.5km) from the original
anchorage and was within 1nM (1.9km) of Stockton Beach. The Sea
Confidence was in a precarious position and in imminent danger of
grounding. The Master let go the port anchor using six shackles of cable.
This slowed the vessel but did not halt the drift and so the starboard
anchor was let go using three shackles of cable.

7
A propeller is fully underwater at 50% immersion. At 50% immersion, the propeller is submerged
by one propeller radius with the upper propeller blades being just submerged. 100% immersion is
when the propeller is submerged by two radii.
23
6.3.8 The two anchor cables subsequently became twisted around each other
due to the movement of the ship. Although the cables were twisted, the
use of the two anchors combined with the ever increasing efficiency of the
propeller as the ship took on more ballast were enough to hold the Sea
Confidence in position 0.7nM (1.3km) from the shoreline with 17m of water
under the keel.

6.3.9 At 1413, the State Marine Pollution Controller directed the Sea Confidence
to accept the assistance of a tug and at 1435 the tug Watagan departed
her berth. The Master had contacted the Sea Confidence’s management
at 1428 and had been granted permission to request the use of a tug if he
deemed it necessary. The Master states that he did not think that a tug
was necessary as the Sea Confidence was holding position and the wind
had abated and veered to the west.

6.3.10 The Watagan made radio contact with the Sea Confidence at 1452 and
arrived on scene at 1515. Video footage confirms the tug Master’s
recollection that the Sea Confidence was steaming ahead onto its anchors
at this time.

6.3.11 Throughout the operation, the tug experienced engineering difficulties that
caused the port engine to remain stuck at high revolutions whenever such
revolutions were applied. This problem was not resolved while the tug was
at sea that day.

6.3.12 Initially the tug tried to approach from ahead of the Sea Confidence but
twice the tug was picked up by the swell and pushed into a dangerous
position under the bow of Sea Confidence. Subsequent attempts were
made to pass a towline from the port side of the Sea Confidence. Although
heaving lines and messengers were passed on two occasions, both times
the lines parted 8 due to a combination of sea conditions and the tug
surging ahead when the port engine remained stuck at high revolutions.

6.3.13 The crews of the Sea Confidence and the tug also appear to have had
conflicting ideas about how the towline was to be passed. The Sea
Confidence wanted to pass the lines in the following order:

(i) heaving line;

(ii) light messenger;
(iii) heavy messenger/mooring line (to be provided by the Sea
Confidence); and
(iv) towing hawser.

8
The towing hawser was never actually connected and it is not apparent whether the lines
snapped or were dropped. Regardless, the net result was that the tow parted.
24
6.3.14 The tug crew were unaware of this and connected the light messenger
directly to the towing hawser, which was then streamed overboard. The
crew onboard the Sea Confidence were unable to heave in the towing
hawser as the light messenger broke under too much strain.

6.3.15 In addition, as the Master of the Watagan had not told the Master of the
Sea Confidence that the tug had engine difficulties, the Master of the Sea
Confidence did not allow for the tug surging ahead.

6.3.16 It is evident that the communications between the two vessels was not
good. Neither relayed their intent for the towing operation to the other and
the Master of the Sea Confidence was not informed of the mechanical
problems aboard the tug.

6.3.17 During the operation, two crewmen onboard the Watagan were injured.
One suffered a crushed thumb when the wheelhouse door slammed shut
and another was knocked down and washed across the aft deck and
struck his head, causing a mild concussion. At 1640, due to the injuries to
the crewmen, the ongoing engine problems and the fading light, the tug
Master made the decision to return to Newcastle harbour.

6.3.18 After the Watagan departed, the Master of the Sea Confidence took
advantage of the lull in the weather and manoeuvred his ship to remove
the twist from the anchor cables. The Sea Confidence was manoeuvred
using the engine and working both anchors until it was 1.2nM (2.2km) off
the coast. Both anchors were then weighed and the ship proceeded to
sea to ride out the gale.

6.4 Betis

6.4.1 The Betis is a sister ship to the Pasha Bulker, and was built two years
prior to the Pasha Bulker.

6.4.2 The Betis arrived at the Newcastle anchorage at 1057 on 7 June 2007
from Zhang Jia Gang in China. Newcastle VTIC advised the Betis to
anchor south of 32° 58’S, more than 2nM (3.7km) from the coast and clear
of other ships – the standard VTIC anchoring direction.

6.4.3 The ship anchored in position 33° 07.4’S 151° 44.2’E using the port
anchor with nine shackles at the waterline. The Betis was initially
anchored 4nM (7.4km) from the nearest point of land, outside of NSW
state waters and port limits.

6.4.4 The Betis did not receive any weather warnings from the VTIC on arrival,
but did receive a gale warning via Inmarsat C EGC from the Bureau of
Meteorology and the coastal weather forecasts on VHF.

25
6.4.5 At 0443 on 8 June 2007 the main engines were put on “stand-by” due to
the deteriorating weather and at 0504 the Master commenced using the
engine to minimise the uneven side-to-side movement of the ship about
the anchor. This action would have reduced the strain on the anchor cable
and windlass and the likelihood of dragging.

6.4.6 At 0610 the Betis commenced weighing anchor. At 0630 the port windlass
motor failed, probably due to the load caused by the ship’s movements in
the heavy swell and rough seas. At that stage there were seven shackles
remaining in the water. At 0635, the ship began dragging its anchor
despite the use of the engine against the wind and waves. The ship
dragged north-west to a position about 3.1nM (5.7km) from the shore.

6.4.7 At 0700, the Betis reported to the VTIC that the port windlass was
unserviceable and could not be fixed by the crew and that the ship was
dragging its anchor.

6.4.8 At 1200 the VTIC observed that the ship was dragging towards the shore
and advised the Master on VHF radio. At 1230 the Betis requested
assistance from the Port of Newcastle as use of the engine and anchor
together could not completely prevent the ship from dragging towards the
shore.

6.4.9 The VTIC advised the Master to contact the tug Wickham on VHF
Channel 9. By 1400, the wind force dropped to less than 20 knots (37
km/h) and the Master was able to better manage the manoeuvring of the
ship. The request for assistance was then cancelled.

6.4.10 The Master noted that the weather was forecast to deteriorate again later
in the day and so, after consultation with the ship’s management, decided
to cut free the port anchor. This was done by 1610.

6.4.11 The Betis proceeded to sea and commenced increasing its ballast load.
The ship never reached a position of imminent danger.

6.5 Tugs Watagan and Wickham

6.5.1 The actions of the tug Watagan have been discussed in Section 6.3 in
relation to its attempt to assist the Sea Confidence.

6.5.2 At 0900, after being advised by the Harbour Master that several ships
were in difficulty, Svitzer Australasia management directed that the
Wickham be prepared for sea. The tug was subsequently mobilised, but
was directed by the Harbour Master to stand by in the harbour due to the
sea conditions outside the harbour.

26
6.5.3 During the afternoon on 8 June after the dramatic reduction in wind speed
and change in direction, the Harbour Master advised Svitzer Australasia
that the Betis had requested assistance, and the Wickham proceeded to
sea. Enroute the tug was advised that the Betis had cancelled the request
for assistance and was no longer considered to be in danger. The
Wickham returned to the north to await further instruction.

6.5.4 Neither the Wickham nor the Watagan are well suited to the emergency
rescue task in the conditions which prevailed. Both tugs are optimised for
harbour towage operations. Of the two, the Wickham was the best suited
for the emergency role and was committed to the Betis, the first ship to
ask for assistance. On receiving the request from the Sea Confidence, at
about 1430 on 8 June, Svitzer Australasia management assessed the
situation and decided the quickest and most appropriate response was to
dispatch the Watagan.

6.5.5 Later, due to fading light, poor weather and the injuries sustained to
crewmen on the tug Watagan, Svitzer Australasia made the decision to
suspend any further tug operations until the following morning, when it
was anticipated that there would be a requirement to render assistance to
the Pasha Bulker.

7. DISCUSSION POINTS
7.1 Weather

7.1.1 There were many public reports about the waves reaching a height of
17.9m. NPC has two wave rider buoys which are situated 560m and 840m
east of the southern breakwater at the entrance to the port. As part of the
Investigation, data from NPC waverider buoys was examined. From this
data it was apparent that the height of 17.9m was incorrect and was
probably due to an operator misreading the wave period (17.9s) as the
wave height (17.9m).

7.1.2 The waverider buoy graphs are in appendix 9.3 and an examination
indicates that some spurious data was also recorded. The suppliers 9 of
the waverider buoys advised investigators that the maximum highest
significant wave accurately recorded was 6.8m and that higher readings
were erroneous, attributed to the tumbling of the recording buoy by a
breaking wave.

7.1.3 The wind speed data shows that the highest wind speeds recorded during
the morning were gusts of 48 - 49 knots (89 – 91 km/h) and that the
highest sustained wind speed was 43 knots (80 km/h). These figures

9
Cardno Lawson Treloar Pty Ltd.
27
 correspond with the high end of a strong gale, Beaufort Force 9. (see
appendix 9.3).

7.1.4 The following time-line provides a guide to the weather conditions at

significant times throughout 7/8 June 2007:

Date Time Wind speed & Direction Event

7 June 2330 Wind gusts first reach over

30 knots from south-east

8 June 0448 Wind gusts first exceed 40 Sea Confidence

knots from south-east commences weighing
anchor 0500

8 June 0700 Wind 44 knots from south-east Pasha Bulker

Gusts up to 49 knots commences weighing
anchor at 0710

8 June 0950 Wind 42 knots from south-east Pasha Bulker

grounds about 0950

8 June 1200 Wind 41 knots, gusting 48 kts Sea Confidence at

from south-south-east anchor off Stockton
Beach

8 June 1230 Wind decreases to 20 knots

and veers to west

8 June 1700 Wind begins to increase (reaching Sea Confidence steams

42 knots with gusts to 49 knots about out to sea about 1640
2100) and backs to south-east

28
7.1.5 The deck logs for all three ships were examined as part of the
Investigation to determine what weather was experienced by the ships up
to 0600 on 8 June. The weather recorded by the ships is tabulated below
and is roughly consistent with the NPC instrumentation.

Weather recorded prior to 08 Weather recorded 08 0600 – 1600

0600 June June
Wind Wind
Barometric Barometric
Force Swell Force Swell
Ship Pressure Pressure
(time first (m) (time first (m)
(hPa) (hPa)
recorded) recorded)
Pasha not not
9 (0500) 1003.5 10 (0900) 1001
Bulker recorded recorded
9-10
Betis 6 1006 10 (0800) 8 1001
(0500)
(v.rough
(rough
Sea sea and
8 (0400) sea and 1010 8-9 (0800) 1007
Confidence heavy
swell)
swell)

7.1.6 The Master of the Betis stated that the wind reached 60 knots (111 km/h)
(Force 11), however the deck log records the wind as being Force 10.
Such speeds were not recorded by the instruments at Nobbys Head.

7.1.7 The recorded data indicates that prior to the ships weighing anchor, the
weather did not exceed a strong gale, or Force 9 on the Beaufort Wind
Scale.

7.2 Weather Warnings and Coastal Radio Network

7.2.1 All vessels at sea receive weather information through the Inmarsat C
ECG system. The system automatically provides weather faxes and
emails from the weather agency for the vessels’ current location. This
equipment is part of the broader Global Maritime Distress Safety System
(GMDSS) and a requirement of the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO).

7.2.2 All vessels in the anchorage off the Port of Newcastle were receiving
weather faxes and emails from the Bureau of Meteorology relevant to that
area. On 7 June and up to 0700 on 8 June there were at least 16
separate warnings issued for the Hunter Coast plus coastal forecasts and
warnings promulgated on VHF radio.

7.2.3 Prior to 2002 the Federal Government in association with Telstra funded
and operated a comprehensive marine communication network. In 2002
Telstra ceased operating its marine communications network and

29
 arrangements were put in place with the state governments for some
federal funding to establish a replacement network in each state.

7.2.4 In NSW the Waterways Authority (now NSW Maritime) established the
Coastal Radio Network in conjunction with the three Port Corporations.
Arrangements for the operation of the network were:

• Sydney Ports Corporation (SPC) would monitor high frequency (HF)

radio communications.
• each of the Port Corporations would monitor very high frequency
(VHF) radio communications on VHF channel 16.
• through a system of radio repeater sets, SPC would transmit weather
forecasts and Marine Safety Information when issued by AMSA. The
weather forecasts, provided by the Bureau of Meteorology, would
cover Sydney, Hunter and Illawarra coastal waters.
• NPC would provide backup to SPC for the broadcasting of weather
forecasts; weather warnings; Marine Safety Information and navigation
warnings on VHF in the event that SPC reports to NPC it is not able to
issue those forecasts or warnings.

7.3 Newcastle Port Corporation

7.3.1 Port Corporations in NSW are created under the provisions of the Ports
and Maritime Administration Act 1995 and operate pursuant to this Act
and the State Owned Corporations Act 1989. Port Corporations are
established at Sydney (which includes Port Botany), Port Kembla and
Newcastle.

7.3.2 The functions and responsibilities of the Port Corporations, including NPC,
are outlined in the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 and
include:

• to establish, manage and operate port facilities and services in its

ports, and
• to exercise the port safety functions for which it is licensed in
accordance with its operating license.

7.3.3 The port safety functions that are listed in the Act means any or all of the
following functions of the Minister:

• the function of providing or arranging for the provision of safety

services in respect of ports (such as the installation and maintenance
of navigation aids, vessel traffic control, pilotage services, the dredging
and maintenance of navigation channels and hydrographic services).

30
 • the function of providing or arranging for the provision of emergency
environment protection services for dealing with pollution incidents in
relevant waters.
• the function of carrying out investigations into marine accidents or
incidents.
• any other function determined by the Minister and specified in an
operating licence under this Division.

7.4 The NPC Port Safety Operating Licence (PSOL)

7.4.1 Under the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995, the Port
Corporations exercise the port safety functions, such as those listed in
Section 7.3, in accordance with a PSOL issued to the Port Corporation.

7.4.2 The current NPC PSOL was issued pursuant to section 12(2) of the Ports
and Maritime Administration Act 1995 in December 2006 by the Minister
for Ports and Waterways.

7.4.3 Key clauses of the PSOL which are relevant to the incident are as follows:

a. Clause 9 of the PSOL establishes the requirement for the Port

Corporation to respond to port-related emergencies. The emergency
response requirements are set out in Appendix 5 of the PSOL.
9. Emergency response

9.1 The Licensee must respond to port-related emergencies, in

accordance with the Licensee’s role in the relevant NSW
emergency management plans, within the area of operations set
out in Appendix 1.

9.2 The Licensee must respond to incidents as required by the NSW

State Waters Marine Oil and Chemical Spill Contingency Plan or
the relevant NSW emergency management plans, in the area of
operations set out in Appendix 2.

9.3 The Licensee shall comply with the emergency response

requirements set out in Appendix 5.

b. Clause 12 of the PSOL establishes the minimum requirements for

communications between the port and ships, including the type of
information that must be available and the qualifications of vessel
traffic operators.

31
 12. Port communications

12.1 The Licensee must maintain a communications system for the

Port which is appropriately resourced, equipped and maintained.
It must be operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week
throughout the year.

12.2 All communications operators must:

(a) possess current and relevant qualifications to enable them to

operate the communications equipment effectively;
(b) provide mariners with marine warnings, information on shipping
movements; and reports related to the port through its usual
communication channels.

7.4.4 The PSOL of each Port Corporation in NSW is audited by an external

auditor annually. The purpose of such an audit is to determine if the Port
Corporation is delivering the port safety functions specified in Section 11
of the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995.

7.4.5 The most recent audit of NPC was conducted on 7 June 2007 by Lloyds
Register Quality Assurance Limited – the day before Pasha Bulker ran
aground. This audit found that all port safety functions of the PSOL were
satisfactorily implemented and maintained, but did make some minor
suggestions for improvement. None of these suggestions were relevant to
the management of the incidents occurring at Newcastle the following day.

7.5 Responsibility of the Master of a Ship

7.5.1 The definition of a ship’s Master is simply defined in international maritime

publications, such as the Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping 1995 (STCW 95), as the person having command of a ship.
The responsibilities of a Master are not defined by any legislation. The
role of the Master as being absolutely responsible for the safety of a ship
and its crew, however, is well established and accepted in maritime law
and few maritime court cases ever argue this point.

7.5.2 A recent judgement of a Federal Court matter (Port Kembla Coal Terminal
Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc, (2004) FCA 1211) quoted (with apparent
approval) the following in relation to the responsibilities of a ship’s master:

”A captain is charged with the responsibility for the safety of the ship and
the efficient prosecution of the voyage” and
“The shipmaster carries the ultimate responsibility …”

32
7.5.3 This responsibility for the safety of the ship remains with the Master at all
times and includes proper attention to secure anchoring, appropriate
ballasting and actions taken in adverse weather.

7.6 Newcastle Anchorage

7.6.1 Newcastle is located at latitude 32° 56’S on the east coast of New South
Wales. The Port of Newcastle is predominantly a bulk cargo port with coal
making up approximately 90 percent of all cargo movements.

7.6.2 The anchorage off Newcastle provides reasonable holding ground in fair
weather but is exposed to weather from the south, which produces
significant swells. Depths in the anchorage vary between 30 and 50
metres.

7.6.3 The anchorage is described in the Admiralty Sailing Directions (refer to

appendix 9.3 for full description). This publication, which is available to
masters of foreign going ships and was aboard the three ships which are
the subject of this investigation, gives warning about the conditions that
may be experienced at this anchorage during autumn and winter low
pressure systems in the Tasman Sea.

7.6.4 There have been other recorded shipping incidents during adverse
weather conditions in the Newcastle anchorage:

• grounding of the Sygna in May 1974,

• collision between Goonzaran and New Noble in November 1995, and
• collision between Pilsum and China Steel Growth in June 2005.

7.6.5 NPC does not regulate or provide positive control of vessels in the
anchorage, but provides advice to every vessel that enters the anchorage
in a prescribed form as follows:

“A fair weather anchorage exists south of latitude 32° 58’S, at a distance

greater than two miles from the shore.
It is advised to anchor with a safe distance from other vessels and keep a
good position watch as vessels may drag their anchor.
No objects or waste materials are to be jettisoned overboard during the
entire time the vessel is at anchor.”

7.7 Ballasting Issues

7.7.1 Newcastle is a coal export port and as a consequence, the vast majority of
bulk carriers waiting to berth in the port arrive in ballast without cargo. A
few arrive partly laden, but essentially in ballast.
33
7.7.2 Correct ballasting is essential to the safety of any ship. Ballasting affects
the manoeuvring and stability of the ship. In the long term, correct
ballasting practices affect the longevity of the ship by ensuring that the hull
is not unduly subjected to forces that will weaken the structure.

7.7.3 While the three ships covered by this Investigation were ballasted to meet
the NPC entry requirements for draft and trim, none were ballasted for
heavy weather and in at least two cases, the ships did not meet the ballast
conditions for heavy weather specified in the ship’s stability books.

7.7.4 Both the Pasha Bulker and the Betis have a ballast loading precaution 10
that stipulates:

“In rough seas, the ship should be ballasted, within the permissible limits
of longitudinal strength, so that the forward draft can be kept not less than
7.800m 11 in order to avoid wave-slamming on the forward bottom of the
ship”. 12

7.7.5 Neither of the ships was ballasted to comply with the rough weather
forward draft precaution. Although the heavy weather ballast condition
was not specifically for propeller immersion; had the ships been compliant,
the increase in draft would have resulted in reduced windage, increased
propeller immersion and reduced pitching. The net outcome of these
effects would be to increase propeller efficiency and give the ship greater
available power when trying to manoeuvre in gale conditions. Number 4
Cargo Hold onboard both the Pasha Bulker and Betis doubles as a water
ballast tank and when full increases the displacement of the ship by
13,680 tonnes.

7.7.6 Similarly, the Sea Confidence has a cargo hold that can be flooded. It is
noted that of the three ships, the Sea Confidence is the only one that
commenced ballasting operations while the ship was in difficulty. It is
probable that it was a combination of taking on extra ballast and using
both anchors that prevented the Sea Confidence from grounding.

7.8 Port Waratah Coal Services (PWCS)

7.8.1 During the course of this Investigation, there was some public and
maritime industry speculation that ships were maintaining unsafe ballast
conditions due to specific requirements by Port Waratah Coal Services
(PWCS) in regard to ship loading times. PWCS is a consortium of coal

10
The Pasha Bulker and the Betis are ships of the same class. The stability book for the Betis
was not sighted by the investigation but is reasonably assumed to be the same as that for the
Pasha Bulker.
11
This is the original emphasis as written in the stability book.
12
Pasha Bulker Loading and Stability information Booklet, page C-2.
34
 producers who own the two coal loading terminals in the Port of
Newcastle.

7.8.2 Specifically it was alleged that if cargo loading was delayed by a slow
ballast discharge rate from the ship, then PWCS would place the ship on a
Vessel Suitability List (referred to by the media as a ‘blacklist’) and refuse
to load the ship at its next call to Newcastle. It was further alleged that the
ship’s Master would be held financially accountable to compensate PWCS
for the delay. The Pasha Bulker was listed on the PWCS Vessel
Suitability List.

7.8.3 PWCS provided evidence that once a ship reaches the Port of Newcastle
anchorage, that ship’s agent sends PWCS a loading plan for the ship,
which includes details of quantity and type of coal required as well as
loading rates and times. When PWCS is satisfied with the loading plan,
they accept the contract. They have no further contact with the ship until it
reaches the berth.

7.8.4 If loading the ship takes significantly longer than indicated in the loading
plan, PWCS will provide the ship’s owners/charterers with a list of
recommendations for improving the rate of loading for its next visit to the
Port of Newcastle. If the ship returns to Newcastle without the required
improvements, PWCS will load the ship a second time, but will inform the
owners/charterers that PWCS will no longer provide loading services to
the ship until the recommended improvements have been made.

7.8.5 In essence, the Vessel Suitability List indicates ships that PWCS needs to
check prior to loading to ensure recommended improvements have been
implemented. PWCS asserts that it in no way infers that the ship will not
be loaded. Implicit within the Vessel Suitability List are restrictions on
vessel de-ballasting times.

7.8.6 PWCS has no contact with any ship regarding its ballast arrangements
while at anchor nor does PWCS make any specific directions regarding
ballast for vessels coming alongside the loading berths; the latter
conditions being regulated by the NPC entry requirements for trim and
ballast. Ultimately a ship’s ballast is left at the discretion of the individual
Master.

7.8.7 The Investigation considers that the PWCS Vessel Suitability List and
(implicit therein) the restrictions on deballasting times may constitute a
commercial pressure on the Masters of ships to maintain the minimum
possible ballast when entering the Port of Newcastle. However, although
the ships of interest to this Investigation are considered to have carried
insufficient ballast for the conditions at the time of the incident, there is no
evidence to suggest that the PWCS Vessel Suitability List was a causal
factor in the failure of the Masters to adequately ballast their respective
vessels prior to the gale.
35
7.8.8 The Pasha Bulker had at least four days warning of the approaching gale
in which to take on extra ballast and was not due to berth until 12 June.
Thus it had four days to discharge any extra ballast that it may have had
to take on to prepare for the oncoming gale conditions.

7.8.9 It should be noted that all three ships discussed in this report were
properly ballasted for fair weather and normal anchorage conditions. In
terms of ballast, the issue was the failure by the Masters to take on
sufficient extra ballast to deal with the weather conditions forecast for the
anchorage.

7.9 Anchoring in Gale Conditions

7.9.1 The danger with bad weather and gale conditions at an anchorage is that
the vessel may drag its anchor and be swept ashore before it has time to
get underway and clear to sea.

7.9.2 When a ship is anchored with a single anchor in a gale, it does not lie
head to wind. Instead, it describes a figure of eight while moving about the
anchor as shown at Figure 3. When a ship moves about the anchor, the
cable is alternately slackened as the ship rides up on it and then jerked
taut as the ship turns broadside and is blown downwind. It is during this
latter stage that the most stress is placed on the anchor and the risk of
dragging is highest. It is a fact that a ship moving about her anchor spends
the majority of time with a large windage presented to the gale.

7.9.3 The uneven movement of a ship about its anchor can be reduced by the
use of rudder and engine and by the use of a second anchor.

36
Figure 3 – Diagram showing the movement of a ship at single anchor in a
strong wind 13

7.9.4 If the decision to depart the anchorage is left too late the vessel may
experience difficulty in manoeuvring in the strong weather conditions and
clearing navigational dangers. This latter situation is more acute when a
vessel is on a lee shore and for large ships which are difficult to
manoeuvre, such as a bulk cargo ship or a tanker, particularly in light
ballast. Furthermore weighing anchor is a more difficult task in strong
weather and places extra strain on the windlass and there is a higher risk
of the windlass becoming unserviceable.

7.9.5 When at anchor, and a gale is forecast or experienced, a Master has a

number of options to consider. These include:

• weighing anchor and proceeding to sea to ride out the bad weather,
• veering more cable to increase the holding power of the anchor and its
cable,
• letting go a second anchor to increase the combined holding power
and reduce the movement about a single anchor, and
• using the ship’s engine to steam onto the anchor and reduce the strain
on the anchor and its cable.

13
Reproduced from the Admiralty Manual of Seamanship Volume 3, 1964, page 369.
37
7.9.6 In assessing these options a Master would also need to consider:

• the distance from the shore, other navigational dangers and other
ships at anchor,
• the depth of water and the nature of the sea bed and its holding power
– mud is better than soft sand, rock is poor,
• the density of shipping in the area, and
• the times of daylight when it is easier to manoeuvre a ship in difficult
conditions.

7.9.7 Of the three ships being investigated, all are considered to have left the
decision to weigh anchor too late, particularly the Pasha Bulker, despite
the forecast of a strong gale, a lee shore and the warnings in the Sailing
Directions.

7.9.8 The Pasha Bulker veered 2 extra shackles of cable on 7 June for a total of
11 shackles of cable. The Sea Confidence remained with 6 shackles of
cable and the Betis remained with 9 shackles of cable. Both the Pasha
Bulker and the Sea Confidence were on the inner edge of the anchorage
and relatively close to land, less than 2.5nM (4.6km).

7.10 Svitzer Australasia

7.10.1 Svitzer Australasia is a company that provides tug vessel services to the
Port of Newcastle. On 8 June, Svitzer Australasia provided two tugs, the
Watagan and the Wickham to stand-by to assist any ships that may have
required assistance. The actions of these two tug vessels are described
Sections 6.4 and 6.5.

7.10.2 Generally, the tug services provided by Svitzer Australasia at Newcastle

are limited to “harbour duties” which includes assisting ships entering and
leaving the port and berthing. The Newcastle based tugs and crews are
rarely required to respond to emergency situations offshore, such as the
incidents of 8 June.

38
8. FINDINGS

8.1 General Remarks

8.1.1 The Investigation has relied heavily on the approximate tracks obtained
from recordings of the radar data available to the VTIC and presented at
appendix 9.2 plus interviews with the Masters of the Pasha Bulker, Sea
Confidence and Betis and four other officers from the Pasha Bulker.

8.1.2 The investigation team was unable to obtain accurate navigational or

VDR 14 data from any of the ships. In addition recordings of the VHF radio
channels used in the Newcastle anchorage were not available from NPC.
The investigation has managed to obtain from the RVCP some limited
recordings of the period following the grounding of the Pasha Bulker.

8.1.3 Normally, all verbal communications conducted on VHF radio between

ships in the Newcastle anchorage and VTIC operators are recorded on
tape with a hard drive backup and the tapes are kept for approximately 10
months. However, when this evidence was requested, initially by the
ATSB, on or about 11 June, NPC discovered that the system had not
been recording since 5 June 2007. Furthermore, no written
communication logs were kept. As a result, there is no primary source of
record for the communications to and from Newcastle VTIC and ships on
7 and 8 June 2007.

8.1.4 The findings with respect to each of the individual Terms of Reference are
listed below.

8.2 Term of Reference 1

Investigate the facts and circumstances of the grounding of the Pasha
Bulker and identify whether any offence has been committed under NSW
marine legislation.

8.2.1 The description of what happened to Pasha Bulker on 7 and 8 June is

detailed at Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The discussion points at Section 7 are
also relevant.

8.2.2 From analysing the available facts it would appear that the grounding of
the Pasha Bulker was caused by a series of judgements and decisions
made by the Master. The most significant being:

14
NSW Maritime does not have the equipment to decipher the VDR data. The Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has the necessary equipment but would not release their
interpreted data. NSW Maritime tested its analysis with the ATSB within the extent permitted by
the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 to verify the broad conclusions reached by this
investigation.
39
 • a failure to realise the potential impact on the Pasha Bulker of the
weather forecast in the anchorage on 8 June,
• an initial decision to ride out the gale at anchor and not to heed the
caution within the Sailing Directions regarding the suitability of the
anchorage in the forecast weather conditions, and
• a decision not to ballast the ship for heavy weather.

8.2.3 The situation was aggravated by:

• allowing the ship to drag its anchor to within 1.2nM (2.2km) of the
coast while the anchor was being weighed and not countering this drift
with effective use of the ship’s engines and commencing to take on
extra ballast, and
• altering course at about 0900 on 8 June when in close proximity to the
shore and placing the weather on Pasha Bulker’s port bow, causing
the ship to lose steerage with insufficient sea room to regain control
and prevent the ship from grounding.

8.2.4 What is unclear is why the Master did not appreciate the impact of the
weather forecasts. Clearly he had some concern about the weather and
took the limited precaution of veering an extra two shackles of cable but
he did not decide to take on heavy weather ballast in the heavy weather
ballast hold or to put to sea earlier.

8.2.5 The Master did state that he was aware of the gale warning as early as 3
June and reviewed the forecast on 7 June assessing that the centre of the
gale was ”very far away….never affecting our ship”. While this conclusion
might have been plausible on 3 June it is inexplicable noting the weather
forecasts available on 7 June.

8.2.6 Furthermore it is unclear why the Master left the bridge at a crucial time to
have breakfast. At this time the ship was, at best, opening very slowly
from the coast while being set to the north and making considerable
leeway, about 65˚ from the course being steered. The situation was
tenuous and required very close monitoring by the Master. The Master
noted the drift on return to the bridge following breakfast and ordered an
alteration of course which, in fact, aggravated the situation.

8.2.7 Although the ship was experiencing great difficulty in making way, the
Master did not start to take on heavy weather ballast. As the Pasha
Bulker closed the coast the Master attempted a final manoeuvre to turn
the ship to starboard, which would appear to be in desperation – it had
little chance of succeeding and did not.

40
8.2.8 The Master had the clear responsibility for the safety of the ship and its
crew and the decisions he made. The ship’s Master and operator also
have a responsibility to ensure the vessel is carrying and making proper
use of the necessary navigation equipment, reference documents and
charts.

8.2.9 From 2200 on 7 June, 47 of the 56 ships in the anchorage put to sea
before the Master of the Pasha Bulker decided to weigh anchor. These
movements generated a considerable amount of radio communication
with the VTIC on VHF channel 9. The VTIC operator was also informing
ships if they had been observed to be dragging their anchors and
requested their intentions. This activity should have been very apparent to
the Master of the Pasha Bulker and noting his anchorage close to the
shore should have served to trigger a reassessment of his earlier
judgements and question whether he had made the correct decisions.

8.2.10 While the Master did have a good command of English, some of the
statements made at interview may be open to other interpretation.
Nevertheless his actions are clear and unambiguous. In general, the
standard of seamanship and decision making displayed by the Master of
the Pasha Bulker is assessed as being poor.

8.2.11 The incident would have been avoided if Pasha Bulker had put to sea
before the weather deteriorated to the extent that it had at 0700. The
ship’s chances of surviving the gale without incident would have been
significantly enhanced if the ship had assumed the heavy weather ballast
condition.

8.2.12 In considering any legal action, it is noteworthy that although the incident
provided a very public spectacle and created much interest, there was no
loss of life and there was no lasting damage to the environment.
Furthermore all damage to the ship and costs associated with its salvage
and repairs, plus the contingency preparations in case of an oil spill are
the subject of a claim on the ship’s insurers. The Japanese company
Fukujin Kisen publicly announced on 4 July 2007 that Australian taxpayers
will not pay for the exercise that freed the ship from Nobbys Beach.

8.2.13 This Investigation has found evidence of a prima facie case of negligent
navigation under Regulation 3 of the Water Traffic Regulations – NSW by
the Master of the Pasha Bulker. However to sustain a conviction the
matter would need to be proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which is the
standard required for any criminal conviction.

8.2.14 The test of negligence is the ‘reasonable person’ test which is most likely
to be problematic noting other Masters in similar circumstances made
similar decisions on the same day. The plight of the Pasha Bulker was
partly determined by delaying, by only one or two hours, the decision to
weigh anchor and proceed to sea. The majority of the ships departed the
41
 anchorage between 0400 and 0600 and Pasha Bulker commenced
weighing anchor at 0710. Some Masters left it even later.

8.2.15 The Investigation also considered the Master’s qualifications and how they
could be reviewed. The Master’s certificate was not issued in Australia
and there is no direct control over review of the qualification with respect
to its suspension, cancellation or downgrading. NSW Maritime is able to
refer this report to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority with a
recommendation that this report and concern over the Master’s
performance be forwarded to the Flag State Authority which issued the
Master’s certificate, seeking that his qualification be reviewed.

8.2.16 This Investigation did not seek to obtain evidence of offences pursuant to
the Marine Pollution Act 1987 by any party. NPC is conducting a separate
investigation under this Act into the events of 8 June 2007.

Recommendation (i)
No prosecution action is taken against the Master of the Pasha Bulker.
Recommendation (ii)
NSW Maritime forwards this report to AMSA with a recommendation that the
report and concern over the Master’s performance be forwarded to the Flag
State Authority which issued the Master’s certificate, seeking that his
qualification be reviewed.

8.3 Term of Reference 2

Investigate the facts and circumstances leading to the injury to two tug
crewman assisting the Sea Confidence and Betis on Friday 8 June 2007.

8.3.1 Sections 6.3 to 6.5 describe the actions of the tugs on 8 June and the
injuries sustained by two crew members of the Watagan while assisting
the Sea Confidence.

8.3.2 Watagan was properly manned for sea with nine crew, including the
Master, Mate and Engineers. Both Watagan and Wickham are designed
and operated principally as harbour tugs, and are not well suited for
emergency towing in the conditions experienced on 8 June.

8.3.3 The conditions were hazardous and involved a certain risk to personnel
safety. The responsibility for the safety of the tug crews rested with
Svitzer Australasia - the operator of the vessels. Svitzer Australasia
attempted to mitigate this risk by a comprehensive safety briefing for the
crews. Svitzer Australasia management emphasised to each tug master

42
 that safety of their crews was paramount when providing assistance to the
ships.

8.3.4 The two crew members sustained their injuries during the course of
attempting to pass a tow to Sea Confidence in extremely demanding
conditions. Following the injuries, the Master of the tug aborted any further
attempts to pass the tow.

8.3.5 Noting Svitzer Australasia’s Occupational Health and Safety

responsibilities, the company should review its procedures for conducting
risk assessments and for conducting emergency towing operations in
adverse weather conditions.

Recommendation (iii)
Svitzer Australasia reviews its risk assessment procedures for emergency towing
operations in adverse weather conditions.

8.4 Term of Reference 3

Determine whether the requirements of the Newcastle Port Corporation’s
Port Safety Operating Licence were complied with.

8.4.1 The functions and responsibilities of NPC in regards to its PSOL are
discussed in Section 7.4 The sections of the PSOL relevant to this
investigation are Clause 9 – Emergency Response and Clause 12 Port
Communications.

8.4.2 NPC met the relevant requirements of Clause 9 well. NPC responded to
the emergency in a very competent manner, exercising appropriate control
and integrating with the other emergency services involved.

8.4.3 Clause 12 of the PSOL has three elements:

• maintain a communication system (12.1),
• have appropriately qualified operators (12(2)(a)), and
• communication operators must provide mariners with marine
warnings, information of shipping movements and reports related to
the port through its usual communication channels (12(2)(b)).

8.4.4 With respect to the communication system, NPC’s radio network provided
the necessary communication to handle the emergency and the port’s
operations. The associated recording equipment was, however, not
working and had not been operating since 5 June. This was not known to
the VTIC operators. The availability of this data would have been helpful
to this Investigation.

43
8.4.5 Whether the recording equipment is part of the communication system is
arguable. Most communication systems do involve a recording element
and if it is not automatically taped there is a need for communications logs
to be kept. Clearly the latter would have been impractical with the amount
of radio traffic and the different channels being used during the incident.
This issue needs to be clarified in the next review of the PSOL.

8.4.6 There is a need for NPC to introduce a procedure where all

communications recording equipment is checked as serviceable at the
commencement of each shift. This is a procedural failure and not
considered to be a causal or contributory factor to the grounding.

8.4.7 The other requirements associated with operators and the information
provided were fully complied with by NPC.

Recommendation (iv)

NPC introduce a procedure where all communications recording equipment is

checked as serviceable at the commencement of each shift.

Recommendation (v)

NSW Maritime reviews the requirements of Clause 12 of the PSOL to ensure

that performance standards are adequately defined.

8.5 Term of Reference 4

Consider the quality and timeliness of weather warnings available to ships
in the vicinity of the Port of Newcastle.

8.5.1 The forecasts from the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) on 7/8 June and the
days leading up to the gale were very accurate and timely with the first
notice of the gale being issued as early as 3 June. The coastal weather
forecasts and warnings issued by the BoM were received by Pasha
Bulker, Sea Confidence and Betis on Inmarsat C EGC.

8.5.2 In addition to being transmitted by Inmarsat C ECG, the coastal weather

forecasts and warnings were also repeated via VHF radio transmissions
made by SPC (through the CRN) and the RVCP.

No recommendation is made with respect to Term of Reference 4.

44
8.6 Term of Reference 5
Consider any standing or verbal communication promulgated by the
Newcastle Port Corporation relevant to the investigation.

Standing Communications

8.6.1 The following documents, prepared by NPC, were supplied to

investigators as the standing communications used by the port:

i) The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Newcastle

NSW information sheet. This document gives general anchorage and
berthing information for the Port of Newcastle, including a description
of local weather (adapted from the Sailing Directions – Australian Pilot
Volume III, 2005).

ii) VHF Radio Procedure – Arriving Vessel (Pilot) – this document

establishes a standard information exchange between an arriving ship
that will require a port pilot and the VTIC. The content of the advice is
listed at Section 7.6.5.

iii) Port of Newcastle Shiphandling Safety Guidelines, Sixth Edition 1st

December 2004 – this document describes the specifics of the NPC
berths, including soundings, tug procedures, under-keel clearances
and ballasting requirements to enter port.

8.6.2 NPC advised that these standing written communications are available to
ships via the ship’s agents and that the Shiphandling Safety Guidelines
are available on the internet.

8.6.3 All ships have access to the relevant Sailing Directions – Australian Pilot
Volume III, 2005 which contains a description of the anchorage and the
associated weather conditions that may be experienced. All three ships
examined during the course of this investigation were in possession of this
document.

8.6.4 The standing instructions issued by NPC appear to be comprehensive and

accurate. In addition, mariners have access to general navigation
reference publications. The weather experienced on 8 June clearly
demonstrated the accuracy and usefulness of the Sailings Directions and
the advice contained therein (see section 9.3).

Verbal Communication

8.6.5 The VTIC communicates with the ships in the anchorage on VHF Channel
9. All ships are required to monitor this channel while they remain in the
anchorage. The VTIC operator on the evening of 7/8 June reports that he

45
 made a standard call to any ship he observed, from radar, to be dragging
its anchor. He generally broadcast the following:

“(Ship Name) this is Newcastle Harbour, our radar indicates that your
vessel is dragging its anchor, weather conditions are deteriorating. What
are your intentions.”

8.6.6 The VTIC operator who came on watch at 0700 on 8 June recalls calling
the Pasha Bulker at about 0730, reporting that the ship appeared to be
dragging or underway. The vessel responded that it was heaving in
(weighing anchor) and getting underway. At about 0740 the Pasha Bulker
called the VTIC and reported they were underway and heading out to sea.
The operator continued to monitor the vessel and at about 0750 called the
vessel after noting it was continuing to close the coast. The Pasha Bulker
confirmed that its intention was to head out to sea.

8.6.7 Another VTIC operator came on duty at 0800 and noted that the Pasha
Bulker was not in a good position and at about 0830 called the ship to
request its intentions. The response was that the ship had its main engine
at full ahead and was intending to move away from the coast. The ship
was asked if it required assistance and responded: No. The operator
reminded the ship to call on channel 9 or channel 16 if it required
assistance.

8.6.8 Shortly after 0900 the operator still remained concerned about the Pasha
Bulker and repeated his earlier call and asking if the ship required
assistance. The ship again responded that it did not need assistance. A
short time later there was another exchange of radio communications,
where the Pasha Bulker reported “our main engines are full astern and we
require assistance.” The tugs were contacted and this was reported to the
ship. The tugs were not able to respond in the prevailing conditions with
the harbour closed due to the weather.

8.6.9 Prior to these events and the gale, NPC did not provide any general
broadcast or warning with respect to the suitability of the anchorage in the
forecast weather conditions. Nor did it make any additional weather
forecasts to those provided to all ships in the anchorage by SPC as part of
the Coastal Radio Network. This was the standard operating procedure
for NPC and it accords with the requirements of the PSOL.

8.6.10 The verbal communications provided by NPC at the time of the incident
were adequate within the existing framework. Section 8.10 considers
aspects that may enhance communications in similar circumstances in the
future.

No recommendation is made with respect to Term of Reference 5.

46
8.7 Term of Reference 6
Consider the actions of all ships subsequent to promulgation of the
weather warnings and any communication from Newcastle Port
Corporation and in particular, the actions of the ships Pasha Bulker, Sea
Confidence and Betis.

8.7.1 Before the gale, on 7 June, there were 56 ships in the Newcastle
anchorage. Observing the weather forecast and the suitability of the
anchorage the most prudent course of action was to put to sea to ride out
the gale. Forty seven ships did so without incident before the gale
reached its peak.

8.7.2 Of the nine ships which remained in the anchorage three got into
difficulties.

8.7.3 The Investigation has not considered the specific circumstances of any
vessels other than these three ships, the Sea Confidence, Pasha Bulker
and Betis. The actions of these ships are addressed under Section 6, and
under Term of Reference 1 at Section 8.2.

8.7.4 The Masters of the Sea Confidence and Betis are also accountable, to
varying degrees, for the failings attributed to the Master of the Pasha
Bulker. The Sea Confidence was extremely close to running aground.

No recommendation is made with respect to Term of Reference 6.

8.8 Term of Reference 7

Consider the actions of all vessels used in support of ships including the
actions of tugs.

8.8.1 The Investigation considered whether any assistance could have been
provided to the Pasha Bulker to prevent the grounding, and is of the view
that even if a tug had been available in sufficient time, it would have been
unable to successfully connect a tow in the prevailing conditions. The
conditions prevented tugs proceeding to sea and the Investigation
considered this was a prudent and appropriate decision.

8.8.2 Following the drop in wind strength at 1230 on 8 June, there was a lull
which permitted tugs to put to sea. The conditions were still marginal with
wave heights of about 7 metres. This period of respite allowed Wickham
to support the Betis and Watagan to attend the Sea Confidence.

47
8.8.3 As discussed at Section 6.3 the evolution of passing the tow between the
Sea Confidence and the Watagan was ad hoc and unlikely to succeed in
the prevailing conditions. There needs to be an agreed set of standard
procedures for passing a tow available so that they can be passed to any
ship which needs to be towed.

8.8.4 During the Investigation an opinion was offered that even if the tow had
been passed successfully between the Watagan and the Sea Confidence,
such success was likely to be short lived. The prevailing weather
conditions were such that a taut towing hawser was likely to part. It was
suggested that in the conditions, the best chance of succeeding was to
use a catenary tow with one of the ship’s anchor cables as a bridle to form
the catenary and reduce the strain on the tow. The Sea Confidence was
not able to connect a catenary tow as its anchor cables were twisted and
unable to be worked.

Recommendation (vi)

NSW Maritime investigates the need to develop and promulgate standard

operating procedures for taking vessels in tow in adverse weather conditions.

8.9 Term of Reference 8

Consider the relevant NSW legislation to determine whether this legislation
adequately provides for the management of ships in circumstances of
ships at anchor and severe weather.

8.9.1 The management of NSW ports and safety on the State’s waterways are
regulated by the following Acts and Regulations:

• Marine Safety Act 1998;

• Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995,
• Ports and Maritime Administration Regulation 2007, and
• Marine Pollution Act 1987.

8.9.2 This package of legislation has been examined as part of the Investigation
and is generally considered satisfactory in defining roles and
responsibilities for the management of the specific incidents of 7/8 June at
the Newcastle anchorage and, more generally, the management of ports
and maritime safety.

8.9.3 The Investigation did reveal an issue concerning the adequacy of

penalties associated with negligent navigation.

48
8.9.4 Any charge of negligent navigation, with respect to the Pasha Bulker,
could only be made under Regulation 3 of the Water Traffic Regulations –
NSW. This would be a relatively minor charge, principally designed for
recreational and commercial vessels. This is considered inadequate in
dealing with seagoing ships, like the Pasha Bulker, and the potential
impact of any negligent navigation.

Recommendation (vii)

That the Marine Safety Act 1998 be amended to provide for a higher level of
penalties for offences involving seagoing ships.

8.10 Term of Reference 9

Make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of any similar marine
incident.

8.10.1 The primary causes of the Pasha Bulker grounding were the Master’s:

• failure to realise the potential impact of the weather forecast in the

anchorage on 7/8 June,
• a decision to ride out the gale at anchor, and
• a decision not to ballast the ship for heavy weather.

8.10.2 The weather forecasts were accurate and timely and appropriately
promulgated via Inmarsat and VHF radio. The suitability of the
anchorage in the forecast weather is also documented in the Sailing
Directions, which were carried onboard the Pasha Bulker, and NPC’s
Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) information sheet,
which may have been available to the ship. For unknown reasons the
Master did not respond to the forecasts and warnings.

8.10.3 While the Masters of the Pasha Bulker, Sea Confidence and Betis did
eventually decide to weigh anchor and head to sea, this decision was left
too late to be without significant risk and none of the ships was ballasted
for heavy weather.

8.10.4 A Master of a ship has the clear responsibility for its safety and deciding
whether the ship should put to sea or remain at anchor, when gale
conditions are forecast. There was a general expectation by NPC that
all ships would proceed to sea 15 prior to the gale on 8 June 2007. As

15
In evidence provided to the Investigation, some experienced NPC Staff expressed the view that
they expected all vessels to proceed to sea prior to the gale.
49
 discussed in section 7.6, there have been three other incidents at the
Newcastle anchorage involving ships getting into difficulties in adverse
weather conditions.

8.10.5 Collectively, the four incidents demonstrate the unsuitability of the

anchorage in gale force winds and the possible need for a more
proactive management of the Newcastle anchorage.

8.10.6 Following the Pasha Bulker incident, NPC has already implemented
some changes to its communications procedures and the management
of the anchorage. The inner edge of the anchorage has been extended
from 2nM (3.7km) to 3nM (5.6km) from the coast. Also more specific
advice is provided regarding ballast and trim, which requires vessels in
ballast to have their propellers fully immersed.

8.10.7 Although it has not been past practice or a specific requirement of the
PSOL, the Investigation considers that there is merit in NPC issuing an
advisory warning to all ships in the anchorage drawing attention to the
forecast of a strong gale and the suitability of the anchorage in such
conditions. NPC is currently conducting its own internal review of the
relative merits of promulgating standard advice when strong or gale
force winds are forecast or being experienced.

8.10.8 With the possible exception of one or two vessels, all other ships in the
anchorage on 7 June were outside the limits of Newcastle Port and not
subject to the direction powers of the Harbour Master. Therefore it was
not possible for NPC to direct any ships to put to sea or take any other
action. NPC could however, issue advisory warnings and
recommendations.

8.10.9 In order to establish what is practised elsewhere, the Investigation asked

the Harbour Master or Vessel Traffic Manager at Mackay, Brisbane, Port
Hedland and Geraldton what action they take in extreme weather
conditions. All stated that they would issue weather advice. However,
there was no consistent approach to the issue of advisory navigation
warnings or guidance to Masters, and the information they would provide
was inconsistent. For example, the Harbour Master at Mackay stated
that he advises ships to take on extra ballast and the Vessel Traffic
Manager at Brisbane stated he advises ships to depart the anchorage
and ride out the weather at sea.

8.10.10 Furthermore, these four sampled ports are relatively isolated on their
section of the coast, whereas NPC is 60nM (111km) from Sydney and
weather warnings and forecasts are provided by Sydney Ports
Corporation as part of the Coastal Radio Network.

50
8.10.11 The Investigation considered a more positive level of control of the
Newcastle anchorage be exercised by NPC. Noting that no changes
should in any way diminish the Master’s standing responsibility for the
safety of the ship and its navigation.

8.10.12 As a comparison, the Queensland coal ports of Gladstone and Hay

Point/Dalrymple were examined. Both of these ports are managed from
the parent ports of Gladstone and Mackay respectively, via their Harbour
Masters. The anchorages to these ports, which may be outside of port
limits, are managed using declared “pilotage areas”. The Harbour
Masters have similar powers of direction inside these pilotage areas as
they do within port limits. For example, arriving ships are given a
designated anchorage position, defined by latitude and longitude.

8.10.13 Within NSW, the Port Kembla Port Corporation (PKPC) has recently had
its port limits extended by regulation to enhance its powers of direction
over ships in its anchorage. PKPC is also assigning ships to designated
anchorage positions when they arrive.

8.10.14 Changes to legislation would not be required to impose further

obligations on Port Corporations through the PSOLs. The definition of
port safety functions in Section 11 of the Ports and Maritime
Administration Act 1995 would allow the Minister to add extra safety
functions to the PSOL.

8.10.15 The issue of port limits extending beyond the 3nM (5.6km) coastal water
limit does not appear to be a problem. The limit of Botany Bay and
Sydney Harbour both include areas of the ocean extending up to 4nm
(7.4km) from the coast. The recently redefined port boundaries for Port
Kembla extend 5nM (9.3km) to sea. If the port boundaries are extended
to cover a larger anchorage area the powers applicable to the port
areas, such as those of the Harbour Master, would be extended. The
Harbour Master would be able to direct vessels within these areas.

8.10.16 The situation at Newcastle is complex. The anchorage is extensive and

can spread over 30nM (56km) along the coast south of the port. The size
of the anchorage and the number of ships introduce potential
management, control and policing problems should a more positive
control be exercised by NPC.

8.10.17 NPC maintains continuous surveillance of the Newcastle anchorage via

radar but it is limited in range to about 25nM (46km) and would not cover
the whole anchorage. The associated infrastructure and personnel are
set for the existing role and would most likely require enhancement if
more positive control was to be exercised.

8.10.18 A strict highly regulated control of an anchorage could challenge the

overall responsibility of the Master for the safety of the ship and
51
 introduce significant liability issues for the port authority. Furthermore
claims might be made by ship owners or charterers against the port for
incurring unnecessary extra running costs.

8.10.19 Any change to the management of anchorages off NSW ports needs to
be carefully and comprehensively considered.

Recommendation (viii)

NSW Maritime, in conjunction with the three NSW Port Corporations, reviews
the port limits and the requirements of the PSOLs with regard to the
management of anchorages off NSW ports and provides recommendations to
the Minister for Ports and Waterways.

8.11 Cumulative List of Recommendations

8.11.1 The cumulative list of recommendations following consideration of each

Term of Reference is that:

i) No prosecution action is taken against the Master of the Pasha Bulker.

ii) NSW Maritime forwards this report to the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority with a recommendation that the report and concern over the
Master’s performance be forwarded to the Flag State Authority which
issued the Master’s certificate, seeking that his qualification be reviewed.
iii) Svitzer Australasia reviews its risk assessment procedures for
conducting emergency towing operations in adverse weather conditions.
iv) NPC introduce a procedure where all communications recording
equipment is checked as serviceable at the commencement of each
shift.
v) NSW Maritime reviews the requirements of Clause 12 of the PSOL to
ensure that performance standards are adequately defined.
vi) NSW Maritime investigates the need to develop and promulgate
standard operating procedures for taking vessels in tow in adverse
weather conditions.
vii) The Marine Safety Act 1998 be amended to provide for a higher level of
penalties for offences involving seagoing ships.
viii) NSW Maritime, in conjunction with the three NSW Port Corporations,
reviews the port limits and the requirements of the PSOLs with regard to
the management of anchorages off NSW ports and provides
recommendations to the Minister for Ports and Waterways.

52
9. APPENDICES
9.1 Terms of Reference
The Investigation was conducted by NSW Maritime under the following Terms of
Reference as reproduced below.

Introduction
On Friday 8 June 2007, the Panamanian registered bulk carrier Pasha Bulker
grounded on Nobbys Beach, Newcastle during severe weather conditions. This
ship had been at anchor off the Port of Newcastle. Other ships, including the
Sea Confidence and the Betis were also in danger of grounding on this day. The
Chief Executive of NSW Maritime, as a delegate of the Minister for Ports and
Waterways, has instigated an investigation into the circumstances of these
incidents pursuant to section 103 of the Marine Safety Act 1998.

Matters to be investigated
The investigation will:

1. investigate the facts and circumstances of the grounding of the Pasha Bulker
and identify whether any offence has been committed under NSW marine
legislation;

2. investigate the facts and circumstances leading to the injury to two tug
crewman assisting the Sea Confidence and Betis on Friday 8 June 2007;

3. determine whether the requirements of the Newcastle Port Corporation’s Port

Safety Operating Licence were complied with;

4. consider the quality and timeliness of weather warnings available to ships in

the vicinity of the Port of Newcastle;

5. consider any standing or verbal communication promulgated by the

Newcastle Port Corporation relevant to the investigation;

6. consider the actions of all ships subsequent to promulgation of the weather

warnings and any communication from Newcastle Port Corporation and in
particular, the actions of the ships Pasha Bulker, Sea Confidence and Betis;

7. consider the actions of all vessels used in support of ships including the
actions of tugs;

8. consider the relevant NSW legislation to determine whether this legislation

adequately provides for the management of ships in circumstances of ships at
anchor and severe weather, and make recommendations to prevent the
recurrence of any similar marine incident; and

9. make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of any similar marine

incident.
53
9.2 Chart of Ship Tracks
Approximate tracks of Sea Confidence, Pasha Bulker and Betis – extract
from AUS 809

54
 9.3 Weather

General Advice Available to Mariners

9.3.1 Included in the Admiralty Sailing Directions – Australia Pilot (Pilot) is the
following information regarding weather for the East coast of Australia:

9.3.2 “Frontal depressions frequently move E or SE across the Southern

Ocean and in summer their tracks lie well to the S of Australia. As winter
approaches, their tracks move progressively farther N to affect the S part
of the area. Other depressions form or intensify off the SE coast of
Australia and can be slow moving before moving off E or SE, and, on
occasions, may give rise to some of the worst conditions that affect the
coast of New South Wales.” 16

9.3.3 More specifically, the Pilot provides the following information and advice
for the Newcastle anchorage.

9.3.4 “During autumn, significant swells are generated by cyclonic depressions

(known locally as an East Coast Low) in the central Tasman Sea and
during winter extreme weather is caused by lows forming close to the
coast. During these periods of extreme weather, coastal swells may
exceed 10m in height.” 17

and

9.3.5 “During S weather, sea and swell conditions can become confused, if so,
it is recommended that vessels weigh anchor and proceed to sea until
the weather moderates.” 18

and

9.3.6 “Whilst no anchorage off the port can be recommended as suitable for all
weather use, good fair weather anchorage can be found S of 32° 58’ S
at a distance greater than 2 miles from the shore…..A good anchor
watch should be maintained and main engines should not be dismantled
or immobilised in any way as weather conditions may deteriorate
rapidly.” 19

16
Admiralty Sailing Directions - Australia Pilot Volume III (the Pilot), Page 34, paragraph 1.172
17
Ibid, Page 97, paragraph 3.90
18
Ibid
19
Ibid, Page 97, paragraph 3.94
55
 Weather Classification

9.3.7 There are two general methods of classifying the intensity of weather.
The first is the Beaufort Scale which is an internationally recognised
weather classification system, a version of which is reproduced below.

Probable
Beaufort Descriptive Mean wind Probable
Deep Sea Criterion maximum
Number Term speed mean wave
wave height
equivalent. height (m)
(m)
Knots
0 Calm <1 Sea like a mirror N/A N/A
Ripples with the appearance of scales are formed, but without foam
1 Light air 1-3 0.1 0.1
crests
Light Breeze Small wavelets, still short but more pronounced; crests have a glassy
2 4-6 0.2) 0.3
appearance and do not break
Gentle Breeze Large wavelets; crests begin to break; foam of glassy appearance; 0.6 1
3 7-10
perhaps scattered white horses
Moderate 1 1.5
4 Breeze
11-16 Small waves, becoming longer; fairly frequent white horses

Moderate waves, taking a more pronounced long form; many white 2 2.5
5 Fresh Breeze 17-21
horses are formed (chance of some spray)
Large waves begin to form; the white foam crests are extensive 3 4
6 Strong Breeze 22-27
everywhere (probably some spray
Sea heaps up and white foam from breaking waves begins to be
7 Near Gale 28-33 4 5.5
blown in streaks along the direction of the wind
Moderately high waves of greater length; edges of crests begin to
Gale
8 34-40 break into spindrift; foam is blown in well-marked streaks along the 5.5 7.5
direction of the wind
High waves; dense streaks of foam along the direction of the wind;
7 10
9 Strong Gale 41-47 crests of waves begin to topple, tumble and roll over; spray may affect
visibility
Very high waves with long overhanging crests; the resulting foam, in
great patches, is blown in dense white streaks along the direction of
10 Storm 48-55 the wind; on the whole, the surface of the sea takes a white 9 12.5
appearance; the tumbling of the sea becomes heavy and shock-like;
visibility affected
Exceptionally high waves (small and medium sized ships might be for
a time lost to view behind the waves); the sea is completely covered
11.5 16
11 Violent Storm 56-63 with long white patches of foam lying along the direction of the wind;
everywhere the edges of the wave crests are blown into froth; visibility
affected

Greater than
The air is filled with foam and spray; sea completely white with driving 14
12 Hurricane 64+ 16
spray; visibility seriously affected
th
Beaufort Scale information sourced from The Mariner’s Handbook 8 Edition 2004 page 110, published by the United
Kingdom Hydrographic Office.

9.3.8 The Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) uses a slightly different classification

system to define wind strengths when issuing coastal and high seas
warnings:
• Strong Wind Warning (Coastal Waters only): from 26 knots (48 km/h)
and up to 33 knots (61 km/h);
• Gale Warning: from 34 knots (63 km/h) and up to 47 knots (87 km/h);
56
 • Storm Force Wind Warning: from 48 knots (89 km/h) and up to 63
knots (117 km/h);
• Hurricane Force Wind Warning: 64 knots (119 km/h) or more.
Note: These wind speeds are based on 10-minute averages

9.3.9 Diagrams (figures 4 – 5) indicate the wave heights during the course of
the gale, and show the difference between the inner and outer buoy
readings that indicate that the reading of 17.9 metre wave height was
erroneous.

Figure 4 – Wave Data Inner Buoy

Wave - Inner Directional - Total - Hs/Tp

18 360

16 310

14
260

12 TpTotal s
210
Height m/Period s

HsTotal m
10

Direction
160
8

110
6

60
4

2 10

0 -40
7/06/2007 7/06/2007 7/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 9/06/2007 9/06/2007
9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48 9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48
Date

Figure 5 – Wave Data Outer Buoy

Wave - Outer Directional - Total - Hs/Tp

20 360

18
310

16
260
14

210
Height m/Period s

12
Direction

TpTotal s
10 160

HsTotal m
8
110

6
60
4

10
2

0 -40
7/06/2007 7/06/2007 7/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 9/06/2007 9/06/2007
9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48 9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48
Date

57
Figure 6 shows the wind speeds and directions recorded at Nobbys Head during
the course of the gale.

Figure 6 – Nobbys Head Wind Data 7/8 June

Nobby's Wind Speed & Direction
60 360

310
50

260

40
210

Sustained_Speed
Speed kn

Direction
30 160 Gust_Speed
Sustained_Direction
Gust_Direction
110
20

60

10
10

0 -40
7/06/2007 7/06/2007 7/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 8/06/2007 9/06/2007 9/06/2007
9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48 9:36 14:24 19:12 0:00 4:48
Date

58
9.4 Primary Sources of Information

Pasha Bulker
Master of Pasha Bulker
Chief Engineer of Pasha Bulker
Chief Officer of Pasha Bulker
Second Officer of Pasha Bulker
Third Officer of Pasha Bulker
Pasha Bulker Loading and Stability Book
Pasha Bulker Loadicator Program
Pasha Bulker Deck Logbook extracts
Pasha Bulker Radio Logbook extracts
Pasha Bulker Engine Logbook extracts

Sea Confidence
Master of Sea Confidence
Sea Confidence Deck Logbook extract

Betis
Master of Betis
Betis Deck Logbook extract

Newcastle Port Corporation (NPC)

Harbour Master
Senior Pilot
VTIC Manager
VTIC Officers
NPC Port Safety Operating Licence
NPC Incident Control Plan (1 April 2001)
NPC Letter dated 04 Jul 07
Anchored vessel information provided by NPC
NPC Coast Radio Network Operating Procedures
BIMCO for Newcastle
NPC VHF Radio Procedures
NPC VTIC Anchorage Watch procedure
NPC Tide Chart and Information Handbook
NPC Meteorological/Oceanographic Graphs (Waverider Buoy Data)
Chart Plots of each ship
Letter RE: NPC Comments on Draft Investigation Report, Dated 1 November
2007

Port Waratah Coal Services (PWCS)

Superintendent of Operations (Kooragang Island)
Manager Live Run and Operational Improvement
PWCS Coal Terminals Handbook

59
Svitzer Australasia Tugs
Master of tug Watagan
Svitzer Australasia Newcastle Port Manager

Miscellaneous
Harbour Master Port of Mackay
Harbour Master Port of Geraldton
Harbour Master Port Hedland
Vessel Traffic Manager Port of Brisbane
Channel 7 News (video footage)
Submission from Maritime Union of Australia dated 1 August 2007
Bureau of Meteorology
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
IALA Operational Procedures of Vessel Traffic Services
Admiralty Sailing directions 10th Edition 2005
Admiralty Manual of Seamanship Volume 1
Letter from Cardno Lawson Treloar Pty Ltd dated 1 August 2007
Report provided by NSW Maritime Naval Architect on Pasha Bulker Stability

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

NSW Maritime gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Captain Kit

Filor (former Deputy Director Surface Safety Investigation, Australian Transport
Safety Bureau) in reviewing this report during its early development.

60