AP V Radhakishan

http://JUDIS.NIC.
IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11

PETITIONER:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
N. RADHAKISHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/1998
BENCH:
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 1998
Present:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar
Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa
Ms.K. Amareshwari, Sr. Adv., V.R. Anumolu, T.Anil Kumar,
Advs. with her for the appellant
H.s. Gururaja Rao, Sr. Adv., T.V. Ratnam, Adv. with him for
the Respondent
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
WADHWA,J.
Against the judgment dated December 12, 1996 of the
Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in O.A.
No. 2239/96 filed by the respondent, the State of Andhra
pradesh has come up in appeal. By the impugned judgment the
Tribunal allowed the petition of the respondent and directed
that the respondent be promoted to the category of Director
of Town and Country Planning, in the existing vacancy,
ignoring the charge memos -- (1) Memo No. 2732/FL/87/27/MA,
dated July 31, 1995; (2) memo no. 145/B2/93-19/MA, dated
October 27, 1995; and (3) Memo No. 898/B.2/94/M.A dated June
1, 1996, if the respondent is otherwise eligible. The
Tribunal found that the Departmental Promotion committee
met on August 16, 1995 and prepared the panel for the panel
year 1994-95, which was approved by the State Government in
October, 1995. One of the persons included in the panel was
promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country
Planning by G.O.M. dated November 14, 1995. The Tribunal
observed that the panel itself having been prepared on
August 16, 1995 should lapse only on December 31, 1996 and
not on December 31, 1995 as was contended by the State. The
name of the respondent was included in the panel. The
Tribunal, therefore, held that since the panel would lapse
only on December 31, 1996 the respondent was entitled for
promotion before that date. The Tribunal also noticed that
the objection of the State that the panel lapsed on December
31, 1995 was never raised either before it or in the State
against an interim order earlier made by the Tribunal.
Tribunal was concerned with the question if promotion
of the respondent could be denied to him after his name had
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11
court and that in a given case, the
nature of the offence and other
circumstances may be such that
quashing the proceedings may not be
in the interest of justice. In such
a case, it has been observed, it is
open to the court to make such
other appropriate order as it finds
just and equitable in the
circumstance of the case."
In that case this Court said that it was more appropriate
and in interest of justice as well as in the interest of
administration that inquiry which has proceeded to a large
extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time the
Court directed that Goyal should be considered forthwith for
promotion without reference to and without taking into
consideration the charges or the pendency of the inquiry, if
he is found fit for promotion.
It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined
principles applicable to all cases and in all situations
where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary
proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary
proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be
examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. the
essence of the matter is that the court has to take into
consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight
them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and
honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings
should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when
delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay.
The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s
not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when
these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his
part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether
delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court
has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on
what account the delay has occurred. if the delay is
unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ
large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how
much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the
charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of
administrative justice that an officer enterusted with a
particular job has to perform his duties honestly,
efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates
from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.
Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take
its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats
justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer
unless it can be shown that he is to or when there is
proper explanation for the delay in conducting the
disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to
balance these two diverse consideration.
In the present case we find that without any reference
to records merely on the report of the Director General,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the
respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without
particularizing the role played by each of the officers
charged. There were four charges against the respondent.
With three of them he was not concerned. He offered
explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary
authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to
appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was
validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no
explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11
proceedings all these years. The case depended on records
of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption
bureau had pointed out that no witnesses ad been examined
before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had
been appointed on after the other, had just to examine the
records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions
were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was
responsible for condoning or approving the same against the
bye-laws. It is nobody’s case that respondent at any stage
tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The
Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the
state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any
explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the
Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated
July 31, 1995 and directing the state to promote the
respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos
dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. the Tribunal
rightly did not quash these two later memos.
Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. It
is dismissed with costs.

AP V Radhakishan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

AP V Radhakishan

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

AP V Radhakishan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/04/1998

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.