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THE LIBRARY OF
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
Edited by
JOHN MCINTYRE AND IAN T. RAMSEY
ANSELM: FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM

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ANSELM:
FIDES QUAERENS.
INTELLECTUM
Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God
in the Context of his Theological Scheme
KARL BARTH
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56 BLOOMSBURY STREET
LONDON
Respectfully dedicated to
The Venerable Faculty of Divinity of
The University of Glasgow
as a token of gratitude
for the honour of a Doctorate of Divinity
conferred on the author
18th Fune 1930
fi Fo i, GC .
4 4
Translated by Ian W. Robertson

from the German Fides Quaerens Intellectum 2nd edition 1958,
Evangelischer Verlag A. G., Ziirich, Switzerland
FIRST ENGLISH EDITION 1960

© s cM PRESS LTD 1960
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
THE CAMELOT PRESS LTD
LONDON AND SOUTHAMPTON
CONTENTS
Abbreviations
Preface to the First Edition
Preface to the Second Edition
INTRODUCTION
JI Tue THEOLOGICAL SCHEME

1 The Necessity for Theology
2 The Possibility of Theology
3 The Conditions of Theology
4 The Manner of Theology
5 The Aim of Theology (The Proof)
II THe PRoor oF THE EXISTENCE OF GoD

A The Presuppositions of the Proof
1 The Name of God
2 The Question of the Existence of God
B The Development of the Proof (Commentary
‘on Proslogion 2-4)
1 The General Existence of God (Pros/. 2)
2 The Special Existence of God (Prosl. 3)
3 The Possibility of Denying the Existence of
God (Prosl. 4)
Index
ABBREVIATIONS
C.D.A. Cur Deus homo

C. Gaun. Contra Gaunilonem (Responsio editoris in
Schmitt edition)
comm. op. Commendatio operts ad Urbanum Papam IT
De casu diab. De casu diaboli
De cone. virg. De conceptu virginali et de originalt peccato
De concordia De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis
et gratiae det cum ltbero arbitrio
De lib. arb. De libertate arbitrit
De nuptits consang. De nuptits consanguineorum
De proc. Spir. De processione Spiritus sancti
De verit. De veritate
Ep. de incarn. Epistola de incarnatione verbi
Monol. Monologion
MPL Patrologia Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne
Pro instp. Pro insipiente (Gaunilonis)
Prosl. Proslogion
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Tuts Preface must be devoted at least to some extent to answer-

ing the question of what I intend this book to accomplish. The
question embarrasses me a little as I realize how varied have
been the motives which prompted me to start and have been
prompting me since I started.
First I must mention the outward cause, which in its own
way was also a very inward cause, namely a seminar on
Anselm’s Cur Deus homo which I held in Bonn during the summer
of 1930. The questions and objections of those who took part
in this seminar and then, most important of all, a Guest
Lecture by my philosopher friend Heinrich Scholz of Miinster
on the Proof of God’s Existence in Anselm’s Proslogion, produced
within me a compelling urge to deal with Anselm quite differ-
ently from hitherto, to deal directly with the problematical
Anselm, the Anselm of Proslogion 2-4, to establish and clarify in
concrete form my own position in regard to him and to express
my views on the subject to a wider circle. I may add that in this
good company Heinrich Scholz decided for his part to do the
same and so we are to expect from him too a study of the
Anselm of Proslogion 2-4—doubtless a welcome counterpart to
this work. It will appear in this series fairly soon.
But of course my love for Anselm goes back much further
than that. In my ‘Prolegomena’ to the Dogmatics I made
vigorous reference to him and as a result was promptly accused
of Roman Catholicism and of Schleiermacherism.! The present
work is not intended as a defence against that charge. However,
it did seem appropriate that at some time, both for my own
sake and for others, I ought to make a definite statement of
some of the reasons why I find more of value and significance in
this theologian than in others. I hope I may be successful in
1 However, only because of quotations from Grabmann’s book on Scholasticism,
which from the theological point of view is not particularly distinguished.
i
making both sides give careful attention to him, for so far they
have failed to do so. Thomas Aquinas and Kant were at one in
their misunderstanding and denial of that very aspect of
Anselm’s theology which is to be our special concern here.
One who stands on so privileged a height that this could be
true of him must surely be reckoned, by Protestants and
Roman Catholics alike, far more than is commonly the case,
as one of those phenomena that simply must be known and
respected.
Moreover, I was also interested in the mere technical aspect
of the problem of interpretation which Anselm’s Proof of the
Existence of God had raised. About this Proof much has already
been written. Its interpretation, traditional since Gaunilo
and all but canonized through Thomas Aquinas and still
influential even in our day,? always struck me as being a kind of
intellectual insolence concealing or distorting everything vital.
On the other hand, neither was I convinced of the value of the
other interpretations that have been expounded to us in the last
few decades from the widest variety of sources,? more subtle
and more accurate as they undoubtedly are. When I looked
around for the causes of my dissatisfaction the following two
formal questions more or less forced themselves upon me con-
cerning the literature to date. Isitpossible to assess Anselm’s
Proof of the Existence of God unless it is read, understood and
explained within the series of the other Anselmic Proofs, that is
within the general context of his ‘proving’, the context of his
own particular theological scheme? And is it possible to assess
it without an exact exegesis of the whole passage (Prosl. 2-4)
which is to be regarded as the main text—an exegesis that
investigates every word and that also gives as full consideration
as possible to Anselm’s discussion with Gaunilo? I have tried to
1 For instance, to mention only three examples—F. Chr. Baur’s Account and
Criticism in his Kirchgeschichte, Vol. 3, 1861, pp. 287f.; or Uberweg-Baumgartner’s
Geschichte der Philosophie, 10th ed., 1915, vol. 2, p. 270; or J. Bainvel in vol. 1 of the
Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, 1923, columns 1351f.
2 We may mention the names B. Adlhoch, R. Seeberg, K. Heim, A. Koyré,
W.v.d. Steinen and of an older generation the worthy F. R. Hasse.
8 «
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
give effect to both these presuppositions, which up until now

seem to have been left out of account as much by Anselm’s
critics as by his friends. Whatever position one may wish to take
up with regard to the interpretation to which this path has led
me, I hope that at least it will be granted that this path is in
fact the right one and that even the champions of other inter-
pretations have to start out along this same road.
From all this I cannot deny that I deem Anselm’s Proof of
the Existence of God in the context of his theological Scheme a
model piece of good, penetrating and neat theology, which at
every step I have found instructive and edifying, though I
would not and could not identify myself completely with the
views of its author. Moreover, I believe that it is a piece of
theology that has quite a lot to say to present-day theology, both
Protestant and Roman Catholic, which, quite apart from its
attitude to its particular form, present-day theology ought to
heed. In saying that, I may be suspected of reading this or that
idea into the eleventh-century thinker, so that under the
protection of his century I might advance it in the twentieth.
But I have no qualms. Who can read with eyes other than his
own ? With that one reservation I think I am able to say that I
have advanced nothing here but what I have actually read in
Anselm.
As it is obvious that I have such a variety of aims in writing
this book, I am entitled to hope that my reader’s interest will
be served, if not with all, then at least with some of them.
Bergli,
Oberrieden (Canton Kiirich),
August 1931
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
Ir was in the series “Studies in the History and Doctrine of

Protestantism’ (Chr. Kaiser, Munich), edited by what now
seems such a remarkable trio, Paul Althaus, Karl Barth and
Karl Heim, that this book first appeared twenty-seven years
ago. There was some very interesting criticism at the time and
it seemed to me that the Roman Catholic observations were
more pertinent, more reasonable and more worthy of con-
sideration than the others. In the preface to the first edition a
companion (perhaps even rival) volume to be written by my
dear friend Heinrich Scholz, who died on 30th December,
1956, was promised, but unfortunately this was not to be. In
such a volume he would have tackled the problem in his
inimitable mathematical and logical manner and would
undoubtedly have shed light both on it and also for all of us on
the indefinable reality of our friendship—at the point where it
was indefinable. In the meantime through pressure of other
work he, like myself, had to some extent lost sight if not of
Anselm’s main theme, at least of the particular way in which
he developed it. So far as I was concerned, after finishing this
book I went straight into my Church Dogmatics and it has kept
me occupied ever since and will continue to occupy me for the
rest of my days. Only a comparatively few commentators, for
example Hans Urs von Balthasar, have realized that my interest
in Anselm was never a side-issue for me or—assuming I am
more or less correct in my historical interpretation of St
Anselm—realized how much it has influenced me or been
absorbed into my own line of thinking. Most of them have
completely failed to see that in this book on Anselm I am work-
ing with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that f’
whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more
in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology. So
II
it has come about, other circumstances probably helping as

well, that to my sorrow and surprise this book, on which at the
time I expended special care and devotion, has remained
until now in its first edition and has long been out of print. In
view of a renewed demand, particularly from the younger
generation, Evangelische Verlag, Zollikon, who now handle
all my pre-1938 works, decided to issue a new edition. It
presents no new material. ‘That would have meant plunging
back into the texts and analysing the vociferous objections
made then and since and for that I just do not have the time
now. The only important change that will be found here is
that the references are taken from the edition of the Collected
Works of Anselm which has appeared in the interval (S.
Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera omnia ad fidem codicum
recensuit Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, O.S.B., vols. I-V, 1938-1951).
That is except for a few passages from less well attested writings
of Anselm that are quoted here as before from Migne (MPL)
since their reproduction is reserved pending the publication of
a later volume of the new edition. ‘The Note on Sources in the
first edition is thus no longer necessary. The work involved in
this revision has been carried out with skill and devotion by
Mr Hinrich Stoevesandt, a divinity student, and I am grateful
to him.
Basel
August, 1958
12
INTRODUCTION
THE Proor of the Existence of God comprises the first and dis-
proportionately shorter of the two parts (cap. 2-4 and 5-26) of
Anselm’s Proslogion. The second and longer part goes on to deal
with the Nature of God. The purpose behind this arrangement
of the book is quite obvious: Da mihi ut, quantum scis expedire,
intelligam quia es, sicut credimus et hoc es quod credimus+—thus
begins the exposition proper after the great introductory
invocation of Prosl. 1. Before this the Prologue of the book had
described how the author had long sought and, after many a
digression, eventually found unum argumenium ... ad astruendum,
quia Deus vere est et quia est summum bonum.? Now this argumentum
must not be identified with the proof which is worked out in
Prosl. 2-4 but rather it is one technical element which Anselm
has made use of in both parts of the book. Therefore, all that
he can have meant by it is the formula for describing God, by
means of which he has in fact proved the Existence of God in the
first part and the Nature of God in the second part: Id quo maius
cogitari non potest.® ‘The sub-title De Existentia Det which appears
in some manuscripts, is dueto a mistaken identity, caused, as
Gaunilo’s reply shows, by the tremendous impression that the
short first part made on the very earliest readers. Anselm never
meant that the part should thus be taken for the whole. The
joy he speaks of in the Prologue sprang from the discovery of
the formula by which he considered himself to be in a position
to prove, on the one hand: quia es, sicut credimus (with the result:
vere es); and on the other hand: quia hoc es, quod credimus (with
the result: summum bonum es). So far as he is concerned Prosl,
5-26 is in actual fact no less important than Prosl. 2-4. However.
1 Prosl. 2:1 101, 3f. 2193, 6ff.
3 In Classical and Mediaeval Latin argumentum can mean either terminus medius
(middle term), lumen quo manifestantur principia (means of proof) or argumentatio
(proof set forth).
13
the aim of our inquiry should be confined to these three first

chapters—the celebrated Proof of the Existence of God.
What has to be said in explanation of the Proof will only make
sense if we may assume a firm grasp of what ‘to prove’ means in
Anselm generally. Too much has been said about this proof,
for it and against it, without there being any real appreciation
of what Anselm was trying to do, and in fact doing, when he
explained ‘was proving’ and when he justified this particular
proof. What is set out in Prosl. 2-4 is first described as a ‘proof’
(probare, probatio) by Anselm’s opponent Gaunilo,! but this
designation is adopted by Anselm himself. This concept can
be found elsewhere in Anselm but always in passages where he
is speaking of a definite result that his work has actually
produced or is expected to produce. Anselm is bent on this
result and strives to achieve it. But in point of fact his own
particular description of what he is doing is not probare at all
but zntelligere. As intelligere is achieved it issues in probare. Here
we can give a general definition: what to prove means is that
the validity of certain propositions advocated by Anselm is
established over against those who doubt or deny them; that
is to say, it means the polemical-apologetic result of zntelligere.
How exactly he conceived this result and what he did and did
not anticipate from it, can be ascertained only after detailed
analysis of his thoughts on intelligere, that is to say, of his theo-
logical scheme. Therefore it is to these that we must first of all
turn.
1 Pro insip. 1: 1125, 4 and 7.
2 C. Gaun. 10: 1 138, 29; 139, 2. Anselm’s ‘work’ Contra Gaunilonem ought sometime
to be specially studied from the standpoint of its literary character. I regard it as
probably being a collection of notes written down in two sections: I-4, 5-10.
i4
I
THE THEOLOGICAL SCHEME
1. THE NECESSITY FOR THEOLOGY
Our first inquiry is into the ‘necessity’ by which znielligere

becomes a problem for Anselm. It would not be wrong to
make the obvious reference to the purpose of the polemical-
apologetic Proof but it would merely be scratching the
surface.
It ought to be noticed first of all that this is not the only
result of intelligere that all the way through Anselm recognizes
and has before him. As zntelligere is achieved, it issues—in joy.?
The dominating factor in Anselm’s mind is that even the
Church Fathers wrote about it in order to give the faithful joy
in believing by a demonstration of the ratio of their faith.?
This reason, which the intelligere seeks and finds, possesses in
itself not only utilitas (by which Anselm may have been thinking
of a polemical proof) but also pulchritudo. It is speciosa super
intellectus hominum.® Is it mere coincidence that in a work like
Cur Deus homo, which on its own admission is so set on proving,
its chief end should be given as, first, this delectari and, secondly,
the polemical obligation of I Peter 3.15 ?4 It is evident here that
a strong foundation is combined with a genial inclination to
please, and this fact may well remind us that early Scholasticism
1 Ad magnum et delectabile quiddam me subito perduxit haec mea meditatio (Monol. 6:
119, 15). Cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur (Ep. 136: 11 281, 40).
- 2 Ad pascendum eos, qui iam corde fide mundato fidei ratione . . . delectantur (C.D.h.
comm. op.: 1 39, 4ff).
3 C.D.h. I 1: 11 48, 8f.; 49, 19. Incidentally, we learn here that Anselm was always
capable of righteous indignation—over bad pictures of Christ. It may also be noted
here that it is in Prosl. 2 of all places that a pictor comes forward as chief witness
for the relationship between the esse rei in intellectu and the intelligere rem esse.
4C.D.h. Ir: 11 47, 9; cf. also 17 15: 1 116, 12: ut me... intellectu laetifices.
15
was contemporary with the heyday of the Romanesque style of

cathedral art. And it might well be a first test of our under-
standing of Anselm to ask ourselves whether we are capable of
appreciating that the despair with which, as he says? in the
prologue of the Proslogion, he sought that unum argumentum,
could not be taken less seriously, because in addition to the
fighting spirit obviously indispensable to one engaged on
theological work, he still had some freedom left to admit other
spirits, one of them clearly being the aesthetics of theological
knowledge. And indeed why not? Why not just that? At least
we have to take this second aim of Anselm’s intelligere very
seriously and we cannot evade the prior question—what
exactly does ‘to prove’ mean, if it is the result of the same
action which may also lead straight to delectatio?
However, the necessity of Anselm’s intelligere does not lie in
the desirability of these, its two results. And it is only by virtue of
its necessity on a higher level that these, its results, are possible
and desirable. Anselm’s concern in all his writings (with one
exception)? is theology, the intellectus fidet. Fides quaerens intel-
lectum—that was the original title of the Proslogion, as is made
clear by the Prologue. Thus the only intelligere that concerns
Anselm is that ‘desired’ by faith. And the necessity that leads
us to the zntelligere to which he is referring, and also to its
results—probare and laetificare—is precisely this ‘desire’ of
faith. |
The first thing to be emphasized is the negation that this
involves. What we are speaking of is a spontaneous desire of
faith. Fundamentally, the quaerere intellectumis really immanent in
fides. Therefore it is not a question of faith ‘requiring’ the ‘proof’
or the ‘joy’. There is absolutely no question at all of a require-
ment of faith. Anselm wants ‘proof’ and ‘joy’ because he wants
1 Cf. also C.D.h. Preface: 11 42, 6: in magna . . . cordis tribulatione.
2 Anselm himself explicitly characterized the work De grammatico as non-
theological (De verit. Prologue: 1 173, 5ff). Note that in the same place he represents
De veritate as a theological work, although to us it is purely logical or meta-
physical.
16
intelligere and he wants intelligere because he believes.1 Any

reversal of this order of compulsion is excluded by Anselm’s
conception of faith. That is to say, for Anselm, ‘to believe’ does
not mean simply a striving of the human will towards God but a
striving of the human will into God and so a participation
(albeit in a manner limited by creatureliness) in God’s mode of
Being? and so a similar participation in God’s aseity, in the
matchless glory of his very Self, and therefore also in God’s
utter absence of necessity.? Thus on no account can the given-
ness or non-given-ness of the results of inéelligere involve for
faith the question of its existence. Therefore, the aim of theology
cannot be to lead men to faith,4 nor to confirm them in the
faith,> nor even to deliver their faith from doubt.® Neither does
the man who asks theological questions ask them for the sake of
the existence of his faith; his theological answers, however
complete they may be, can have no bearing on the existence of
his faith. Gratia Dei praeveniente, he is so sure of his faith that, so
far as he is aware, nihil tamen sit quod ab eius firmitate evellere valeat,
even although what he believes he could conceive nulla ratione.
1 Nos vero, quia credimus (rationem quaerimus) (C.D.h. I 3: 11 50, 19).
2 Quisquis tendendo ad illam (sc. summam essentiam) pervenerit, non extra illam remane-
bit, sed intra illam permanebit ;quod expressius et familiarius significatur, si dicitur tendendum
esse in illam, quam si dicitur ad illam. Hac itaque ratione puto congruentius posse dici
credendum esse in illam quam ad illam (Monol. 76: 1 83, 27-84, 2).
3 Deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid (C.D.h.
I 5: m 100, 20f). Deus nulli quicquam debet, sed omnis creatura illi debet; et ideo non
expedit homini, ut agat cum Deo, quemadmodum par cum pari (ibid. I 19: 1 86, 7ff).
Summas veritas... nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est, nisi quia est (De
verit. IO: 1 190, 4).
4 Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam ... (Prosl. 1: 1 100, 18). Non ut per rationem
ad fidem accedant (C.D.h. I 1: 11 47, 8; cf. Ep. 136: wt 281, 38f).
5 Non ut me in fide confirmes (C.D.h. IT 15: 1 116, 11). Anselm makes an urgent
plea that we should not ascribe to him the dreadful praesumptio that he is speaking
ad confirmandum fidei Christianae firmamentum, quasi mea indigeat defensione. That would
be like trying to support Mount Olympus with pegs and ropes. Quite absurd.
And here the reference is to the rock in Nebuchadnezzar’s vision which tore itself
away from the mountain and ended by filling the whole world. All sancti et sapientes,
qui super eius aeternam firmitatem se stabilitos esse gaudent, would most certainly con-
demn me, si eum meis rationibus fulcire et quasi nutantem stabilire nitar (Ep. de incarn. 1:
m5, 7ff).
8 Non ad hoc veni, ut auferas mihi fidei dubitationem (C.D.h. I 25: 1.96, 6). He decides
to come to the aid of those labouring under certain dogmatic difficulties etiam si
fides in illis superet rationem quae illis fidei videtur repugnare (Ep. de incarn. 1: 11 6, 2f).
B 17
The rei veritas remains fixed whatever its relation to the zniellectus
ad eam capiendam. It is the presupposition of all theological
inquiry that faith as such remains undisturbed by the vagaries
of the theological ‘yes’ and ‘no’.? If zntelligere does not reach its
goal (and it is certainly a long way from doing so), then in
place of the joy of knowing there remains reverence before
Truth itself, which is no less ‘Truth because this is so.? For as
truth, that is the validity of the propositions of human know-
ledge, is entirely determined by the thing believed, so is this
thing (meaning faith in this thing) utterly and completely
independent of the validity of these human propositions.*
It is not the existence of faith, but rather—and here we
approach Anselm’s position—the nature of faith, that desires
knowledge. Credo ut intelligam® means: It is my very faith itself
that summons me to knowledge. There are four separate but
converging lines in Anselm’s thought along which this inner
compulsion becomes clear.
1. There is a neat statement of Anselm’s doctrine of God that
must be mentioned. It reads: Deum veritatem esse credimus.®
Truth generally means: Rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis.? But
God is related to all that is called Truth apart from him, not
only as summa veritas but, because he is the Creator, also as
causa veritatis. Thus God is at least also causa veritatis, quae cogit-
ations est.8 He is the God in whom zntelligentia and veritas are
identical, the God® whose Word to us is nothing other than the
1C.D.h. I 1: 1 48, 16-49, 2. Saepe namque aliquid esse certi sumus et tamen hoc ratione
probare nescimus (ibid. IT 13: 1 113, 17f). Cuncta, quae ipse (sc. Deus) dicit, certa esse...
dubitandum non est, quamvis non eorum ratio intelligatur a nobis (ibid. IT 15: 11 116, 5f).
Credentem me fecisti scire, quod nesciens credebam (De casu diab. 16: 1 261, 25).
2 Nulla difficultas aut impossibilitas intelligendi valeat illum a veritate, cui per fidem
adhaesit, excutere (Ep. de incarn. 1: 11 10, 15f).
3 Cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur; cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest,
veneratur (Ep. 136: 1 281, 40f). Anselm explicitly says that one of his purposes in
writing the Monologion and the Proslogion was ad adiuvandum religiosum studium eorum,
qui humiliter quaerunt intelligere, quod firmissime credunt (Ep. de incarn. 6: 11 21, 2f).
4 Rectitudo . . . qua significatio recta dicitur, non habet esse aut aliquem motum per
significationem, quomodocumque ipsa moveatur significatio (De verit. 13: 1 198, 18ff).
5 Prosl. r: 1 100, 18. 8 De verit. 1: 1 176, 4. * Ibid., rr: 1 191, tof.
8 Ibid., 10: 1 190, 10f. 9 Monol. 46: 1 62, 20ff.
18
integra veritas paternae substantiae.+ He is sensibilis, that is, cognos-

cibilis.2, Obviously we cannot believe in this God without his
becoming the author of a vera cogitatio—that is, faith in him also
demands knowledge of him. |
2. According to Anselm’s psychology, faith is in effect
primarily a movement of the will. We heard earlier of the
paraphrase: tendere in Deum.® ‘This tendere, however, is nothing
but the voluntary decision of obedience owed to God—love for
God.‘ But to this effective primacy of the will there corresponds
the original primacy of knowledge.’ Faith means the free
exercise of will, but an exercise of will by a rational creature
means choosing and depends on the distinction between iustum
et iniustum, verum et non verum, bonum et malum.® ‘This distinguishing
is clearly the basic act of what we call knowing.
3. The relation with which we are at present dealing can also
be understood from the side of Anselm’s anthropology. Faith,
according to Anselm, does not come about without something
new encountering us and happening to us from outside,
nequaquam sine sui generis semine et laboriosa cultura. Fides esse nequit
sine conceptione. ‘The seed to be received is the ‘Word of God’ that
is preached and heard; and that it comes to us and that we have
the rectitudo volendi to receive it, is grace.? But the Word en-
counters in us a fotestas—Anselm describes it as the zmago
summae essentiae (of the holy Three-in-One-ness of God) per
1 [hid., 46: 1 62, 25f. 2 Prosl. 6: 1 104f. 3 Monol. 76f: 1 836.
4 Sicut Deus voluntate bonus est, sic homo, ad eius similitudinem factus, voluntate bonus .. .
quia imitatur eum qui aeternaliter et essentialiter a se ipso est bonus (Medit. 19: 5, MPL
158, 806f). Nihil igitur apertius quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam
essentiam amet super omnia bona (Monol. 68: 1 79, 1ff). So too, the concept veritas
receives its ultimate and crucial interpretation by the concept justitia, that is:
rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata (De verit. 12: 1 194, 26).
5 Amare autem eam nequit, nisi eius reminisct et eam studuerit intelligere (Monol. 68: 1
79, 5f). Justitia cur laus debetur (as distinct from the righteousness of irrational
creatures) ... non est in ulla natura, quae rectitudinem non agnoscit . . . Velle autem illam
non valet, qui nescit eam (De verit. 12: 1 192, 27-33). And right on to eternal blessed-
ness it holds true that: Utique tantum gaudebunt, quantum amabunt; tantum amabunt,
quantum cognoscent (Prosl. 26: 1 121, of).
8 Monol. 68: 1 78, 22; C.D.h. II 1: 1.97, 6.
7 De concordia Qu. III 6: 1 270, 20f; 271, 7ff.
19
naturalem potentiam impressa—by which, without participation in

them, we are yet capable of (a) recollection of, (b) knowledge of
and (c) love for an optimum et maximum omnium. It is this potestas,
this vestigium trinitatis, that distinguishes us from animals and
makes us men.! In faith this potentiality is actualized.” Al-
though man does not believe apart from the Word that comes
to him and apart from prevenient grace—the zmago Dei instead
of being naturaliter impressa is now per voluntarium effectum expressa®
—nevertheless, (a) he ‘remembers’* God, (4) he recognizes
God and (c) he loves God. Knowledge of God must then come
about, like love to God, on the occurrence of faith, because the
completeness of man’s likeness to God, as restored in the
Christian, so requires it. |
4. The fourth line in Anselm along which intelligere necessarily
follows from faith is the line of eschatology. On one occasion he
called the zntellectus, quem in hac vita capimus the medium inter
fidem et speciem.5 We ought not to press his reasoning here too
far for it is obviously a little vague. For him knowledge, as
opposed to vision, ranks higher than faith only in a very relative
sense.® ‘There can be absolutely no question at all of zntelligere
breaking through the barrier between the regnum gratiae and the
regnum gloriae. On the contrary, it is in its very quaerere and
invenire that intellectus comes up against the inexorable limitations
of humanity in a way that faith, as such, does not. Just because
he is intelligens the Christian, of all men, has to learn to dis-
cern with agonizing clarity what is conceivable by him about
1 Monol. 32: 151, off; 67:1 78, 7ff; 68: 1 79, 1ff.
2 Creasti in me hance imaginem tuam, ut tui memor te cogitem, te amem. Sed sic est abolita
attritione vitiorum, sic est offuscata fumo peccatorum, ut non possit facere ad quod facta est,
nist tu renoves et reformes eam (Prosl. 1: 1 100, 12ff).
3 Monol. 68: 1 78, 156.
4 As far as Iam aware Anselm made no further use of the doctrine of the memoria,
which was undoubtedly taken over from Augustine (Confessions x 17 to 24). At
any rate, in constrast to Augustine, he did not develop the idea in a Platonic or
Neo-Platonic way.
5 C.D.hA. comm. op.: 1 40, 10f.
6 It is better to avoid this kind of distinction of value in Anselm.
20
God himself.1 So we shall have to interpret the medial charac-
ter of knowledge in Anselm’s sense by saying that knowledge
stands between faith and vision in the same way as we might
say that a mountain stands between a man looking at it from
the valley and the sun. Jnéelligere is a potentiality for advancing
in the direction of heavenly vision to a point that can be
reached and that is worth trying to reach. It has within itself
something of the nature of vision and it is worth striving for as
similitudo of vision, just because it leads men, not beyond, but
right up to the limits of faith.?
This is the ratio of credo ut intelligam—independent of all
objectives and so of all attempts at proving or at finding joy: the
God in whom we believe is causa veritatis in cogitatione. Know- —
ledge at once combines with that love of God on which faith is
set. Intellectus is also involved in actualizing the zmago Dei as this
occurs in faith. Jnéellectus is the limited, but fully attainable,
first step towards that vision which is the eschatological counter-
part of faith. Therefore fides is essentially—quaerens intellectum.
Therefore Anselm regards it as negligentia, st postquam confirmati
sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus, intelligere.? ‘Therefore
just because we possess the certainty of faith, we must hunger |
after the fidei ratio.*
1 Adhuc lates, Domine, animam meam in luce et beatitudine tua, et idcirco versatur illa
adhuc tn tenebris et miseria sua (Prosl. 17: 1 113, 7£). Ergo, Domine, non solum es quo
maius cogitart nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit (Prosl. 15: 1 112, 13f).
Cur non te sentit, Domine Deus, anima mea, si invenit te? An non invenit, quem invenit esse
lucem et veritatem? Quomodo namque intellexit hoc, nisi videndo lucem et veritatem? Aut
potuit omnino aliquid intelligere de te nisi per lucem tuam et veritatem tuam? ... An et
veritas et lux est quod vidit, et tamen nondum te vidit, quia vidit te aliquatenus, sed non vidit
te sicutt es? Domine Deus meus, formator et reformator meus, dic desideranti animae meae,
quid aliud es quam quod vidit, ut pure videat quod desiderat (Prosl. 14: 1 111, 14-24).
2 Plus enim persuadebis altiores in hac re rationes latere, si aliquam te videre monstraveris,
quam st te nullam in ea rationem intelligere nihil dicendo probaveris (C.D.h, II 16: 1 117,
2off).
SC. DA D7 st 48s) 178.
4 Fidei rationem post eius (sc. fide) certudinem debemus esurire (C.D.h. comm. op.: 1
39, 5)—an injunction (intentionem ad intellectum extendere), which Anselm along with
Augustine found explicitly stated in the nisi credideritis non intelligetis, the famous
misunderstanding of Isa. 7.9.
21
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY
When we ask ourselves how an intellectus fidei is possible at all

and how the formula credo ut intelligam is feasible, there is one
overriding consideration to be kept in mind. For Anselm, as
well as for the whole of the Early Church (including the Refor-
mation and Protestant orthodoxy), the actual credere itself was
never an illogical, irrational and, in respect of knowledge,
wholly deficient fendere in Deum, in spite of the continual
emphasis on its distinctive character as obedience and ex-
perience. Inasmuch as faith is faith in God,! and therefore
really faith in what is right, it is the proper action of the will—
due to God, enjoined by God and bound up with saving
‘experience’. Faith comes by hearing and hearing comes by
preaching.? Faith is related to the ‘Word of Christ’ and is not
faith if it is not conceived, that is acknowledged and affirmed by
the Word of Christ. And the Word of Christ is identical with
the ‘Word of those who preach Christ’;? that means it is
legitimately represented by particular human words.* Anselm’s
view as to the precise extent of this human word, the authentic
representative of the Word, is not very clear. But it is certain
that it would include the Bible in a very special way.® But the
1 Amare autem aut sperare non potest, quod non credit. Expedit itaque eidem humanae
animae summam essentiam et ea, sine quibus illa amari non potest, credere, ut illa credendo
tendat in illam (Monol. 76: 1 83, 16ff). In illam tendere nisi credat illam, nullus potest
(ibid. 77:1 84, tif).
cath in schola Christiana quod teneo, tenendo assero, asserendo amo (Ep. 49: ut 162,
2of),
3 Nullus namque velle potest, quod prius corde non concipit. Velle autem credere, quod
est credendum, est recte velle. Nemo ergo potest hoc velle, si nescit, quod credendum est. ‘Think
of Rom. 10.13-14, 17. Quod autem (sc. Paulus) dicit fidem esse ex auditu, intelligendum est
quia fides est ex hoc, quod concipit mens per auditum; neque ita, ut sola conceptio mentis
faciat fidem in homine, sed quia fides esse nequit sine conceptione . . . ‘Auditus autem est
per verbum Christi’, hoc est per verbum praedicantium Christum (De concordia Qu. III 6:
II 270, 28-271, 10).
4 Korum auctoritas quibus dictum est: Non enim vos estis, qui loquimini, sed spiritus
patris vestri loquitur in vobis Matt. 10.20 (De nuptiis consang. 1: MPL 158, 557).
5 He described his writings (in a paraphrase of our word ‘theological’) as
22
concept ‘Holy Scripture’ is itself, according to Anselm, to be

understood in a fundamentally broad sense: at all events those
inferences that are consistent with its text join the text with
equal weight and authority.1 And the kind of inference he
was thinking of is at least partly clear. Anselm has more than
once very solemnly affirmed his ‘faith’ in the Symbolum Romanum,
in the Symbolum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum and in the Symbolum
Quicumque,? and at the same time given great latitude for the
adoption of further necessary elements of faith that are still out-
side formulated dogma.? He also made explicit and emphatic
mention of the scripta catholicorum patrum et maxime beati Augustini, mi
as the norm, if not the source, of his thinking.* And he declared
that in the end the ‘surest’ way to refute an error theologically
within the Church is to refer it (ostendere) to the Pope at Rome,
ut eius prudentia examinetur.’ In short, there now emerges the
tractatus pertinentes ad studium sacrae scripturae (De verit. Preface: 1 173, 2). In passages
mentioned later, in which he comes to speak of the final criterion by which he
regulated all his work, in so far as he ever gave it a name, he called it Holy Scrip-
ture. In an epistolary instruction on “The Holy Life’ he urged upon the questioner
the cura studendi in sacra scriptura as primary and fundamental (Ep. 2: m1 gg, 28).
The essence of his view on the importance of Holy Scripture as the source of the
Church’s proclamation, he gave as follows: Sicut ergo Deus in principio per miraculum
Secit frumentum et alia de terra nascentia ad alimentum hominum sine cultore et seminibus :
ita sine humana doctrina mirabiliter fecit corda prophetarum et apostolorum necnon et evangelia
foecunda salutaribus seminibus: unde accipimus quidquid salubriter in agricultura Dei ad
alimentum animarum seminamus, sicut non nisi de primis terrae seminibus habemus, quod ad
nutrimentum corporum propagamus. Siquidem nihil utiliter ad salutem spiritualem praedicamus,
quod sacra scriptura Spiritus sancti miraculo foecundata non protulerit (De concordia Qu.
III 6: 1 271, 20ff).
1 Quare non tantum suscipere cum certitudine debemus, quae in sacra Scriptura leguntur,
sed etiam ea, quae ex his, nulla alia contradicente ratione rationabili necessitate sequuntur
(De proc. Spir. 11: 1 209, 14ff).
2 Ep. 136: mi 280, 17ff and Ep. de incarn. 4 (in the Prior Recensio, discovered and
first printed by Father Schmitt). In this second passage Anselm adds: Haec est
petra, super quam aedificavit Christus ecclestam suam, adversus quam portae inferi non
praevalebunt. Haec est illa firma petra, super quam sapiens aedificavit domum suam; quae nec
impulsu fluminum nec flatu ventorum est mota. Super hanc nitar aedificare domum meam.
Qui aedificat super firmitatem huius fidet, aedificat super Christum; et qui non aedificat
super hanc fidem, non aedificat super Christum, praeter quem fundamentum aliud poni non
potest (1 283, 15ff).
3 Scimus enim quod non omnia, quae credere et confiteri debemus, ibi dicta sunt; nec illi,
qui symbolum illud dictaverunt, voluerunt fidem Christianam esse contentam ea tantummodo
credere et confiteri, quae ibi posuerunt (De proc. Spir. 13: 1 211, 18ff).
4 Ep. 77: wt 199, 17ff; Monol. Prologue: 1 8, 8ff. 5 Ep. de incarn. 1: 11 3, 7ff.
23
Church! either as a virtual second source alongside Holy Scrip-

ture or simply as anorm for the interpretation of Scripture. If the
latter, with what degree of authority ?And what is the order of
precedence of the various elements—Dogma, Tradition, Fathers,
‘Pope? These questions cannot be answered from the texts of
Anselm—it must be remembered that we are in the eleventh cen-
tury and not the sixteenth or the twentieth and we must not expect
to find either the present-day Roman Catholic thesis or our own
Protestant anti-thesis. To that extent it is not possible to give
concrete definition to what Anselm understood by the verbum
praedicantium Christum. But whatever it may be, Anselm’s sub-
jective credo has an objective Credo of the Church as its unim-
peachable point of reference—that is, a number of proposi-
tions formulated in human words (including, of course, the
Bible and the Symbols of the Early Church as basic documents
of the Catholic Church’s faith). The ‘Word of Christ’ is the
truth that faith believes it to be, in that it is identical with the
‘Word of those who preach Christ.’ In relation to this human
word of Christian proclamation, credere is the presupposition of
intelligere.
It is just this relationship between credo and Credo that deter-
mines how far a Christian can advance from credere to intelligere,
how far therefore theology is possible: As credere of the Credo,
faith is itself, so to speak, an intelligere, distinguished from the
intelligere which it ‘desires’ only in degree and not in kind.?
In its grasp of the Christian message faith is assuredly nothing
less than the awareness of a vox significans rem, of a coherent
continuity that is expressed logically and grammatically,
which, having been heard, is understood and now exists in
intellectu. Faith of course possesses this awareness in common
with unbelief. And unbelief means simply that nothing but this
1 Hic enim me querat qui quaerere vult (Hom. 7: MPL 158, 629). Alongside the
advice to obey (obedire) this first authority (Scripture), other advice is also given:
Ecclesiae sequi consuetudinem, cuius consuetudines velle convellere, genus est haeresis (De
nuptiis consang.: MPL 158, 557). Quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur—
cannot in any circumstances be denied (Ep. de incarn. 1: 11 6, 10f).
2 Adiuva me, ut intelligam, quod dico (Prosl. 9: 1 108, 8f).
24.
awareness, this esse in intellectu, results from hearing the Christian

proclamation and that the vox significans rem does its work in
vain because the man is not aware of the res that it signifies.1
Faith is also this awareness. Its affinity to zntelligere is, however,
not just this primitive and ambiguous affinity. Far above and
beyond this awareness—to the esse in intellectu is added the
intelligere esse 1n re—faith is assent to what is preached as the
Truth, assent for the sake of Christ who is its real and ultimate
Author and who, himself the Truth, can proclaim only the
Truth.? If that is where it begins, this is where it ends—the
ultimate in knowledge, already anticipated in faith, the final
word of knowledge which (with the first word) faith has
already heard—voluntas Det numquam est irrationabilis.? If fides
quaerit intellectum,* then all that remains to be considered is the
gap separating this awareness that has come about and the
assent which has been given. And just because the beginning \
and the end are already given in faith, and because all that has |
to be settled regarding the intelligere that we are seeking is the
gap between these two extremes, this intelligere is a soluble
problem and theology a feasible task. Because of this twofold
affinity between credere and intelligere, Anselm is perfectly able,
as opportunity affords, to describe the obedire auctoritati and the
sequi ecclestae consuetudinem in and by itself as the semplex et pura
ratio, not merely as auctoritas solo imperto cognoscens, but as ratio
rationabiliter docens of a particular proposition whose meaning
is in question.’ Anselm always has the solution of his problems
1 Cf. Prosl. 2: 1101, 7ff and especially 4:1 103, 18ff.

2 Ipse idem Deus-homo novum condat testamentum et vetus approbet: sicut ipsum veracem
esse necesse est confiteri, ita nihil, quod in illis continetur, verum esse potest aliquis diffiteri
(C.D.h. H 22: 1 133, 8ff).
3 C.D.A. I 8: 1159, 11. Nec aliquatenus quod dixit esse verum aut quod fecit, rationabiliter
esse fastum dubito (ibid. IJ 15: 1 116, 8f).
4 In this connection note the final sentence of the Proof, Prosl. 2-4: Qui ergo
intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare (Prosl. 4: 1104, 4).
5 De nuptiis consang. 1: MPL 158, 557. Cf. also the passage De casu diab. 21 (1
267, 17f): Fateor enim nondum alicubi, excepta divina auctoritate, cui indubitanter credo,
me legisse rationem, quae mihi sufficeret. Moreover, even in the auctoritas he found a
ratio and no doubt.a satisfying one.
2D
already behind him (through faith in the impartial good sense of

the decisions of ecclesiastical authority), while, as it were, they
are still ahead. Therefore, his credo ut intelligam can as little
imply an intellectual storming of the gates of heaven as it can a
sacrificium intellectus. It is just this same objective Credo which
compels Christian humility before the rato veritatis that is the
presupposition of all human knowledge of heavenly things and
that belongs to the actual revelation of God. And this Credo
makes the science of theology possible and gives it a basis. It is
thus and only thus that the characteristic absence of crisis in
Anselm’s theologizing can be understood.?
3. THE CONDITIONS OF THEOLOGY
This demand on izntelligere that we have been discussing,

which fides both makes and meets, gives rise to a series of
conditions to which theological work is subject and of which we
must now speak before taking up the question of the content of
theology’s distinctive task.
1. In its relation to the Credo, theological science, as science
of the Credo, can have only a positive character.? Nam et hoc
credo, quia nist credidero, non intelligam.® ‘That is to say: While I
believe, I also believe that the knowledge for which I seek, as
it is demanded and rendered possible by faith, has faith as its
presupposition, and that in itself it would immediately become
impossible were it not the knowledge of faith.4 Faith, however, is
related to the Credo of the Church into which we are baptized.
Thus the knowledge that is sought cannot be anything but an
extension and explication of that acceptance of the Credo of
1JIt goes without saying that Anselm’s credo ut intelligam is completely out of
place on the title-page of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre.
2 Dedisti semper humilem scientiam, quae aedificet (Medit. 18: MPL 158, 799).
Theology is a humilis sapientia in contrast to an insipiens superbia (Ep. de incarn. 1:
11 6, 8f).
3 Prosl. 1 (I 100, 19).
* Rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus
ratione discutere (C.D.h. I 1: 11 48, 16f).
26
the Church, which faith itself already implied. The man who
asks for Christian knowledge asks, ‘to what extent is it thus?’,
on the basis of a presupposition that is never for a moment
questioned, namely, that it is as he, a Christian, believes.
That and that alone. A science of faith, which denied or even
questioned the Faith (the Credo of the Church), would ipso
facto cease to be either ‘faithful’ or ‘scientific’. Its denials would
a priort be no better than bats and owls squabbling with
eagles about the reality of the beams of the midday sun.
Intelligere, the intelligere for which faith seeks, is compatible with
a reverent ‘I do not yet know’ or with an ultimate ignorance
concerning the extent of the truth accepted in faith. But it is
not compatible with an insolent ‘I know better’ in face of the
‘that...’ of this truth.+ Lntelligere comes about by reflection on
the Credo that has already been spoken and affirmed.’
2. The theologian asks—‘to what extent is reality as the
Christian believes it to be?’ Anselm did not deny that this
question of degree, if pushed beyond a certain limit, would be
turned into a question of fact and so theology would be turned
into ‘a-theology’. For that reason the question may not be
pushed beyond this limit. Humiliter quantum potest the theo-
logian, in order to remain a theologian, will quaerere rationem
1 Palam namque est quia illi non habent fidei firmitatem, qui quoniam quod credunt
intelligere non possunt, disputant contra eiusdem fidei a sanctis patribus confirmatam veritatem.
Velut st vespertiliones et noctuae non nist in nocte caelum videntes de meridianis solis radiis
disceptent contra aquilas ipsum solem irreverberato visu intuentes (Ep. de incarn. 1: u 8,
1ff). Ab iis, qui se Christiani nominis honore gaudere fatentur, iuste exigendum est, ut
cautionem in baptismate factam inconcusse teneant (Ep. 136: ut 280, 35ff). Nullus quippe
Christianus debet disputare quomodo, quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur,
non sit, sed semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando et secundum illam vivendo
humiliter quantum potest quaerere rationem quomodo sit. Si potest intelligere, Deo gratias
agat; si non potest, non immitat cornua ad ventilandum, sed submittat caput ad venerandum
(Ezek. 34.21). Citius enim potest in se confidens humana sapientia impingendo cornua sibi
evellere quam innitendo petram hanc evolvere (Ep. de incarn. 1: 1 6, 10-7, 6). In the prior
recensto of this work Anselm had said: Deo protegente numquam de hac fide disputabo,
quomodo non sit; Deo dante semper credendo, amando, vivendo de illa disputabo, quomodo sit
(1 283, 22ff). Qui enim pie vivere quaerit, sanctam “Scripturam meditatur, et quod nondum
intelligit, non reprehendit, quare nec resistit: quod est (Matt. 5.5) initem fiert (Hom. 2:
MPL 158, 596).
2 Exemplum meditationis de fidet ratione—is how the original title of the Monologion
ought to read. Meditatio partt scientiam (Medit. 7, 1: MPL 158, 741).
27
guomodo sit. ‘That means that at a certain point he will silence

the question quomodo sit. Any extension or explication of or
meditation upon the acceptance of the Credo in faith can be
nothing more than a description of this acceptance, that is of
the Credo accepted. It cannot be—this would be contrary to
humilitas and we have not the polestas to do it—a basis of our
acceptance or of the accepted Credo. The basis is in the fact of
the Credo and of the credo, in the fact of the divine revelation.
The fact itself, as it emerges faintly through the dogma of the
three-fold unity of God or of the Incarnation, is inconceivable.
Therefore, zntelligere will not go beyond the limit of the inner
necessity of the articles of the Credo, beyond the limit of faith’s
essential nature which corresponds to these articles.4 The task
of theology at this limit—arising from the conception of God
that Christianity gives—will rather be rationabiliter comprehendere
incomprehensibile esse, quomodo... ;* that is, to consider alongside
its demonstration of the inner necessity of Christian truth its
factuality, which is derived from no external necessity, and to
understand this factuality as the impetus of its inner necessity.
Anyone who wants to ask more questions at this limit can only
be a fool who, though he hears the revealed Word and has it
in intellectu, yet because the res, the fact of revelation, escapes
him, still asks for an external necessity, a guomodo, which he can
find only in the inner necessity, in the esse, of the truth itself
which is being proclaimed and which he is calling in question.®
1On the Trinity: Videtur mihi huius tam sublimis rei secretum transcendere omnem
intellectus aciem humant, et idcirco conatum explicandi qualiter hoc sit, continendum puto.
Sufficere namque debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc ratiocinando
pervenerit, ut eam certissime esse cognoscat, etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu, quomodo
ita sit, nec idcirco minus tis adhibendam fidei certitudinem, quae probationibus necessariis
nulla alia repugnante ratione asseruntur, si suae naturalis altitudinis incomprehensibilitate
explicari non patiantur (Monol. 64: 1 74, 30-75, 6). .
On the Incarnation: Qua vero ratione sapientia Dei hoc fecit, si non possumus in-
ielligere, non debemus mirari, sed cum veneratione tolerare aliquid esse in secretis tantae rei,
quod ignoremus (C.D.A. II 16: 1 117, 3ff).
2 Monol. 64 (175, 11f); cf. Prosl. 15 (1112, 14ff).
3 Quid respondendum est illi, qui idcirco astruit esse impossibile quod necesse est esse,
quia nescit, quomodo sit? Answer: Quia insipiens est! . . . Quod necessaria ratione veraciter
esse colligitur, id in nullam deduct debet dubitationem, etiam si ratio, quomodo sit, non
percipitur (C.D.h. I 25: 1.95, 18ff; 96, 2f).
28
3. Every theological statement is an inadequate expression of

its object.1 The actual Word of Christ spoken to us is not an
inadequate expression of its object,? though of course every
attempt on our part, even the highest and the best, to reproduce
that Word in thought or in speech is inadequate.® Strictly ee
speaking, it is only God himself who has a conception of God.

All that we have are conceptions of objects, none of which is
identical with God. Even the most worthy descriptions are only
relatively worthy of him. He is all that we are able to say about
him and is not only wholly-other, though certainly he alone is
true and real,* unique® and in a category all his own and
known only to himself. Therefore, every one of the categories
known to us by which we attempt to conceive him is, in the last
analysis, not really one of his categories at all. God shatters
every syllogism.® But just as everything which is not God could
not exist apart from God and is something only because of
God, with increasing intensity an aliqua imitatio illius essentiae,’
so it is possible for expressions which are really appropriate
only to objects that are not identical with God, to be true ex-
pressions, per aliquam similitudinem aut tmaginem (ut cum vultum
alicuius consideramus in speculo), even when these expressions are
1 Valde minus aliquid, immo longe aliud in mente mea sua significatione constituunt,
quam sit illud, ad quod intelligendum per hance tenuem significationem mens ipsa mea conatur
proficere (Monol. 65: 1 76, 27ff).
2 Satis itaque manifestum est in verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse ipsorum simil-
itudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam (Monol. 31: 150, 7ff).
3 Non tento, Domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum
meum (Prosl. 1: 1 100, 15f).
4 Monol. 28: 1 45, 25ff.
5 In the uniqueness of the solely, originally Existent One (Prosl. 22: 1 116, 15ff;
De casu diab. 1: 1 233, 16ff).
8 Si quando illi est cum aliis nominis alicuius communio, valde procul dubio intelligenda
est diversa significatio (Monol. 26:1 44, 17ff). Illa substantia nullo communi substantiarum
tractatu includitur (Monol. 27: 1 45, 4f). Sic est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam
naturam, ut, st quando de illa dicitur aliquid verbis, quae communia sunt aliis naturis,
sensus nullatenus sit communis ... Quaecumque nomina de illa natura dici posse videntur
(even the nomina sapienta and essentia) non tam mihi eam ostendunt per proprietatem .. .
(Monol. 65: 1 76, 2ff, 22f).
* Monol. 31 and 34, De casu diab. 1.
29
, applied to the God who can never be expressed.! Not all

‘speculative’ theology says what is true. But even theology
which does say what is true is still ‘speculative’ theology.”
\ Theology can neither avoid nor ignore the fact of being thus
conditioned; nor ought this to make it ashamed.
4. It follows from this that theological statements can be
made with only scientific certainty, which, on account of its
relativity, has to be distinguished from the certainty of faith.
Theological statements as such are contested statements—
challenged by the sheer incomparability of their object.®
It is just this very absoluteness of the revelation to which his
statements apply that isolates the theologian in his meditation,
as one who can think about himself with only the relative
power of the ratio certitudinis,t who often will be able to work
only by experiment,® who waits on the correction of others,®
who can never assume the ultimate certainty of even his best
conceived statements,’ who will always understand his most
profound intelligere as nothing more than an aliquatenus intelligere
veritatem tuam® and his science as no more than imbecillitas
scientae meae.® ‘There is one, and only one, apparent exception
to this rule: the theologian speaks absolutely when his state-
ments coincide with the text, or with the necessary inferences
1 Falsum non est, st quid de illa ratione docente per aliud velut in aenigmate potest aestimart
(Monol. 65: 177, 2f).
2 Quod speculor is Anselm’s own description of his action (Monol. 6: 1 19, 19).
3 Sic quippe unam eandemque rem dicimus et non dicimus, videmus, et non videmus.. .
per aliud; but not per suam proprietam (Monol. 65: 1 76, 16ff).
4 Non potest intellectus meus ad illam. Nimis fulget, non capit illam, nec suffert oculus
animae meae diu intendere in illam. Reverberatur fulgore, vincitur amplitudine, obruitur
immensitate, confunditur capacitate. O summa et inacessibilis lux! O tota et beata veritas,
quam longe es a me, qui tam prope tibi sum! Quam remota es a conspectu meo, qui sic praesens
sum conspectut tuo (Prosl. 16: 1 112, 24ff).
5 Tentabo pro mea possibilitate Deo adiuvante... (C.D.h. I 2: 1 50, 4). Si aliquatenus
potero, quod postulas ostendere, gratias agamus Deo. Si vero non potero, sufficiant ea, quae
supra probata sunt (ibid. IT 16: 1 117, 23ff).
6 Si quid diximus, quod corrigendum sit, non renuo correctionem, si rationabiliter fit
(ibid. IT 22: 1 133, 12f).
” Haec breviter . . . pro capacitate intellectus mei, non tam affirmando quam coniectando dixt,
donec mihi Deus melius aliquo modo revelet (De conc. virg. 29: 1 173, 4ff).
S Prost. F< 1100; 17; 9C.D.h. I 25: 1 96, 17.
30
from the text, of the sacred authority.1 But, as we shall find

Anselm explaining later, the task of theology, the quest for
intellugere in the narrower sense, begins at the very place where
biblical quotation stops. Thus, any statement that is really <a,
theological, that is to say not covered by biblical authority, is

bound by this rule: such a statement is not final; fundamentally
it is an interim-statement, the best that knowledge and con-
science can for the present construe; it awaits better instruction
from God or man.?
5. Fundamentally it is possible and indeed necessary for the
science of theology to advance along its entire front. Even of the
Church Fathers, whom he still regarded as authoritative,
Anselm expressly said that we can and must progress beyond
the results of their work. In matters of faith-knowledge they
have performed a great service, a service in fact which in its
own way cannot be surpassed. But on the other hand their life,
like all human life, was short and it would be going too far to
assume that their writings represent the final achievement of
intelligere possible to the objective ratio veritatis in its relation to
human powers of understanding or that further development
should be denied us; it is also certain that the Lord who has
promised to be with the Church until the end of the world
will not cease to pour out the gifts of his grace in her midst.
Clearly, in Anselm’s mind all this was true not just of the
1 That this is what Anselm meant follows from his statement that the theologian
does not speak absolutely without the express mandate of the biblical authority
(Monol. 1: 1 14, 1ff; C.D.A. I 2: 0 50, 7ff; ibid. 18: m 82, 5ff; De proc. Spir. rr:
II 209, 14).
2 Non alia certudine accipiatur, nisi quia interim ita mihi videtur, donec Deus mihi melius
aliquo modo revelet (C.D.h. I 2: 11 50, Of). Sic volo accipi ut, quamvis ex rationibus quae
mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur, non ob hoc tamen omnino necessarium, sed
tantum sic interim videri posse dicatur (Monol. 1: 1 14, 2ff). Dicam igitur sic breviter de hoc
quod sentio, ut nullius de eadem re fidelem improbem sententiam, nec meam, Si veritati repugnare
probari rationabiliter poterit pervicaciter defendam (De conc. virg. Prologue: 1 139, 10ff).
3 Quamvis post apostolos sancti patres et doctores nostri multi tot et tanta de fidei nostrae
ratione dicant . . . ut nec nostris nec futuris temporibus ullum illis parem in veritatis contem-
platione speremus: nullum tamen reprehendendum arbitror, si fide stabilitus in rationis eius
indagine se voluerit exercere. Nam et illi, quia breves dies hominis sunt (Job 14.5), non
omnia quae possent, si diutius vixissent, dicere potuerunt; et veritatis ratio tam ampla tamque
profunda est, ut a mortalibus nequeat exhauriri; et Dominus in ecclesia sua, cum qua Se esse
usque ad consummationem saeculi promittit, gratiae suae dona non desinit impertiri (C.D.h.
comm. op.: 1 39, 2-40, 7).
31
theology of the Church Fathers but of all theology. He is aware

not only of the existence of those mazores et plures rationes of truth
which must remain ultimately closed to the human spirit
(‘ultimately’ at least as far as this world is concerned),+ but he
‘is also aware of the existence of ratzones which for the present
are hidden but are intrinsically accessible and have still to be
laid bare in the future.? We are therefore justified in ascribing
to Anselm the explicit notion of progress in theology, in so far
as he thought of the scientific process as an ascent from one
ratio to an ever higher raizo.* In this connection it should, how-
ever, be noted that this progress which takes place from time
to time at particular moments of history is not at the mercy of
the theologian’s whim but is conditioned by the wisdom of God
who well knows what it is good for us to perceive at any given
time.* That the perfectibility of theology implies for Anselm
both stop® and start must not be ignored.
6. We have, however, one concrete criterion for all theological
statements, though not the kind of criterion that enables us to
value such statements positively, that is assess their specific
value as knowledge. This verdict, the verdict whether a
particular scientific contribution is really intelligere, that is
whether it signifies progress in zntelligere, rests in a provisional
sense with the author, his readers, those with whom he carries
on the debate and those who listen to it.6 But of course in the
ultimate sense it is hidden and remains hidden with God who
himself is ‘Truth. 'The fundamental reason for the vulnerability
LC Dil fd220r 50,123 dbid. 11.102 59s Tal.
2 C.D.h. I 2: 11 50, 8ff; De conc. virg. 21: 11 161, 3ff.
3 Debes ... sperare de gratia Dei, quia si ea quae gratis accepisti libenter impertiris, altiora,
ad quae nondum attigisti, mereberis accipere (C.D.h. I 1: 1 49, 3ff ). It is worth noting that
Anselm gives this thought a specially prominent position in that very first chapter
of Cur Deus homo, where his scientific self-consciousness has perhaps reached its peak.
4 Da mihi, ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam (Prosl. 2: 1 101, 3f).
5 $i aliquatenus quaestioni tuae satisfacere potero, certum esse debebit, quia et sapientior
me plenius hoc facere poterit. Immo sciendum est, quidquid inde homo dicere possit, altiores
tantae rei adhuc latere rationes (C.D.h. I 2: 1 50, 10ff).
® Under this category come the more or less favourable conclusions with which,
for example in the Cur Deus homo, Boso (or Anselm by the mouth of Boso) usually
underlines the completion of individual trains of thought.
32
of theology that follows from the inadequacy, the merely

scientific certainty and the perfectibility of its language, is this
—while the best of its statements can find human approval,
it is not possible for the final criterion of this approval to be
demonstrated or appealed to. There is, however, one criterion
which at least determines whether a theologoumenon is ad- <
missible or not. This criterion is the text of Holy Scripture,
which according to Anselm forms the basic stability of the
Credo to which the credere and therefore the zntelligere refer.
While it is the decisive source, it is also the determining norm of
intelligere, the auctoritas veritatis, quam ratio colligit.1 In this respect
Anselm’s rule runs as follows: If a proposition accords with the
actual wording of the Bible or with the direct inferences from it,
then naturally it is valid with absolute certainty, but just
because of this agreement it is not strictly a theological proposi-
tion. If, on the other hand, it is a strictly theological proposi-
tion, that is to say a proposition formed independently of the
actual wording of Scripture, then the fact that it does not
contradict the biblical text, determines its validity. But if it did
contradict the Bible, however attractive it might be on other
grounds, it would be rendered invalid.?
7. A further condition of intelligere, however, is the reality of
credere in and for itself. It is also absolutely decisive for know-
ledge that what is Right should be rightly believed. But right
belief is simply belief that is a human act of response and that
is by definition a tendere in Deum. Illam credere nisi tendat in illam,
1 De concordia Qu. II 6: 1 272, 6f. It will be noticed that Boso, the opponent in
the discussion in Cur Deus homo, (for example, as in I 3: 1 50, 20ff), does not by
any means represent only doubt with his questions but, in drawing attention to
apparently contradictory biblical passages, he represents the ecclesiastical authority
as well. Theological science has also to justify itself on this score.
2 Nam si quid ratione dicimus aliquando, quod in dictis eius (sc. sacrae scripturae) aperte
monstrare aut ex ipsis probare nequimus : hoc modo per illam cognoscimus utrum sit accipiendum
aut respuendum. Si enim aperta ratione colligitur et illa ex nulla parte contradicit (quoniam
ipsa sicut nullt adversatur veritati, ita nulli favet falsitati): hoc ipso, quia non negat quod
ratione dicitur, eius auctoritate suscipitur. At, si ipsa nostro sensui indubitanter repugnat,
quamuis nobis ratio nostra videatur inexpugnabilis, nulla tamen veritate fulciri credenda
est (De concordia Qu. III 6: 1 271, 28-272, 6). Certus enim sum, si quid dico quod sacrae
scripturae absque dubio contradicat, quia falsum est; nec illud tenere volo, si cognovero
(C.D.h. I 18: 11 82, 8ff)
c 33
nullr prodest. 1 Faith does not mean only credere id, but also
credere in id, quod credi debet, otherwise for all its supposed
certainty it is a faith that is useless and dead.? Are faith and the
knowledge of faith based on the Word of God? Most certainly;
but when we speak of the gift of this Word, the effect of the
Word is, invariably, that both the Word and the event of
hearing the Word are understood together.? Are faith and the
knowledge of faith matters of the heart? Most certainly; but
for that very reason also matters of the will—for how could
there be a right heart where right faith and right knowledge of
faith are not willed ?4 Now where this right faith is absent there
can be no right knowledge; in that case the scientific nature of
theology is called in question just as much as when the thing
believed is false.2 Anselm saw these two fatal difficulties in
the closest relation. For that reason he could not emphasize
too strongly (in his warning against the theology of bats and
owls) that prior to any desire or ability to find theological
answers is the question of dedication on the part of the theo-
logian himself. What is required is a pure heart, eyes that have
been opened, child-like obedience, a life in the Spirit, rich
nourishment from Holy Scripture to make him capable of
finding these answers.6 For him it goes without saying that
1 Monol. 77:1 84, 12f. 2 Monol. 78: 185, 8f; De concordia Qu. III 2: 11 265, 10f.
3 Est autem semen huius agriculturae verbum Dei, immo non verbum, sed sensus qui
percipitur per verbum. Vox namque sine sensu nihil constituit in corde (De concordia Qu.
III 6: 11 270, 23ff).
4 Quamvis enim corde credamus et intelligamus, sicut corde volumus, non tamen iudicat
Spiritus sanctus illum rectum habere cor, qui recte credit et intelligit et non recte vult ; quia non
utitur rectitudine fidei et intellectus ad recte volendum, propter quod datum est rationali creaturae
recte credere et intelligere (ibid. Qu. III 2: 1 265, 5ff). Addita namque rectitudine volendi
conceptioni per gratiam fit fides (ibid. Qu. III 6: u 271, 8f).
5 Neque rectum intellectum habere dicendus est, qui secundum illum non recte vult (ibid.
Qu. III 2: 1 265, of). Non solum ad intelligendum altiora prohibetur mens ascendere sine
fide et mandatorum Dei oboedientia sed etiam aliquando datus intellectus subtrahitur . .
neglecta bona conscientia (Ep. de incarn. 1: 11 9, Off).
6 Prius ergo fide mundandum est cor. . . et prius per praeceptorum Domini custodiam
illuminandi sunt oculi . . . et prius per humilem oboedientiam testimoniorum Dei debemus
fieri parouli. . .. Prius inquam ea quae carnts sunt postponentes secundum spiritum vivamus
quam profunda fidei diiudicando discutiamus. . Verum enim est quia quanto opulentius
nutrimur in sacra scriptura ex iis, quae per oboedientiam pascunt, tanto subtilius provehimur
ad ea, quae per intellectum satiant (Ep. de incarn. 1: 1 8, 7ff)
34
where faith is really faith, that is to say obedience, the fight

between bats and owls over the reality of the sun’s rays will
just not happen and that a theology that is grounded on the
obedience of faith will be a positive theology. He knows
perfectly well that in saying this he is taking a risk and so he
adds that even this necessary connection between faith in what
is right and right faith (and vice versa) has to be taken in faith
to be understood. For only in faith could this connection
between the obedience of faith and the faith of the Church be
experienced and only in experience could it be understood.?
Thus it cannot be denied that, faced with the danger on the
one hand of a dead orthodoxy and on the other of a flightiness
that is only too much alive, Anselm here applied a similar
corrective? to that applied later by Melancthon with his
demand for a fiducial faith or still later by Pietism with its
emphasis on the experience of rebirth or by present-day
theologians in their demand for ‘existential’ thinking. However,
it is most instructive to see how very conscious Anselm himself
obviously was of the provisional nature of this condition of
intelligere. ‘Though it means for him one of many serious
questions, it is not the final question.
8. When we consider the connection which Anselm held to be
necessary between theology and prayer we put our finger on the
condition of intelligere which, unless we are completely mis-
taken, emerges at this point as suz generis from all the others and
which conditions all these others and makes them relative.?
1 Nimirum hoc ipsum quod dico: qui non crediderit, non intelliget. Nam qui non crediderit,
non experietur: et qui expertus non fuerit, non cognoscet (ibid. 1: 11 9, 5f)—this sentence,
as is well known, appears alongside Credo ut intelligam on the title page of Schlier-
macher’s Glaubenslehre and speaks of the ‘experience’ of the necessity that right
personal obedience of faith should be related to the faith of the Church and it
claims that faith is superior to this experience.
2 Nemo ergo se temere immergat in condensa divinarum quaestionum, nisi prius in soliditate
fidei conquisita morum et sapientiae gravitate, ne per multiplicia sophismatum diverticula
incauta levitate discurrens, aliqua tenact illaqueetur falsitate (ibid. 1: 119, 16ff).
3 Including particularly the last-mentioned, the authenticity of credere. On one
occasion, praying for the illuminating grace of God, Anselm thankfully (if that be
overlooked the whole passage cannot but be misunderstood) dares the bold
statement that now he has clearly recognized that this knowledge would still
35
When his Monologion lay finished before him Anselm felt

compelled to work through for a second time what was essen-
tially the same material—the doctrine of God in the narrower
sense—in the form of the Proslogion, that is, in the form of an
explicit address to God. But even this form did not become his
literary pattern. In Cur Deus homo and other writings we see him
make use of the dialogue form between teacher and student.
In De concordia, one of his later works, a tendency can be noted
towards the method of the Quaestiones, which became character-
istic of later Scholasticism. And all his life in the Meditationes
he developed, as an alternative to the invocation form of the
Proslogion, the monologue of the soul on the things of God and
man. For this reason it must not be overlooked that in the
form of the Proslogion an attitude manifests itself whose signi-
ficance for his whole inquiry transcends matters of style and
indeed things human.! It is in Cur Deus homo, technically
perhaps Anselm’s most complete work, that indications of this
attitude keep breaking through. He is to expound quod Deus
mihi dignabitur aperire.2 He reminds his colleague of the duty that
his questions impose of interceding for the teacher. Boso
interrupts at one of the great highlights in the exposition of the
Proof with an adoring, ‘Benedictus Deus’. And when at another
pointhe expresses amazement at the masterly conduct of the
discussion, Anselm’s reply is that guidance along the path of
remain to him even were he to refuse to believe: Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias
tibi; quia quod prius credidi, te donante, iam sic intelligo, te illuminante, ut, si te esse nolim
credere, non possim non intelligere (Prosl. 4: 1104, 5ff).
1 ‘We are well able to listen to the enchanted language of such passages now
that the Enlightenment has been disposed of by Herder, Classicism and Romantic-
ism. But even today this kind of thing is taken as a purely subjective result of
feeling, whereas that of logical succession is taken as an entirely objective product
of the intellect and so any real understanding of either is prevented by this wedge
that is driven between them right at the start’—this objection of W. von den Steinen
(Vom Heiligen Geist des Mittelalters, 1926, pp. 36f) is only too true.
2C.D.h. Ir: 11 48, 10.6
3 Deo adiuvante et vestris orationibus, quas hoc postulantes saepe mihi petenti ad hoc ipsum
promisistis (ibid. I 2: 1 50, 4ff).
4... tam magnum quiddam invenimus de hoc quod quaerimus. Prosequere igitur, ut
incepisti. Spero enim, quia Deus nos adiuvabit (ibid. II 6: u 101, 20f).
36
truth must have been God’s doing.! To this the closing words
of the book correspond: $2 autem veritatis testimonio roboratur,
quod nos rationabiliter invenisse existimamus, Deo non nobis attribuere
debemus, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen.” ‘There is more in this
than just the general, though of course true, statement that for
Anselm right knowledge is conditioned by the prevenient and
co-operating grace of God.® This general consideration and also
the fact that this grace must ever be sought by prayer already
imply that the ultimate and decisive capacity for the intellectus ‘
fidei does not belong to human reason acting on its own but
has always to be bestowed* on human reason as surely as
intelligere is a voluntarius effectus.> It is also true that this capacity
which is bestowed consists in following correctly the successive
logical steps that lead to knowledge. The donum gratiae, the
subject of Anselm’s prayer, is from this point of view identical
with seeking and attaining the highest reach of human think-
ing. But that, however, is just one side of the matter. A
careful reading of the relevant text of the opening prayer of the
Proslogion’ shows that all the way through what Anselm has in
mind as the object of his request is twofold. The first of course
is—that God would instruct his heart, ubi et quomodo te
quaerat, that God would enlighten his eyes, that he who by
nature ever stoops to earth might be lifted up to look on him.
Here we cannot fail to recognize this aspect of grace as the
actualization of that power to know which was originally
1 Non ego te duco, sed ille, de quo loguimur, sine quo nihil possumus, nos ducit ubicumque
viam veritatis tenemus (ibid. II g: 1 106, 7f).
2 Ibid. IT 22: 1 133, 13ff. Si qué dixt, quod quaerenti cuilibet sufficere debeat, non
mihi imputo, quia non ego sed gratia Dei mecum (De concordia Qu. III 14: 1 288, 12ff).
3 Knowledge belongs to the dona gratiae which the Lord of the Church never
ceases to pour out upon her (C.D.h. comm. op.: 1 40, 6). Et praedicatio est gratia...
et auditus est gratia et intellectus ex auditu gratia et rectitudo volendi gratia est (De concordia
Ou ill G2 1/277, i1f).
4 Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut . . . intelligam (Prosl. 2: 1 101, 3).
Revela me de me ad te (Prosl. 18: 1114, 10f).
5 Monol. 68: 1 78, 16.
6 Munda, sana, acue, illumina oculum mentis meae, ut intueatur te (Prosl. 18:1114, 11f).
? Prosl. 1: 1 97ff.
37
created in man. But the occurrence of intellectus and therefore

the requested grace has still another objective aspect. Anselm
places alongside this request a second—it seems to me im-
possible to take it as a mere rhetorical repetition of the first in
view of the whole tenor of the context—that God would
instruct his heart ubi et quomodo te inveniat, that God would let
him see his face, let him see his very Self.1 That God would give
himself to him again. He interprets the plight of man in his
failure to know God, a plight which even the believer shares,”
as being due to the fact that he is involved in the remoteness
from God of a humanity that is sinful by inheritance.? This
remoteness is clearly an objective remoteness of God himself—
God is absent, he dwells in light unapproachable. What is the
man who yearns for him to do? Anhelat videre te et nimis abest
ili facies tua; accedere ad te desiderat et inaccessibilis est habitatio
tua . . . Usquequo Domine obliviscerts nos, usquequo avertis faciem
tuam a nobis? Quando respicies et exaudies nos .. . et ostendes nobis
faciem tuam? Both then mean: Wee quaerete re possum, nist tu doceas,
nec invenire, nisi te ostendas. What is at stake here is not just the
right way to seek God, but in addition God’s presence, on which
the whole grace of Christian knowledge primarily depends,
the encounter with him which can never be brought about by
all our searching for God however thorough it may be, although
it is only to the man who seeks God with a pure heart that this
encounter comes. We are already acquainted to some extent
with the dialectic in the concept intelligere.t ‘That there is also
an intelligere esse in re only aliquatenus is not self-evident. Even
this modified zntelligere by which man is enabled to see some-
thing of the very face of God, has to be sought in prayer for all
right seeking (it also is grace) would be of no avail if God did
not ‘show’ himself, if the encounter with him were not in fact
1 Ostende nobis teipsum (ibid.: 1 99, 18f).
2 Tu me fecisti et refecisti, et omnia mea bona tu mihi contulisti, et nondum novi te (ibid. :
1 98, 13f).
3 Heu me miserum, unum de aliis miseris filiis Evae, elongatis a Deo (ibid. : 1 99, 8).
4Cf. pp. 24f.
38
primarily a movement from his side and if the finding that goes
with it, the modified intelligere, did not take place. It is only
from this point of view that the attitude of Anselm which is
becoming obvious in the Proslogion can be fully understood.
This attitude is not just that of a ‘pious’ thinker who offers his
work to the service of the divine work that his work may be
done well. It is that of course. But above and beyond that? itis a,
specific and perhaps the most decisive expression of his scientific |
objectivity. Everything depends not only on the fact that God
grants him grace to think correctly about him, but also on the
fact that God himself comes within his system as the object
of this thinking, that he ‘shows’ himself to the thinker and in so
doing modifies ‘correct’ thinking to an intelligere esse in re.
Only thus does the grace of Christian knowledge become
complete. The author of the Proslogion keeps up the address to
God on which he has embarked, not in order to extort this
fulness of grace, but because he knows this fulness of grace to be
essential. In this attitude he stands in encounter with God for
he knows that God must stand in encounter with him if his
intellagere is not to be delusion and if he himself is not to be a
mere insipiens. The Proof, Prosl. 2-4, is also conducted in this
attitude and in this knowledge. We cannot be indifferent to
this if we are to understand and interpret him.?
To summarize what has been established: The knowledge, |
the zntellectus, with which Anselm is concerned is the zntellectus —
fidei. That means that it can consist only of positive meditation
“on the object of faith. It cannot establish this object of faith as
1 Auge desiderium meum et da quod peto, quoniam si cuncta quae fecisti, mihi dederis,
non sufficit servo tuo, nisi teipsum dederis. Da ergo teipsum mihi, Deus meus, redde te mihi
(Medit. 14, 2: MPL 158, 781).
2 With sure instinct Kierkegaard found here the thing that interests him in
Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God: ‘Moreover, his own way—of proving.
Anselm says, “I want to prove the existence of God. To that end I ask God to
strengthen and help me’’—but that is surely a much better proof of the existence
of God, namely, the certainty that to prove it we need God’s help. If we were able
to prove the existence of God without his help, that would be as if it were less
» certain that he is there. . . .” (Walter Ruttenbeck, Séren Kierkegaard, 1930, p.
143).
39
such but rather has to understand it in its very incomprehensi-

bility. Yet nevertheless, it has to progress at the level of reflec-
tion, expressing in symbols what in itself cannot be expressed.
It will therefore be able to claim only scientific certainty for its
results and not the certainty of faith and it will therefore
not deny the fundamental imperfection of these results. It will
not on any account be able to set itself in explicit contradiction
to the Bible, the textual basis of the revealed object of faith.
And it would not be what it is or achieve what it does achieve
if it were not the knowledge of faith-obedience. In the end, the
fact that it reaches its goal is grace, both with regard to the
perception of the goal and the human effort to reach it; and
therefore in the last analysis it is a question of prayer and the
answer to prayer.
4. THE MANNER OF THEOLOGY
Having defined our terms, it ought to be a comparatively

simple matter to show the type of function that Anselm under-
stood the intellectus to have.
In explaining Anselm’s use of “zntelligere’ it is vitally important
to remember the literal meaning of the word: intus legere. After
all that we have said there can be no question but that the
fundamental meaning of intelligere in Anselm is legere: to reflect
upon what has already been said in the Credo. In recognizing
and assenting to truth intelligere and credere come together and
the intelligere is itself and remains a credere while the credere in
and by itself, as we have seen, is also an embryonic zntelligere.
But inéelligere means still more than that: to read and ponder
what has been already said—that is to say, in the appropria-
tion of truth, actually to traverse that intervening distance
(between recognition and assent) and so therefore to understand
the truth as truth. Corresponding to the position of post-Adamic
man, as we have just heard from Prosl. 1, the credere and this
real intelligere are to be distinguished not just abstractly but
40
also in practice, for they do not coincide in the sense that the
believer simply possesses or can automatically acquire the
intellectus fidet, the understanding of the Credo by his own
thought. Rather he must seek it in prayer and by the persistent
application of his intellectual powers. He will not seek it
anywhere outside of or apart from the revealed Credo of the
Church and certainly not apart from or outside of Holy
Scripture. Anselm is distinguished from the ‘liberal’ theologians
of his time in that his zntelligere is really intended to be no more
than a deepened form of /egere. But—and this distinguishes him
just as definitely from the ‘positivists’, the traditionalists of his
day—it does involve a deepened Jegere, an intus legere, a reflect-
ing upon. So as sons and heirs of Adam we are not confronted
by the truth revealed in Scripture in such a way that, when the
hearing or reading of the outward text is crowned by faith
(certain as it is that this text is the full revealed truth), we are
then absolved from the task of understanding it as truth,
which, though divinely given, has still to be sought by human
means. From our point of view, the revealed truth has, as it
were, an inner text which of course simply asserts that what to us
is the outward text is the truth, according to its claim to
authority and to our faith. This inner text can be found only
within the outward text, but cannot simply be heard or read
along with the outward text, for it can be sought and found
in the outward text only by virtue of a distinct intention and act
and also—and this is decisive—only by virtue of special grace.
Scripture is of course super solidam veritatem . . . velut super
firmum fundamentum fundata. And this its ‘basis’ is clear to us in
faith. But even though it is all that, it is still a problem for our
understanding and we are confronted with the task of examin-
ing the thing itself that is revealed and believed—within the
limits of this ‘itself? and therefore it can be only ‘to some
extent’, Deo adiuvante aliquatenus perspicere veritatem.1 Not only
objective truth as such, but its inner meaning, its basis and its
1C.D.h. I 19: 1 131, of.
41
context, as we discern them, ought to bear witness that what

Scripture declares is in fact so.
Consequently it cannot be—if it is to be perspicere too—
that zntelligere consists in our bringing to remembrance a
text of Scripture which confirms the contents of an article of
faith in order to establish that article of faith. That would be
to revert to the obviously indispensable presupposition of
intelligere, to the believing legere.? ‘The opposition and derision
of unbelievers and the uncertainty even of believing Christians,
the questions of the wise and the foolish over the text of
Scripture and the Credo*® all show that humanly speaking the
inner and the outward text of the revelation are by no means a
unity; that their meaning, basis and context, and with these
their truth, are not such that we can simply read them off, but
on the contrary for us they are wrapped in mystery and we
can grasp them only by a special effort of understanding that
goes beyond mere reading. It is true that the Word appro-
priated in faith is also in itself, as a mere vox significans rem in
intellectu, the whole saving truth full of meaning and with its
own basis and context. But it is precisely as such that we are
intended to grasp it.* So the recital of ‘proof-texts’ as confirma-
tion would do no more than state the problem all over again
and would contribute nothing to its solution. This is asserted
by the methodological principle which Anselm strongly
emphasized—that when it is a question of intelligere and probare
nothing can be achieved by an appeal to the authority of Holy
1 Quatenus . . . quidquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret id ita esse... et

rationis necessitas breviter cogeret et veritatis claritas patenter ostenderet (Monol. Prologue:
17, 7{f). Monstratur. ... ratione et veritate (C.D.h. Preface: 1 42, 14f).
2 As a theologian Anselm will non tam ostendere, quam tecum quaerere (C.D.h. I 2:
It 50, 6
3 Quam quaestionem solent et infideles nobis simplicitatem Christianam quasi fatuam
deridentes obicere, et fideles multi in corde versare . . . De qua quaestione non solum
litterati, sed etiam illitterati multi quaerunt et rationem eius desiderant (C.D.h. I 1: 1 47,
11-48, 6).
4 Quapropter summo studio animum ad hoc intenderat, quatenus iuxta fidem suam mentis
ratione mereretur percipere, quae in ipsis (sc. scripturis) sensit multa caligine tecta latere
(Vita S. Anselmi auctore Eadmero, lib. I cap. 289: MPL 158, 55).
42
___Scripture.! The much disputed rule which Anselm adopted for

his work Cur Deus homo is no more than a special application of
this principle—that the discussion of Christology is to be argued
remoto Christo, quast numquam aliquid fuertt de illo. . . quasi mhil
sciatur de Christo. All this does not mean that it was Anselm’s
intention to suspend Holy Scripture completely as source and
norm of his thinking so as to reconstruct the Credo apart from
the contents of Scripture, tabula rasa, from elements of know-
ledge obtained elsewhere. The commentary on this passage
which is often overlooked and yet which is our best guide bears
testimony to what Anselm has actually done in Cur Deus homo,
as in all his other works. It is abundantly clear from this that
not for a moment do Scripture and Credo cease to be the pre-
supposition and object of his thinking, only that whenever he
comes up against a particular problem where he is concerned
with its scientific answer, he refrains from drawing upon the
statements of the Bible or the Credo for his answer or basing his
answer upon their authority. That is to say, he refrains from
introducing or quoting ‘it is written’ as a substitute for scientific
investigation (the nature of which we have still to discuss),
at a point where it is the very quotation that requires to be
considered and understood.®
It is mainly from this standpoint that another much disputed
methodological formula of Anselm’s is to be understood. He
says: In all enquiries* and demonstrations® the rule sole ratione
1 Quatenus auctoritate scripturae penitus nihil in ea (sc. meditatione) persuaderetur
(Monol. Prologue: 1 7, 7£). Huic homini non est respondendum auctoritate sacrae scripturae,
quia aut et non credit, aut eam perverso sensu interpretatur (Ep. de incarn. 2; 1 11, 5f).
Ut, quod fide tenemus . . . sine scripturae auctoritate probari possit (ibid. 6: 1 20, 18f).
2C.D.h. Preface: 1 42, 12ff. Ponamus .. . incarnationem .. . numquam fuisse (ibid.
I 10: 11 67, 12f). Christum et Christianam fidem quasi numquam fuisset posuimus (ibid. I
20: 11 88, 4f). Quasi de illo, qui numquam fuerit (ibid. II ro: 1 106, 20). Ante experi-
mentum... . (tbid. IT rr: 1 111, 28).
3 The statement of the Roman Breviary (21 April, Lectio 6) that at the Council of
Bari (1098) Anselm defended the Latin doctrine of the outpouring of the Holy
Spirit innumeris scripturarum et sanctorum patrum testimonits, corresponds neither to his
normal procedure nor to the contents of his special essay on that question. On the
contrary, Anselm is in fact the exponent of a method of theological exposition that
almost completely dispenses with supporting quotations.
4C.D.h. I 20: 0 88, 8. 5 C.D.h. I rr: 11 111, 28.
43
should be kept? so as to satisfy Jews and even Gentiles in dis-

putation.” This formula, which as we have explained precludes
collision with authority, is as liable to be understood or mis-
understood as was Luther’s sola fide in its context. It cannot be
_ understood as if Anselm had written solitaria ratione. ‘Authority
is the necessary presupposition of Anselm’s ratio, just as works
_ are the necessary consequence of Luther’s /ides. But just as,
_ for Luther, fides alone can justify, so for Anselm ratio alone is to
be accepted as the suitable criterion in the service of znéelligere
in its narrower, stricter sense.
But what does ratio mean in Anselm?
Understanding of this decisive concept is immediately
complicated by the fact that the word is continually used as
much in the ablative as in the accusative and so can obviously
denote both the means to as well as the end of his ‘seeking’.
If he says ratzone® then ratio seems to denote the means to the
desired intellectus, but if, on the other hand, he speaks of
rationem esurire,* quaerere,® ostendere,® intelligere,? of meditari de
ratione,® then it seems to denote the desired intellectus itself. We
will be justified in thinking primarily in the first case of man’s
knowing ratio and in the second case of the ratio that is to be
known, the ratio that belongs to the object of faith itself.
‘Primarily’—for when we look at the details of Anselm’s
remarkable definition of these two rationes and their mutual
relations we shall have to be prepared for a great deal of over-
lapping. There is no doubt that Anselm is conscious of some-
thing akin to a knowing ratio peculiar to man. On one occasion
he uses ratio to describe the primary capacity of dealing with
1 Monol. r: 1 13, 11. 2C.D.h. I 22: 1 133, 8.

3 Or mihi ducem rationem sequenti (Monol. 29: 1 47, 5) or: ratione docente (Monol.
65: 177 3) or: ratione ducente (Monol. 1: 1 13, 15) or: rationabiliter (De proc. Spir.
197,03 Ep. 1964 mt 281, 97; C.D:R) 2253 m'O0, 7: 1btd. EL 220 mh 3a. 1g see
al.), or: ex rationibus (Monol. 1: 1 14, 2) or: rationibus necessariis (Ep. de incarn. 6:
it 20, 19; C.D.A. Preface: 11 42, 12; et. al.).
4 C_D.h. comm. op.: 1 39, 5. 5 C.D.h. I 3: 1 50, 19.
6 C.D.h. I 25: 1 96, 6; ibid. IT 16: 1 116, 17. 2G DheTM 162k V7, eas
8 Prosl. Prologue :1 93, 2.
44
experience, of formulating conceptions and judgments and

he calls this: et princeps et tudex omnium quae sunt in homine.+
And he calls man (along with angels, as distinct from all other
creatures)? a rationalis natura and understands by his rationality
the capacity of forming judgments, the capacity of deciding
between true and false, good and evil, etc.? I know, however,
of only one passage in Anselm where the human side of ratio
is emphasized and therefore its contrast to the objective ratio
to a certain extent made prominent.* But he has clearly gone
beyond the idea of human (or even angelic) ability to form
concepts or judgments, when he comes to speak of the ratio
quaestionis® or of the ratio certitudinis meae® or of the ratio fider™
or of the ratio of the words and acts of God, of the ratio of their
necessity and possibility. The primary result of these various
relationships is the conception of a ratio peculiar to the object
of faith and we can say: if an ontic ratio were to be proved by
means of the knowing ratio of the human faculty of making
concepts and judgments, after the object of faith is given by
revelation, then this conception would not be correctly inter-
preted until we take into account that Anselm recognizes a
third and ultimate ratio, a ratio veritatis.® Strictly understood
the ratio veritatis is identical with the ratio summae naturae, that is
with the divine Word” consubstantial with the Father. It is
the ratio of God."! It is not because it is ratio that it has truth but
because God, Truth, has it. This Word is not divine as word,
1 Ep. de incarn. 1: 1 10, 1f. The passage is directed against the sensuality of the
heretical disputers.
2 The realm of spirits, made up of men and angels, if not shared in by the rest of
creation also, according to Anselm, is the aim and end of the ways of God and
is called the rationalis et beata civitas (C.D.h. I 18: 11 80, 17).
® De verit.. 12° 1193.2; Monol. 68: 1:78,.21; C.D.h. I 152 173,23 ibid. TT 1? )1
97> 4-
4 Ratio nostra (De concordia Qu. III 6: 11 272, 5). 5 C.D.h. Ir: 1 48, 5.
6 C.D.h. I 25: 11.96, 7. ? Prosl. Prologue: 1 93, 2; C.D.h. comm. op.: 11 39, 3.
8 C.D.h. I 15: 1 116, 5f.
9C. Gaun. 3: 1 133, 113 C.D.h. comm. op.: 1 40, 4; C.D.h. IT 19: 11 130, 29; or:
veritatis soliditas rationabilis (C.D.h. I 4: 1 52, 3).
10 Monol. of. 11 Deus nihil sine ratione facit (C.D.h. II 10: 1 108, 23f).
45
but because it is begotten of the Father—spoken by him. The

following holds good only of all those other ratzones with which
the ratio Dei is not identical but which as the ratio of his creation
participate in the ratio Dei: Truth is not bound to it but it is
bound to Truth.! That first of all applies to the noetic ratio.
In view of his use of the noetic ratio Anselm might (I know no
instance) also have used the inversion—veritas rationis. But in
that case the veritas rationis would obviously be identical with
the veritas significationis (with the truth for example of a propo-
sition) and above all it would be subject to the rule that it
(when we mean more than the ‘truth’ of the natural power of
thinking and speaking: ad quod facta est) absolutely conditioned
by the conformity of the significatio to the object that is des-
cribed.? In this the correct usage fixed by the object determines
whether it is really a veritas rationis nostrae that can be meant.
But even the truth of the object’s existence and nature is depen-
dent not upon itself but upon the divine Word (and so on the
real ratio veritatis strictly understood) through which it is
created. This Word in creating it also confers upon it a resem-
blance to the truth which belongs to itself (as the Word spoken
from God).® The way in which the right use of the human
ratio is determined primarily by its object is therefore, as it
were, only the operation by means of which Truth, that is.
God himself, makes this decision.4 What is meant by the
human ratio with regard to truth can therefore in no circum-
1 Summa veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est, sed cum aliquid secundum illam est,
tunc eius dicitur veritas vel rectitudo (De verit. 13: 1 199, 27ff). Nullo claudi potest veritas
principio vel fine (Monol. 18: 1 33, 21f).
2 Oratio . . . cum significat esse quod est (cf. non esse quod non est) tunc est in ea veritas
et est vera (De verit. 2: 1 178, 6f).
3 Sic existendi veritas intelligatur in verbo, cuius essentia sic summe est, ut quodam modo
illa sola sit; in tis vero, quae in eius comparatione quodam modo non sunt et tamen per illud
et secundum illud facta sunt aliquid, imitatio aliqua summae illius essentiae perpendatur
(Monol. 31: 1 49, 3ff).
4 Cum veritas, quae est in rerum existentia, sit effectum summae veritatis, ipsa quoque causa
est veritatis, quae conitationis est, et eius quae in propositione, that means ‘by the will of’
(De verit. 10: 1 190, off).
46
stances be one that is creative and normative.! Secondly, as

far as ontic ratio is concerned it follows from what has been
said, that its part in truth is fundamentally the same but higher
than that of the noetic ratio: its part like every part of truthitself,
as the truth of all rationes, has to be conferred. But while this
conferring on the side of the noetic ratio is a matter of decision
that has to be made from time to time, it has to be said about
the ontic ratio that truth is conferred upon it with the creation
of the object of which it is the ratio. This is of course specially
true of the ratio fidet with which Anselm deals. For him, it is
without question identical in the proper and strict sense with
the ratio veritatis. And even here decision enters into it, not as
to whether it is ratio veritatis but whether it can be recognized
as such. In the Credo and in the Bible it is hidden and must
reveal itself in order to make itself known to us.? It does this,
however, only if and in so far as the Truth, God himself, does
it. Thus: from time to time in the event of knowing, it happens
that the noetic ratio of the veritas conforms to the ontic and to
that extent is or is not vera ratio—or (and this is normally the
case in praxt) is to some extent aliquatenus. Fundamentally, the
ratio either as ontic or noetic is never higher than the truth
but truth is itself the master of all rationes beyond the contrast
between ontic and noetic, deciding for itself, now here, now
there, what is vera ratio: in so far as the ratio of the object of ©
faith and the use which man makes of his capacity to think
and judge conform to Truth (by virtue of Truth’s own decision) |
its true rationality is determined and the zniellectus that is sought ,
occurs.
There are a few observations on what has just been said,
which must be made at this point before we pursue further the
structure of Anselm’s conception of ratio.
1. We must draw attention to the light that is shed from this
unexpected quarter on the relationships already discussed,
1 Et istae duae veritates (sc. cogitationis et propositionis) nullius sunt causa veritatis
(ibid. ro: 1 190, 11f).
2 Therefore: ratio veritatis nos docuit (C.D.h. IT 19: 1 130, 29).
47
of knowledge to grace and of knowledge to prayer. This is

clear: if what has been said of the relativity of all rationes is
in fact true, then knowledge must be sought in prayer in the
manner of Prosl. z—however confident we may be in the ratio
of the object of faith, however assured of our integrity in using
our power of reason correctly. And as in that case knowledge is
sought in prayer, so prayer can be made only if what has been
said about the relativity of all rationes is in fact true.
2. Therefore, because it is truth that disposes of all rationes
and not vice versa, the revelation must ensue first and foremost in
the form of authority, in the form of the outward text: above all
the ratio veritatis can be nothing more than something dictated.
Then the human capacity for reason itself becomes a vera ratio
when it is used in conformity with this something dictated. Just
at this point the conception is somewhat remote, as if the ‘faith
under authority’ (faith is always ‘faith under authority’)
were an ‘irrational’ attitude. Yet in obeying the authority he
is assuredly asserting the hidden ratio of the object of faith in
_ order thereby to face and take up a problem presented to the
human ratio.
3. One form of the revelation is obviously also the occurrence
of intelligere, of the vera ratione quaerere veram rationem, the intus
legere, to which even the inner text discloses itself, inasmuch
as the conformity of ratio to truth depends neither upon the
object nor the subject but on that same revealing power of God
which illumines faith and which faith encounters as authority.
The antithesis between auctoritas and ratio does not coincide
with the antithesis between God and man but represents the
distinction between two stages of the one divine road along
which man first attains faith and then on the basis of faith (but
now Sola ratione) attains knowledge.
Our further examination of the concept of ratio must take
into consideration its relation to the concept of necessitas which
in Anselm we find invariably connected with it. In speaking of
the objective ratio, the ratio proper to the object of faith, Anselm
48
has connected ratio and necessitas by et! and in the same chapter
by vel and by et.2 Yet even at points where we would expect
ratio as a description of the object that is sought or found, he has
simply used necessitas.2 And even when speaking of the sub-
jective ratio which has to be achieved or is achieved dialectically
he has equated ratio and necessitast and interpreted ratio by
necessitas’> and necessitas by ratio.6 I find it both possible and
necessary to make the following comment on these remarkable
facts:
Necessitas undoubtedly means the attribute of being unable
not to be, or of being unable to be different. Among the many
possible meanings of ratio in an author who continually employs
the concept subjectively and objectively and in addition in this
context uses it for necessitas, the one that is most highly recom-
mended as a general guide is conformity to law.
There follow therefore in respect of the object of faith and
in respect of knowledge of it the following definitions of
necessitas and ratio:
(1) The necessttas that is peculiar to the object of faith is the
impossibility of the object of faith not existing or of being other-
wise than it is. The necessitas is its basis inasmuch as it does not
permit it to change or to cease to exist.
(2) The necessitas that is peculiar to knowledge of the object of
faith is the impossibility for thought to conceive the object of
faith as not existing or as existing differently. The necessitas
establishes this knowledge in so far as it is the negation achieved
1 Qualiter mors illa rationabilis et necessaria monstrari possit (C.D.h. I 10: 11 66, 19f).
2 Ibid. Ir: 1 48, 2 and 22.
3 Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua natura... (Monol. 4: 1 17, 8f). Si ergo cogitari potest
esse (sc. Deus), ex necessitate est (C. Gaun. 1: 1 131, 5). Monstratur . . . ex necessitate
omnia quae de Christo credimus, fieri oportere (C.D.h. Preface: 1 43, 2f). Probes Deum fieri
hominem ex necessitate (ibid. II 22: 1 133, 6), etc. This naturally includes the frequent
necesse est used to conclude proofs and sections of proofs.
4 Veritatis solidatis rationabilis, id est necessitas (C.D.h. I 4 : 1 52, 36).
5 Ratio necessaria (ibid. I 25: 1 96, 2; et al., also in the plural). Rationem.. .
comitatur necessitas (ibid. I 10 : 1 67, 5f).
6 Rationis necessitas (Monol. Prologue: 17, 10); rationabilis necessitas (C.D.h. I 25:
11 96, 10; bid. I 15 : 1115, 24; De proc. Spir. 11: 1 209, 16)
D 49
by thought of the non-existence or different existence excluded

by the necessitas of the object of faith.
(3) The ratio that is peculiar to the object of faith is the
fact that its existence conforms to law and that it exists in this
particular way. The ratio is the rationality of the object in
so far as it makes it intelligible to a being who can under-
stand an existence and a particular existence that conform to
law. :
(4) The ratio peculiar to the knowledge of the object of faith
is the conception of the conformity to law of the existence and
particular existence of the object of faith taken up into the
conception of the object of faith itself. The rato is the under-
standing of this knowledge in so far as it characterizes it as the
understanding of the object of faith by a being capable of
comprehending an existence and a particular existence that
conform to law.
From the relation of Definitions 1 and 2 to one another it
follows:
(5) The establishing of knowledge of the object of faith
consists in recognition of the basis that is peculiar to the object
of faith itself. Ontic necessity precedes noetic.
From the relation of Definitions 3 and 4 to one another it
follows:
(6) The element of reason in the knowledge of the object of
faith consists in recognition of the rationality that is peculiar to
the object of faith itself. Ontic rationality precedes noetic.
Anselm’s frequent habit of interchanging necessitas
and ratio
justifies the following conclusions:
(7) The basis peculiar to the object of faith is consistent with
its own particular rationality; ontic necessity 1s consistent with
ontic rationality.
(8) The distinctive way in which knowledge of the object of
faith is established is consistent with its own particular ration-
ality; noetic necessity is consistent with noetic rationality.
From 5 and 7 it follows:
50
(9) Ontic necessity precedes even noetic rationality: the

rationality of the object of faith also consists in the recognition
of its own basis.
From 6 and 8 it follows:
(10) Ontic rationality precedes noetic necessity; the estab-
lishing of knowledge of the object of faith consists also in the
recognition of the rationality belonging to the object of faith.
However, from what was said earlier about the relation of
ontic and noetic ratio to veritas it follows:
(11) As ontic rationality is itself not an ultimate but is only
true rationality measured alongside the summa veritas, the same is
true of the ontic necessity that is consistent with it.1 It is in the
Truth and by the Truth, in God and by God that the basis is a
basis and that rationality possesses rationality.
On the mutual relationship between necessity and rationality
this has to be said:
(12) Inasmuch as the concept of necessity, though as sub-
stantiation it has noetic content too, possesses original affinity
with the ontic and inasmuch as the concept of rationality,
though as reasonableness it has ontic content too, possesses
original affinity with the noetic—to that extent necessity must
precede rationality. We see the same result if we take the
problem back to the concept of truth. In so far as Anselm?
clearly interprets truth in terms of rectitudo but on the other
hand interprets righteousness? in terms of itself, he subordinates
the knowledge of God to the will of God.
1 Deus nihil facit necessitate quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid. A
necessitas that exists for God could only be the immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a
se ipso et non ab alio habet et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas (C.D.h. II 5: 1 100, 20ff ).
Ille maxime laudandus est de bonis, quae habet et servat non ulla necessitate sed. . . propria
et aeterna immutabilitate (ibid. II ro: 1 108, 7f; cf. ibid. IT 16-17). Omnis necessitas ...
eius (sc. Dei) subiacet voluntati. Quippe quod vult, necesse est esse (Medit. 3: m 86, 60f;
..Medit. rz in MPL 158, 764). Ontic necessity is ascribed for example in Cur Deus
homo to the incarnation and to the atoning death of Christ. It should never have
been overlooked that ontic necessity in Anselm can as little be a final word as any
other word that is not the inexpressible Word of the One and Only God, glorious
in himself. Si vis omnium quae fecit et quae passus est veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia
ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas (C.D.h.
IT 17: 1 125, 28ff).
2 De verit. r1f: 1191ff. 3 Cf. also De conc. virg. 3: 1 142f; De lib. arb. 3: 1 210ff.
51
ANSELM. FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM
We summarize:
(13) It also follows from a consideration of the parallel con-
ception to ratio, the conception of necessitas, that the ‘rational’
knowledge of the object of faith is derived from the object of
faith and not vice versa. ‘That means to say that the object of
faith and its knowledge are ultimately derived from Truth, that
is, from God and from his will.
(14) The concept mnecessitas, however, explains what is
meant by ‘rational’ knowledge. When Anselm tries ratone,
that is with his reason (by means of the capacity of comprehend-
ing existence and a particular existence as conforming to law),
to apprehend noetically the rationem fidei, that is the rationality
of the object of faith (its power of being understood by a being
capable of comprehending existence and a particular existence
that conforms to law), what he is trying to do is this: to con-
ceive necessitatem, that is the basis of the object of faith (the
impossibility of its not existing or of its existing differently),
necessitate; to conceive it ‘with reason’ (conceiving the im-
possibility of its not existing or of its existing differently).
That the object of faith has such a basis that it is impossible
for it not to exist or to exist differently is for him given in the
revelation and is certain in faith. His starting point is therefore
not to seek ‘what can be’ but to seek ‘what is’ and in fact
_to seek ‘what cannot fail to be’. It is precisely as ‘what can-
not fail to be’ that he tries to conceive ‘what is’. Correspond-
ing to the basis in faith there has to be a reason in know-
ledge; to the ontic a corresponding noetic necessity. The way to
the latter he finds in the confidence based on faith and faith
alone that there might be a valid use of the human capacity to
form concepts and judgments and that therefore there could
be a valid noetic rationality (an understanding of existence and
particular existence conforming to law). This could correspond
to ontic rationality (to the rationality of the object of faith) and
in virtue of this combination of ontic rationality and ontic
necessity (rationality and basis of the object of faith) could
52
even bring to light the noetic necessity that is sought (the

reason). With the proviso that truth itself is sovereign, Anselm
has been successful in his search for the intelligere of this noetic
rationality which is in fact aimed at noetic necessity by the
roundabout argument for the rationality and necessity of the
object.
How Anselm’s struggle for this noetic rationality and there-
fore for the perception of the existence and particular existence
of the object of faith was worked out in concreto has now to be
shown.
From the whole tenor of his treatment of the problem as we
have seen it up till now, we would expect his concern to be
to meditate from time to time upon a particular article of the
Christian Credo, that is to investigate the meaning of what it
contains that he may place it in its relation to all the other
articles or to the one next to it, comparing and connecting it
with them and allowing them to illumine it. All this he does
with the intention of himself conceiving by reflection the hidden
law of the object of faith about which this article speaks, that
thereby he may show it forth and so be able to know the thing
believed: the noetic ratio leads to the discovery of the ontic
rato in so far as it follows after it; in which case the remaining
articles of the Credo point the way along which the noetic
precedes the ontic ratio, along which the ontic ratio has to
follow to discover it.”
Or should Anselm have thought of it all quite differently—
at least parts of it occasionally? Should he really have sought
the law of the existence and particular existence of the object
of faith in the human capacity to form concepts and judgments
(as identical with its laws) and therefore assumed as possible
and necessary an independent knowledge alongside that of
faith, able to draw from its own sources? Should he therefore
1 We may think of the literal meaning of the verb ‘investigare’ which Anselm
liked to use to describe his researches (e.g. Monol. 1: 1 13, 14.)—‘to follow a trail’
(e.g. used of a dog on the scent),
2 That therefore means: ratione ducente et illo prosequente (Monol. 1: 1 13, 15f).
Do
‘ have begun quaerens intellectum with nothing, that is with the

rules of an autonomous human reason and with the data of
/ general human experience, and therefore of his own accord as
) tnveniens intellectum, that is by means of certain universal
‘necessities of thought’ (comparable to Pharaoh’s magicians),
not so much have found but rather have created a kind of
shadow Credo?
To save repetition we shall have to say: nothing less than
everything that we have so far established from Anselm’s
actual text with regard to the presuppositions, conditions and
the nature of Anselm’s intelligere testifies against the possibility
of accepting such a view even in part. And in fact it also lays
itself open to direct refutation. We may recall what Anselm
himself has said about his procedure. He declares, for example,
his intention to lead the Greeks rationabiliter to insight into the
‘filioque’ and continues that he will do this in such a way as to
apply what they believe to the proof of what they do not
believe.? So too in one of his later works he drew the limits of
his task in this way: it would be valid for demonstrating the
consistency of the doctrine of predestination with the doctrine of
free-will to assume the validity of both. The decisive proof
against the alleged ‘rationalism’ of Anselm is most certainly,
as we have already mentioned once before, what he has in
actual fact said in his writings. As far as I am aware no one has
ever yet tried to assert that the ‘arguments’ brought forward in
his treatment of, say, the Incarnation of the Word, or of the
relation of ‘Nature’ and ‘Persons’ in God, or of the coming of
the Holy Spirit from the Father and from the Son, of the Virgin
1 It reduces the theology of Anselm (shocking example: H. Reuter, Geschichte

der religiésen Aufklérung im Mittelalter, vol. 1, 1875, pp. 297f) to a labyrinth of
arbitrariness or inconsequence and has no basis in his texts viewed as a whole,
however easy it may be to misunderstand him in this direction from isolated
passages read out of the context of this whole.
2 Graecorum fide atque tis quae credunt indubitanter et confitentur, pro certissimis
argumentis ad probandum quod non credunt utar (De proc. Spir. Prologue: 11 177, 15ff).
3 Ponamus igitur simul esse et praescientiam .. . et libertatem . . . et videamus utrum
impossibile sit, haec duo simul esse (De concordia Qu. I 1: 11 246, 2ff).
ops
Birth and inherited sin, or of the fall of Lucifer—that these

‘arguments’ are rational grounds in the sense of inferences from
general truths. But throughout all Anselm’s investigation the
origin of the rationes necessariae is to be found somewhere other
than where it ought to be found in a philosopher who deduces
the Credo a priori—namely, on the same level as that on which
the question to be answered is raised, within the Credo itself.
Within it, now this Article and now that Article figures as the
unknown X which is solved in the investigation by means of the
Articles of faith a, b, c, d... which are assumed to be known
(without assuming knowledge of X and to that extent sola
ratione). ‘The inquiring theologian, with his capacity for forming
concepts and making judgments, is never assigned the function
of determining the fixed point or fixed points from which the
argument is to proceed. His function is rather as follows: on
the one hand, a selection from among the points fixed previ-
ously (elsewhere, or in another way); and on the other hand—
and this is his proper task—the formulation, according to the
rules of logic based upon the law of contradiction (and within
the limits it permits), of the definitions, conclusions, differen-
tiations and correlations necessary for the resolution of that
X. And so—not mastering the object but being mastered by
it—he achieves true noetic ratio, a real comprehension of the
ontic ratio of the object of faith; he attains to the intellectus fidet.
Even in the Cur Deus hono—the writing which at this point we
regard as the one most open to dispute—it is exactly the same.
The vital presuppositions which underlie the demonstration of
the rationality, or rather, the necessity, of the Incarnation and
of the atoning Death of Christ are: continuity between a
divine purpose and the human race,! the obligation essential to
the nature of man to obey God,” sin as man’s eternal guilt
before God,® the inviolability of God’s negation of sin,* man’s
inability to save himself® and last but not least—the aseity and
1C.D.h. I 4, 16-19, 23; II 1. 2 Ibid. I 20. a Ibid’ hry 225 fre 4
4 Ibid. I 8, 12-15, 24; II 20. 5 Ibid. I 24.
ae)
‘honour’ of God expressed in the Creation Dogma, which in all

contexts permits, one might say ‘requires’, Anselm to apply the
criterion of what is or is not ‘fitting’ for God. These are the
a, b,c, d... from which points the X, which on this occasion
is a Christological X,? will be shown to be ‘rational’ or ‘neces-
sary’..® ‘This position comes out much more clearly in the
Monologion* and in the second part of the Proslogion, not to
mention just yet Prosl. 2-4. In both these places Anselm deals
with—admittedly a particularly awkward theme—the Being
of God. The question may be seriously asked whether at least in
these writings® he has not indulged in a priori theology. Even
here I would say not, though I would not dispute the existence
of a certain lack of clarity in method. The road taken by
Anselm’s later writings (and it is in Cur Deus homo that this is
most clearly seen), leads in the opposite direction. Anselm could
not have remained ignorant of so serious a break in his develop-
ment® or failed to give some kind of indication of it. But in
none of his letters and writings have we a trace of evidence for
1 In Deo quamlibet parvum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas (ibid. I 10: 1 67 4f).

2 Described by that remoto Christo which we have already mentioned (cf. p. 43).
It means: precisely because on this occasion the point at issue is the proof of the
rationality and necessity of the Person and Work of Christ, the space which it
receives in Scripture, in the Credo and in Christian experience on this occasion is to
be filled up; that is, the arguments based thereon are this time to be left out of
account.
3 Hence this concentration of the inquiry on this problem—Von enim proposuimus
tractare nisi de sola incarnatione (cf. also ibid. I 10: 11 67, of —does not stop Anselm,
following Boso’s encouragement hilarem datorem diligit Deus (ibid. I 16: 1 74, 15ff)
also illustrating in the same way at least in passing the rationality or necessity of
certain neighbouring points in the Credo (here belongs inter alia the long excursus on
the eschatological Kingdom of Spirits, J 16-19, which at the time Anselm had
omitted from the recapitulation of Cur Deus homo given in Medit. 3—11 in MPL)
—so that at the end Boso—perhaps not without humour slightly tinged by school-
boy optimism—can be of the opinion: per unius quaestionis quam proposuimus solutionem,
quidquid in novo veterique testamento continetur, probatum intelligo (ibid. II 22: 1 133, 4f).
4T could not agree with the verdict of F. R. Hasse (Anselm of Canterbury, vol 2,
1852, p. 114): “This his first work is easily the simplest to understand; none other
is better thought out, more uniformly constructed or more carefully expounded.’
On the contrary, I think that in the Monologion Anselm had not yet quite found his
feet.
5 They fit into the early period of his activity as Prior at Bec (1063-78).
6 We may think of his tactical situation over against the actual rationalists of his
time.
56
that conclusion. My view is then that even in the Monologion

we are confronted by a very pronounced rejection of specula-
tion that does not respect the incomprehensibility of the reality
of the object of faith, by a recognition of the indirectness of all
knowledge of God,? and also, though more clearly than in the
Proslogion, by the reference to the Pattern of faith which is the
basis of everything. When at the beginning Anselm declared
himself capable of bringing to an understanding of the Nature of
God even a person to whom the Credo has until now been
foreign either because he was not acquainted with it or because
he did not believe it,4 that cannot mean (compare cap. 64)
that by such instruction he could create either for that man
or for himself a substitute for the knowledge of faith. In laying
hold of the Word Anselm has left behind him the unbridgeable
gulf between an understanding of the divine Being that can
be attained if need be without faith and the affirmation of
this Being carried out in spite of, and with, the basic incon-
ceivability of its guomodo. It is from this point that his teaching
begins and it is there alone that instruction can take place
that would make possible advances to the solution of other
questions as well. It is in this way that the development
of Monol. 1-6, which is frequently though erroneously (on
account of the memory of Thomas Aquinas) described as the
‘Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God’, will be under-
stood. In the controversy with Gaunilo Anselm expressly
described the procedure that is used here—of ascending from
the conception of the relative Good, Great and Existent Being
which confronts us in the world to that of a final and real,
indeed a single Good, Great and Existent Being—as a conicere
_ such that the question sive sit in re aliquid huius modi might remain
an open question.® That, however, means—by presupposing
the question, to be clarified elsewhere, about the Existence of
God, the Nature of God is to be elucidated here in the Mono-
logion (actually in a way that the religiously ignorant can
1 Monol. 64. %Ibid.65. Ibid. 76f. Ibid. 1. 5C. Gaun. 8: 1137, 23f.
57
understand). But the Existence of God, which then in Prosl 2-4

itself becomes the problem, is not all in the Monologion that is
taken as ‘believed’, as to be examined elsewhere. Behind
Monol. 1-6 there stands (thus also explaining cap. 7-8) the
dogma of the creation out of nothing; behind the doctrine of
the attributes of God? (despite all the Neo-Platonic technique in
the exposition) there stands the Christian avowal of the Unity
and Omnipotence of God; behind the doctrine of the Divine
Word? there is naturally the Christology of the Roman Catholic
Church, which we cannot discuss here. And if Anselm, in
explaining the Doctrine of the Trinity,? adduces the well-
known Augustinian vestigium trinitatis (memoria, intelligentia,
amor) as the image of God in man and therefore as the nearest
and best basis of knowledge,* that also meant for him at least,
as we also can take it to mean, a ‘biblical-ecclesiastical-dog-
matic’ presupposition and not an instance of ‘natural’ theology,
of a second theology alongside the one Revealed Theology.
In the second part of the Proslogion (apart from what it has in
common with the Monologion) Anselm’s ‘rationalism’ would
have to be sought in the closer systematic which he attained
by the application of the unum argumentum (id quo maius cogitari
nequit) that he had meanwhile discovered. But this very
argumentum is again inexplicable if combined with Creation®
and God’s Unity and Aseity.® The deliberations on the relation
of Mercy and Impassivity’ and of Mercy and Righteousness in
God® assumed the questions of Cur Deus homo to be answered,
and the expositions on God’s Hiddenness and Incomprehen-
sibility? remind us again of the reality of the Revelation which
cannot be analysed by any causal or teleological construction
but which is rational and necessary in itself. Finally, we may
recall the credo ut intelligam, so unambiguous (unlike Augustine’s),
at the beginning of this very work and also the remarkable
1 Monol 15-24. 2 Ibid. 9-14, 29-37. 3 Ibid. 29-65.

4 [hid. 47-48, 66-68. 5 Prosl. 3. 6 Thid. 5.
? Ibid. 8. 8 Ibid. 9-11. 9 Ibid. 14-17.
58
form of adoration with which Anselm embellished his argu-

ment just at this point. Strange indeed the contradiction if,
against such a background, what he had intended to say about
God were something his thinking had created rather than some-
thing received. However interesting for a study of his procedural
technique! the reference to his inevitable philosophical
ancestry (Augustine, Plotinus, Plato) may be, so far as the
contents of his ‘proofs’ are concerned, there is absolutely no
valid reason against, and a great many reasons for, under-
standing him theologically as a descendant of this line. ‘The
Proof of the Existence of God in Prosl. 2-4, on which we have
not yet embarked here, would be completely anomalous if it
were to be understood in any other way.
5. THE AIM OF THEOLOGY (THE PROOF)
Right at the outset of our inquiry, in anticipation, we

established that Anselm speaks of ‘proofs’ when he has in mind a
particular result, namely, the polemical-apologetical result of
his theological work. In so far as there is knowledge it issues in °
proof and proof is, as it were, the highest reach of knowledge.
And Anselm wants to prove.? Of course he wants to do more
than prove. He 1s also interested, as we saw, in the pulchritudo
of the completed knowledge. But he still wants to prove. His
thinking is done in relation to One whom he is to address and
who stands over against the merely human. In the Monologion
we hear the voice of a persona secum sola cogitatione disputantis et
investigantis.® But as we saw, the adoption of the dialogue form
1 In this connection cf. Alexandre Koyré, L’idée de Dieu dans la OEE de St.
Anselme, Paris 1923.
2 For example, according to a later statement of his own in the Monologion
and Proslogion—to prove: quod fide tenemus de divina natura et eius personis (Ep. de
incarn. 6: 11 20, 18) or, the Western Filioque (De proc. Spir. 1: 11 177, 16) or, the
necessity of the incarnation of Christ (C.D.h. I 22: 11 133, 6)
3 Monol. Prologue: 1 8, 18f—as far as I can see, according to Monol. 1 even this
solitary Christian thinker occupies himself very vigorously with the possibilities
of what is non-Christian.
59
did not mean that he was renouncing such thinking in soli-

tude. For that reason it is therefore significant. He knows,
and he knows that his readers know, that the Articles of
the Christian Credo are misunderstood, doubted and disputed
by heathens, Jews and heretics and that even where that
is not so, within the Church itself, its ratio is sought not with-
out some anxiety. In coming-to-grips with this situation
Anselm’s znéelligere is realized, and to that extent probare is
achieved.
If we want to understand what ‘proofs’ means here the first
thing that has to be observed is that the ratzo veritatis inherent in
the Articles of the Christian Credo is itself at no point the subject
of discussion but on the contrary it forms the self-evident basis
of discussion. The dialogue form and the desire for proof in no
sense indicate that Anselm has accepted a position where faith
and unbelief, the voice of the Church and every other voice,
have equal rights. ‘The reason which Anselm occasionally gives
for choosing this particular dialogue form certainly does not
suggest that the Archbishop of Canterbury ever had the
slightest intention of vacating his cathedra even temporarily for
the purposes of this discussion. And secondly, Boso who feigns
to oppose and ask questions takes up his position—the same is
in effect true of the disczpulus in the other dialogues—expressly
on the basis of Anselm’s credo ut intelligam,® explains his wonted
representation of the ‘unbelieving’ as a ‘mask’* and at the
same time, as already noticed, represents the interest of
ecclesiastical authority as against theology. Obviously this is no
free school of free convictions. The relation between Anselm
1C.D.h. Preface: 11 42, off; ibid. Ii: 47, 11-48, 2; wid. I 22: 1 133, 8. Ep. de
incarn. I: 116, 2f.
2 Quoniam ea, quae per interrogationem et responsionem investigantur, multis et maxime
tardioribus ingeniis magis patent et ideo plus placent (C.D.h. I 1: 1 48, 11ff).
3C.D.h. Ir: 1 48, 16ff. Anselm starts off on the assumption that he is asked
ex caritate et religioso studio (ibid. I 2: 1 50, 3f).
4 Patere igitur, ut verbis utar infidelium. Aequum enim est, ut cum nostrae fidei rationem
studemus inguirere, ponam eorum obiectiones (ibid. I 3: 11 50, 16f). Accipis in hac quaestione
personam eorum qui credere nihil volunt ... (ibid. I ro: 1167, if).
60
and Gaunilo, the monk of Marmoutiers and critic of section 2-4

of the Proslogion, is exactly the same. Gaunilo is far from being
an atheist. Not only does he expressly? declare his agreement
with all the other parts of the Proslogion but he also describes
the first part of the work which he challenges as recte quidem sensa,
even if minus firmiter argumentata, so that with that reservation he
considers that he can and ought to assent to the whole.? Thus
it is not the existence of God that he discusses but only the
proof that Anselm gives for it. He too, writes, as is expressly
confirmed by Anselm, not as znsipiens, but as catholicus even if as
catholicus pro insipiente.* ‘Thus no part of the entire edifice of the
Church is for a single moment in jeopardy. Concerning the
objective rationality of faith Anselm neither regards himself as
having been asked nor bound to give any account. No doubt it
was only with the greatest surprise that he faced the imputation
that in this matter the theologian too must have his ‘anxiety’:
apart from the appropriately ecclesiastical assumption of this
objective rationality, all the trouble over intelligere as well as
all the questions and answers of theological polemic and
apologetic had neither meaning nor object. On the assumption
that it is true to say: God exists, God is the highest Being, is a
Being in Three Persons; became man, etc.—Anselm discusses
the question of how far it is true and in asking and allowing
himself to be asked about this ‘how far’ in respect of particular
articles of faith, in his answers he takes as his starting-point the
1 Note his sentence meant in all seriousness: Summum illud quod est, scilicet Deus,
et esse et non esse non posse indubitanter intelligo (Pro insip. 7: 1129, 15f).
2 Indeed, with an extravagance that is almost suspicious: Cetera libelli allius
tam veraciter et tam praeclare sunt magnificeque disserta, tanta denique referta utilitate et
pit ac sancti affectus intimo quodam odore fragrantia ... (Pro. insip. 8: 1 129, 20ff).
Did Gaunilo already admire to some extent Anselm’s ‘piety’ so as to be able to
dispense with his theology with more confidence?
3 Omnia cum ingenti veneratione et laude suscipienda (Pro insip. 8: 1 129, 24f).
4’. Gaun. Prologue: 1 130, 4f—in view of this little Prologue and in view of the
remaining content of Anselm’s answer it is absolutely impossible, following P.
Daniels (P. Augustinus Daniels, O.S.B., Quellenbeitrége und Untersuchungen zur
Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im 13. Jahrhundert, Miinster 1909), to give to this work the
title ‘Contra insipientem’ (even if there were any manuscript evidence available—a
conclusion not to be gathered from Daniel’s exposition on p. 3). This title cannot
be Anselm’s,
61
assumption that all the other articles are true. Thus his con-
ception of intelligere must obviously, if he is not going to
contradict, himself completely, be his conception of probare
as well. The anxiety regarding the ‘how far’ is enough; for the
difficulties brought up by the others and still more those of
which he is sufficiently aware himself are really serious. This
anxiety is appropriate and significant. It is to be accepted by
any conscientious inquiry that does not ignore even the most
obviously superficial and indeed stupid opposition, that in its
progress leaves behind nothing that is unexplained? and that is
not content? merely to uncover formal analogies (convententiae).
There is added anxiety with regard to the uncertainty and the
limited nature of all human knowledge, regarding the genuine-
ness of the act of faith that forms the basis of knowledge
and finally regarding the gracious presence of God which first
makes it real and which has ever and anew to be sought.
_ Uncertainty as to whether in Holy Scripture or in the Credo
God has done his work well; uncertainty because of the exist-
ence of the unbelieving, that is of other religions or of heresy;
serious consideration of the possibility of rejecting revelation—
none of these in any sense belong to the presuppositions of
Anselm’s Proof.
There is therefore a special significance in the one who stands
over against the heathen, Jew or heretic to whom the Proof is
addressed. There is no question but that this other person who
rejects the Christian revelation and therefore Anselm’s pre-
supposition, is really before Anselm’s mind as he writes and that
he is speaking in opposition to him, addressing him, wishing to
say something to him or at least wishing to reduce him to
silence. Certainly not one of Anselm’s writings appeals to us as
being addressed directly to those outside that is as ‘apologetic’
1 Nullam vel simplicem paeneque fatuam objectionem disputanti mihi occurentem negligendo
volo praeterire. Quatenus et ego nihil ambiguum in praecedentibus relinquens certior valeam ad
sequentia procedere et si cui forte quod speculor persuadere voluero, omni vel modico remoto
obstaculo quilibet tardus intellectus ad audita facile possit accedere (Monol. 6: 1 19, 16ff;
cf. ibid. Prologue: 1 7, 11f).
2 C.D.h. I 3-4.
62
in the modern sense. The readers whom he visualizes and for

whom he caters are the Christian theologians, or more exactly,
the Benedictine theologians of his day.t Anselm’s theology is
therefore no esoteric wisdom; it develops—we will have to say,
‘usually’—as the rendering of an account against omni poscenti
se rationem de ea quae in nobis est spe.” It is the denial that more or
less assumes the role of partner in the discussion.® But that is
not to say that he felt compelled to take up his position on his
opponent’s ground. He could not do that and he did not do it.
As soon as he formulated his polemical-apologetic programme
thus—‘it is right znsipienter quaerentt sapienter respondere’* or
again ‘rationabiliter ostendendum est, quam trrationabiliter nos
contemnant’®—the opposites sapientia and insipientia, rationabilitas
and zirrationabilitas make it quite clear that the parties in the
discussion are operating on two very different planes. And if in
these passages we are not to understand such a complex con-
cept as ratio in a non-dialectic, subjective sense, in accordance
with certain necessary associations that emanate from the
eighteenth century, but rather in the same vigorous sense in
which, according to our argument, it is used elsewhere in
Anselm, then surely it is impossible that all of a sudden at this
point Anselm should have conceded to the non-believer (and
to himself as well) a noetic rationability without its being
conditioned by an ontic one, that is without its being ulti-
mately conditioned by the summa veritas and therefore without
revelation, grace and faith—in order to embark arm in arm
with the unbeliever on an arbitrary reconstruction, ‘from pure
reason’, of the Christian knowledge and so to surrender to him
the required proof for the raizo fider. Just as Anselm holds that
1 Compare in this respect Daniels, pp. 112f. SO. DAeL PP 47; tot:
3 Fides nostra contra impios ratione defendenda est (Ep. 136: 111 280, 34f). Ille insipiens,
contra quem sum locutus in meo opuscolo...(C. Gaun. Prologue: 1 130, 3f).
4 De casu diab. 27: 1 275, 5.
5 Ep. 136: 11 281, 37f; or: the unbeliever is to be trained ad ea, quae irrationabiliter
ignorat, rationabiliter proficere (Monol. 1: 1 13, 16) or: ratione qua se (sc. infidelis)
defendere nititur, eius error demonstrandus est (Ep. de incarn. 2: 1 11, 7f).
63
there is no self-redemption of any sort+ so he also holds that

there is none from irrationabilitas to rationabilitas, and from
insiprentia to sapientia. But on the contrary, when it happens that
the noetic ratio rises out of zrrationabilitas and therefore becomes
vera ratio then this is the work of the self-illuminating ratio
veritatis which illumines
the noetic ratio from above, that is, it is
the work of the ratio fidei itself. In this all that we can do from
the human side is to try to explore this ratio to the best of our
knowledge and conscience with the aid of the documents of
revelation, and so to bring it before our opponent as something
that has been investigated in order that it might speak for
itself and might speak directly to him. Anselm also regards the
‘unbelievers’ as suffering from the fact that they forego this
human assistance. Not being in a position to study the ratio
jider itself and no one else having done this work for them,
they certainly hear the message of the Christian Credo but its
meaning strikes them as being contrary to reason or vice versa.”
They want to know about this ratio first before they believe it.®
Clearly in this latter respect Anselm can have no desire to help
them. As theology cannot anticipate the transformation of,
insipiens into fidelis so now with a believer’s knowledge neither
can it expect to dissolve the rectus ordo of the relation between
faith and knowledge by virtue of which faith is obedience to
authority which must be prior to knowledge.* If that trans-
formation did not take place and therefore this obedience did
not occur all that would remain between Anselm and his
opponent would be a gulf (from each side of which two
totally different things are being said in the same language),
1 Nec enim convertere me possum ad te tot et tantis vulneribus et aegritudinibus et morte

ipsa depressus et impotens effectus. Sed tu, misericors Pater, converte me, et convertar ad te
(Medit. 8: MPL 158, 747f).
2 Infideles Christianam fidem quia rationi putant illam repugnare respuentes . . . (C.D.h.
Preface: 1 42, 10f). Nequaquam enim acquiescunt multi Deum aliquid velle, si ratio
repugnare videtur (ibid. I 8: 11 59, 12f).
3 Qui nullatenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere (ibid. I 3: mu 50, 17f).
Qui credere nihil volunt, nisi praemonstrata ratione (ibid. I 10: 1 67, 1f)
*C.DAhe TD rs As, 16.
64
over which therefore neither help nor agreement is possible.?

The inexplicable possibility exists that the partner in discussion
is and remains an instpiens, in which case all discussion with him
is pointless and meaningless. Were Anselm to reckon in concreto
with the given-ness of this possibility he could obviously do
nothing but abandon the attempt, only just begun, to give
human assistance to his partner. If, in the last analysis, this
partner is completely devoid of faith, then any attempt to help
him in regard to knowledge of faith, of which of course he must
also be devoid, cannot but be in vain. And so insipienter quaerere
and sapienter respondere are marching along side by side but
really having nothing in common and once that is recognized
they might as well save themselves all the trouble and ex-
citement.
But now we come to the exceedingly remarkable fact that
Anselm did not reckon with the given-ness of that possibility,
or at least made no use of such a notion.” It has often been
noted that Anselm’s writings, whose purposes have frequently
been compared to those of the Crusades,* are on the other
hand distinguished by an extraordinary mildness when it
comes to polemics.* This can and must be understood partly
1 The incomprehensibility of predestination corresponds to the incomprehensi-
bility of the factuality of the revelation: Anselm sees mixtim et iustorum et iniustorum
infantes ad baptismi gratiam eligi et ab illa reprobari (De conc. virg. 24: 1 167, 17f) and
in face of this mystery can offer neither explanation nor advice: Jllud certe nulla
ratione comprehendi potest, cur de similibus malis hos magis salves quam illos per summam
bonitatem et illos magis damnes quam istos per summam iustitiam (Prosl. 11: 1 109, 22ff).
2 In my opinion it is touched on twice (that this can happen is worth noting): in
the quia insipiens est! ergo contemnendum est, quod dicit (C.D.h. I 25: 1 95, 20f) and
likewise at the climax of the proof (Prosl. 3: 1 103, 11). But in both passages it is
abandoned at once.
3 For example, F. Overbeck, Vorgeschichte und Jugend der Mitielalterlichen Scholastik
1917, pp. 228f. 1094-98 Anselm writes Cur Deus homo. 1095—Urban II calls for the
first Crusade. 1099—Jerusalem is taken.
4 The few exceptions where it rises to an effect bordering on anger are from
another point of view characteristic—Ep. de incarn 1 (1 9, 20ff)—he speaks quite
angrily against the nominalistic-philosophical background of certain of his con-
temporaries—Ep. 136 (m1 280, 26ff)—he just cannot understand the effect of the
‘Christian’ heresy in view of baptism even the authors of the heresy share, in which.
C.D.h. II ro (a 108, 20ff)—Boso is sharply rebuked because in discussing the
problem of freedom he had cast up the question of why God did not create man
like himself—immune from temptation.
: 65
in terms of personal psychology. But this mildness plus the fact

that, apparently without the slightest inhibition, Anselm did
in fact embark on the attempt to provide proof in face of
unbelievers and false believers and despite the Credo ut intelligam
and his predestinarian background, nevertheless requires some
practical explanation. We can start from Anselm’s astonishing
recognition (put into the mouth of Boso) that what the believer
and the unbeliever are meaning and seeking in their questions
is exactly the same: Quamvis enim illi 1deo rationem quaerant,
quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus: unum idemque tamen est,
quod quaerimus.t What does that mean? We know that Anselm’s
quaerere rationem means to show the noetic rationality of faith
by explaining the mutual relations of the individual parts of
the Credo. Unum idemque est, quod quaerimus: thus Anselm gives
credit to the unbelievers to the extent that the ratio of faith
which they lack and for which they ask is one and the same
ratio as the one which he himself is seeking. It is not the reve-
lation itself that offends them—if that happened then of
course they would be insipientes and beyond help. Anselm does
> not burden them with this possibility. But leaving aside the
question of revelation as such, they do take offence at some
constituent part of the revelation because the context, the
totality of the revelation is unknown to them and therefore
this or that constituent part (not being illumined by the whole)
is beyond their comprehension. In face of the unbeliever’s rock
of offence thus understood, the Christian theologian does not
feel himself powerless. ‘Thus understood, it is in fact identical
with the rock of offence by which he himself was driven and
continues to be driven from credere to intelligere. Therefore all he
has to do is to lead his opponent along his own path and thus be
able to give him the answers to the questions that even he him-
self is asking. If such is Anselm’s interpretation of the quest of
the ‘unbeliever’ then we can understand how he comes to
1C.D.h. I 3: 1 50, 18ff.
66
engage in a discussion with him without either accepting the

unbeliever’s criterion, such as universal human reason, or
stipulating that the unbeliever in order to become competent
to discuss must first be converted into a believer. Anselm
assumes his own ground, the ground of strictly theological (we
would nowadays say dogmatic) impartiality, to be likewise a
ground on which the ‘unbeliever’ could quite well discuss and
would want to discuss. Thus he summons him on to his own
ground; or rather he addresses him as one who by his questions
has already accepted this ground and therefore he is able (with-
out renouncing the credo ut zntelligam or his predestinarian back-
ground) to discuss with him as if he were a Boso or a Gaunilo.
~»Did Anselm really so interpret the unbeliever’s quest? Again
this must be settled one way or the other on an examination of
the actual content of Anselm’s writings. On that basis we must
certainly say, ‘Yes. Anselm has so interpreted this quest.’ We
-will not find any passage in Anselm where he worked out the
‘proof’, that is the argument directed outwards with the un-
believer in view, as an action that is different from the searchings
that take faith itself as starting-point or where another special
‘apologetic’ action would follow on the ‘dogmatic’ or where such
action basing itself on or including the dogmatic action would
come first anagogically or apagogically.2 But even the working
out of the zntelligere of faith, even the inward proof, is also the
outward proof. The unbeliever’s quest isnot simply taken up in
any casual fashion and incorporated into the theological task
but all the way through it is in fact treated as identical with the
quest of the believer himself. Long before his ‘unbelieving’
partner in discussion ever appeared, Anselm most certainly
intended to destroy the appearance of a repugnare between
ratio and fides. It was and remains quite impossible for Anselm
1 That is why he can even appoint his fellow-believer Boso as representative of
the ‘unbeliever’.
2 It would have been quite impossible for Anselm to write a Summa theologica
as well as a Summa contra Gentiles: a volume of Dogmatics as well as a Philosophy
of Religion or the like.
67
to allow his faith to come to peaceable terms with lack of

knowledge. What question of the unbeliever could be new to
him and what answer could he give him save that which he
gives to himself?, Anselm’s Proof works on the assumption
that there is a solidarity between the theologian and the
worldling which has not come about because the theologian
has become one of the crowd, or one voice in a universal
debating chamber, but because he is determined to address the
worldling as one with whom he has at least this in common—
theology. So he is able to promise him instruction on how he
could convince himself, given a certain amount of intelligence,
of the reasonableness of the Christian faith without having
first accepted the truth of the revelation. Fancy giving him such
instruction as assumes Christian Dogma, although it is a matter
of guaerit, quia non credit; the questioning is from one who is
outside, indeed a ‘spectator’, and he not only doubts but denies
and despises! But itis precisely this instruction which is pro-
vided for precisely this person!
Anselm’s theology is simple. That is the plain secret of his
‘proving’. Anselm is not in a position to treat Christian know-
ledge as an esoteric mystery, as a phenomenon that would have
to shun the cold light of secular thinking. He credits his
theology as such—without special adaptation for those outside
—with being conclusive and convincing. He would have to
distrust his theology and it would no longer be convincing even
to himself and therefore it would be bad theology, if, for the
benefit of those outside, he had to give precedence to special
proofs over its own distinctive arguments. And Anselm is in no
position to serve the world with something other than that
with which he himself is served. Not only because he quite
honestly has nothing else to offer or because he knows no other
1 $7 quis... quae de Deo sive de eius creatura necessarie credimus, aut non audiendo aut
sion credendo ignorat: puto quia ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingeni est, potest
ipse sibi saltem sola ratione persuadere. Qnod cum multis modis facere possit, unum ponam . . .
then follows the ‘Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God’ (Monol. 1: 113, 5ff),
which has already been mentioned.
68
proof than the one that convinces him, but also because he
knows himself to be responsible to the world and dares not
offer it anything less than the best., And for that reason
Anselm knows just one question, one language and one task
of theology. He does not undertake his task without the
intention of ‘proving’, which means wishing to make the
Faith comprehensible to everyone, not only to himself, not,
only to the little flock but to everyone. But he can only “
prove on the basis of an investigation in strict theological
neutrality, as if there were no rejection of the revelation and
of dogma.
Thus there arises here a final enigma the statement (not the
solution) of which may conveniently form the conclusion of
this section. To say that with this procedure Anselm makes it
easy for himself would obviously be far too foolish an objection
to be worthy of lengthy refutation. Anyone who knows Anselm’s
proofs knows that he did not make it easy for himself. And the
other possibility, the possibility of a discussion on the ‘un-
believer’s ground, was for Anselm, be it ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’,
excluded and forbidden—it was no possibility at all. No doubt,
however, it can and must be asked, on the basis of his pre-
supposition: is he not deceiving himself when he thinks that
his ‘proofs’ could ever be understood by the unbelievers, by
those who quaerunt, quia non credunt, and when he thinks that
not only is theological discussion possible with them, but that it
should succeed—the question of revelation and of faith always
left open—in convincing them of the reasonableness of the
Credo? What kind of unbelievers could he have had in mind
who allow themselves to be transposed in this way nolens volens
into the realm of theology? And was it not the case that his
own credo ut intelligam was the best argument against the
possibility of such uncommitted understanding, against the
possibility of a theologia irregenitorum, a theological, non-Christian
impartiality ?And even at its best could the outcome of such
instruction be anything but useless information about the
69
inner consistency of Christian statements which would be

completely incapable of preventing the person so informed
from doubting, denying and despising the whole thing as much
as ever and, with the whole thing, the details too?, In what
sense could this result, which it is highly improbable would be
otherwise, be worth all the trouble expended on it? Is it not
true that right from the start the whole attempt to prove was a
false and reprehensible notion and would Anselm not have
done better and remained truer to his own purposes had he
given his theology the clear character of an esoteric science?
To that we have the following to say: In the history of theology
in all times and developments the via regia of divine simplicity
and the way of the most incredible deception have always run
parallel, separated only by the merest hair’s breadth. It
can never be at all evident in any statement of any theologian
whether it stands on this or that side of the boundary. Therefore
we are not to be surprised if we see the possibility of incredible
deception apparently clear enough for us to spot even in the
midst of the theology of Anselm. But we must also for that
reason not blind ourselves to the possibility that what at first
glance looks like incredible deception might in actual fact be
divine simplicity which, not heeding the evil appearance,
knows exactly what it wants and does not want and is surer
of its goal than is realized by the all too hasty critic. That it
means disaster for his entire undertaking is not the only view
that we need take of Anselm’s desire to prove: perhaps he was
daring to assume that disbelief, the quza non credimus, the doubt,
denial and derision of the unbeliever are not really to be taken
so seriously as the unbeliever himself would take them. Perhaps,
while appealing to him ‘with proof’, it was not in his lack of
faith that he was trusting but in his faith. Perhaps he saw him
standing at his side not only within the precincts of theology,
but more important within the precincts of the Church.
Because of some sort of quality encountered in the unbeliever?
Perhaps because of some kind of power of his subjective ratio
70
existing from creation and not obliterated by the Fall? Or,

because of some vague, universal piousness possessed even by
the natural man? These of course are possibilities totally
foreign to Anselm and from a rational standpoint are to be
discounted. It may be, however, that Anselm could quite well
have risked that astonishing assumption because of the power
of the objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens and is
enlightened from above by the summa veritas and which,
according to Anselm, was able to teach and all along did teach
truths that are beyond the power of one human being to teach
another. Perhaps for Anselm theology had as much a part in
proclaiming Christ as preaching, where the first and last
presupposition of the preacher must be trust in the ob-
jective ratio that both enlightens and is enlightened, where
consequently sins are not to be imputed, the sinner not to be
held guilty for his sinfulness but in his sinfulness to be claimed
for God, and where we must move on past the listener’s tragic
non credo to our task with a sense of humour, which in this
instance is not only permissible but is actually demanded.
Perhaps Anselm did not know any other way of speaking of the
Christian Credo except by addressing the sinner as one who had
not sinned, the non-Christian as a Christian, the unbeliever as
believer, on the basis of the great ‘as if? which is really not an
‘as if? at all, but which at all times has been the final and decisive
means whereby the believer could speak to the unbeliever.
Perhaps, desiring to prove, he did not really remain standing
on this side of the gulf between the believer and non-believer
but crossed it, though on this occasion not in search of a truce
as has been said of him and has often happened, but—here
reminiscences of the days of the Crusaders could come to the
fore—as conqueror whose weapon was the fact that he met the
unbelievers as one of them and accepted them as his equal.}
1 Unde ego considerans quantum peccavi quantisque iniquitatibus infelix anima mea
polluta sit, intelligo me non solum aequalem cum altis peccatoribus sed plus quam ullum
peccatorem et ultra omnes peccatores esse peccatorem (Medit. 6: MPL 158, 739).
a
But we must not stretch this point any further. We can

only say that if that is how Anselm thought then it was
reasonable and so, dismissing the possibility that he was
deceived, clearly his attitude to proving is exactly as we have >
seen.
72
II
THE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE
OF GOD
A. The Presuppositions of the Proof

1. THE NAME OF GOD
In Prosl. 2-4 Anselm wants to prove the existence of God. He

proves it by assuming a Name of God the meaning of which
implies that the statement ‘God exists’ is necessary (that means,
that the statement ‘God does not exist’ is impossible). In
Prosl. 5-26 Anselm wants to prove the Nature of God (that
means his Perfection and Unique Originality). He proves it on
the presupposition of a Name of God, the meaning of which
implies that the statements, ‘God is perfect and originally wise,
mighty, righteous, etc.,’ are necessary (that is, all statements to
the opposite effect are impossible). The lever in both cases, the
argumentum in his analysis of both parts of the Proslogion is
therefore the Name of God that is presupposed! concerning
which the author tells us in the Prologue how he sought it and
how, after he had abandoned the search, he suddenly found it.
At the beginning of Prosl. 2, where it appears for the first time,
this Name is rendered by the words: aliquid quo mihil cogitan
possit. The actual formulation is not fixed either in the Proslogion
itself or in the essay against Gaunilo: instead of aliquid Anselm
can also say zd. It can even be further abbreviated by omitting
the pronoun. Possit can be replaced by potest and occasionally
1 Tantam enim vim huius prolationis in se continet significatio (that simply means the
Name of God that is presupposed) wt hoc ipsum quod dicitur, ex necessitate eo ipso
quod intelligitur vel cogitatur et revera probetur existere et id ipsum esse quidquid de divina
substantia oportet credere (C. Gaun. 10: 1 138, 30-139, 3).
73
by valet; nihil also by non; nihil (or non) . . . possit (or potest)
also by nequit and also, quite frequently, by maius or melius.
Only this last variant is important for an understanding of the
formula. In the first place the literal meaning of the formula is
clear. It can be quite easily translated into French: ‘Un étre
tel qu’on n’en peut concevoir de plus grand’* or even better, ‘Quelque
chose dont on ne peut rien concevoir de plus grand.’? In German it can
be paraphrased: ‘Eiwas tiber dem ein Grosseres nicht gedacht werden
kann’. (Something beyond which nothing greater can be
conceived.) Here ‘great’ suggests, as is shown by the variant
melius and by the whole application of the formula, quite
generally the large mass of all the qualities of the object
described and therefore as much its ‘greatness’ in relation to
time and space as the ‘greatness’ of its mental attributes or of
its power, or of its inner and outward value or ultimately the
type of its particular existence. The ‘greater’ which cannot
be conceived beyond the thing described is therefore quite
generally: anything superior to it. And from the application
which the conception is given, particularly in Prosl. 2-4, the
definitive sense can be taken to be: the being that stands
over against it as a fundamentally higher mode of being. For a
fuller understanding of the literal meaning of this Name the
first thing that has to be noticed is what it does not say: it
does not say—God is the highest that man has in fact conceived,
beyond which he can conceive nothing higher. Nor does
it say—God is the highest that man could conceive. Thus it
denies neither the former reality nor the latter possibility, but
leaves open the question of the givenness of them both. Clearly it
is deliberately chosen in such a way that the object which it
describes emerges as something completely independent of
whether men in actual fact conceive it or can conceive it. It is
so chosen that its actual conception, as well as the possibility of
its conception, emerges as being dependent upon an essentially
1 So Bainvel in the Dictionnaire de Théol. cath., vol. 1, Column 1351.
2So A. Koyré, Saint Anselme de Cantorbéry, Fides quaerens intellectum, Paris 1930,
p. 13.
74
THE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
unexpressed condition.? All that the formula says about this

object is, as far as I can see, this one thing, this one negative:
nothing greater than it can be imagined; nothing can be
imagined that in any respect whatsoever could or would outdo
it; as soon as anyone conceives anything which in any respect
whatsoever is greater than it, in so far as it can be conceived
at all—then he has not yet begun to conceive it or has already
ceased. It remains to be said: we are dealing with a concept of
strict noetic content which Anselm describes here as a concept
of God. It does not say that God is, nor what he is, but rather,
in the form of a prohibition that man can understand, who he is.
It is une définition purement conceptuelle.2 It contains nothing in”
the way of statements about the existence or about the nature
of the object described. Thus nothing of that sort is to be
derived from it on subsequent analysis. If it is to be of any use /
in proving the existence and nature of God then a second
assumption, to be clearly distinguished from this first one, 1s
necessary—the prior ‘givenness’ (credible on other grounds) of
the thought of the Existence and of the Nature of God which
with his help is to be raised to knowledge and proof. Aliguid quo
nihil maius cogitart possit is therefore on no account the condensed
formula of a doctrine of God that is capable of later expansion
but it is a genuine description (significatio), one Name of God;
selected from among the various revealed Names of God
for this occasion and for this particular purpose, in such a way
that to reach a knowledge of God the revelation of this same
God from some other source is clearly assumed. All that can
possibly be expected from this Name is that, in conformity with
the programme of Anselm’s theology, it should demonstrates
that between the Name of God and the revelation of his
1 It goes without saying that it immediately implies a serious misunderstanding

when Wilhelm of Auxerre (died 1232) in his Report on Anselm’s Proof thought he
could interchange, that is interpret, Anselm’s cogitari by excogitart (Daniels, p. 27).
2A. Koyré, L’idée de Dieu, etc., p. 203.
3 Again it was a crucial misunderstanding when Johannes Peckham (died 1292)
quoted Anselm’s Proof as the argumentum a definitione sumptum (Daniels, p. 44).
ps)
Existence and Nature from the other source there exists a

strong and discernible connection. Only in that way and to
) that extent will statements about the existence and Nature of
God inevitably follow from an understanding of this Name.
From what has been said we have first of all to establish that
the presupposition of this Name has without any doubt a
strictly theological character. Notice how the formula is
introduced—et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo mais... .1
What is said here is confirmed by the conclusive statement in
which Anselm later guarded against the possible rejection of
this Name for God, that is against the fact that it is unknown
to the Christian: quod quam falsum sit, fide et conscientia tua pro
firmissimo utor argumento.2 In this statement the fides of Gaunilo,
who is being addressed, is itself to confirm his acquaintance
with this Name of God and his conscientia is to confirm his
acquaintance with the person whose name this is: as a believing
Christian Gaunilo knows very well who the quo maius cogitar
nequit is. With this we ought also to compare the remarkable
accounts given by Anselm in the Prologue to the Proslogion
of the discovery of this concept. He sought it saepe studtoseque,
sometimes thinking he was to find it the next moment, some-
times thinking he would never find it. Eventually he gave up
the attempt as being an impossible undertaking and decided
so as not to waste further time on it, not to think about it any
more. As soon as he did that, however, the idea began to force
itself upon him for the first time in the right way. Cum igitur
quadam die vehementer eius importunitati resistendo fatigarer, in ipso
cogitationum conflictu sic se obtulit quod desperaveram, ut studiose
cogitationem amplecterer, quam sollicitus repellebam.? Is this a
scientific report on an investigation or is it not rather a—
perhaps quite typical—account of an experience of prophetic?
insight? However that may be: Anselm did not regard this’
designation for God as a non-essential theologoumenon and '
1 Prosl. 2:1 101, 4f. — 2 C. Gaun. 1: 1.130, 15f.
3 193, 10ff. Compare also the Vita of Eadmer, I 2, 9 (MPL 158, 55).
76
certainly not as a constituent part of a universal human aware-

ness of God,! but as an article of faith. If we assume for a
moment that there were for Anselm, alongside the explicit
statements of the text of the revelation, consequences arising
directly from these to which he attached equal weight,? then
we will have no difficulty over the fact that naturally the quo
maius cogitari nequit does not admit of proof by appeal to any
text that was authoritative for him.? Thus in no sense is he of °
the opinion that he produced this formula out of his own head
but he declares quite explicitly the source from which he con- |
siders it to have come to him: when he gives God a Name, it is ¥
not like one person forming a concept of another person; rather
it is as acreature standing before his Creator. In this relation-
ship whichis actualized by virtue of God’s revelation, as he
thinks of God he knows that he is under this prohibition; he
can conceive of nothing greater, to be precise, ‘better’, beyond
God without lapsing into the absurdity, excluded for faith, of
placing himself above God in attempting to conceive of this
greater.4 Quo maius cogitart nequit only appears to be a concept
that he formed for himself; it is in fact as far as he is concerned \”
a revealed Name of God.® Thus we see at once (how could it be
1 This was how he was understood to a large extent later on: . . . Anselmum,
qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius...
(Bonaventura, Daniels, p. 38) .. . arguit Anselmus ...: Deus est secundum omnes quo
nihil maius . . . (Joh. Peckham, Daniels, p. 43).
2 Cf. p. 23, n..1.
3 In comparison we may perhaps also recall in this connection Luther’s sola fide.
4 Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super Creatorem
et iudicaret de Creatore: quod valde est absurdum (Prosl. 3: 1 103, 4ff). Perhaps it is not
an accident that just here as an exception Anselm brings the melius into use instead
of the maius.
5 Among the later Scholastics who dealt with Anselm’s Proof, Bonaventura and
Thomas Aquinas in particular saw correctly that what was involved in the concept
that Anselm presupposed, was the nomen Dei (Daniels, pp. 39 and 65f). And in
Agidius of Rome (died 1316) there is a sentence which could be the most exact
interpretation of Anselm’s intention: Demonstare Deum esse est declarare quid est quod
importatur per hoc nomen Deus—if Agidius did not unfortunately continue: quod
patet ex omnibus demonstrationibus quae hoc probant (Daniels, p. 76), from which it
follows that nomen in the sense of ‘all’ these proofs, did not mean for him the
nomen personae, but the nomen essentiale Dei, that is the Nature of God. And that is
how it stands with Bonaventura and Thomas as well. But the quo maius cogitari
nequit in Anselm himself has the meaning and plays the réle of a nomen personae.
77
otherwise after the immediately preceding closing words of

Prosl. 1?) that at the very outset of his Proof of the Existence of
God and indeed precisely there, Anselmis fully and legitimately
engaged in the exposition of his theological programme. It
goes without saying that for him the Existence of God? is given
yas an article of faith. This Existence of God which is accepted
in faith is now to be recognized and proved on the presupposi-
tion of the Name of God? likewise accepted in faith and is to be
understood as necessary for thought. Thus here the Name of
God is the ‘a’ taken from the Credo by means of which the
Existence of God now represented as X is to be transformed
into a known quantity from one that is unknown (not dis-
believed but as yet not realized): Nullus intelligens id quod Deus
est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est.4 Starting from this point of
the Credo, the other thing, the Existence of God, must make
itself—not credible (it is that already)—but intelligible. The
choice of this particular point, the discovery of this particular
Name of God, was the first step along the path that was to
commit him to the development of the Proof. That it had a
vital significance for him follows just as much from the manner
in which he reports his discovery in the Prologue as from the
manner in which he defended it later against Gaunilo. We can
be certain: at all events this first step does not lead away from
the constraint of specifically theological thinking but rather
leads right into it; it concerns the choice of the concrete limit
which so far as this question is concerned appears to make
knowledge possible.
1 Da mihi, ut . . . intelligam quia es, sicut credimus (Prosl. 2:1 101, 3f).
2 Anselm’s references to the revelatory-theological character of the vital assump-
tion of his Proof are overlooked when this is understood, as is frequently done by
Thomas Aquinas in particular, as an answer to the question Utrum Deum esse sit per
se notum? There is no such notum per se for Anselm in theology, no insights which
do not stand under the seal of faith.
3 The Nature of God accepted by faith and already indispensable for the
definition of the conception of the Existence of God certainly comes under con-
sideration as 5; further points of the Credo as c, d, e. . . may stand more or less
visibly in the background.
4 Prosl. 4: 1 103, 2o0f.
78
We are combining further comment on the Name of God

which was normative for Anselm’s Proof with a discussion of
Gaunilo’s two misunderstandings which followed immediately
on this first step.
1. Gaunilo develops the thought, especially in cap. 4-5 of his
reply, that when men hear the Name of God they are unable,
for lack of any kind of intuitive response and therefore of any
suitable universal concept, to grasp more than a mere word
(vox), to grasp at the same time the rez veritas, truth in relation
to God. Whether it be the word Deus or Anselm’s formula—the
word itself could not provide him with a knowledge of God
unless some extension of what the word is meant to denote were
also given to him from another source. There are no less than
four points here that incidentally affect Anselm.
(a) In his scepticism of the possibility (maintained by Anselm)
of a knowledge of God, Gaunilo appears as a great champion
of the concept of the incomprehensibility of God. Ought there
really to be a word capable of giving knowledge of God; should
any human word about God be more than a reasonably
meaningful symbol of a human, an all too human, desire, that
is never fulfilled, to comprehend the incomprehensible?
These are the questions he feels compelled to address to Anselm.
And it is quite remarkable that in so doing he felt compelled to
appeal directly to Anselm.! Surely just a glance at Monol.
26-27 and 64-65 would have been enough to show to anyone
directing such questions to Anselm that in so doing he was
merely beating the air. Also in the Proslogion itself he might
equally well have read in the first chapter: guia nullatenus comparo
wlt intellectum meum,? in cap. 15: Ergo Domine, non solum es quo
maius cogitart nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit? and
in cap. 16-17 a whole succession of most impressive declarations
of the total hiddenness of God even for those who know him
1 Quandoquidem et tu talem asseris illam (sc. rem), ut esse non possit simile quicquam
(Pro. insip. 4: 1127, 2f).
* Prost. 21. 100;,.16. 3 Prosl. 1521112, 14f.
79
in faith. The only explanation for Gaunilo’s obvious failure to

take such passages into account is that he did not realize that for+
Anselm even the statement of the incomprehensibility of God
was an article of faith not in any sense denied by the pre-
supposition of the Name of God, that the whole point of the
presupposition was to raise this article of faith (as well as others)
to knowledge by means of the Name of God and that he indeed
proved it logically in the Proslogion using this same Name of
God.! How then do we know that God is incomprehensible?
How do we come to assert the inadequacy of all concepts of
God formed by men? Certainly for Anselm, like everything we*
know of the Nature of God, it follows in and by faith: in faith
we are given and by faith we recognize, a designation for God
which is not totally inadequate, not just a symbol, etc., for the
simple reason that it expresses nothing about the nature of
God but rather lays down a rule of thought which, if we follow
it, enables us to endorse the statements about the Nature of
God accepted in faith (example, the statement of his in-
comprehensibility) as our own necessary thoughts. This
necessary thought which is endorsed, the Proof, itself stands of
course under the shadow of the incomprehensibility of God; it
stands with the proviso that thinking is merely speculative,
simply per similitudinem not per proprietatem, with the proviso
that in itself it is an empty shell ever requiring to be filled
from above, by the Truth itself. But this proviso is also its
protection: within the limits in which all theology is contained
it is always true and an inviolable validity attaches to it.
Against which we must seriously ask whether the incomprehen-
sibility of God that Gaunilo so favours is anything but a state-
ment of purely secular gnosis, not based on faith and incapable
of providing any basis for a knowledge of God, and therefore
whether it can really possess the critical force which it ought to
have.
1 It is proved thus: Quoniam namque valet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi (sc. quiddam
maius quam cogitari possit): si tu non es hoc ipsum, potest cogitart aliquid maius te: quod
fert nequit (Prosl. 15: 1 112, 15ff).
80
(b) But now Gaunilo desires and seems to regard as possible a

second element of knowledge which operates in conjunction
with the supposedly empty Name of God. If he had understood
Anselm then he must have been aware that not even Anselm
is trying with his Name of God to produce knowledge of the
Nature and Existence of God out of a vacuum—a creatio ex
nihilo indeed—but that for Anselm it is axiomatic, as the
contents of the Proslogion indisputably show, that the element of
knowledge deriving from the other source is presupposed in the
articles of faith concerning the Existence and Nature of God,
only that now these are treated—in respect of their knowledge-
content (not in respect of their truth-content!)—as unknown,
that is as articles that are true but still not understood. Gaunilo |
could not have overlooked these facts had it not been that by the
second element of knowledge which he postulated he was
thinking of something quite different from what Anselm was
thinking. It is quite clear that when he demands an indubium
aliquod argumenitum,+ when he wants to be sure re vera esse alicubt
matus ipsum, in order thereby to know God’s Existence by means
of the concept of God,? when he calls for a demonstration of a
res vere atque indubie extstens,> the demonstration of the esse of
that natura maior et melior omnium,* he does not mean the given-
ness of an article of faith from another source which fills out the
concept of God and which is to be proved by means of this
concept, but quite simply he is thinking of the givenness of a
corresponding idea. That this is in fact what he meant follows
from the two illustrations which he himself gave of his objec-
tions: when someone speaks to him about knowing ‘God’ he
would like to know as much about ‘God’ from other sources as
he knows at least in general from his acquaintance with other
men about a particular man who may be unknown to him
personally.* And he compares the unknown Existence of God
to an unknown island in a far-off sea whose existence he will not
1 Pro insip. 2: 1 126, of. 2 Ibid. 521.128, .19f. 3 Ibid. 6: 1 128, 31.
4 Ibid. 7: 1 129, 8f. 5 Ibid. 4:1 127, 4ff.
F 81
allow to be proved by a description of its perfection but only by

the same method as that in which men have habitually proved
the existence of hitherto unknown islands.1 That shows how
lightly he took his statement about the incomprehensibility of
God. The element of knowledge other than the Name of God
of which Anselm was thinking, in these circumstances must
have seemed to him of little note and little comfort.
(c) For Gaunilo quo maius cogitart nequit is any concept as it
can be formed by man with or without regard to the object
concerned. ‘Therefore he can bring into the discussion the
incomprehensibility of God as an argument against the validity
of knowledge in Anselm’s formula. Therefore he can postulate
that this formula in order to become valid for knowledge
requires to be completed by an idea. For him a word in itself is
in all circumstances ‘only’ a word, an empty word, which can
however, be delivered from its emptiness where a correspond-
ing idea is given except where the intended content is God.
It is clear that from here he would only have rejected Anselm’s
element of knowledge from the other source and that he could
also have described the article of faith about the Existence of
God in respect of its epistemological validity as nothing more
than an empty vox. That there ever could be words which even
in themselves do not remain ‘mere’ words but are a divine
revelation in the guise of something ‘conceived’ by a human
\ brain in accordance with human logic and expressed in
human Latin—that, in complete contrast to Anselm, was for
him a totally foreign concept.
(d) In one breath Gaunilo described the quo matus cogitari
nequit and the word Deus as epistemologically invalid.” Without
giving the special content of the formula more careful con-
sideration, he saw in quo maius cogitari nequit as well as in Deus
a definition of the Perfect Nature of God which as mere vox
was invalid. This will come out still more clearly later on. He
1 Pro insip. 6: 1 128, 14ff.
2 Vix umquam poterit esse credibile, cum dictum et auditum fuerit istud, non eo modo posse
cogitari non esse, quo etiam potest (cogitari) non esse Deus (Pro insip. 2: 1 126, 4ff).
82
overlooked the fact that this vox is to be distinguished from the

vox ‘Deus’ aliquatenus intelligibilis, just because its content is
only of a noetic and not of an ontic nature. Anselm had of
course expressly declared: Non tento, Domine, penetrare altitudinem
tuam . .. sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam.+ Just
because of the concept of God in the Proslogion this aliquatenus
cannot signify a quantitative limitation of the range of human
insight into the nature of God simply because this Name of
God is lacking in ontic content. In that case it can only describe
the noetic mediation of this Name of God. This Name of God
conceives God only in that sphere in which he can be con-
ceived,? not 2m altitudine sua, but with great hesitation and
reserve—by conceiving the manner in which he is not to be
conceived. He is not to be conceived in such a way—this
possibility is ruled out by the revelation-faith relationship to ,
him—that anything greater than him could be imagined or |
even imagined as conceivable. In the way of any thinker who
has a hankering in this direction, the revealed Name of the
Lord—his Name is quo maius cogitart nequit—stands as effective
deterrent.? Since theology adheres to this command; since thee
noetic ratio of faith follows the ratio of the object of faith and
consequently the ontic ratio; and since, therefore, theology
assents to that Name of God as an article of faith and pre-
supposes it for all that follows—it is able to illumine the noetic
necessity of faith (that means the impossibility of denying the
existence and the perfect nature of the God designated by that
Name) by the roundabout route of ontic necessity which is
1 Prosl. 1: 1100, 15ff. Putasne aliquatenus posse cogitari vel intelligi aut esse in cogitatione
vel intellectu, de quo haec intelliguntur? (C. Gaun. 1: 1 132 3f). Aut si aliquando negatur,
quod aliquatenus intelligitur, et idem est illi quod nullatenus intelligitur: nonne facilius
probatur, quod dubium est, de illo quod in aliquo, quam de eo quod in nullo est intellectu?
Quare nec credibile potest esse idcirco quemlibet negare ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’? quod
auditum aliquatenus intelligit: quia negat ‘Deum’, cuius sensum nullo modo cogitat. Aut
si et tllud, quia non omnino intelligitur, negatur: nonne tamen facilius id quod aliquo modo,
quam id quod nullo modo intelligitur, probatur? (ibid. 7: 1 136, 27-137, 3).
2 Contra insipientem ad probandum Deum esse attuli ‘quo maius cogitari non possit’,
cum illud nullo modo, istud aliquo modo intelligeret (C. Gaun. 7: 1 137, 3ff).
3 Simply cf. Monol. 15 (1 29, 17ff): Nefas est putare, quod substantia supremae naturae
sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquomodo non ipsum.
83
inseparable from ontic rationality. Thus theology can know

what is believed, that is, prove it. In this sense, as already
illustrated, the conception of God in the Proslogion, just because
of its limitation, possesses epistemological validity. According
to Anselm, to want to take aliquatenus as a nullatenus or deny
validity of knowledge to this Name of God, because it does not
happen to be identical with God’s own conception of himself,
is the same as maintaining that we cannot see the daylight
because our eye in fact is not able to see the light of the sun
from which the daylight proceeds.! He is not to be blamed for
such wanton misinterpretation of this Something into Nothing.
2. Gaunilo persistently so understood Anselm’s formula and
in numerous passages so quoted it as if Anselm had actually
written in the Proslogion which he was criticizing: Aliquid, quod
est maius omnibus. We may well wonder at the gentleness with
which Anselm protested? at this substitution and at the fact
that even despite this negligence on the part of his opponent,
so confusing for all concerned, he did not hesitate to acknow-
ledge at the end of his reply Gaunilo’s good-will.? By this
negligence Gaunilo failed most seriously to appreciate that the
formula which Anselm used in the Proslogion did not simply
have a more particular content but a different content al-
together from the definitions which he utilized in the Mono-
logion in connection with Augustine.t~The restlessness with
which Anselm searched for a new argumentum in the Prologue to
the Proslogion and the joy with which he reports having found
1 Quod si dicis, non intelligi et non. esse in intellectu, quod non penitus intelligitur: dic
quia qui non potest intueri purissimam lucem solis, non videt lucem diet, quae non est nisi
ux solis (C. Gaun. 1: 1 132, 5ff).
2 Nusquam in omnibus dictis meis invenitur talis probatio . . . iniuste me reprehendisti
dixisse quod non dixi (C. Gaun. 5: 1 134, 26f; 135, 22f). By omnia dicta the Proslogion
is primarily intended, to which alone Gaunilo was referring. The Monologion can,
however, be intended as well in so far as there too the maius omnibus is not applied
to the Proof of the Existence of God.
3 benevolentia (C. Gaun. 10: 1 139, 11).
4 The conception of God in the Monologion which Gaunilo was obviously listen-
ing to, meant: the greatest or highest or best: aliquid maximum et optimum id est
summum omnium quae sunt (Monol. 2: 115, 22f). Necesse est, ut sit (sc. substantia supremae
naturae) quidquid omnino melius est, quam non ipsum (ibid. 15: 1 29, 19). God is aliqua
84
it could not be explained had he been able to accept one of

these older definitions as equivalent to his new argumentum.
In the same passage he declared what the new argumenium that
he was seeking ought to achieve: namely, it ought to be
sufficient as unum argumentum to prove the Existence and Nature
of God.! And certainly it ought to have such force of proof that
in its structure it may correspond to what faith holds to be the
Nature of God and therefore be able to be used to prove God
in a manner befitting God. Thus God’s Nature is soon trans-
cribed as follows: God alone is the summum bonum nullo alto
indigens et quo omnia indigent ut sint et bene sint. ‘That, however, \
means that the Name of God on the presupposition of which ,
the Existence and Nature of this God are to be proved, must be |
so formed that in view of the Existence of God believed but not
proved, or Nature of God believed but not proved,? it is enough
to conceive this Name or express it, in order thereby to com-
plete the required proof.? The formula corresponding to
Anselm’s previous position, which was carelessly drawn into the
substantia quam censet (sc. homo) supra omnem naturam, quae Deus non est (ibid. 80:
1 86, 2o0f). That is in fact, though not literally, Gaunilo’s ‘quod est maius omnibus’.
Cf. in this respect, Augustine’s: (Deus) ita cogitatur, ut aliquid quo nihil melius sit atque
sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere . . . Thus God is the Greatest that can be
imagined—perhaps this was the passage that formed the starting-point from which
Anselm aspired to his later formula, which is also characteristically different from
this Augustinian one. . . nec inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat esse, quo melius aliquid
est (De doctr. chr. I 7). We may notice how in this second sentence Augustine again
moved away from the direction in which Anselm proceeded further. So also in this
second passage which belongs to it: Hunc plane fatebor Deum, quo nihil superius esse
constiterit (De lib. arb. II 6, 14). We can see Anselm’s whole relation to Augustine
at this point condensed in the passage C. Gaun. ro (1 139, 3ff): credimus namque de
divina substantia quidquid absolute cogitari potest melius esse quam non esse. (Anselm goes
so far with Augustine) ... Nihil autem huiusmodi non esse potest, quo maius aliquid
cogitari non potest. Necesse igitur est ‘quo maius cogitari non potest’ esse, quidquid de divina
essentia credi oportet. (Here we are dealing with thoughts of Anselm’s that are
independent of Augustine.)
1 Prosl. Prologue: 1 93, 6ff. He calls the Monologion, by way of a reproach mulitorum
concatenatione contextum argumentorum (ibid.: 1 93, 5), and with this is obviously
objecting that there the Name of God as such has none at all of the systematic
significance which he now wants to give it.
2 The prior-givenness of a subject of the Proof can naturally not be excluded
by the ‘aseity’ of the Name presupposed.
3 Argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret (Prosl. Prologue:
1 93, 6f). In isto vero (sc. argumento) non est opus alio quam hoc ipso quod sonat: quo maius
cogitart non possit. . . . de se per seipsum probat ‘quo maius nequit cogitari’ (C. Gaun.
5: 1135, 19ff; cf. also ibid. ro: 1 138, 30ff).
85
discussion by Gaunilo,—gquod est maius omnibus—would not

conform to these conditions. This can be seen at once to be
simply a transliteration back into ontic terminology of the
noetic terminology which Anselm is now deliberately choosing
and to which he is careful to give point. Neither is it in the
narrow, strict sense a designation or Name of God like quo
matus cogitari nequit, but in itself it is a brief paraphrase of the
Nature of God. As such, therefore as far as proof is concerned
alike both of the Existence and Nature of God as these are held
by faith, it is insufficient. It is no accident that though in various
passages! in the Monologion Anselm asserts the Existence of
God as held by faith, he did not try to prove it. The insight
_\ that such proof is impossible on the basis of the conception of
God assumed in the Monologion, is perhaps a later achievement.
It comes to formal expression in the answer to Gaunilo?
and is based on the fact that quod est maius omnibus might also be
‘conceived of as not-existing. As long, however, as the con-
“ception that is presupposed does not in itself rule out that
possibility and as long, therefore, as the non-existence of God is
conceivable without the presupposed conception of God being
destroyed, this conception is not amenable to proof because a
proof of the Existence of God is only being discussed when this -
Existence is demonstrated as necessary to thought (that is, as
impossible not to be thought). But in the same context Anselm
also declares—and that by way of public self-correction apropos
the Monologion—that that conception would not be sufficient
to prove what faith holds to be the Nature of God and for the
reason that once again quod est maius omnibus does not preclude
the possibility that a maius eo (etiam si non sit) could at least be
conceived.’ However, even the exclusion of such a possibility
1 Explicit Monol. 6; implicit zbid. 31 and 34. 2C. Gaun. 5: 1 134, 27ff.
3 Quid enim: si quis dicat esse aliquid maius omnibus quae sunt et idipsum tamen posse
cogitari non esse et aliquid maius eo etiam si non sit posse tamen cogitari? An hic sic aperte
inferri potest: non est ergo maius omnibus quae sunt... ? (C. Gaun. 5: 1135, 14ff).
Not only in the Proslogion but also in the later work De veritate, where once again
Anselm gave a Proof of the Nature of God (De verit. 1: 1176, 12), we see him as a
result working with the impossibile est cogitare....
86
would have to be accomplished by a real proof of the originally

perfect Nature of God. Obviously Gaunilo could not have
attempted anything more devastating than his ill-considered
re-transliteration into ontic terms of the new formula that
Anselm introduced in the Proslogion. The very thing that
Anselm intended should make it valid as a proof, its austere
character as a rule for thinking about God, was thereby taken
away from it and it is hardly surprising that, on the basis of this
presupposition, Gaunilo was not able to appreciate Anselm’s
actual Proof. Again, he is just beating the air when he thinks it
necessary to inform Anselm that by means of this conception
the Proof is not possible.?
The invalidity for proof which Anselm himself asserted of
the quod est maius omnibus stood in very close connection with a
second consideration, namely that as a Name of God it did not
possess that self-sufficiency that belongs to and befits the nature
of its subject. F or the quod est maius omnibus to become admissible
within itself. That is, in order to be the highest, it must first

presuppose the existence and nature of omnia, that is of objects
which in their existence and nature point beyond themselves to
the ‘highest’ which forms their peak. Without the rest of the
pyramid the peak could not be a peak. De minoribus bonis ad
matora conscendendo (as Anselm described it, still in his reply
to Gaunilo) do we arrive at the conception of the optimum
maximum summum. It is only from other heights that the highest
comes into view. From the existence and nature of the lower
we may conicere, form tentative conclusions about, such a
highest: the unbeliever is to be reminded that we can do this
and the believer is to be reminded from Rom. 1.20 that our
ability to do this is a truth of revelation. But—in so doing
1 The fact that Anselm’s Proof became known in wider theological circles during
the thirteenth century was in the end unfortunate. The first to take it up (Richard
Fishacre, Wilhelm of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, cf. Daniels, pp. 24, 27, 30f)
immediately compromised it by introducing it within a series of proofs of God
clearly based on ontic assumptions each and all of which Anselm had declared to
be ambiguous, 2C. Gaun. 8: 1 137, 18 and 27ff.
87
neither the nature nor even the existence of the ‘highest’ as

such is known or proved. For why should it not be conceived
of as not existing, or, if existing, capable of being surpassed?1
In order to be valid for proof the conception of the ‘highest’
requires in the second place to be supplemented by such
another concept as excludes the very possibility of this mode of
thinking. This vital concept is just the quo maius cogitari nequtt.
In so far as the maius omnibus is thought of as identical to the
quo matus cogitart nequit, the existence and perfection of what it
describes can be proved—but not otherwise.? Therefore it has
none of that self-sufficiency with which it would correspond
to its object. This self-sufficiency does, however, belong to the
Name of God discovered in the Proslogion. ‘The designation of
God as the quo maius cogitari nequit does not assume the existence
or nature of any creature, certainly not of God himself, neither
as actually conceived nor as being conceivable. It simply says
that if God should or could be conceived—that both these
are in fact so is obviously the other assumption, the substance of
the Proof—then nothing else may be conceived of as greater
than God. For all its formal, or noetic insufficiency it stands on
its own feet. The Proof that is to be worked out on the assump-
1 Jt is just in C. Gaun. 8, where the inherent continuity between Anselm’s new

formula and the conception of God in the Monologion comes out most clearly, that
he lays great emphasis on the fact that the question sive sit in re aliquid huiusmodi,
sive non sit cannot be answered along the road taken in the Monologion (via emin-
entiae).
2 From this standpoint too Gaunilo’s island analogy is shown up as a useless
notion. Gaunilo takes the quo maius cogitari nequit as a definition of the Nature of
God and Anselm’s Proof as deriving God’s Existence from God’s Nature as that is
thus established. In actual fact for Anselm the Proof of the Nature of God follows
just as much as the Proof of his Existence from the quo maius cogitari nequit, and
indeed in such a way that the latter is prior to the former. Anselm too does not
think first of the perfection of that ‘island’ in order to know its existence; Anselm
also wants to know first of all its existence but most certainly from a less un-
reliable source than the general experience of which Gaunilo is clearly thinking.
And to that extent he wants to know of its perfection too, then of its unique per-
fection that is not to be confused with any other: Nullatenus enim potest intelligi
‘quo maius cogitari non possit’, nisi id, quod solum omnibus est maius. Sicut ergo ‘quo maius
cogitari nequit’ intelligitur et est in intellectu, et ideo esse in rei veritate asseritur: sic quod
matius dicitur omnibus, intelligt et esse in intellectu et idcirco re ipsa esse ex necessitate con-
cluditur. Vides ergo quam recte me comparasti stulto illi qui hoc solo, quod descripta intelli-
geretur, perditam insulam vellet asserere? (C. Gaun. 5: 1 135, 26ff).
88
tion of this designation of God will not be an analytic but a

synthetic proposition.1 In that it corresponds to its object.?
And likewise it can now be valid as a proof: it is able to
perform the same function as the presupposed Name of God is
to perform in a Proof of God. With quo maius cogitart nequit the
enemy (denial or doubt) is sought out on his own ground, in
thought itself; on which ground this enemy is repeatedly calling
in question the knowledge of God on the assumption of an ontic
conception of God, and is placed under the sign of the Name of
God and is thereby challenged to necessary knowledge of God.
Quo maius cogitart nequit is designed to exclude just this con-
ceivability of the non-existence or imperfection of God which
lurks in the background of every ontic conception of God—
to exclude it with the radicalism and force of the Creator’s own
injunction to the creature—non eritis sicut Deus—and likewise to
establish knowledge of the truth of the existence and perfection
of God.
We may say that the motive that led Anselm to choose this
particular Name was completely misunderstood by Gaunilo.
Otherwise the maius omnibus would not have appeared at all.
Our understanding of Anselm’s intention will depend on our
avoiding right from the start this erroneous substitution by
- Gaunilo.?
2. THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
It is part of the advance which the Proslogion represents on

the Monologion that now the question of the Existence of God
(quia es) stands out as a special problem distinct from the
1 Above all the argumentum proves itself, as it stated in the passages quoted in
note 3 on page 85 and therefore it may also be used as a means of proof.
2 Cf. with this the older statement on the aseity of God: Si enim nulla earum rerum
umquam esset, quarum relatione summa et maior dicitur, ipsa nec summa nec maior intellig-
retur: nec tamen idcirco minus bona esset aut essentialis suae magnitudinis in aliquo detri-
mentum pateretur (Monol..15: 1 13 ff).
3 How remarkable it is that even so clever and independent an historian as
F. Overbeck (op. cit., p. 220) could not rise even a little above the level of the
common but false explanation of the basic concept of our Proof.
89
problem of the Nature of God (quia hoc es). Naturally, even in

the Monologion Anselm is acquainted with the concept esse
in the sense of exzstere or subsistere;+ just as even there he had also
asserted the Existence of God to be an article of faith. But it
belongs to the powers which are there assumed to be known
and at that point perhaps Anselm did not even think of it as
a possible problem, as the X to be solved. At least it was not
till the Proslogion that it became for him the object of zntellectus
fidet, that is of the Proof, in a way that may be thus distin-
guished: that now he broaches the question of esse right at the
beginning of the book as prior to the question of the Nature
of God.
In the Monologion the meaning of the concept ‘existence’ is
clarified once we see that the three phrases essentia, esse, existens
sive subsistens are compared with one another and it is said of
them that they are inter-related as lux, lucere and lucens.?
In view of Anselm’s later statements, which will be quoted
later, we may venture the following interpretation: essentia
meants potentiality (potentia), esse the reality (actus) of an
object’s existence. But it is called exzstens sive subsistens in so far
as it exists, that is—it is best to keep to the negative definition—
in so far as it is an object not just in human thinking or for
human thinking. Essentia and esse may also belong to an object
in such a way that its existence is presupposed in an act of
human thinking—for in so far as it is conceived, it is conceived
as existing. However, it is still not settled whether this act of
thinking has in relation to the presupposition the character of
mere hypothesis, fiction, lie or mistake. All that would mean:
the object concerned exists only as presupposition of this act of
thinking, therefore it possesses no existence. However, this
amounts to: it does not exist, though it may be that statements
logical and meaningful in themselves can be made about the
1 For example, Monol. 6: 1 19, 21f; ibid. 16: 1 30, 22ff; elk 28: 145, 25ff; ibid.
31:1 49, 3f; ibid. 34: 153, 176.
2 Monol. 6: 1 20, 15 ff.
gO
potentiality and reality of its nature (for instance, about the

abilities and deeds of a fictitious character). On the other hand,
the description ex-sistens or sub-sistens applied to an object
characterizes it simultaneously as emerging (ex-sistens) from
the inner circle of abstract existence (where it also exists in so
far as it forms the subject of discussion), as ‘existing for itself’
as opposed to all thinking of the potentiality or reality of its
existence as well as of its actual existence, existing (swb-sistens)
independently (even when not debarred from our thinking);
existence belongs to it, it exists, although perhaps very little or
nothing at all may be stated about the potentiality or reality of
its existence. This interpretation of the Monologion passage will
be illuminating if we place alongside it what we hear in the
Proslogion and in the Answer to Gaunilo about the concept
of Existence. Here on one occasion Anselm makes this dis-
tinction: it is aliud rem esse in intellectu, aliud intelligere rem esse.
| The first esse may imply the non-existence of the res apart
from its existence in thought, as, for instance, the esse of a
picture in intellectu of the artist before the completion of the
actual work. The second esse is the existence of the res apart
from its existence in thought which is added to the first esse,
as, for instance, the esse of the picture when the artist’s work is
- finished: et habet in intellectu et intelliget esse.1 A second distinc-
tion goes even deeper (by a different application this time of
the term res): an object either has esse in intellectu solo or esse
et in intellectu et in re.2 On the one hand, potentiality of being
and reality of being as determining an object which on occasion
exists merely in thought, and, on the other hand, actual
existence are clearly related to one another,? according to
Anselm, as an inner circle is related to an outer one: when an
object is thought of as having potentiality of existence and
1 Prosl. 2: 1 101, 10ff.
2 Prosl. 2: 1 102, 33 C. Gaun. 2: 1 132, 22f; ibid. 6: 1 136, 7f.
3 He certainly did not want by this to exclude and could not exclude the further
possible case of an esse in re sola (God ‘before’ the Creation) ; but this did not come
into the question of knowledge.
QI
reality of existence it is also thought of as existing, be that mere

hypothesis, poetic licence, deception or error. But the fact that ¢
existence does belong to it, that it is not merely thought to be
existing, that its existence is neither hypothesis nor poetry,
neither deceit nor mistake—is not contained in the thought of
its power to exist or of the reality of its existence. That has to be
—and this assumption comes into the discussion independ-
ently—specially thought, and if known and proved then it
has to be specially known and proved.
The question of this special thought and proof is the question
of existence. It is distinguished from all other questions of
knowledge as the question of the object of knowledge, of the
object as such and to what extent it is not merely what we
think, but what we think. It asks whether and to what extent
this object, as surely as it is the object of thought, at the
same time stands over against thought and is itself not to be
reduced to something that is merely thought; it asks whether
and to what extent, while belonging to the inner circle of what
is thought, it also ‘protrudes’ into the outer circle of what is
not only thought, but exists independently of thought. For
Anselm, on_ this ex-sistere of the object depends nothing lesy
than its Trueness. Its being iin truth is for Anselm, as it were,
the third and last outer circle by which the existence and
within the existence, the existence in thought, must be enclosed
if a thought, that is an object that is thought, is to be true. ‘The
object then is first of all in reality, then following from that it
exists, then as a consequence of that it can be thought. Without
the middle step of existing what is thought could not be real.
Anything really in intellectu solo (thatisexcluding the esse in re)
would be falsum; on the other hand what is e¢ in intellectu et in re
is identical with what is real! because it could not be in re
had it not first existed in reality. As we heard earlier, the truth
of a statement depends precisely on this: that it describes as
existing something in fact existing.2 The question of the
1C. Gaun. 6: 1 136, 7f. 2 De verit. 2: 1 178, 6f; cf. p. 46, n. 2.
92
knowledge of an object must go further than knowing it as

existing (that means, in knowing it as having power and reality
of existence). To be true knowledge, to be knowledge of the
truth, it must press on to knowledge of the existence of the
object thus known in itself, to knowledge of its objectivity.
Not till the question of knowledge reaches this second outer
circle, not till it probes whether the object exists beyond mere
thought, is it really in earnest. Not till then does it press into
the third or inclusive realm of truth. However, once the urgency
of the question of existence is seen as a question of truth, every-
thing will depend on grasping it and answering it in its special
nature. It cannot be confused again with the question of the
power and reality of the existence, the potentiality and actual-
ity, the essentia and esse of the object. Furthermore, the appear-’
ance must be avoided that it is a case of elevating existence in
thought analytically to actual existence. It must be clear that
the question of existence, far from being involved in the,
question of nature, is an entirely new question. That the ques-
tion of nature is thereby assumed to be answered—whose
existence is being questioned must of course be fixed—is
another matter. But the existence may not be derived from the
nature of the object whose existence is in question. The question
of existence must quite definitely be asked on the assumption
that in no sense whatsoever is it answered along with the ques-
tion of nature.t Obviously in this last respect Anselm did not
only sever the question of existence from that of nature in the
Proslogion but gave it priority of study.
The doctrine of the Nature of God which comes up for
discussion in the Monologion andin Prosl. 5-26 deals with God’s
essentia and esse and in nuce declares that in distinction to all
1 Bonaventura and, following him, Matthew of Aquasparta, raised the objection
against Gaunilo’s island analogy (Pro insip. 6) that the description of the island as
perfect means an oppositio in adiecto which is not the case when the same description
is applied to God (Daniels, pp. 40 and 62). The objection is valid and therefore
represents a compromise on Anselm’s part in so far as he had to confirm the
impression that Gaunilo’s task was to conclude the Existence of God from a
correctly worked out conception of his nature.
93
other creative beings these two in God are not two, but one.
By virtue of his aseity,or his glory as Creator, God is all that
he is, not through participation in certain potentialities not
identical with his actual Power; all his potentialities do not
first require to be actualized in the reality of his Power, but he is
himself what he ever is and what he ever is, he is himself. His
Potentiality and his Reality are identical.t The proof of this
potential Reality or actualized Potentiality of God had
been worked out in the Monologion on the assumption of the
maius omnibus as the conception of God and with the question
of the Existence of God left open. We saw how in the Proslogion
Anselm came to substitute for that conception of God the
quo matus cogitart nequit and thereby to prove even the Nature
of God in a different way. Obviously with this he was disturbed
by the proximity of that open question to the other part of his
Doctrine of God.? Of course, for faith the Existence of God
is not an open question. There is naturally not the slightest
suspicion that the Existence of God, as an article of faith,
might just be hypothesis, fiction, deceit or error. But to see the
impossibility of conceiving the non-existence of God is not the
Aame as the certainty with which faith conceives the existence
of God. Inability to see this must seem to threaten the know-
ledge of God’s Nature already gained. Here too the required
knowledge of faith cannot rest content with an unsolved X.
, Alt has to be shown that it is impossible to conceive the
object described as God as being only a conception. To show
1 Quidquid . . . de illa (sc. summa essentia) dicatur: non qualis vel quanta, sed magis
guid sit monstratur (Monol. 16: 1 31, 1f). Idem igitur est quodlibet unum eorum (of the
divine attributes) quod omnia, sive simul sive singula (ibid. 17: 1 31, 23f). Tu vero es,
quod es, quia quidquid aliquando aut aliquo modo es, hoc totus et semper es (Prosl. 22:1
116, 20f). Summa veritas... nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est, nist
quia est (De verit. 10: 1 190, 4). Non tibi est aliud essentia quam bonitas et omnipo-
tentia . . . et omnia illa quae similiter de te dicuntur et creduntur (Medit. 19, 3: MPL 158,
805).
2 The first possible meaning of the title of Prosl. 2 (1 101, 2): quod vere sit Deus
is therefore this: the question of truth in regard to God’s existence is to be taken
seriously in such a way that the question advances beyond the ‘inner’ circle of
the mere thought of the object into the ‘outer’ circle of the thought of this particular
object as such—and so it advances in the direction of truth itself.
ve
this is the purpose of the Proof of the Existence of God in

Prosl. 2-4.
But for all that we have so far said, we have still not fully
brought out the specific and characteristic urgency which
constrained Anselm to prove the Existence of God.
Our exposition to this point could even be used in support of
an ancient misunderstanding. Because of our synoptic view we:
have done what Anselm himself did not do and have spoken
first of the question of the existence of objects in general and
then of the question of the Existence of God. This is liable to
cause misunderstanding for it suggests that the question of the
Existence of God is to be understood as a special case of the
general question of the existence of any object and is to be
answered accordingly. And the originator of this misunder-
standing too is Gaunilo. Just as he deemed the concept of God
to-be-a general concept so he took the Existence of God to be
existence in general. By so doing he misconstrued Anselm’s
second step just as he did the first, and of course the immediate
consequence is that for him the question of the Existence of God
is nothing like as urgent as it is for Anselm.
The fact that Gaunilo is able to speak of the Existence of God +
and of the unknown island in the sea in one and the same breath
highlights two things: the whittling down of the special ques-
tion of the Existence of God to the level of the general question
of existence, and the consequent merging and begging of that
special question.! It is clear that the Proof of the Existence
of the Island is fundamentally different from the Proof of God’s
Existence and that the form of proof, however desirable it
might be, can if necessary be entirely dispensed with because
there is no question at all of there being an ultimate necessity
to conceive the existence of this particular island. But for
1 We can but cast the mantle of charity over the fact that in this context later
participants in the discussion even spoke of the winged horse Pegasus and of—
‘a hundred dollars’!
95
Gaunilo it is exactly the same with the Proof of God. The

passion with which Anselm wants to know the Existence of
God because he believes it and therefore must think it, is
quite foreign to Gaunilo. For Gaunilo it might equally well
remain unproved. His curious passion is reserved on the other
hand for asserting that it might very well be possible to con-
ceive of God as existing only as a conception.! The entire
apologia Pro Insipiente is in support of this freedom. It gives no
indication itself of having any kind of grasp of the problem or
of any concern to find a better solution than Anselm’s which it
rejected. Certainly Gaunilo is an eager thinker, keen and
honest, but the only pressure he feels is the pressure to avoid
Anselm’s position in his fierce criticism of Anselm’s solution.
Is he not sure of his faith? Or, is he quite unaware of a fides
quaerens intellectum? He has been described as a sceptic, as a
traditionalist, and it may be that perhaps he was both. What is
certain is that his feverish activity in this matter is not reflected
in his knowledge of his argument. He must not conceive the
Existence of God. All his passion confirms the impression that he
really must not do that. Therefore he cannot wish to prove it.
Free from this twofold compulsion and in the guise of a non-
partisan seeker after truth, he has sufficient time and leisure
to treat himself to the fun of a Liber pro insipiente. He was neither
the first nor the last ‘theologian’ of that breed.
Anselm’s constraint at the outset of his Proof is best illustrated
by his classic reply to Gaunilo’s remarks concerning the lost
island:, he confidently asserts that he can once and for all
prove the existence of this island if anyone is in a position to
convince him of the existence or even just the concept of
something, which though different from what is described by
his Name of God, yet might reasonably be the subject of the
same proof.? Now that means: Anselm proves the existence of
1 Pro insip. 2:1 125, 14ff; ibid. 7: 1 129, 14.
2 Fidens loquor, quia si quis invenerit mihi aut re ipsa aut sola cogitatione existens praeter
‘quo maius cogitari non possit’, cui aptare valeat conexionem huius meae argumentationis:
inveniam et dabo illi perditam insulam amplius non perdendam (C. Gaun. 3: 1 133, 6ff).
96
a thing when it is existence alone that can be proved.! Under

the pressure thus exerted the proof of the Existence of God is for
him a demand.
We saw: the fact that God exists cannot be derived from his
Nature; for over against all answers to the question— What is
God ?’—the question—‘Is there a God ?’—remains a special,
open question (albeit closed as far as certainty of faith is con-
cerned). The conception of God then that is presupposed in a
- proof of the Existence of God must not therefore be a kind of
disguised doctrine of his Nature. We may certainly make
inferences from the Nature of God as to what existence in
general can and does mean, but it is for God to say how far we
are right or wrong. The real meaning of Existence as attributed
“to God, even if attributed only in thought, has to be investigated
always with the question left open—this is what has to be
proved—whether it is impossible to conceive of God as existing
only as a concept. Existence means in general the existence of
an object without regard to whether it is thought of as existing.
~The reality of an object and the fact of its being thought of
demand that it exists. But even the reality by itself demands
both its existence and true thinking of its existence. It exists and
isrightly thought of as existing because and to the extent that it
-is first of all real. The decision as to whether it exists and
whether it is truly conceived is not made in and by itself but is
made within the third all-inclusive circle, that is on the basis of
Truth itself. This decisive Truth is God. And it is his Existence
that is involved. It is certainly also true that the point at issue
1 Proprium est Deo, non posse intelligi non esse. For: illa quippe omnia et sola possunt
cogitart non esse, quae initium aut finem aut partium habent coniunctionem et... quidquid
alicubi aut aliquando totum non est. Illud vero solum non potest cogitari non esse, in quo nec
initium nec finem nec partium coniunctionem, et quod non nisi semper et ubique totum ulla
invenit cogitatio (ibid. 4: 1 133, 27f; 134, 2ff). Bonaventura was wrong when he
thought that there was a further proof by Anselm of the Existence of God to be
found in this passage (Daniels, p. 39). Anselm’s point in cap. 4 of his essay against
Gaunilo is not a proof of the Existence of God but a proof of the fact that in the
strict sense which Anselm means the only thing that can be proved is the Existence
of God. This subsidiary proof is worked out from the Nature of God, where it
belongs. But just for that reason it cannot serve and it cannot be meant as a proof
of the Existence of God.
G 97
here is existence plain and simple: the Existence of God apart

from his Existence in thought. But because God is Truth what
is meant is obviously existence in a superlative sense, not the
existere of objects that is conditioned by truth in the second or
middle circle, but the existere of Truth itself which is the
condition, the basis and indeed the fashioner of all other
existence, the simple origin of all objectivity, of all true outward
being and therefore also of all true inner being. God exists—
if he does exist—in the unique manner that befits him as the
only One who ultimately really exists.1 What is outside of
him has its existence by his grace,? is created by him out of
nothing? and is also kept from complete disintegration only
_by the same gracious-creative activity of God.* Apart therefore
( from the will and work of God all that is not God would not
exist. Thus all that is not God exists, so to say, enclosed within
the purpose of God’s conceiving.’ In itself and from itself at no
point had it the possibility of existence but only from God and
from God alone.® It obtains existence by the Word of God.’
1 [ste spiritus, qui sic suo quodam mirabiliter singulari et singulariter mirabili modo est,
quadam ratione solus est, alia vero quaecumque videntur esse, huic collata, non sunt (Monol.
28:145, 25ff). Secundum hanc igitur rationem solus ille creator spiritus est, et omnia creata
non sunt (ibid. 28: 1 46, 20f). Solus igitur verissime omnium et ideo maxime omnium habes
esse, quia quidquid aliud est, non sic vere, et idcirco minus habet esse (Prosl. 3: 1 103 7ff).
Quid es nisi... summum omnium solum existens per seipsum (Prosl. 5: 1 104, 11f). Ille
itaque, cuius esse tam excellens, tam singulariter est, ut solum vere sit, in cuius comparatione
omne esse nihil est... (Medit. 1, 3: MPL 158, 712). Tu vero vere es, et non est aliud
nist tu (ibid. 19, 3: MPL 158, 805).
2 Omnis enim creatura gratia existit, quia gratia facta est (De concordia Qu. III 2: u
264, 18).
3 Illa summa essentia tantam rerum molem ... sola per seipsam, produxit ex nihilo (Monol.
Frag (git).
* non solum non est aliqua alia essentia nisi illo faciente, sed nec aliquatenus manere potest
quod facta est nisi eodem ipso servante (De casu diab. 1: 1 234, 19ff). Necesse est ut, sicut
nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem
servatricem praesentiam (Monol. 13: 1 27, 13ff). Quidguid aliud est, ne in nihilum cadat,
ab ea praesente sustinetur (ibid. 22:1 41, 6f; cf. ibid. 28: 1 46, 17f).
5 Non nihil erant (sc. ante creationem) quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum
quam fierent (Monol. 9: 1 24, 10f).
® Omnino nihil potuit (sc. mundus) antequam esset. . . . Non ergo potuit esse antequam
esset . . . Sed Deo, in cuius potestate erat ut fieret, erat possibile. Quia ergo Deus prius
potuit facere mundum quam fieret, ideo est mundus non quia ipse mundus potuit prius esse
(De casu diab. 12: 1 253, off).
7 Summam substantiam constat prius in se quasi dixisse cunctam creaturam, quam eam
secundum eandem et per eandem suam intimam locutionem conderet (Monol. rr: 1 26, 3ff).
98
And also it has no existence other than that which it has in the
Word of God; in so far as it is, and what it is, it is in the Word
and by the Word.! And for that very reason in the end it can
certainly be known to exist in the usual way, but it cannot be
proved to exist.? In this way therefore the Existence of God of
_which Anselm speaks and which he wants to prove, is dis-
tinguished from all other existence.
The Monologion had closed with these words, which can only
be understood in this context: Vere igitur hic est non solum Deus
sed solus Deus ineffabiliter trinus et unus.? ‘To prove that this One
to whom none may be likened has unique existence and alone
has existence that can be proved, is clearly a task whose urgency
is beyond all comparison with other existence proofs. The
proof of this particular existence is not demanded because the
knowledge that God exists in the same way as everything else
exists would be indispensable for a knowledge of the Truth of
God. Of course he exists in this way also but he does not exist
only or primarily in this way. If he did exist solely and primarily
in this way then the Proof of his Existence would be as desir-
able, but also as dispensable, as every other existence proof.
¢The Existence of God is not only unique but it is the sole
existence which is real and ultimate, the very basis of all other
existences and therefore just because of that also the only
existence which in the strict sense can be proved. Also while
he does exist in the same way as everything else exists, in reality
he exists first and foremost in the manner peculiar to himself.
Supposing that his Existence to thought were of necessity
1 Existendi veritas intelligatur in verbo (Monol. 31: 1 49, 3). Cum ipse summus spiritus
dicit seipsum, dicit omnia, quae facta sunt. Nam et antequam fierent et cum iam facta sunt et
cum corrumpuntur seu aliquo modo variantur : semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed
quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem
creata, in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia (the Being) et prima existendi veritas (ibid.
34/153, 21ff). An putas aliquid esse aliquando aut alicubi, quod non sit in summa veritate,
et quod inde non acceperit quod est inquantum est, aut quod possit aliud esse quam quod ibi
est? . . . Absolute concludere potes quia omne quod est, vere est, quoniam non est aliud quam
quod ibi est (De verit. 7:1 185, 11ff).
2 Quidquid est . . . etiam cum scitur esse, posse non esse cogitart (C. Gaun. 4: 1 134, 15f).
3 Monol. 80; 1 87, ref.
99
propounded by faith in God, it would still have to be known

and proved: not only because the knowledge of all other exist-
ences (just the opposite of what Gaunilo thinks) stands or falls
with the knowledge of this Existence, but because here and only
here the question of Existence itself is being raised and not
just (again as Gaunilo thinks) the question of the existence of
any particular thing. The question of this Existence must be
raised just as surely as the question of truth has to be raised.
It is possible for us to avoid the question of the existence of this
or that particular thing. No thing exists so necessarily that
knowledge of it is indispensable because no thing has real,
“ ultimate existence. God is the object of knowledge who has
absolute necessity as the One who does exist. If he is sur-
rendered to thought by his revelation in faith then there will
be no dispensing with the necessity to prove this thing that is
believed.
B. The Development of the Proof

Commentary on Prosl. 2-4
1. THE GENERAL EXISTENCE OF GOD (Prosl. 2)

From the findings of source criticism we may assume? that
the chapter headings in the Proslogion go back to Anselm him-
self. The title of Prosl. 2 runs:
Quod vere sit Deus (1 101, 2) _ That God truly exists.
In this whole context esse is to be translated as existere:

Prosl. 2-4, apart from the first lines of introduction, deals with
the question of the Existence of God. The beginning of Prosl. 5:
Quid igitur es . . .? introduces the second problem of the book,
1 The second possible meaning of the title of Prosl. 2: Quod vere sit Deus is as
follows: that existent must be sought which, in so far as it exists uniquely in truth,
is itself the basis of all existence.
2 This is also suggested by the last lines of the Praefatio to Cur Deus homo (1 43,
4ff).
100
that of the Nature of God. The adverb vere has two meanings
with reference to the problem of the divine esse, that is existere.
1. It refersto God’s existence generally. God does not exist only
in thought but over against thought. Just because he exists not
only ‘inwardly’ but also ‘outwardly’ (2m intellectu et in re), he
(from the human standpoint) ‘truly’ exists, exists from the side
of truth and therefore really exists. 2. It refers to the existence
that is utterly unique to God. God does not only exist in the
manner of other existents (over against thinking, independent,
in true objectivity). But God exists in the uniquely true manner
that befits the Existent One who is at once the Origin and
Basis of all that exists apart from him and beside him—and
therefore the Origin and Basis of all reality behind the con-
ception of any existence. Prosl. 2 proves the existence of God in
the first possible sense of the vere esse and Prosl. 3 in the second
sense. Prosl. 4 illustrates the fact of the antithesis—‘there is no
God’. Quod vere sit Deus might therefore suggest in itself the
contents of Prosl. 2 and 3. As Anselm gave the special theme of
Prosl. 3 its own title, we may assume that with the title of
Prosl. 2 what he had in mind was the first sense of vere esse
corresponding to the contents of this chapter: the first point
that is at issue here is the existence of God in general, that he
exists at all.
Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, ‘Therefore, Lord, who givest know-
da mihi, ut quantum scis expedire, in- ledge to faith, grant in whatever
telligam quia es sicut credimus, et hoc es measure thou willest, that I may
quod credimus. know that thou dost exist as we
(1101, 3f) believe and that thou art what we
believe.
As we said earlier: Anselm thinks and proves in prayer and

therefore not on logical presuppositions but by acceptance
in practice of the existence of the One whose existence he
undertakes to think out and prove. The point of the proof
which is becoming visible in Prosl. 3 would be missed, and so
the whole thing misunderstood, were the fact to be ignored
IOI
that Anselm speaks about God while speaking to him. The

knowledge which the proof seeks to expound and impart is the
knowledge that is peculiar to faith, knowledge of what is
believed from what is believed. It is—and this is why it has to
be sought in prayer—a knowledge that must be bestowed on
man. The condition quantum scis expedire is related to aliquatenus
intelligere at the end of Prosl. 1, and asserts primarily that the
scientific experiment about to be undertaken will take place
within the limits which God himself imposes on noetic in-
vestigation. There can be no question of exploring the divine
altitudo. From this point the references go on to agree that the
measure of clarity and distinctness with which the seeker is
able to view such knowledge at any particular moment of
history (in relation to those who have gone before and who
will come after), is a matter of Divine Providence. The Pros-
logion as a whole deals with the Existence (quza es) and Perfect
Nature (guia hoc es) of God. Both are presupposed as revealed
and believed: credimus. For faith the question of truth is
answered on both sides. But for that very reason it now arises
for thought. Veritas will not be separated from veritas cogitationis;
nor credo from the task: ut intelligam. And intelligere means: by
presupposing other articles of faith, to perceive the necessity of
this article of faith and the sheer impossibility of its denial. It is
with this perception as it applies to the Existence and Perfect
Nature of God that the Proslogion is concerned.
\. Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo But we believe: Thou art ‘something
¢ nihil maius cogitari possit. (1 101, 4f) beyond which nothing greater can
be conceived’.
a
With this sentence is introduced, as an article of faith, one

presupposition of the two proofs that are to be furnished in
the Proslogion. It has already been fully discussed. The formula
that replaces the tw spoken in prayer, is the formula for the
Name of God as it is manifest to the believer who desires to
know it. It conceals no declaration about the Nature of God
and still less about God’s Existence. The formula simply
I02
repeats the injunction inculcated on the believer’s thinking by

the revelation (credimus te esse. . . ) not to imagine anything
greater than God on pain of the consequence that the con-
ception of a ‘God’ alongside such a greater than he would
immediately cease to be aconception of the true God, that is of
the God revealed and believed. For the one who seeks according
to the intellectus fide, God is utterly aliquid quo nihil maius cogitart
possit: unless we recognize this injunction which is inseparable
from this object, the object disappears for all knowledge and,
if the word Deus remains the same, then it must be something
different that is meant. The God who is the object of faith, the
only One under discussion here, bears this Name. And so in the
Proslogion Anselm wants to prove the Existence and Perfect
Nature of this God.
An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia Is there then no such Nature because
‘dixit insipiens in corde suo nonest Deus’: ? ‘the fool has said in his heart: there
(1 101, 5ff) is no God’?
With this question Anselm turns to the problem of the

Existence of God and that in the first instance in its universal
sense: the problem of the independence of his Existence as
against the Existence which he can have in human thinking.
Here also est means existit. Aliqua talis natura: a real thing, an
object of this Name. The concept of Existence thus lies in both
subject and the predicate of the statement of the question: 1s
the object which, according to what has just been assumed,
bears this Name, not really an object at all? This question
concerns not faith itself, but thinking within faith, because the
assertion ‘God is not a real object’ is possible and real. The
perfect—dixit insipiens, which Anselm takes over here from
Ps. 13.1 in its Vulgate form—stresses that this assertion is
something that has occurred. Because such an objection is
lodged the question is therefore a real one for faith’s think-
ing: when the unbeliever explicitly says ‘no’, then the believer
must clearly and explicitly assert ‘yes’. That is to say he is
called upon to think as necessary what is believed about the
103
inconceivable existence of God. From this objection it would

appear to follow that God can be thought of as existing merely
in thought, that the assertion of his independent existence may
also be understood as hypothesis, fiction, deceit or error. There
exists no necessity in fact to understand the sentence: est aliqua
talis natura—as a positive statement instead of as a question. On
those, however, who so understand it, falls the task of balancing
the missing factual, outward necessity of this understanding
with a demonstration of its objective, inner necessity and so
‘showing this objection which is actually possible to be in fact
mistaken and thus rejecting it. But where does this objection
come from? By its very origin is it not compromised and liable
to rejection without discussion? Is it of such weight that the
believer should acknowledge himself as bound to answer it?
/\n actual fact, just as Anselm understands the thesis Deus est
\ as not just a logical possibility but qualified as the thesis of
‘ faith, so also at once the antithesis, Deus non est, is not just a
/ logical possibility corresponding to the previous one, but is
qualified or disqualified, as the antithesis of lack of faith. It is
the fool who says, ‘there is no God’. Anselm read the Psalm only
in the Vulgate. Nevertheless, his zmsipiens is scarcely different
from the nabal of the original text. All that we know about him—
what he lacks is not intellectual endowment and erudition;
he is not stupid but behaves stupidly; he is quite clever but he is
following a principle that is from the outset perverse and
pernicious, because he does not know the fear of the Lord,
because he has fallen away from God1—all that holds more or
less clearly of Anselm’s insipiens also. Neither ought we to allow
ourselves to be misled by the (ironical) description of him as
stultus et insipiens at the end of Prosl. 3. According to the same
chapter the absurdity of his thinking is that it is nothing to
him that he exalts himself as creature above the Creator.
According to Prosl. 4 he is not intelligens id quod Deus est.
1 For these phrases I am indebted to the kindness of my colleague, Lic. Dr M.
Thilo of Bonn.
21 103, 21.
104
Therefore, it is not because of narrow-mindedness or lack of

_ education that he can think: quia Deus non est. In the end, in
view of the intractable purpose of his counter-thesis, all that
Anselm can do is leave him alone and let him go on reiterating
it till the last day. But there is a further consideration to be
taken into account: if it can be assumed that Anselm had
before him the quotation from Ps. 13.1 in its context in the
Vulgate text, then at the mention of the znsipiens he was bound
to think of Augustine’s massa perditionis which is usually identi-
fied with the whole of humanity—the massa perditionis in which
God can abandon the individual by not setting him free, so
that by means of this very sacrifice which corresponds to his
divine righteousness, he may condemn the man in himself, or
rather his unredeemed human nature.? While the believer
thinks differently from the fool he implicitly recognizes his
human solidarity with him and the grace of God as the only
thing that can break through and annul this solidarity. In
view of this break-through from above, obviously his statement
and that of the znszpzens do not simply represent logical contra-
dictions, but are first and foremost symbols of two radically
different modes of human existence determined bya funda-
mentally different attitude of man to God; ultimately they are
expressions of two quite different judgments over against God
himself. It might be thought that Anselm could and ought to
have declined discussion with the fool a limine. But he himself
must know! The question with which he is confronted by the
objection of the znszpiens as to the objective, inner necessity of
the article of faith in God’s existence is not new to him: the
foolishness of man without God was not the only or even the
1 Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus! Corrupti sunt, et abominabiles facti sunt
in studiis suis; non est qui faciat bonum, non est usque ad unum. Dominus de coelo prospexit
super filios hominum, ut videat, si est intelligens aut requirens Deum. Omnes declinaverunt,
simul inutiles facti sunt; non est qui faciat bonum; non est usque ad unum. ... It is most
remarkable that the point in question is the same passage as Paul cites (Rom. 3.9)
as proof of the general, complete defection of the Jews and Greeks.
2 Cf. to this Anselmic doctrine of reprobation: De casu diab. 18-20: 1 263 ff; De
conc. virg. 25: 11 168f; De concordia Qu. IT 2: 1 261.
105
first thing to confront him with this question, but rather the
fides quaerens intellectum itself{—unum idemque est quod quaerimus.1
Thinking, albeit differently from him, the believer time and
time again finds himself in this human solidarity with the
insipiens, whose objection serves to remind the believer of his
own task, and he cannot refuse to make his answer. Even
though there may be no agreement between him and the
insiprens till the end of time, yet the znsepiens of today might be
the believer of tomorrow and even today he must be sum-
moned to have a part in the response of faith.
Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit But most certainly even this fool
hoc ipsum quod dico: ‘aliquid quo maius recognizes what he hears when he
nihil cogitart potest’, intelligit quod hears what I say: ‘something beyond
audit. 0, (1 101, 7f) which nothing greater can be
CONCEIVED 4 cya)
It is important to note the form in which the decisive pre-

supposition is introduced that ‘God’ means aliquid quo maius
nihil cogitari potest—cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico. Anselm could
not have begun less philosophically. He has absolutely no
thought whatsoever of reaching an agreement with his opponent
in the debate (or with himself in his capacity as a philosopher)
over a universal minimum knowledge of God, still less of
becoming involved in a movement towards his opponent’s
basis of argument. He himself defines what is to be meant by
‘God’ in the discussion: he speaks and the other has to listen.?
This procedure, which is not entirely self-evident, becomes
obvious when he has interpreted the basis of the discussion that
he himself laid down, the definition of the Name of God as an
article of faith or revelation. This was to be assumed as already
made known if the attempt to understand the other article of
revelation concerning the Existence of God were to be tackled
1 Cf. p. 66.
2 Anselm would have had to express himself quite differently had he conceived
the quo maius cogitari nequit according to the ideas of the Scholastics of the thir-
teenth century (cf. p. 77, n. 1, above) as part of the gefieral stock of thought and
language.
106
sensibly.1 And so this opening of the discussion is itself an

implicit challenge to the insipiens to believe: this Name might
be new to him, it could have the power as verbum praedicantium
Christum to bring him to the point where he would no longer
think as insipiens and therefore surely with a different result.
But this qualified sense of dico and the possibility of an equally
qualified audit remain latent. All that dico means explicitly is—
I utter this formula; and audit—he hears it in the physical
sense; and (this is how Anselm explains himself later), he
understands it grammatically and logically.? If this audit is
assumed then, Anselm goes on, we may assert: intelligit quod
audit. This means: he, the fool who in his heart denies the
Existence of God, on hearing this formula cannot avoid think-
ing it over and considering it to himself in its literal meaning
(whatever he may make of it)—-God is the One who manifests
himself in the command not to imagine a greater than he. The
later formulation of this conclusion shows that Anselm kept in
mind and reckoned with the fact that the insipiens is able to
repeat the wording of this formula and, on the presupposition
of what he understands by its literal meaning, can deny the
existence of the God thus described: at this he charges the .
insipiens with being unable to bring about this negation without
at the same time at least conceiving the Name of God and so
assuming responsibility for the meaning of what he denies.®
1 Briefly at the beginning of the reply to Gaunilo possible objection to this basis
of discussion is considered—it was not expressly raised by Gaunilo. But it is imme-
diately dismissed with an appeal to faith—$z ‘quo maius cogitart non potest’ non
intelligitur vel cogitatur . . . profecto Deus . . . non est quo maius cogitari non possit...
Quod quam falsum sit, fide... tua pro firmissimo utor argumento (C. Gaun. 1: 1 130, 12ff).
2 Utique qui non intelligit, si nota lingua dicitur, aut nullum aut nimis obrutum habet
intellectum (C. Gaun. 2:1 132, 11ff).
3 Etsi quisquam est tam insipiens, ut dicat non esse aliquid quo maius non possit cogitari,
non tamen ita erit impudens, ut dicat se non posse intelligere aut cogitare quid dicat. Aut si
quis talis invenitur, non modo sermo eius est respuendus, sed et ipse conspuendus. Quisquis
igitur negat aliquid esse quo maius nequeat cogitari: utique intelligit et cogitat negationem
quam facit. Quam negationem intelligere aut cogitare non potest sine partibus eius. Pars
autem eius est “quo maius cogitari non potest’. Quicumque igitur hoc negat, inielligit et
cogitat “quo maius cogitari nesquit? (C. Gaun. 9: 1 138, 11ff). Here also we may note
how as a foregone conclusion Anselm takes up his position along with his partner
on this very presupposition regarding the description of God.
107
Thus: the suggested Name of God is not some incomprehensible

utterance but one that can be understood. The injunction
which it brings to expression—whether it be obeyed or not—
is clear in itself. Whoever agrees (Anselm does not bother
much about this agreement, Anselm dictates) always to
interpret in future the word Deus by the formula quo maius
cogitart nequit, cannot subsequently come forward with the
complaint that for him the literal meaning of ‘God’ is a sound
that has no meaning.
. - - et quod intelligit, in intellectu eius est, ...and what he knows, exists in his
etiam st non intelligat illud esse. knowledge, even when he does not
(1 101, 8f) know that it exists.
Esse in intellectu appears later on in our chapter clearly dis-
tinguished from esse in re and in the discussion with Gaunilo
seems to mean the same as esse in cogitatione.t ‘The expression
therefore means: to exist in knowledge, in thinking, in thought:
an object that exists as something that is thought; to be some-
thing that is thought of as existing. Anselm makes a fourth
division that now points in an altogether new direction
(1. dicere, 2. audire, 3. intelligere, 4. in intellectu esse). He does not
immediately pursue the point that the hearer of this formula is
now able to reflect upon it, but rather claims that even for the
insipiens this formula does describe something or someone. The
formula is spoken to him as the formula of a name, asa descrip-
tion of the word Deus, which is itself a verbal symbol for the
One round whom the discussion centres—the Almighty. In
conceiving this formula he therefore also conceives this prob-
lematical Almighty; he conceives what is designated quo
maius cogitart nequit as existing, as an object. Or put the other
way round: this problematical Almighty is now something he
conceives as an object and as existing.” This is even the case
1C. Gaun. 12-1 $30, 13.
2 Cf. with this A. Koyré’s description: Avoir quelque chose dans V’intelligence n’est
que la maniére la plus générale de dire que cette méme chose est l’objet d’un acte intellectuel.
On pourrait peut-étre dire que dans le cas, ou l’on se représente l'objet comme existent, on
Va dans Vintelligence avec son existence. L’étre que l’on a dans Vintelligence n'est pas une
108
‘when he does now know that it exists’, that is, not only when he
cannot conceive the existence of this problematical Almighty
as more than a concept, but when as znsipiens he actually
denies it. This passage is clarified in various respects by the
passages in the discussion with Gaunilo that specially deal
with it.
1. Gaunilo interpreted Anselm correctly when he formulated
his opinion as follows: on the basis simply of knowing this
formula, in that knowledge, God is present.
2. Gaunilo interpreted Anselm no less correctly when—going
beyond the literal meaning of this passage but in accordance
with Anselm’s own argument subsequently sharpened and just
quoted*—he expounded Anselm’s view to the effect that even
the man who denies or doubts the existence of God ‘has’ God
existing an intellectu.® !
3. Anselm later interpreted his statement by saying that all
he wanted to establish was that there is a knowledge at least on
the part of certain men in which God has existence.* This
conclusion he bases on the somewhat confusing question which
he obviously intends ironically: whether something that is
proved to have true and necessary existence can exist in no
man’s knowledge?® Naturally what is assumed here can only
be what the Existence Proof attempts to do and not what it
succeeds in doing: what could for certain men be the object of
a proof of its (true) existence must have prior (problematical)
existence in their knowledge. There are such men, as figura
copie, une image, une représentation ou un symbole de V’étre réel. C’est cet étre lui-méme.
In intellectu esse ne veut dire qu’étre Vobjet d’une intention intellectuelle, avoir une existence
intentionelle (L’idée de Dieu, etc., pp. 208f).
1 Quod hoc iam esse dicitur in intellectu meo, non ob aliud, nisi quia id, quod dicitur,
intelligo ... (Pro insip. 2: 1125, 14f). Cf. Anselm’s own recapitulation: dixi quia si
intelligitur, est in intellectu (C. Gaun. 2: 1 132, 14).
4 Gf. ps 107, 3.
3... quod ipse negans vel ambigens de illa (sc. natura) iam habeat eam in intellectu, cum
audiens illam dici, id quod dicitur, intelligit (Pro insip. 1: 1 125, 4ff).
4... ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’, si est in ullo intellectu. . . (C. Gaun. 2: 1 132, 30f).
5 An est in nullo intellectu, quod necessario in rei veritate esse monstratum est? (ibid. 1
132, mat):
109
shows. Ergo: Deus est in ullo intellectu. And even on this un-
derstanding the statement is sufficient for Anselm’s purpose.
4. Following immediately from this question (the whole
context is somewhat elastic) Anselm presumes that his opponent
will concede the esse Dei in intellectu in some sense but throw
doubt on the znielligere of this esse.t Anselm does not at first
embark on the question of this znéelligere but demonstrates once
more the logical necessity of the step from intelligere (sc. quod
audit) towsee in intellectu.2, He assumes the following to be known
and agreed. (1) That in the actual event of thinking (cogzitatzo),
by virtue of the act of thought (cogitare), there takes place a
representation of what is thought (quod cogitatur)—(something is
thought)—-so that it can be said of what is thought in this event
and by virtue of this act: it exists in and with this event (est
in cogitatione). (2) That the zntellectus is a special form of the
cogitatio and the zntelligere is a special form of the cogitare, so
that this rule is to be applied to them too. From these premisses
it follows that where something becomes known, as for example
the object described as quo maius cogitart nequit, a representation
of this object takes place by virtue of the act of knowing
(intelligere) and within the event of knowledge (znéellectus),
so that we may say of it: it exists in and with this event (est on
intellectu.® Just here we have to bear in mind the reservation
that was made in the Proslogion passage itself: etiam st non in-
telligat tllud esse. The question is still by no means settled whether
or not this event is due to a voluntary or involuntary deception
(in respect of the extramental existence of the object repre-
sented). All that it says and shows is that in this event a repre-
sentation of this object as such invariably takes place and
therefore its intramental existence can be asserted.
5. Against the conclusion reached in our text Gaunilo raised
1 Sed dices quia etsi est in intellectu, non tamen consequitur quia intelligitur (ibid.: 1
132, 15f).
2 Vide, quia consequitur essein intellectu ex eo quia intelligitur (ibid. : 1 132, 16f).
3 Sicut enim quod cogitatur, cogitatione cogitatur, et quod cogitatione cogitatur, sicut
cogitatur, sic est in cogitatione: ita quod intelligitur intellectu intelligitur, et quod intellectu
intelligitur, sicut intelligitur, ita est in intellectu. Quid hoc planius? (ibid.: 1 132, 17ff).
IIo
two objections. They are not directed against its validity, which
Gaunilo tacitly seems rather to acknowledge, but against the
significance which Anselm is prepared to attach to it. The first
objection is: on Anselm’s view, objects whether they genuinely
exist or not can equally well have existence ascribed to them.?
Anselm’s reply to this could simply be that in sustaining such an
argument Gaunilo is wasting his breath. The statement to be
proved, Deus est (in intellectu et) in re, is first to be established in
the general and ambiguous and not very clear form—Deus
est in intellectu. What had first to be shown was whether in this
form it was to have limited (2m solo initellectu) or extended (zn
intellectu et in re) interpretation, whether, that is, the dubium
is in fact falsum or verum. How could Gaunilo expect this result
to be already obvious in the presupposition?? Naturally in
knowledge there do exist things that exist only in knowledge
and (accepting the contention that in true objectivity vera
would have to exist in another way also, namely, zn re) to that
extent they are falsa.? And naturally knowledge of the real
existence of the things specified by Anselm’s formula is not a
general but a special knowledge: what has to be determined is
whether it specifies a ‘true’ or ‘false’ object. But how far does
this represent an objection against the presupposition: Deus est in
intellectu audientis et intelligentis ‘quo matus cogitari nequit’ ?4 In fact
we shall have to say that this objection was already met by the
1 Nonne et quaecumque falsa ac nullo prorsus modo in seipsis existentia in intellectu habere
similiter dici possem, cum ea, dicente aliquo, quaecumque ille diceret, ego intelligerem?
Gaunilo holds that this esse in intellectu is consummated ¢€0 modo, quo etiam falsa quaeque
vel dubia haberi possit in cogitatione . . . in quo (sc. in intellectu meo, cum auditum intelligo)
similiter esse posse quaecumque alia incerta vel etiam falsa ab aliquo, cuius verba intelligerem
dicta (Pro insip. 2:1 125, 15ff; 126, 11f).
2 Miror quid hic sensisti contra me dubium probare volentem, cui primum hoc sat erat, ut
quolibet modo illud intelligi et esse in intellectu ostenderem, quatenus consequenter consider-
ay utrum esset in solo intellectu, velut falsa, an et in re, ut vera (C. Gaun. 6: 1 136,
4
3 Nam si falsa et dubia hoc modo intelliguntur et sunt in intellectu, quia cum dicuntur,
audiens intelligit quid dicens significet, nihil prohibet quod dixi intelligi et esse in intellectu
(ibid.: 1 136, 8ff).
4 Quodsi et falsa aliquo modo intelliguntur, et non omnis sed cuiusdam intellectus est haec
definitio: non debui reprehendi quia dixi ‘quo maius cogitari non possit’ intelligi et in intellectu
esse, etiam antequam certum esset re ipsa illud existere (ibid. : 1 136, 17ff).
II!
reservation which Anselm himself made in our Proslogion passage.

6. Gaunilo’s second and cleverer objection is this: granted
that the object designated guo maius cogitari nequit, just by this
name being spoken and heard, exists within the knowledge of
the hearer, is an object—yet this happens in such a manner as
cannot be conceived.! It has, so to speak, only an existence
intended by thought, namely the existence which thinking
endeavours (in vain) to ascribe to an object which is described
to it as existing but which as existing is totally unknown to it.?
Gaunilo makes these statements on the following basis: we
know the object designated quo maius cogitart nequit as little as
we know that designated Deus as an object known to us on the
grounds of a definite perception or something analogous to such
a definite perception.? Indeed this object is unknown to us,
either directly or indirectly, which is the same as Anselm’s
description of it as unique (and therefore not to be inferred even
indirectly).4 A man falsely described to us as existing, we
could at least conceive of as existing, because we know at least
in general what is meant by human existence. But in no sense
can we thus conceive of the existence of God; we can only
do so on the basis of the word that we hear about it. But,
Gaunilo adds somewhat uncertainly, on the mere basis of a
word we could ‘hardly ever, indeed never’ imagine something
to be true'—by which he means: understand by the thing to be
1 Si ‘esse’ dicendum est in intellectu, quod secundum veritatem cuiusquam rei nequit saltem
cogitari, et hoc in meo sic ‘esse’ non denego (Pro insip. 5: 1127, 28f).
2 Ego enim nondum dico, immo etiam nego vel dubito, ulla re vera esse maius illud, nec
aliud ei ‘esse’ concedo quam illud, si dicendum est ‘esse’, cum secundum vocem tantum auditam
rem prorsus ignotam sibi conatur animus effingere (ibid.: 1 128, 4ff).
3 Illud omnibus quae cogitari possint maius . . . tam ego secundum rem vel ex specie mihi
vel ex genere notam, cogitare auditum vel in intellectu habere non possum, quam nec ipsum
Deum (ibid. 4: 1 126, 30-127, 2).
4 Neque enim aut rem ipsam novi aut ex alia possum conicere simili, quandoquidem et tu
talem asseris illam, ut esse non possit simile quicquam (ibid.: 1 127, 3f). Gaunilo may be
thinking here of the whole contents of Prosl. 5-26.
5 Nec sici gitur ut haberem falsum istud (the existence of this man who does not exist)
in cogitatione vel in intellectu, habere possum illud, cum audio dict ‘Deus’ aut ‘aliquid omnibus
maius’ cum, quando illud secundum rem veram mihique notam cogitare possem, istud omnino
nequeam nisi tantum secundum vocem, secundum quam solam aut vix aut numquam potest
ullum cogitari verum (ibid.: 1 127, 11ff).
II2
conceived as existing not only the sound of the letters and

syllables (which naturally ‘exist’) of the word that is heard but
also the thing that the word signifies,4 and actually attribute
the thought of God’s existence (and therefore his existence in
thought) to the thinking of someone who has no knowledge of
God’s existence from any other source,? but only this word he
has heard! For an understanding of Anselm’s reaction to this
objection there are three elements in his reply which should be
noted:
(a) Right at the beginning of this essay in the passage that
we have already quoted more than once, Anselm declares it
impossible for a Christian like Gaunilo to act as if he knew
nothing at all about what the formula quo maius cogitan nequit
describes. Perhaps the znszpiens does know nothing (for he may
remain insipiens even after the Name of God is proclaimed to
him) but at least Gaunilo, as spokesman for the inszpiens, shares
Anselm’s knowledge of the esse Dez in intellectu. As a Christian
he has part in this event of the znéellectus, he is subject of an
action of the zntelligere and is therefore charged with it and called
as a witness that in this event as such the esse Det is reality.®
At least zn ullo iniellectu* God is not just a vain intention but an
object that is known.
(b) Recapitulating what was said earlier in connection with
this object:> knowledge of the inconceivability of God cannot
be played off against knowledge of his (intramental) existence
because as knowledge of God and therefore knowledge of faith
1 Siquidem cum ita cogitatur, non tam vox ipsa quae res est utique vera, hoc est litterarum
sonus vel syllabarum, quam vocis auditae significatio cogitetur (ibid.: 1 127, 15ff).
2 Ita ut (sc. cogitatur) . . . ab eo qui illud non novit et solummodo cogitat secundum animi
motum illius auditu vocis effectum significationemque perceptae vocis conantem effingere sibt.
Quod mirum est, si umquam rei veritate potuerit. Ita ergo, nec prorsus aliter, adhuc in intellectu
meo constat illud haberi, cum audio intelligoque dicentem esse aliquid maius omnibus quae
valeant cogitari (ibid.: 1 127, 17ff).
3 Ego vero dico: si ‘quo maius cogitari non potest’ non intelligitur vel cogitatur nec est in
intellectu vel cogitatione: profecto Deus . . . non est in intellectu vel cogitatione. Quod quam
falsum sit . . . conscientia tua pro firmissimo utor argumento. Ergo ‘quo maius cogitari
non potest’ vere intelligitur et cogitatur et est in intellectu et cogitatione (C. Gaun. 1: 1
130, 12ff).
4 Cf. p. 109, n. 4. 5 Cf. pp. 7off.
ie 113
it rather presupposes this latter. It excludes far more radically

than Gaunilo appears to assume an intuitive knowledge on our
part of God’s Existence. If, by this objection, Gaunilo really
was thinking of the inconceivability of God then he must have
known that there was absolutely no question whatsoever of a
knowledge of God’s existence secundum veritatem cuiusquam rei}
(that is, for example, corresponding to the knowledge we can
have of a man’s existence) and that consequently the impos-
sibility of it should not have been introduced as an argument
against knowledge of his existence. But combined with this
fatal flaw in his technical knowledge is the fact that for him
quo maius cogitart nequit is just one percepta vox amongst many
others and is not a dynamic word of revelation ; it is not the
Name of God that is revealed and believed. His failure to
understand God’s inconceivability now shows itself in that he
does not see that as this is ever confirmed by definite qualified
voces which for that very reason are more than just the noise of
letters and syllables, so it is also cancelled. As a Christian (as
was shown under (a) )—he could not treat these voces and in
concreto the vox ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’? as he was doing. By so
doing he avoids the necessity, or rather, denies himself the
possibility, of facing this: to hear and understand this Name
involves an aliquatenus intelligere of existence in so far as the
person hearing and understanding is by no means confronted
by a mere word (such as the word ‘Deus’) but by a prohibition
which certainly does not contain or express anything about the
existence of God but which nonetheless by setting a definite
limit on concepts of God, describes existence in intellectu.
From this point we can at least catch a glimpse (as a problem)
of the contents of the statement of faith in question concerning
the existence of God awareness of which came to us from else-
where, so that we cannot hear it without at the same time
becoming aware of the existence of this same God who makes
the prohibition (which is nothing like the existence of a mere
ACh pe 11a) nek,
114
X). Just as something conceivable is said by the statement of

God’s inconceivability and therefore God is described in a
definite way without his being turned into a quantity that can
be conceived, so the Name of God describes him whose name it
is—aliquatenus, in the noetic sphere, in the form of a mere
definition; but none the less it does describe him.! The hesitant
‘hardly ever, or indeed never’ in Gaunilo’s denial of the
intellectual power of all voces would appear to indicate that
at this point our opponent himself is not quite sure of his case.
How indeed could he be?
(c) The argument so far adduced against the objection (that
God’s existence for our knowledge on the basis of hearing his
Name is simply the existence of something utterly unknown to
us) left out of account, with Gaunilo, the fact that along with
God’s Name and his existence which is being proved here,
God’s Nature is also revealed. If this is taken into account, as is
reasonable, then the objection becomes absolutely impossible.
It should be noted that there is no question whatsoever of
Anselm’s appeal to this point of view being used to prove the
proposition that God exists from the statement of his Nature.®
All that is involved is: whoever hears the Name of God can— .
whether he does so is a different question, but he can—
‘thereby conceive something’ because, if he really hears, he
cannot possibly lack a revelation of the Nature of God and that
is the point here. And to the extent to which he is able to do
that he can hardly dispute the existence of God in his con-
sciousness on the ground that for him the Name of God is an
empty concept. Anselm came to mention this in two passages
of his essay against Gaunilo and from two different standpoints.
1 Sicut enim nil prohibet dict ‘ineffabile’, licet illud dici non possit quod ‘ineffabile’ dicitur :
et quemadmodum cogitari potest ‘non cogitabile’, quamvis illud cogitari non possit cut convenit
‘non cogitabile’ dici: ita cum dicitur ‘quo nil maius valet cogitari’, procul dubio quod auditur
cogitart et intelligi potest, etiam si res illa cogitari non valeat aut intelligi, qua maius cogitart
nequit (C. Gaun. 9: 1 138, 6ff).
A Of DELS. 8, 6:
3 Everything that has to be said here, except the question of existence which has
to be settled on other grounds, holds good—etiam si non credat in re esse quod cogitat
... sive sit in re aliquid huiusmodi sive non sit (C. Gaun. 8: 1 137, 19 and 23f).
115
In the first place, summarizing what Gaunilo could read in

Prosl. 13 and 18-22, he showed how on the basis of the formula
quo maius cogitari nequit it is also possible to comprehend the
indivisible eternity and omnipresence of God: only the non-
eternal and non-omnipresent, therefore only the finite can be
conceived as non-existing. God—assuming that he exists—
cannot be conceived as non-existing. Something conceivable as
non-existing, even were it to exist, would not be God, would
not be quo maius cogitart nequit. ‘Thus God must be the One who
is indivisibly eternal and omnipresent. Assuming once more
that God’s Nature is utterly beyond conceiving, which these
concepts do not deny but rather assert, assuming that total
veiling wherein God becomes conceivable to us as eternal and
omnipresent in his very unveiling—God’s eternity and omni-
presence being revealed to us, their necessity becoming
intelligible on the basis of the formula quo maius cogitart nequit
—assuming this, knowledge of what is described as quo maius
cogitart nequit does occur even although it be noetically limited
and touches the actual object only from the outside; conse-
quently it has existence in our knowledge as a subject? known
to us at all times and in all places. In this connection Anselm
has to remind us of a second point. The second half of
Gaunilo’s statement: neque enim aut rem ipsam novi aut ex alia
possum conicere simili2—is not valid in this absolute form. The
man who is outside the Church, the man who is without
revelation and faith, knows nothing in actual practice about
1 Quare quidquid alicubi aut aliquando totum non est, etiam si est, potest cogitart non
esse. At ‘quo maius nequit cogitari’: si est(!), non potest cogitari non esse; alioquin st est,
non est quo maius cogitari non possit, quod non convenit. Nullatenus ergo alicubi aut aliquando
totum non est, sed semper et ubique totum est. Putasne aliquatenus posse cogitart vel intelligt
aut esse in cogitatione vel intellectu, de quo haec intelliguntur? . . . Certe vel hactenus in-
telligitur et est in intellectu ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’, ut haec de eo intelligantur (C. Gaun. 1:
I 131, 31-132, 9). The chapter C. Gaun. 1 is not well arranged, because Anselm
first of all reproduces Gaunilo’s objections thus (1 130, 2off): Putas [1] ex eo quia
intelligitur aliquid quo maius cogitari nequit, non consequi illud esse in intellectu, [2] nec
si est in intellectu, ideo esse in re—but, then in reply (1 131, 1ff) he proceeds with [1]
three new facets of the Proof in the form of Prosl. 3 and [2] the note on the esse in
intellectu (1 131, 18-132, 9).
2 Pro insip. 4: 1127, 2.
116
him who bears the Name quo maius cogitari nequit, whom the
Church confesses as the summum bonum nullo alio indigens et
quo omnia indigent.1 Outside the Church there is in practice no
conicere Deum. There is nothing in the world which is szmile
to human reason as such and fer se, which is necessary to it and
which quite independently of anything outside of itself is also a
medium for knowledge of God. That there should be such
media requires the existence of the Church, revelation and
faith. In so far as man is viewed in himself and apart from the
Church, God is in fact an object which he neither knows directly
nor indirectly. But that does not mean that within his world
man cannot know God or that the things of this world cannot
become for him szmilia of God. As we saw earlier? even the
Church’s knowledge and faith’s knowledge is knowledge
per similitudinem. Here, within the Church, there takes place a
conicere, an inference from experience of the world as to the
nature of God just as truly as this does not take place outside
the Church. Here, ‘ascending’ (conscendendo) beyond relative,
finite, material things—conscious of the inadequacy of the
insights and statements that can be achieved—this summum
bonum actually becomes accessible. The revelation is the
revelation of God in his world, in the world which is so con-
stituted that God’s Nature can be manifest therein zn speculo,
per similitudinem, per analogiam (as far as God wills to reveal
himself and has in fact revealed himself), even if in fact it is
manifest to no one. With its knowledge of God the Church
actualizes a possibility open to mankind? but of which mankind ~
as such cannot avail itself in practice because of the Fall—yet,
for that very reason, a possibility whose reality must be insisted
upon, and which within the Church can be realized. The
answer to the znsipiens who denies the existence of God because
he is unable to conceive anything by the word ‘God’, should
1 Prosl. Prologue: 1 93, 8. aie Cf. pp. 2of.
3 Which obviously does not reside inits created nature as such but in the fact of
its being created in the image of God in creaturely dependence on the Son who
from all eternity knows the Father.
117
therefore be that as a man he would be well able to do so were

he not also homo insipiens. The Catholic however ought to con-
sider Rom. 1.20 and should not protect the insipiens in this
respect. The attempt to conceive of something by the word
‘God’ and therefore of the esse Dez in intellectu must not break
down because God is a hidden God. As such he is also the God
who is manifest, who even reveals himself in the real world of
the znsiprens. There is a conicere Deum. Where and when it
actually happens is of course another question.+
Aliud enim est rem esse in intellectu, aliud ‘The existence of an object in know-
intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor ledge is one thing, knowledge of its
praecogitat quae facturus est, habet quidem existence is another. For when an
in intellectu, sed nondum intelligit esse artist thinks out in advance what he
quod nondum fecit. Cum vero iam pinxit, is going to create, then he certainly
_et habet in intellectu et intelligit esse quod has it in his mind but he knows that
tam fecit. (1 101, off) what he has not yet created does not
yet exist. But his painting once
finished, then he both has it in his
mind and he knows that what he has
now created does exist.
What we have before us in this exposition is the very un-

ambiguous development of Anselm’s (general) concept of
knowledge of existence. It connects with the condition attached
to the previous quotation that what a man knows has existence
in his knowledge even if he does not know of its existence. This
paradox obviously calls for comment. If the first statement is
true like the one following it with the condition attached, then
the concept intelligere, as well as the concept esse (existere),
must have been used in both cases in different senses. ‘This is
precisely the opinion that Anselm at once goes on to express.
We may conceive a thing as existing without knowing whether
1 Quoniam namque omne minus bonum in tantum est simile maiori bono inquantum est
bonum: patet cuilibet rationabili menti, quia de bonis minoribus ad maiora conscendendo ex
iis quibus aliquid maius cogitari potest, multum possumus conicere illud quo nihil potest maius
cogitari . . . Sic itaque facile refelli potest insipiens qui sacram auctoritatem non recipit, st
negat ‘quo maius cogitari non valet’ ex aliis rebus conici posse. At st quis catholicus hoc neget,
meminerit quia ‘invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur,
sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas’ (C. Gaun. 8: 1 137, 14-138, 3).
118
it exists and even although it has existence only in our know-

ledge. Its existence in knowledge and awareness of its existence
in knowledge are to be distinguished; moreover, we would
obviously have to distinguish between its existence apart from
the limitation of knowledge, its real existence that is not merely
intended or imagined, and the knowledge of such existence—
knowledge that strikes out beyond the limits of knowledge and
knows real existence. Thus far Anselm has shown that God has
existence in this first sense and may be known as existing where
his Name is proclaimed, heard and understood. But aliud—
aliud. He hastens to explain that not till then is the question of
existence raised, not till then is the object in dispute described.
What is dealt with in the Proof of the Existence of God is
existence and knowledge of existence in the second sense. It was
absolutely essential to make sure of the existence of God in the
first sense and we shall be reminded later that this has been
done. But Anselm made sure first of all of the problem, the
dubium; in no sense does this bring the problem nearer any
kind of solution. It must still first be shown, by asserting the
second sense of these concepts, whether the dubium was true or
false. The intelligere rem esse, the proof of which has still to come,
also determines the truth of the esse rez in intellectu. This starting-
point, the point immediately before the beginning of the Proof
proper (in its general form), is illustrated by the picture of the
relation between an artist’s idea and his work. The tertium
comparationis consists in this (and in this alone): there is an
intramental existence of objects as well as one that is both
intramental and extramental; thus there is also a corresponding
double knowledge of existence. The second is the true, real
knowledge of existence to which the first is related as an artistic
conception that may bear fruit or may be for ever barren is
related to the work of art that may issue from it as its fulfilment,
vindication and justification. At any rate, the distinction that
has to be made here is overshadowed by this preliminary
distinction. And it is precisely when the theory of existence
119
has to follow the reality of existence, when thought of the

existence of the object has to follow its existence, that the theory
first comes up against this preliminary distinction, the am-
biguous esse rez in intellectu, and has the right and the duty to —
assume that this previous distinction does from time to time
occur. In two points Gaunilo warns us how not to understand
Anselm’s artist analogy.
1. Gaunilo complained that on this analogy temporal pre-
cedence would necessarily be implied for the habere rem in in-
tellectu over the intelligere rem esse, whereas on the presuppositions
of the zntelligere rem esse the two must take place simultaneously.
This objection is so fantastic that Anselm was quite right hardly
to touch on it in his reply.? There was absolutely no question
at all in the analogy of contrasting precedence in time. Anselm
explicitly said in our Proslogion passage that on the presupposi-
tions of the zntelligere rem esse it and the habere rem in intellectu
happen at one and the same time: cum vero 1am pinxit, et habet in
intellectu et intelligit esse. ‘The fact that Gaunilo questioned the
possibility of a neutral habere rem in intellectu prior to the in-
telligere rem esse, only goes to show how little he understood the
course of Anselm’s proof which proceeded so carefully from
premiss to conclusion.
2. Gaunilo devoted a whole chapter of ae reply,® the most
enigmatic of all we may say, to proving that Augustine had
said* that when a carpenter (faber) constructs a chest then first
of all the artistic sense of the carpenter ponders the creation
(tn arte) of this chest (areca) and arca quae fit in opere non est vita,
arca quae est in arte vita est, quia vivit anima artificis. Debasing
Augustine, Gaunilo makes of this: 2la pictura antquam fiat, in
ipsa pictoris arte habetur et tale quippiam ... nihil ese aliud quam pars
quaedam intelligentiae ipsius . . . quam scientia vel intelligentia animae
ipsius. However, with the truth of the quo maius cogitant nequit—
1 Non hic erit tam aliud idemque tempore praecedens, habere rem in intellectu, et aliud
idque tempore sequens, intelligere rem esse; ut fit de pictura quae prius est in animo pictoris,
deinde in opere (Pro insip. 2: 1 126, 1ff)
2C. Gaun. 6:1 136, 1off. 3 Pro insip. 9:1 126, 14ff. * In Foannem, tract. 1, 16.
I20
assuming that it is true and as such is zm intellectu—it could on

no account be the case that it is identical with the intellectus,
quo capitur. Anselm’s reply to this speech was quite short and
somewhat ironical: he had not had this application of the
analogy (to the primacy of the idea over the finished work and
therefore to the creative rdéle of man in respect of the existence
of God) in mind at all.4 What serious design and intention there
may have been in this part of Gaunilo’s essay is in practice
difficult to determine. Why does he devote such attention to
this opening statement of Anselm’s? Why does he not see that
Anselm could just as easily have used a different illustration?
Why does he bring in just here the giant spectre of Augustine?
Does he suddenly sense in Anselm’s habere rem in intellectu, to
which he had just objected because of its neutrality, something
akin to Feuerbachianism—the elevation of man to be creator
of God ?? Or is it not worth while searching any further because
what we have here is simply an objection of convenience, of
embarrassment ? However that may be, it is as little calculated
to advance the discussion as the first objection.
Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel Thus even the fool can be convinced
in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogit- that ‘that than which nothing greater
ari potest, quia hoc cum audit, intelligit, can be conceived’ exists in his know-
et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. ledge. For when he hears it, he
(1 101, 13ff) knows it; and what is known is in
knowledge.
1 Quod vero tam studiose probas ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’ non tale esse qualis nondum
facta pictura in intellectu pictoris: sine causa fit. Non enim ad hoc protuli picturam praecog-
itatam, ut tale illud de quo agebatur vellem asserere, sed tantum ut aliquid esse in intellectu,
quod esse non intelligeretur, possem ostendere (C. Gaun. 8: 1 137, 6ff).
2 W. v. d. Steinen, Der Heilige Geist des Mitteletaers, 1926, p. 38, interprets (‘at
this point I insert a secondary thought’) Anselm’s artistic analogy as follows: ‘the
artist has the idea of a picture, but it has no reality; however, if he creates the
picture, he thereby also creates the reality . . . in the same way an Almighty can
also be conceived who is only a conception. But anyone who is a thinker and not a
dreamer cannot rest content with this; even in the wildest thinking there resides
the law pervading all nature that demands reality and it will not be content until
it has also formed what is already complete as an ideal. God has not only prompted
us to rely on him... ; not only prompted us to conceive him; he has also prompted
us to create him as much in living faith as in living thought . . . also the man
who thinks clearly, if only his thought be completely logical, wills God.’ Why did
this author not allow the Anselm passage quoted in the previous note to keep him
from this ingenious ‘secondary thought’? And why not by perceiving that he who
I2I
This statement closes the circle that began above with Sed
certe ipse idem... and confirms the assertion that was then made
and has since been proved. Let us now turn back for a moment:
up till now our concern has been to settle the object of inquiry.
The protest of the inszpiens, ‘non est Deus’, has served to remind
even the believing thinker that the problem of the Existence of
God is not self-evident. The Existence of God has to be already
proved in this first preliminary sense, it has to be shown that
the znsipiens can certainly say in his heart that ‘there is no God’
—without that succeeding in altering (even when denied by
him) anything in respect of the Existence of God and that in
particular in his knowledge. From this conclusion which even
the unbeliever cannot avoid, the believer also has to be shown
where to begin in order that his faith in God’s Existence may
be brought to knowledge. What has been said so far has been
directed to thisconclusion. The starting-point for this exposition
was not some available or accessible human conviction about
God, but it was his Name proclaimed and believed. This
Name can be heard and understood of men. In that case it
does describe something or someone to men: the one whose
name it is thus exists at least zn intellectu of man, whether believed
or not, whether in his true existence accepted or denied. Here,
even though perhaps it may be only here, he has existence.
Even if anyone wanted to deny this as being inconeivable to
him, yet in face of the fact that even evidence for the true
existence of God can be produced, he cannot deny that at least
for others this hypothesis could be evident. Be that as it may, the
fact that knowledge of this Name occurs introduces the problem
of God’s existence—no more than that. The objection that in
this sense this is to introduce the problem of the existence of
any absurdity whatsoever overlooks the fact that a premiss is
involved which the proof proper has first of all to vindicate
without its value as a premiss being thereby impaired. And
so manifestly intended to write in Anselm’s praise, with this interpretation was
branding himself as one who had clearly inherited Gaunilo’s understanding of
Anselm?
122
against the objection that we are unable to conceive of any-

thing that purports to exist zn intellectu, it can be said on the
other hand that a Christian is not allowed to raise this objection
and that the Name of God is no mere word but a description
where the thing described is also conceivable as present;
that even apart from this there are ample signposts indicating
the nature of the thing described. Real knowledge of existence »
is to be distinguished then from this ambiguous type: its real
concern will be knowledge of the existence of God that is also
extramental and indeed this is to be the subject of the main and
decisive proof itself. What has to be established here is that
the assumption of his intramental existence is possible. This
cannot be denied even in the thought of the znszpiens that denies
God.
Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non And certainly ‘that than which
potest esse in solo intellectu. (1 101, 15f) nothing greater can be conceived’
cannot exist only in knowledge.
We have now entered upon the Proof proper (first of the

general existence of God—in the restricted sense in which
things that are different from God also exist). This statement
declares what is now to be proved (in sharp contrast to what
resulted from the premiss)—the impossibility of an existence
of God only within knowledge; that means the necessity of his
objective existence, his actual existence. The hypothesis that
God exists in human knowledge (on the grounds that his Name
is proclaimed, heard and understood) is proved by what has
been already said. This existing in knowledge is a problematical
existing which has first to be examined in respect of its truth.
The universal criterion of the truth of a thing that exists
(applicable to God as to all that exists) is just the opposite of
this limit ‘existing in knowledge’. If God exists in truth he
cannot exist merely in knowledge. Truth is not primarily in
knowledge, but only secondarily so. It is first truth in objects:
it is primarily truth in itself. Truth that was only in knowledge
would be a broken reed. The same could be said of a truth
123
which was true only in knowledge and in objects but was not
true in itself. But at least it is in the first place a criterion of
truth that it should be truth not only in knowledge but also in
objects. The subject of the Proof is only the negative, first part
of this statement: in Truth there exists what exists not only in
knowledge; that means, what is known as incapable of existing
in knowledge alone is known as existing in Truth. When that is
known in relation to God, then the existence of God is proved
(always in the narrow sense in which the existence of things
other than God can also be proved).
Sz enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest If it exists thus only in knowledge it
cogitart esse et in ve... (1 101, 16f) can also be conceived as existing
objectively.
Anselm first assumed the possibility, the premiss that the

phrase, God exists in knowledge, understood in the restricted
sense, 1s to be taken as definitive: that is, God exists only in
knowledge. If this were so, the possibility would none the less
{remain of removing in thought the parenthesis ‘only in know-
Nicdues and of ascribing to this God, contrary to his self-imposed
reality, an existence consisting not only in knowledge but also
in objectivity. Even the consciousness that this is inconsistent
with God’s self-imposed reality, which inconsistency is involved
in this view, need not deter us. God is called zd quo maius
cogitart nequit. In so far as this Name is the criterion for what
may or may not be believed about him, it is not clear to what
extent we can refuse to ascribe to him in theory extramental
in addition to this intramental existence. It may even be that
knowledge of the God who exists in solo intellectu instinctively
and irresistibly presses to such reality as it assumes here ‘only
inwardly’ with bold and contradictory exaggerations about his
existence ‘outwardly also’. But even from the point of view of
logic there is nothing to prevent such cogitare. For it can have
no claim on truth in the strict sense but merely regard itself as a
reflection of awareness of God in its own consciousness. How-
ever figuratively and irresponsibly the est e¢ in re may be meant,
124
at least it can always be thought. Perhaps there is no representa-

tion at all thus deliberately included in the reservation whose
validity was meant only intramentally. By such a representa-
tion this reservation would of necessity be openly shattered and
a mythologizing esse in re would have to be conceived as well,
at the borderline of thought. Be that as it may: potest cogitart
et in re.
. - quod maius est. (1 10T, 17)... that is greater.
These three words, joined to the twofold possibility just

announced, introduce the argument which is crucial for the
proof: if (1) God exists only in knowledge and if (2) God can
be conceived as existing objectively and not only in knowledge,
then it means—a greater is conceivable than he who first
assumed to be ‘God’. The general rule which is assumed at this
point—that a being who exists in knowledge and in addition
exists objectively is ‘greater’ than one who merely exists in
knowledge—is no axiom, but an inference from Anselm’s
doctrines of Truth and Knowledge which are already known to
us. If a being exists not only in knowledge but also objectively
then for Anselm it must be ‘greater’ than one existing only in
knowledge, because the realm of knowledge forms the third
and final level of reality, and the realm of objectivity forms the
second, which is directly related to the first level, the realm of
Truth itself. Why should something that really exists only in
knowledge not be incomparably much ‘smaller’ than what also
exists objectively ?Why should this latter not be incomparably
much ‘greater’? It has the qualitative and not quantitative
superiority of the source of all truth (in so far as it is not identical
with God) not in itself, but for itself, granted by God, distinct
from knowledge. Thus in consequence of this rule, which for ,/
Anselm was self-evident, the God who is conceivable and who
exists in knowledge and in objectivity is greater and essentially
greater than the God who previously was assumed as existing
only in knowledge. But just because on Anselm’s assumptions
125
the maius is essentially greater, a being on a higher level, the

conception of this maius violates the identity assumed from the
start of the maius with the minus that up till now was presumed
to be God, the One who existed in solo intellectu. Whoever
ascribes both intra- and extramental existence to God is not
thinking of the same God as the person for whom God is this
minus. It is still not settled that this minus cannot be identical
with God but it should not be overlooked that over against him
this maius is at the same time an aliud, something not identical
with him, not a predicate that he can have added himself
but a new second subject distinct from him. If we make use in
any sense whatever of the possibility of ascribing to the God
who is assumed to exist only intramentally, extramental
existence as well, then we have to be clear that we have con-
ceived a greater and therefore a different being alongside God.
And even if we do not make any use of this possibility, but
cannot help recognizing it simply as a possibility, then we
cannot deny that theoretically we have placed such a greater
and therefore different being alongside the God who claims
real existence zn solo intellectu.
Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, When, therefore, ‘that than which a
est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius greater cannot be conceived’ exists
cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari only in knowledge, then ‘that than
potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. which a greater cannot be con-
(I 101, 17-102, 2) ceived’is such than which a greater
can be conceived. But this it clearly
cannot be.
We saw that it is possible, going beyond the assumed reality

of God’s existence in solo intellectu, to conceive of God as existing
in intellectu et in re. But in so doing we do not conceive of the
same God but of a being who is different, greater and superior.
What is the consequence? The consequence is that it becomes
quite impossible to identify this being who exists in solo intellectu
with God. God is zd quo maius cogitari nequit. But this being is such,
as we have shown, that mentally it is possible to place along-
side him a being who is different from him and greater than
126
him. This first being is thus equated with God in a manner

that is explicitly forbidden by God’s Name—conceiving of
God in such a way that something greater than him is con-
ceivable. It is called quo maius cogitart non potest and yet it is
a quo maius cogitari potest. ‘This contradiction is intolerable:
certe hoc esse non potest. The Name of God cannot apply to this
being.1 There must be some unfortunate confusion here with
some pseudo-God who is not God. But even the Name of God
that is wrongly attributed to him signifies his unmasking. If
this being who exists only in knowledge is seriously taken for
God, he turns out to be a contradiction in terms, in fact
nothing. The ‘God’ who only exists in knowledge could only be
a reality on the assumption that he did not make any serious
claim to be God and did not bear the Name of God that for
him is too great. As a fine product of the intellect, as ‘God’, he
may well survive in solo intellectu. But to be identified with
God the least he would need to possess would be the existence
that applies even to the created world: the esse in intellectu et
in re.
Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo ‘Thus objectively as well as in
maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et knowledge there does undoubtedly
in re. (1 102, 2f) exist ‘something than which nothing
greater can be conceived’.
To understand this conclusion we must not simply grasp the

first German translation which comes our way: ‘there does
therefore undoubtedly exist something. . . .”* Despite the fact
1 Anselm has offered in C. Gaun. 2 (1 132, 14-133, 2) a complete, and in detail
perhaps even fuller, repetition of the train of thought developed here. Worth
noting in confirmation of our interpretation here is the Proof which is given there
of the certe hoc esse non potest of our Proslogion passage: utique ‘quo maius cogitari potest’
in nullo intellectu est ‘quo maius cogitari non possit’ (1 132, 20f).
2 Thus J. Brinktrine in his translation of the Proslogion into German in Ferdinand
Schéningh’s Sammlung philosopherischer Lesestoffe, Paderborn, n.d.)—not a work of any
significance. The translation of H. Bouchitté is quite arbitrary and misleading (Le
rationalisme chrétien a la fin du XI siécle, Paris 1842, p. 247): Il existe donc certainement
un étre audessus duquel on ne peut rien imaginer, ni dans la pensée ni dans le fait. Better,
but not entirely unambiguous because of the absence of quotation marks which
are quite indispensable here, A. Koyré: Par conséquent il ny a aucun doute, que
quelque chose dont on ne peut rien concevoir de plus grand existe et dans l’intelligence et dans
la réalité.
127
that exzstit is placed first, it follows from the whole content of

the chapter that the emphasis of the sentence is not on this
existit, which in itself is ambiguous, but on what explains it—
et in intellectu et in re. Not till then does the existit become unam-
biguous in the sense of the desired result. What Anselm regards
as having been proved by what has gone before is that the
thing described as aliquid quo matus cogitari non valet has existence
not only in knowledge but also has objective (and to that
extent genuine) existence. Now how far has that been proved?
In so far as it has been shown that God exists in the knowledge
of the hearer when the Name of God is preached, understood
and heard. But he cannot exist merely in the knowledge of the
hearer because a God who exists merely thus stands in im-
possible contradiction to his own Name as it is revealed and
believed, because, in other words, he would be called God but
would not be God. Thus as God he cannot exist in knowledge
as the one who merely exists in knowledge.! It should be noted
that nothing has been proved beyond this negative. The last
word of the Proof is hoc esse non potest, as also its intention was
described only negatively: Deus non potest esse in solo intellectu.”
But the conclusion reaches further: God’s existence eé¢ in
intellectu et in re is concluded from the fact that a God who exists
in solo intellectu has been proved impossible. With what justifica-
tion? All that is proved is just this negative. The positive
statement about the genuine and extramental existence of God
(in the general sense of the concept ‘existence’) does not stem
from the proof and is in no sense derived from it but is proved
by the proof only in so far as the opposite statement about
God’s merely intramental existence is shown to be absurd.
Where then does this positive statement come from? It was
suddenly brought in with the hypothetical potest cogitari esse
1 In the parallel C. Gaun. 2 (1 132, 30ff) the conclusion is in this form which
further confirms the paraphrase given in the text: An ergo non consequitur, ‘quo maius
cogitari nequit’, si est in ullo intellectu, non esse in solo intellectu? Si enim est in solo intellectu,
est quo maius cogitari potest ; quod non convenit.
2 Cf. p. 123.
128
et in re? and it remains now merely because it was proved that

the statement to the opposite effect was absurd. If that is a
‘proof’ then it is the proof of an article of faith which still
holds good apart from all proof.* The positive statement cannot
be traced back’as it originates in revelation. And the statement
that is opposite to it can only be reduced ad absurdum by means
of another that likewise comes from revelation, God is quo
matus cogitart nequit. That, however, can be done. And to that
extent the genuine existence of God (in the general sense of
the concept “existence’) can be proved and has been proved
here.
Nothing is perhaps more significant for the essay Pro in-
siprente than the fact that in the main Gaunilo deals only with
the train of thought from Prosl. 2 that has just been analysed
and that in it he sees, like so many of his successors, Anselm’s
Proof of God.? Further—without allowing the doctrine of God
in the rest of the Proslogion (which he praised) to bring the
importance of this matter to his attention, he could pass over
the references of Prosl. 3 which to Anselm were crucial, with a
few observations which though not unintelligent in themselves
scarcely comprise a seventh part of the total work. In the fact
that he regards* Anselm’s first word as the decisive one,
indeed the only one, and Anselm’s second word as a mere
repetition of the first, and in the ease with which he disposes of
this second word, we cannot fail to find proof of our earlier
contention that Gaunilo had no interest in the problem that v
ultimately was the only one of interest to Anselm, the absolutely
1 Cf. p. 124.
2 That this is what Anselm means will become evident in Prosl. 3, where in the
parallel passage, the vital et hoc es tu Domine, Deus noster (1 103, 3) appears. Why not
here? Obviously because the proof in Prosl. 2 is only a stage on the way to the
proof proper which is not to be worked out till Prosl. 3.
3 Aux yeux d’Anselme, la preuve est faite, we read—we can scarcely believe our
eyes—at the end of the reference to Prosl. 2 in the Dictionnaire de Théol. cath. vol. 1,
column 1351.
4... cum deinceps asseritur, tale esse maius illud, ut nec sola cogitatione valeat non esse,
et hoc rursus non aliunde probatur, quam eo ipso, quod aliter non erit omnibus maius .. -
(Pro insip. 7: 1 129, 1ff)
I I29
unique existence of God. But quite obstinately and in actual

fact very shortsightedly all he demanded was proof that God
exists in the manner of created things. We saw that Anselm
does not deny this but actually proves it in Prosl. 2. Vere est
means here: he does not exist only in thought but also exists
over against thought. Why should this sign of true existence
not belong as much to him as to every object of his creation?
But obviously belong to him as God in a totally different way.
That is what the Proslogion has still not made clear. By the mere
fact that God exists in just the same way as any other object, the
problem of his existence is still not answered as far as Anselm is
concerned (unlike Gaunilo). God is ‘outside’, God stands over
against the thinking in the unique manner in which the
Creator stands over against the thinking of the creation. That
is the characteristic force of the article of faith on the Existence
of God. That is what is to be proved in Prosl. 3. If Gaunilo had
no interest in this background and aim of Anselm’s inquiry how
then was he to understand Prosl. 2 on its own? We already know
the objections which he had to bring against the introduction to
the Proof of Prosl. 2 (against the esse Det in intellectu and
against the artist analogy). These elements of his polemic art
apart, the only other proper reference to the point at issue is
in what is expressed most forcibly in the famous island analogy
in the sixth chapter of his work. We have already referred to
this in detailt and we can only repeat: Gaunilo refuses to be
satisfied, as we saw, with the mere expression quo maius cogitart
nequit and with a proof that is based on hearing and under-
standing this expression. Thus he is not disputing the correct-
ness of the conclusions that Anselm draws—that alongside the
God who merely exists in intellectu something conceivable as ex-
isting in intellectu et in re would be ‘greater’ and that therefore an
intolerable contradiction obtains between the Name of God
that is the hypothesis and his existence in solo intellectu. What he
is objecting to is the givenness, which Anselm describes, of the
1 Cf. pp. 81 and 95f.
130
presupposition of these conclusions and therefore also to the re-

sult that is reached by means of these conclusions. Who or what
this expression describes is completly unknown to us; it would
have to be revealed to us somehow, but certainly not just by this
expression, in order to witness to its own existence in this its
known reality as opposed to something merely existing in
intellectu.! Whereas Anselm’s quo maius cogitari nequit charms
him, Gaunilo likes the description of an incomparably rich and
lovely island in the sea, belonging to no one and uninhabited,
which ex difficultate vel potius impossibilitate inveniend: quod non est
is called the ‘lost’ island. This description he could well under-
stand though quite unable thereby to have it proved that
because of its known excellence this island is bound also to
exist.2, We saw already that all this is sheer misunderstanding. Gh
Anselm’s hypothesis is certainly an expression, but not as
Gaunilo thinks empty words, but the Word of God—not as
Gaunilo thinks, an expression given and to be understood in
isolation, but a Word of God within the context of his revela-
tion, to which also belongs the revelation of his existence. It
declares the Name of God from which Name we certainly
cannot derive his existence, as Gaunilo interpolates, but from
which the impossibility of his non-existence (on the assumption
of his revealed, unique existence as Creator—which Gaunilo
ignores) is perceived and which makes it possible to recog-
nize in thought the Existence of God that is believed. This result
does not satisfy Gaunilo because he himself is obviously in
search of a proof of God from some sort of experience, a proof
which would have nothing to do with Anselm’s znéellectus fider
and which would be excluded by Anselm’s very concept of God.
1 Prius enim certum mihi necesse est fiat re vera esse alicubi maius ipsum, et tum demum ex eo
quod maius est omnibus, in seipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum (Pro insip. 5: 1
128, 11ff).
2 Si, inquam, per haec ille mihi velit astruere de insula illa, quod vere sit, ambigendum ultra
non esse: aut iocari illum credam, aut nescio quem stultiorem debeam reputare, utrum me,
st et concedam, an illum, st se putet aliqua certitudine insulae illius essentiam astruxisse
(Pro insip. 6:1 128, 26ff).
3 Fo modo summe sensibilis es, quo summe omnia cognoscis, non quo animal corporeo sensu
cognoscit (Prosl. 6: 1 105, 5f).
I3I
In this way then Gaunilo comments on Prosl. 2, and in doing

so shows he is at cross purposes with Anselm.
2. THE SPECIAL EXISTENCE OF GOD (Prosi. 3)

Quod non possit cogitari non esse. That he could not be conceived as
(I 102, 5)
not existing. .
This heading denotes the second, more specific meaning of
vere sit: God exists in such a way (true only of him) that
it is
impossible for him to be conceived as not existing.
Quod utique sic vere est, ut nec cogitari Which so truly exists that it cannot
possit non esse. even be conceived as not existing.
(1 102, 6)
We have now to take a look at a second, narrower definition
of the general existence of God (sic vere est). Of course in this
closely defined way existence is being asserted of the God
described by quo maius cogitari nequit. And not only in this way,
as Prosl. 2 showed. But in this definite manner only of God.
This second definition reads—he does not only exist; there is
no possibility of his being conceived as not existing. We might
object (and the reason why Prosl. 3 is frequently overlooked or
taken lightly may be implicitly based on this objection), that
this second statement that is now to be proved is identical with
the first statement that was proved in Prosi. 2, in so far as this
is accepted as proved. If the existence of God is proved there,
then it must mean that it is impossible for him to be conceived
as not existing. The antithesis between a God who exists only
in thought and One who exists objectively (and therefore
genuinely) as well as in thought showed—God would not be
God if this ‘God’ who exists only in thought were God. We are
not thinking of the true God when we think of this God. Thus
it is impossible for us to conceive of the true God as not exist-
ing. To what extent is the thesis of Prosl. 3 more than a mere
repetition or underlining of this result from Prosl. 2?
Answers: in Prosi. 2 the concept of existence was expressly
the general concept of existence in thought and in reality. On
that basis it was proved that it is impossible to conceive of God
132
if his existence in thought and in reality are denied. But the

very impossibility of thus denying the existence of a being can
be understood as a merely factual denial that accompanies a
recognition of this being’s existence in fact, though insisting
that in theory it might be possible for it not to exist. What we
know as existing in intellectu et in re we cannot in fact at the
same time conceive as not existing. But we cannot deny that
we could think of it in itself as not existing (assuming that
the factual impossibility would not hinder us). In Prosl. 2 it
was then shown that in actual fact God cannot be conceived
as not existing. Not of course on the ground of positive know-
ledge of his existence. With the existence of God there is
absolutely no question at all of a knowledge of his Existence
such as we can have of the existence of other things, and the
knowledge of it that we certainly have from revelation, was
definitely eliminated here as a basis of proof. But on the basis
of the revealed Name of God, which cannot possibly apply to
a being that does not exist zm tntellectu et in re, the question
arises of the God who exists in intellectu et in re and who, as
bearer of this Name, is known only by revelation. Whoever
hears and understands this Name can in fact apply this Name
to no mere object of thought but only to the God who makes
known his Existence in the same revelation. To that extent
it is actually already proved in Pros/. 2 that it is impossible’
for us to conceive the true God as not existing. However, it
has not so far been proved, and the question now arises,
whether it is true that the reason that prevents the actual
denial of the Existence of God can also debar even the hypo-
thetical conception of the non-existence of God. Could this
reason not be of the same type as our positive acquaintance of
the existence of other things on the ground of the knowledge
that we have of them? This acquaintance certainly has the
power to render impossible for us the thought that these things
do not exist but it does not have the power to withhold from us
the thought that their non-existence might be conceived. The
133
concept of existence assumed in Prosl. 2 is the general concept,

applicable to all things that exist. A thing that we know as,
existing cannot at one and the same time be conceived as
both existing and as not existing. But we can quite well con-
celve, simultaneously with the thought of its existence, that it
possibly might not exist were it not known to us as existing.
_ The question is now: whether, despite the proof just demon-
strated, we are in such a position in respect of God that,
knowing his existence, we have to reckon at the same time at
least hypothetically with his non-existence or whether God
makes an exception in the case of knowledge of his existence
so that the knowledge that we have of him renders impossible
in practice not only the thought of his non-existence, but also
—likewise in practice—the thought of the very possibility of
his non-existence. Must this impossibility in practice mean also
the absolute exclusion of our conceiving God’s non-existence?
Our chapter answers this question. It lifts the concept of the
Existence of God right out of the plane of the general concept
of existence.1 The limitation on the concept of existence—
esse in intellectu et in re—with which it was applied to God in
Prosl. 2, now disappears. Our chapter affirms the exception
that is made here: the revealed Name of God has more power
than the positive knowledge that we can have of the existence
of other things zn intellectu et in re. It compels in him who hears
and understands it a recognition not only of the actual im-
possibility of the thought that God does not exist but also of
the impossibility of that thought ever being conceived. Beyond
the recognition that God exists, the Name of God as it is heard
and understood compels the more precise definition that God
does not exist as all other things exist whose non-existence we
cannot reject in theory even when this theory is impossible for
us to conceive in practice. But God exists—and he alone—
1C. in this respect: B. Adlhoch, ‘Der Gottesbeweis des heiligen Anselm’ (Philos,
Jahrb. der Gérresgesellschaft vol. 8, Part 1 1895, pp. 380 ); K. Heim, Das Gewissheits-
problem, 1911, pp. 78; R. Seeberg, Dogmengeschichte vol. 3, 1913, Bp. 150f; A.
Koyré: L’idée de Dieu, etc., 1923, pp. 1936.
134
in such a way that it is impossible even to conceive the possi-

bility of his non-existence. That is the thesis of Pros/. 3. And that
is not a repetition but a vital narrowing of the result of Prosi. 2.
At this point we insert an account of the essence of Gaunilo’s

comments on Prosl. 3 that were put into Pro insip. 7' and also
of Anselm’s reply given in C. Gaun. 4. Gaunilo’s objection is
important because it is in it that his own position becomes
relatively clearer than anywhere else. And Anselm’s reply ought
to be the best proof that the interpretation that we have just
attempted of Prosl. 3 is correct.
Leaving everything else aside, Gaunilo’s main objection is to
the whole manner in which the chapter puts the question.
Instead of ‘God cannot be conceived as not existing’ (cogitart),
on his view Anselm would have been better to have said, ‘we
cannot know God as not existing or as possibly not existing’
(ntelligz). ‘Thereby denial of or doubt as to God’s existence
would be characterized as falsum, as Gaunilo thinks it ought
to be. For falsa nequeunt intelligi: knowledge is ever knowledge
of truth. However, that falsa and therefore also this particular
Cas can be conceived, as is obviously the case with the
fnsipiens, Anselm had no intention of disputing. From this
point onwards—just from the point where in its own way it
becomes interesting—Gaunilo’s exposition becomes sketchy:
‘I know myself as existing and also at the same time as
possibly not existing. On the other hand, I know God as
existing but it is impossible for me to know him as possibly
not existing. In knowing myself as existing, can I at the
same time conceive of myself as not existing? I do not know.
1 What is not of the essence is the repetition of the objection that the rez veritate
esse of God must be made known or must have been made known in the first place
otherwise than by means of the mere expression, before any sort of conclusions
about his Existence can be drawn from the Perfection of God that the expression
declares (1 129, 1-10). Gaunilo’s confusion between maius omnibus and quo maius
cogitart nequit (see pp. 84ff, above) has a particularly disastrous effect here—he
actually paraphrases here Anselm’s alleged maius omnibus with natura maius et
melius omnium quae sunt and with summa res.
135
If I can then I can also do it for everything else whose exist-

ence I know with the same certainty. If I cannot, then the
fact that I cannot conceive an existence as not existing is
not true only in respect of God.’
We see here (apart from the general statement in the last
chapter this is the only occasion in his essay, but here it is very
definite), that even Gaunilo asserts the existence of God, indeed
the intelligere of the existence of God, though of course we also
see at once that what he understands by it is something quite
different from what Anselm understands. His zntelligere is
synonymous with a scire which for some reason or another is a
certissime scire.2 It may be that what he wants this to describe,
if it is a case of intelligere Deum esse, is the same as Anselm
describes* as the certainty of faith that is already well estab-
lished prior to all theology. But perhaps he is familiar rather
with’ the certissimum argumentum which he is always missing in
Anselm and what he has in mind is some empirical knowledge
of God, perhaps somewhat in the manner in which Thomas
Aquinas later made it credible to many. Certainly he wants to
be sure that his zntelligere is understood differently from all pure
thinking and vice versa, pure thinking also—of course to its
shame—as independent from what he styles zntelligere. Gaunilo
‘recognizes’ or ‘knows’ not a little: he knows, for example, even
certissime, that he himself exists. He certainly also knows the
limited nature of this his existence and therefore of the possi-
bility of his non-existence. On the other hand he does not
know—and he does not want to make up his mind merely ‘by
thinking’—whether despite this his knowledge of his existence
1 Cum autem dicitur, quod summa res ista non esse nequeat cogitari: melius fortasse
diceretur, quod non esse aut etiam posse non esse non possit intelligi. Nam secundum propriet-
atem verbi istius (sc. intelligere) falsa nequeunt intelligi, quae possunt utique eo modo cogitart,
quo Deum non esse insipiens cogitavit. Et me quoque esse certissime scio, sed et posse non
esse nthilominus scio; summum vero illud, quod est, scilicet Deus, et esse et non esse non posse
indubitanter intelligo. Cogitare autem me non esse quamdiu esse certissime scio, nescio utrum
possim; sed si possum, cur non et quidquid aliud eadem certitudine scio? Sit autem non possum:
non erit iam istud proprium Deo (Pro insip. 7: 1 129, 10ff).
2 With this the passage cf. also Pro insip. 2 (1 125, 20ff): . . . quia scilicet non
possim hoc aliter cogitare nisi intelligendo id est scientia comprehendendo re ipsa illud existere.
3 Cf. pp. 26ff.
136
he could or could not conceive of himself as not existing. His

position in respect of God is exactly the same. He knows God as
existing and indeed even that it is impossible for him not to
exist. But one sentence expressing this (perhaps on the ground
of tradition, perhaps of experience or perhaps of both) would
satisfy his claim to characterize the opposition of the insipiens
as falsum. Against which he expects nothing from a special
effort of thought in this realm (perhaps in any realm). Norm-
ally cogitare is just the simple reproduction of zntelligere, and
intelligere means scire. On the other hand (abnormal) thinking
that is not identical with the reproduction of the thing known
seems to him in all circumstances to be hopeless: just as much
when it asserts (with Anselm) the Existence of God as when
(with the znsipiens) it denies it. Do I exist? Does anything exist?
Does God exist ?What thinking could decide these conclusively?
Be my knowledge in all these points ever so sure, pure thinking
as such is here as free as it is insufficient to make this decision.
We can conceive of God as not existing. Let us then abide by
the thinking that is identical with the reproduction of know-
ledge.” The end of the passage is particularly remarkable. What
does the ‘either—or’ mean with which Gaunilo ends? The
question as to the necessity of the thought of his own existence
was obviously dragged into the discussion because he assumed
that behind Anselm’s doctrine of the impossibility of the
thought of God’s non-existence there stood a general doctrine
of necessary thoughts ultimately based on that of the necessity of
his own existence. In my opinion he regarded him as standing
where Descartes later stood. And so he thinks Anselm has only
this alternative: either his statement ‘the thought of one’s own
existence is necessary’ is false—in which case all corresponding
1 Thomas Aquinas (Summa contra gentiles I 11) will not be afraid to say later
nullum inconviens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse.
2 Bouchitté (Le rationalisme chrétien, p. 306), is no doubt right to compliment
Gaunilo, admittedly in connection with a different passage, with the remark:
Les hommes accoutumés aux études philosophiques reconnaitront certainement, qu’il y a dans
ce passage et dans ce qui suit quelque chose que ne désavouerait pas la philosophie expérimentale
et sensualiste de nos jours.
137
statements collapse with it, including the statement, ‘the

thought of God’s existence is necessary’. Or this statement is
correct—in which case the statement about the existence of
- God has at least a parallel and that finishes the uniqueness of
| the Existence of God which Anselm asserted. It can be main-
tained that these last words of his, Gaunilo’s polemic, are the
most spiritually valuable in his whole work, and yet they are
the least relevant to Anselm.
Anselm replied to this as follows. Just because the point at
issue is the proof of the existence which is peculiar to God, our
thesis must be: “God cannot be conceived as not existing.’ It is
certainly true that God cannot be known as not existing, since a
falsum can never be an object of knowledge. But supposing he,
Anselm, had put forward this thesis, would Gaunilo not have
replied to him (and correctly) in the sense of his closing
sentence: this statement is applicable to all that exists and not
only to God. Whereas the statement, ‘God cannot be conceived
as not existing’, can only have one subject, ‘God’. For all that
exists apart from God can be conceived as not existing.” The
proof of this follows from the Nature of God.? All things
finite and divisible (but only these) can be conceived as not
existing: in view of what is beyond their spatial and temporal
limits, in view of their partial non-identity with themselves,
obviously the thought of their possible non-existence must
occur, however assured we may be that their existence is
known. The Infinite and Indivisible, which is God (and it
alone), cannot be conceived as not existing (in so far as on other
1 Si enim dixissem, rem ipsam non posse intelligi non esse, fortasse tu ipse . . . obiceres,
nihil quod est posse intelligi non esse . . . Quare non esse proprium Deo non posse intelligi
non esse (C. Gaun. 4: 1 133, 24ff).
2 Sed hoc utique non potest obici de cogitatione, si bene consideretur. Nam et si nulla, quae
sunt, possint intelligi non esse, omnia tamen possunt cogitari non esse praeter id quod summe
est (ibid.: 1 133, 29-134, 2).
3 Once again it ought to be noted (cf. p. 97, n. 1, above) that the point here is
not the actual question of the Existence of God, a question which is assumed
to be still open, but the question as to what ‘existence’ can and does mean when
it refers to God. This question is to be answered from the Nature of God.
4 Illa quippe omnia et sola possunt cogitari non esse, quae initium aut finem aut partium
habent coniunctionem (ibid.: 1 134, 2f).
138
grounds it must be conceived as existing). In so far as it has no

bounds and in its totality is identical with itself, its existence
(assuming it to possess such) cannot be denied.1 Thus: if the
Existence of God is to be proved then it must be proved that
he cannot be conceived as not existing. But Anselm has no
intention of relating this to any analogous statement about his
own existence, let alone of setting it in a relation of dependence
on such a statement, as Gaunilo seems to take for granted.
There is no analogous statement (Anselm is not Descartes)
concerning man’s own existence. Of course Gaunilo can say
that he does not know whether he could conceive himself as not
existing while knowing his existence. Naturally he is able to do
that as certainly as he is capable of creating a fiction by ignoring
what he knows of his existence. The nature of man as distinct
from the Nature of God will not put any obstacle in the way of
such a fiction.? Anything at all (except God) we can conceive
as not existing: that is to say, although we know its existence
and although in fact we are not able to grasp the thought of its
non-existence, we can create the hypothesis or fiction that
would correspond.® ‘Thus in reply to Gaunilo’s sceptical state-
ment that he does not know whether he could conceive himself
as not existing, it has to be said that in actual fact he cannot do
this (prevented by knowledge of his existence), but can do it
very well hypothetically, as a fiction. And the same is true of
our thinking in respect of all things apart from God.* Thus
there is no general doctrine of necessary thoughts standing
behind the thesis of Pros!. 3. That there are also things other
1 [llud vero solum non potest cogitari non esse, in quo nec initium nec finem nec partium
coniunctionem, et quod non nisi semper et ubique totum ulla invenit cogitatio (ibid.: 1 134,
4ff).
2 Scito igitur, quia potes cogitare te non esse, quamdiu esse certissime scis; quod te miror
dixisse nescire. Multa namque cogitamus non esse, quae scimus esse, et multa esse, quae non
esse scimus—non existimando sed fingendo ita esse ut cogitamus (ibid. : 1 134, 7ff).
3 Et quidem possumus cogitare aliquid non esse quamdiu scimus esse, quia simul et illud
possumus et istud scimus; et non possumus cogitare non esse quamdiu scimus esse, quia non
possumus cogitare esse simul et non esse (ibid.: 1 134, 10ff).
4 Si quis igitur sic distinguat huius prolationis has duas sententias, intelliget nihil, quamdiu
esse Scitur, posse cogitari non esse, et quidquid est praeter id quo maius cogitari nequit, etiam
cum scitur esse, posse non esse cogitart (ibid., 1 134, 13 ff).
139
than God that cannot in fact be conceived as not existing, is a

different matter. What is represented by Anselm in Prosl. 3
is this sentence, of which God alone can be the subject: even in
this second sense, even hypothetically, God cannot be con-
ceived as not existing.t Anselm comes to terms in Prosl. 4
with the fact, dealt with so disastrously by Gaunilo, that none
the less the znstpiens asserts that he can conceive the non-
existence of God.? What had to be shown here was that in
Prosl. 3 Anselm is concerned with a problem which for all his
vaunted positivism Gaunilo has not yet even seen. Just here,
where Gaunilo is at his cleverest, all that he can show is that he
is completely at cross purposes with Anselm for the reason that
where his work ends, Anselm’s begins.
Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non It is possible to conceive as existing
possit cogitart non esse; quod maius est, something which cannot be con-
quam quod non esse cogitari potest. ceived as not existing: that which is
(1 102, 6ff) greater than what can be conceived
as not existing.
What follows now is the narrowing of the proof in Prosl. 2

achieved in the sense of the opening sentence that sets the
theme of the chapter. It is taken as proved and admitted that
existence in general, esse zn intellectu et in re, applies to God; on
the other hand the special brand of true existence, applicable
only to him (his sic vere esse) and which according to the
opening sentence consists in the fact, not yet established in the
proof, that he so exists that he cannot be conceived as not
existing—that is taken as still open to question. Just because it
is not a case of a second proof (nor indeed of a repetition of the
first) but rather a case of narrowing the one and only proof,
admittedly in a way that is decisive, without further pre-
paration this narrowing is combined with the first general state-
1 Sic igitur et proprium est Deo non posse cogitari non esse, et tamen multa non possunt
cogitart, quamdiu sunt, non esse (ibid.: 1 134, 16ff).
2 Quomodo tamen dicatur cogitari Deus non esse, in ipso libello puto sufficienter esse
dictum (ibid.: 1 134, 18f).
140
ment; it can and must be essentially the same proof as before,

except that now right along the line a second reflection on the
impossibility of the non-existence of God is to be carried to the
length of the impossibility of even conceiving his non-existence.
Anselm starts from the possibility of conceiving a being who
exists and who cannot be thought together of as not existing and
one who likewise exists but can be thought of as not existing.
The esse in intellectu et in rein the sense of Pros/. 2 applies to both; but
they are distinguished from one another in that theoretical denial
of this esse is impossible in the case of the first being but possible
in the case of the second. The opening statement is thus: these
two beings and their existing side by side are conceivable.
Let us suppose that we did conceive of these two beings along-
side one another. We must admit that once more we have
conceived first of a ‘greater’ and of a ‘smaller’ being, a being of
a higher and of a lower order. The principle of progressive
orders which Anselm here assumes could be the same as that in
Prosl. 2 only that this time we have a higher degree within the
same series. It is now no longer a contrast between something
that exists on the one hand merely in thought and on the
other hand in thought and objectively but a contrast between
something that certainly exists objectively as well as in thought
but yet which is conceivable as not existing and on the other
hand something existing objectively and in thought but which
is not conceivable as not existing. Out of the general vere esse
there now rises significantly before us a vere esse whose reality
has its basis neither merely subjectively nor merely subjectively
and objectively but is based beyond this contrast a se, in itself.
A being to which vere esse in this latter sense applies, whose
existence is therefore independent of the antithesis between
knowledge and object, such a being is obviously a maius.
It belongs to a higher level of existence than a being to which
vere esse applies merely in the general sense, which however
genuinely it may exist, is subject to this antithesis and whose
existence can therefore be denied in theory by the same
I4I
thinking as has to assert its existence in fact. This first being

exists not only in reality but exists as the reality of existence
itself, as the criterion of all existence and non-existence which
is always presupposed in all thinking of the existence and non-
existence of other beings; consequently it cannot be conceived
as not existing. Whoever thinks of these two beings side by side
has conceived this ‘greater’ over against a ‘smaller’.
Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, When, therefore, ‘that than which a
potest cogitari non esse: 1d ipsum quo greater cannot be conceived’ can be
maius cogitari nequit non est id quo maius conceived as not existing, then ‘that
cogitari nequit ; quod convenire non potest. than which a greater cannot be con-
(1 102, 8ff) ceived’ is not ‘that than which a
greater cannot be conceived’. Which
is a contradiction.
For the sake of argument God is identified with this second

being, who though existing, is however conceivable as not
existing. Why should God not exist within this limitation as is
the case with all other beings known to us? As the most exalted
Being in the universe at the head of many others? The gods of
the heathen seem to manage it. But that very fact raises the
question whether these ‘gods’ justify their name. It is by the
revelation of the Name of God that this question is decided.
The God who is revealed is called quo maius cogitari nequit.
And from that we again have this intolerable contradiction:
this God who though existing can be conceived as not existing,
is called zd quo matus cogitari nequit and yet is not that. That a
matus is conceivable has just been shown. Quod convenire non
potest. Once again it is obvious that a pseudo-God has to be
unmasked and the Name of God denied to a being who cannot
be seriously taken as God. Whether or not this ‘God’ exists in
intellectu et in re, he does not exist as God. God cannot possibly
exist merely thus. In order to be identical with God, over and
above his identity with a being who exists in this manner, he
would have to be identical to this conceivable maius. Whether
distinct from or similar to this latter he shows himself up for
what he always is—not God.
142
Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitart ‘Therefore ‘something beyond which
non potest, ut nec cogitart possit non esse nothing greater can be conceived’
(1 103, 1f) exists in reality in such a manner
thatit cannot be conceived as not
existing.
Again the conclusion is drawn: what is described as aliquid

quo matus cogitart non potest exists in such a way that it cannot be
conceived as not existing. ‘To what extent is this conclusion
binding ? Clearly first of all, we repeat, only in so far as a ‘God’
conceivable as not existing is not disqualified from being God
by the contradiction between the Name of the God who is
revealed and the manner of existence of this so-called ‘God’.
God as he is revealed cannot in any circumstances exist in that
way. But once more the actual conclusion stretches out beyond
this negative that can be proved; from the impossibility of the
revealed God having such an existence a conclusion is drawn
as to the existence that is peculiar to him and which no thinking
can question. And again it has to be said: this last, vital
positive statement appears (after the opposite statement about
God’s existence being questioned by thinking has been proved
absurd), without its following as a consequence from the
preceding line of thought. It is brought in as a possibility of
thought alongside another (potest cogitart esse aliquid... ).
If it is to remain, if it is now supposed to be proved, svc ergo
vere est, then this can make sense only if an article of faith,
fixed in itself as such, has been proved in such a way that the
opposite statement would be reduced ad absurdum by means of
the statement of the Name of God which is likewise assumed to
be revealed and believed. This article of faith (regarding that
existence of God which is not only genuine but also incapable
of being denied even theoretically) was introduced first of all
disguised as a possibility of thought alongside another, and it
remains before us as the positive result after this opposite
statement has been dropped. Responsibility for the givenness
of this statement (for the last ratio quomodo sit) is not for the
1 Cf. pp. 27f.
143
theologian to bear. Jntelligere means to see into the noetic

rationality and therefore into the noetic necessity of the
statements that are revealed, on the basis that they possess
ontic rationality and necessity as revealed statements, prior
to all intelligere, to all ‘proof’ and therefore not based on
proof. This can only happen in theology as such. But it can
happen and it is what in fact has happened here.
Before following Prosl. 3 to its climax, for the sake of com-

pleteness we must turn once again to Anselm’s Apology against
Gaunilo. As already mentioned, in one passage there he plainly
repeated the simple proof of Pros/. 2.1 On the other hand, in a
whole succession of passages—a further indication of where his
interests lay—he continually offered his opponent new varia-
tions of the narrowed-down proof of Prosl. 3. We summarize
them shortly so as to show: 1. That the decisive thought of
Prosl. 3 is not bound to the form which it is given there but
is capable of variations; 2. that what these passages in fact
deal with are variations of the narrowed-down proof of
Prost.) 9.
1. C. Gaun. 9.2 We start with this last passage because it is
here that we find ourselves nearest to the form which the
argument takes in Prosl. 3. Again, something that is conceived
as ‘greater’ is compared with something conceived as ‘smaller’.
Again, the Name of God shows that God cannot be identical
with this ‘smaller’. And finally it is again taken to follow (on
the basis of the so-called article of faith)—as he cannot be the
‘smaller’, God is the ‘greater’. The difference between this and
the basic form of Prosi. 3 consists in the fact that here the maius
1C. Gaun. 2: 1 132, 22ff.
2 Palam autem est, quia similiter potest cogitari et intelligi, quod non potest non esse.
Maius vero cogitat qui hoc cogitat, quam qui cogitat quod possit non esse. Dum ergo cogitatur
quo maius non possit cogitari: si cogitatur quod possit non esse, non cogitatur quo non possit
cogitari maius. Sed nequit idem simul cogitari et non cogitart. Quare qui cogitat quo maius
non possit cogitari: non cogitat quod possit, sed quod non possit non esse. Quapropter necesse
est esse quod cogitat, quia quidquid non esse potest, non est quod cogitat (1 138, 19 ff).
144
is defined as the quod non potest non esse and that in consequence
the result must also be: necesse est esse quod cogitat (sc. qui cogitat
quo maius cogitari nequit). ‘This distinction obviously involves an
abbreviation; for rationality necessity is at once substituted,
surely intimating—the proof consists in demonstrating that it
is impossible to conceive of God as not existing.
2. C. Gaun. 3.1 Here Anselm replies to Gaunilo’s island
analogy: what is described as quo maius cogitart nequit could not
be conceived as not existing because it exists (if at all) in virtue
of the rationality (and therefore on the basis) of Truth itself.
If it did not exist thus it would not exist at all. The island
analogy is nonsense because it overlooks the fact that it is
only the existence of God (and therefore not the existence of
this island) that can be proved as Anselm has proved it. And
the argument proceeds: anyone who denies the existence of
God must face the question whether he is really thinking of
him who is called quo maius cogitari nequit. If he is not thinking
of him then obviously he does not deny his existence. If he is
thinking of him then he is thinking of one whose existence
cannot be denied. For could his existence be denied then he
would have to be conceivable as finite. But he is not con-
ceivable as finite. (Whoever thinks of him who is called quo
maius cogitari nequit is never to think of a finite being, but rather
ratione veritatis, and so of a being that does not exist in the man-
ner of finite beings). Therefore, whoever thinks of him thinks of
one whose existence cannot be denied. Thus the existence of
him who is called quo maius cogitart nequit cannot be denied.
Here too we immediately recognize the nerve of the proof of
Prosl. 3: by what his Name forbids, God is fundamentally
1 Palam autem iam videtur, ‘quo non valet cogitari maius’ non posse cogitari non esse, quod
tam certa ratione veritatis existit. Aliter enim nullatenus existeret. Denique si quis dicit se
cogitare illud non esse, dico quia cum hoc cogitat: aut cogitat aliquid quo maius cogitari non
possit, aut non cogitat. Si non cogitat, non cogitat non esse quod non cogitat. Si vero cogitat,
utique cogitat aliquid quod nec cogitari possit non esse. Si enim posset cogitart non esse,
cogitart posset habere principium et finem. Sed hoc non potest. Qui ergo illud cogitat, aliquid
cogitat quod nec cogitari non esse possit. Hoc vero qui cogitat, non cogitat 1dipsum non esse.
Alioquin cogitat, quod cogitari non potest. Non igitur potest cogitari non esse ‘quo maius
nequit cogitari’ (1 133, 10ff ).
K 145
distinguished from all beings that can be conceived as not

existing. The proof of course cannot establish that even when
we deny his existence we still conceive of him and therefore
must conceive of him in this his uniqueness as the infinite
Being and therefore as existing. All it tries to prove and all it
can prove is that when we really conceive him we conceive him
as existing of necessity, as so existing that he cannot be con-
ceived as not existing. This reminder of God’s infinity alludes
to one of the statements of revelation about the Nature of
God. But the fact that God is infinite does not prove that he
exists. Rather the fact that God is infinite proves that (if he
exists) he exists differently from beings who are not infinite—
that is, he does not exist in such a way that his existence can be
denied. The positive conclusion that he exists does not follow
from the statement quoted here concerning his Nature. That
remains outstanding at the point where he who is called quo
maius cogitart nequit is conceived and where therefore his
existence too is an article of faith.
3. C. Gaun. r (where Anselm gives the proof successively in
three different forms). We are confronted first of all+ with an
inversion of the form just given under 2. He who is called quo
maius cogitari nequit can be conceived as existing. But who is it
who is then conceived? A being whose existence is infinite. A
being whose existence could be denied would have to be
conceived as a finite being. If then he who is called quo maius
cogitart nequit is not conceivable as a finite being then his
existence cannot be denied. If he can be conceived as existing,
then of necessity he must exist, and that means he must be
conceived as existing of necessity. Of the ‘abbreviation’ that is
applied, the same is to be said as under 1; of the appeal to the
infinity of God, the same as under 2. For the rest we again
recognize the basic form—separation of God’s existence from
1 $7 vel cogitart potest esse, necesse est illud esse. Nam ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’ non
potest cogitari esse nisi sine initio. Quidquid autem potest cogitari esse et non est, per initium
potest cogitari esse. Non ergo ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’ cogitari potest esse et non est. St
ergo cogitari potest esse, ex necessitate est (1 131, 1ff).
146
that of all other beings. Consequently, this existence, unlike

that of all other beings, cannot be disputed. Conclusion (the
positive article of faith remains outstanding): God exists of
necessity. )
4. GC. Gaun. rt in a second passage:! Anselm takes as his
starting-point the assumption that at least the concept as such
expressed in the Name quo maius cogitart nequit (no matter
whether the existence of its bearer is accepted or denied) is
capable of realization. Supposing then someone were to deny or
doubt his Existence, that man could nevertheless neither deny
nor doubt that if he, who bears this name, did exist in accord-
ance with his Name then he would have to exist and that with
ontic objectivity (actu) as much as for our knowledge (cnéellectu).
His Name forbids that he should be reckoned as one of those
beings who merely exist in fact, that is who are recognized as
existing. A purely conceptual being and one that does not really
exist could never be obliged to exist: even if it did exist it could
obviously either exist or not exist, be-known as existing or as
not existing; at best it would be a being existing in fact and
known as existing. The ‘if then’ statement is therefore not
applicable to a purely conceptual being that does not really
exist but only to a being who can be conceived and who really
does exist, of whom at the same time it can be said what is in
fact to be said of God: it is impossible for it not to exist or to be
conceived as not existing. A highly complicated feature, but
one that is very significant for Anselm’s thought and intention
in this matter, is that at first the question as to the general
existence of God (in the sense of Prosl. 2) is expressly left open.
It is only the Name of God that is introduced by the hypothesis:
cogitart potest. Then the Name of God extorts the admission
that he who has this Name, if he existed (in the sense of Prosl.
1 Amplius. Si utique vel cogitari potest, necesse est illud esse. Nullus enim negans aut
dubitans esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, negat vel dubitat quia, si esset, nec actu
nec intellectu potest non esse. Aliter namque non esset quo maius cogitari non posset. Sed
quidquid cogitart potest et non est: si esset, posset vel actu vel intellectu non esse. Quare si vel
cogitart potest, non potest non esse ‘quo maius cogitari nequit’ 1 131, 6ff).
147
2), would exist of necessity (in the sense of Prosi. 3). Then this
‘if? is whittled down by the assertion that a purely conceptual
being, even if it did exist (in the sense of Prosl. 2), would not
exist of necessity. And then it is concluded (we would have
appreciated a transitional step)—-God is no mere conceptual
being but one who exists in the Prosi. 2 sense, that is one who
exists of necessity. The procedure is then—first the question of
Prosl. 3 is answered hypothetically and then by means of this
hypothetical answer (!) the question of Prosl. 2, and, following
from it, the question of Prosl. 3, are answered categorically.
_ 5. And now in a third passage? of C. Gaun. 1, Anselm goes
yet a step further. The question of Prosl. 2 is to be taken not
just as being open, but as being denied, apart from the possi-
bility of conceiving the thought-content of God’s Name. Again
two ‘if then’ statements of similar content now appear but in
reverse order from that in the form given previously: if a
purely conceptual being not really existing were to exist, then
as such (for obviously even if it were a being that existed it
would not be one that existed of necessity) it would not be
identical to God. Therefore, if God were to exist as such a
merely conceptual being not really existing, then he would not
be identical with himself. Therefore, this hypothesis is absurd.
Therefore, in conceiving the thought-content of this Name, all
“we can assume is the existence of its bearer. The Name of God
thus demands that his existence, even if it is denied, cannot (and
‘incidentally this renders its denial impossible) be conceived
merely as an existence in fact, but only as one that is necessary.
6. C. Gaun. 57 is worked out with the same material. Again
1 Sed ponamus non esse, si vel cogitari valet. At quidquid cogitari potest et non est: st
esset, non esset ‘quo maius cogitari non possit’. Si ergo esset ‘quo maius cogitari non possit’,
non esset quo maius cogitari non possit; quod nimis est absurdum. Falsum est igitur non esse
aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, si vel cogitari potest (1 131, 12ff).
2 Nam quod non est, potest non esse; et quod non esse potest, cogitari potest non esse.
Quidquid autem cogitari potest non esse: si est, non est quo maius cogitari non possit.
Quod si non est: utique si esset, non esset quo maius non possit cogitari. Sed dici non potest,
quia ‘quo maius non possit cogitari’ si est, non est quo maius cogitari non possit ; aut si esset,
non esset quo non possit cogitart maius. Patet ergo quia nec non est nec potest non esse aut
cogitari non esse. Aliter enim si est, non est quod dicitur; et si esset, non esset (I 134, 31-135,
7):
148
the hypothesis is on the one hand the non-existence of God and

on the other, the conceivability of his Name. From the first
would follow the possibility of his non-existence and from the
second its conceivability. However, something conceivable as
not existing, even if it does exist, is not the legitimate bearer of
the Name quo maius cogitari nequit. And if it does not exist, it
would not be the legitimate bearer of this name, even if it were
to exist, for alongside him there would be a Greater conceiv-
able, who could not be conceived as not existing. This im-
possibility of regarding it as the legitimate bearer of the Name
of God is the characteristic distinction between God and every
being that is conceivable as not existing. Thus God would
have to be a being distinct from himself in order to be a
being conceivable as not existing. And so he cannot be a
being conceivable as not existing. With the inconceivability
of his non-existence, its very possibility also collapses and
incidentally with it the reality of his non-existence that was the
hypothesis.
In all six of these variants the object of the Proof (in agree-
ment with Prosl. 3) is not the existence that God has in common
with beings who are different from him, but rather that
peculiar, indeed unique and in the end only true existence
which, over and above this general existence, applies only to
him—the absolutely necessary, because original existence
ratione veritatis. Incidentally forms four to six reach conclusions
that refer back to general existence and so to a strengthening
of the Proof of Prosl. 2. But only incidentally. There can be
no question but that in these last four forms too Anselm’s
primary and decisive interest was the non cogitart potest non esse.
In all its six forms the Proof consists (again agreeing with
Prosl. 3) in demonstrating: it is impossible to conceive him who
is called quo matus cogitart nequit as existing in the way that
other beings are conceivable as existing, that is in such a way
that his non-existence could be conceived. His Name and his
Nature exclude this. In demonstrating this the way is prepared
149
for the positive statement: God so exists that his non-existence

is inconceivable. This statement as such is not proved. On
the contrary it stands, like the general statement of Prosl. 2,
‘God exists’, as an article of faith by itself. What happens in
the Proof and its variants is that sometimes this article of faith
is strictly proved, at other times its opposite is strictly excluded
by the Proof, that is by the interpretation of the revealed
Name and Nature of God. That is the znéelligere of God’s
Existence corresponding to Anselm’s programme.
Et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster. Sic ergo And this thou art, O Lord our God.
vere es, Domine Deus meus, ut nec cogitari Thou dost exist in truth in such a
possis non esse: et merito. St enim aliqua way that thou canst not be conceived
mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, as- as not existing. And that with
cenderet creatura super Creatorum et indi- reason. For if any and every mind |
caret de Creatore, quod valde est absurdum. were able to conceive of something
(1 103, 3ff) better than thee then the creature
would be rising above the Creator
and judging the Creator. This
would be most absurd.
Whether or not we understand this part of the text perhaps

determines for every reader of Anselm whether the whole is
understood or not. The chapter could have closed with the
preceding sentence, for with that sentence the Proof as such is
completed. But the chapter does not close and anyone who does
not heed this, anyone who does not take what Anselm now
inserts at least as seriously as the actual Proof will most certainly
misunderstand the Proof itself. In the first place Anselm resumes
the form of address to God, that is he passes from the language
of theological inquiry to the language of prayer. Or rather—
once again! he shows that the whole theological inquiry is
intended to be understood as undertaken and carried through
in prayer. In prayer and surely that means—by presupposing
in the most positive manner conceivable the object of the
1 Cf. the opening sentences of Prosl. 2.
150
inquiry, his Presence and his Authority for the course and the
success of the inquiry concerning him. This ‘object’ who is
worshipped and thus investigated is, however, Dominus Deus
noster
= Dominus Deus meus, the God who is Lord of the Church
and as such is the God of the inquiring theologian, who is
Lord in this double relationship and to whom only devout
obedience is possible. Theology is devout obedience. Could
Anselm interpret his Credo ut intelligam more clearly than by
revealing this attitude in which he pursues his study and more
obviously than by insisting that it is on this that the course and
outcome of his inquiry depend? Even formally his inquiry is
distinguished by a provocative lack of all doubt, including all
‘philosophic doubt’, of all anxiety, including all apologetic
anxiety and in this connection by a no less provocative in-
tellectual coolness. Gan it be otherwise when theology is
what it is for him: assent to a decision coming from its object,
from the ‘Lord’, acknowledgment and recognition of the
‘Lord’s’ own communication of himself? It is certain that we
cannot take Anselm’s attitude that is so manifest here as
proof that his thinking is based on received revelation. But it
does assuredly prove that he means his thinking to be thus
based and it is in that way that he wants to be understood as a
thinker. If anyone interprets his argument as an a-priori
philosophical system then he will certainly not have support
from Anselm himself at any point. Anselm’s own words have
to be quietly altered and abbreviated if he is to be so inter-
preted. Just as, for example, Anselm’s critics, beginning with
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, have discreetly taken no notice of this
passage and all that follows from it. We can interpret his
Proof only when, along with Anselm, in Anselm’s own sense,
we share the presupposition of his inquiry—that the object of
the inquiry stands over against him who inquires not as ‘it’, not
even as ‘he’, but as ‘thou’, as the unmediated ‘thou’ of the
Lord.—‘And this thou art... .’ “That’ refers to aliquid quo maius
cogitart non potest. It was in fact the assumption made at the
151
beginning of Prosl. 2—Credimus te esse aliquid pro mhil maius

cogitart possit. Now at the end of the inquiry it is again brought
to remembrance. It is not just of anything, but of God the
Lord whom we believe because he has revealed himself
because he stands unmediated over against us as God the Lord,
it is of him that it is proved that he exists—since he exists thus:
‘in truth’, and that now means in such a way, ‘that thou
canst not be conceived as not existing’. He who is present in
unmediated form to the thinking churchman and who is
worshipped by him, he is the One whose existence cannot only
be thought of as sure in itself, but in relation to him even
thinking is not free; he renders impossible the very thought of
his non-existence, so certainly is he the One ‘beyond whom a
greater cannot be conceived‘. But this equation which is vital
for the Proof in its general and special form, is it valid? Does
God really bear this Name? Must everyone who conceives of
God really conceive of the prohibition expressed in this Name?
Anselm does subsequently establish this basis of the whole—
theologically as is appropriate. There is an intelligimus that
also corresponds to the credimus at the beginning of Prosl. 2.
How do we know that God’s real Name is quo maius cogitart
nequit? We know it because that is how God has revealed
himself and because we believe him as he has revealed himself.
But this knowing can be explained: we know it because on the
basis of revelation and faith, standing before God, we know that
we do not stand as any one being before any other being, but
as a creature before his Creator. As such, and from him who
stands over against us, we do not fail to hear this Name of God
and we unhesitatingly accept the prohibition it expresses. To
what extent? To the extent that the creature stands absolutely
under his Creator and remains there and therefore in his
thinking cannot set anything above the Creator. Along with his
existence, he also has his thinking about existence, its values
and its degrees, all entirely from the Creator. His thinking can
be true only in so far as it is true in the Creator himself. The
152
conception of a ‘better’ beyond the Creator would imply for the

creature an ascent (ascendere) to a point where by nature he
cannot stand, a judgment (zudicare) by a standard of truth or
value which by nature he cannot possess. Conceiving a greater |
than the Creator would therefore mean absurdity—not in the
literal sense but the great logical-moral absurdity which just
because it is that, cannot be. The Creator as such is absolutely
the guo maius cogitart nequit for the creature as such. Should the \/
creature fail to hear this Name of God and the prohibition it
contains then that can only mean that he has not yet under-
stood the Creator as such nor himself as creature. It is in faith
that he understands him and himself within this relation and so
hears his Name and the prohibition against conceiving any-
thing greater than him.! And so Anselm, who has proved that
1We note here two further objections which Thomas Aquinas raised against the
Proof of Prosl. 3. The first is given (Sententiae lib. r Dist. rrz Qu. 1, Art 1 ad 4:
Daniels, p. 65) as Anselm’s interpretation: Ratio Anselmi ita intelligenda est: quod
postquam intelligimus Deum, non potest intelligi quod sit Deus et possit cogitari non esse;
sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquis non possit negare vel cogitare Deum non esse;
- potest enim cogitare nihil huius modi esse quo maius cogitari non possit; et ideo ratio sua
procedit ex hac suppositione, quod supponatur aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest.
This exposition is as unlike Anselm as it could possibly be and can only be taken
as criticism. Of the exposition itself we can say: the view that God cannot be
conceived as not existing does not in any circumstances follow for Anselm from
an a priori intelligere Deum, but from the article of faith; ‘God is called quo maius
cogitarit nequit’, just as insight into this article of faith follows in its turn from the
article of faith ‘God is the Creator’. In Anselm aliquid esse quo maius cogitart non
potest is not a suppositio but the revelation apart from which there is no theology at
all. In this case it is the revelation of the Name of God and of the prohibition
which it expresses. This prohibition certainly ‘can’ be transgressed. We ‘can’
therefore cogitare nihil huius modi esse quo maius cogitari non potest. When Anselm
says that we cannot conceive this he says it in the presence of God and therefore
as one who cannot transgress this prohibition. In Thomas’ criticism this sense of
‘unable’ is unfortunately disregarded. The second objection, now openly formu-
lated as such, reads (Summa contra gentiles « 11): Nec etiam oportet. . . . Deo posse
aliquid maius cogitari si potest cogitari non esse. Nam quod possit cogitari non esse, non ex
imperfectione sui esse est vel incertitudine, cum suum esse sit secundum se mantfestissimum,
sed ex debilitate nostri intellectus, qui eum intueri non potest per seipsum sed ex effectibus
eius. We can compare with this the final words of Prosl. 3 to catch a glimpse of the
contradiction between two worlds that is disclosed here. When Anselm speaks of
revelation and faith Thomas disputes the possibility of intuitio Dei per seipsum.
So where Anselm sees stultitia and insipientia at work against the background of
divine reprobation, where he sees God offended by the exaltation of the creature
above the Creator (Cf. C.D.h. I 15: 1 72, 29ff), the problem for Thomas is
creaturely imperfection, to which he can reconcile himself by remembering the
unassailable ‘manifestness’ of God secundum se, and by demonstrating the zntuztzo
Dei ex effectibus eius.
193
it is impossible for him who is called quo maius cogitari nequit

not to exist, can say with a clear conscience that he has proved
it impossible for God not to exist.
Et quidem quidquid est aliud praeter te And so it stands: whatever exists
solum, potest cogitari non esse. Solus igitur apart from thee, the Only One, can
verissime omnium et ideo maxime omnium be conceived as not existing. Thou
habes esse: quia quidquid aliud est, non alone of all beings hast really true
Sic vere, et idcirco minus habet esse. existence—and therefore thou alone
(1 103, 6ff) of all beings hast perfect existence. For
anything other than thee! does not
possess this manner of existence and
therefore possesses but imperfect
existence.
Anselm has proved that it is impossible for God not to exist.

That means, however, that he has proved what can be proved
only of God. For that reason then the main point that Anselm
wanted to make did not come till the narrowed-down Proof of
Prosl. 3 and it was not the general Proof of Prosl. 2. Of course in
Prosl. 2 he had also proved that God certainly did exist, that is
possessed not just reality in thought but objective reality. But
what a complete misunderstanding it is to think that this Proof
formed the substance of his purpose! If God were to exist
merely generally, in the manner of all other beings, then not
only would he not exist as God, but according to Anselm’s own
account?—he did not create himself and therefore does not
possess existence as such, as is granted to the creature—he
would not exist at all. All that his Existence has in common
with that of other beings is objective reality as such. But the
objective reality of all beings apart from him is such that it can
be conceived as not existing and indeed in a special sense has to
be conceived as not existing. This to the extent that the
existence of all beings apart from him is conditioned by his
Existence and is an existence that is bestowed from out of his
Existence. The reason why there is such a thing as existence is
that God exists. With his Existence stands or falls the existence
1 Koyré: Tout ce qui n'est pas tot.
2 Certa ratione veritatis existit; aliter enim nullatenus existeret (C. Gaun. 3: 1 133,
Vat))
154
of all beings that are distinct from him. Only fools and their
theological and philosophical supporters, the Gaunilos, could
think that the criterion of general existence is the criterion of
God’s Existence and could therefore either not get beyond
Prosl. 2 or take Prosl. 3 as conditioned by Prosl. 2. Whereas it
is all the other way round: it is the Existence of God that is
the criterion of general existence and if either of these two
chapters of Anselm is ultimately or decisively conditioned by
the other, then it is Prosl. 2 by Prosl. 3, and not vice versa. It is
the Existence of God that is proved when it is proved that
God cannot be conceived as not existing. Thus, with the pro-
hibition against conceiving anything greater than him and with
this prohibition ruling out the thought of his non-existence—
thus does God alone confront man. Thus he and he alone is
objective reality. Because God exists in the inexplicable manner
which thought cannot dismiss, as he does exist as bearer of his
revealed Name, for that reason there is objective reality and the
possibility of its being conceived and so there is also the possi-
bility of conceiving of God as existing at all (in the sense of
Prosl. 2). In which case absolutely everything that exists apart
from him exists, as it were, coupled to his Existence and is
therefore conceivable as existing only in relation to the con-
ception of his Existence (that cannot be denied) and so, apart
from this connection, is ever conceivable, also as non-existing.
God alone is incapable of not existing and therefore he alone
can be the subject of the Proof of Pros/. 3. Therefore the One
and Only God—we cannot emphasize too strongly or take too
seriously the fact that Anselm says all this in the second person
singular—has Existence that is utterly true (verisseme) and there-
fore perfect (maxime).
Vere est was how it was put in Pros/. 2 and what was meant was
quite generally that God has at least as much objective reality
as all other beings. Then Prosl. 3 qualified this thesis—gquod sic
vere est, ut nec cogitart possit non esse. But this same sic that does the
qualifying also designates the truth of God’s Existence as being
itahe,
different from that of the existence of all other beings: verissime

. . . habes esse. The superlative (and we may equally well add
even the superlative maxime) is a faltering phrase for the fusion
of truth and appropriateness, applicable to all existence differ-
ent from God himself if it is to be true and right; the fusion
which also applies to Prosl. 2, to the existence of God himself;
the fusion which according to Prosl. 3 is identical with the
insoluble but intellectually inevitable Existence of God as
Creator. There are beings who exist. Even God is a Being who
exists. But God alone, the Creator, is a being who exists in a
manner insoluble but beyond the power of thought to deny, in
relation to whom true and appropriate existence is also given
to other beings. Verissime and maxime, in the truth and appropri-
ateness which is the criterion of all existence, God alone has
existence. While the esse and even the vere esse is not to be denied
to these beings that are distinct from him who is inconceivable
as not existing, nevertheless the sic esse or sic vere esse, the truth
and appropriateness of their existence, come from God and
remain in God. What God has in perfection (qualitative and
not quantitative) they have only in imperfection (qualitative
and not just quantitative)—Existence, objective reality. No
one, nothing else at all confronts me as thou dost—in such a
way that this ascendere above and tudicare on the object is made
impossible for me and the only question is of obedience or
disobedience. And so in fact (the result of the previous con-
sideration of the Name of God is confirmed)—the Existence of
God is proved when it is proved that God cannot be conceived
as not existing.
Cur itaque ‘dixit insipiens in corde suo: On what ground, then, did the fool
non est Deus’, cum tam in promptu sit ra- say ‘there is no God’ when to the
tionali menti te maxime omnium esse? rational mind it is quite plain that
Cur, nisi quia stultus et insipiens? thou of all beings dost exist in per-
(1 103, gff) fection? On what other ground than
that he is perverse and foolish?
Anselm comes back to the starting-point of his inquiry. Along-
side the believer, who in relation to the Existence of God now
156
stands within appropriate limits as one who knows, there still

stands, unmoved like a block of wood, the insipiens with his
“Non est Deus’. The formal, inner necessity of the statement
est aliqua talis naturat is demonstrated, but that does not create
any necessity in fact to take it as a positive statement instead of
as a question. Although, in fact just because, this demonstra-
tion was a self-contained circle, it is confronted (Anselm does not
need any Gaunilo to say it) with the assertion, ‘God is not a
real object’, with the same kind of consistency about it as
presumably belongs to a self-enclosed circle. The analysis of
this actual (physical) possibility of the thesis of unbelief (An-
selm is certainly as passionately concerned with it as any
Gaunilo) is treated as a special problem at the end of Prosi. 4.
Here it concerns him—in complete contrast to the knowledge
of faith that has been achieved—only as fact. He has not
forgotten and has no intention of overlooking this other person
who keeps on saying and is obviously able to say and perhaps is
bound to say, ‘Deus non est’. He does not forget or overlook him
just because he himself stands so very close to him and because
by this opposition he himself is faced with the question which
is now answered. Unum idemque est quod quaerimus! Did he not
have to know his opponent’s case very intimately and expound
it very forcibly in order to defeat him and so raise faith to
knowledge? Is not he, who obviously was so well able to con-
ceive and expound this opposite point of view, himself in some
way and at some point an insipiens too? Or at least is the solid-
arity between him and his opponent not so entirely broken that
he could always understand him as well as he understands
himself? It is enough that side by side with the man who says,
‘only God really exists’, there is the man who says on the other
hand, ‘there is no God’. And with him the question arises,
“Why does he talk thus? Where is he from? Who is he?’ The
question: quomodo insipiens dixit ... of Prosl. 42 is not the same
question. It is, as it were, a question as to the nature of the
1 Prosl. 2: 1 101, 6. 21 103, 13.
157
negative statement. At the moment all that Anselm is con-

cerned with is its reality as such (cur?). One possible reason
that might lead a man to say, ‘Deus non est’ is now rejected in
accordance with the Proof just presented: he is no longer able
to say that he cannot understand the article of faith on the
Existence of God as such or the necessity of its content in
relation to the other articles of faith. For the present all that
could be done for such understanding, has been done—accord-
ing to Anselm better results are admittedly in reserve. As a
matter of fact ‘sound human understanding’ can tell us—not
only that God exists, but that of all other beings he alone exists
in perfection, vertssime, maxime. It is certainly astonishing that
Anselm ventures to describe denial of the Existence of God as a
self-evident impossible possibility, for the rationalis mens simply
excluded—in view of the possibility of theological instruction
and especially in view of his theologoumenon just concluded
which quite openly and admittedly was brought about with the
help of very different material from ‘sound human understand-
ing’. And it is even more astonishing that after this reason has
collapsed all that he appears to be able to consider is one
other reason—divine reprobation of whoever denies the
Existence of God. But if from false theological pride or with an
unkind severity, anyone could argue against an earnestly
seeking fellow mortal, once again the vital condition involved
in Anselm’s thinking would be ignored. We saw that this
thinking is achieved—and this is the most important thing that
can be said about it—as it continues in worship.! The subduing
of the mens rationalis which he describes here as happening
once for all, is for him the being subdued by the object, the
Dominus Deus noster, before whose face he has been theologizing;
the being subdued which he himself has experienced and
which he can and must also assume to be the case with anyone
who has been truly theologizing with him. According to
1 Within the framework of the Benedictine opus Dei, ought perhaps to be added
in order to be quite concrete.
158
Anselm there are no theological problems that are finally

settled, so surely must we, when we have prayed, pray again |
and continue to pray. But it would be prayer devoid of faith
in the hearing of prayer (and therefore not prayer) if theological
thinking in the act of its fulfilment were not entirely sure of its
case and so unwilling to venture forth at its own level with its
unconditional demand. And it is exactly the same with the
basis which Anselm describes as the only possible basis for the
statement Deus non est. From what has been already said and
in this whole context, the commonplace explanation of quza
stultus est et insipiens is quite impossible—that the man who says
Deus non est is a clown who is incapable of following the proof
because he cannot think logically. That would be a completely
unjustifiable affront to one’s fellow mortal. Anselm comes no-
where near it: we will hear in Prosl. 4 that he explained the
meaning of the statement Deus non est entirely on the assump-
tion that from the intellectual point of view he who holds it
is to be taken seriously. Neither is any moral defect directly
expressed by the stultus et insipiens. That it signifies both in-
tellectual and moral perversity is of course undoubtedly true.
Obviously the stultus inserted into the quotation reinforces the
statement in this direction. And the point is not a perversity
that is, as it were, physical but technical, and here again not a
perversity of individual functions but of the whole position.
The insipiens may be quite normal intellectually and morally.
Only that, whether normal or not, he is just an insipiens;
one who accomplishes what is not physically impossible but
what it is forbidden to attempt; one who puts himself (the
inner impossibility is not an outward impossibility for him)
in a position where as a human being, normal or otherwise, he
can only fall.t Anselm did not ascribe it to any quality of his
1 Volendo aliquid, quod velle tunc non debebat, deseruit iustitiam et sic peccavit (De casu
diab. 4: 1 241, 4f). Ideo illam deseruit, quia voluit quod velle non debuit; et hoc modo, id
est volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit. Cur voluit quod non debuit? Nulla causa praecessit
hance voluntatem, nisi quia velle potuit. An ideo voluit, quia potuit? Non; quia similiter
potuit velle bonus angelus ; nec tamen voluit . . . Cur ergo voluit? Non nisi quia voluit. Nam
159
own, but to the grace of God, that he himself was not an

insipiens doing the same thing and that for him the inner im-
possibility was at the same time an outward one.! For that
reason the otherwise fearful reproach, “Thou art a stultus et
insipiens’, is not a direct reproach. It is only by the grace of
God that Anselm’s solidarity with him has been ended. The
insipiens thinks and speaks as one who is not saved by the grace
of God. That is the reason for his perversity, and why he can
say, Deus non est. The reproach does not imply any uncharit-
ableness. It is with just this reproach on his lips that Anselm
takes his place as near as it is possible to be and therefore with
as much promise as there could possibly be, alongside this
fellow mortal whose action is so unintelligible. It is precisely
with this reproach that, at the end of his attempt ‘to prove’
the article of faith about the existence of God, he has to declare
haec voluntas nullam aliam habuit causam .. . sed ipsa sibi efficiens causa fuit, si dici potest,
et effectum (ibid. 27: 1 275, 21ff). “The actual origin of evil is for Anselm an “un-
fathomable”’ fact, that means one that is devoid of any inner or outer necessity’
(F. R. Hasse, Anselm von Canterbury vol. 2, 1852, p. 427).
1 Utrum aliquis hane rectitudinem non habens eam aliquo modo a se habere possit? Utique
a se illam habere nequit, nisi aut volendo aut non volendo. Volendo quidem nullus valet eam
per se adipisci, quia nequit eam velle, nisi illam habeat. Quod autem aliquis non habens
rectitudinem voluntatis, illam valeat per se non volendo assequi, mens nullius accipit. Nullo
igitur modo potest eam creatura habere a se. Sed neque creatura valet eam habere ab alia
creatura. Sicut namque creatura nequit creaturam salvare, ita non potest illi dare per quod
debeat salvari. Sequitur itaque quia nulla creatura rectitudinem habet . . . nisi per Dei gratiam
. . lia ut gratia sola possit hominem salvare, nihil eius libero arbitrio agente . . . dando
voluntati rectitudinem quam servet per liberum arbitrium. Et quamvis non omnibus det,
quoniam ‘cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat’: nulli tamen dat pro aliquo praecedenti
merito, quoniam “quis prior dedit Deo et retribuetur ei?’ Si autem voluntas: . . . meretur aut
augmentum acceptae iustitiae aut etiam potestatem pro bona voluntate aut praemium aliquod:
haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae et ‘gratia pro gratia’; et ideo totum est imputandum
gratiae, ‘quia neque volentis est’ quod vult, ‘neque currentis est? quod currit, ‘sed miserentis
est Dei’. Omnibus enim, excepto solo Deo, dicitur: ‘Quid habes quod non acceptisti? ...’
(De concordia Qu. III, 3: m 266, 8-267, 4). Scio. . . quod bona tua sicut fraude nulla
tibi arripere aut auferre possum, sic nec ullis meritis obtinere me omnia posse quibus ad te
revertar et complaceam. Quid enim meritis mets deberi potest, nisi mortis aeternae supplicium?
Scio quod in beneplacito tuo sancto est me disperdere secundum multitudinem flagitiorium .
vel reformare me, vel facere me tibi acceptabilem secundum divitias inaestimabiles miseri-
cordiae tuae, qui solus es reformator creaturae quam solus formasti (Medit. 7, 4: MPL
158, 744). Ad te confugio, sciens quod non est mihi fuga a te nisi ad te. Quis me potest
liberare de manibus tuis, nisi tu solus? ... Ad teipsum, obsecro, respice, cut nunquam sine
veniae spe supplicatur. In temetipso invenies unde et propter quod miserearis secundum abund-
antiam suavitatis tuae et immensitatem misericordiae tuae. Noli, obsecro, ad me respicere,
quia nihil in me invenies, nisi unde irasci debeas vel nist morte aeterna dignissimum ree
MPL 158, 744f).
160
the possibility of a statement that contradicts it. This

contradictory statement is the statement of unbelief, of the
corrupt will, of man unreconciled.
3. THE POSSIBILITY OF DENYING THE

EXISTENCE OF GOD (Prosl. 4)
Quomodo insipiens dixit in corde, quod Wow the fool has said in his heart
cogitari non potest. (I 103, 13) something that cannot be conceived.
For Anselm the problem of the man who denies God is first
raised by the fact that he has designated as a ‘fool’ one who
is where he is only by the wrath of God. He says in his heart
what, according to the above proof, cannot be conceived at
all. Only as an znsipiens ishe capable of this. Thus it is concluded
that his statement is nonsense, must be nonsense and is de-
barred from serious theological debate. But this other state-
ment, reached at the end of Prosl. 3, ‘the fool has said in his
heart, ““There is no God”’ ’—is also a statement of faith which
as such requires knowledge. If the sense of the statement,
‘God exists’ is really to be understood then the nonsense of the
opposite statement as such must be understood too. Anselm
takes for the subject of a final inquiry not how the fool comes
to be a fool—that is his secret and God’s—but rather how the
fool behaves as a fool, what constitutes the folly of denying the
Existence of God and to what extent his statement is really
nonsense which must be debarred from serious theological
debate.
Verum quomodo dixit in corde quod cogit- But how did he come to say in his
are non potuit; aut quomodo cogitare non heart what he cannot have con-
potuit quod dixit in corde, cum idem sit ceived or how could he not conceive
dicere in corde et cogitare? (1 103, 14ff) what he said in his heart, since ‘to
say in one’s heart’ and ‘to conceive’
are one and the same thing?
The question as to the foolishness of the fool may be put in two

ways. The first way is to make his foolishness as such the start-
ing-point. He says in his heart what he is unable to conceive.
: 161
He says, namely, ‘God does not exist’. And according to the

exposition in Prosl. 3 that is something he cannot conceive.
Not at all? But he nevertheless says it in his heart. Therefore,
he can do the impossible. For obviously ‘saying in his heart’ and
‘conceiving’ are the same. Questions: How does he manage it?
How can he reconcile this contradiction within himself? The
other way is to make the fact of his foolishness the starting-point.
He cannot conceive the thing that he says in his heart. What he
says is, ‘God does not exist’. But as has been shown, that is
something he cannot conceive. But he still does it. Can he
really not do it? Even where ‘to say in his heart’ and ‘to
conceive’ are the same? Should he not therefore be able to say
that his foolishness is not foolishness at all? Thus: 1. How far can
he say what he can in no sense conceive? 2. How far can he
conceive what he can in no sense say? This is the question
of the foolishness of the fool that must be asked and answered
if the fact of the denial of God is to be proved as a fact of fool-
ishness and if the proof of God’s Existence is thereby to be
completed.
Quod si vere, immo quia vere et cogitavit If, or rather because he has actually
quia dixit in corde, et non dixit in corde conceived it (for he said it in his
quia cogitare non potuit: non uno tantum heart) and has not said it in his
modo dicitur aliquid in corde vel cogitatur. heart (for he could not conceive it)
(1 103, 16ff) —it is clear that ‘to say in one’s
heart’ or ‘to conceive’ is not an
unambiguous proceeding.
Despite the assumption that ‘to say in one’s heart’ and ‘to
think’ are one and the same thing, it might happen—in fact
with the znsipiens it actually does happen—that on the one hand
someone in fact thinks something: he could do this; because he
said it in his heart, he could therefore say it, could and did
therefore also conceive it. And on the other hand, he did not
say this in his heart: he could not do it; because he could not
think it, he therefore could not say it and for that reason he
did not say it. Thus: He did a thing and did not do it; he could
do something and could not do it. This miracle is then only
162
possible as a miracle of foolishness (and that it certainly is)

if his ‘saying in his heart’ and his ‘thinking’ are different things,
or to the extent that he can say and think a thing at the same
time as he cannot say or think it. He does it and can do it ina
different way (non eodem modo—aliter is what it is called later)
from the way he cannot and does not do it. The assertion and
the denial of the Existence of God do not take place—here
we have the fundamental solution of the problem—on the
same plane at all. The fool is able to say what he is certainly
unable to conceive in so far as when he says it he is standing on
a plane where he can assert the non-existence of God. And he is
unable to conceive of what he is nevertheless able to say in so
far as he is standing on another plane where it would be im-
possible for him to assert the non-existence of God. This is the ,
fool’s basic folly that in his thinking he is standing on a plane
where the assertion of God’s non-existence is certainly possible
but where to stand on that plane is in itself—folly.
Aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox eam A thing is conceived in one way
significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum when it is the word describing it
quod res est intelligitur. (1 103, 18f) that is conceived, in another way
when the thing itself is known.
The identification of the two possible mod: of thinking (of the

existence) of an object reminds us of a distinction which Anselm
made and which we have already met. Aliud est rem esse in
intellectu, aliud intelligere rem esse we heard in Prosl. 21 in the
context of the introductory proof that there is at least an intra-
mental existence of God.? We can think of an object by thinking
of the word that describes it, that is by obeying the directions
which our thinking receives from the sign language of this
word and so considering what claims to be the thought of the
object concerned. In that case we can and indeed we certainly
will think of the object concerned as existing. We must first
13 101, of.
2 We must keep in mind here all that was said about the meaning of this state-
ment and of its proof together with what was said in its defence against Gaunilo
on pp. 108ff.
163
think of it as existing, even if we want to deny its existence, let

alone assert it. And precisely when it is the existence of God
that is in question, which is known to us by the verbum praedi-
cantium Christum, the very first point will be to conceive the vox
significans Deum. There is no folly in that in itself. In Prosl. 2
Anselm constructed the first general form of his Proof on the
view that even the fool has to admit at least the intramental
existence of God and therefore to that extent cannot be a
fool: quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in in-
tellectu est, just as an artist can and must see his work existing
in spirit before he has created it.t But of course this thinking
has as yet nothing to do with a real, objective, as distinct
from merely conceptual, existence or with knowledge of real
existence or therefore with Truth itself. For the truth of think-
ing or speaking stands or falls by the relations of its sign
language to what exists independently of its signs. Thinking of
the vox significans rem could only be true as an integrating
element in any thinking of the ves significata.2 The thinking of
the vox significans rem in itself, in abstraction from the thought of
something that really exists, or set over against it as something
different, would have to be described as false. Of course it
could still be an event possible and significant in itself. In that
case it would be false to call it ‘wrong’ in view of the meaning
or lack of meaning attaching to it because of the absence of
something that really exists.? The truth of a statement as such is
1y 101, 7ff and 14f.
2 Nihil est verum nisi participando veritatem; et ideo veri veritas in ipso vero est; res
vero enuntiata . . . causa veritatis eius (sc. enuntiationis) dicenda est (De verit. 2: 1 177,
16ff). Therefore it is not the oratio itself that is the veritas, but: cum significat esse
quod est, tunc est in ea veritas et est vera. In so far as such a significatio recta est, non est
ili aliud veritas quam rectitudo (ibid.: 1 178, 6f, 16, 25). Ad hoc namque nobis datum est
posse cogitare esse vel non esse aliquid, ut cogitemus esse quod est et non esse quod non est
(ibid. 9: 1 180, 12ff).
3 According to Anselm’s doctrine of evil (De casu diab. 19 [1 264] and passim;
De conc. virg. 4-5 [11 143-47]; De concordia Qu. I 7 [11 257—-60]) there is no evil res
or actio or essentia or substantia, but only an evil absence of iustitia, or rectitudo.
From this it follows for a doctrine of knowledge that any significare esse quod non est
is not outside of the truth of the natural powers (cogitare posse) and yet is false,
because the meaning of these powers is not satisfied thereby (De verit. 2-3: 1
177-80).
164
linked with the fact that it has no permanence of its own. That
means that as a statement it can be transitory and variable
without its for that reason speaking any less truly.1 Because
this cannot be said of cogitare vocem significantem introduced in
abstraction it is therefore false thinking; it is thus folly to think
on this plane.
Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus non In the first way, then, it is possible to
esse, isto vero minime. (1 103, 20) think of God as not existing but
impossible in the other.
The whole effort of Prosl. 2-3 had been to prove conclusively

that God cannot be conceived as not existing. The demonstra-
tion that this is impossible is Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of
God. The insipiens seems to confront him as living confutation
of his proof: he can think of God as not existing.? Anselm does
not deny this fact. Neither does he ascribe it to lack of in-
tellectual capacity or to malevolent inconsistency on the part
of the insipiens. But only to the simple fact that he is an znsipiens
and as such thinks on a level where one can only think falsely—
though without violating the inner consistency of that level.
When one thinks falsely, and from the foregoing that means
directing one’s thinking abstractly to the vox significans rem
without knowing the zd ipsum quod res est—as one must think as
an insipiens—then it really is possible to do what according to
the Proof of Prosl. 2-3 is impossible. By the miracle of foolish-
ness it is possible to think of God as not existing. But only by
this miracle. Anselm had certainly not reckoned with this.
His statement, and his proof of the statement, ‘God cannot be
1 Nulla igitur significatio est recta alia rectitudine quam illa, quae permanet pereunte
significatione . . . Rectitudo, qua significatio recta dicitur, non habet esse aut aliquem motum
per significationem quomodocumque ipsa moveatur significatio (De verit. 13: 1 198, 8f and
18ff). This definition results from the fact that in the last analysis God himself and
only he is Truth, he who alone has permanence in himself: Solius Dei est propriam
habere voluntatem (Ep. de incarn. ro: 1 27, 11. Cf. De casu diab. 4: 1 242, 5f). In
the fundamental superiority of the res over against the cogitatio, or significatio, there
is reflected God’s superiority over all created reality.
2 It was not too paltry an objection for Gaunilo to raise it against Anselm:
Si non potest (sc. cogitari non ese): cur contra negantem aut dubitantem, quod sit aliqua talis
natura, tota ista disputatio est assumpta? (Pro insip. 2: 1 126, 6f).
165
thought of as not existing’ rests on the assumption of the

intelligere id ipsum quod res est. His thinking is, as he admits, the
thinking of fides quaerens intellectum. How could it think only
the word ‘God’? How could the word that is spoken to it about
God be but an empty word? It starts out from the knowledge of
God himself whose existence it wants to know. On this assump-
tion God cannot possibly be thought of as not existing.
Nullus quippe intelligens id quod Deus For no one who knows God himself
est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est, licet can think, ‘God does not exist’—
haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla aut. even although he may say these
cum aliqua extranea significatione. words in his heart, whether without
(I 103, 20-104, 2) meaning or without relevance.
This is the presupposition of fides quaerens intellectum which

cannot be abandoned even to please the znsipiens, which, on the
contrary rather, just because of the insipiens, has to be insisted
upon to the end—if there is anything at all that can serve to
make him cease from being a fool then it will be just this in-
sistence—the presupposition on which the thought of God’s
non-existence is impossible: knowing God himself. ‘That means:
intelligere 1d quod Deus est. From the whole tenor of Anselm’s
thought and from what immediately follows it—Deus enim est id
quo matus cogitart non potest—it cannot mean—‘knowing God’s
Nature’ so that God’s existence would follow from what we
know of his Nature.! It is certainly true that knowledge of
1 According to the received Gerberon text our passage would run as follows:
nullus quippe intelligens id quod sunt ignis et aqua potest cogitare 1gnem esse aquam secundum
rem; licet hoc possit secundum voces. Ita igitur nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest
cogitare, quia Deus non est... (MPL 158, 229). Thus: anyone who knows the Nature
of fire and water, can so connect the corresponding terms that he brings about the
meaningless thought ‘water is fire’. But by that he does not think of anything real
because it is contradictory to what we know of the nature of fire that it should be
what we know as water. And so anyone who knows God’s Nature can only con-
ceive the terms and not the reality of God’s non-existence, because non-existence
is contrary to what we know is God’s Nature. It cannot be put any better than
Anselm has constantly tried to put it. But according to the textual studies of P.
Daniels this whole picture of fire and water is an interpolation. W. von den
Steinen who in the place already mentioned, p. 40, continually works with this
picture, would certainly have held on to it. Anselm simply did not say what the
old interpreter, and so many others after him, wanted to make him say. For him
God and non-existence are of course so related, as fire and water are related, that
it is impossible to predicate the one of the other. But the impossibility of God’s non-
existence is too unique a thing for it to be mentioned in the same breath as a
166
God’s Nature, of his Omnipresence and Eternity, of his

infinite Holiness and Mercy is also included in intelligere id
quod Deus est. But the fact that it is this knowledge does not
compel it to be knowledge of God’s Existence too. Even if
every conceivable physical and moral property were raised to
the nth degree, that could quite well be nothing more than the
sum total of the predicates of a purely conceptual being. The
fact that id quod Deus est is synonomous with God himself
makes this analogical, ‘speculative’ understanding of his
reality into true knowledge of his Nature and that creates the
fully efficacious, indeed over-efficacious substitute for the
missing (and necessarily missing) experiential knowledge of
him. This in turn compels knowledge of his Existence, the
knowledge which is possible and becomes real so necessarily
and so exclusively as against all other knowledge, including all
denial and doubt, only in so far as it is knowledge of his
Existence. God himself compels this knowledge. Whoever
knows him himself cannot think, ‘God does not exist’. No one
has been able to do it who knew him. Wherever God has
been known, he himself has excluded the very thought of this
with mathematical precision, and wherever he is to be known,
he will continue to exclude it. ‘Exclude’-—that means turn it
into a thought that is impossible, null and void and finished.
That we do from time to time actually think it, that from time
to time with the fool we say in our heart ‘there is no God’—
as Anselm expressly takes into account—that is not excluded.
At the very point where we are considering the compelling
comparison between fire and water. The impossibility of this latter comparison
results from our knowledge of the nature of both. The impossibility of the non-
existence of fire or of water would not result from that knowledge in itself. It results
from it only in so far as our knowledge of the nature of both is experiential and is
therefore knowledge that assumes their existence in fact. But it results only as an
actual impossibility related to our experience. But on the one hand our knowledge
of God’s Nature is not that kind of experiential knowledge that actually presupposes
God’s Existence. And on the other hand, the impossibility of God’s non-existence
is not that kind of merely factual impossibility related to our experience. So it is
possible—as this interpreter has done albeit in all sincerity and with great zeal—
to consider oneself and conduct oneself as a pupil of Anselm and yet basically be a
right good Gaunilo.
167
knowledge of God himself we have every reason to recall the

solidarity, broken but not destroyed, that the man under this
compulsion has with the insipiens. Perhaps, nay certainly, far
more impassioned, far more complete and with far more doubt
than is the case with the ordinary fool, will be the cry, ‘there is
no God’, in the heart of him who knows God himself—we may
think again here of Anselm’s prayers which are not to be taken
as mere rehetoric. But in the very act of thinking and uttering
it, his denial will be cancelled and annulled. The words: ‘God
does not exist’, will have no meaning in his mouth or in his
heart or will have an alien meaning which has nothing at all
to do with God himself whom he knows as existing, or with his
knowledge of God or therefore with himself. He will not know
what he is denying. He will be denying an idol. Or, he will be
confessing his own abandonment of God, for it is just the
man who knows God who will continually have reason to do
this. But in no circumstances will he deny God himself. No
more will he be able to form the thought, ‘God (zd quod Deus
est, God himself) does not exist’. On no account—in so far as
he knows God himself. Anselm developed his Proof on this level
of intelligere id quod Deus est; it would have been senseless to have
sought to develop it on any other level. Just for that reason the
living embodiment in the znsipiens of evidence to the contrary
can make no material impression on him.
_ What the znsipiens can prove is this and only this, that he does
“not know him whose Existence he denies. And it is not his
denial, but his not knowing, that constitutes his folly.
Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non For God is ‘that beyond which
potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique nothing greater can be conceived’.
intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogita- Whoever truly knows that knows
tione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic that it exists in such a way that even
esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare. in thought it cannot but exist.
(1 104, 2ff) And so whoever knows that this is
the manner of God’s_ existence
cannot conceive him as not existing.
What does it mean to know—to know and recognize—God

168
himself? Anselm goes back to his argumentum. God is he who, |,

revealing himself as Creator, is called quo maius cogitari nequit
and therefore who immediately confronts us with his Name as
the one who forbids us to conceive a greater than him. To know
that properly is to know id quod Deus est, God himself. In this
his Name as Lord he himself is and is known, known in such a
way that the denial of his Existence becomes impossible and
thereby the proof of his Existence is made valid. Therefore
bene intelligere is not to be immediately equated a priori with
intelligere id tpsum quod res est. But in the sense of our passage
bene intelligere is the fulfilment, the development, the manner of
this real knowledge, which by its relation to the object estab-
lishes itself as true. It consists concretely in the fact that the
embargo contained in the Name of God is heard, recognized
and obeyed and that therefore in his thinking man allows God
to be God. In his very thoughts, precisely in the limitation of
his freedom of thought. All piety and morality are nothing
worth, have nothing to do with God and can even be atheistic
or may become atheistic again unless they are directed towards
establishing an absolute limitation on this, the most inward
and most intimate area of freedom. Bene intelligere means: to
know once and for all, as a real ox knows its master or a true
ass its master’s stall. Bene intelligere means: finally to realize
that it is not possible to think beyond God, not possible to
think as a spectator of oneself or of God, that all thinking
about God has to begin with thinking to God. That is what the
fool and also his advocate Gaunilo have not yet realized. Those
who have realized it, by so doing, stand under the compulsion
of knowledge of God’s Existence. And immediately and
primarily of that existence of God which belongs only to him
amongst all that exists, his szc esse, the existence which cannot be
annulled even in mere thought. Once more and with no
ambiguity Anselm makes clear that the narrowed-down Proof
of Prosl. 3, the proof of this sic esse, the proof that it is impossible
for God to be conceived as not existing, is what he understands
169
by knowledge and proof of God’s Existence. With the bene

intelligere of the divine Name a ‘God’ who as God can be
conceived as not existing is cast out and room made for the
God of faith, of revelation and of the Church who so exists
that he makes even the thought of his non-existence impossible.
To know God himself, as the fool does not know him, means
therefore to stand under the compulsion of this his Existence.
Therefore those who know God himself, the zntelligens id quod
Deus est, cannot conceive of God as not existing.
Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi, I thank thee, good Lord, I thank
quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic thee, that what I at first believed
intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim because of thy gift, I now know
credere, non possim non intelligere. because of thine illumining in such a
(1 104, 5ff) way that even if I did not want to
believe thine Existence, yet I could
not but know it.
The Proof as Anselm wanted to conduct it and had to

conduct it is finished. He himself reminds us again of what he
understands by proof. Not a science that can be unravelled by
the Church’s faith and that establishes the Church’s faith in a
source outside of itself. It is a question of theology. It is a
question of the proof of faith by faith which was already
established in itself without proof. And both—faith that is
proved and faith that proves—Anselm expressly understands
not as presuppositions that can be achieved by man but as
presuppositions that have been achieved by God, the former as
divine donare and the latter as divine illuminare. He ‘assumed’!
neither the Church’s Credo nor his own credere, but he prayed
and the Church’s Credo and his own credere were assumed. God
gave himself to him to know and he was able to know God.
On this foundation, comparable to no philosophical pre-
supposition and inconceivable for all systematic theology, he
has come to know and has proved the Existence of God. For
that reason his last word must be gratitude. Not satisfaction
over a work that he has completed and that resounds to his
1 Cf. p. 153, n. I.
170
own praise as its master, but gratitude for a work that has
been done and of which he is in no sense the master.
God gave himself as the object of his knowledge and God
illumined him that he might know him as object. Apart from
this event there is no proof of the existence, that is of the reality
of God. But in the power of this event there is a proof which is
worthy of gratitude. It is truth that has spoken and not man in
search of faith. Man might not want faith. Man might remain
always a fool. As we heard, it is of grace if he does not. But
even if he did, sz te esse nolim credere, truth has spoken—in a
way that cannot be ignored, refuted or forgotten and in such a
way that man is forbidden and to that extent is unable not to
recognize it. Just because it is the science of faith about faith,
theology possesses light but it is not the light of the theologian’s
. faith.
That Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God has repeatedly
been called the ‘Ontological’ Proof of God, that commentators
have refused to see that it is in a different book altogether from
the well-known teaching of Descartes! and Leibniz,? that
anyone could seriously think that it is even remotely affected
by what Kant put forward against these doctrines?—all that
is so much nonsense on which no more words ought to be
wasted.
1 Discours de la méthode 1V; Meédit. III and V. 2 Monadologie 45.
3 Kritik der reinen Vernunft and ed., pp. 625f.
171
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INDEX
The figures in italics refer to footnotes
Adlhoch, B., 8.2, 134.7 Luther, 44, 77-3
Agidius of Rome, 77.5
Alexander of Hales, 87.1 Matthew of Aquasparta, 93.1
Althaus, P., 11 Melancthon, 35
Aquinas, Thomas, 8, 57, 77.5,
FOE AL SOse lS fly nlaoee Nebuchadnezzar, 17.5
Augustine, 20.4, 58, 59, 84, Neo-Platonism, 20.4, 58
84.4, 105, 120, 121
Overbeck, F., 65.3, 89.3
Bainvel, J., 8.7, 74.7
Balthasar, H. Urs von, 11 Peckham) |0.75.Gad 7ot
Bari, Council of, 43.3 Pietism, 35
Baur, F. Chr., 8.7 Plato, 20.4, 59
Bonaventura, 77.1, 77.5, 93.1; Plotinus, 59
97.1 Protestant, 8f, 22, 24
Bouchitté, H., 127.2, 137.2
Brinktrine, J., 127.2 Reformation, 22
Reuter, Hy 54.7
Classicism, 36.1
Roman Breviary, 43.3
PaAMels bar MOL.g) hOGiT,: Y5ct. Roman Catholic, 7ff, 11, 24,
58, 118
75:35 77-1, 77:5) 87.1, 93-1; Romanticism, 37.7
O75 9:1, TOOLE
Descartes, 139, 171 Ruttenbeck, W., 39.2
Dogmatics (Barth), 7, 11
Schleiermacher, 7, 26.7, 35.1
Enlightenment, 36.r pehmitts FO. (12,93.2
Scholasticism, 7.7, 15, 36, 77.5,
Fishacre, R., 87.1 106.2
Scholz, H., 7, 11
Grabmann, M., 7.1 Schéningh, F., 127.2
Seeberg, R., 8.2, 134.7
Hasse, F. R., 8.2, 56.4, 159.7 Steinen, W.v.d., 8.2, 36.7, 121.2,
Heim, K., 8.2, 11, 134.7 166.7
Herder, 36.1
Kant, 8, 171 Thilo, M., 104.17
Kierkegaard, 39.2
Royre,A.; 8.2, 59.1, 74.2, 75:2; Uberweg-Baumgartner, 8.7
108.2,/327.2, 134.2; 154.2 Urban II, 65.3
Leibniz, 171 Wilhelm of Auxerre, 75.7, 87.7

173
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eT ABE MOATD LLRDS Fat

SGM PRESS LTD

Translated by Ian W. Robertson

FIRST ENGLISH EDITION 1960

JI Tue THEOLOGICAL SCHEME

II THe PRoor oF THE EXISTENCE OF GoD

C.D.A. Cur Deus homo

Tuts Preface must be devoted at least to some extent to answer-

give effect to both these presuppositions, which up until now

Ir was in the series “Studies in the History and Doctrine of

it has come about, other circumstances probably helping as

the aim of our inquiry should be confined to these three first

1. THE NECESSITY FOR THEOLOGY

Our first inquiry is into the ‘necessity’ by which znielligere

was contemporary with the heyday of the Romanesque style of

intelligere and he wants intelligere because he believes.1 Any

integra veritas paternae substantiae.+ He is sensibilis, that is, cognos-

naturalem potentiam impressa—by which, without participation in

2. THE POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY

When we ask ourselves how an intellectus fidei is possible at all

concept ‘Holy Scripture’ is itself, according to Anselm, to be

Church! either as a virtual second source alongside Holy Scrip-

awareness, this esse in intellectu, results from hearing the Christian

1 Cf. Prosl. 2: 1101, 7ff and especially 4:1 103, 18ff.

already behind him (through faith in the impartial good sense of

3. THE CONDITIONS OF THEOLOGY

This demand on izntelligere that we have been discussing,

guomodo sit. ‘That means that at a certain point he will silence

3. Every theological statement is an inadequate expression of

speaking, it is only God himself who has a conception of God.

, applied to the God who can never be expressed.! Not all

from the text, of the sacred authority.1 But, as we shall find

theological, that is to say not covered by biblical authority, is

theology of the Church Fathers but of all theology. He is aware

of theology that follows from the inadequacy, the merely

where faith is really faith, that is to say obedience, the fight

When his Monologion lay finished before him Anselm felt

created in man. But the occurrence of intellectus and therefore

such but rather has to understand it in its very incomprehensi-

4. THE MANNER OF THEOLOGY

Having defined our terms, it ought to be a comparatively

context, as we discern them, ought to bear witness that what

1 Quatenus . . . quidquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret id ita esse... et

___Scripture.! The much disputed rule which Anselm adopted for

should be kept? so as to satisfy Jews and even Gentiles in dis-

1 Monol. r: 1 13, 11. 2C.D.h. I 22: 1 133, 8.

experience, of formulating conceptions and judgments and

but because it is begotten of the Father—spoken by him. The

stances be one that is creative and normative.! Secondly, as

of knowledge to grace and of knowledge to prayer. This is

by thought of the non-existence or different existence excluded

(9) Ontic necessity precedes even noetic rationality: the

even bring to light the noetic necessity that is sought (the

‘ have begun quaerens intellectum with nothing, that is with the

1 It reduces the theology of Anselm (shocking example: H. Reuter, Geschichte

Birth and inherited sin, or of the fall of Lucifer—that these

‘honour’ of God expressed in the Creation Dogma, which in all

1 In Deo quamlibet parvum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas (ibid. I 10: 1 67 4f).