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Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for

democracy?
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2017.1288551
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REPOSITORY RECORD
Van Aelst, Peter, Jesper Stromback, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Claes de Vreese, Jorg Matthes, David
Hopmann, et al.. 2019. “Political Communication in a High-choice Media Environment: A Challenge for
Democracy?”. figshare. https://hdl.handle.net/2134/24775.
Annals of the International Communication Association, 41:1, 3-27
Political Communication in a High-Choice Media Environment: A Challenge for
Democracy?
Peter Van Aelst, Jesper Strömbäck, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Claes de Vreese, Jörg Matthes,
David Hopmann, Susana Salgado, Nicolas Hubé, Agnieszka Stępińska, Stylianos
Papathanassopoulos, Rosa Berganza, Guido Legnante, Carsten Reinemann, Tamir Sheafer &
James Stanyer
Abstract
During the last decennia media environments and political communication systems have
changed fundamentally. These changes have major ramifications for the political information
environments and the extent to which they aid people in becoming informed citizens. Against
this background, the purpose of this article is to review research on key changes and trends in
political information environments and assess their democratic implications. We will focus on
advanced postindustrial democracies and six concerns that are all closely linked to
the dissemination and acquisition of political knowledge: (1) declining supply of political
information, (2) declining quality of news, (3) increasing media concentration and declining
diversity of news, (4) increasing fragmentation and polarization, (5) increasing relativism and
(6) increasing inequality in political knowledge.
Introduction
In an oft-cited analysis at the turn of the millennium, Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) asked
whether changes in political communication and the growing influence of the mass media
presented a challenge to democracy. While their review of the evidence suggested that the
most dystrophic assessments were unwarranted, they still concluded “political systems in
most liberal democracies are facing momentous changes on the communication front that
1
raise serious challenges to the old order” (p. 259).
Since then, media environments and political communication systems have changed
fundamentally with the increasing proliferation of digital, social and mobile media (Vowe &
Henn, 2016), the blurring of boundaries between media and their genres (Chadwick, 2013),
the decline of traditional news media with respect to their business models and hegemony
over media consumption (Pew Research Center, 2016), and citizenries less attached to
institutional politics and news media than ever (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). If political
communication systems at the turn of the millennia were facing “momentous changes”, the
development since have only accelerated and amplified changes in media environments and
political communication (Blumler, 2016, p. 27).
Not least important is the transition from low to high-choice media environments. This
change has major ramifications for the political information environments and, hence,
processes of knowledge dissemination and acquisition in postindustrial democracies. While
previous studies have mainly operationalized the political information environment in terms
of amount and types of news available to citizens, we argue that a full understanding of
political information environments needs to take not only the supply side but also the demand
side into account. The rationale is that in any market-based situation, supply and demand are
inextricable linked. Building on but going beyond previous conceptualizations, we therefore
define a political information environment as the supply and demand of political news and
political information within a certain society. The supply side encompasses the quantity and
quality as well as the structure of political news and information available through various old
and new media. The demand side encompasses how various segments within a society make
use of political news and information and the quality of that information.
From a democratic perspective, a fundamental question is how changes in political
information environments influence the character and quality of our democracies. On the one
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hand, many concerns have been raised. Prior (2007, p. 270), for example, warns that “Greater
media choice exacerbates tensions between citizens’ immediate gratifications and the health
of the political system in which they live”, Pariser (2001, p. 82) that we increasingly live in
algorithm-shaped filter bubbles that “invisibly transforms the world we experience by
controlling what we see and don’t see”, and Davis (2014, p. 112) that political journalism is
becoming “more superficial and sensationalist, less informed and less investigative, more
desk-bound, more cannibalistic, and generally prone to taking newsgathering short-cuts in its
practice”. On the other hand, changes in media technologies have also extended freedom of
choice, opened up for increasing interactivity, and expanded the opportunities for citizen and
civil society participation in the public sphere (Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang, 2015; Blumler,
2016, p. 29). In these and other respects, ordinary citizens have been empowered by the very
same changes that in other respects might undermine one fundamental element of political
information environments in democracies: the extent to which they aid citizens in becoming
informed about politics and current affairs.
Against this background, the purpose of this article is to review research on key
changes and trends in political information environments and assess their democratic
implications. To delimit the scope of this review, we will focus on advanced postindustrial
democracies and six concerns that are all closely linked to processes of the dissemination and
acquisition of knowledge about politics and current affairs: (1) declining supply of political
information, (2) declining quality of news, (3) increasing media concentration and declining
diversity of news, (4) increasing fragmentation and polarization, (5) increasing relativism and
(6) increasing inequality in political knowledge.
The article is structured as follows. In the first section we will expand the discussion
of the concept of political information environment. In the subsequent six sections, we will
focus on the different concerns and assess the empirical support for them. In light of the
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findings presented, we will elaborate on the democratic implications in the conclusion, and
offer some suggestions for future political communication research. Although we often talk
about political information in general, we will focus particularly on political news, broadly
defined as news related to political issues, actors and institutions, which are produced by
journalists and aimed at a larger public. This is of course not the only form of political
information that is relevant and that people might learn from, but it still constitutes the core
and most important form of widely available and used political information.
The Importance of the Political Information Environment
For a democracy to be well functioning, citizens need information about politics. Only when
people have knowledge about the actors, the state of various societal affairs, and the rules of
the political game can they hold informed opinions and act meaningfully as citizens. Exactly
how informed people need to be for democracy to function is a matter of contention (Lupia &
McCubbins, 1998; Patterson, 2013; Zaller, 2003), and dependent of what normative model of
democracy is espoused (Strömbäck, 2005), but there is little doubt that well-informed citizens
are better able to link their interest with their attitudes, choose political representatives who
are consistent with their own attitudes, and participate in politics (Aalberg & Curran, 2012;
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Milner, 2002; Prior 2007).
Until quite recently, the mass media were considered as the key actor in providing
“the kind of information people need to be free and self-governing” (Kovach & Rosenstiel,
2014, p. 9), and there are numerous studies showing that mass media still constitute the most
important source of information about politics and current affairs (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel
& Shearer, 2016; Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016). At the same time, across
Western democracies news consumption patterns are shifting and traditional news media –
not least newspapers – losing ground. The world of politics and communication has never
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been very stable, as noted by Blumler and Kavanagh (1999), but the rise of Internet and social
media have accelerated and exacerbated many developments.
One key concept to assess the implications of changes in the relationship between
media, politics and citizens is the political information environment. Sometimes labeled
information environment or media environment (Aalberg, Van Aelst & Curran, 2010; Jerit,
Barabas & Bolsen, 2006; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011), the concept usually refers to the
aggregate supply of news or political information that is “out there”. Esser and colleagues
(2012, p. 250), for example, define the political information environment as “the quantitative
supply of news and public affairs content provided to a national audience by routinely
available sources”, and link it to the opportunity structures for accessing and learning from
the news. Several studies suggest that the political information environment has a significant
impact on people’s media use and knowledge of politics and current affairs (Aalberg &
Curran, 2012; Althaus, Cizmar & Gimpel, 2009; Prior, 2007). Jerit et al. (2006), for example,
show that US citizens learn more about political issues in information-rich environments
compared to information-poor environments. This finding stresses the importance of going
beyond individual factors, such as education, to explain political knowledge. Studies also
suggest that differences in political knowledge across countries partly can be attributed to
variations in political information environments (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Banducci, Giebler
& Kritzinger, 2016; Curran, Iyengar, Lund & Salovaara-Moring, 2009).
In sum, there seems to be broad consensus that the supply side of political information
environments matters. The underlying mechanism is that the more political information that is
widely available, the higher the likelihood that people will be exposed to, and subsequently
learn from, political information.
Supply thus sets a boundary condition for demand. For several reasons, however, this
mechanism is under pressure. First, in a high choice media environment people can much
5
more easily opt out of news and only consume the non-political content they prefer (Prior,
2007). Increasing media choice might thus result in an increasing share of “news avoiders”
(Blekesaune, Elvestad & Aalberg, 2012; Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2013) and,
hence, weaker “trapping effects” (Schoenbach & Lauf, 2002) where people are incidentally
exposed to news and other political information. This holds particularly true for news in
traditional news media, while the extent to which people are incidentally exposed to and learn
from news and other political information via digital and social media is still largely an open
question (Hindman, 2009; Kim, Wang, Gotlieb, Gabay & Edgerly, 2013). Second, increasing
choice implies a growing interconnectedness between demand and supply, as it compels news
media and other information providers to provide the kind of content that their target groups
demand in order to remain competitive (Hamilton, 2004). As digital technologies have
improved the ability to track audience behavior and adjust media content accordingly, the
interconnectedness between supply and demand has become even stronger. Boczkowski and
Mitchelstein (2013), for example, show that across media systems, news consumers are
pushing media outlets to offer more soft news at the expense of hard news. Growing
competition for audience attention only strengthens this tendency for media to cater to
audience demands, for example by providing ‘click-bait’ (Blom & Hansen, 2015).
Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the political information environment in any
particular society should look at both the supply and the demand of political information. The
supply side encompasses the amount and quality of political news and other political
information provided by the media in a specific political information environment, as well as
the opportunity structure to access and learn from political information. In addition, the
supply side is also determined by the behavior of political actors, as key producers of political
information. The demand side encompasses the amount and quality of information that people
are interested in consuming and the skills they require to comprehend and retain this
6
information. As we will discuss in more detail below, supply and demand factors determine
themselves mutually in any given political information environment. The political
information environment is thus shaped by the behavior of political actors as well as media
actors and ordinary citizens, with reciprocal influences on all sets of actors.
Against this background, we will now turn to some fundamental concerns that have
been raised with respect to changes in political information environments. We will discuss six
of them in detail.
Concern 1: Declining Amount of Political News
To list “declining amount of political news” as a concern might appear odd in a time where
there seems to be political news everywhere. There are however several reasons for why a
declining amount of political news still is a concern. First, more political news in the overall
media environment does not equal more political news in the most widely used media sources
such as general interest television channels or websites. Second, an increase in the absolute
amount of political news does not equal an increase in the relative amount of political news as
a share of the overall media supply. Third, and related to the demand side, there is a concern
that people’s motivation to consume political news is declining.
Beginning with the absolute amount of political news, in contrast to worries during
the 1990s (Patterson, 2002), there is little doubt that it has increased during the last decades.
With respect to television, several comparative studies show that the amount of news and
public affairs programming has risen significantly since the 1970’s (Aalberg et al., 2010;
Esser et al., 2012). Studies also suggest that the introduction of commercial broadcasters
resulted in more rather than less news, as some of them present news and public affairs in
lengthy and prominent time slots. At the same time, public broadcasters have broadened their
range of news programming (Aalberg et al., 2010), and general television channels are in
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many countries complemented by channels that broadcast news 24/7. Thus, both in major and
specialized channels there is more political news to be found than there used to be.
Another significant trend is that virtually all newspapers in established democracies
today are online, and that in many countries, new web-only news providers have established
themselves. While the content of online versions of print media in the early phase of the
Internet often was described as “shovelware”, since then online news have developed and
major news websites now offer a rich spectrum of political and current events reporting.
Equally important is that citizens are no longer restricted to newspapers in the area in which
they live, but can access online news from virtually everywhere, virtually anytime, and
through their preferred media platform. In addition, there are a plethora of blogs, independent
news sites, and citizen journalism outlets that in principle can be accessed by anyone. All
these changes suggest a major improvement from the time when people were restricted to
their local and national print newspapers and a limited number of broadcast news programs.
There are obviously significant variations across countries, not least in terms of the
opportunity structures for news and public affairs on television. In some countries news and
public affairs programs are broadcast on prime time and dispersed throughout the evening, in
other countries they are scheduled outside of primetime or concentrated around a particular
time. Such scheduling strategies have major implications for the ease to which people find
news on the most important and most widely watched channels. The strength of public service
broadcasting also varies across countries (Tambini, 2015), which several comparative studies
show has implications for the supply and the use of news and public affairs as well as for
political knowledge (Cushion, 2012; Fraile & Iyengar, 2014; Shehata, Hopmann, Nord &
Höijer, 2015; Soroka et al., 2013). Important to note is also that there is limited research on
how the amount of political news has developed in individual media. With more market-
driven news media and successive cuts to newsroom budgets, there are serious concerns that
8
political and other hard news will be covered less (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1996). This
might hold particularly true for local news, where there are also less alternative news
providers than with respect to national news.
Second, an increase in the absolute amount of political news does not equal an
increase in the relative amount of political news. Even if there is more political information
out there than ever, most evidence suggests that the major increase in the total media supply is
related to non-political content such as sports or entertainment, and that news and other
political information constitute a small and declining share of the total media supply (cf.
Hindman, 2009; Prior, 2007). Most newer television channels focus on entertainment and
sports, most websites on other areas than politics, and most of what is being discussed on
social media does not involve politics. This has implications for a key performance indicator
of political information environments – the capacity to inform by providing a multiplicity of
opportunities to encounter news even if not searched for. Important to note is that the
decreasing share of the media supply that constitute political information means that it has
become easier to consume media while avoiding political news (Prior, 2007).
Third and turning to the demand side of political information environments, there is a
concern that the demand for – or use of – political news is declining (Aalberg et al., 2013;
Mitchell et al., 2016). The general pattern is decreasing use of most kind of traditional news
media such as television news and, in particular, newspapers. To take one example, according
to the 2016 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, among people younger than 44 years old,
online media are now considered the most important source of news. The report covers 26
countries from around the world and in 24 of them digital news consumption has become
more important than traditional news use (Newman, et al., 2016, p. 53).
Does the increasing use of digital and social media compensate for the trend towards
decreasing consumption of traditional news sources? To some extent the answer is yes, but
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instructive is Hindman’s study (2009) using traffic data from 2007 showing that most web
traffic goes to adult websites, followed by web-mail services and search engines. Less than
three percent of all web traffic goes to news and media sites, while the share of web traffic
going to political web sites is below one percent (p. 60–61). This is a stark reminder that news
and political information constitute only a small fraction of what people are doing online,
despite the availability of a plethora of news and political sites.
The greater the media choice, the more selective people have to be, and the more
selective people have to be, the more important their preferences become. As a consequence,
several studies have found growing gaps between heavy users and low/non users which are
attributable largely to different sets of motivations and gratifications sought by people
(Aalberg, Blekesaune & Elvestad, 2013; Ksiazek, Malthouse & Webster, 2010; Strömbäck et
al., 2013). It is also likely the case that differences in the demand for political news would
vary even more than differences in demand for news in general.
Summing up, there is convincing evidence that the absolute amount of political
information has increased, but also that the relative amount of political news has declined and
that public demand for political news is limited. It is less clear how the demand for political
news has changed, but increasing media choice has made individuals’ preferences more
important. The implication is that the linkage between people’s demand for different kinds of
content and the content they consume has become stronger. Therefore, our overall conclusion
is that there are reasons to be concerned about the relative amount of political news and what
this means for the opportunity structures for accessing political news in contrast to other
forms of media content. How this will influence the demand for political news both on the
aggregate level and among highly versus rarely interested users, is one of the most burning
questions for future political communication research (see also concern 6).
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Concern 2: Towards Declining Quality of News
The second major concern is that economic constraints and incentives and the increasing
competition for audience attention will harm the quality of political news in the media. To
maintain or increase audience shares, in an era of stiffening market competition and
decreasing editorial budgets, media have been accused of choosing more popular and less
expensive content over more important and expensive-to-produce news (Davis, 2014). While
not new, concerns about declining quality of the news are widespread both within and outside
academia – encapsulated in terms such as dumbing-down, tabloidization, infotainment and
softening of news (Reinemann et al., 2012). This concern rests on the broadly shared
assumption that high quality political news is crucial for public knowledge and a prerequisite
for a healthy democracy.
There is however much less consensus on what ‘high quality’ means or how it should
be operationalized. Several scholars stress that it depends on the preferred normative model of
democracy and the role of the media within that model. Deliberative or participatory models
of democracy, for instance, require different quality benchmarks than the competitive model
of democracy (Albæk, Van Dalen, Jebril & de Vreese, 2014; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, &
Rucht, 2001; Strömbäck, 2005; Zaller, 2003). Nevertheless, as a baseline, the concept of
political information environment suggests that media coverage should help people to make
informed choices and hold politicians accountable, in essence providing people with the
information they need to be free and self-governing (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014). At a
minimum, this implies that political news should be substantial, factual and diverse (Jandura
& Friedrich, 2014).
Substantial news means that it deals with issues and topics that are relevant for people
in their role as citizens rather than just addressing people in the role of consumer with various
kinds of soft news. At the heart of substantial political news thus lies ‘factual information’:
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information that is ‘true’ in the sense that it is verified, accurate and complete (see also
concern 5). In addition, qualitative journalism needs to be diverse in the sense that it presents
citizens with a wide variety of actors, issues and viewpoints (see also concern 3).
Unfortunately there is little empirical research on changes in the quality of news
across different dimensions of the concept. Several ‘threats’ against substantial political news
have received extensive attention in many democracies. For instance, the framing of politics
as a strategic game or a horse race at the expense of the more substantial issue framing is
often seen as a threat to the quality of political news as it draws attention to the more
entertaining and competitive aspect of politics at the expense of important political issues and
policies, while also contributing to political distrust (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Schuck,
Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2013). Although most research has focused on election periods,
studies show that this kind of framing is quite prevalent also between election periods
(Aalberg, Strömbäck & de Vreese, 2016; Lawrence, 2000).
A more broadly studied threat towards news quality is soft news. The concept relates
mainly to the topic cluster of a story (for instance, public affairs) and its style or
presentational mode (for instance, more personalized) (Reinemann, Stanyer & Scherr, 2016).
The term is often associated with concepts such as tabloidization and popularization, which
suggest a trend over time. According to Boczkowski and Peer (2011, p. 857), however only
citing US scholars, there is a “growing agreement among media scholars about a trend
towards the softening of the news”. For instance, Patterson (2000) showed that the news in
the mass media ‘without a public policy component’ increased during the period 1980-1999.
More recently, scholars argue that the late night comedians even have become the most
important newscasters in the US (Baym, 2010). Based on an extensive review of empirical
studies on hard and soft news (including those on tabloidization and infotainment),
Reinemann et al. (2012) conclude however that the evidence is mixed. Contrary to popular
12
claims, there is no overwhelming evidence of a trend of declining hard news across developed
democracies. Rather, studies in different countries have found mixed evidence and
fluctuations over time rather than a general trend (Hubé, 2014; McLachlan & Golding, 2000;
Rowe, 2011; Uribe & Gunter, 2004; Winston, 2002).
At the same time, the lack of conceptual clarity and different operationalizations of
hard and soft news makes it difficult to compare studies across time and space, and there is a
severe deficit of comparative studies on soft news. One exception is a six-country study by
Umbricht and Esser (2016), covering the time period from the 1960s to 2010s. Looking at
different indicators of popularization of political news, such as scandalization,
emotionalization and privatization, they found an increase over time, mainly in the US and
UK media. However, there was no convergence in ‘popularization-related reporting styles’
across countries. Other recent comparative studies also show that the amount of soft news
varies significantly across countries (Reinemann et al., 2016).
This brings us to the demand side, where there is quite some disagreement among
scholars whether people prefer hard news above soft news. Mainly based on market shares
and survey data, Patterson (2003) and Prior (2003) claim that the audience for soft news in the
US remains relatively small compared to hard news, and that it might even be shrinking (see
also Nguyen, 2012). Other scholars suggest that the soft news audience is growing without
necessarily leading to a declining audience for hard news (Baum, 2003). The question is what
the public would prefer if they could choose without constraints. With respect to the US,
Graber (1988) and Zaller (1999) have argued that the appetite for hard political news among
the general public is limited. Support for this can be found in research showing that in terms
of political news, in an experimental setting most people prefer horse race-coverage and find
strategy or game-related campaign coverage more appealing than issue coverage (Iyengar,
Norpoth & Hahn, 2004). More recently, a study by Boczkowski and Mitchelstein (2013),
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based on patterns of news item selection, suggest that the tendency towards more soft news is
driven by audience preferences. Based on an analysis of news websites in a wide variety of
countries, there seems to be a systematic gap in public affairs information between the news
stories that journalists and editors put up front and the ones that people consume the most
(Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2013). At the same time, Baum (2003) argues that people who
would otherwise not watch any news at all might demand and pay attention to soft news and
entertainment which may include political content.
Of course, these results refer to the average preferences and might hide large variation
between publics. Hamilton (2004) notes that commercial media outlets will mainly take into
account the preferences of those audience segments that are most valued by advertisers. In the
US, that segment consists of younger (18-35) females. Since this group tends to favor
entertaining and soft news more than the average news consumer, this demand might push
commercial news media to further sideline substantial issue news (see also Nguyen, 2012).
In short, there is no compelling evidence of a universal downward trend towards
declining quality in terms of more soft or game-framed news. What research rather shows is
variation across time and countries as well as across media types within countries (Aalberg et
al., 2016; De Swert, Belo, Kamhawi, Lo, Mujica, Porath, 2013; Reinemann et al., 2016).
While there are exceptions, and a lack of longitudinal and cross-national comparative studies,
most major news media still seem to seek to provide a mixture of hard political information
and more entertaining soft news coverage. At the same time, media organizations are
increasingly monitoring what people click on and share. Together with further newsroom-cuts
and competition for audiences, there might be stronger incentives ahead for news media to cut
corners in terms of journalistic quality and focus on audience-appealing content at the
expense of more substantial reporting. How strong such incentives are will vary across types
of media. Our overall conclusion is thus that there is less reason to be concerned about a
14
universal trend towards soft, entertaining and game-framed news, more reason to be
concerned about decreasing resources for journalism and increasing quality differences
between media, and more reason to be concerned about the actual demand for high-quality
news. There is also more reason to be concerned about how this will influence gaps in
political knowledge between those who consume low- and high-quality journalism
respectively (see also concern 6).
Concern 3: Towards Increasing Power Concentration and Decreasing Diversity?
The third major concern focuses on increasing power concentration within the media business
and how it influences content diversity. In recent decades, many news companies have
witnessed a deterioration of business conditions and suffered a decline in revenues from sales
and advertising. It has led to numerous cost-cutting exercises where newsroom budgets, staff
sizes, product offerings and correspondent bureaus have been reduced. To stay profitable in a
time of relentless pressure to invest in new technologies, the number of media mergers has
increased in many countries and caused their markets to become more concentrated (Almiron,
2010; Fenton, 2011; Papathanasopoulos & Negrine, 2011). This is frequently seen as a
problem for society as it affects the diversity of actors and viewpoints represented in public
debates (Cook, 1998; Schudson, 2003; Thompson, 1995). The key concern is that increased
ownership concentration in a given political communication environment may lead to a more
”narrow ideological debate” in the media (Curran, 2006; Benson, 2004).
A review of the relevant literature reveals that research on content diversity is still
quite limited. Even if political economy studies have been addressing these concerns for
decades, this line of scholarship has been criticized for its lack of systematic empirical
research (Mosco, 2010). For instance, the claim that media ownership affects the editorial line
is expressed frequently, but there is hardly any systematic, empirical evidence to support it
15
(Wagner & Collins, 2014, p. 3). According to Hanretty (2014, p. 29), this is not because of a
lack of scholarly interest but rather because of the difficulties of “collecting sufficient, and
sufficiently varied, data on both influence and ownership structure”. Furthermore, influence
of owners might be hard to establish as journalists might use self-censorship in reporting news
relating to the business interests of the media conglomerate.
Most studies on the impact of concentration on media content focus on case studies,
and the cases often seem chosen with the knowledge that they will confirm the hypothesis.
Undoubtedly most attention has been given to media mogul Rupert Murdoch and his News
Corp, including leading media outlets in Australia, the US and the UK. Deacon and Wring
(2015), for example, describe how Murdoch ‘used’ his tabloid the Sun to campaign for the
Conservatives and against Labour. Although the Sun has a reputation of being an outspoken
partisan paper, the active and sometimes vicious coverage of the Labour leader could be
related to Labour’s plans for stricter regulation on media ownership. Other studies have
established that Murdoch takes direct influence on the outlets he owns (Arsenault & Castells,
2008; Benson, 2012; McKnight 2010; Wagner & Collins, 2014).
Although the Murdoch case is a quite convincing example of the influence of media
owners, it is also rather exceptional. As argued by McKnight (2010, p. 304), News Corp is a
rather atypical case because it “has been a media group in which the propagation of a political
world view has been a powerful and quite separate goal, which at key points overrides the
normal corporate goal of financial success.” The same holds for the influence attributed to
Silvio Berlusconi, media mogul and former prime minister of Italy (Durante & Knight, 2012).
The Italian case has also been studied through the lenses of Berlusconi’s media laws and their
unilateral coverage (Hibberd, 2007; Padovani, 2012).
Research that goes beyond the influence of a famous media owner are scarce and the
findings somewhat contradictory. Only a handful of studies have addressed the impact of
16
media concentration and types of ownership on the actual news content. Some of these have
addressed the issue of content diversity (Entman, 2006; Voakes, Kapfer, Kurpius, & Chern,
1996), but have not been able to establish any causal interference. While some studies show a
reduction in media coverage diversity in the wake of mergers or acquisitions (Landry, 2011),
other studies find stability, convergence and divergence in editorial content over time (Ho &
Quinn, 2009). This indicates that effects of ownership concentration on content diversity can
go in different directions.
Ownership can also affect the way the news is presented or what is omitted from the
news. For instance, in many Latin American countries, processes of privatization in the media
strengthened close relationships between media owners and the political system (Fox &
Waisbord, 2002), and Porto (2012) shows how the largest media conglomerate in Brazil, TV
Globo, in some periods hindered democratization by ignoring some events and silencing
alternative political views. Research also suggests that certain types of news might be more
influenced than others. Several studies show that, compared to smaller and independent media
companies, large group owners tend to focus on preferred policies (Duval, 2005) and devote
less attention to local politics and community level stories (Hamilton, 2004; Nielsen, 2015;
Yanich, 2010). Other studies suggest however that corporate media owners have a smaller
influence on news content than media companies in the hand of individuals or families
(Hanretty, 2014). From a supply side perspective, it is nevertheless evident that diversified
ownership provides stronger guarantees for editorial and journalistic freedom.
Any discussion on media diversity also has to take the growing number of online news
outlets into account. Despite expectations to the contrary, many studies suggest increasing
concentration online, both in terms of content and traffic to the websites (Curran, Coen,
Aalberg & Iyengar, 2012). Hindman (2009), for example, shows that concentration in terms
of audience share is higher with respect to online news and media websites compared to print
17
newspaper and magazine circulation, and that those media that benefit the most online are
those that have strong brands offline. He also found that blog use is characterized by a high
degree of audience concentration (see also Davis, 2009). In terms of content, Boczkowski
(2010, p. 6) demonstrates that journalists’ imitation practices intensify in a news environment
characterized by Internet abundance: “In an age of information plenty, what most consumers
get is more of the same”. This suggests a continuation of the diversity paradox observed
almost twenty years ago, where more outlet diversity coincides with less content diversity
(Van Cuilenburg, 1998, p.44). This seems to hold cross-nationally. In a comparative study of
seven democracies covering four continents, Tiffen et al. (2014) find that the source balance
generally was lower for online new sites than for quality papers or public service news.
Online news and commercial broadcasters were also more likely to only present one side of
stories involving conflict. At the same time it should be noted that in less-democratic
contexts, where traditional news media are state-owned or controlled, online news can add
considerably to both content and source diversity and to overall plurality in these societies
(Salgado, 2014).
Turning to the demand for diversity in the news, for a long time the assumption was
that if the media only offer diverse content, then citizens will obtain a more varied media diet
and a richer understanding of the world. This notion rested on the presumption that there is a
demand for diverse news content. Newer research casts serious doubts on such presumptions.
Coined ’exposure diversity’ or ‘diversity as received’ (Van der Wurff, 2011), recent empirical
studies deal with how and to what extent audiences consume different viewpoints provided to
them (Webster, 2007; Napoli, 2011). This is done by empirically tracking individuals’ news
consumption (Webster & Ksiazek, 2012), or by studying if a fragmented media market results
in people actively selecting diverse content (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). In contrast to previous
presumptions, altogether findings suggest that more media outlets have resulted in people
18
taking part of news from fewer rather than more media outlets (Webster, 2007). As noted by
Hindman (2009, p. 133-134), “the audience for online news outlets and political web sites is
shaped by two powerful and countervailing trends: continued or accelerated concentration
among the most popular outlets, combined with fragmentation among the least-read-ones”.
Summing up, while there are reasons to be concerned that media concentration has a
negative influence on outlet and content diversity, empirical evidence is mixed. Thus far the
overall political information environment does not seem to have been impoverished by media
concentration. However, certain markets, like the one for local political news, might be more
vulnerable than others, as might certain countries. In several Central and East European
countries, for example, successful local businessmen are buying media companies to advance
both their business and political interests (Stetka, 2015; Esser, Stępińska, Hopmann, 2016).
More in general, research shows that increasing media choice might lead to less rather than
more diversity, both with respect to outlet and content diversity, suggesting that demand for
more diverse content is limited. This indicates that it is equally important to be concerned by
increasing media concentration and decreasing diversity from below, shaped by audience
demand, as from above, shaped by the economics of media industries or the grand plans of
media moguls.
Concern 4: Towards Increasing Polarization and Fragmentation
The fourth concern focuses on increasing fragmentation and polarization of media content and
media use in the wake of the transformation into high-choice media environments. The core
argument is that societies are facing increasing political divides with respect to both media
content and public beliefs. This divide is, according to the literature, in large parts caused by
developments in politics and changes in the media environment. 1 To some extent polarization
may also be related to what is known as political parallelism, or the link between political
19
actors and the media, that characterize many media systems in Southern and Eastern Europe
and South America (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2011; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002).
Beginning with the supply, the polarization argument states that the increase in the
number of available media channels, in broadcasting but even more so online, has created a
greater supply of niche or partisan media. This greater supply, in turn, is thought to lead to a
more fragmented audience, either because the supply matches a demand for niche or partisan
media or because the supply creates a greater demand for media tailored to people’s political
beliefs. In either case, this might lead to a further polarization of political views, “filter
bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) or a “balkanization” (Sunstein, 2007) of the public sphere. In short,
changes in the political information environment have created opportunity structures for
selective exposure based on political attitudes and beliefs (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013;
Stroud, 2011; Skovsgaard, Shehata & Strömbäck, 2016). The main concern is that such a
development will erode a common core of the public sphere and cause conflicts in society. A
continuous process of polarization might lead to less shared facts, extremism and disrespect
for citizens with other points of view, thereby weakening social cohesion and challenging
fundamental democratic institutions and practices (Sunstein, 2007).
Polarization can manifest itself in media content (supply) as well as in audience
behavior (demand). With respect to news media, most studies on the supply of polarized news
originate from the United States, albeit with some exceptions (Çarkoğluet, Baruh & Yıldırım,
2014; de Nooy & Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Hahn, Ryu & Park, 2015). It is however striking that
none of these studies is based on a longitudinal design. It is therefore problematic to make
inferences about polarization, which implies a development over time. In fact, a review of the
literature presents no unambiguous proof for a trend toward increased partisan polarization of
news media content, although most would agree that there is a greater supply of partisan
biased information online than ever. The success of partisan news broadcasters, such as Fox
20
News and MSNBC, and online platforms such as Breitbart and The Huffington Post, in the
US, also contributes to the view that there is a trend towards increasing polarization of media
content.
Even if existing studies do not allow conclusions with respect to changes in polarized
news content across time, some patterns found are interesting. One study shows, for example,
that polarized groups (very conservative or very liberal) receive more prominent attention in
the news compared to the moderate groups, and that they are not portrayed more negatively
than moderate groups (McCluskey & Kim, 2012). This suggests that contemporary news
values favor polarization, due to the potential for conflict and its entertaining value. This
might also explain the extensive media attention paid in many countries to populist political
parties positioned on the far left or right side of politics (Esser, et al., 2016). The tendency to
prioritize extreme over moderate views may also be caused by the journalistic doctrine to
present “two sides of a story;” it may open the news gates for radical counter-positions.
With respect to digital media, Hahn, Ryu, and Park (2015) point to another mechanism
that may cause polarization. They argue that Twitter is likely to increase polarization as it
reduces the likelihood of chance encounters with disagreeable views. Other studies find that
even if citizens are more likely to read tweets offered by like-minded others, they are also
engaged with those with whom they disagree (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). Such findings show that
a preference for attitude-consistent information does not equal active avoidance of attitude-
discrepant information (Garrett, 2009).
When it comes to the demand for polarized news, two key questions are at stake. One is
the degree of selective exposure based on political preferences. The other is whether exposure
to partisan media increases polarization, that is, the effects of polarized news. Here studies
show that people have a tendency to prefer information sources consistent with their political
beliefs (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Iyngar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2011) and that there is a
21
relationship between frequent use of pro-attitudinal information and more polarized or
extreme attitudes (Hollander, 2008; Tewksbury & Riles, 2015; Tsfati, Stroud & Chotiner,
2014). Gvirsman (2014), for example, demonstrate that proponents of a strong political
ideology report significantly more reliance on partisan media as a news source. Another study
finds mixed support for the hypothesis that increased media choice increases polarization, as
the effect was present only among those high in political interest (Davis & Dunaway, 2016).
The authors therefore conclude that “the increased availability of partisan news via expanding
media choice may not translate into mass effects beyond those highly interested in politics”
(p. 292). Similar conclusions follow from studies simultaneously investigating selective
exposure based on political interest and political beliefs: while there is evidence of political
selective exposure, selective exposure based on political interest exerts a stronger effect
(Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Skovsgaard et al., 2016).
This discussion leads us to studies related to the demand for and the effects of polarized
news. Most research in this area is based on experiments, and the overall finding is that the
effect of media exposure depends on the characteristics of both the content and the audience.
This implies that if citizens show patterns of selective exposure, it does not necessarily
polarize their attitudes. Even if news selection often is understood as an antecedent of
audience polarization, there is strong evidence that attitude importance outweighs the
information environment when explaining polarization (Leeper, 2014). All findings available
to date suggest that, by and large, citizens with extreme views are more likely to show
polarization after exposure to media messages compared to citizens with less extreme views.
Exposure to, or demand for, partisan media may therefore increase polarization, but typically
only for certain groups of people. Some studies also suggest that political discussion with
like-minded others leads to polarization, and that the politically extreme may become more
polarized when confronted with discussion content that runs counter to their prior opinions
22
(Wojcieszak, 2011). The robustness of such findings, across time and in different political and
media environmental contexts, is however open for further probing.
When summarizing the findings, two important caveats should be noted. First, most
studies on political selectivity in media use is based on the US case, that has a political
climate and media environment that are conducive to politically driven selective exposure.
Hence, the validity of findings in political information environments where the opportunity
structures for political selective exposure are different is an open question. Therefore, we
would encourage more studies from other context, like Conroy-Krutz and Moehler’s (2015)
study based on a new democracy in Africa. Second, most studies focus on traditional media,
and to some extent Twitter, while there is limited research on the supply and demand of other
politically biased online information sources out there, ranging from sites espousing one
political party or extremist views to fake news stories that are easily distributed via social
media platforms such as Facebook.
Summing up, while there are strong theoretical arguments for the concern that changes
in political information environments might lead to increasing fragmentation and polarization
with respect to both the supply and demand for politically biased information, the empirical
evidence does not support more far-reaching claims about a balkanization of the public sphere
or more people living encapsulated in their own filter bubbles. Although the supply of biased
information has increased, particularly online, news media with an ambition to cover politics
in a balanced and neutral way still constitute the main source of political information for most
people, and selectivity based on political interest seems to be more widespread than
selectivity based on political beliefs. Our overall conclusion is therefore that there are reasons
to be concerned about increasing fragmentation and polarization, but that this concern needs
to be tempered by empirical findings which shows that neither the supply nor the demand for
biased information is as widespread as is sometimes claimed.
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Concern 5: Towards Increasing Relativism
The fifth major concern is that we are witnessing a development towards increasing relativism
toward facts, evidence and empirical knowledge; a development in which factual information
more and more comes to be seen as a matter of opinion, in which evidence is neglected, and
in which misinformation, rumors and conspiracy theories increasingly permeate public
discourse and public opinion (Mohammed, 2012; Mooney & Kirshenbaum, 2009). Increasing
relativism might result in situations in which different political camps cannot even agree upon
very basic facts and evidence, or in discourses in which mere opinions not backed by
evidence are traded as facts. It concerns the rise of what is sometimes called “truthiness”, a
term introduced by comedian Stephen Colbert to refer to when someone believes something is
true because it “feels right”, without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, or
facts (Manjoo, 2008, p. 188–189).
Relativism is problematic insofar as democracies depend on both citizens and political
actors relying on factual information to generate empirical beliefs or knowledge that can
guide their decision-making (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). Facts are, as Delli
Carpini and Keeter (1996, p. 8, 11) put it, “the currency of citizenship” that “prevent debates
from becoming disconnected from the material conditions they attempt to address.” Among
other things, politicians need factual information to be able to judge how severe a problem is
and when pondering various measures that could be taken to solve a problem. Citizens
similarly need to know what a party platform or candidate actually says, and whether, for
example, the economy or crime situation is improving or deteriorating. 2
Though “truth” is a portentous term, from a more practical point of view, what matters
most is that there are claims that intersubjectively can be categorized as “false” or “correct”.
For example, we can decide whether there are certain elements in a health care plan (Pasek,
24
Sood & Krosnick, 2015); whether the US and UK governments had information about WMDs
before it attacked Iraq (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Herring & Robinson, 2014); or whether
there is scientific evidence on vaccines causing autism (Dixon & Clarke, 2013; Kata, 2010).
We can also decide whether President Obama is a Muslim or a foreigner (Hollander, 2010;
Crawford & Bhatia, 2012) or whether Donald Trump sued former customers of Trump
University who wanted to get their money back.
Issues such as these are not a matter of opinion: it is a matter of true and false. Yet, at
the core of the concern of “post-factual” relativism is that the epistemic status of information
and knowledge has increasingly become an issue of public debate up to the point where
factual information is often downgraded to mere opinion. This means that those engaged in
public discourse increasingly challenge facts as mere opinions, even if the overwhelming
majority of scientists or publicly available evidence back the facts. If this were the case, it
would endanger the very heart of democratic decision-making. If political parties cannot
agree upon the basic facts they base their decisions on, political discourse becomes virtually
impossible. As Hannah Arendt (1967) once noted, “What is at stake here is (…) common and
factual reality itself, and this is indeed a political problem of the first order.”
Whether concerns about increasing relativism are warranted is hence an important
question. Beginning with the supply side, one key reason for the concern about increasing
relativism is the weakening of traditional, journalistic media and that “the internet may
provide a social context facilitating” not only the dissemination, but also the endorsement of
misinformation (Klein, Van der Linden, Pantazi & Kissine, 2014, p. 163). Thanks to online
media, it has become easier than ever for those inclined to spread false or misleading
information to gain an advantage in political conflicts. The result is a “crisis of verification”,
made worse by the mingling of half-truths and false claims into “factitious informational
blends” (Rojecki & Meraz, 2016) and algorithms that do not effectively discriminate between
25
true and false information when people search for information or use social media.
Adding to this, the way in which think tanks produce facts and knowledge also needs
to be recognized. Originally, think tanks typically consisted of “academic experts” who would
come up with ways to solve specific problems in society, but today they rather seem intent on
promoting their ideological agendas (Abelson, 2009). One major strategy used by these is to
produce research evidence that is politically biased (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Research also
suggest that the supply of biased facts is often picked up news media that might not have time
to check on the veracity of the information. McKevon (2012) even claims that advocacy think
thanks are the most influential news sources in the US and Australia, and studies suggest that
they are also quite prominent in some European countries (Blach-Ørsten and Kristensen,
2014). For these, and for all others who have an interest in disseminating their version of
reality, it has become much easier to directly reach their target groups and bypass the news
media gates.
In the case of the news media, there has been a long debate on the question whether it
is possible to obtain true and objective information (Lippmann, 1922). While Kovach and
Rosenstiel (2014) note that journalists’ search for the truth is a process fraught with problems,
they compare the news making process to a conversation with the public in which journalists
should flag any misinformation, disinformation, or self-promoting information. Most scholars
also agree that journalists have a responsibility to make a clear distinction between facts and
opinions (Goldstein, 2007; Patterson, 2013), although some stress that the responsibility lies
with political actors (Herring & Robinson, 2014; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006). Many news
media are however aware of the problem, reacting to perceived increase in false or misleading
information floating around by introducing various fact-checking formats and websites. Some
scholars even refer to this fact-checking as a movement (Spivak, 2011; Graves, Nyhan and
Reifler, 2016), a new style of journalistic reporting that is concerned with assessing the truth
26
of substantive claims made by politicians.
Turning to the demand side, we do not know much about the demand for false “facts”
that support rather than challenge people’s beliefs. Similarly, few studies provide insight into
the demand for fact checkers or scientists disseminating scientific knowledge in the public
sphere. At least in the US there is however evidence that trust in science has decreased among
certain groups of citizens and that there is a process of increased politicization of science.
Gauchat (2012) for instance, demonstrates that conservatives in the United States have
become increasingly distrustful of scientific knowledge. While they were the most trustful
group in the 1970s, compared to liberals and moderates, they have become the least trustful
by 2010. Among liberals and moderates, the level of trust in science has been very stable.
Hmielowski and colleagues link these different levels of trust to media use. They demonstrate
that use of conservative media decreases trust in science whereas mainstream and non-
conservative media use increases trust in science, and explain why some citizens for instance
choose to ignore the scientific consensus that exist regarding the causes and consequences of
global warming (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014).
More broadly, we also see that many scholars have shifted their focus from lack of
political knowledge to the phenomenon of confidently held false beliefs and misinformation
that also may have grave consequences on political preferences (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit,
Schwieder & Rich, 2000; Fowler & Margolis, 2013). Here numerous studies have shown that
there seems to be a partisan bias in political knowledge, with voters holding false or biased
beliefs about factual political or scientific matters that are in line with their general political
worldviews (Bartels, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2013; Crawford & Bhatia, 2012; Pasek, Stark,
Krosnick & Tompson, 2014; Kraft, Lodge & Taber, 2015). Thus, there seems to be a public
demand for biased information. To explain this, confirmation biases and motivated reasoning
have been mentioned as key causes for the effect of pre-existing attitudes on factual beliefs
27
(Prior, Sood, Khanna, 2015). The use of offline or online partisan media, the interaction of
news coverage and online search behavior, and how information is spread through social
networks online, has also been investigated as potential factors explaining biased knowledge.
We do not however, know much about how these misperceptions may be corrected, but some
experimental studies do suggest that fact checkers have an effect on people’s belief (Fridkin,
Kenny & Wintersieck, 2015), while others find that false information shapes attitudes even
after the information has been effectively discredited (Thorson, 2016).
One reason for increasing relativism might be that governments, political institutions
and news media have lost their exclusive status of reality construction, while another might be
a longer-term development towards secularization and post-modernism (Mooney &
Kirshenbaum, 2009). It should also be noted that some political actors seem to take
allegations of spreading misinformation much less seriously than established political actors
traditionally used to do. For instance, Mooney (2005) stated that the rejection of neutral
scientific knowledge in the US began with the emergence of “the new right”– a group
skeptical of organized science and the intellectual establishment. Mooney argues that these
groups have gradually contributed to a situation where many people believe what they want to
believe, even if it goes against scientific or other facts, and where many turn to false news and
media that support their beliefs while mistrusting what is known as mainstream media or
scientific consensus. This trend might explain why the large amount of false statements by
Donald Trump during the 2016 election campaign did not seem to reduce his electoral
support 3. In other words, the incentives for political actors and others to stick to the truth
seem to have weakened, further contributing to increasing relativism.
Summing up, although there is a lack of longitudinal and comparative research, there
does appear to be an increase in the supply of misinformation or “factitious informational
blends” (Rojecki & Meraz, 2016) circulating in political information environments. Many
28
studies also show that people have a tendency to dismiss facts that challenge their already
held beliefs. Based on the demand for polarized news, it also appears as if public demand for
“facts” that align with their political beliefs either is increasing or that it has become easier for
people to match their demand with the supply of biased information. In either case, the result
is that there is a risk that people will increasingly hold, and hold on to, false beliefs. Our
overall conclusion therefore is that there are strong reasons to be concerned about increasing
relativism of facts and how that might influence public discourse and jeopardize building
consensus in ideologically polarized environments.
Concern 6: Towards Increasing Inequalities
The sixth and final concern focuses on the use of various information sources and how that
influences public knowledge. The core of the concern is that increasing media choice will
lead to increasing inequalities in the extent to which people make use of the news media, and
that this will result in increasing inequalities in knowledge about politics and current affairs
among different groups in society (Aalberg et al., 2013; Blekesaune et al., 2012; Eveland and
Scheufele, 2000; Gaziano, 2010; Hwang and Jeong, 2009; Ksiazek et al., 2010; Strömbäck et
al., 2013; Wei & Hindman, 2011). Thus, the concern is rooted in how changes in the supply
of news and other political information influence the demand and, subsequently, learning
about politics and current affairs.
Despite this widespread concern there are few studies with a longitudinal approach
that connect news media use with political knowledge or other outcome variables. There is
thus a mismatch between the concern, requiring longitudinal data, and empirical evidence,
typically focusing on shorter time periods. There are some exceptions, though. Prior (2007),
for example, demonstrates empirically how the media environment influences the effects of
individual characteristics, such as the ability and motivation to follow the news and learn
29
about politics. In the past, few media options were available, and citizens who were not very
interested in news still encountered and learned political information because the few
available media options regularly featured newscasts and current affairs. Nowadays, Prior
argues, more media choice and increased availability of entertainment programming allows
for easier avoidance of political information among those who are not interested, leading to
less accidental exposure to news, less political knowledge and, as a consequence, an exclusion
of the un-motivated from democratic politics (see also Hollander, 2008; Wei & Hindman,
2011).
Several other studies also show that political learning is dependent on the supply
offered by the aggregate information environment. In a longitudinal study, Jerit and
colleagues show that higher levels of information in the environment elevate knowledge for
everyone, but also that the educated learn disproportionately more from newspaper coverage
(see also Fraile 2011; Slater, Hayes, Reineke, Long & Bettinghaus, 2009). Increases in
television coverage, by contrast, benefit the least educated almost as much as the most
educated. The information environment thus has a nuanced effect: certain news formats
reinforce differences in political knowledge; others diminish those differences. One important
conclusion is thus that the increased level of information available in society will reinforce the
knowledge gap that exists between people with low and high levels of education – and with
and without interest in politics and news – although more easily digestible formats such as
quick-and-easy TV news, satirical news or infotainment may perhaps function as a leveler (de
Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Gil de Zuniga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012; Young, 2016).
Turning to the demand perspective, some longitudinal studies have chosen to treat
media use as the dependent variable, and focus on how increased gaps in media use are linked
to related measures such as political interest and trust. One Swedish study, for example,
shows both that news consumption has become more polarized between news-seekers and
30
news-avoiders since the 1980’s and that political interest has become a more important
determinant of news consumption (Strömbäck et al., 2013; see also Bonfadelli, 2002; Kziazek
et al., 2010). Other studies confirm that political interest and informational TV use have
increased their importance in widening the knowledge gap (Hopmann, Wonneberger, Shehata
& Höijer, 2016). Beam and Kosicki (2014) also shows that the personalization of news portals
is a further instrument for news-seekers to get more news, and that the use of these may
thereby increase inequalities.
Along similar lines, Blekesaune et al. (2012) show that the group of news-avoiders
increased across Europe between 2002 and 2008, and that the probability of tuning out is a
function both of individual traits of the citizen and the supply of news in particular media
systems. More specifically, they find that it is mainly citizens with low levels of social capital
that avoid the news. In another study, Aalberg et al. (2013) investigate how the public’s
consumption of news versus entertainment developed between 2002 and 2010 in different
European media systems. Among other things, the authors show that the demand, or the time
citizens spend watching news and programs about politics and current affairs, has declined.
Aside from longitudinal studies, several comparative studies argue that the impact of
choice and the commercialization of media on news media use and knowledge can be studied
by investigating countries with different types of media system and political information
environments, and thereby how levels of commercialization influence knowledge gaps
(Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Banducci et al., 2016; Curran et al, 2009; Fraile & Iyengar, 2014;
Soroka et al., 2013). In addition, several studies investigate how exposure to commercial
versus public service news may influence learning and knowledge gaps (Aarts & Semetko,
2003; Shehata et al., 2015). These studies generally find that inequalities in media use and
knowledge gaps are greater in more commercially oriented media systems.
Relatedly, some studies use a cross-sectional comparative approach to explore how
31
media environmental characteristics have effects on gaps in the demand for news, beyond the
effects of individual-level characteristics. For instance, Norris’ (2001) study of inequalities
related to Internet use across and within countries shows that information rich citizens have a
tendency to get richer, and in that way increase existing information gaps and the digital
divide. Shehata and Strömbäck (2011) also show how media environments moderate the
impact of education and interest, as media systems characterized by higher levels of
newspaper-centrism are related to smaller gaps in newspaper reading between those with high
and low levels of education and political interest. Slater et al. (2009) similarly show that
differences in the amount of news coverage of a topic influences knowledge differences
across groups. Simply put, the more extensive the coverage, the less sizable the knowledge
differences are between groups.
There are also studies looking into questions of causality and effect, trying to explore
which groups may be influenced the most by what type of content or medium they demand.
The evidence with respect to learning effects among different groups from following different
types of media (TV, newspapers, online) is not conclusive, however. There is limited
evidence suggesting that viewers learn from soft news and entertainment (Hahn, Iyengar, Van
Aelst & Curran, 2012; Kim and Vishak, 2008), though some studies suggest that exposure to
conflict and human interest frames, often associated with soft news, may increase learning
among groups less interested in politics (Albæk et al., 2014). Several studies also show that
public service news has stronger knowledge effects than commercial TV news (Aalberg &
Curran, 2012; Fraile & Iyengar, 2014; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Liu & Eveland, 2005;
Shehata et al., 2015; Soroka et al., 2013; Strömbäck, 2016; Tewksbury, Weaver & Maddex,
2001).
One key question related to how changes in media environments influence knowledge
acquisition and inequalities is the likelihood of accidental exposure and learning from Internet
32
use compared to the use of traditional media. While some studies argue “passing the threshold
to get news overviews at all seems to be easier online” (Trilling & Schoenbach, 2013, p. 45)
and that use of social media might have leveling effects (Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck &
Ljungberg, 2013; Kobayashi & Inamasu, 2015), other studies suggest that motivation to find
and learn from the news have a greater impact with respect to online compared to offline
media (Haight, Quan-Haase & Corbett, 2014; Van Dijk & Hacker, 2003; Wei & Hindman,
2011). As social media become an increasingly important source of information, investigating
the extent to which people incidentally learn about politics from using social media, and
whether using social media compensates for not using traditional news media in terms of
political learning, should be a priority.
Summing up, there is compelling evidence of increasing gaps in news media use –
online and offline – between different groups and that personal preferences are more decisive
today than in the earlier age of low-choice media environments. Put differently, the increasing
supply has made for a better match with the demand for political information among the most
politically interested and the demand for non-political information among those not interested
in politics. Several studies convincingly suggest that this might lead to increasing knowledge
gaps, although the lack of longitudinal studies prohibits firm conclusions. Research is also not
conclusive with respect to learning effects from following different media types, or the
likelihood for accidental learning while using digital and social media. As media use
increasingly moves online, and as studies suggest that motivation is more decisive for
learning from online compared to offline media, there is a risk that growing differences in
media use will lead to wider knowledge gaps. Our overall conclusion is therefore that there
are strong reasons to be concerned about increasing inequalities in media use and knowledge
about politics and public affairs.
33
Conclusion and Discussion
Imagine a democracy where the supply of news and political information constitute just a
miniscule share of the total media supply, where just a small minority regularly follows news
about politics and current affairs, where the quality of news and political information is so
poor that it does not matter for levels of knowledge whether people absorb it or not, where
diversity is reduced to such an extent that people no longer hear the other side of the story,
where people are only willing to expose themselves to attitude-consistent information, where
people systematically dismiss any information that goes against their views no matter what
hard facts show, where everybody is entitled not only to their own opinions but also their own
facts, and where differences in media use produce a small group of highly informed and a
larger group of misinformed citizens who hold diametrically opposed views on the state of the
nation or how the country should be run.
Clearly, such as scenario would pose a serious challenge for democracy or even
threaten its survival. As shown by this review on trends in political information environments,
fortunately the state of affairs is not that bad. While a lack of longitudinal and cross-national
research in many cases prohibits firm conclusions, rather than showing a wholesale
deterioration, the evidence shows a more mixed picture. Thus, on the one hand, the amount of
political news and information is increasing; on the other, the share of the total media supply
constituting political news and information is decreasing. While in some countries soft and
game-framed news is on the rise, in others it is not and there is no evidence of a convergence
towards a popularization-related reporting style. While there on the one hand is increasing
concentration in the media sector, on the other hand there is no compelling evidence of
decreasing diversity. Media environments are becoming more fragmented and polarized, and
people tend to prefer attitude-consistent information, but most people at the same time still
turn to major news providers and also consume of attitude-discrepant information. While
34
there is a growing supply of partisan biased and fake information, there is little evidence of a
strongly increasing demand for such information. And while the opportunity structures for
finding non-political information have improved, it has also become easier for news junkies to
find high-quality news and political information.
Based on this, one important conclusion coming out of this review is that the direst
warnings are not warranted. All news is not bad. Equally important, however, is that all news
is not good either and that many of the concerns have a material foundation. There clearly are
some trends with respect to political information environments that do represent a serious
challenge for democracy.
Important in this context is that democracy, to function well, requires more than a
formal framework guaranteeing that the law protects every citizen’s equal democratic rights
and that those in power are elected in free, fair and recurring elections. Democracy is not just
a set of institutions. Democracy is also about processes seeking to make sure that all citizens
have opportunities to participate in politics, to voice their opinions and influence political
decision-making, and to ensure that all citizens and their interests are represented. Democracy
requires not only formal rights. Democracy also requires, among other things, inclusiveness,
enlightened understanding and effective participation (Dahl 1989).
In light of this, several of the trends reviewed here pose challenges for democracy not
only because there is evidence suggesting that the concerns are at least partly warranted, but
also because they are closely linked to the degree of inclusiveness, enlightened understanding
and effective participation. Increasing inequalities in political knowledge, for example, will
not only inhibit the opportunities for enlightened understanding in society at large. It will also
have a negative impact on effective participation and inclusiveness, as those who are better
informed are better equipped to participate and exert influence on political outcomes.
Increasing relativism might similarly undermine the degree of enlightened understanding,
35
directly when it contributes to widely held misperceptions and indirectly when it aggravates
reason-based policy discussions. Increasing fragmentation and polarization might not only
contribute to increasing relativism and increasing inequalities in political knowledge: it might
also undermine the degree of inclusiveness and social cohesion by contributing to more
conflict, intolerance and anti-pluralism.
Although the direst warnings about where democracies are heading due to changes in
political information environments are not warranted, our overall conclusion is therefore that
several political communication trends in high-choice media environments do represent a
challenge for democracy. Based on the empirical evidence thus far, the most important seems
to be increasing fragmentation and polarization, epistemic relativism and growing inequalities
in political knowledge.
Having said this, our review also shows that not all trends are global trends, nor do
they affect all countries to the same extent. Some concerns may furthermore be more justified
for some types of news and not for others. For instance, in many democracies the amount of
local political news is a problem, despite an increasing absolute amount of political news at
the national level. Many countries are also witnessing a declining attention for local elections
and local politics in general that might negatively affect citizen participation at the local level
(Nielsen, 2015; Hayes & Lawless, 2015). It should also be kept in mind that the evidence in
many cases is inconclusive or mixed. That holds for the prevalence of the alleged trends as
well as for their causes and consequences, how they are contingent on factors on the macro-
and meso-levels of analysis, and hence the mechanisms and causal factors at work.
These observations lead us to five suggestions for future research. First, there is great
need for more comparative research across both time and space. Although cross-national
comparative political communication research has become more common (Esser &
Hanitzsch, 2012) it is still rather exceptional. Most studies are still single-country studies, and
36
in most studies the case under study is the – quite exceptional – case of the United States. To
understand what factors shape different aspects of political information environments, cross-
national comparative research is absolutely essential.
Second, considering how often trends are discussed or concepts implying a trend are
used, it is striking that longitudinal studies in political communication are so rare. On some
concerns discussed here, we were not able to find any study covering a longer period of time,
allowing a firm assessment of whether there is a trend or not. More longitudinal research is
hence needed.
Third, there is a great need to expand research to other continents across the world
than North America and Europe. Even if we here have focused on advanced postindustrial
democracies, it remains a fact that there is a paucity of political communication research both
in general and with respect to the concerns analyzed here pertaining to democracies in
continents such as South America, Africa and Asia. This seriously hampers our understanding
of the global situation as well as of the antecedents and consequences of various political
communication phenomena.
Fourth, we also think there is a need for more descriptive research. In particular, in the
international communication literature it is often hard to find descriptive data of developments
over time. Most journals give premium to methodologically and theoretically sophisticated
articles, and when space is scarce, many scholars do not include the descriptive data that their
analyses are based on. While there are strong arguments for this, to assess whether the
prevalence of phenomena vary across time or space, descriptive data are indispensable. In that
respect, there are some useful examples in political science. For instance, the Political Data
Yearbook documents election results, national referenda, and institutional reforms in most
Western democracies. We would also advise scholars to make greater use of the interactive
features of publications such as online appendices to provide descriptive information.
37
Fifth, there is a great need for conceptual clarity and consistency in terms of how key
concepts are conceptualized and operationalized (Esser, Strömbäck, de Vreese, 2012). While
many scholars use similar concepts, the conceptualizations are often vague, and both the
conceptualizations and the operationalizations often differ. This makes it hard to take stock of
current knowledge and assess whether differences in findings across studies are real or a
function of differences in conceptualizations or operationalizations. This shortcoming, in turn,
hampers all attempts to build theories helping us to understand and explain variations across
time or space.
These suggestions may not revolutionize research in political communication, but if
adhered to, they would make it significantly easier to assess trends in political communication
and whether they constitute a challenge for democracy. Considering how much might be at
stake, that is no small achievement.
38
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1
Here we focus on the media as a potential cause of polarization. For a broader overview of
potential causes and consequences of polarization, see Barber and McCarty (2013).
2
We are aware that the amount of knowledge necessary is an issue of debate and that at least
some researchers hold the view that citizens can arrive at rather sensible decisions by using
various kinds of heuristics (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). However, we would argue that public
discourse and decisions need to have at least some foundation in facts to not become
completely erratic and that even the best heuristics will be misleading if they are triggered by
false information (see Kuklinski et al., 2000).
3
According to PolitiFact about 7 out of 10 statements made by Donald Trump during the
campaign turned out to be (partly) false.
53

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Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for

Taylor & Francis © International Communication Association

Political Communication in a High-Choice Media Environment: A Challenge for

David Hopmann, Susana Salgado, Nicolas Hubé, Agnieszka Stępińska, Stylianos

(6) increasing inequality in political knowledge.

raise serious challenges to the old order” (p. 259).

political communication (Blumler, 2016, p. 27).

processes of knowledge dissemination and acquisition in postindustrial democracies. While

inextricable linked. Building on but going beyond previous conceptualizations, we therefore

From a democratic perspective, a fundamental question is how changes in political

algorithm-shaped filter bubbles that “invisibly transforms the world we experience by

informed about politics and current affairs.

(6) increasing inequality in political knowledge.

The Importance of the Political Information Environment

Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Milner, 2002; Prior 2007).

media have accelerated and exacerbated many developments.

compared to information-poor environments. This finding stresses the importance of going

& Kritzinger, 2016; Curran, Iyengar, Lund & Salovaara-Moring, 2009).

learn from, political information.

demand in order to remain competitive (Hamilton, 2004). As digital technologies have

Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the political information environment in any

information provided by the media in a specific political information environment, as well as

themselves mutually in any given political information environment. The political

Concern 1: Declining Amount of Political News

that people’s motivation to consume political news is declining.

Another significant trend is that virtually all newspapers in established democracies

providers than with respect to national news.

of political information environments – the capacity to inform by providing a multiplicity of

despite the availability of a plethora of news and political sites.

attributable largely to different sets of motivations and gratifications sought by people

vary even more than differences in demand for news in general.

Concern 2: Towards Declining Quality of News

maintain or increase audience shares, in an era of stiffening market competition and

academia – encapsulated in terms such as dumbing-down, tabloidization, infotainment and

for a healthy democracy.

& Friedrich, 2014).

Unfortunately there is little empirical research on changes in the quality of news

(Aalberg, Strömbäck & de Vreese, 2016; Lawrence, 2000).

important newscasters in the US (Baym, 2010). Based on an extensive review of empirical

Rowe, 2011; Uribe & Gunter, 2004; Winston, 2002).

different indicators of popularization of political news, such as scandalization,

UK media. However, there was no convergence in ‘popularization-related reporting styles’

varies significantly across countries (Reinemann et al., 2016).

driven by audience preferences. Based on an analysis of news websites in a wide variety of

entertainment which may include political content.

In short, there is no compelling evidence of a universal downward trend towards

corners in terms of journalistic quality and focus on audience-appealing content at the

respectively (see also concern 6).

Concern 3: Towards Increasing Power Concentration and Decreasing Diversity?

ownership concentration in a given political communication environment may lead to a more

”narrow ideological debate” in the media (Curran, 2006; Benson, 2004).

relating to the business interests of the media conglomerate.

2008; Benson, 2012; McKnight 2010; Wagner & Collins, 2014).

unilateral coverage (Hibberd, 2007; Padovani, 2012).

ownership provides stronger guarantees for editorial and journalistic freedom.

(2010, p. 6) demonstrates that journalists’ imitation practices intensify in a news environment

shaped by two powerful and countervailing trends: continued or accelerated concentration

Concern 4: Towards Increasing Polarization and Fragmentation