UNIT-1

THEORY OF LAW

i) WHAT IS LAW
ii) HOW IS IT MADE – (LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY)
iii) FUNCTION OF LAW
iv) THEORIES OF JUSTICE- RAWLS

The word ‘Interpretation’ is derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’ which means to explain
or expound or to understand or translate.
Interpretation is a process through which one arrives at the true and correct intention of the
law-making body which is laid in the form of statutes. This helps in finding out the intention
of the author.
Interpretation of any data generally means to analyze the available data and come out with an
opinion which is certain and clear.
This helps to find out the ways to understand and analyse the statute, where it leads the
interpreter to the whole new meaning which is completely different from the general meaning.

NEED FOR INTERPRETATION

The ambiguity of the words used in the statute: Sometimes there will be words that have more
than one meaning. And it may not be clear which meaning has to be used. There could be
multiple interpretations made out of it.
Change in the environment: We all know that society changes from time to time and there may
be new developments happening in a society that is not taken into consideration, this lacks the
predictability of the future event.
Complexities of the statutes: usually statutes are complex and huge, it contains complicated
words, jargon and some technical terms which are not easy to understand and this complexity
may lead to confusion.
4 When legislation doesn’t cover a specific area: Every time when legislations are out it doesn’t
cover all the area it leaves some grey areas and interpretation helps in bridging the gaps
between.
5 Drafting error: The draft may be made without sufficient knowledge of the subject. It may
also happen due to the lack of necessary words and correct grammar. This makes the draft
unclear and creates ambiguity in the legislature.
6 Incomplete rules: There are few implied rules and regulations and some implied powers and
privileges which are not mentioned in the statute and when these are not defined properly in
the statute this leads to ambiguity
MEANING OF LAW
Law is a set of rules created by state institutions which make laws through the authority of the
state. The laws have sanctions which are recognised by the state and enforced by state-
authorised bodies.
In its judicial sense, 'Law' means a body of rules of conduct, action or behavior of persons,
made and enforced by the state.

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It expresses a rule of human action.

ANALYTICAL SCHOOL
The major premise of analytical School of jurisprudence is to deal with law as it exists in the
present form.
The imperative school since it regards law as the direction (command) of the sovereign.
The Positivist School because the exponents of this school are concerned neither with the past
nor with the future of law but with law as it exists i.e., with law `as it is
John Austin
Austin is known as the father of English Jurisprudence. According to him,'Law is a command
of sovereign backed by a sanction.'He regards law as the direction of the politically powerful
authority backed by a sanction. This means that Law is whatever the Law-Maker says and it
supersedes judgements by judges/precedents etc.
He distinguishes law from morality. He divides law into two parts:
Divine law: Law set by God for men
Human Law: Laws made by men for men
Merits:
Simple and clear definition of Law
Has an important and Universal Truth Law is created and enforced by the State.
Demerits:
Customs overlooked: In the early times, not the command of any superior, but customs
regulated the conduct of the people. Therefore, customs should also be included in the study of
jurisprudence.
No place for judge made law: Nobody, in modern times, will deny that judges perform a
creative function and Austin's definition of law does not include it.
Bentham: He defined law as:

Law is an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign

in a state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class
of persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power.
Bentham supported the economic principle of 'laissez faire' which meant interference of the
State in the economic activities of individuals.
Bentham propounded the principle of utilitarianism. According to this theory, the right aim of
legislation is the carrying out of the principle utility.
Bentham defined utility as the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or procure
some good. According to him, the consequences of good and evil are respectively 'pleasure and
pain'.
SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL
The Sociological school of Jurisprudence advocates that the Law and society are related to each
other
Law is a social phenomenon and law has some direct or indirect relation to society. Sociological
School of Jurisprudence focuses on balancing the welfare of state and individual was realized.
Rosco pound
Roscoe Pound concentrates more on functional aspect of law. So, his approach may also be
known as functional approach. According to him 'The end of law should be to satisfy a

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maximum of wants with a minimum of friction.' He demands for maximum happiness with less
disagreement.

He has given a theory of 'Social engineering' which means a balance between the competing
interests in society. Social means group of individuals forming a society.
Engineering means applied science carried out by engineers to produce finished products,
based on continuous experimentation and experience to get the finished product by means of
an instrument or device. He thinks that jurist should work with a plan and accordingly various
interests of society should be protected by law.
Historical school

HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE describes the origin of law. This school

argues that the law was found not made.
The Historical School believe that law is made from people according to their changing needs.
It believes that law is an outcome of development of the society because it originates from the
conventions, customs, religious principle, economic needs of the people. Basic source of
historical school is custom.
A custom is a traditional and widely accepted way of behaving or doing something that is
specific to a particular society, place, or time. Customs are considered superior to
legislations in this school. The reasons for the emergence of this school are:

It came as a reaction to the natural school of law.

It opposes the ideology of the analytical school of jurisprudence.

REALIST SCHOOL is a type of school which focuses on decisions.

In actual sense, there is no realistic school. It is known as 'realism' that is actually a movement
which consists of thought and works in law.
Realists have a pragmatic approach towards understanding jurisprudence and thus it
emphasizes the judicial organization more which is responsible for the application of the law.
The realist school of law believes that law is real and co-relates law with reality.
There are two types of realist school:

American Realist: the scholars along with learning from there own experiences, but also
observed the judgements and learned from them.
Scandinavian Realists: in this, the scholars believed only in their own experience.

NATURAL SCHOOL OF LAW is generally regarded as the law of nature,morals, divine law
or the law that is universal and eternal in nature.
It has been given different meanings at different points of time and though man creates it, it is
found through the nature of an individual. It is mostly influenced by religion.
The central idea of this theory is that there is a higher law based on morality against which the
validity of human law can be measured. There is a belief that certain moral laws cannot go
against without losing its moral or legal character. If legislation is not moral it is not law. There
is an essential connection between law and morality in this school of law

HART VS FULLER

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Hart is a positivist, so he does not believe that there is a necessary connection between law and
morality.
While he does acknowledge that there is a close relationship between law and morality, and
does not disagree that the development of the law has been immensely influenced by morality.
However, he does not believe that they are interdependent on each other. As such he feels that
a line should be drawn between what law should be, and what law ought to be.
The fact of the matter remains, that a law does not stop being law due to moral criticism of it.
Hart believes that officials should display truthfulness about the law by concentrating on what
it says rather than focusing on what one desires it to say.
According to Hart the law consists of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules art duty
imposing rules on the citizens and have a legal sanction. Secondary rules are power conferring
laws that describe how laws should be recognised, adjudicated or changed
Hart acknowledges that law and morals are bound to intersect at some point, for instance where
a case comes up where the wording of the relevant statute is not sufficient to give effect to the
purpose of the law.
Hart says that such cases can be solved by way Judicial interpretation.
Fuller is a naturalist, and he sees laws as a way of achieving social order by regulating human
behaviour through laws.
He believes that our legal systems are derived from the norms of justice which have a moral
aspect.
He argues that for a law to be valid, it must conform to a certain moral function test. These are
the eight desiderata set out by Fuller; (I) Rules (ii) published (iii) prospective (iv) intelligible
(v) not contradictory (vi) possible to comply with (vii) reasonably stable through time (viii)
followed by officials.
Fuller implores law makers to take into consideration each of the above before determining
whether a law is valid.
Fuller goes further to explain morality by categorising it in two; Morality of aspiration and
morality of duty. Morality of aspiration suggests a desired norm of human conduct that
promotes his/her best interest.
Morality of duty describes the standards people follow to ensure smooth functioning of society
A good example this point that was discussed in the Hart- Fuller Debate Published in the
Harvard law review because it demonstrates the differing views of naturalism and positivism,
particularly in the context of Nazi laws. Facts of the case are as follows:
“A German woman denounced her husband to the authorities in accordance with the anti-
sedition laws of 1934 & 1938. He had made derogatory remarks about Hitler. The husband was
prosecuted and convicted of slandering the Fuhrer, which carried the death penalty. Although
sentenced to death he was not executed but was sent as a soldier to the Eastern front. He
survived the war and upon his return instituted legal proceedings against his wife. The wife
argued that she had not committed a crime because a court had sentenced her husband in
accordance with the relevant law of the time. However, the wife was convicted of ‘illegally
depriving another of his freedom’, a crime under the Penal Code, which had remained in force
throughout the Nazi period. The court described the Nazi laws as “contrary to the sound
conscience and sense of justice of all decent human beings”.

If we follow Harts positivist views, the decision given by the Court was wrong, because hart
believes that no matter how heinous the Nazi laws were, they were by the Enabling Act passed

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by the Reichstag, and were valid. It satisfies Hart’s rule of recognition
Fuller on the other hand recognised the Court’s decision because it created respect for law and
morality, and by using his desiderata Fuller states that all Nazi laws were illicit. This justifies
the court’s overlooking of the earlier 1934 act and upholding the wife’s conviction. Without
the courts applying a moral concept in the application of the law, the courts would have had to
acquit the wife and agreed with Hart.
Even though Hart did not favor the retrospective application of criminal statutes. Hart was
strongly against the Court’s decision to introduce a concept of morality and deciding the statute
that protected the woman was no law.
Fuller contended that Hitler’s regime was so harmful to morality, that there was nothing in the
system that could qualify to be called a law as they did not comply with his desiderata. He
stated that the Nazi laws lacked the necessary internal morality required in the process of law-
making, which gives laws respect and makes them obligatory to be followed by citizens. Fuller
believed that unless the Nazi laws were treated as non-laws, the perpetrators of evils under the
Nazi regime would go unpunished.
SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS CASE
The case of the Speluncean Explorers is a paper written by Lon L Fuller which was published
in 1949. It was the philosopher’s first article to make it to the Harvard law review. This
hypothetical case gave us an insight into the application of various legal theories.
Jurisprudence is essentially concerned with these theories or philosophies of law rather than
the actual practice. This case has drawn so much theoretical interest that apart from the five
opinions of the fictitious judges of the Supreme Court of Newgarth that were initially published
in Fuller’s paper, there have been various other opinions on the same too. The case of the
Speluncean Explorers is aimed at introducing students of the philosophy of law to diverse legal
theories.
Facts: This is a case involving murder and cannibalism. The four accused explorers were
stranded in a cave with a fifth explorer named Roger Whetmore.
They were stranded as the cave’s entrance was obstructed due to a landslide. The 5 explorers
only carried minimal provisions and did not have any food to survive for long.
Luckily for them, on the twentieth day, they noticed a portable wireless machine in the cave
which could help them contact people at the rescue camp through a similar machine that was
installed there. Through this, they contacted the rescue team and soon enough, rescue efforts
were underway.
The rescuers, however, had a tough time navigating their way through consequent landslides
and informed the explorers that it would take about 10 days to rescue them. During the rescue
process, unfortunately, ten of the rescuers lost their lives due to fresh landslides.
Post a discussion with medical experts regarding their situation, the explorers learned that there
was little to no possibility of their survival for an additional 10 days without any food. Roger
Whetmore suggested that they should kill and eat one of the members of the group for survival.
The other explorers agreed but did not know how they should go about choosing the prey. No
rescuer, doctor, member of the government, or priest offered advice regarding this situation
when the explorers asked.
So, they decided to throw a dice and leave it to luck. Before throwing the dice, Roger
Whetmore, albeit the one to originally suggest the idea, realised he couldn’t go through with it
and withdrew.
The others however were keen on going ahead with the plan and threw the dice anyway without

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excluding Whetmore so as to improve their chances at survival.
Unfortunately for him, the dice went to Whetmore’s disadvantage and he was killed and eaten
by the four accused.
The four living explorers were finally rescued on the 32nd day. Whetmore was killed and eaten
on the 23rd day, 9 days earlier.
The medical experts deduced that there was a chance of all five surviving had the four survivors
not cannibalised Whetmore.
After being rescued, the 4 surviving explorers were treated for malnutrition and shock. Post
this, they were tried for murder and consequently awarded capital punishment by the Court of
General Instances of the County of Stowfield.
They then proceed to file a review petition in the Supreme Court of Newgarth.
Upon appeal, the case is decided by a bench of 5 judges namely, Chief Justice Truepenny,
Justice Foster, Justice Tatting, Justice Keen, and Justice Handy.
Chief Justice Truepenny upholds the conviction of the four accused explorers. In his opinion,
the trial that led to their initial conviction was a fair and just one that simply followed the route
of law.
He begins stating his reasons for holding the accused guilty by reiterating what the basic statute
states, which is “Whosoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death”.
Justice Truepenny takes the viewpoint of an exclusionary legal positivist and plainly states that
law is to be considered as law and the language of the statute is such that it does not permit any
exceptions whatsoever. So, he believed there was no choice but to uphold the conviction. In
this way, he, as a positivist, shows complete and utmost regard for the law.
Justice Foster overturns the initial judgement and acquits the accused. He was a natural law
theorist and hence takes that approach to justify his decision.
Justice Foster was critical of Chief Justice Truepenny’s logical positivist approach as he
believed in the maxim “cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex” which translates to ‘When the
reason for a law ceases to exist, the law itself ceases’.
This essentially means that we have the law for a reason and once the reason disappears, the
law disappears as well.
Justice Foster believed that ten rescue workers losing their lives in an effort to save that of five
explorers being deemed as right and saving the lives of four explorers at the cost of one being
deemed as wrong.
Saying so, Justice Foster stated that the value of life, in this case, is overrated. The rescuers
knew what they were getting into and the associated risks. He was of the opinion that if ten
lives were expendable to save five, saving four lives at the expense of one should be allowed
too.
Justice Tatting recuses himself from the matter stating that there is no way to distinguish the
principles according to which the case can be decided in a free and rational manner. That said,
he does criticize Justice Foster’s natural law position.
He argued that if the defendants were right to kill Whetmore, then in a situation wherein
Whetmore kills them in self-defense, pleading the same wouldn’t get him acquitted. That,
however, is inconsistent with the self-defense theory which is a legitimate ground for acquittal
when self-defense is exercised proportionally and within limits.
He also pointed out that Justice Foster fails to consider Whetmore’s withdrawal which took
place even before the dice was rolled.
He points out that another reason for the failure of the self-defense point of view would be that

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murder requires a willful act whereas self-defense is an impulse. In this scenario, the accused
acted in a wilful manner after prolonged deliberation and not impulsively.
Justice Keen favoured the death penalty and convicted the accused explorers. According to
him, the role of a judge is limited to applying the law.
Justice Handy acquitted the accused explorers and followed the approach of legal realism
which was connected to common sense. He appeals to public opinion and believes that the
defendants should be pardoned.
FUNCTIONS OF LAW
According to Corley and Reed (1986) law is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by
controlling authority and having legally binding forces.
Laws are created because they help prevent chaos within the business environment and society.
For example, In business, the law sets guidelines regarding employment regulations,
compliance, and even inter-office regulations.
Interpretation is the primary function of the Court. The law should be interpreted according to
the will of the legislature. Sometimes the role of the judge will shift from interpreter to giving
life to law and making the rule of law functional.
This is Judicial activism. Judge-made laws are the legal doctrines established by judicial
precedents rather than by a statute. Judges interpret a law in such a way as to create a new law.
Judge-made laws follow stare decisis doctrine
John Rawls does not discuss general ethics, but examines a particular aspect of ethics, namely,
justice. He presents theoretical arguments about general principles which can form the basis of
a just society, which he calls “Justice as Fairness”.
John Rawl’s concept of social justice gives emphasis to fairness, it must be fair to all, to the
most talented as well as the most disadvantaged section.
John Rawls argues that the adoption of two fundamental principles of justice would guarantee
a just and morally acceptable society:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
A to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
B attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity

SIGNIFICANCE OF JOHN RAWLS THEORY

The first principle ensures civil liberties to all and the second principle is similar to ‘positive
discrimination’.
Rawls tries to show (by imaging a hypothetical situation) how such principles would be
universally adopted, moving partly towards general ethical issues.
He introduces a theoretical “veil of ignorance”.
It ensures that all the “players” in the social game would be placed in a particular situation.
Rawls calls it the “original position.”
In this position, everyone only has a general knowledge about the facts of “life and society”.
Therefore, each player is to make a “rationally prudential choice” concerning the kind of social
institution they would enter into contract with.
Rawls argues that given his assumptions people would prefer liberal societies with freedoms
and liberties based on equality of opportunities, but with due allowance to the problems of

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various disadvantaged groups.
Rawls theory of justice can find concurrence with the one of the basic premises of the Indian
constitution that has provided for reservation to equalize the differences, and attempted to undo
the historic injustices meted out to certain communities.
Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words
of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning.
It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have been certain
principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the Courts. These principles
are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation’.
Meaning and Object
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the legislature’s intention conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used.
According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the process by which the courts seek to
ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it
is expressed.
As explained by Cooley: “Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former
is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author
intended to convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting
the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. This distinction has been widely
criticized.

UNIT-2
NEED FOR INTERPRETATION

i) WHAT IS INTERPRETATION
ii) PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION
iii) WHEN TO INTERPRET

CASE LAWS:
● GULF GOANS HOTELS CO. V. UNION OF INDIA, [(2014) 10 SCC 673]
● MS GITHA HARIHARAN AND ANOTHER V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND
ANOTHER, (AIR1999, 2SCC 228)
● D.M., ARAVALI GOLF CLUB V. CHANDER HASS, 2007 (14) SCALE 1
Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is
ambiguous, not clear; where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeating the object of the statute.
In R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, it was held that
“… If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the
Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision.”
In Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay same principle was observed
that “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the
intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court to take upon itself
the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.”

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 According to Blackstone the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by
exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which
are ‘either the words, the context, the subject-matter or the spirit and reason of the law’
REASONS FOR INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Legislative Language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may require interpretation;
and

Legislative Intent connotes the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’
pervading through the statute.

While interpreting Statutes following essentials are required:

Intention of the legislature.
Statute must be read as a whole in its Context.
Statute should be construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if statutory provision is
ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must be adopted which
will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that which
will give none.
If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.
CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES
A. Classification with reference to basis of Duration
(i) Perpetual statutes - It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its duration and such a
statute remains in force until its repeal which may be express or implied.
Temporary statutes - A statute is temporary when its duration is only for a specified
time and it expires on the expiry of the specified time unless it is repealed earlier.
Mandatory statute: A mandatory statute compels the performance of certain things or
compels that a certain thing must be done in a certain manner or form. It is a statute that
leaves nothing to the discretion of the Court in respect of compliance with its terms.
Mandatory statute relates to matters of substance, affects substantial rights, and is the
very essence of the thing required to be done. A mandatory provision in a statute is one
which if not followed renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void.
Directory statute: A directory statute is an enactment of a legislative body that indicates
only what should be done, with no provision for enforcement. The provisions of a
directory statute are matter of form only and do not affect any substantial right, and do
not relate to the essence of the thing to be done, so that compliance is a matter of
convenience rather than substance.
In Aeron Steel Rolling Mills v State of Punjab AIR 1960 Punj 55, the question before
the court was whether section 33B of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, which
empowered the State Government to transfer a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act from one Tribunal to another, was mandatory or directory.
The relevant portion of the provision read as follows—“ The appropriate Government
may, by order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein withdraw any proceeding
under this Act pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal and
transfer the same to another Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case
may be, for the disposal of the proceeding”.
The Court held— “A failure to comply with this provision is not likely to result in any

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 injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of interested person, or in the loss of any
advantage, the destruction of any right or the sacrifice of any benefit. On the other hand,
insistence on a strict compliance with it is likely to result in serious general
inconvenience of injustice to hundreds of innocent person who have no control over
Government without promoting the real aim and object of the legislature.
The power to transfer is not so limited by the direction to give reasons that it cannot be
exercised without following the directions given. No penalty has been provided for
failure to comply with the terms of provision and the enactment is silent in regard to
the consequences of non – compliance. No substantial rights depend on a strict
observance of this provision; no injury can result from ignoring it; and no Court can
declare that the principal object of the legislature that case should be capable of being
transferred has not been achieved. Considerations of convenience and justice plainly
require that this provision should be held to be directory and not mandatory.
C. Classification with reference to Objective
Enabling statutes – These statutes are which widens the scope with or without direction
on how to execute it.
Disabling statutes – These statutes restrict or cut down rights existing at common law.
Prohibitory statute – This type of statute which forbids the doing of certain things.
Codifying Statute – It presents and orderly and authoritative statement of the leading
rules of law on a given subject, whether those rules are to be found in statute law or
common law.
Consolidating statute – The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the whole
body of statutory law on a subject in complete form repeating the former statute.
B. Curative or validating Statute - A curative or validating statute is one passed to fix
problems in a previous law or to make legal proceedings, documents or actions valid,
even if they didn’t meet the legal requirements. These statutes often include phrases
like “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or court order.” They’re meant to make
previously unlawful actions legal or to overturn court decisions
Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa and others, the Supreme
Court of India explained that while deciding legal rights is a job for the courts, only the
legislature can pass laws to validate illegal actions or laws. However, when the validity
of a validating law is in question, the court must Whether the validation respects the
rights guaranteed by the constitution.
Repealing Statute – A statute which revokes or terminates another statute is a repealing
statute.
Amending Statute – It is a Statute which makes and addition to or operates to change
the original law so as to effectively carry out the purpose for which the original law was
passed
Judgement of the Supreme Court of India in the matter of GULF GOANS HOTELS
CO. LTD & OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS dated 22/09/2014 regarding
allegedly illegal constructions raised by the appellants. The Court has noted that "The
constructions raised by the appellants are not per se illegal in the conventional sense.
They are not without permission and sanction of the competent authority. What has
been alleged by the State and has been approved by the High Court is that such
constructions are in derogation of the environmental guidelines in force warranting
demolition of the same as a step to safeguard the environment of the beaches in Goa.

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Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (The natural guardians of
a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor’s
property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are … in the
case of a boy or an unmarried girl-the father, and after him, the mother: provided that
the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be
with the mother)
MS GITA HARIHARAN AND ANOTHER V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND
ANOTHER
… the word did not necessarily mean after the death of the father, on the contrary, it
[means] ‘in the absence off’ be it temporary or otherwise or total apathy of the father
towards the child or even inability of the father by reason of ailment or otherwise.”
He concluded that ascribing the literal meaning to the word ‘after’ cannot arise having
due regard to the object of the Act and the constitutional guarantee of gender equality,
since any other interpretation would render the statute void which ought to be avoided.
It held that both the father and mother are natural guardians of a minor Hindu child, and
the mother cannot be said to be natural guardian only after the death of the father as
that would not only be discriminatory but also against the welfare of the child, which
is legislative intent of HMGA, 1956.
D.M., ARAVALI GOLF CLUB V. CHANDER HASS 2007
In the year 1988, Haryana Tourism Corporation, hereinafter referred to as appellants
appointed the respondents as a Gardener in the golf club on daily wages. Later, in the
year 1989, they were asked to perform the duties of Tractor Drivers. They did so even
when there was no mentioning of this post under the Corporation required in the golf
club. However, the salary that they were paid was the same as that of the Gardener as
there was no mention of Drivers. Their services were later on continued as Gardener
only and when the respondents appealed against this, they were not heard as there was
no such post and it was mentioned that the golf club is a vast area and it would require
heavy machinery to operate in cleaning that area, and this would be a part of the job of
the gardener to drive those machines.
For the first issue, the court held that since there was no post of the Tractor Driver as
mentioned by the Corporation, therefore the respondents cannot be regularized for the
same post .
Considering the second issue, the court held that the High courts or any other court
have no authority to direct for the creation of a post as it is the job of the Corporation
per se and there should be no interference with the same.

UNIT-3

PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION REQUIRES TO ACCOMMODATE BASIC

PRINCIPLES

I) INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
II) EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS
III) UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QAUAMPEREAT

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 CASE LAWS:
● BADHSAHV.URMILA BADSHAH GODSE, [(2014) 1 SCC 188]
● PADMA SUNDARA RAO V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2002) 3 SCC 533
● AVTAR SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, AIR 1955 SC 1107

INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE (SENTENTIA LEGIS)

The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature
enacting it”, South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. V. S. Sarup Singh.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must
be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be
supposed to have been intended but what has been said. The key to the opening of every
law is the reason and spirit of the law. Each word, phrase or sentence, is to be construed
in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. Interpretation must depend on the
text and the context, as they are the bases of interpretation.
If the text is the texture, context gives the color. Neither can be ignored. A particular
clause or expression is construed by construing the whole instrument and any dominant
purposes that it may express.
BASIC PRINCIPLES/ GUIDING RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF
LAW

1. Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is;

2. Statute Must Be Construed As Whole;
3. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable
Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is
The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. The words
of a statute never should, in interpretation, be added to or subtracted from without almost a
necessity.

I. Avoiding addition or substitution of words

It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words in a statute.
The rules of interpretation do not permit addition or deletion unless the section itself stands
meaningless or of doubtful meaning.
Section 621-A(1) of Companies Act, 1956 provides for compounding by the Company La w
Board, of any offence punishable under the Act, not being an offence punishable with the
imprisonment only, or with imprisonment and also with fine, either before or after the
institution of any prosecution.
Question was whether a quasi Judicial body like Company Law Board can have the authority
to decide compounding of offences without taking prior permission from the court
It was held that Company Law Board has the power to compound the offences without the
permission of the Board. Since the legislature has not put any rider of prior permission; hence,
the court should not interpret it otherwise.
Section 42(1) of Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 enacts- no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or
permit the use of the vehicle in any public place save under the condition of the permit
A careful analysis of this provision will show :
(1) that it is not a punishing section and does not create any offence, (2) that it does not contain

12
any general prohibition applicable to every one, (3) that it imposes a responsibility only on
owners of transport vehicles and not on any body else, and (4) that the only prohibition which
it imposes on owners of transport vehicles is that they should not
(i) use or permit the use of such vehicles;
(ii) in a public place; and
(iii) in a particular manner except under the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by
the appropriate authorities for use of that vehicle in that place and in that manner.
Now the amendment is

Section 123 in The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

123. Riding on running board, etc.—(1) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall
carry any person or permit any person to be carried on the running board or otherwise than
within the body of the vehicle.
(2) No person shall travel on the running board on the top or on the bonnet of a motor vehicle.
II Avoiding rejection of words

As on the one hand, it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other
hand, effort should be made to give meaning to every word used by the legislature.
In the interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every
part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should
have effect. Therefore the words should not be wasted, except for compelling reasons.
III. Departure from the rule
The court, in the process of discharging its interpretative function, may correct the obvious
drafting errors, after having considered the intended purpose.
A departure from the rule of literal construction may be legitimate so as to avoid any part of
the statute becoming meaningless. It may therefore, be permissible to supply words, which
appear to have been accidentally omitted or adopt a construction, which deprives certain
existing words of all meaning.
Statute Must Be Construed As Whole
This principle states that statute should be interpreted ex visceribus actus, within the act’s four
corners. Every clause needs to be construed concerning the context and other clauses of the
Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the
subject matter.
The maxim Ex Visceribus Actus means that every part of the statute must be construed within
the four corners of the Act.
No provision should be interpreted in isolation.
The statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari material (on the same
subject matter),
the general scope of the statute, and
the mischief it is to remedy, is the basic context of any statute.
The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying
the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each component influences the meaning of
the other , would be different in each given case.
Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however significant or insignificant it
may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each section must be construed as a whole, whether
or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. They may be interdependent, each portion

13
throwing light, if need be on the rest.
In Chief General Manager (Telecom), NE Telecom Circle v. Rajendra Chandra Bhattacharjee
(1995)
The office Memorandum dated 14.12.1983 provided officer who will serve in North Eastern
region for a fixed tenure he considered for further posting at a station of his choice. Under this
provision, the respondent named his posting at Agartala of his choice posting, but he was
transferred to Dimapur. Respondent challenged the said before Central Administrative Tribunal
who quashed the impugned transfer order, hence this Appeal.
The memorandum object to give allowance was meant to attract persons outside the North
Eastern region to work in the region because of inaccessibility and difficult terrain.
Respondent for a majority of his tenure had served in Agartala region only being his home town
whether the respondents of that case were entitled to special duty allowance even though they
are residents of North Eastern region merely because of the posts to which they were appointed
When the provision relating to choice after completion of fixed tenure in North Eastern region
was studied in light of the policy as a whole, it was observed that this provision was made
applicable only for those persons who belonged to the region other North Eastern region. It
was admitted position that the respondent belonged to North East region, his home town was
Agartala in the State of Tripura, he was originally appointed and posted in that region and for
most of his service, he was posted at Agartala. In view of these facts, the Supreme Court
observed that respondent had no right to claim his posting at Agartala.
POPPATLAL SHAH V STATE OF MADRAS
The word sale in the madras sale tax while interpretation as a whole relates to a contract of sale
and not a contract for sale. Mere transactions taking place in Madras, while actual sales taking
place somewhere else does not attract the sale tax of madras.
Supreme Court observed that it is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain legislative
intent all constituent parts of the statute are to be taken into consideration along
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA V RAMA MEDICAL COLLEGE
The court held that even though medical colleges have been permitted to open colleges, they
till require permission from the medical council in case they want to increase the seats.
Unlimited powers have not been given to medical colleges as their statute has to be read with
the provisions of the medical council.

THE NEWSPAPERS LTD. V THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P. 1957

‘A’ was employed as a lino typist by the appellant company, on contractual basis, but on
allegations of incompetence he was dismissed from service. His case was not taken up by any
union of workers of the appellant company nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in
similar or-allied trades, but the U.P. Working Journalists Union, Lucknow, with which was one
of the respondents had no connection took the matter to the
Conciliation Board, Allahabad, and - ultimately the Government made a reference to the
Industrial Tribunal by a notification in which one of the points for determination
referred was as to- whether the services of the third respondent were wrongfully
terminated by the management.

The legality of the reference was challenged by the appellant and the question was
raised as to whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within
the definition of "industrial dispute" under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

14
Held, that the reference was bad because the dispute was not between the employer on the one
hand and his workmen on the other, nor could the U.P. Working journalists Union be
called " his workmen ", within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Though the making of a reference by the Government under the
Act is the exercise of its administrative powers, an
aggrieved party can question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to show that what
was referred was not an industrial dispute.
Statute To Be Construed To Make It Effective And Workable
Where alternative construction is possible, the court must give effect to that which will be
responsible for smooth working of system for which statute was enacted, rather than to put
hindrances on its way. This is known as Construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
The interpretation should be construed to make the statute workable, which secures the object,
unless crucial omissions or clear direction makes that end unattainable.
The meaning of the statute must be considered rather then the rendering the statute a nullity.
Plain words require no construction. This starts with the premise that the words are plain and
that the conclusion can be arrived at after construing the words.
Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words
shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision
from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the
test of the statute.” [Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 :
AIR 2003]
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was
changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days
of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor
vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must
be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”.
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah (2013)
In the facts of the present case, we are dealing with a situation where the marriage between the
parties has been proved. However, the petitioner was already married. But he duped the
respondent by suppressing the factum of alleged first marriage. On these facts, in our opinion,
he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage
of his own wrong.
The parties had been living together for a long time and on that basis question arose as to
whether there would be a presumption of marriage between the two because of the said reason,
thus, giving rise to claim of maintenance under Section 125,Cr.P.C. by interpreting the term
“wife” widely.
The Court has impressed that if man and woman have been living together for a long time even
without a valid marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage entitling such a woman to
maintenance should be drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain
application under Section 125,Cr.P.C
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QAUAM PEREAT
The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ is an important principle of interpretation of
statutes which literally means: “It may rather become operative than null”. The effect of this
maxim is that an enacting provision or a statute has to be so construed to make it effective and
operative.

15
While interpreting any provision, the courts should not lean towards a construction that renders
any provision or the statute void or futile. Hence, whenever the words used in a provision are
imprecise, uncertain, and ambiguous thereby leading to the possibility of alternative
constructions, then the courts should construe the provision in such a manner that none of the
provisions of the statute is turned inoperative.
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is based on the following principles and
presumptions:
A statute should not be declared void for vagueness.
When the courts embark on interpreting a provision, the first and foremost necessity is that the
law survives.
While pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the courts must start with the
presumption in favor of its constitutionality.
The true interpretation of a provision or a statute is one that is in accordance with the intention
of the legislature. The intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise than to give effect to all
the provisions of the statute for achieving the object for which the law was enacted.
Adopting an interpretation by which any provision is rendered inoperative or unworkable will
be adverse to the legislative intent.
The courts are to interpret the law and the making and repealing of legislation is the exclusive
domain of the legislature. In such circumstances, any interpretation by which any provision or
statute turns futile amounts to a rejection of law and that is not within the jurisdiction of courts.
Courts can strike down a law on the ground of unconstitutionality but the courts cannot
introduce any vagueness or unconstitutionality in a provision by adopting a peculiar
construction or construing a provision in a particular manner
Avtar Singh v. the State of Punjab (1965)
In this case the question arose regarding the interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act,
1910.The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity from the Punjab State Electricity
Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act and the respondent proceeded against him
under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the appeal filed by the appellant, he did
not challenge the finding that he had committed the theft but only raised a question of law that
his conviction was illegal in view of certain statutory provisions.
Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided that, “Whoever dishonestly abstracts,
consumes or uses any energy shall be deemed to have committed theft within the meaning of
the Indian Penal Code”. Hence, as per Section 39, an accused found guilty shall be punished
under Section 379 of the I.P.C.
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided for the procedure for conviction in the
following terms: No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against
the Act…. except at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person
aggrieved by the same.
The appellant contended that he could not be convicted under Section 39 as the procedure for
conviction as required by Section 50 was not followed. According to the appellant, his
prosecution was bad and incompetent as it was not at the instance of the Government or an
Electrical Inspector or a person aggrieved by the theft.
The Supreme Court held that since the offence is against the Electricity Act and not the I.P.C.,
the procedure provided under Section 50 must have been followed. The conviction of the
appellant was set aside.
Thus, the Court, in this case applied the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and avoided

16
the construction that would have rendered Section 50 inoperative and futile.
KB Nagpur, MD (Ayurvedic) v. the Union of India (2012) SC
In this case, the question arose regarding the construction of Section 7(1) of the Indian
Medicine Central Council Act, 1970. The said provision stated that the President, Vice
President, or member of the Central Council shall continue until his successor shall have been
duly elected or nominated. The clause “or until his successor shall have been duly elected or
nominated, whichever is longer” was challenged as being unconstitutional and violative
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, while applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, upheld the
constitutionality of Section 7(1) and held that the said provision was made by Parliament to
take care of situations when election to the post of President, Vice-President or member is
delayed for various reasons thereby ensuring that there is no vacuum in the membership of the
Central Council. The Court thus construed Section 7(1) so as to make it effective and operative.
Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. (2002)
The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is, whether after quashing of
notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”) fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification
under Section 6.
Section 6 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. Subject to the provisions of Part VII of
this Act, [when the] [appropriate Government] is satisfied after considering the report, if any,
made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose,
or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary
to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders…………
Court held that The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be
supposed and has been intended but what has been said.
Section 6 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose
(1)Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, [when the [appropriate
Government] [Substituted by Act 38 of 1923, Section 4, for " whenever it appears to the Local
Government" .] is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5 -A, sub-
section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a
declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government
or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders [and different declarations may be made
from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification
under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or
have been made (wherever required) under section 5-A, sub-section (2)] [Inserted by Act 13 of
1967, Section 3 (w.e.f. 12.4.1967).]:[6Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1),(i)published after the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of
1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall
be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the
notification;or(ii)published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the
notification:][Provided further] [Substituted by Act 13 of 1967, Section 3, for " Provided that"

17
(w.e.f 12.4.1967).] that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be
awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues
or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.[Explanation 1. In computing any of
the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by
an order of a Court shall be excluded.Explanation 2. Where the compensation to be awarded
for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public
revenues.] [Inserted by Act 68 of 1984, Section 6 (w.e.f. 24.9.1984).](2)[Every
declaration] [Substituted by Act 13 of 1967, Section 3, for " the declaration" (w.e.f.
12.4.1967).]shall be published in the Official Gazette, [and in two daily newspapers circulating
in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language,
and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving
of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the
declaration), and such declaration shall state] [Substituted by Act 68 of 1984, Section 6, for "
and shall state" (w.e.f. 24.9.1984).] the district or other territorial division in which the land is
situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have
been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.
However, in Padmasundara Rao's case supra, the Constitution Bench overruled Narasimhaiah
judgment on the ground that fixing another period of one year from the date of judgment for
making the section 6 declaration, would amount to legislation by judicial fiat.
The Supreme Court observed that courts can only interpret the law and cannot legislate and
that if a provision of law is misused or subjected to abuse of process of law, it would be for the
legislature to amend, modify or repeal the law.

UNIT-4
RULES OF STATUORY INTERPRETATION
LITERAL RULE
CASE LAWS
● TEJ KIRAN JAIN V. N. SANJIVA REDDY, [(1970) 2 SCC 272]
● B.N. MUTTOV. T.K. NANDI (DR.) (1979) 1 SCC 361

RULES WORDS ASSOCIATED WITH RULES

18
 LITERAL RULE TRUE MEANING/PLAIN MEANING/NATURAL MEANING/OR
DINARY/PRIMARY MEANING

GOLDEN RULE REMOVING AMBIGUITY OF LITERAL RULE

MISCHIEF RUL DEFECT/LOOPHOLE/REMEDY/inadequacy/limitation/PURPOSI

E VE APPROACH

TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE TRUE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION

HARMONIOUS CONFLICT BETWEEN MINIMUM 2 RULE/PROVISION

RULE

EJUSDEM GEN WHEN THERE IS CLEAR CATEGORY FOLOWED BY WORDS

ERIS WHICH

ARE NOT CLEAR. EX: IN ANY

CASE/ANY OTHER/SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES/SIMILAR NA

TURE/OR

ORTHERWISE /WHATSOEVER/
BENEFICIAL R BENEFIT TO A PARTICULAR CLASS
ULE

NOSCITOR A S ASSOCIATED WORDS TAKE MEANING FROM ONE ANOTHE

OCISSIS R

Literal Rule of Interpretation

The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning rule, is a type of statutory construction.
The literal rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by judges.
Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or ordinary meaning and
applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss on the words or seek to make sense of the
statute.
The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation in the absence of a
contrary definition within the statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal
meaning.

19
The courts are enjoined to take the words as used by the legislature and too give them the
meaning which naturally implies as held in Molar Mal (deceased) v. Kay Iron Works (Pvt.)
Ltd.
If the language used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, a court of law at the present
day has only to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense; ‘Verbis plane expressis
amnino standum est’.
Advantages of the Literal rule
Restricts the role of the judge
Provides no scope for judges to use their own opinions or prejudices
Upholds the separation of power
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
Whitely v Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147

A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any person entitled to vote.' The defendant used
the vote of a dead man.
The statute relating to voting rights required a person to be living in order to be entitled to vote.
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394

The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his shop window with a price tag on it. Statute
made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such flick knives for sale.
Under section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (which was expanded in
1961, after this case finished, to deal with the gap in the law):
(1) Any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives to
any other person—

(a) any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button,
spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a “flick
knife” or “flick gun”; or
(b) any knife which has a blade which is released from the handle or sheath thereof by the force
of gravity or the application of centrifugal force and which, when released, is locked in place
by means of a button, spring, lever, or other device, sometimes known as a “gravity knife” shall
be guilty of an offence ... and in the case of a second or subsequent offence to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding...or to both such imprisonment
and fine.
(2) The importation of any such knife as is described in the foregoing subsection is hereby
prohibited
Whitely v Chappel
Held: The literal rule was applied and the defendant was thus acquitted.
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394

His conviction was quashed as goods on display in shops are not 'offers' in the technical sense
but an invitation to treat. The court applied the literal rule of statutory interpretation.

Motipur Zanzindary Company Private Limited v. state of Bihar

Under s. 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, the Government issued a notification exempting
certain goods from the payment of sales tax, including "green vegetables other than potatoes,

20
except when sold in sealed containers".
The appellant who was a producer of sugar can was assessed to sales tax. He contended that
sugar cane was a green vegetables and was exempted from tax and that he was not a dealer
as defined in s. 2 (c) of the Act and could not be assessed to sales tax. The question was
whether sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables or not
The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a taxing statute the natural and ordinary
meaning Of a word should be the 'correct meaning.
In the present instance the word vegetables should be interpreted in its natural and popular-
sense and that dictionary meaning is not of such help here. Vegetables as the normal people
mean by it are those which can-be grown in a kitchen garden or farm to be used for the table,
that is to say, to be eaten during lunch or dinner. Sugarcane definitely does not fall under this
category.
Held, that sugar cane was not a green vegetable and was not exempted under the
notification.
Partridge v Crittenden (1968) 2 All ER 421

The defendant placed an advertisement in a classified section of a magazine offering some

exquisite birds for sale. S.6 of the Protection of Birds Act 1954 made it an offence to offer such
birds for sale. He was charged and convicted of the offence and appealed against his conviction.
The court held that the defendant's conviction was quashed. The advert was an invitation to
treat not an offer. The literal rule of statutory interpretation was applied.
R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446

The defendant bit off his victim's nose. The statute made it an offence in case anyone causes
'to stab, cut or wound’.
The court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did not come within the meaning of
stab, cut or wound as these words implied an instrument had to be used. Therefore the
defendant's conviction was quashed.
R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303 House of Lords

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to
another under s.5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. A package containing £500 worth of
cannabis was found in his car. The defendant stated the cannabis belonged to a friend and that
the friend was picking it up later..
The trial judge convicted him and ruled that his action in handing the drugs back to the friend
was an action of supply. On Appeal, his conviction was reinstated because "The word "supply,"
in its ordinary natural meaning, connotes the mere transfer of physical control of some chattel
or object from one person to another.
This was dissented by a judge stating that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a
depositee, or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described
as an act of supplying goods to another. In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant, the left
luggage officer, the warehouseman and the shoe mender do not 'supply' to their customers the
articles which those customers have left with them."
The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the
application as invalid.

21
RAINBOW STEEL LIMITED V COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX
The question was whether a thermal plant sold in perfect condition would be an old machinery
within UP Sales Tax. According to the government old, discarded, unserviceable and obsolete
machinery would attract 5 % tax. The court held that while constructively giving the meaning
to the word ‘old’ visa vi enactment it means discarded, unserviceable and obsolete. Thus
thermal plant would not be regarded as old machinery.
K.B. NAGPUR V UNION OF INDIA
Indian medical council Act provided that the President, Vice President and members of central
council shall continue till the successor is duly nominated or elected is not violative of Article
14. This provision is not arbitrary as it would take care of certain emergency situation, and old
members can take a decision till the new members are elected

London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278

A railway worker was killed while oiling the track. No look out notice had been provided. A
statute provided compensation payable on death for those 'relaying or repairing' the track.
Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either of these categories.
This result although very harsh could not to be said to be absurd so the golden rule could not
be applied. There was no ambiguity in the words therefore the mischief rule could not be
applied. Unfortunately the widow was entitled to nothing
Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899) AC 143
The Betting Act 1853 made it an offence to keep a house, office, room or other place for the
purposes of betting. The House of Lords had to decide if the statute applied to enclosure at
Kempton Park Racecourse The defendant argued that he operates an outside place
Held:

House, office, room or other place' because the list of words indicated that 'other place' should
be construed as an indoor place. The court held that the other items mentioned in the statute
related to places indoors whereas plea of enclosure was outside. There was thus no offence
committed.

Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India

Section 6 , in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that the Chairman and other members
of the council shall hold office for a period of three years. Sub- section 7 of section 6 of the
Press Council Act, 1978 provides: ‘A retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not
more than one term.’ Question was whether a person who had already been a member of the
Council for two terms earlier and now is retired whether he is eligible for being nominated
The Supreme Court applied the literal and grammatical meaning of these words and held that
the provision applied to a member “just retiring” and not to a retired member and that a retired
member who had held office for two terms sometime in the past is not debarred from being
nominated again.
Tej Kiran Jain And Others v. N. Sanjiva Reddy And Others, 1970’
The appellants filed a suit against Shri Sanjiva Reddy (former Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Shri
Y. B. Chavan (Home Minister) and three members of Parliament asking for a compensation of
Rs. 26000, claiming that during the calling attention motion of the Lok Sabha, they made
Defamatory statements against THEM.
The motion was to discuss the behaviour of The Shankaracharya at The World Hindu Religious

22
conference held in Patna. He was reported to have remarked that Untouchability was in
harmony with the tenets of Hinduism and added that no law could come in its way, he was also
believed to have walked out when National Anthem played at the event.
The appellants contended that the respondents “gave themselves up to the use of language
which was more commonplace than serious, more lax than dignified, more unparliamentary
than sober and jokes and puns were bandied around the playful spree, and His Holiness was
compared as dog.
QUESTION WAS WHETHER PARLIAMENTARY PRIVELEGES U/A 105 gave immunity
against the irregularity of procedure, not its illegality OR COMPLETE IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court in its judgement elucidated that the meaning of Art. 105 as explained in
the constitution is pretty clear. It uses the word ‘anything’ which refers to everything, further
‘in Parliament’ refers to during the sitting of the parliament when the proceedings are in course
S.A.Venkataraman v. The State
Section 6 of THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947
Previous sanction necessary for prosecutions.-
(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 164
or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub -section (2) or sub-section (3A) of Section
5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction,-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is
not removable from his office gave by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the
Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not
removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State
Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
The court said that this case dealt with Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was to
do with taking a sanction from an appropriate authority .It considers only the present working
employees as employees, those who have retired are not considered as employees. The court
said, “In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to
give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough.
Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnatli Singh, 14 AIR 1954 SC 749
The Election Tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under section 123(7) of
Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had employed more
persons than prescribed for election purpose and that the salary of this persons exceeded the
maximum election expenditure permissible under the law.
The contention of the appellant was that all those persons who had campaigned for him in the
election were in the· employment of his father and were thereby receiving salaries from his
father by virtue-of their employment.
As far as he was concerned, he had not made payments to; them exceeding the permissible
limit.
The Supreme Court, following the grammatical interpretation said that the meaning of section
123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was quite clear and, therefore, as far as these campaigners were
concerned they were merely volunteers campaigning· for the appellant
Ranjit Udeshi v. State 'Of Maharashtra
The appellant was convicted under Section 292, Indian Penal Code by the High Court for

23
selling an obscene book titled Lady Chatterley's Lover the sale of which was banned by the
Government of India. the appellant contended before the Supreme Court that mens rea of the
accused had always to :be proved to maintain conviction under criminal.law.
Since the prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, that is to say, that the appellant sold or kept
for selling the obscene book with the knowledge that the book was obscene, the conviction was
unjustified.
He further argued :that there are such a large number 0f books these days in bookstalls and
their contents so different from each other that a book seller cannot possibly know and is not
expected to know the contents of each book and cannot, therefore, be convicted. in the absence
,of a guilty mind.
The Supreme Court held that knowledge of obscenity was not an essential element of the
offence under Section 292, Indian Penal Code. The section is plain and its meaning
unambiguous. The Court must give natural meaning to the words used in the section and on
this count the contention of the appellant held no water.
DISADVANTAGES
Lead to injustice
Creates awkward precedents which require Parliamentary time to correct.
Fails to recognise the complexities and limitation of English language.
Undermines public confidence in the law
B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi
A government servant (B.N. Mutto) was residing in a government allotted accommodation and
his own house was leased to the respondent (T.K. Nandi). Later on, the government took
decision that government servants who own houses in the locality should vacate the
government accommodation. However, before the order of government to vacate the premises,
he had retired from the service. The question arose whether he can get the benefit of sec. 14A,
and Sec. 25b(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act .
Under section 14, a court cannot transfer possession unless it is a special circumstance. Section
14(1)(e) provides an exception to this. It states that a transfer can be made where the landlord
has the bonafide necessity to live there. Section 14A conferred a right to recover immediate
possession of premises to certain persons. The Apex Court observed that a reading of Section
14A discloses that a right to recover immediate possession of premises accrues to certain
persons if the requisite conditions are satisfied. It may be noted that the section does not require
that the person occupying the premises allotted by the central government should be a
government servant.
Therefore the court held that the landlord who retired before the date on which the Government
gave the notice to quit is also entitled to the benefits of section 14A and allowed the appeal
with costs.

UNIT-5
RULES OF STATUORY INTERPRETATION
GOLDEN RULE
CASE LAWS:
● D. SAIBABA VS BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA &ANR AIR2003SC2502

24
● G. NARAYANASWAMI V. PANNERSEVAN(1972) 3 SCC 717

The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied where an application of the literal
rule would lead to an absurdity. The courts may then apply a secondary meaning.
The Golden rule is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart from a word’s
normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.
It is a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule,
it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead to
an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the judge can depart from
this meaning.
This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there
is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.
For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not use lifts in case of fire.” Under the
literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However,
this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously
to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.
The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to
principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning.
R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
Allen, having a wife, went through a ceremony of marriage with another woman. He was
charged as guilty of bigamy. He argued that he could not validly “marry” another person while
being married. under s.57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states
'whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former
husband or wife is guilty of an offence'
Held:

The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry' should be interpreted as 'to go
through a marriage ceremony'. The defendant's conviction was upheld.

Re Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch 98
A man had planned, murdered his mother and then committed suicide. Under the plain terms
of section 46 Administration of Estates Act 1925 , as the woman had died intestate her murderer
stood to inherit substantially her entire estate, which would then have passed to his descendants.
This was challenged by other members of the woman's family .
The court used the golden rule to find in favour of the family members, preventing the son's
descendants as a matter of public policy from profiting from his crime.
An example of the same is S. 125 of the CrPC which deals with maintenance given to women.
The court while interpreting the term ‘wife’ included those women who have entered into
bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced women. The court has stated that even though a
woman may have relinquished her rights on divorce, she may claim maintenance u/s 125 as
she will she be regarded as a ‘wife’ 10 years after such divorce.
Further, in the case of Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors the
courts interpreted that Article 21 shall be available to non-citizens as well as citizens.
Lee v Knapp
The defendant committed a breach of section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, which

25
provides that if in any case owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road an accident
occurs; whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the
motor vehicle shall stop and then move away. The defendant committed an accident, stopped
his car and moved away.
Court had to interpret the word STOP
The golden rule of interpretation is in case of accident, the person has to stop for reasonable
period.
Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the
section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make
necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot of accident
Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore
The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in section 14 of U.P.
Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was
limited to “landless laborers”. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having
no agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless
businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement,
which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A
businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act
State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum (1963)
The respondents were the owners of 55 bighas and 7 biswas of land in two villages.
Their lands along with nearby lands were acquired by the appellant for his use without notice.
The respondents were not informed about the acquisition through a notice and were not present
at the time of the award.
The Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 96 per acre but the respondents a year
later contended the valuation of their lands. The senior subordinate judge rejected their
application as it was already 6 months since the sale and was thus beyond the period of
limitation as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Issue of the case
Whether the limitation period starts from the day of judgment or from the day of getting the
knowledge of the award
The Supreme Court held that the parties must first come to know the award in order to make
an application for reference under Section 18. The parties were not informed of the award by
notice.
Since the parties got to know of the award on a later date, the limitation period for Section 18
would start from this date and not the date on which the compensation was awarded.
In this case, the Court applied the golden rule to modify the meaning of the provision to include
the start of the limitation period from the date of receiving the notice of award
D Saibaba vs Bar Council of India AIR 2003
The appellant is a person with an orthopedic handicap. He was allotted an STD booth in the
quota of handicapped persons to earn a livelihood. As time went by he graduated from Law
school and was enrolled as a lawyer under the Advocates Act, 1961. Thereafter, he commenced
apprenticeship where he served his legal duties from 10 am to 5 pm by attending the Courts in
the chambers of his senior. In the meantime, his father had retired from service, and took up
the task of looking after of the STD booth.
As the allotment stood in the name of the appellant, he was advised by the Bar Council to
surrender the booth. He sought time on the ground that there were outstanding dues that needed

26
to be collected which would be difficult to do if he abruptly surrendered the booth.
The Bar Council, however, was not inclined to give more time and issued an order for the
cancellation of his name from the Roll of Advocates.
Faced with this situation, the appellant, within a few days of the order of the Bar Council,
surrendered the license to operate the STD booth and appealed to the Bar Council to recall or
suitably modify its earlier order directing deletion of his name from roll of Advocates in view
of his corrective action.
The Supreme Court held that the Bar Council should have condoned the innocuous lapse on
the part of the appellant by exercising its Review jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court further held that the Bar Council should have taken a sympathetic view
and permitted the appellant to continue in his work to becoming a full fledged lawyer, after
surrendering the booth.
In view of these observations, the Supreme Court impugned that the order of the Bar Council
should be set aside and that the enrolment of the appellant as an advocate be restored.

Adler v George (1964) aka RAF case

You cannot obstruct a member of HM forces engaged in security duty in the vicinity of a
prohibited place.
Adler gained access to a RAF station (a prohibited place within the meaning of the Official
Secrets Act 1920) and was actually within its boundaries. He obstructed a member of Her
Majesty's forces engaged in security duty in relation to the station.
Adler pleaded not guilty because ‘in the VICINITY of a prohibited place’ suggests NOT ON
the premises but nearby.
The courts felt that this was not the Parliament’s intention, and therefore the literal rule led to
an absurd literal meaning.
Therefore the GOLDEN rule was applied whereby the it was held that the defendant was guilty
of the offence because "in the vicinity of" should be interpreted to mean ON OR NEAR the
prohibited place.
G.Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 aka Graduation Case
The appellant’s election, held on April 11, 1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from the
Madras District Graduates’ Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High
Court.
Grounds in HC • The Appellant Narayana-swami, who had only passed the High School
Leaving Examination and was not a Graduate, could not be elected at all to the Legislative
Council from the Graduates’ Constituency.
secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of the very concept of representation of especially
qualified persons that an individual who does not possess the essential or basic qualification of
the electors should be a representative of those who are to be represented because of this special
qualification of theirs.
The term “electorate”, used in Article 171(3), (a), (b) and (c) has neither been defined by the
Constitution nor in any enactment by Parliament. • Section 2(1) (a) of the Representation of
People Act 43 of 1951, however, says: “ ‘elector’, in relation to a constituency means a person
whose name is entered in the electoral roll of that constituency for the time being in force and
who is not subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1950.”

27
 Section 16 of the Representation of People Act, 43 of 1951, lays down the qualifications of an
elector negatively by prescribing who shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll.
A disqualified person is one who: “(a) is not a citizen of India; or (b) is of unsound mind and
stands so declared by a competent court; or (c) is for the time being disqualified from voting
under the provisions of any law relating to corrupt practices and other offences in connection
with elections.”
whether the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate to stand in the elections?
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “electorate” is confined to the body of persons who
elect. • It does not contain, within its ambit, the extended notion of a body of persons electing
representatives “from amongst themselves”. • Thus, the use of the term “electorate”, in Article
171(3) of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a limit upon the field of choice of
members of the electorate by requiring that the person to be chosen must also be a member of
the electorate.
The language as well as the legislative history of Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and
Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us to presume a deliberate omission
of the qualification that the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate. • In our
opinion, no absurdity results if we presume such an intention. We cannot infer as the learned
Judge of the Madras High Court had done, from the mere fact of such an omission and opinions
underlying Article 171 of our Constitution, that the omission was either unintentional or that it
led to absurd results.
By adding a condition to be necessary or implied qualifications of a representative of the
Graduates which the Judge had really invaded the legislative sphere. The defect, if any, in the
law could be removed only by law made by Parliament. •
The appellant possesses all the qualifications laid down for such a candidate. Therefore, we
allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment of Madras High Court
CRITICISM OF GOLDEN RULE
It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis lack of wider contextual
understandings of “meanings.”
The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve situations where
difficult choices have to be made between several fairly plausible arguments, not situations
where the words lead to obvious absurdities.
The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic

UNIT-6
STATUTORY RULE OF INTERPRETATION
MISCHIEF RULE

CASE LAWS:
● R.M.D CHAMARBANGWALA V. UNION OF INDIA, (AIR 1957 SC 628)
● SMITH V. HUGHES, [(1960) 1 W.L.R. 830]
● S.R. CHAUDHURI V. STATE OF PUNJAB (2001) 7 SCC 126

28
Mischief means "Voluntarily cause injury or loss to someone“
Mischief rule is a rule of interpretation to prevent misuse of provisions of the statute.
Mischief rule is framed to avoid any mischief added by the statute.
This rule is so interpreted that any mischief in statute must be avoided and object and purpose
of passing the act by the legislature is attained.
The main aim of the rule is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
In applying the Mischief Rule, the court is essentially asking what part of the law did the law
not cover but was meant to be rectified by the parliament in passing the bill.
The rule was first laid out in a 16th-century ruling of the Barons of the Exchequer Court in
Heydon’s case which have been continually cited with approval and acted upon.
The main aim of the rule is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
It is also called purposive construction rule, for the aim of this rule is to cure or prevent the
mischief of the language of the statute or document, and give effect to its intention or purpose.
As per this rule, the meaning and purport of the statute or document is explored and interpreted
in that way.
Mischief Rule laid by the Barons of the Exchequer in the Heydon's case (Heydon 's case (1584)
3 Co R) as follows, namely- "That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general
four things are to be discerned and considered:
(1) What was the common law before the making of the Act?
(2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
(3) What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed to cure it
(4) The true reason of the remedy and the judges to always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy
Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange
The appellant/petitioner, a dealer in scented supari, was charged with the offence of having
sold scented supari with saccharin and cyclamate, prohibited artificial sweeteners, in
contravention of S. 7(i)(ii) and rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and
thereby having committed an offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act.
QUESTION WAS WHETHER Supari is food within the meaning of S. 2(v) of the Act.
Court held that Supari is food within the meaning of S. 2(v) of the Act. The Act defines 'food'
very widely as covering any article used as food and every component which enters it and even
flavoring matter and condiments. In food offenses mischief rule to be applied. Appellant will
be liable
Smith v. Huges, 1960 WLR 830, in this case around the 1960s, the prostitutes were soliciting
in the streets of London and it was creating a huge problem in London. This was causing a
great problem in maintaining law and order. To prevent this problem, Street Offences Act, 1959
was enacted. After the enactment of this act, the prostitutes started soliciting from windows
and balconies.
Further, the prostitutes who were carrying on to solicit from the streets and balconies were
charged under section 1(1) of the said Act. But the prostitutes pleaded that they were not
solicited from the streets. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the
balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act,
1959, and that accordingly no offence had been committed.
The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street

29
or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a
common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.
Considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act, Everybody knows that this was an Act
intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being
molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether
the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, Hence
she would be liable.
Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871.
Issues of the case were as follows- Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to
round up the cattle grazing on the government land. The MCD rounded up 25-30 cattle
belonging to Kanwar Singh. The preamble of the statute authorized the corporation to round
up the abandoned cattle as they were causing a nuisance when left unattended. It was contended
by Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of ownership and those cattle that
were rounded up belonged to him and hence, were not abandoned.

The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word abandoned must be
interpreted to mean not only let loose or left unattended and even the temporary loss of
ownership would be covered as abandoned. In the Act before us when the legislature used the
word "abandoned" it did not intend to say that the cattle must be ownerless.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Sri Krishna Manufacturing Company, AIR 1962
SC 1526, Issue, in this Case, was that the respondent concerned was running a factory where
four units were for manufacturing. Out of these four units one was for paddy mill, other three
consisted of flour mill, saw mill and copper sheet units. The number of employees there were
more than 50. The RPFC applied the provisions of Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952
thereby directing the factory to give the benefits to the employees.
The person concerned segregated the entire factory into four separate units wherein the number
of employees had fallen below 50, and he argued that the provisions were not applicable to him
because the number is less than 50 in each unit.
It was held by the court that the mischief rule has to be applied and all the four units must be
taken to be one industry, and therefore, the applicability of PFA was upheld.
S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001)***
According to Article 164(4), a Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a
member of the legislature of the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a
Minister. In its present judgment, the Supreme Court has held that it would amount to
subverting the Constitution if it permits an individual, who is not a member of the legislature,
to be appointed a Minister for a second term of "six consecutive months" without
himself/herself getting elected to the legislature in the meanwhile.
The court ruled that Article 164(4) is at best in the nature of an exception to the normal rule of
only members of the legislature being Ministers, with its effectiveness restricted to a short
period of six consecutive months. The court ruled: "The clear mandate of Article 164(4) that if
an individual concerned is not able to get elected to the legislature within the grace period of
six consecutive months, he shall cease to be a Minister, cannot be allowed to be frustrated by
giving a gap of few days and re-appointing the individual as a Minister, without his securing
the confidence of the electorate in the meanwhile.

R.M.D Chamarbangwala v. Union Of India, (AIR 1957 SC 628)

30
the constitutionality of the Prize Competitions Act 1955, was challenged on the ground that it
violated the Fundamental Right of the petitioners secured by Article 19(1(g).
The impugned Act, provided for the control and regulation of prize competitions. It was
contended that Section 2(d) of the impugned Act which defined the expression “prize
competitions” included not only competitions of a gambling nature but also those in which
success to a substantial degree depends on skill.
Having regard to the circumstances under which the impugned Act was passed, the Supreme
Court held that it was to control and regulate prize competitions of a gambling character.
Therefore, the Court stated that the application of impugned provision of the Act could be
restricted to the competitions of gambling character.
The provisions of the impugned Act were thus held severable in their application to
competitions, in which, success did not depend, to any substantial extent, on skill. The Court
held that when a Statute, was in part, void, it would be enforced as regards the rest, if that was
severable from what was invalid. Courts would be reluctant to declare a law invalid or ultra
vires on account of unconstitutionality.
Courts would accept an interpretation, which would be in favour of constitutionality rather
than the one which would render the law unconstitutional.

UNIT-7
STATUTORY RULE OF INTERPRETATION
HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
CASE LAWS:
● K.M NANAVATI V. STATE OF BOMBAY, (AIR 1961 SC 112)
● SPEEDLINE AGENCIES V. T. STANES& CO. LTD., (2010) 6 SCC 257
● THE REMINGTON RAND OF INDIA LTD. V. THE WORKMEN,AIR 1968 SC 224

According to this rule, a statute should be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should
be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute.
The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, between the different parts of an enactment and
conflict between the various provisions should be sought to be harmonized. The aim of the
courts are:-
i) An interpretation which makes the enactment consistent .
ii) A construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or
parts of the statute.
However, in the case in which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the
court’s decision shall prevail.
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
In this case, the trustees of an ancient, renowned temple of Sri Venkataramana, were managing
the temple on behalf of Gowda Saraswath Brahmin under a scheme. Madras Temple Entry
Authorization Act of 1947 which had for its object the removal of disability of Harijan from
entering the Hindu Public Temple, the trustees made a representation that the temple is a private

31
one and therefore outside the operation of the Act.
However, the Government did not accept that position and held that the said Act applied to the
temple.
The trustees argued that the temple was not defined under Madras Temple Entry Authorization
Act and it is offensive to Article 26(b) of the Constitution of India.
Dealing with the controversy that of the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act violated
Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution, the High Court held that a denominational institution
is also a public institution, Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution would apply, and therefore, all
classes of Hindus were entitled to enter into the temple for worship.
There is, it should be noted, a fundamental distinction between excluding persons from temples
open for purposes of worship to the Hindu public in genera on the ground that they belong to
the excluded communities and excluding persons from denominational temples on the ground
that they are not object within the benefit of the foundation. The former will be hit by Art. 17
and the latter protected by Art. 25.
Article 25 (2) (b) applies in terms to all religious institutions of a public character without
qualification or reserve. Public institutions would mean not merely temples dedicated to the
public as a whole but also those founded for the benefit of sections thereof, and denominational
temples would be comprised therein.
COMPLETE EXCLUSION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
25. THEREFORE, THE GENERAL PUBLIC MAY BE DISQUALIFIED TO ENTER THE
TEMPLE ONLY ON THE DAYS WHERE CEREMONIES ARE PERFORMED THAT ARE
INTEGRAL TO SARASWATH BRAHMIN. DISPUTE BETWEEN ARTICLE 25 AND
ARTCLE 26 WAS RESOLVED THROUGH HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.
M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha
Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinha who is a member of Bihar Legislative Assembly alleged the
Chief Minister of being partial in the selection process of his Ministers, transfers of public
servants and involvement and in corrupt administrative practices. A reference was made in his
speech to the case of a District Judge who was only ‘transferred' contrary to the advice of the
Chief Justice of Patna High Court who recommended his discharge.
Though the statement was expunged by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, the English
daily, ‘Searchlight', published an article reporting the entire speech of Mr. Maheshwar Prasad
Narayan Sinha, including the expunged parts as well.
Issues Whether the Constitution of India, under Article 194(3), empowers a State Legislative
Assembly to restrict any publication of a proceeding that has been witnessed by its members
or to prohibit the publication of the parts that has been directed to be expunged?

Whether the said privilege under Article 194(3) have an upper hand over the Article 19(1)(a)
which grants a Fundamental Right of ‘free speech and expression' to every citizen of India?

both Article 19(1)(a) & Article 194(3), both stand out to have equivalent importance and one
of them cannot be provided any privilege over the other. In cases of such a conflict, the principle
of ‘Harmonious Construction' shall adopted, relying upon which, Article 19(1)(a) stands
general and Article 194(3) stands special.
Hence, the court deduced a conclusion that the notice by the Assembly stands valid and the
petition stands dismissed.
Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh

32
Certain disputes between the employer and the workmen were referred to an industrial tribunal.
After adjudication, the tribunal sent its award to the government for publication. However,
before the award was published, the parties to the dispute came to a settlement and accordingly,
wrote a letter to the government jointly, intimating the fact that the dispute had been settled;
hence the award shall not be published.
On the government’s refusal to withhold the publication, the employer approached the High
Court for a writ or direction to the government to withhold the publication.
The High Court rejected the writ petition as well as the writ arising therefrom. The parties then
appealed by special leave to the Supreme Court.
The main contention of the appellants was that Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is directory in nature and not mandatory.
A mandatory statute or statutory provision is one which must be followed in order that the
proceeding to which it relates may be valid.
A directory statute or provision is one which need not be complied with in order
It is not always easy to determine whether a particular statute is mandatory or directory.
Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory, and the word ‘may’ is directory, although
they are often used interchangeably in legislation.
Section 17(1) states, ‘Every award shall within a period of thirty days from the date of its
receipt by the appropriate government be published in such manner as the appropriate
government thinks fit”.
The use of the word ‘shall’, the court observed, is a pointer to Section 17(1) being mandatory
in nature.
Section 17(2) states, ‘Award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be
called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever.
Section 17A, of the Industrial Disputes Act, provides that the award under Section 17 becomes
enforceable after thirty days of publication, though the government may declare certain
contingencies in which it may not be enforceable.
Section 18 (1) provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and
the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the
parties to the agreement.
The court read Section 17 and Section 17A together and declared that the intention behind
Section 17 is that the duty cast on the government to publish the award is mandatory and not
directory. And hence, the contention of the appellants did not hold good Though the Supreme
Court maintained that Section 17 (1) is mandatory, and ordinarily the government has to publish
an award sent to it by the tribunal, in special circumstances of the case and with a view to avoid
a conflict between a settlement binding under Section 18 (1), it held that the only solution is to
withhold the publication of the award as this would not in any way affect the mandatory
provision of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Raj Krushna Bose vs Binod Khanungo & others.
Two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict, were
brought forth in this case. Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can nominate or
second a candidate in election but Section 123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist
any candidate in election except by casting his vote.
The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be harmoniously interpreted
and held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate or second a candidate seeking
election in State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is

33
interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a
candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.
K M NANAVATI V STATE OF BOMBAY 1961
A Navy Commander KM Nanavati was accused of murdering his wife’s secret lover, Prem
Ahuja, and as a result, was held guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
He was charged under Section 302 and Section 304 of the IPC and the trial was held by a
Sessions Judge, Bombay and the special jury held him not guilty under both the sections
involved under IPC. However, the Sessions Judge was dissatisfied with the jury’s decision as
he felt that it was not a logical decision taking into view the evidence of the case. So, he took
the case to the High Court of Bombay giving reasons for his views. The High Court approved
the reasoning of the Sessions Judge. The High Court said that taking into account the
circumstances of the case, the offence could not be reduced from murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. The High Court held Nanavati guilty of the offence of murder and
this decision was further challenged in the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Governor of
Bombay by the use of power vested in him under Article 161 of the Constitution of India passed
an order for the suspension of Nanavati.
The decision of the Governor was questioned because when the suspension was ordered the
case was sub-judice under the Supreme Court. Applying the principle of harmonious
construction to settle the conflict that arose between the executive and the judiciary, the
Supreme Court held that Article 161 and the suspension by the Governor were not applicable
when the case was sub-judice

M/S Speedline Agencies vs M/S T.Stanes & Co.Ltd on 14 May, 2010**

The Supreme Court has ruled that a company which has amalgamated with another can evict a
tenant of the old firm from its premises for bona fide requirement of the new company which
has come into existence. In this case, Speedline Agencies vs T Stanes & Co, the landlord
company in Coimbatore had merged in another and formed a new one.
The original company had won the eviction of a tenant company from its premises. The tenant
company resisted the implementation of the decree as the original landlord was no longer in
existence after the amalgamation and the new landlord company had no right to evict old
tenants.
The amalgamated company argued that it wanted to expand its activities, and the premises were
wanted for that. The court agreed with it and observed: “If a landlord which is a company
cannot advance its interest in the business by amalgamating with another company by putting
to use its own property, it would be unjust, unfair and unreasonable.
In a case of landlord requiring the premises for its own use, the rent control law may clash with
the provisions of the Companies Act. The two Acts have to be harmoniously interpreted and
not interpreted as to result in the one Act destroying a right under the other Act.”
Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. The Workmen,AIR 1968
Section 17(1) of the Industrial, Disputes Act, 1947, makes it obligatory on the appropriate
Government to publish the award received by it from the Industrial Tribunal; but, the provision
in the section as to time, that the Government shall publish it within a period of thirty days
from the date of its receipt, is merely directory and not mandatory as contended.
Therefore, where the Government received the award on 14th October 1966 and published it
in the Gazette on the 15th November 1966, did the award cease to be enforceable
Under sub-s. (1) of s. 17-A an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from

34
the date of its publication under s. 17 and under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 an award is to remain in
operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable
under s. 17-A. From all these provisions it was argued that the limits of time mentioned
in the sections were mandatory and not directory and if an award was published beyond
the period of thirty days, in contravention of s. 17(1) it could not be given effect to.
Keeping the above principles in mind, we cannot but hold that a provision as to time in s.
17(1) is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the
Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the
publication of the award ought not to be held up. But the fixation of the period of 30 days
mentioned therein does not mean that the publication beyond
that time will render the award invalid

UNIT-8
MAXIMS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
● EJUSDEM GENERIS
● NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
CASE LAWS:
● UNION OF INDIA V. ALOK KUMAR, (AIR 2010 SC 2735)
● ASHBURY RAILWAY CARRIAGE & IRON CO. V. RICHE (1875) LR 7 HL 653

SUSIDIARY RULES FOR LITERAL INTERPRETATION

A. Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a Sociis literally means “It is known from its associates”.
Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words
can be derived from its association with other words within the context of the phrase.
This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are related to each other.
For example purse means clutch, Tote bag and sling bag even if it has not been mentioned
expressly.
In Commrs. v. Savoy Hotel, (1966) 2 All ER 299.
While dealing with the Purchase Tax Act, which used the expression ‘manufactured beverages
including fruit-juices and bottled waters and syrups etc.’, The question was whether orange
juice unsweetened and freshly prepared comes within the description or not.
• It was held that the description ‘fruit juices, as occurring therein should be construed in
the context of the preceding words and the orange juice unsweetened and freshly
prepared was not within the description
Pardeep Aggarbatti, Ludhiana vs State Of Punjab & Others on 23 October, 1997

35
 • The appellant is a registered dealer in 'dhoop' and 'aggarbatti' and we are concerned
with its assessment to sales tax thereon under the provisions of the Punjab General Sales
Tax Act, 1948, for the period 1973-74.
• Entry No.16 of Schedule A to the said Act. at the relevant time read thus;
• "Cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth-paste, tooth-power, kum-
kum and soap,"
• The appellant was sought to be made liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 10 paisa in a
rupee, as was leviable upon items falling under the said Entry No.16, on the basis that
'dhoop' and 'aggarbatti' were covered by the word "perfumery" therein which was
contented
• The word "perfumery" in the context in which it, is used has, therefore, no application
to 'dhoop' and 'aggarbatti’ as it dosent come under personal hygiene product.
• PLEASE REMEMBER
• When the object of the legislature is clear and then also words which has a wide
outreach is used then noscitor a sociis is not applied. For example interpretation
of words like TRADE, UNDERTAKING, BUSINESS, SERVICE used in
industrial dispute do not require noscitor a sociis.
B. CASUS OMISSUS
The term ‘omissus’ means “cases of omission”.
Omission in a statute cannot be supplied by construction.
A matter which should have been provided in a statute cannot be supplied by the courts.
A casus omissus cannot be supplied by courts by judicial interpretative process except in the
case of clear necessity and when the reason for it’s found in the four corners of the statute itself.
The first and primary rule of the construction is that the intention of the legislature must be
found in the word used by the legislature itself.
C. EJUSDEM GENERIS
When particular words pertaining to a class, category are followed by general words, the
general words are construed as limited to the things of the same kind as those specified. This
rule which is known as the rule of ejusdem generis.
WHEN THERE IS CLEAR CATEGORY FOLOWED BY WORDS WHICH ARE NOT
CLEAR. EX: IN ANY CASE/ANY OTHER/SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES/SIMILAR
NATURE/OR ORTHERWISE /WHATSOEVER/
In Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker, the Supreme Court has laid down
conditions that needs to be fulfilled for this rule of construction is used. They are:
The statute contains an enumeration of specific words.
The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category.

36
 There is no indication of a different legislative intent.
Characteristic of words are not changed
Difference between Noscitur A Sociis and Ejusdem Generis Rule

Noscitur A Sociis Ejusdem Generis

Latin term meaning ‘recognised by its Latin term meaning ‘of the same kind
partners’

Used for interpreting questionable Used for interpreting loosely written

words in statutes. statutes

It is broader in concept. This rule puts the It is narrow in concept. This rule puts the
word into
word into consideration the whole phrase.
consideration the nearby words.

Meaning of doubtful words can be known If a statute list specific classes of things then
from it has to be
the accompanying words or its association of referred as general
words

• In Evans v. Cross the words 'other devices' had to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of
the Road Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic signals' to include 'all signals,
warning sign posts, direction posts, signs, or other devices'. Applying the rule of
Ejusdem Generis the Court decide whether a painted white line on a road could be
called a traffic signal or not.
• Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held that a painted white line on a road
could not be called a traffic sign because devices are things, which a painted line on
road is not
Emperor v/s Ratansi Hirji

37
 • Section 412 -A of the Bombay Municipal Act required a person to acquire a license
before he could use any place for the sale of milk, butter or other milk products.
• Ratansi Hirji was a merchant who was dealing with ghee without obtaining license. The
State prosecuted him for not obtaining license. The question before the court was
whether ghee would came within the expression 'other milk products' and whether a
person does obtain a license for the sale of ghee
• THE COURT HELD THAT THE WORD ‘OTHER MILK PRODUCT’ SHOULD
BE CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT PRECEDED THOSE
WORDS. BY APPLYING THE RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS THE COURT
HELD THAT GHEE IS NOT OF THE SAME NATURE AS BUTTER AND
MILK. MILK AND BUTTER ARE SUBJECT. GHEE IS NOT LIABLE TO
SPEEDY DECAY. THUS IT IS NOT OF SAME NATURE OF GHEE AND
BUTTER.
• It will not be disputed that "ghee" is derived from milk but can it be
said of "ghee" as it can be said of cream, butter, whey or curd that it
is a direct product of milk
• For one thing "ghee" is not subject to the same speedy decay as these
products of milk along with milk are. In this respect "ghee" does not
resemble milk to the same extent as these products of milk do.
• "Ghee" is made from melted butter. Pure "ghee" no doubt is derived
from milk, as it is made from butter which is a product of milk.
"Ghee", however, is not the same as butter. It possesses certain
qualities, e, g., durability, which make it distinct from butter. In many
respects "ghee" and butter are put to different uses. Hence not guilty
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co
v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653***
• The rule of ultra vires was for the first time laid down by the House of
Lords in Ashbury Railway Carriage Company case. In Ashbury Railway
Carriage and Iron Company was incorporated and in its memorandum the
objects of the company were as to make and sell or lend on hires railway
carriage and wagons, to carry on the business of mechanical engineers
and general contractors and to purchase, lease, work and sell mines,

38
 minerals, land and buildings.
• The company entered into the agreement for financing the construction of
a railway line in Belgium with Riche and all the members ratified the
agreement.
• Later on the company repudiated the contract and subsequently stopped
the funds on the ground that it was ultra vires the company and
consequently Riche instituted a suit for damages for the breach of contract
against the company. Contentions raised by Riche were that the contract
was well within the meaning of words ‘general contractors’ and therefore
within the power of the company and the contracts were ratified by the
majority of the shareholders.
• It was Held by the House of Lords that the contract was beyond the objects
stated in the Memorandum of Association. The term general contractors
indicate those contracts which are connected with the business of
mechanical engineers. Even if all the shareholders or members agree or
desire to make contract valid it would amount to go beyond the objects of
the memorandum. Hence, the court held it to be ultra vires.
• It held that if a company pursues objects beyond the scope of the
memorandum of association, the company's actions are ultra vires
and void. Lord Cairns LC said,
• It was the intention of the legislature, not implied, but actually
expressed, that the corporations, should not enter, having regard to
this memorandum of association, into a contract of this description.
The contract in my judgment could not have been ratified by the
unanimous assent of the whole corporation. (NOSCITOR A SOCIIS)
Union of India v. Alok Kumar, (AIR 2010 SC 2735)**

• A simple but question of some significance under service

jurisprudence falls for consideration in the present appeals,
whether or not under the relevant Rules and provisions of the

39
 Act, the Railway Authorities have the jurisdiction to appoint
a retired employee of the Department as `Inquiry Officer'
within the ambit of Rule 9(2) of the Railway Servants
(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 (for short referred to as
`the Rules’).
• Rule 9. Procedure for imposing major penalties (1) No order
imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule
6 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the
manner provided in this rule and Rule 10, or in the manner provided
by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850) where such
inquiry is held under that Act.
• (2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there
are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of
misconduct or misbehaviour against a railway servant, it may itself
inquire into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions
of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be,
[a Board of Inquiry or other authority] to inquire into the truth
thereof. (ejusderm generis)

UNIT IX-XI

UNIT-9
MAXIMS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
● EXPRESSO UNIUSEST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
● GENERALIASPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT
● REDDENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS

EXPRESSO UNIUSEST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a Latin phrase that means express mention of one
thing excludes all others.
• This is one of the rules used in interpretation of statutes.

• The phrase indicates that items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the
statute.

40
• When something is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption that the
things not mentioned are excluded.

• Where can this Rule be Applied?

• This maxim will only be applied in such cases where specific words are being mentioned
in any statute.
• However, it will not be applied in those cases where general words are being mentioned
along-with specific words, for example – etc, so on, others or any other such generalizing
words.
• In R.V. Secretary of State for the Home Deptt., 1988 here, the decree excluded the father
of an illegitimate child from rights under immigration law at the time, because the statute
specifically mentioned the mother alone.
• The Supreme Court dealing with the same issue earlier in Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon
(India) Ltd. 1970
• held that where two courts would have jurisdiction and the agreement is that the dispute
should be tried only by one of them, the court mentioned in the agreement would have
jurisdiction.
• This expression comes with its own disadvantages and is not recommended at later stage.
• If this is followed strictly it would restrict judicial activism and cases like kesavanand
Bharti doctrine of basic structure would not come.

GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT

• Generalia specialibus non derogant is a Latin maxim. It is a maxim used for statutory
interpretation. • Generalia stands from general;
• Specialibus stands for special.
• When interpreted, it means that general laws do not prevail over special laws
“The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant” means that, for the purposes of
interpretation of two statutes in apparent conflict, the provisions of a general statute must yield
to those of a special one
SURESH NANDA V CBI

The question that arises now is can a passport be impounded by exercising power under
section 102 read with section 165 and 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

• Section 102 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 gives powers to the police officer to seize
any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found
under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
• Sub-section (5) of Section 165 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides that the copies
of record made under Sub-section (1) or subsection (3) shall forthwith be sent to the nearest
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance to the offence

41
• Whereas Section 104 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 authorizes the court to impound
any document or thing produced before it under the Code.
• Section 165 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 does not speak about the passport which
has been searched and seized as in the present case. It does not speak about the documents
found in search, but copies of the records prepared under Sub-section (1) and Subsection
(3).
• "Impound" means to keep in custody of the law. There must be some distinct action which
will show that documents or things have been impounded. According to the Oxford
Dictionary "impound" means to take legal or formal possession.
• The Court stated that when we read Section 104 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and
Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967 together, we will find that under the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, the Court is empowered to impound any document or thing
produced before it whereas, the Passports Act, 1967 speaks specifically of impounding of
the passport.
• It is stated that the Passport Act, 1967 being a specific Act and Section 104 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 being a general provision for impounding any document or
thing, it is the Passports Act, 1967 which shall prevail over the provision under the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 as regards the passport. Thus, by necessary
implication, the power of Court to impound any document or thing produced before
it would exclude passport.
Reddendo singular singulis

• The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a
complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right
construction to render each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying
each object to its appropriate subject.
• A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of speech.
• Example: if there a sentence “anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun”. Here, the word
“draw” is applied to “sword” only and the word “load” applied to “gun” only. Therefore,
the former verb to former noun and latter verb to latter noun because it is impossible to
draw a gun and load a sword.
• This rule has been applied in the case of Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga,
AIR 1969, in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads,
“Provided that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or
moved in the legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the President”. It was
held that the word introduced applies to bill and moved applies to amendment.
• I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to B’. a bequest is a gift of personal
property made by a will other than land, such as an item of jewellery or a car.

UNIT- 10 &11 PRESUMPTIONS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

 IN FAVOUR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ENACTMENT
 THE LEGISLATURE DOES NOT COMMIT MISTAKES OR MAKE OMISSIONS
 STATUTES ARE PRESUMED TO BE IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
 PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF NATURAL JUSTICE
 PRESUMPTIONS RELATED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

42
 LEGISLATURE DOES NOT INTEND WHAT IS INCONVENIENT
ANDUNREASONABLE
 STATE IS BOUND BY THE STATUTE
CASE LAWS:
● STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. VS. RESPONDENT: INDIAN HOTEL AND
RESTAURANTSASSN. AND ORS. 2013(5)ABR222
• There is a presumption in law that the statutes are valid. The legislature does not intend to
enact a law which ultra-vires the
Constitution.
• The acts which are either passed by the Parliament, or by the State legislature or by their
subordinate bodies, should not cross the constitutional boundaries.
• No laws can be enacted which are against the provisions and spirit of the constitution.
• If there are two interpretations, one that saves the Act from becoming unconstitutional and
the other that makes the statute void, then in such a case, the interpretation that renders the
Act constitutional should be followed.
• There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an Act. one who alleges against
the constitutionality of an enactment, must show that there is a transgression of the
constitutional boundaries.
• When the validity of the statute made by the competent legislature is challenged, the court
must presume that the statute is valid.
• If there is any doubt about the constitutional validity of any law, the benefit of doubt should
be in the favour of the constitutional validity of an Act. The Court should assume that the
legislature has not committed a mistake and out-lined the intention in the Act what it
intended.
• It is presumed that the legislature has expressed its intention in the Act what it intended. It
is presumed that the legislature has expressed its intention in appropriate words. Every
word used by the legislature, must be given its due importance.
Presumption in Statutes

• In the interpretation of statutes, certain so-called presumptions exist, which are not truly
concerned with evidence at all, but are cannons of interpretation.
• To "presume" means to suppose that something is probably true. Thus presumption means
an act of presuming, assuming or imagining something to be true.
• The legislature is presumed to use appropriate words to manifest its intention.

1. In favour of the constitutionality of Enactment

2. The legislature does not commit mistakes or make
omissions
3. Statutes are presumed to be in conformity with
International Law
4. Presumptions in favor of Natural Justice
5. Presumptions related to the Jurisdiction of the Courts
6. Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient andunreasonable

43
7. State is bound by the Statute
Presumption of Constitutionality
• Constitutionality is the state of being constitutional Law is judged for its constitutionality
on the generality of its provisions
• Legislature is presumed to have inserted every part of the statute for purpose. There is
always a presumption of constitutionality in favour of a statute and the burden is upon him
who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional
principles.
• Since the rule-making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene the
constitutional provisions, the court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions in such a
manner as would involve its unconstitutionality.
• The presumption of constitutionality is indeed so strong that in order to sustain it, the court
may take into consideration, matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the
history of the time and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at
the time of legislation. Interpretation creating unjust and discriminatory situation should be
avoided.
• Though presumption is that, the Act is constitutional and that the legislature understands
and appreciates needs of the people, but when the Act is ex facie discriminatory and
arbitrary, such presumption cannot stand. The burden of proof lies on him who challenges
the vires. If a provision can be construed in two senses, one making the provision con
institutional and the other unconstitutional, the court would always lean in favour of the
former construction.
Presumption against exceeding constitutional powers
• There is a presumption of constitutionality of the rule or the legislation, unless ex facie it
violates the fundamental rights.
• Thus, there is a presumption that the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction and the
burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the legislature, or that it
has transgressed some constitutional mandates, such as those regarding fundamental rights,
is always on the person who challenges the vires.

Legislature leaves no lacuna

• The presumption is that legislature does not leave any lacuna. Either by negligence, or by
lack of foresight, or because it did not know its job, it has left some lacuna-no such
presumption be made.
• As observed in Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa(1987), that
Parliament is neither expected to use unnecessary expressions nor is expected to express
itself unnecessarily. As it does not use word without meaning something, it does not
legislate where no legislation is called for.
Presumption against exclusion or ousting the established jurisdiction
• A statutory enactment is not competent to take away the jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution; this jurisdiction can be taken away only by means of amending the
Constitution.
• In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1993) it was observed that even a provision in the
Constitution conferring finality to the decision of an authority is not construed as
completely excluding judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution,

44
 but it limits it to jurisdictional errors, for example mala fides, non compliance with rules of
natural justice, infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandates and perversity.
• If the legislature states that the decision or order of a tribunal, or a court shall be final and
conclusive, the remedies available under the Constitution remain unrestrained or
uninhabited."
Statutes Are Presumed To Be In Conformity With International Law
• Every statute is to be applied and interpreted as far as its language admits, in a way, as not
to be inconsistent with the established rules of international law. But this intention must be
clearly expressed in the enactment.
• International conventions are generally not resorted to for the purpose of interpretation, but
it helps as an external aid for the purpose of resolving ambiguities in the language.
• Presumption against Intending Injustice: When laws are made by elected representative
of the people, it is proper to assume that they enact laws which the society considers as
honest, fair and reasonable. As a result, justice and reason constitute the great general
legislative intent in every piece of legislation. If this is not there and harsh and ridiculous
effect was actually intended by the legislature, it could not be easily accepted that it
represents the legislative intent.
State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Indian Hotel and RestaurantsAssn. and Ors.
2013**

• The instant writ petitions have been preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,
challenging certain provisions of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Obscene Dance in Hotels,
Restaurant and Bar Rooms and Protection of Dignity of Women (Working therein) Act,
2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and also the Rules framed there under being the
Maharashtra Prohibition of Obscene Dance in Hotels, Restaurant and Bar Rooms and
Protection of Dignity of Women (Working therein) Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Rules’) which, as the Petitioners submit, violate the Fundamental Rights of the
Petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19 (1)(a), 19 (1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution
of India.
It was held that:
• There can’t be the total prohibition of dance in beer bars.
• The Supreme Court relaxed the terms and conditions associated with the grant of licence.
• A complete ban on serving of alcoholic drinks was also prohibited as it is considered
disproportionate and arbitrary.
• Considering the famous K.S. Puttaswamy judgement, installation of CCTV cameras were
allowed only at the entry of the beer bars.
• Showering of currency notes and coins was prohibited in dance bars while allowing that
tip can be given by customers to the staff.
• Timing mentioned in this act was considered fine as it seems enough to the court.
• Court made it compulsory that there must be a written contract with the employees and
wages are to be transferred in a bank account every month. Such contracts are to be
deposited to the licensing authority.
• Obscenity is already punishable under Indian Penal Code, 1860 so any other law giving
punishment for the same leads to the invasion of Article 14 of
Indian Constitution.

45
• The Supreme Court in Case of B. Shah v. Presiding officer, Labour Court 1978 , had to
decide whether the female employee would get the wages for six days or for week during
maternity leave (considering that Sunday as holiday)under Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
• The Court removed such technicalities on ground of object of Social justice and held: “In
interpreting provisions of beneficial pieces of legislation intended to achieve the object of
doing social justice to women workers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall
within the purview of Article 42 of the constitution, the beneficent rule of construction,
which would enable the women worker not only to subsist but also to make up for her
dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserves her efficiency as a worker and maintain the
level of her provision efficiency and output, has to be adopted by the court.
Manohar Lal vs The State Of Punjab (1961 AIR
418) (BENEFICIAL statute also known as Remedial statute where you apply only golden rule)
1.Provision of Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940 says: • s. 7(1) Employer shall keep his
shop closed on the day which he had himself chosen as a " close day ".
2.The appellant who was a shopkeeper was convicted for the second time by the Additional
District Magistrate for contravening the provisions of s. 7(1) of the Punjab Trade
Employees Act, 1940
3. He raised the plea that the Act did not apply to his shop as he did not employ any stranger
but that himself alone worked in it and that the application of s. 7(1) to his shop would be
violative of his fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution and
also that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within Art. 19(6) as it was not in the
interest of the general.
Held, that the main object of the Act was the welfare of the employees and to protect their as
well as the employers' health by preventing them from over work. Such a restriction being in
the interest of the general public was reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution.
The provisions of s. 7(1) were constitutionally valid and were justified as for securing
administrative convenience and avoiding evasion of those provisions designed for the
protection of the workmen.
Deepika Singh vs Central Administrative Tribunal on 16 August, 2022 (beneficial statute
/ remedial statute)
• The appellant was, at the material time, working on the post of Nursing Officer in the Post
Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research 1 at Chandigarh since her
appointment on 25 November 2005. On 18 February 2014, the appellant married Amir
Singh. The spouse of the appellant was married before his marriage to the appellant, but his
former wife passed away on 16 February 2013. From his first marriage, he has two children,
a male child born on 1 February 2001 and a female child born on 3 March 2005. The
appellant filed an application on 4 May 2015, requesting the authorities at PGIMER to enter
the names of the two children born from the first marriage of her spouse in the official
service record.

• The appellant had her first biological child on 4 June 2019 from her marriage. On 6 June
2019, she applied for maternity leave for the period from 27 June 2019 to 23 December
2019 in terms of Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972.

• The request of the appellant for the grant of maternity leave was rejected on 3 September
2019 on the ground that she had two surviving children and had availed of child care leave
earlier for the two children born from the first marriage of her spouse. Consequently,

46
 maternity leave for “PGIMER” “Rules of 1972” was found to be inadmissible and she was
granted leave

• Aggrieved by the decisions dated 3 September 2019 and 21 January 2020 of the
administrative authorities at PGIMER, the appellant moved the Central Administrative
Tribunal Therefore, for all practical purposes and as far as respondent department is
concerned, she has already two surviving children and she is taking benefit for them from
the respondent department by way of Child Care Leave and other benefits.
•
• It was held that Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where
legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to
make inroads by making etymological excursions and that her leave is valid

47
UNIT 12-15 INTERNAL & EXTERNAL AID
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION INTERNAL AIDS
● TITLE
● PREAMBLE
● HEADINGS
● MARGINAL NOTES
● PUNCTUATION
● ILLUSTRATIONS
● DEFINITIONS
● PROVISO
● EXPLANATION
● SCHEDULE
EXTERNAL AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION
● PARLIAMENTARYHISTORY
● HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
● REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONS
● SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
● FOREIGN DECISIONS
● DICTIONARIES
● TEXT BOOKS
● STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
CASE LAWS:
● S.R. CHAUDHARY V. STATE OF PUNJAB (2001) 7 SCC 126
Aids to interpretation of statutes
◦ An Aid, is a device that helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the
court has to take recourse to various internal and external aids. Internal aids mean those
materials which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part of enactment.

◦ These internal aids include, long title, preamble, headings, marginal notes, illustrations,
punctuation, proviso, schedule, etc.

◦ When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to External aids. External
Aids may be parliamentary material, historical background, reports of a committee or a
commission, official statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions, etc

◦ B. Prabhakar Rao and others v State of A.P. and others , AIR 1986 SC 120 O.Chennappa,
Reddy J. has observed : “Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have
recourse to external aids to discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled
out. This is now a well settled principle of modern statutory construction.”
◦ District Mining Officer and others v Tata Iron & Steel Co. and another , (2001) 7 SCC 358
Supreme Court has observed: “It is also a cardinal principle of construction that external
aids are brought in by widening the concept of context as including not only other enacting
provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in
pari materia and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. ”

48
◦ “Internal aids” mean those aids which are available in the statute itself. Each and every part
of an enactment helps in interpretation. However, it is important to decipher as to whether
theses parts can be of any help in the interpretation of the statute .

◦ Title Long title – The Long Title of a Statute is an internal part of the statute and is admissible
as an aid to its construction. Statute is headed by a long title and it gives the description
about the object of an Act. It begins with the words- “An Act to ………….” For e.g. The
long title of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is – “An Act to consolidate and amend the
law relating to criminal procedure”.

◦ In recent times, long title has been used by the courts to interpret certain provision of the
statutes. However, its useful only to the extent of removing the ambiguity and confusions
and is not a conclusive aid to interpret the provision of the statute.

◦ In Manohar Lal v State of Punjab, Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide the
scope of the Act. Although the title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an enacting provision
and though useful in case of ambiguity of the enacting provisions, is ineffective to control
their clear meaning.

◦In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274- the title of the Madras General
Sales Tax, 1939, was An Act to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in
the Province of Madras.

◦This was utilized to indicate that the object of the Act is to impose taxes on sales that take
place within the province.
◦ Short Title - The short title of an Act is for the purpose of reference & for its identification.
It ends with the year of passing of the Act. E.g. “The Indian Penal Code, 1860”; “The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872”. The Short Title is generally given at the beginning with the words-
“This Act may be called……………” For e.g Section 1 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
says – “This Act may be called, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872”. Even though short title is
the part of the statute, it does not have any role in the interpretation of the provisions of an
Act.

◦ Preamble The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute.
Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It contains the recitals
showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of the Act is clear the
preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an
ambiguous act.

◦ Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461– wherein the apex court
strongly relied on the Preamble to the Constitution of India in reaching a conclusion that the
power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under Article 368 was not unlimited and
did not enable the Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of the
Constitution.

49
◦ In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC 913

• In this case, the appellant challenged his conviction under Section 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947. His main ground was that after the establishment of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment, the anti-corruption department of the Delhi Police has ceased to have
power of investigating bribery cases because the preamble of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 pointed out to this effect.

• An Act to make provision for the constitution of a special police force 2 [in Delhi for the
investigation of certain offences in 3 [the Union territories]] for the superintendence and
administration of the said force and for the extension to other areas of the powers and
jurisdiction of members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences.
WHEREAS it is necessary to constitute a special police force 2 [in Delhi for the investigation
of certain offences in 3 [the Union territories]] and to make provision for the
superintendence and administration of the said force and for the extension to other area 4
*** of the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard to the
investigation of the said offences

• The court, however, held that no preamble can interfere with clear and unambiguous words
of a statue. Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, 1946 empowered the Delhi
Special Police also to investigate such cases.

◦ Marginal notes Marginal notes are inserted at the side of the sections in an act which
express the effect of the section but they are not part of statute.
They are also known as Side notes and are i
nserted by drafters and not legislators.

The rule of interpretation is that in olden times a help is used to be taken from marginal notes
when the clear meaning of the provision is in doubt but as per modern view of the court,
marginal notes doesn't have any role to play because either they are inserted by legislators
nor does they form the part of the statute. However, for interpreting constitution many times
marginal notes are referred because they are made by constituent assembly.

Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court held that the marginal
notes of Article 286 is the part of the Constitution of India which talks about Restrictions
as to imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods therefore, it could be relied
on to furnish a clue to the purpose and meaning of the article.

◦ Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the understanding
the real scope. In Mahesh Chandra Sharma V.Raj Kumari Sharma, (AIR 1996 SC 869), it
was held that illustrations are parts of the Section and help to elucidate the principles of the
section.

◦ Proviso The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined

50
 to that case. There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a
proviso may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as
restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the
provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main
enactment.” [CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC)
Explanations: An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the
meaning of the words appearing in the section. An Explanation to a statutory provision has to
be read with the main provision to which it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation
appended to a section or a subsection becomes an integral part of it and has no independent
existence apart from it. The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main
section. An Explanation is quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, excepts
and restricts while the former explains, clarifies or subtracts or includes something by
introducing a legal fiction.
Schedules: form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for working
out the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule cannot override the
provisions of the express enactment.
◦ Headings

◦ In all modern statutes, generally headings are attached to almost each section, just preceding
the provisions. For example, the heading of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is “When bail may be taken in case of non- bailable offence”.

◦ Headings are not passed by the Legislature but they are subsequently inserted after the Bill
has become law.

◦ These headings have been treated by courts as preambles to those sections or set of sections.

◦ Naturally, the rules applicable to the preamble are followed in case of headings also while
interpreting an enactment. Therefore, if the plain meaning of enactment is clear, help from
headings cannot be taken by the courts.

◦ However, if more than one conclusion are possible while interpreting a particular provision,
the courts may seek guidance from the headings to arrive at the true meaning.

◦ EXAMPLE: provision says : long term tax will be charged at 20% on the capital gains
amount

◦ Explanation: also education cess at 3% shall be levied on the above amount

◦ Proviso: Provided that no tax shall be charged on the amount of gains on shares sold on a
recognized stock exchange

◦ Section 62(1)(a)(i)

◦ Section will be -62

◦ Sub section will be - 1

◦ Clause will be - a

51
◦ Sub clause will be - i

◦Proviso: Condition required to be fulfilled in order for the provision to be applicable.

◦Exception: Situation/Condition where the provision shall not apply.

◦ Definition clause

It define certain words used elsewhere in the body of statute with the purpose to avoid the
necessity of frequent repetitions in describing the subject matter and extend the natural
meaning of some words as per the statute. It also define intention of the legislature in respect
of words mention in statute and avoid confusion.

◦ Punctuation

Punctuation are put in the form of colon, semi colon, comma, full stop, dash, hyphen,
brackets etc. In earlier times statutes are passed without punctuations and therefore, the
courts were not concerned with looking at punctuations but in modern times statutes are
passed with punctuations.

◦ External Aid of Interpretation:

◦ Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and Surrounding circumstances:

◦ The historical facts of the statute that is the external circumstances in which it was enacted.

◦ It should also be taken into consideration so that it can be understood that the statute in
question was intended to alter the law or leave it where it stood.

◦ Statement of objective and reasons as to why the statute is being brought to enactment can
also be a very helpful fact in the research for historical facts.

◦ The Supreme Court in a number of cases referred to debates in the Constituent Assembly for
interpretation of constitutional provisions.

◦ Case Law: S. R. Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab & ors.

◦ In this case, it has stated that it is a settled position that debates in the Constituent Assembly
may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a Constitutional provision because it is the function
of the Court to find out the intention of the framers of the Constitution.

◦ Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions:

◦ A Statute must be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or

did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute.

◦ Any relevant changes in the social conditions and technology should be given due weightage.

◦ Case Law: S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India

52
◦ It was stated that statute cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic
and political setting in which it is intended to operate.

◦ Reference to Other Statute (pari materia):

◦ For the purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory provision, courts can refer to
or can take help of other statutes.

◦ It is also known as statutory aids.

◦ It allows the use of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later
statute in the same context.

◦ Example: The Limitation Act, the General Clauses Act ◦ Above mentioned are the examples
of statutory aid.

◦Dictionaries:

◦When a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find
out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in
the selection of one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the
scheme, context and legislative history.

53
RULES WORDS ASSOCIATED WITH RULES

LITERAL RULE
TRUE MEANING/PLAIN MEANING/NATURAL MEANING/
ORDINARY/PRIMARY MEANING

GOLDEN RULE REMOVING AMBIGUITY OF LITERAL RULE

MISCHIEF RULE DEFECT/LOOPHOLE/REMEDY/inadequacy/limitation/

PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO GIVE EFFECT TO
THE TRUE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION

HARMONIOUS
CONFLICT BETWEEN MINIMUM 2 RULE/PROVISION
RULE

EJUSDEM GENERIS WHEN THERE IS CLEAR CATEGORY FOLOWED BY WORDS

WHICH ARE NOT CLEAR. EX: IN ANY CASE/ANY OTHER/SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES/SIMILAR NATURE/OR ORTHERWISE
/WHATSOEVER/

BENEFICIAL RULE BENEFIT TO A PARTICULAR CLASS

NOSCITOR A ASSOCIATED WORDS TAKE MEANING FROM ONE ANOTHER

SOCISSIS

UNIT 16-17 SUBSIDIARY RULES OF INTERPRETATION

●NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE
●LEGAL FICTION
● MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS
● CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE WORDS
Non-Obstante clause

◦Notwithstanding means despite; in spite of; without being opposed or impeded by;
nevertheless; however, regardless of.

54
◦A “non-obstante” provision is a provision in a statute that begins with the words
‘Notwithstanding anything contained’ and is often used in a statute to give an overriding
effect to a particular section or the statute as a whole.
◦ A non-obstante clause is used in legislative drafting to make an

1. exemption to or
2. To override the provision
◦A non-obstante clause is generally appended to a section with a view to give the enacting
part of the section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provision in the same or
other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause.
◦ It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions or Act mentioned in the non-obstante
clause, the provision following it will have its full operation or the provisions embraced in
the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment or the
provision in which the non-obstante clause occurs.
◦When a provision of an enactment is made ‘subject to’ another provision, it implies that the
provision in question will adhere to the other provision to which it is subject.
◦ A non-obstante clause, on the other hand, is a legislative device for giving overriding
effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions found in the same or another
law, in order to avoid the operation and effect of all such contrary provisions in respect of
which the non-obstante provision has been given overriding effect. [Jawahar Sons
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State and Ors., 2002]
◦e.g. Section 129 of The CGST Act start with
◦“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any person transports any goods or
stores any goods while they are in transit in contravention of the provisions of this Act or
the rules made thereunder, all such goods and conveyance used as a means of transport for
carrying the said goods and documents relating to such goods and conveyance shall be liable
to detention or seizure and after detention or seizure, shall be released,”

◦It has a non -obstante clause. It overrides the entire CGST Act.
◦ Section 31 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
◦ 31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent.—(1) A breach of protection order,
or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and
shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
◦ Section 32(1) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
◦(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
the offence under sub-section (1) of section
31 shall be cognizable and non-bailable
◦Two provisions in the same Act each containing a non-obstante clause require a harmonious
interpretation of the two seemingly conflicting provisions in the same Act. In this difficult
exercise, there are involved proper consideration of giving effect to the object and purpose
of two provisions and the language employed in each. Shri Swaran Singh & Anr. v. Shri
Kasturi Lal; (1977) 1 SCC 750] ◦Section 106 OF COMPANIES ACT, 2013: Restriction
on voting rights.

55
◦106. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the articles of a company may provide
that no member shall exercise any voting right in respect of any shares registered in his name
on which any calls or other sums presently payable by him have not been paid, or in regard
to which the company has exercised any right of lien.
◦SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED means this law will be effective unless, in a given
circumstances, some other existing law directly prescribes a different result.

◦Section 152 (2) of Companies Act 2013,Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
every director shall be appointed by the company in general meeting.
◦While trying to interpret NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE, one should not go beyond the
intentions of the legislature. This view was taken in the cases of South Іndіa Corporatіon
Pvt. Ltd. v. Secy., Board of Revenue, Trіvandrum (1964)
◦In the case of Bipathumma and Ors. v. Mariam Bibi (1966), the Court took the view that
non-obstante clauses do not have a repealing effect. They do not completely supersede the
other provisions of law. Such a clause simply performs the function of removing
impediments created by the other provisions from affecting the enforcement of the enacting
part of the concerned section it is attached to
◦We can find a non-obstante clause in Section 32A of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1958 as well. As per this Section, “notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force no
sentence awarded under this Act shall be suspended or remitted or commuted”.
◦To sum up, non-obstante clauses are one of the internal aids present for interpreting a statute
which helps with interpreting two or more laws associated in regards to the same field which
appears to be conflicting.
LEGAL FICTION

◦ legal fiction is a fact assumed to be true by courts which, in fact, is not the case, but is used
to enable the courts to resolve matters before it or to apply a legal rule.
◦ Lawyers and judges often use expressions like “it is presumed”, “it is implied” and such other
phrases or expressions which tend to bring in fictions, in a case, almost unnoticed.
◦ Legal fiction is defined as:-
◦ 1. A legal assumption that a thing is true which is either not true, or which is probably
false.
◦ 2. An assumption of law that something which is false is true.
◦ 3. A state of facts exists which has never really existed.
◦ Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and succession Act creates a legal fiction. According to
section 12 “ An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father
or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date
all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and
replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family”
◦ Here the legal fiction has been created to give effect to the relationship between a child and
his adoptive parents. This fiction confers a lawful right to the child adopted, to be considered
and thereby treated as the real child born in the adoptive family for all purposes, including
succession

56
◦Another example of legal fiction is a famous maxim Ignorantia juris non excusat which
literally means “Ignorance of law is no excuse”.
◦ This maxim is based on a fiction that every person has knowledge of the law. The absence of
such fiction would generate confusion making it impossible to enforce the law as everyone
will claim his or her ignorance of law.
◦It is a well settled principle that the companies have a separate legal existence. The emphasis
is that corporations are mere fictions introduced by the state authority for certain beneficial
purposes of society or administration.

◦ Once the state has invested legal personality in a company it would ordinarily be difficult to
prove that the crime has been committed and that the corporate personality of the company
was used as a mere facade.
◦ 157 OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACT: Transfer of certificate of insurance.—(1) Where a person
in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter transfers to another person the ownership of the motor vehicle in
respect of which such insurance was taken together with the policy of insurance relating
thereto, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed
to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred
with effect from the date of its transfer. 1[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that such deemed transfer shall include transfer of rights and liabilities of
the said certificate of insurance and policy of insurance.]
◦ (2) The transferee shall apply within fourteen days from the date of transfer in the prescribed
form to the insurer for making necessary changes in regard to the fact of transfer in the
certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate in his favour and the insurer
shall make the necessary changes in the certificate and the policy of insurance in regard to
the transfer of insurance.
◦In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v Complete Insulation Pvt Ltd, the Supreme Court held that
legal fiction created under S.157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the transfer of third party
insurance is deemed to have effect from buyer to seller.
◦One must understand the distinction between a legal fiction and the presumption of a fact.
Legal fiction assumes existence of a fact which may not really exist. However, a
presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain circumstances.
◦One of the examples distinguishing legal fiction and presumption is under Indian Penal Code
wherein ignorance of law is not an excuse is a legal fiction and a child below the age of 7
years being incapable of committing an offence under section 82 is a presumption of law.
◦ A legal fiction presupposes the correctness of the state of facts on which it is based and all the
consequences which flow from that state of facts have got to be worked out to their logical
extent.
◦ But due regard must be had in this behalf to the purpose for which the legal fiction has been
created.
◦ Thus, one must not stretch the meaning of a fiction beyond its legitimate field or engraft one
fiction upon another unless the legislature has specifically provided for such a course of
action.

57
◦ The twin principles of construction governing “legal fiction” include one requiring the fictions
to be taken to their logical conclusion and the other confining them to their legitimate field
- have to be harmonised dexterously.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS
◦ A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceeding
to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if its observance is not
necessary to the validity of the proceeding, and a statute may be mandatory in some
respects and directory in others.
◦ In DA Koregaonkar v State of Bombay it was held that, one of the important tests that must
always be employed in order to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory in
character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a particular provision causes
inconvenience or injustice and, if it does, then the court would say that, the provision
must be complied with and that it is obligatory in its character.
◦ Determination of Mandatory Provision Its determination depends upon two points (a)
Language of Statute or Enactment: and (b) Intention of law.
◦ In respect to the performance of statute following words are used: shall:may:must:It must be
lawful andAs deems fit, etc. These words should be understood in their natural sense while
construing. Also, the intention of the legislature should be kept in mind.
◦ When any statute uses ‘Shall’ then it shall be construed firstly as Mandatory provision.
Supreme Court said that while ‘interpreting the word ‘Shall’, the intention of the legislature
should be considered and to know the intention of legislature, Content, imagination, etc. of
statutes should be considered.
1.The word ‘May’ represent optional or discretionary acts or ifs provision. In other words. It
could be said that the word ‘May’ used in statute represents the discretionary powers of
performance of that statute or its provision

2.But. If liability has been imposed along with the discretion of public authority in a
statute, the word ‘May’ be construed as ‘shall’ or ‘must’.
◦ In Sidhu Ram v Secretary Railway Board the Court had to consider the import of Rule
1732 of the Railway Establishment Code. The relevant portion of the Rule read thus— “where
the penalty of dismissal , removal from service, compulsory retirement, reduction in rank or
withholding of increment has been imposed, the appellate authority may give the railway
servant either at his discretion or if so requested by the latter a personal hearing, before
disposing of the appeal.” ◦ The term 'may' must be taken in it naturally, i.e. in its permissive
sense and not in its obligatory sense. 'May and 'shall' are generally used in contradistinction to
each other and normally should be given their natural meaning especially when they occur in
the same section. Also in some cases the word 'may' is used in such a way as to create a duty
that must be performed.
◦ In GullipilliSowria Raj vs. BandaruPavani @ GullipiliPavani this Court while dealing
with a similar issue held as under:

◦“The expression “may” used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been
sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage
under the Act between two Hindus & Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section
5 in that a Hindu Marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnised according to
the ceremonies indicated therein”

58
Conjunctive and Disjunctive words
Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words ‘or’ ‘and’: The word ‘or’ is normally
disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive. However, at times they are read
as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature as
disclosed from the context. This would be so where the literal reading of the
words produces an unintelligible or absurd result. In such a case ‘and’ may by
read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying the words
is less favourable to the subject, provided that the intention of the legislature is
otherwise quite clear.
Example: In the Official Secrets Act, 1920, as per section 7 any person who
attempts to commit any offence under the principal Act or this Act, or solicits or
incites or endeavours to persuade another person to commit an offence, or aids
or abets and does any act preparatory to the commission of an offence’. Here,
the word ‘and’ in bold is to be read as ’or’. Reading ‘and’ as ‘and’ will result in
unintelligible and absurd sense and against the clear intention of the Legislature.

UNIT 18
INTERPRETATION WITH REFERENCE TO SUBJECT MATTER
● TAXING STATUTES
● PENAL STATUTES ●
REMEDIAL STATUTES
CASE LAWS:
● STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND ORS V. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
(2005) 4SCC 530

TAXING STATUTE
• A taxing statute should be strictly construed even if the literal interpretation
results in hardship or inconvenience, common sense approach equity, logic and
morality have no role to play. CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 362 ITR 673
(SC).

• The two well-settled principles of interpretation, as applicable in taxing statute

(1) There is no equity in tax, and the principle of strict or literal construction
applies in interpreting tax statutes. Hence, on the plain language of the statute, if the
assesses is entitled to two benefits, he has to be granted both these benefits;

(2) If there are two reasonable interpretations of taxing statutes, the one that
favors the assesses has to be accepted

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• Taxation statute is a fiscal statute which imposes the pecuniary burden on the
taxpayer. So such statutes are construed strictly. Plain, clear and direct
grammatical meaning is given.

• In a Taxation statute, if a word has a clear meaning, then in that case, the court is
bound to follow the clear meaning even if such meaning results in absurd results.
It is in legislature’s domain to rectify such absurdity.

• In case of taxation statutes, Courts cannot extend the scope of law by giving
meanings to word which are unclear or uncertain.

• This is based on the reason that if legislature had thought of such situation then it
would have covered it by using appropriate description and words under the
principal act or taxation authority would have issued some notification clarifying
the same.

• The case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kores India Ltd. (AIR 1977 SC 132) , the
issue was pertaining to inclusion of carbon paper in the definition of word “paper”.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in common parlance word paper
is one which is used for writing, packaging and printing whereas carbon paper is
used entirely for different purpose.

• Moreover, manufacturing process of carbon paper is entirely different and

complicated from that of normal paper. So, Court held carbon paper will not be
included in normal paper so as to make it subject to taxation. It was held that
meaning of paper is quiet clear and there is no need to interpret it so as to extend
its meaning to include carbon paper.

• Thus, Courts are not required to extend the meaning to cover the subjects which
on the face cannot be included in common parlance. It is only when specifically
provided by statute then only it becomes subject to tax.

• C.I.T. v B. M. Kharwar 1965

The assessee transferred some machinery of a firm to a private limited company.
He sought to avoid the liability to be taxed on the excess realised over the written
down value of the machinery on the plea that the substance of the transaction was
only a step to readjust the business relation of the partners inter se. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention holding that while the taxing authorities were
entitled to determine the true legal relation resulting from a transaction to unravel
the device adopted by a party.
• Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
The doctrine of substantial compliance is a judicial invention, equitable in nature,
designed to avoid hardship in cases where a party does all that can reasonably
expected of it, but failed or faulted in some minor or inconsequent aspects which
cannot be described as the "essence" or the "substance" of the requirements. Like

60
 the concept of "reasonableness", the acceptance or otherwise of a plea of
"substantial compliance" depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case
and the purpose and object to be achieved and the context of the prerequisites
which are essential to achieve the object and purpose of the rule or the regulation.

• The doctrine of substantial compliance seeks to preserve the need to comply

strictly with the conditions or requirements that are important to invoke a tax or
duty exemption and to forgive non-compliance for either unimportant and
tangential requirements or requirements that are so confusingly or incorrectly
written that an earnest effort at compliance should be accepted.
• The law is well settled that a person who claims exemption or concession has to
establish that he is entitled to that exemption or concession. A provision providing
for an exemption, concession or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed
strictly with certain exceptions depending upon the settings on which the
provision has been placed in the Statute and the object and purpose to be achieved.

• If exemption is available on complying with certain conditions, the conditions

have to be complied with.

• The mandatory requirements of those conditions must be obeyed or fulfilled

exactly, though at times, some latitude can be shown, if there is a failure to comply
with some requirements which are directory in nature, the non-compliance of
which would not affect the essence or substance of the notification granting
exemption.

PENAL STATUTE

• General Principles of interpreting penal statutes:

1. To be strictly interpreted:

• The language of penal statutes cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of
its term in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the the statute
was enacted.
The rule of strict construction does not involve any scope of flexibility or
plasticity with it.

2. Mischief to be suppressed:

• Penal codes must be construed in such a manner which will suppress the mischief
and advance the object which the legislature had formed

3. Where there are two interpretation:

61
• If in any case there are 2 interpretations to a provision of a penal law the one which
is favorable to the accused should be preferred but with due regard to the context
in which it is mentioned.

4. Consideration of Public Policy:

• While interpreting any penal statute there must be due consideration to public policy.
5. Presumption against retrospective operation:

• A penal statute cannot be presumed to have retrospective effect, but if it is beneficial

to the accused whereby the punishment is reduced by legislation, then the accused
can be benefitted out of such a retrospective effect.

6. Harmonious Construction:

• The interpretation of any one of the provisions of a penal statute must always be in
accordance with the rest of the provisions of that statute. Therefore the rule of
harmonious construction must be applied to penal statutes

7. Mens Rea in statutory offenses:

• The mental element behind any offence must be considered while interpreting any
penal statute. Therefore the existence of a guilty intent is an essential ingredient
of a crime at common law.

• State of West Bengal v. S.K. Guha AIR 1982 SC 949.

• It is recognized rule of construction of the penal statutes that where the equivocal
word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the
canons of interpretation fail to solve , the benefit of doubt should be given to the
subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself.

• Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal AIR 2000 SC 828. While referring to the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, the court laid down that the Act was brought
in to purify public administration. When the legislature used comprehensive
terminology to achieve the said purpose, it would be appropriate not to limit the
content by construction when particularly the spirit of the statute is in accord with
the words used therein

62
 Remedial statutes Penal statutes

Remedial Statutes deal with the wrongs Penal Statutes deal with the wrongs against
1) against an individual. the State.

They deal with those matters which affect They deal with those matters which
2) the Individual only affect the whole community.

Remedial Statutes provides a remedy for Whereas Penal Statutes provides punishment
3) infringement of private civil rights of an for public wrong
individual.

Remedial Statutes deals with Remedial Statutes deal with such wrongful
4) such wrongful acts for which acts, the commission of which attracts
remedy is civil action. punitive (Penal) action.

5) The remedy for wrongful acts in the form Penalty such as imprisonment, fine,
of damages or compensation to the forfeiture etc.is imposed on the offender
aggrieved party but the wrongdoer is not
held liable for any penalty

REMEDIAL STATUTES
• Remedial statutes and statutes which have come to be enacted on
demand of the permanent public policy generally receive a liberal
interpretation.

• On constructing a remedial statute the courts ought to give to it ‘the

widest operation which its language will permit. They have only to
see that the particular case is within the mischief to be remedied and
falls withinthe language of the enactment.

• The labour and welfare legislations should be broadly and liberally

construed and while construing them due regard to the Directive
Principles of State Policy (Part IV) and to any international
convention on the subject must be given by the courts.

• In MC Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu the Child Labour (Prohibition

and Regulation) Act, 1986 was construed. The Court, having regard

63
 to the Directive Principles in Arts 39(e), 39(f), 4(i), 45 and 47 of the
Constitution, the fundamental rights in Art 24, the International
convention on the right of the child, not only directed a survey of
child labour and its prohibition but also directed payment of Rs.
25,000 as contribution by the employer to the Child Labour-
Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund or alternative employment to
parent/guardian of the child to ameliorate poverty and lack of funds
for welfare of the child which is the main cause of child labour.
• In case of a social benefit oriented legislation like the Consumer
Protection Act 1986 the provisions of the consumer to achieve the
purpose of the enactment but without doing violence to the
language.

• If a section of a remedial statute is capable of two constructions, that

construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the
Act and is more beneficial to those in whose interest the Act may
have been passed.

• It has been held that a law enacted essentially to benefit a class of

persons considered to be oppressed

• In Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd Qasim, it was held that effect of a

beneficial legislation is not construed to be defeated by a subsequent
legislation except through a clear provision. Therefore, the rights of
the minor children, irrespective of their religion, to get maintenance
from their parents as provided in § 125 of the Criminal Procedure
Code 1973 was construed not to have been taken away in respect of
Muslims by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act 1986. It has been held that the right of children to claim
maintenance under § 125 Cr PC is independent of the right of
divorced mother to claim maintenance for the infant children and
the former is not affected by the Muslim Women Act 1986.
• Sadhoo v. Haji Lal Mohd Biri Works
In this case the Supreme Court interpreted § 31(2) (a) of the Beedi and Cigar
Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act 1966.

• This § 31(2) (a) provides that the employees discharged, dismissed

or retrenched may appeal to the prescribed authority.

64
 • It was held that by the liberal construction of the section there need
to be no written order of termination to enable the employee to
appeal and that an employee who was terminated by stopping him
to enter the place of work could appeal to the prescribed authority.

UNIT 19
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
● PRINCIPLE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION
● PRINCIPLE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE
● PRINCIPLE OF ECLIPSE
● PRINCIPLE OF SEVERABILITY
● PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS

• The constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of our country. Since it is
written in the form of a statute, the general principles of statutory interpretation
are applicable to the interpretation of the constitution as well. As is the case with
any other statute, the court tries to find out the intention of the framers of the
constitution from the words used by them.

• in the case of State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952, SC used one of the
standard principles of interpretation that where more than one reasonable
interpretation of a constitutional provision are possible, that which would ensure
the smooth and harmonious working of the constitution shall be accepted rather
than the one that would lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience,
or make well existing provisions of existing law nugatory while interpreting the
constitution.

• It is important to note that the constitution itself endorses the general principles of
interpretation through Article 367(1), which states that unless the context
otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for the
interpretation of this constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an act of the
legislature.

• Courts have ruled in cases such as Jugmendar Das vs State 1951, that not only
the general definitions given in the General Clauses Act but also the general rules
of construction given therein are applicable to the constitution

DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

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• This doctrine was brought about to bring harmony between the different lists
mentioned in the Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. Different subjects
are mentioned in different lists in this schedule.

• However, there can be a situation where an entry of one list overlaps with
that of another list. This is the time when this doctrine comes into the picture.

• It was said that the words of the entries should be given wide amplitude and
the courts shall bring harmony between the different entries and
lists.(TikaRamjivstheStateofUP.)

DOCTRINE OF ECLIPSE
• The doctrine states that if any law becomes contradictory to the fundamental
rights, then it does not permanently die but becomes inactive.
• As soon as that fundamental right is omitted from the Constitution, the
inactive law becomes revived.
• When a court strikes a part of the law, it becomes unenforceable. Hence, an
‘eclipse’ is said to be cast on it. The law just becomes invalid but continues to
exist.
• The eclipse is removed when another (probably a higher level court) makes
the law valid again or an amendment is brought to it by way of legislation.
• Supreme Court first applied this doctrine in the case of
BhikajivsStateofMadhya
Pradesh where it applied to pre-constitutional law. The extension to the
postconstitutional law was stated in the case ofDulareLodhvsADJKanpur.
DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY

•
Article 13 of the Constitution of India describes the Doctrine of Severability
as a saviour in the fight against infringement of fundamental rights. It states
the extent to which any part is inconsistent which shall be termed as invalid.
•
If a particular part of the legislation goes beyond the fundamental rights of
the Constitution, the actual part of the legislation is declared invalid if the
legislation / unconstitutional part of the legislation is separable.
•
However, if the unconstitutional part of the law is inseparable, the entire
legislation is declared invalid.
•
The State will not make any law which takes away/abbreviates the rights gave in
Part III of the Constitution ie. Major Rights. Any law made in contradiction of the
arrangements of the Constitution will be void and invalid. The invalid part will be
separated and announced invalid in the event that it is extremely severable.

•
That is, if the part which isn't disjoined can genuinely exist without the separated
part.

66
 •
Sometimes the substantial and invalid parts of the Act are so stirred up that they
can't be isolated from one another. In such cases, the whole Act will be invalid. (F
N BALSARA V STATE OF BOMBAY)

DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE

• Pith means ‘true nature’ and Substance means ‘the most important or essential part of
something’.

• The doctrine was first acknowledged in the Canadian Constitution and In India, it
came to be adopted in the pre-independence period, under the Government of India
Act, 1935.

• The Doctrine of Pith and Substance is usually applied where the question arises of
determining whether a particular law relates to a particular subject (mentioned in
Seventh Schedule), the court looks to the substance of the matter.

• Apart from its applicability in cases related to the competency of the legislature
(Article 246), the Doctrine of Pith and Substance is also applied in cases related to
repugnancy in laws made by Parliament and laws made by the State Legislatures
(Article 254).

• The doctrine is employed in such cases to resolve the inconsistency between laws
made by the Centre and the State Legislature.

DOCTRINE OF INCIDENTAL OR ANCILLARY POWERS

• It has developed as an addition to the Doctrine of Pith and Substance.

• This doctrine is invoked when there is a need to aid the principal legislation in
question.
• The Doctrine of Pith and Substance deals only with subjects but the Doctrine of
Incidental or Ancillary Powers deals with the power to legislate on such subjects
and the matters connected thereto.

• Article 4 talks about power to make consequential changes in the law on matters
supplemental and incidental to the law providing for altering the names of states
under Article 2 and 3.
• Article 169 talks about the power given to the parliament on abolition or creation of
Legislative Councils in States “as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of
the law and may also contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential
provisions as Parliament may deem necessary.”

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 • The SC in the State of Rajasthan v. G Chawla (1958) stated: “The power to legislate
on a topic of legislation carries with it the power to legislate on an ancillary matter
which can be said to be reasonably included in the power given.”
DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION
• The doctrine of Colourable Legislation is based on the maxim ‘what cannot be done
directly, cannot be done indirectly’. It restricts legislatures from indirectly doing
something which, due to want of jurisdiction, they can not do directly. This
encroachment may be direct or indirect. In the case of the latter, the expression
‘colourable legislation’ is applied. In other words, colourable legislation is a ‘fraud
on the constitution’.

• The court employs the doctrine of Pith and Substance to determine if the legislature
is competent to enact the disputed statute. The extent of encroachment is a relevant
factor while determining if the enactment is colourable legislation

DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS

• Under the Indian conception of federalism, a state law that has operation outside the
given state is invalid. The doctrine of territorial nexus is invoked to find out if the
law in question has an operation beyond its jurisdiction. This doctrine stipulates
that:

1.Territory: The object to which a particular law applies does not have to be located
within the strict territory of the state. Instead, it needs to have a sufficient
territorial connection to the enacting state.

2.Subject: There needs to be a territorial nexus between the state enacting the law and
the law’s subject matter. The connection must be real and not illusory.

• State of Bombay v. RMDC, 1957

• In the given case, a lottery was conducted via a newspaper. This newspaper had
wide circulation within the State of Bombay, but quite a bit outside the state too.
The Bombay Government levied a lump sum tax on lotteries. The tax extended to
the circulation and distribution of newspapers that were published outside the
state. This tax was challenged in court. The Apex Court reasoned that even though
newspapers were published and had wide circulation outside the state, collectors
of the entry fees for the competition were within Bombay. Thus, there was
sufficient territorial nexus and the tax was held to be valid.

• Article 4 talks about power to make consequential changes in the law on

matters supplemental and incidental to the law providing for altering the
names of states under Article 2 and 3.

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UNIT 20
MIMANSA RULES OF INTERPRETATION
● ATIDESHA AXIOM
● SARTHAKYATA AXIOM
● LAGHAVA AXIOM
● ARTHAIKATVA AXIOM

◦ The principles of interpretation of statutes mainly relied on in our law courts are those dealt
with in the works of Western jurists. However, in our country we had developed from very
early times a scientific system of interpretation known as the Mimansa Principles and these
were regularly followed by our renowned jurists.
◦ Whenever there was any conflict between the Smritis e.g. Manusmriti and Yagnavalkya
Smriti, or ambiguity in a Shruti or Smriti, the Mimansa Principles were applied. Most of
these principles are rational and scientific, and in some respects superior to the principles
obtaining in Western Law.
◦ In ancient time people rather than worshipping the gods like we do today used to perform
some ritualistic Yagya i.e. sacrificial fire to the gods. With this backdrop, Mimansa system
was created in connection with Yagya
◦ With the change in time and language, language and grammar of the non-shruti part of the
Sanskrit literature were altered and made in accordance with the Panini grammar and hence
was easily comprehensible.

◦ But similar alteration was not permitted for shruti literature. One did not have the liberty to
change the language and grammar of the Vedas because it was considered to be sacred. In
fact it was not even written and was transmitted by oral tradition. Brahmanas too, form a
part of the Veda and hence their language too could not be altered and made in accordance
with the Panini’s grammar.

◦ For the conduct of Yagyas in accordance with the rules they had to devise a system of
interpretation to resolve the conflicts, ambiguities, etc. in the Shrutis, which were aggravated
by the archaic, pre-Panini Sanskrit employed in the Vedic texts.

◦ No doubt the principles of interpretation were initially evolved to resolve conflicts that arose
in connection with the meaning of rules governing performance of the Yagya, but gradually
these principles came to be accepted for interpreting legal texts also which were mixed up
with religious rules in the Smritis.

69
◦ The Mimansa principles are in two respects superior to Maxwell's principles of
interpretation, viz.: (1) They can be utilised not only for interpreting statutes but also
judgments, whereas Maxwell's principles can only be used for interpreting statutory law.
◦ The Mimansa Principles distinguish between obligatory statements and non-obligatory
statements. The main obligatory rule is called a Vidhi which are basically rules or
procedures.

◦ The main non-obligatory statement is known as an Arthavada. An Arthavada is a

statement of praise or explanation. Most of the Vedas proper consist of Arthavadas.
Arthavada is like the preamble or statement of objects in a statute. An Arthavada has no
legal force by itself, but it is not entirely useless since like a statement of objects or preamble
it can help to clarify an ambiguous Vidhi, or give the reason for it.
◦ Six axioms of interpretation have therefore been developed for the interpretation of
shastras3They are:

◦ (1) The Sarthakyata axiom, which means that every word and sentence must have some
meaning.
◦ (2) The Laghava axiom which states that that construction which makes the meaning simpler
and shorter is to be preferred.
◦ (3) The Arthaikatva axiom, which states that no two meaning should not be attached to a
word or sentence occurring at one and the same place..
◦ (4) The Gunapradhan axiom, which states that if a word or sentence purporting to express
a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea the former must be adjusted to the latter,
or must be disregarded altogether.
◦ (5) The Samanjasya axiom which states that all attempts should be made at reconciliation
of apparently conflicting texts.
◦ (6) The Vikalpa axiom, which states that if there is a real and irreconcilable contradiction
between two legal rules having equal force, the rule more in accordance with equity and
usage should be adopted at one's option.
◦ Badha principle signifies exclusion by repugnancy. For example, a special law prevails over
a general law, a higher law prevails over a lower law, a clear law prevails over an unclear
law.
◦ Application of Mimansa principles sometimes lead to different results. For example, there is
a text of Vasishta which says "a woman should not give or take a son in adoption except
with the consent of her husband". This has been interpreted in 4 different ways by our
commentators.
◦ (1) The Dattak Mimansa holds that no widow can adopt a son because the consent required is
consent at the time of adoption, and the husband being dead no consent of his can be had at
the time of adoption.
◦ Mithila School of Mitakshara, is of the same opinion, but for a different reason. According
to him, adoption can only be resorted to after performing the homa, and since a woman
cannot perform the homa with Vedic mantras, she cannot adopt.

70
◦ The Dayabhaga view is that the husband's assent is not required at the time of actual
adoption, and hence if the husband had given assent in his lifetime his widow can adopt
after his death.
◦ The view of the Dravida School of Mitakshara is that the words "except with the assent of
the husband" are only illustrative, and hence assent of her husband's agnates or father-in-
law's agnates is sufficient.
◦ Apart from the above mentioned axioms of interpretation there are well-known general
principles of interpretation in Mimansa, viz.:
◦ (1) the Shruti Principle, or the literal rule.
◦ (2) the Linga principle (also called golden rule)
◦ In Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan v. State of U.P. the controversy was as to which of two
clerks appointed on the same day in an Intermediate College would be senior, and hence
entitled to promotion as Head Clerk. Now there is no rule to cater to this situation. However,
Chapter 2, Regulation 3 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Regulations states that where 2
teachers are appointed on the same day, the senior in age will be senior. Using the atidesh
Principle of mimansa it was held that the same principle which applies to teachers should
be also applied to clerks, and hence the senior in age would be senior.
◦ The atidesh principle originated in the practical difficulty of performing certain yagyas. There
are some yagyas whose method of performance is given in detail in the Brahmanas.
However, there are other yagyas whose rules are not given any where, and these are known
as vikriti yagyas. The question arose how these latter are to be performed? The atidesh
principle was created to resolve this difficulty, and according to this principle the yagya is
to be performed according to the rules of the prakriti yagya belonging to the same genus.
◦ Tribhuwan Misra v. D.I.O.S. (1992) In this case the petitioner, who was the senior most
teacher in an Intermediate College, had filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
claiming that he should have been appointed ad hoc Principal on the retirement of the
previous Principal, but the management had superseded him.

◦ Decision of the court: In which one of the Division Bench ruling held that; the senior most
teacher should be appointed as ad hoc Principal, whereas another Division Bench delivered
held that it is the discretion of the Management as to who is to be appointed. In this case the
Samanjasya principle was used to reconcile two apparently conflicting Division Bench
rulings.

◦ It was explained that the former decision should be interpreted to mean that ordinarily the
senior most teacher should be appointed Principal, while the latter decision should be
interpreted to mean that in exceptional cases, viz., if there are grave charges against him,

71
 then can be superseded by a reasoned order, though only after giving him a show-cause
notice.

UNIT 21
INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
● GENERAL DEFINITIONS

• The General Clauses Act of 1897 establishes the fundamental

foundation for interpreting the legislation. The act is also known as
the Interpretation Act. It provides a standard set of legal
terminology, techniques, and expressions that serve to avoid
repetition and a standard set of concepts used in legislation. It
defines things more clearly by providing standards for interpretation
and expression.

• The purpose of the legislation is to ensure uniformity of speech by

defining a set of commonly used terminology. So, one of the
statutory aids to interpretation is the General Clauses Act making
the statutory language more concise.

• The Act covers all fields of law and contains provisions relating to
the interpretation of the General Clauses Act and other Indian
legislation. The Act’s definition applies only when the context
requires it.

• The General Clauses Act contains “definitions” of various terms

and some general interpretation guidelines.

• The general definitions will apply to all Central Acts and

legislations where no definition is provided except its subject or
context is objectionable.

• When there is a disagreement between pre-constitutional and post-

constitutional laws and no clear definition in the individual
enactments, the General Clauses Act seems very useful. To
minimise ambiguity, the Act provides a clear suggestion for
contradictory sections and distinguishes the acts according to their
commencement and enforcement dates.

• The General Clauses Act was designed to make legislative laws

more concise and to eliminate the duplication of the same words
across the same piece of law. Wherever possible, the purpose of an
act is to avoid redundant language in a statute.

72
 OBJECTIVES
• To make Central Acts’ language more concise;
• To ensure uniformity of phrasing in Central Acts by providing definitions for a set
of commonly used terms;

• To express some useful rules for the construction and interpretation of the central
acts explicitly.

• To prevent errors and omissions by incorporating some common form clauses into
each act that would otherwise get included in each Central Act

• The Supreme Court outlined the Act’s objective in the matter of Chief Inspector
of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar. The court stated that the General Clauses Act
aims to consolidate many provisions about word interpretation and legal
principles that would ordinarily have to be defined separately in various Acts and
legislations into a single statute. Legislation’s goal is to eliminate superfluous
wording from statutes whenever possible.

• The Act specifies how general Acts and other legislation with an allIndia scope
should get construed. Its significance is clear in light of the many legislations to
which it applies.

• Section 3 of the Act is the main section containing definitions that apply to the act
itself and all the central acts and legislation post-1897.

• The General Clauses Act does not apply when the acts contain separate and
specific definitions of their own or when the subject or context of the term is
objectionable.

• Section 3 defines 67 terms and phrases usually used in legislation and intends to
act as a dictionary for the terms and phrases. Some of the essential terms and
phrases include:

1.Section 3(2) “Act”: When rendering a crime or a civil wrong, the term “act” relates
to a series of actions and expressions pertaining to acts done and to whether legal
or illegal omissions. The term ‘act’ encompasses both legal and unlawful omissions

2.Section 3(3) “Affidavit”: Affidavits shall contain affirmation and declaration in the
context of those permitted by law to affirm or declare rather than swear.

3.The definition provided above is broad in scope. Affidavits must include affirmations
and declarations, according to the law. The affidavit is not defined in this definition.

73
4.However, in common usage, we may grasp this phrase. An affidavit is a written
document verified by oath or affirmation and intended to be used as evidence in court
or before any authority.

5.Section 3(7) “Central Act”: A ‘Central Act’ is a piece of legislation passed by

Parliament that includes: 1. A statute of the Dominion Legislature or the Indian
Legislature enacted before the Constitution’s inception, and
2. An Act passed by the Governor-General in Parliament or his or her legislative
capacity before the act’s commencement
1.Section 3(13) “Commencement”: When referring to the Acts
or legislation, the term “commencement” refers to the date on
which the Law or legislation becomes effective.

2.The procedure by which legislation, rules, treaties, and other regulatory frameworks
gain legal authority and become effective is referred to as commencement. A law
cannot be considered in effect unless put into effect through legislative action or
through the application of authority by an authorised representative to do so.

3.Section 3(18) “Document”: Any matter written, conveyed, or characterised on any

material by way of letters, figures, or symbols, or even by more than either of
those means to record that matter, will be referred to as a “document.”

4.Section 3(22) “Good Faith”: Under the General Clauses Act, the subject of good
faith is a factual one and is to be determined based on the specific facts of each
instance. As a result, anything handled with proper care and attention that isn’t
malicious is deemed to be undertaken in good faith.

5.Section 3(23) “Government”: The term ‘government’ or ‘the government’ refers to

state and central governments. As a result, whenever the term “government” is
mentioned, it refers to central and state governments.

1.Section 3(27) “Imprisonment”: ‘Imprisonment’ means any type of detention as specified

in the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2.According to section 53 of the IPC, offenders are subject to one of two types of
imprisonment: harsh (i.e., with hard labour) or simple (i.e., with no hard labour).
As a result, when an Act specifies that an act is punishable by sentence, the Court
may, at its authority, make the imprisonment strict or light.

3.Section 3(29) “Indian Law”: ‘Indian law’ means:

1. Any Act, ordinance, legislation, rule, order, by-law, or another instrument
having legal force in any province of India or part thereof before the
beginning of the Constitution
2. Any law that has the legal force in any Part A or Part C State or part
thereof after the commencement of the Constitution but does not involve

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 any Act of British parliament or any Order in Council, rule, or other
component made under such Act.

4.Section 3(65) ” Writing”: The term “writing” includes printing, lithography,

photography, and other ways of displaying or reproducing words in visible forms
• (Section 5)

• If a Central Act does not specify a date for its implementation, it will get executed
when:

• It receives the Governor General’s assent in the case of the Central Act.

• It is enacted before the beginning of the Constitution of India and/or

• It is provided with the President’s approval in the case of a Parliamentary act.

• If a precise implementation date is specified in the Gazette, the Act will take effect
on that date.

• Effect of Repeal (Section 6)

• Unless some other reason exists, any central legislation or legislation enacted after
the commencing of the General Clauses Act shall not repeal any Act which is
enacted or is yet to be enacted. The repeal shall not:

• Impact the prior operation of any repealed enactment or anything done or

experienced under it.

• Affect any right, privilege, duty, or responsibility obtained, accrued, or incurred

due to any repealed legislation.

• Affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed in connection with any

crime committed in violation of any repealed legislation

• Affect any investigation, litigation, or remedy relating to such claims, privilege,

debt, or obligation, or any investigation, litigation, or remedy that may be started,
continued, or insisted upon.

• Repeal of an act that modifies the language of an act or legislation (Section 6A)

• If any Central Act or legislation enacted after the enactment of the General Clauses
Act attempts to repeal any legislation by which the content of any Central Act or
Legislation was revised by the:

• explicit omission,

• insertion, or

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 • replacement of any matter,

• The repeal shall not prejudice the continuation of any such revision made by the
legislation which is repealed and in effect at the time of such repeal unless a
different purpose appears.

• Reinstatement of abolished statutes (Section 7)

• To recover, either entirely or partly, any legislation wholly or partially abolished, it
shall be essential to specify that purpose in any Central Act or legislation adopted
after the beginning of the General Clauses Act.

• This clause also applies to all Central Acts enacted after January 3, 1968, and any
legislation enacted on or after January 14, 1887.

• Construction of repealed enactment references (Section 8)

• If any provision of this enactment is repealed or re-enacted with or without any
modification, then the previous provision before re-enactment should be considered
as a reference to the provision re-enacted unless a different intention appears from
the newly enacted provision.

• Time Computation
• If any law or proceeding is instructed or permitted to be completed or taken in any
court or office on a specific day or within a period prescribed by any legislation or
legislation, and the Court or office is shut on that day or on the last day of the period
prescribed, the act or proceeding shall be regarded as complete or taken in due
period if it is done or taken the next day the Court or office is open.

• Distance measurement
• Unless a contrary intention shows, any distance calculated for the objectives of any
Central Act or Legislation issued after the commencing of this Act shall be
calculated in a horizontal line in a flat direction.

UNIT 22
TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (VIENNA CONVENTION
OF THE LAW OF TREATIES)
● ARTICLE31 GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
● ARTICLE 32 SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION
● ARTICLE 33 INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES AUTHENTICATED IN TWO OR
MORE LANGUAGE
Vienna Convention of 1969, which codified the law of treaties, the international treaty is “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by the
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation” (article 2, paragraph 1, letter (a).

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◦Another important document in this regard, the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations, extends the international treaty scope, by including international
organizations in category subjects of international law that can have the role as part of a
treaty.
◦ There are at least three commonly acknowledged "schools" or approaches to treaty
interpretation, which correspond to methods of construction of any legal text— including
constitutions, statutes, and contracts.
◦ Textualist. The first school is textualism. All solid treaty interpretation begins with the words
of a provision itself, as they are commonly understood. VCLT Article 31, in discussing treaty
interpretation, calls for an examination of a text’s "ordinary meaning.
◦ Intentionalist. Textualism can be a form of contextual reading of different provisions in a
treaty text, in order to reach a sensible result. Already one can see a tension between the text
of a treaty provision and the intent of the drafters. However, the second, intentionalist,
approach to treaty interpretation has never been popular in international law.
◦ Teleological. That leaves the third school of interpretation: seeking to effectuate the purpose
of a treaty, rather than slavishly following the text or attempting to divine the intent of the
drafters. Known in international law as a teleological approach, it can also be called
purposivism. It is captured in the VCLT’s requirement that treaties be construed in light of
their "object and purpose" and in view of "relevant rules of international law.
Rules and Principles of Interpretation of Treaties
1. The interpretation technique of the legal norm as regards the treaty interpretation requires
four interpretation methods:

2. Grammatical interpretation, requiring a legal standard international interpretation of the

rules of grammar on syntax, morphology, vocabulary;

3. Systematic interpretation, which involves the establishing of the international legal

standard meaning of a treaty by its relation to the whole text, to the legal institution or
other provisions of international law;

4. Historical and teleological interpretation, which consists of clarifying the meaning of the
terms of a treaty taking into account the historical, social, political conditions, needs
which led to the adoption of the document in question and the purpose pursued by the
states, as parties to the Treaty, in such case it should be considered the preparatory work
for drafting the treaty text, the debates about the draft treaty within international
conferences, exchanges of notes etc.

5. Logical interpretation, a method which leads to clarify the content of a treaty by the use
of reasoning and arguments of formal logics
◦ Fitzmaurice identified FIVE principles of interpretation based on the International Court
jurisprudence mainly:

1. principle of actuality or textuality,

2. principle of the natural and ordinary meaning,

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3. principle of integration,
4. principle of effectivness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat),
5. principle of subsequent practice and principle of contemporaneity.
◦ As we observe in the doctrine, most of these principles have been introduced in the
International Law Commissions proposals and they were adopted “without changes” by
the Vienna Conference in the articles 31 and 32.
◦ 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes in article 31 the general rule
of interpretation of treaties: “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose”.
◦ Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. .The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
◦ (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty;
◦ (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c)any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

◦ Principle of good faith is a fundamental principle of international law. Good faith in

international law has the usual sense, i.e., intention and consciousness of the compliance of
the attitude with the truth, with the rules of law.
◦ This provision is consistent with that contained in article 26 VCLT, that is pacta sunt
servanda.
◦ According to the principle of good faith the interpretation of any treaty must be made with the
intention of establishing the exact meaning of its regulations. In the matter of treaty
interpretation, good faith demands the compliance of the following requirements:
1. if the treaty is clear, the meaning should not change under the pretext of respecting the
spirit;
2. the used terms in the treaty must be assigned to their ordinary, natural meaning, and they
should be interpreted taking into account the object and purpose of the treaty;

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3. to a term it will be assigned a special meaning if it is established that it was the intention
of the parties.
◦ In the situation where from interpretations under article 31 VCLT it is achieved to an
ambiguous meaning or obscure or the interpretation has led to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable, the article 32 provides the possibility of using complementary
means of interpretation, noting the preparatory work and the circumstances in which the
treaty was concluded. This solution can be approached also to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31.
◦ Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation

◦ Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory

work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31,
◦ or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable
◦ Article 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages
1.When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of
divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2.A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties
so agree.

3.The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4.Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison
of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and
32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object
and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.

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