Kashmir Dispute
Kashmir Dispute
Kashmir Dispute
Introduction
India‟s revocation of Article 370, which had granted Jammu and Kashmir a special status, has
changed the security and strategic dynamics in the relations between India and Pakistan. While
Pakistan has limited international support, it still vows to consume all diplomatic options against
India‟s greater strategic and economic weight, and to overcome the status quo inertia of the
international community.
Historical Baggage
At the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 the State of Jammu and
Kashmir was one of the 564 princely states that faced the choice of either joining India or
Pakistan in accordance with the twin principles of geographical contiguity and self-
determination following the lapse of British paramountcy.
Faced with the armed revolt by Muslims from Poonch in June 1947, the Maharaja
retaliated with brutal force against them. The situation deteriorated during August and
September of 1947, as the Kashmiri Muslims openly revolted. Their fellow tribesmen
from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province joined in this armed insurrection.
To forestall his imminent overthrow by the advancing rebel troops, the Maharaja
requested military aid from India, and approved the annexation of Kashmir to the Indian
Union on October 26, 1947.
Divergent Perspectives
The decision of the Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to the Indian Union, regardless of its
circumstances, is "final and legal and it cannot be disputed."
If there is any "unfinished" business of partition it is the requirement that Pakistan
relinquish control of that part of Jammu and Kashmir that it illegally occupies.
India further maintains that the UN Resolutions calling for the will of the people to be
ascertained are no longer tenable because Pakistan has not fulfilled the precondition of
withdrawal from the territory it occupied through aggression.
After Pakistan's attempts to alter the status quo by force of war in 1965, Islamabad has
forfeited the right to invoke the UN Resolutions.
The problem of Kashmir, according to India, is one of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.
The Pakistani Perspective
The Government of Pakistan has maintained that J&K has been a disputed territory.
The state's accession to India in October 1947 was provisional and executed under the
coercive pressure of Indian military presence.
The disputed status of J & К is acknowledged in the UN Security Council resolutions of
August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, to which both Pakistan and India agreed. These
resolutions remain fully in force today, and cannot be unilaterally disregarded by either
party.
https://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2009/Volume4/1007-1035.pdf
The Indian approach to Kashmir dispute operates at three distinct levels: local, bilateral and
international.
At Local Level
crush the Kashmiri resistance by massive use of force
manipulating the differences among different Kashmiri resistance groups
At Bilateral level
expressing its willingness to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, though
avoid conducting any meaningful dialogue with Pakistan regarding Kashmir;
maintaining a posture of dialogue with Pakistan is to gain time to consolidate its
hold over in Kashmir by pacifying the Kashmiri resistance
At international Level
deflecting the Pakistani campaign alleging human-rights violations in Kashmir;
emphasizing that the Simla agreement provides the only viable forum to settle the
Kashmir issue;
and discrediting the Kashmiri resistance movement as a "terrorist activity"
sponsored by Pakistan
The article 370, which came into effect in 1949, exempts Jammu and Kashmir state from
the Indian constitution.
It allows the Indian-administered region jurisdiction to make its own laws in all matters
except finance, defence, foreign affairs and communications.
It established a separate constitution and a separate flag and denied property rights in
the region to the outsiders.
Article 35A
Article 35A was introduced through a presidential order in 1954 to continue the old
provisions of the territory regulations under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
The article permits the local legislature in Indian-administered Kashmir to define
permanent residents of the region.
It forbids outsiders from permanently settling, buying land, holding local government
jobs or winning education scholarships in the region.
The provisions under Articles 370 and 35-A have long been an ideological sticking point
for the BJP, “who view India as a fundamentally Hindu nation” and have qualms about a
“Muslim majority state with special privileges.”
The annulment of this legislation featured prominently in the Hindu nationalist party‟s
recent electoral campaign. Prime Minister Modi and other BJP leaders have claimed that
Articles 370 and 35-A were obstacles to Kashmiri prosperity, stunting economic
development, encouraging “dynastic politics and corruption,” and nurturing “terrorism
and separatism” in the region.
What impact does the revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A have on India-Pakistan relations
and on regional security as a whole?
The BJP‟s actions exacerbated the already fraught relationship with Pakistan and negatively
impacted regional security in South Asia. Since its inception as a state, Pakistan has seen the
Kashmir issue as an existential one and has seen its role as the champion and protector of
Kashmir‟s Muslim-majority citizenry.
The international community has raised concerns about the situation in Kashmir, with UN
Secretary General Antonio Guterres urging “maximum restraint” by all parties.
Prime Minister Khan raised India‟s actions in Kashmir at the UN General Assembly.
Additionally, the government in Islamabad continues to take several actions against India: it has
expelled the Indian ambassador in Islamabad, downgraded diplomatic relations and severed trade
with its neighbor, suspended the cross-border Samjohta Express rail service, and banned the
screening of Bollywood movies and broadcasting of Indian channels on cable television.
In addition, the evolving situation in Kashmir might negatively impact the peace process in
Afghanistan. Pakistan has been wary of Indian intentions in Afghanistan for decades, and this
turn of events in Kashmir will make Islamabad that much more mistrusting of its neighbor.
Pakistan has been playing a significant role in recent U.S.-Afghan peace negotiations with the
Taliban. The Kashmir issue may not only detract Pakistani resources and political will away
from Afghanistan but potentially could also be used as leverage to persuade the United States to
intervene with India.
Finally, there is the likelihood of an escalation of tensions in Kashmir into full-blown violence.
Forced demographic changes would create an atmosphere ripe for communal violence between
Muslims and Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir that risks escalating to the whole country.
Communal tensions have already been high since Prime Minister Modi‟s first term, and events in
Kashmir would only fan the flames farther.
These are delicate times for Pakistan, considering its slowing economy, a minority government,
and the FATF noose hanging around its neck. From a strategic perspective, Pakistan may see
itself as having at least six options at its disposal to contemplate in the current context but it must
consider the morality and practical consequences of each, otherwise it may suffer perilous
isolation in international affairs. We outline these six options below.
Pakistan is in no position to take up such a challenge given its parlous state today. However, an
integrated and mutually reinforcing six-track Kashmir policy could render the seemingly
impossible possible.
1. The first track would, within the framework of UN resolutions, seek to restore dialogue
with India in pursuance of a negotiated and principled Kashmir settlement in regular
consultation with the Kashmiri resistance leadership. A likely Indian refusal to respond
would contrast with Pakistan‟s constructive and peaceful approach.
2. The second track would seek to deter India from its current policies in IHK which include
gross human rights violations, torture, and likely genocide according to the Genocide
Convention of 1948 and the Genocide Alert issued by Genocide Watch on Aug 11, 2019,
only six days after Aug 5.
3. The third track would be to ensure the survival of legitimate Kashmiri resistance,
including armed resistance, to Indian annexation, black laws, atrocities and genocide.
This is entirely legitimate according to international law, including UN resolutions.
However, to remain legitimate such resistance must forbid all acts of terror against
unarmed civilians.
4. A fourth track would need to address any division of Kashmiri opinion between the
Pakistan and azadi options on the basis of a proper understanding of Article 257 of the
Pakistan Constitution. This reconciles the two options within the Pakistan option and
denies India an opportunity to divide Kashmiri opinion. But it would require Kashmiri
trust in Pakistan‟s fidelity to its own constitutional obligation to the Kashmiri people.
5. A fifth track would involve an intensification of Pakistan‟s diplomacy on behalf of (i) a
principled and negotiated Kashmir settlement verifiably acceptable to Kashmiri opinion,
especially in the Valley; (ii) Kashmiri political and human rights protections in order to
avoid unthinkable outcomes which the current situation is rapidly sliding towards; and
(iii) making the international community aware of its existential stake in restraining
India.
6. The sixth track would integrate the five tracks into a comprehensive national
transformation policy. This would transform Pakistan‟s image, maximize its policy
options, and render its voice far more resonant in the capitals of the world.