Temporal Description Logics
Temporal Description Logics
Temporal Description Logics
Abstract
A class of interval-based temporal languages for uniformly representing and reasoning
about actions and plans is presented. Actions are represented by describing what is true
while the action itself is occurring, and plans are constructed by temporally relating actions
and world states. The temporal languages are members of the family of Description Logics,
which are characterized by high expressivity combined with good computational properties.
The subsumption problem for a class of temporal Description Logics is investigated and
sound and complete decision procedures are given. The basic language TL-F is considered
rst: it is the composition of a temporal logic TL { able to express interval temporal
networks { together with the non-temporal logic F { a Feature Description Logic. It is
proven that subsumption in this language is an NP-complete problem. Then it is shown
how to reason with the more expressive languages TLU -FU and TL-ALCF . The former
adds disjunction both at the temporal and non-temporal sides of the language, the latter
extends the non-temporal side with set-valued features (i.e., roles) and a propositionally
complete language.
1. Introduction
The representation of temporal knowledge has received considerable attention in the Ar-
ti cial Intelligence community in an attempt to extend existing knowledge representation
systems to deal with actions and change. At the same time, many logic-based formalisms
were developed and analyzed by logicians and philosophers for the same purposes. In this
class of logical formalisms, properties such as expressive power and computability have been
studied as regards typical problems involving events and actions.
This paper analyzes from a theoretical point of view the logical and computational
properties of a knowledge representation system that allows us to deal with time, actions
and plans in a uniform way. The most common approaches to model actions are based
on the notion of state change { e.g., the formal models based on the original situation
calculus (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Sandewall & Shoham, 1994) or the Strips-like planning
systems (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971; Lifschitz, 1987) { in which actions are generally considered
instantaneous and de ned as functions from one state to another by means of pre- and
post-conditions. Here, an explicit notion of time is introduced in the modeling language
and actions are de ned as occurring over time intervals, following the Allen proposal (Allen,
c 1998 AI Access Foundation and Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. All rights reserved.
Artale & Franconi
1991). In this formalism an action is represented by describing the time course of the
world while the action occurs. Concurrent or overlapping actions are allowed: e ects of
overlapping actions can be di erent from the sum of their individual e ects; e ects may
not directly follow the action but more complex temporal relations may hold. For instance,
consider the motion of a pointer on a screen driven by a mouse: the pointer moves because
of the movement of the device on the pad { there is a cause-e ect relation { but the two
events are contemporary, in the common-sense notion of the word.
A class of interval temporal logics is studied based on Description Logics and inspired by
the works of Schmiedel (1990) and of Weida and Litman (1992). In this class of formalisms
a state describes a collection of properties of the world holding at a certain time. Actions are
represented through temporal constraints on world states, which pertain to the action itself.
Plans are built by temporally relating actions and states. To represent the temporal dimen-
sion classical Description Logics are extended with temporal constructors; thus a uniform
representation for states, actions and plans is provided. Furthermore, the distinction made
by Description Logics between the terminological and assertional aspects of the knowledge
allows us to describe actions and plans both at an abstract level (action/plan types) and
at an instance level (individual actions and plans). In this environment, the subsumption
calculus is the main inference tool for managing collections of action and plan types. Action
and plan types can be organized in a subsumption-based taxonomy, which plays the role
of an action/plan library to be used for the tasks known in the literature as plan retrieval
and individual plan recognition (Kautz, 1991). A re nement of the plan recognition no-
tion is proposed, by splitting it into the di erent tasks of plan description classi cation {
involving a plan type { and speci c plan recognition with respect to a plan description {
involving an individual plan. According to the latter reasoning task, the system is able to
recognize which type of action/plan has taken place at a certain time interval, given a set
of observations of the world.
Advantages of using Description Logics are their high expressivity combined with de-
sirable computational properties { such as decidability, soundness and completeness of de-
duction procedures (Buchheit, Donini, & Schaerf, 1993; Schaerf, 1994; Donini, Lenzerini,
Nardi, & Schaerf, 1994; Donini, Lenzerini, Nardi, & Nutt, 1995). The main purpose of this
work is to investigate a class of decidable temporal Description Logics, and to provide com-
plete algorithms for computing subsumption. To this aim, we start with TL-F , a language
being the composition of a temporal logic TL { able to express interval temporal networks {
together with the non-temporal Description Logic F { a Feature Description Logic (Smolka,
1992). It turns out that subsumption for TL-F is an NP-complete problem. Then, we show
how to reason with more expressive languages: TLU -FU , which adds disjunction both at
the temporal and non-temporal sides of the language, and TL-ALCF , which extends the
non-temporal side with set-valued features (i.e., roles) and a propositionally complete De-
scription Logic (Hollunder & Nutt, 1990). In both cases we show that reasoning is decidable
and we supply sound and complete procedures for computing subsumption.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the main features of Description
Logics in Section 2, Section 3 organizes the intuitions underlying our proposal. The technical
bases are introduced by brie y overviewing the temporal extensions of Description Logics
relevant for this approach { together with the inter-relationships with the interval temporal
modal logic { speci cally intended for time and action representation and reasoning. The
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
basic feature temporal language (TL-F ) is introduced in Section 4. The language syntax is
rst described in Section 4.1, together with a worked out example illustrating the informal
meaning of temporal expressions. Section 4.2 reveals the model theoretic semantics of TL-F ,
together with a formal de nition of the subsumption and instance recognition problems.
Section 5 shows that the temporal language is suitable for action and plan representation
and reasoning: the well known cooking domain and blocks world domain are taken into
consideration. The sound and complete calculus for the feature temporal language TL-F
is presented in details in Section 6. A proof that subsumption for TL-F is an NP-complete
problem is included. The calculus for TL-F forms the basic reasoning procedure that
can be adapted to deal with logics having an extended propositional part. An algorithm
for checking subsumption in presence of disjunction (TLU -FU ) is devised in Section 7.1;
while in Section 7.2 the non-temporal part of the language is extended with roles and
full propositional calculus (TL-ALCF ). In both cases, the subsumption problem is still
decidable. Operators for homogeneity and persistence are presented in Section 8 for an
adequate representation of world states. In particular, a possible solution to the frame
problem, i.e., the problem to compute what remains unchanged by an action, is suggested.
Section 9 surveys the whole spectrum of extensions of Description Logics for representing
and reasoning with time and action. This Section is concluded by a comparison with State
Change based approaches by brie y illustrating the e ort made in the situation calculus
area to temporally extend this class of formalisms. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. Description Logics
Description Logics1 are formalisms designed for a logical reconstruction of representa-
tion tools such as frames, semantic networks, object-oriented and semantic data models
{ see (Calvanese, Lenzerini, & Nardi, 1994) for a survey. Nowadays, Description Logics
are also considered the most important unifying formalism for the many object-centered
representation languages used in areas other than Knowledge Representation. Important
characteristics of Description Logics are high expressivity together with decidability, which
guarantee the existence of reasoning algorithms that always terminate with the correct
answers.
This Section gives a brief introduction to a basic Description Logic, which will serve as
the basic representation language for our proposal. As for the formal apparatus, the formal-
ism introduced by (Schmidt-Schau & Smolka, 1991) and further elaborated by (Donini,
Hollunder, Lenzerini, Spaccamela, Nardi, & Nutt, 1992; Donini et al., 1994, 1995; Buchheit
et al., 1993; De Giacomo & Lenzerini, 1995, 1996) is followed: in this way, Description
Logics are considered as a structured fragment of predicate logic. ALC (Schmidt-Schau &
Smolka, 1991) is the minimal Description Logic including full negation and disjunction {
i.e., propositional calculus, and it is a notational variant of the propositional modal logic
K(m) (Halpern & Moses, 1985; Schild, 1991).
The basic types of a Description Logic are concepts, roles, features, and individuals. A
concept is a description gathering the common properties among a collection of individuals;
from a logical point of view it is a unary predicate ranging over the domain of individu-
1. Description Logics have been also called Frame-Based Description Languages, Term Subsumption Lan-
guages, Terminological Logics, Taxonomic Logics, Concept Languages or KL-One-like languages.
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Artale & Franconi
C; D ! A j (atomic concept)
>j (top)
?j (bottom)
:C j (complement)
C uD j (conjunction)
C tD j (disjunction)
8P .C j (universal quanti er)
9P .C j (existential quanti er)
p:Cj (selection)
p#qj (agreement)
p"qj (disagreement)
p" (unde nedness)
p; q ! f j (atomic feature)
pq (path)
als. Properties are represented either by means of roles { which are interpreted as binary
relations associating to individuals of a given class values for that property { or by means
of features { which are interpreted as functions associating to individuals of a given class
a single value for that property. The language ALCF , extending ALC with features (i.e.,
functional roles) is considered. By the syntax rules of Figure 1, ALCF concepts (denoted by
the letters C and D) are built out of atomic concepts (denoted by the letter A), atomic roles
(denoted by the letter P ), and atomic features (denoted by the letter f ). The syntax rules
are expressed following the tradition of Description Logics (Baader, Burckert, Heinsohn,
Hollunder, Muller, Nebel, Nutt, & Pro tlich, 1990).
The meaning of concept expressions is de ned as sets of individuals, as for unary pred-
icates, and the meaning of roles as sets of pairs of individuals, as for binary predicates.
Formally, an interpretation is a pair I = (I ; I ) consisting of a set I of individuals (the
domain of I ) and a function I (the interpretation function of I ) mapping every concept
to a subset of I , every role to a subset of I I , every feature to a partial function
from I to I , and every individual into a di erent element of I { i.e., aI 6= bI if a 6= b
(Unique Name Assumption) { such that the equations of the left column in Figure 2 are
satis ed.
The ALCF semantics identi es concept expressions as fragments of rst-order predicate
logic. Since the interpretation I assigns to every atomic concept, role or feature a unary or
binary (functional) relation over I , respectively, one can think of atomic concepts, roles
and features as unary and binary (functional) predicates. This can be seen as follows: an
atomic concept A, an atomic role P , and an atomic feature f , are mapped respectively to
the open formulas FA ( ), P ( ; ), and Ff ( ; ) with Ff satisfying the functionality axiom
8y; z.Ff (x; y) ^ Ff (x; z) ! y = z { i.e., Ff is a functional relation.
The rightmost column of Figure 2 gives the transformational semantics of ALCF ex-
pressions in terms of FOL well-formed formul, while the left column gives the standard
extensional semantics. As far as the transformational semantics is concerned, a concept C ,
a role P and a path p correspond to the FOL open formulae FC ( ), FP ( ; ), and Fp ( ; ),
466
A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
>I = I true
?I = ; false
(:C )I = I n C I :FC ( )
(C u D)I = C I \ DI FC ( ) ^ FD ( )
(C t D)I = C [D
I I FC ( ) _ FD ( )
(9P .C )I = fa 2 j 9b.(a; b) 2 P ^ b 2 C g
I I I 9x.FP ( ; x) ^ FC (x)
(8P .C )I = fa 2 I j 8b.(a; b) 2 P I ) b 2 C I g 8x.FP ( ; x) ) FC (x)
(p : C )I =fa 2 dom pI j pI (a) 2 C I g 9x.Fp ( ; x) ^ FC (x)
p # qI =fa 2 dom pI \ dom qI j pI (a) = qI (a)g (9x.Fp ( ; x) ^ Fq ( ; x))
p " qI =fa 2 dom pI \ dom qI j pI (a) 6= qI (a)g (9x; y.Fp ( ; x) ^ Fq ( ; y))^
(8x; y .Fp ( ; x) ^ Fq ( ; y ) ! x 6= y )
(p ")I = I n dom pI :9x.Fp ( ; x)
(p q) = p q
I I I 9x.Fp ( ; x) ^ Fq (x; )
respectively. It is worth noting that the extensional semantics of the left column gives also
an interpretation for the formulas of the right column so that the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 2.1 (Concepts vs. fol formul) Let C be an ALCF concept expression.
Then the transformational semantics of Figure 2 maps C into a logically equivalent rst
order formula.
A terminology or TBox is a nite set of terminological axioms. For an atomic concept A,
called de: ned concept, and a (possibly complex) concept C , a terminological axiom is of the
form A = C . An atomic concept not appearing on the left-hand side of any terminological
axiom is called a primitive concept. Acyclic simple TBoxes only are considered: a de ned
concept may appear at most once as the left-hand side of an axiom, and no terminological
cycles are allowed, i.e., no de ned concept may occur { neither directly: nor indirectly {
within its own de nition (Nebel, 1991). An interpretation I satis es A = C if and only if
AI = C I .
As an example, consider the unary relation (i.e., a concept) denoting the class of happy
fathers, de ned using the atomic predicates Man, Doctor, Rich, Famous (concepts) and
CHILD, FRIEND (roles):
:
HappyFather = Man u (9CHILD.>) u 8CHILD.(Doctor u 9FRIEND.(Rich t Famous))
i.e., the men whose children are doctors having some rich or famous friend.
An ABox is a nite set of assertional axioms, i.e. predications on individual objects. Let
O be the alphabet of symbols denoting individuals; an assertion is an axiom of the form
C (a), R(a; b) or p(a; b), where a and b denote individuals in O. C (a) is satis ed by an
interpretation I i aI 2 C I , P (a; b) is satis ed by I i (aI ; bI ) 2 P I , and p(a; b) is satis ed
by I i pI (aI ) = bI .
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Artale & Franconi
with the meaning of a LivingBeing at the reference interval NOW, who will not be alive
at an interval x sometime after the reference interval NOW. Schmiedel does not propose
any algorithm for computing subsumption, but gives some preliminary hints. Actually,
Schmiedel's logic is argued to be undecidable (Bettini, 1997), sacri cing the main bene t
of Description Logics: the possibility of having decidable inference techniques.
Schmiedel's temporal Description Logic, when closed under complementation, contains
as a proper fragment the temporal logic HS proposed by Halpern and Shoham (1991).
The logic HS is a propositional modal logic which extends propositional logic with modal
formul of the kind hRi. and [R]. { where R is a basic Allen's temporal relation and hi
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
and [] are the possibility and necessity modal operators. For example, the modal formula
LivingBeing ^ hafteri.:LivingBeing corresponds to the abovementioned Mortal concept.
Unfortunately, the HS logic is shown to be undecidable, at least for most interesting classes
of temporal structures: \One gets decidability only in very restricted cases, such as when
the set of temporal models considered is a nite collection of structures, each consisting of
a nite set of natural numbers." (Halpern & Shoham, 1991)
Weida and Litman (1992, 1994) propose T-Rex, a loose hybrid integration between
Description Logics and constraint networks. Plans are de ned as collections of steps together
with temporal constraints between their duration. Each step is associated with an action
type, represented by a generic concept in K-Rep { a non-temporal Description Logic. Thus
a plan is seen as a plan network, a temporal constraint network whose nodes, corresponding
to time intervals, are labeled with action types and are associated with the steps of the plan
itself. As an example of plan in T-Rex they show the plan of preparing spaghetti marinara:
( defplan Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara
((step1 Boil-Spaghetti)
(step2 Make-Marinara)
(step3 Put-Together-SM))
((step1 (before meets) step3)
(step2 (before meets) step3)))
This is a plan composed by three actions, i.e., boiling spaghetti, preparing marinara sauce,
and assembling all things at the end. Temporal constraints between the steps establish
the temporal order in doing the corresponding actions. A structural plan subsumption
algorithm is de ned, characterized in terms of graph matching, and based on two separate
notions of subsumption: pure terminological subsumption between action types labeling
the nodes, and pure temporal subsumption between interval relationships labeling the arcs.
The plan library is used to guide plan recognition (Weida, 1996) in a way similar to that
proposed by Kautz (1991). Even if this work has strong motivations, no formal semantics
is provided for the language and the reasoning problems.
Starting from the assumption that an action has a duration in time, our proposal con-
siders an interval-based modal temporal logic { in the spirit of Halpern and Shoham (1991)
{ and reduces the expressivity of (Schmiedel, 1990) in the direction of (Weida & Litman,
1992). While Schmiedel's work lacks computational machinery, and Halpern and Shoham's
logic is undecidable, here an expressive decidable logic is obtained, providing sound and
complete reasoning algorithms. Di erently from T-Rex which uses two di erent languages
to represent actions and plans { a non temporal Description Logic for describing actions
and a second language to compose plans by adding temporal information { here an exten-
sion of a Description Logic is chosen in which time operators are available directly as term
constructors. This view implies an integration of a temporal domain in the semantic struc-
ture where terms themselves are interpreted, giving the formal way both for a well-founded
notion of subsumption and for proving soundness and completeness of the corresponding
procedure. As an example of the formalism, the plan for preparing spaghetti marinara
introduced above is represented as follows:
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Artale & Franconi
Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara =
: 3(y z w) (y (before; meets) w)(z (before; meets) w).
(Boil-Spaghetti@y u
Make-Marinara@z u
Put-Together-SM@w)
4.1 Syntax
Basic types of the language are concepts , individuals, temporal variables and intervals.
Concepts can describe entities of the world, states and events. Temporal variables denote
intervals bound by temporal constraints, by means of which abstract temporal patterns in
the form of constraint networks are expressed. Concepts (resp. individuals) can be speci ed
to hold at a certain temporal variable (resp. interval). In this way, action types (resp.
individual actions) can be represented in a uniform way by temporally related concepts
(resp. individuals).
For the basic temporal interval relations the Allen notation (Allen, 1991) (Figure 3) is
used: before (b), meets (m), during (d), overlaps (o), starts (s), nishes (f), equal (=), after
(a), met-by (mi), contains (di), overlapped-by (oi), started-by (si), nished-by ( ). Concept
expressions (denoted by C; D) are syntactically built out of atomic concepts (denoted by A),
atomic features (denoted by f ), atomic parametric features (denoted by ?g) and temporal
variables (denoted by X; Y ). Temporal concepts (C; D) are distinguished from non-temporal
concepts (E; F ), following the syntax rules of Figure 4. Names for atomic features and
atomic parametric features are from the same alphabet of symbols; the ? symbol is not
intended as operator, but only as di erentiating the two syntactic types.
470
A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
Temporal variables are introduced by the temporal existential quanti er \3" { excluding
the special temporal variable ], usually called NOW, and intended as the reference interval.
Variables appearing in temporal constraints (Tc) must be declared within the same temporal
quanti er, with the exception of the special variable ]. Temporal variables appearing in the
right hand side of an \@" operator are called bindable. Concepts must not include unbound
(a.k.a. free) bindable variables. Informally, a bindable variable is said to be bound in a
concept if it is declared at the nearest temporal quanti er in the body of which it occurs;
this avoid the usual formal inductive de nition of a bound variable. Moreover, in chained
constructs of the form ((C [Y1 ]@X1 )[Y2 ]@X2 : : :) non bindable variables { i.e., the ones on
the left hand side of an \@" operator { cannot appear more than once. Note that, since
Description Logics are a fragment of FOL with one free variable, the above mentioned
restrictions force the temporal side of the language to have only one free temporal variable,
i.e., the reference time ].
As usual, terminological axioms for building simple acyclic TL-F TBoxes are allowed.
While using in a concept expression a name referring to a de ned concept, it is possible to
use the substitutive quali er construct, to impose a coreference with a variable appearing
in the de nition associated to the de ned concept. The statement C [Y ]@X constrains the
variable Y , which should appear in the de nition of the de ned concept C , to corefer with X
(see Section 5.2 for an example). A drawback in the use of this operator is the requirement
to know the internal syntactical form of the de ned concept, namely, the names of its
temporal variables.
Let O and OT be two alphabets of symbols denoting individuals and temporal intervals,
respectively. An assertion { i.e., a predication on temporally quali ed individual entities {
is a statement of one of the forms C (i; a); p(i; a; b); ?g(a; b); R(i; j ), where C is a concept, p
is a feature, ?g is a parametric feature, R is a temporal relation, a and b denote individuals
in O, i and j denote temporal intervals in OT .
471
Artale & Franconi
TL C; D ! E j (non-temporal concept)
C uD j (conjunction)
C @X j (quali er)
C [Y ]@X j (substitutive quali er)
3(X ) Tc.C (existential quanti er)
Tc ! (X (R) Y ) j (temporal constraint)
(X (R) ]) j
(] (R) Y )
Tc ! Tc j Tc Tc
R; S ! R , S j (disjunction)
s j mi j f j : : : (Allen's relations)
X; Y ! x j y j z j : : : (temporal variables)
X ! XjX X
F E; F ! A j (atomic concept)
>j (top)
EuF j (conjunction)
p#qj (agreement)
p:E (selection)
p; q ! f j (atomic feature)
?g j (atomic parametric feature)
pq (path)
] -
Basic-Stack(BLOCK)
x -
OnTable(BLOCK)
y
OnBlock(BLOCK)
-
Figure 5: Temporal dependencies in the de nition of the Basic-Stack action.
] embedded within the concept expression C is interpreted as the X variable2 . The informal
meaning of a concept with a temporal existential quanti cation can be understood with the
following examples in the action domain.
:
Basic-Stack = 3(x y ) (x m ])(] m y ). ((?BLOCK : OnTable)@x u (?BLOCK : OnBlock)@y )
Figure 5 shows the temporal dependencies of the intervals in which the concept Basic-Stack
holds. Basic-Stack denotes, according to the de nition (a terminological axiom), any
action occurring at some interval involving a ?BLOCK that was once OnTable and then
OnBlock. The ] interval could be understood as the occurring time of the action type being
de ned: referring to it within the de nition is an explicit way to temporally relate states
and actions occurring in the world with respect to the occurrence of the action itself. The
temporal constraints (x m ]) and (] m y) state that the interval denoted by x should meet
the interval denoted by ] { the occurrence interval of the action type Basic-Stack { and
that ] should meet y. The parametric feature ?BLOCK plays the role of formal parameter of
the action, mapping any individual action of type Basic-Stack to the block to be stacked,
independently from time. Please note that, whereas the existence and identity of the ?BLOCK
of the action is time invariant, it can be quali ed di erently in di erent intervals of time,
e.g., the ?BLOCK is necessarily OnTable only during the interval denoted by x.
Let us comment now on the introduction of explicit temporal variables. The absence of
explicit temporal variables would weaken the temporal structure of a concept since arbitrary
relationships between more than two intervals could not be represented anymore. For
example, having only implicit intervals it is not possible to describe the situation in which
two concept expressions, say C and D, hold at two meeting intervals (say x, y) with the rst
interval starting and the second nishing the reference interval (i.e., the temporal pattern
(x meets y)(x starts ])(y nishes ]) cannot be represented). More precisely, it is not possible
to represent temporal relations between more than two intervals if they are not derivable by
the temporal propagation of the constraints imposed on pairs of variables. While explicit
variables go against the general thrust of Description Logics, the gained expressive power
together with the observation that the variables are limited only to the temporal part of
the language are the main motivations for using them. However, it is easy to drop them by
limiting the temporal expressiveness as proposed by Bettini (1997) (see also Section 9).
An assertion of the type Basic-Stack(i; a) states that the individual a is an action of
the type Basic-Stack occurred at the interval i. Moreover, the same assertion implies that
a is related to a ?BLOCK , say b, which is of type OnTable at some interval j , meeting i, and
of type OnBlock at another interval l, met by i.
2. Since any concept is implicitly temporally quali ed at the special ] variable, it is not necessary to
explicitly qualify concepts at ].
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Artale & Franconi
of a temporal constraint network is a set of variable assignments that satisfy the temporal
constraints. A variable assignment is a function V : X 7! T<? associating an interval value to
a temporal variable. A temporal constraint network is consistent if it admits a non empty
interpretation. The notation, hX; TciEfx1 7!t1 ;x2 7!t2 ;:::g , used to interpret concept expressions,
denotes the subset of hX; TciE where the variable xi is mapped to the interval value ti .
It is now possible to interpret generic concept expressions. Consider the equations
introduced in Figure 7. An interpretation function IV ;t;H, based on a variable assignment
V , an interval t and a set of constraints H = fx1 7! t1; : : :g over the assignments of inner
variables, extends the primitive interpretation function in such a way that the equations
of Figure 7 are satis ed. Intuitively, the interpretation of a concept CVI ;t;H is the set of
entities of the domain that are of type C at the time interval t, with the assignment for the
free temporal variables in C given by V { see (C @X )IV ;t;H { and with the constraints for
the assignment of variables in the scope of the outermost temporal quanti ers given by H.
Note that, H interprets the variable renaming due to the temporal substitutive quali er {
see (C [Y ]@X )IV ;t;H { and it takes e ect during the choice of a variable assignment, as the
equation for (3(X ) Tc. C )IV ;t;H shows.
In absence of free variables in the concept expression { with the exception of ]{ for
notational simpli cation the natural interpretation function CtI ; being equivalent to the
interpretation function CVI ;t;H with any V such that V (]) = t and H = ; is introduced. The
set of interpretations fCVI ;t;Hg obtained by varying I ; V ; t with a xed H is maximal wrt set
inclusion if H = ;, i.e., the set of natural interpretations includes any set of interpretations
with a xed H. In fact, since H represents a constraint in the assignment of variables, the
unconstrained set is the larger one. Note that, for feature interpretation only the natural
one is used since it is not admitted to temporally qualify them.
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Artale & Franconi
]
Boil-Spaghetti
-
x
Make-Spaghetti
- ]
Boil
-
z
Make-Marinara
- w -
Put-Together-SM
y -
Boil-Spaghetti
x - y
Make-Spaghetti Boil
-
1991; Weida & Litman, 1992) and the block world (Allen, 1991), with the aim of showing
the applicability of our framework.
Figure 8 shows the temporal dependencies of the intervals in which the concept Boil-Spa-
ghetti holds. The de nition employs the ] interval to denote the occurrence time of the
plan itself; in this way, it is possible to describe how di erent actions or states of the world
concurring to the de nition of the plan are related to it. This is why the variable ] is
explicitly present in the de nition of Boil-Spaghetti, instead of a generic variable: the
Boil action should take place at the same time of the plan itself, while Make-Spaghetti
occurs before it.
The de nition of a plan can be reused within the de nition of other plans by exploiting
the full compositionality of the language. The plan de ned above Boil-Spaghetti is used
in the de nition of Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara:
:
Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara = 3(y z w) (y b w)(z b w).
(Boil-Spaghetti@y u
Make-Marinara@z u
Put-Together-SM@w)
In this case, precise temporal relations between the nodes of two corresponding temporal
constraint networks are asserted: e.g., the action Put-Together-SM takes place strictly after
the Boil action (Figure 9). Observe that the occurrence interval of the plan Assemble-Spa-
ghetti-Marinara does not appear in the Figure because it is not temporally related with
any other interval.
A plan subsuming Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara is the more general plan de ned be-
low, Prepare-Spaghetti, supposing that the action Make-Sauce subsumes Make-Marinara.
This means that among all the individual actions of the type Prepare-Spaghetti there are
all the individual actions of type Assemble-Spaghetti-Marinara:
:
Prepare-Spaghetti = 3 (y z ) (). (Boil-Spaghetti@y u Make-Sauce@z )
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]
Stack(OBJ1, OBJ2) -
- w
Clear-Block(OBJ1)
v
- z
Holding-Block(OBJ1) Clear-Block(OBJ1)
Clear-Block(OBJ2)
x
- y
ON(OBJ1, OBJ2)
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C @X u D@X ! (C u D)@X
(C @X1 )@X2 ! C @X1
(C @X1 u D)@X2 ! C @X1 u D@X2
C u 3(X ) Tc. D ! 3(X ) Tc. (C u D)
if C doesn't contain free variables
3(X )Tc1 .(C u
3(Y ) Tc2 . D [Y1 ]@X1 : : : [Yp ]@Xq @X ) ! 3(X ][Y1 =X1 ]:::[Yp=Xq ] Y )Tc1 [ Tc2+[]=X] .(C u D+ @X )
if D doesn't contain existential temporal quanti ers
p : (q : C ) ! (p q) : C
p : (C u D) ! p : C u p : D
p : (q1 # q2 ) ! p q1 # p q2
Prescriptions: X ][Y1 =X1 ]:::[Yp=Xq ] Y returns the union of the two sets of variables X and Y , where each
occurrence of Y1 ; : : : ; Yp is substituted by X1 ; : : : ; Xq , respectively, while all the other elements of Y occurring
in X are renamed with fresh new identi ers. Z+ is intended to be the expression Z where the same
substitution or renaming has taken place. The condition on the last rule forces application to start from the
last nested existential temporal quali ed concept.
Figure 11: Rewrite rules to transform an arbitrary concept into an existential concept.
Proposition 6.1 (Equivalence of EF) Every concept C can be reduced in linear time
into an equivalent existential concept (ef C ), by exhaustively applying the set of rewrite
rules of Figure 11.
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(closure) The transitive closure of the Allen temporal relations in the conceptual
temporal constraint network is computed, obtaining a minimal temporal network (see,
e.g., (van Beek & Manchak, 1996)).
(= collapsing) For each equality temporal constraint, collapse the equal nodes by
applying the following rewrite(rule:
3(X ) Tc (xi = xj ). Q ! 3 3(X n fxj g) Tc[xj =xi]. Q[xj =xi ] if xi 6= xj and xj 6= ].
(X n fxi g) Tc[xi=]] . Q[xi =]] if xi 6= xj and xj = ].
Then apply exhaustively the rst rule of Figure 11.
(covering) For each y 2 X let compute the covering = fZ 1; : : : ; Z ng following the
procedure showed by proposition 6.3. Whenever the covering is not empty, translate
Qy applying the following rewrite rule: Qy ! Qy ui=1:::nlcsfQi1 ; : : : ; Qim g where Z i =
fzi1 ; : : : ; zim g, and Qij @zij 2 hX; Tc; Q@X i.
(parameter introduction) New information is added to each node because of the pres-
ence of parameters, as the following rules show. The ; symbol is intended so that,
each time the concept expression in the left hand side appears in some node of the
temporal constraint network, possibly conjoined with other concepts, then the right
hand side represents the concept expression that must be conjunctively added to all the
other nodes; square brackets point out optional parts; the letters f (?f ) and g (?g),
possibly with subscripts, denote atomic (parametric) features while p and q stand for
generic features.
?g1 : : : ?gn [ f [ p]] : C ; ?g1 : : : ?gn : >.
?g1 : : : ?gn [ f [ p]] # g [ q] ; ?g1 : : : ?gn : >.
?g1 : : : ?gn # ?f1 : : : ?fm ; ?g1 : : : ?gn # ?f1 : : : ?fm .
?g1 : : : ?gn g [ p] # ?f1 : : : ?fm [ f [ q]] ; ?g1 : : : ?gn : > u
?f1 : : : ?fm : >.
Proposition 6.6 (Equivalence of CEF) Every concept in existential form can be re-
duced into an equivalent completed existential concept.
Both the covering and the parameter introduction steps can be computed independently
after the =-collapsing step and then conjoining the resulting concept expressions. Observe
that, to obtain a completed existential concept, the steps of the normalization procedure
require linear time with the exception of the computation of the transitive closure of the
temporal relations, and the covering step. Both these steps involve NP-complete temporal
constraint problems (van Beek & Cohen, 1990). However, it is possible to devise reasonable
subsets of Allen's algebra for which the problem is polynomial (Renz & Nebel, 1997). The
most relevant properties of a concept in CEF is that all the admissible interval temporal
relations are explicit and the concept expression in each node is no more re nable without
changing the overall concept meaning; this is stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 6.7 (Node independence of CEF) Let hX; Tc; Q@X i be a conceptual tem-
poral constraint network in its completed form (CEF); then, for all Q 2 Q and for all
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
In this example, the essential graph is also the CEF of Stack since there are no redundant
nodes.
6.2 Computing Subsumption
A concept subsumes another one just in case every possible instance of the second is also an
instance of the rst, for every time interval. Thanks to the normal form, concept subsump-
tion in the temporal language is reduced to concept subsumption between non-temporal
concepts and to subsumption between temporal constraint networks. A similar general pro-
cedure was rst presented in (Weida & Litman, 1992), where the language for non-temporal
concepts is less expressive { it does not include features or parametric features.
To compute subsumption between non-temporal concepts { which may possibly include
lcs concepts { we refer to (Cohen, Borgida, & Hirsh, 1992). In the following, we will write
\wF " for subsumption between non-temporal F concepts taking into account lcs concepts.
De nition 6.11 (Variable mapping) A variable mapping M is a total function M :
X 1 7! X 2 such that M(]) = ]. We write M(X ) to intend fM(X ) j X 2 X g, and M(Tc)
to intend f(M(X ) (R) M(Y )) j (X (R) Y ) 2 Tcg.
De nition 6.12 (Temporal constraint subsumption) A temporal constraint (X1 (R1 )Y1)
is said to subsume a temporal constraint (X2 (R2 )Y2 ) under a generic variable mapping M,
written (X1 (R1 )Y1 ) wM (X2 (R2 ) Y2 ), if M(X1 ) = X2 , M(Y1 ) = Y2 and (R1 )E (R2 )E
for every temporal interpretation E .
Proposition 6.13 (TC subsumption algorithm) (X1 (R1 )Y1) wM (X2 (R2 )Y2) if and
only if M(X1 ) = X2 , M(Y1 ) = Y2 and the disjuncts in R1 are a superset of the disjuncts
in R2 .
Proof. Follows from the observation that the 13 temporal relations are mutually disjoint
and their union covers the whole interval pairs space. 2
De nition 6.14 (Temporal constraint network subsumption) A temporal constraint
network hX 1 ; Tc1 i subsumes a temporal constraint network hX 2 ; Tc2 i under a variable map-
ping M : X 1 7! X 2 , written hX 1 ; Tc1 i wM hX 2 ; Tc2 i, if hM(X 1 ); M(Tc1 )iE hX 2 ; Tc2 iE
for every temporal interpretation E .
Proposition 6.15 (TCN subsumption algorithm) hX 1; Tc1 i wM hX 2 ; Tc2i i , after
computing the temporal transitive closure, there exists a variable mapping M : X 1 7! X 2
such that for all X1i ; Y1j 2 X 1 exist X2m ; Y2n 2 X 2 which satisfy (X1i (R1i;j ) Y1j ) wM
(X2m (R2m;n ) Y2n ).
Proof. \( " Since from de nition 6.12 (X1i (R1i;j ) Y1j ) wM (X2m (R2m;n ) Y2n ) implies that
(R1i;j )E (R2m;n )E for every E , then, from the de nition of interpretation of a temporal
constraint network, it is easy to see that each assignment of variables V in the interpretation
of hX 2 ; Tc2 i is also an assignment in the interpretation of hM(X 1 ); M(Tc1 )i.
\) " Suppose that one is not able to nd such a mapping; then, by hypothesis, for each
possible variable mapping there exists some i; j such that R1i;j is not a superset of R2m;n .
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Since, by assumption, the temporal constraint networks are minimal, the temporal relation
R2m;n cannot be further restricted. So, for each variable mapping and each temporal inter-
pretation E , we can build an assignment V such that hV (X2m ); V (X2n )i 2 (R2m;n )E while
hV (X1i ); V (X1j )i 62 (R1i;j )E . Now, we can extend the assignment V in such a way that
V 2 (hX 2; Tc2 i)E while V 62 (hM(X 1 ); M(Tc1)i)E . This contradicts the assumption that
hX 1; Tc1 i wM hX 2; Tc2 i. 2
De nition 6.16 (S-mapping) An s-mapping from a conceptual temporal constraint net-
work hX 1 ; Tc1 ; Q@X 1 i to a conceptual temporal constraint network hX 2 ; Tc2 ; Q@X 2 i is a
variable mapping S : X 1 7! X 2 such that the non-temporal concept labeling each node
in X 1 subsumes the non-temporal concept labeling the corresponding node in S (X 1 ), and
hX 1; Tc1 i wS hX 2; Tc2i.
The algorithm for checking subsumption between temporal concept expressions reduces the
subsumer and the subsumee in essential graph form, then it looks for an s-mapping be-
tween the essential graphs by exhaustive search. To prove the completeness of the overall
subsumption procedure it will be showed that the introduction of lcs's preserves the sub-
sumption. A model-theoretic characterization of the lcs will be given for showing this
property. Let's start to build an Herbrand model for an F concept. Let C 0(x) denote the
rst order formula corresponding to a concept C (see proposition 2.1), while the function-
ality of features can be expressed with a set of formul F . By syntax induction it easy to
show that C 0 (x) is an existentially quanti ed formula with one free variable. Moreover, the
matrices of such formula is a conjunction of positive predicates. F [ fC 0 (x)g is logically
equivalent to F [ fC 00 (x)g where the functionality axioms allow to map every subformula
y 9y.Ff (x; y) into 9!y.Ff (x; y). Then C (x) is such that all the existential quanti ers in
V 00
C 0 (x) (which come from the rst order conversion of features) are replaced by 9! quanti ers.
Now, F [ fC 000 (a)g { where a is a constant substituting the free variable x and C 000 (a) is
obtained by skolemizing the 9! quanti ed variables { is a set of de nite Horn clauses.
De nition 6.17 (Herbrand model) Let C be an F concept expression. Then we de ne
its Minimal Herbrand Model HC as the Minimal Herbrand Model of the above mentioned
set of de nite Horn clauses F [ fC 000 (a)g.
Lemma 6.18 (F concept subsumption) Let C; D be F concept expressions, and HC ; HD
their minimal Herbrand models obtained by skolemizing the rst order set F [fC 000 (a); D000 (a)g.
Then, C v D i HD HC .
Proof. C v D i F [ fC 0 (x)g j= D0 (x), i F [ fC 00 (x)g j= D00 (x), where C 00 and D00
are obtained by applying the functionality axioms to the set fC 0 (x); D0 (x)g (i.e., uni-
fying the variables in the functional predicates) and then replacing all the existential
quanti ers by 9! quanti ers. Now, C 000 (x) and D000 (x) are obtained by skolemizing the
9! quanti ed variables in the following way: let C 00(x) = 9!y1; : : : ; yn(x; y1 ; : : : ; yn) and let
D00(x) = 9!y1 ; : : : ; yk ; z1 ; : : : ; zm (x; y1 ; : : : ; yk ; z1 ; : : : ; zm ), with 0 k n, then skolemize
the formula: = 9!y1 ; : : : ; yn ; z1 ; : : : ; zm (x; y1 ; : : : ; yn ) ^ (x; y1 ; : : : ; yk ; z1 ; : : : ; zm ), and
let 0 (x) indicate its skolemized form. Then, C 000 (x) = 0 (x) and D000 (x) = 0 (x). Now,
since every existential quanti cation in C 00 (x); D00 (x) was of type 89! then the thesis is true
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i F [ fC 000 (a)g j= D000 (a), where a is a constant substituting the free variable x (see (van
Dalen, 1994)). Now, as showed by lemma 6.17, both C 000 (a) and D000 (a) have minimal Her-
brand models HC ; HD that verify the lemma hypothesis. Then, F [ fC 000 (a)g j= D000 (a) i
HD HC . 2
We are now able to give a model-theoretic characterization of the lcs that will be crucial
to prove the subsumption-preserving property.
Lemma 6.19 (lcs model property) Let Q1; : : : ; Qn be F concept expressions, and HQ1 ;
: : : ; HQn their minimal Herbrand models obtained by skolemizing the rst order set F [
fQ0001 (a); : : : ; Q000n (a)g. Then, Q = lcsfQ1 ; : : : ; Qn g i HQ = HQ1 \ : : : \ HQn .
Proof. First of all, let show that HQ is the minimal Herbrand model of a concept Q in
the language F . Every HQi can be seen as a rooted directed acyclic graph where nodes
are labelled with (possible empty) set of atomic concepts and arcs with atomic features
while equality constraints between nodes correspond to features agreement. Whithout loss
of generality let us consider the case where HQ = HQ1 \ HQ2 . It is sucient to show
that HQ is a rooted directed acyclic graph. Let a be the root of HQ1 ; HQ2 , then will be
proved by induction that if Fi (ai 1 ; ai ) 2 HQ (where Fi is the rst order translation of a
feature, ai 1 ; ai are obtained as a result of the skolemization process, and a0 = a) then
fF1 (a; a1 ); : : : ; Fi (ai 1; ai )g HQ. The case i = 1 is trivial. Let i > 1. Now, Fi (ai 1 ; ai) 2
HQ i Fi(ai 1 ; ai ) 2 HQ1 \ HQ2 . But ai 1 is uniquely de ned by the skolem function
fFi 1 (where, the function symbols fFi are newly generated for each feature Fi by the
skolemization process). Then, Fi (ai 1 ; ai ) 2 HQ1 \ HQ2 i Fi (ai 1 ; fFi 1 (ai )) 2 HQ1 \ HQ2
i Fi 1 (ai 2 ; fFi 1 (ai )) 2 HQ1 \ HQ2 . Then the thesis is true by induction.
Let us now prove the \(" direction. Suppose by absurd that there is an F concept C
such that: Q1 v C ^ Q2 v C ^ C < Q. Then, Q1 v C i HC HQ1 , and Q2 v C , i
HC HQ2 . But then HC HQ1 \ HQ2 , i.e., HC HQ. Then Q v C which contradicts the
hypothesis.
The \)" direction can be proved with analogous considerations. 2
Proposition 6.20 (lcs subsumption-preserving property) Let A; B; C; D be F con-
cepts, then A u (B t C ) v D i A u lcsfB; C g v D.
Proof. A u (B t C ) v D i A u B v D and A u C v D. Now, A u B v D i F [
fA000 (a); B 000 (a)g j= D000(a) i HA [ HB j= D000 (a) i HD HA [ HB . For the same reasons,
A u C v D i HD HA [ HC . But then, HD HA [ HB and HD HA [ HC , i.e.,
HD HA [ (HB \ HC ), i.e., HD HA [ HlcsfB;C g . But, HD HA [ HlcsfB;C g i
A u lcsfB; C g v D. 2
The following theorem provides a sound and complete procedure to compute subsump-
tion. The completeness proof takes into account that the temporal structure is dense and
unbounded. This allows us to introduce any new node to a conceptual temporal constraint
network without changing its meaning. Remember that, for each of these redundant nodes,
time-invariant information holds.
Theorem 6.21 (TL-F concept subsumption) A concept C1 subsumes a concept C2 i
there exists an s-mapping from the essential graph of C1 to the essential graph of C2 .
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Proof. Let T1 = hX 1 ; Tc1 ; Q@X 1 i be the essential graph of C1 , and T2 = hX 2 ; Tc2 ; Q@X 2 i
be the essential graph of C2 .
\( " (Soundness). Follows from the fact that the essential graph form is logically equiv-
alent to the starting concept, and from the soundness of the procedures for computing
both the TCN subsumption (proposition 6.15) and the subsumption between non-temporal
concepts (Cohen et al., 1992).
\) " (Completeness). Suppose that such an s-mapping does not exist. Two main cases
can be distinguished.
i) There is not a mapping M such that hX 1 ; Tc1 i wM hX 2 ; Tc2 i. By adding redundant
nodes to T2 , an equivalent conceptual temporal constraint network T2 = hX 2 ; Tc2 ; Q@X 2 i
may be obtained. Let us consider such an extended network
in a way that there exists a
variable mapping M such that hX 1 ; Tc1 i wM hX 2 ; Tc2 i. Now, for all possible M , there
is a node X1i 2 X 1 such that M (X1i ) = X2j with X2j 62 X 2 . Now, Q1i 6wF Q2j , since X2j
cannot coincide with other nodes in X 2 neither can have a covering otherwise the hypothesis
that the mapping M does not exist would be contradicted. Then from proposition 6.7 Q2j
is in a time-invariant node, whereas Q1i is not since T1 is an essential graph. Then, although
the construction of M allows for the existence of a unique V 3 for both networks (follows
from proposition 6.15), it is possible to build an instance of T2 that is not an instance of T1 .
ii) For each possible mapping M such that hX 1 ; Tc1 i wM hX 2 ; Tc2 i there will be always
two nodes X1i and X2j such that M(X1i ) = X2j and Q1i 6wF Q2j . Now, the concept ex-
pression Q2j cannot be re ned (looking for a subsumption relationship with Q1i ) by adding
to it an F concept since from proposition 6.7 this would change the overall interpretation.
On the other hand, the lcs introduction { which would substitute the more speci c con-
cept disjunction implicitly presents because of a node covering { is a subsumption-invariant
concept substitution, as showed by lemma 6.20.
Both cases contradict the assumption that T1 subsumes T2 . 2
6.2.1 Complexity of Subsumption
Now it is shown that checking subsumption between TL-F concept expressions in the es-
sential graph form is an NP-complete problem. Therefore, a polynomial reduction from the
NP-complete problem of deciding whether a graph contains an isomorphic subgraph is pre-
sented. It is then shown that the subsumption computation, as proposed in theorem 6.21,
can be done by a non-deterministic algorithm that takes polynomial time in the size of the
concepts involved. First of all let us consider the complexity of computing subsumption
between non-temporal concepts.
Lemma 6.22 (F subsumpion complexity) Let C; D be F concept expressions that can
contain lcs's. Then, checking whether C vF D takes polynomial time.
Proof. See (Cohen et al., 1992). 2
Here the problem of subgraph isomorphism is brie y recalled. Given two graphs, G1 =
(V1 ; E1 ) and G2 = (V2 ; E2 ), G1 contains a subgraph isomorphic to G2 if there exists a
3. Since subsumption is computed with respect to a xed evaluation time, V maps the di erent occurrences
of ] to the same interval; this justi es the choice that M(]) = ].
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subset of the vertices V 0 V1 and a subset of the edges E 0 E1 such that j V 0 j=j V2 j,
j E 0 j=j E2 j, and there exists a one-to-one function f : V2 7! V 0 satisfying fu; vg 2 E2 i
ff (u); f (v)g 2 E 0.
Given
: a graph G = (V; E ), with V = fv1 ; : : : ; vn g associate a temporal concept expression:
C = 3(v1 ; : : : ; vn ) : : : (vi (b; a) vj ) : : : . (A@v1 u : : : u A@vn ), where A is an atomic concept
and fvi ; vj g 2 E . This transformation allows us to prove that the problem of subgraph
isomorphism can be reduced to the subsumption of temporal concepts.
Proposition 6.23 Given two graphs G1 and G2, G1 contains a subgraph isomorphic to G2
i C2 w C1 , where C1 and C2 are the corresponding temporal concepts expressions.
Proof. A temporal network with edges labeled only with the (before _ after) relation is always
consistent, minimal and non-directed4 (Gerevini & Schubert, 1994). Then, each temporal
concept is in the essential graph form. Now the proof easily follows since, every time G2 is
an isomorphic subgraph of G1 the one-to-one function f is also an s-mapping from C2 to
C1 , and it is true that C2 w C1 . On the other hand, the s-mapping that gives rise to the
subsumption is also the one-to-one isomorphism from G2 to G1 . 2
Theorem 6.24 (NP-hardness) Concept subsumption between TL-F concept expressions
in normal form is an NP-hard problem.
Proof. Follows from proposition 6.23 and the reduction being clearly polynomial. 2
Now the NP-completeness is proven.
Theorem 6.25 (NP-completeness) Concept subsumption between TL-F concept expres-
sions in normal form is an NP-complete problem.
Proof. To prove NP-completeness it is necessary to show that the proposed calculus can
be solved by a nondeterministic algorithm that takes polynomial time. Now, given two
temporal concepts, T1 and T2 , in their essential graph form, let j X 1 j= N1 and j X 2 j= N2 .
Then, to check whether T1 w T2 , the algorithm guesses one of the N2N1 variable mapping
from T1 to T2 and veri es whether it is an s-mapping, too. This last step can be done in
deterministic polynomial time since, given a mapping M, it is possible to determine whether
hX 1; Tc1 i wM hX 2; Tc2i by checking at most N1(N1 1)=2 edges looking for subsumption
between the corresponding temporal relations (solved by a set inclusion procedure); while
the N1 non-temporal concept subsumptions can be computed in polynomial time. 2
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
(C t D)@X ! C @X t D@X
p : (C t D ) ! p:Ctp:D
(C1 t C2 ) u D ! (C1 u D) t (C2 u D)
3(X ) Tc. (C t D) ! 3(X ) Tc. C t 3(X ) Tc. D
makes the di erence with other logic-based approaches (Schmiedel, 1990; Bettini, 1997;
Halpern & Shoham, 1991). The dual of 3 (i.e., the universal temporal quanti er 2) makes
the satis ability problem { and the subsumption { for propositionally complete languages
undecidable in the most interesting temporal structures (Halpern & Shoham, 1991; Venema,
1990; Bettini, 1993). For the representation of actions and plans in the context of plan
recognition, the universal temporal quanti er is not strictly necessary. This limitation makes
these languages decidable, with nice computational properties, and capable of supporting
other kinds of useful extensions. The examples shown throughout the paper may serve as a
partial validation of the claim. Section 8.1 proposes the introduction of a limited universal
temporal quanti cation that maintains decidability of subsumption.
7.1 Disjunctive Concepts: TLU -FU
The language TLU -FU adds to the basic language TL-F the disjunction operator { with
the usual semantics { both at the temporal and non-temporal levels:
C; D ! TL j C t D (TLU )
E; F ! F j E t F (FU )
Before showing how to modify the calculus to check subsumption, let us begin with a
clarifying example. The gain in expressivity allows us to describe the alternative realizations
that a given plan may have. Let us consider a scenario with a robot moving in an empty
room that can move only either horizontally or vertically. Let's call Rect-Move that which
involves a simple sequence of the two basic moving actions. Then, to describe a Rect-Move
plan we can make use of the disjunction operator:
:
Rect-Move = 3(x y ) (] m x)(x m y ). (Hor-Move@x u Ver-Move@y ) t
3(x y) (] m x)(x m y). (Ver-Move@x u Hor-Move@y)
7.1.1 The Calculus for TLU -FU
Normal Form
In computing subsumption, a normal form for concepts is needed. The normalization pro-
cedure is similar to that reported in Section 6.1. Let us start by reducing each concept
expression into an equivalent disjunctive concept of the form:
(3(X 1 ) Tc1 . G1) t t (3(X n) Tcn. Gn) t Q1 t t Qm
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where Gi are conjunctions of concepts of the form Qik @Xik , and each Q does not contain
neither temporal information, nor disjunctions, i.e., it is an element of the language F .
Proposition 7.1 (Equivalence of disjunctive form) Every concept C can be reduced
into an equivalent disjunctive form (df C ), by exhaustively applying the set of rewrite rules
of Figure 13 in addition to the rules introduced in Figure 11.
It is now possible to compute the completed disjunctive normal form (cdnf C ). Each dis-
junct of such normal form has some interesting properties, which are crucial for the proof
of the theorem 7.4 on concept subsumption: temporal constraints are always explicit, i.e.,
any two intervals are related by a basic temporal relation; there is no disjunction, either
implicit or explicit, neither in the conceptual part nor in the temporal part, i.e., it is a
TL-F concept; the information in each node is independent of the information in the other
nodes and it does not contain time-invariant (i.e., redundant) nodes.
De nition 7.2 (Completed disjunctive normal form) Given a concept in disjunctive
form, the completed disjunctive normal form is obtained by applying the following rewrite
rules to each disjunct:
(Temporal completion) The rules of de nition 6.5 are applied to each disjunct with
the exclusion of the covering step, which is replaced by the t-introduction step. If a
disjunct is unsatis able { i.e., the temporal constraint network associated with it is
inconsistent { then eliminate it.
(Essential form) The rules of de nition 6.8 are applied to each disjunct.
(t introduction) Reduce to concepts containing only basic temporal relationships:
3(X ) (X1 (R,S ) X2 ) Tc.C ! 3(X )(X1 R X2 )Tc.C t 3(X )(X1 S X2 )Tc.C
Proposition 7.3 (Equivalence of CDNF) Every concept expression can be reduced into
an equivalent completed disjunctive normal concept.
Subsumption
The theorem 7.4 reduces subsumption between CDNF concepts into subsumption of disjun-
ction-free concepts, such that the results of theorem 6.21 can be applied. The following
theorem gives a terminating, sound, and complete subsumption calculus for TLU -FU .
Theorem 7.4 (TLU -FU concept subsumption) Let C = C1 t t Cm and D = D1 t
t Dn be TLU -FU concepts in CDNF. Then, C v D if and only if 8i9j . Ci v Dj .
Proof. Since it is easy to show that C1 t : : : t Cn v D i 8i.Ci v D we need only to prove the
restricted thesis: Ci v D1 t t Dn i Ci v D1 _ : : : _ Ci v Dn . Every concept expression in
CDNF corresponds to an existential quanti ed formula with two free variables. Moreover,
the matrices of such formul are conjunctions of positive predicates. Let us denote the
formula corresponding to a concept C as C 0 (t; x). Now, the restricted thesis holds i it is
true that F [ fCi000 (a; b)g j= D1000 (a; b) _ D2000 (a; b). Now, let HB the minimal Herbrand model
of F [fCi000 (a; b)g. Then, F [fCi000 (a; b)g j= D1000 (a; b) _ D2000 (a; b) i HB j= D1000 (a; b) _ D2000 (a; b).
Since we are talking of a single model, D1000 (a; b) _ D2000 (a; b) is valid in HB if and only if either
D1000(a; b) or D2000 (a; b) is valid in HB . This proves the theorem.5 2
5. The proof of this theorem comes from an idea of Werner Nutt.
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As a consequence of the theorems 6.25, 7.4 the following complexity result holds.
Theorem 7.5 (TLU -FU subsumption complexity) Concept subsumption between TLU -FU
concept expressions in normal form is an NP-complete problem.
7.2 A Propositionally Complete Language: TL-ALCF
TL-ALCF uses the propositionally complete Description Logic ALCF (Hollunder & Nutt,
1990) for non-temporal concepts by changing the syntax rules for TL-F in the following
way:
E; F ! FU j ? j :E j p " q j p "j 8P .E j 9P .E (ALCF )
The interpretation functions are extended to take into account roles:
P I T<? I I
PtI = P^t I I j 8a; b. ha; bi 2 P^t $ ht; a; bi 2 P I
As seen in Section 2, ALCF adds to F full negation { thus introducing disagreement (p " q)
and unde nedness (p ") for features, and role quanti cation (8P .E; 9P .E ).
As an example of the expressive power gained, let us re ne the description of the world
states involved in the Stack action (see Section 5.2). Suppose that a block is described by
saying that it has LATERAL-SIDEs (role) and BOTTOM- and TOP-SIDEs (features). Then, the
property of being clear could be represented as follows:
:
Clear-Block = Block u 8LATERAL-SIDE.Clear u TOP-SIDE : HAS-ABOVE "
which says that, in order to be clear, each LATERAL-SIDE has to be clear and nothing has
to be over the TOP-SIDE. Now, the situation in which a block involved in a Stack action is
on top of another one is reformulated with the following concept expression:
(?OBJECT1 TOP-SIDE HAS-ABOVE # ?OBJECT2)
Furthermore, given the above de nition of Clear-Blocks, it can be derived that:
(?OBJECT1 TOP-SIDE HAS-ABOVE # ?OBJECT2) v (?OBJECT1 : :Clear-Block)
i.e., an object, having another object on top of it, is no more a clear object.
In TL-ALCF it is possible to describe states with some form of incomplete knowledge
by exploiting the disjunction among non-temporal concepts. For example, let us say that
the agent of an action can be either a human being or a machine: ?AGENT:(Person t Robot).
7.2.1 The Calculus for TL-ALCF
This Section presents a calculus for deciding subsumption between temporal concepts in
the Description Logic TL-ALCF . Again, the calculus is based on the idea of separating the
inference on the temporal part from the inference on the Description Logic part (\vALCF "),
and adopting standard procedures developed in the two areas.
Normal Form
Once more, the subsumption calculus is based on a normalization procedure. The rst
step reduces a concept expression into an equivalent existential form { 3(X ) Tc. (Q0 u
Q1 @X1 u : : : u Qn @Xn) { by applying the rewrite rules of Figure 11 augmented with the
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Artale & Franconi
:> ! ?
:? ! >
:(C u D) ! :C t :D
:(C t D) ! :C u :D
: :C ! C
:8P .C ! 9P .:C
:9P .C ! 8P .:C
:f : C ! f " t f : :C
:p : C ! f " t f : (:q : C ) if p = f q
:p # q ! p"tq"tp"q
:p " q ! p"tq"tp#q
(f p ) " ! f " t f : (p ")
Note: By f we denote both an atomic feature and an atomic parametric feature.
Figure 14: Rewrite rules to transform an arbitrary concept into a simple concept.
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
Figure 15: Rewrite rules that compute the parameter introduction step.
2. For each Qj = Ej1 t : : : t Ejn , on compute its time-invariant part (let us indicate
this particular concept expression as Q~ j ). This gives Q~ j by computing for each
disjunct Eji in Qj its time-invariant information E~ji . If Eji vALCF ?, then
E~ji = ?. Otherwise, rewrite every conjunct in Eji as showed in Figure 15, while
the conjuncts not considered there are rewrote to >. Now, unless there is an
E~ji = >, Q~ j = E~j1 t : : : t E~jn must be conjunctively added to all the other nodes.
Proposition 7.7 (Equivalence of CEF) Every concept in existential form can be re-
duced into an equivalent completed existential concept.
As for the TL-F case, both covering and parameter introduction can be computed inde-
pendently. As a consequence of the above normalization phase, the proposition 6.7 (node
independence) is now true for TL-ALCF concepts in CEF. Observe that, to obtain a CEF
concept, the steps of the normalization procedure require the computation of the transitive
closure of the temporal relations { which is an NP-complete problem (van Beek & Co-
hen, 1990) { and the computation of ALCF subsumption { which is a PSPACE-complete
problem (Hollunder & Nutt, 1990).
Before the presentation of the last normalization phase, which will eliminate redundant
nodes, it is now possible to check whether a concept expression is satis able.
Proposition 7.8 (Concept satis ability) A TL-ALCF concept in CEF, hX; Tc; Q@X i,
is satis able (with the proviso that the temporal constraints are satis able) if and only if the
non-temporal concepts labeling each node in X are satis able. Checking satis ability of a
TL-ALCF concept in CEF is a PSPACE-complete problem.
Proof. Is a direct consequence of the node independence established by proposition 6.7,
which is true also for TL-ALCF concepts in CEF. 2
The normalization procedure now goes on by rewriting unsatis able concepts to ? and
then computing the essential graph form for satis able concepts. This last phase is more
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Artale & Franconi
complex than for the other temporal languages considered in this paper essentially because
ALCF can express the > concept by means of a concept expression (e.g., > = A t :A).
From this consideration it follows that in TL-ALCF a redundant node can be derived from
a complex concept expression (e.g., both A t:A, and ?g : A t ?g : :A are redundant nodes).
The key idea is that all the time-invariant information is present in the ] node thanks to
the CEF. Thus it is needed only to extract this information from the ] node by computing
the disjunctive normal form of Q] , applying the ~ translation, and then testing whether
Q~ ] vALCF Qi , for a given node xi.
De nition 7.9 (Essential graph) The subgraph of the CEF of a TL-ALCF conceptual
temporal constraint network T = hX; Tc; Q@X i obtained by deleting the nodes xi such that
Q~ ] vALCF Qi { with the exception of the ] node { is called essential graph of T : (ess T ).
Proposition 7.10 (Equivalence of essential graph) Every CEF concept can be reduced
into an equivalent essential graph form (and, obviously, every concept can be reduced into
an equivalent essential graph form).
Subsumption
The overall normalization procedure reduces the subsumption problem in TL-ALCF to the
subsumption between ALCF concepts.
Theorem 7.11 (TL-ALCF concept subsumption) A concept C1 subsumes a concept
C2 if and only if there exists an s-mapping from the essential graph of C1 to the essential
graph of C2 .
The above theorem gives a sound and complete algorithm for computing subsumption be-
tween TL-ALCF concepts (the proof is the same as the one for theorem 6.21). The sub-
sumption problem is now PSPACE-hard, since satis ability and subsumption for ALCF
concepts were proven to be PSPACE-complete (Hollunder & Nutt, 1990).
] -
Simple-Stack(BLOCK)
r x -
OnTable(BLOCK) r
OnBlock(BLOCK)
y
-
a block is on the table for a whole day, one can conclude that it is also on the table in the
morning. On the other hand, actions are not necessarily homogeneous. In the linguistic
literature a di erence is made between activity and performance verbs. The distinction
comes out in the fact that activity verbs do have sub-events that are denoted by the same
verb, whereas performance verbs do not. Generally, activity verbs represent ongoing events,
for example to eat and to run, and can be described as homogeneous predicates; whereas
performance verbs represent events with a well de ned granularity in time, such as to prepare
spaghetti. Performance verbs are an example of anti-homogeneous events: if they occur over
an interval of time t, then they do not occur over a subinterval of t, as they would not yet
be completed.
The language is extended by introducing the Homogeneity operator:
C; D ! rC (homogeneous concept)
The semantics of homogeneous concepts is easily given in terms of the semantics of the
temporal universal quanti er: rC 2x (x (=; s; d; f ) ]). C @x. This means that rC
is an homogeneous concept if and only if when it holds at an interval it remains true at
each subinterval. In particular, 2x universally quali es the temporal variable x, while the
temporal constraint (x (=; s; d; f ) ]) imposes that x is a generic interval contained in ].
Moreover, it is always true that rC v C , i.e., rC is a more speci c concept than C .
Let us consider as an example a more accurate de nition of the Basic-Stack action
(see Section 4.1.1):
:
Simple-Stack = 3(x y )(x m ])(] m y ). ((?BLOCK : rOnTable)@x u
(?BLOCK : rOnBlock)@y)
Figure 16 shows the temporal dependencies of the intervals in which the Simple-Stack
holds. The di erence with the Basic-Stack action is the use of the homogeneity operator.
In fact, since the predicates OnTable and OnBlock denote states, their homogeneity should
be explicitly declared. The assertion Simple-Stack(i; a) says that a is an individual action
of type Simple-Stack occurred at interval i. Moreover, the same assertion implies that a
is related to a ?BLOCK, say b, which is of type OnTable at some interval j { meeting i { and
at all intervals included in j , while it is of type OnBlock at another interval l { met by i {
and at all intervals included in l:
Simple-Stack(i; a) =) 9b. ?BLOCK(a; b) ^9 j; l. m(j; i) ^ m(i; l) ^
8 ^; ^l. (=; s; d; f )(^; j ) ^ (=; s; d; f )(^l; l) !
OnTable(^; b) ^ OnBlock(^ l; b):
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Artale & Franconi
] -
Instant-Stack(BLOCK)
r
OnTable(BLOCK) -r y OnBlock(BLOCK)
-
z
Note that the Simple-Stack action subsumes the Instant-Stack action, whose temporal
dependencies are depicted in Figure 17:
:
Instant-Stack = 3(z y )(] f z )(] m y ). ((?BLOCK : rOnTable)@z u
(?BLOCK : rOnBlock)@y)
Subsumption holds because the class of intervals { obtained by homogeneity of the state
OnTable as de ned in the Simple-Stack action { including x and all its subintervals is a
subset of the class of intervals over which the block is known to be on the table, according
to the de nition of Instant-Stack { this latter class includes all the subintervals of z .
If the Instant-Stack action had been de ned without the r operator, then it would not
specialize any more the Simple-Stack action. In fact, according to such a weaker de nition
of Instant-Stack, specifying that the object is on the table at z does not imply that the
object is on the table at subintervals of z ; in particular, it is not possible to deduce any
more that the object is on the table at x and its subintervals, as speci ed in the de nition of
Simple-Stack action. Moreover, the weak Instant-Stack action type would not specialize
the weak Simple-Stack action type { i.e., Basic-Stack { too. Thus, homogeneity helps
us to de ne states and actions in a more accurate way, such that important inferences are
captured.
As seen above, the de nition of homogeneity makes use of universal temporal quan-
ti cation. Remember that subsumption in a propositionally complete Description Logic
with both existential and universal temporal quanti cation is undecidable and it is still an
open problem if it becomes decidable in absence of negation (Bettini, 1993). The homo-
geneity operator is a restricted form of universal quanti cation. An even more restricted
form interests us here, where the concept C in rC does not contain any other temporal
operator (called simple homogeneous concept). The expressiveness of the resulting logic is
enough, for example, to correctly represent the homogeneous nature of states. In (Artale,
Bettini, & Franconi, 1994) an algorithm to compute subsumption in TL-F augmented with
the homogeneity operator is proposed. Even if a formal proof is still not available, good
arguments are discussed to conjecture its completeness. This would also prove decidability
of this logic and of the corresponding modal logics.
8.2 Persistence
This Section shows how our framework can be successfully extended in a general way to
cope with inertial properties. In the basic temporal language, a property holding, say, as
a post-condition of an action at a certain interval, is not guaranteed to hold anymore at
other included or subsequent intervals. This is the reason why we propose an extended
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
] - x ]
-:
Load(GUN) Loaded(GUN) Fire(GUN,TARGET) Loaded(GUN)
z
:= Loaded(GUN)
x
or
- Dead(TARGET)
y
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Artale & Franconi
fred :
i
Load(gun)
- i1
Loaded( gun)
gun
Fire(
j
,
- j1
) Loaded( gun)
or the gun was not loaded { possibly by inertia { before ring. The Yale Shooting Problem
considers the situation described by the following set of assertions (ABox):
Load(i; load-action ); ?GUN(load-action ; gun ); a(j; i); Fire(j; re-action );
?GUN( re-action ; gun ); ?TARGET( re-action ; fred ):
i.e., at the beginning the gun is loaded; then, the action of ring the gun against the target
fred is performed. According to the semantics of the language, logical consequences of the
knowledge base are:
j= 9i1 . m(i; i1 ) ^ Loaded(i1 ; gun )
j= 9j1 . m(j; j1 ) ^ :Loaded(j1 ; gun )
j= 9j0 . f (j; j0 ) ^ = Loaded(j0 ; gun )
j= 9j2 . m(j; j2 ) ^ Dead(j1 ; fred ):
i.e., (see also Figure 19) (i) the Load action makes the gun loaded; (ii) the Fire action
makes the gun unloaded at the end; (iii) since there is no evidence to the contrary, the gun
is still loaded at j0 by inertia; (iv) since the gun is not unloaded at j0 , the target fred must
be dead.
Since the inertia operator is useful to describe the behavior of properties, which are
characterized as homogeneous concepts, a simple way of representing persistence in the
context of homogeneous concepts is proposed.
Proposition 8.2 Let P be a property { i.e., P =: rP 0 is an homogeneous concept { and
a knowledge base such that 6j= P (j; a). = P (j; a) is true in { i.e., j= = P (j; a) {
if and only if two intervals i; k exist such that: j= (start(i) start(j ) ^ P (i; a)) and
[ fs(i; k); f (j; k); P (k; a)g is satis able.
Proof. The entailment test veri es the rst part of the de nition of inertia, while the
satis ability test veri es that, between the interval at which the system knows that the
individual a belongs to P { i { and the interval at which P (a) is deduced by inertia { j
{ does not exist an interval h at which the system knows that P (a) is false. Indeed, such
interval h would be related to the interval k by the relation in and since it is supposed
that P is homogeneous, the knowledge base with :P (h; a) ^ P (k; a) ^ in(h; k) would be
inconsistent. 2
The deduction P (j; a) ! = P (j; a) can be obtained as a particular case of the above stated
proposition.
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
9. Related Works
The original formalism devised by Allen (1991) forms, in its very basis, the foundation for
our work. It is a predicate logic in which interval temporal networks can be introduced,
properties can be asserted to hold over intervals, and events can be said to occur at inter-
vals. His approach is very general, but it su ers from problems related to the semantic
formalization of the predicates hold and occur (Blackburn, 1992). Moreover, computa-
tional properties of the formalism are not analyzed. The study of this latter aspect was, on
the contrary, our main concern.
In the Description Logic literature, other approaches for representing and reasoning with
time and action were proposed. In the beginning the approaches based on an explicit notion
of time are surveyed, and then the Strips-like approaches are considered. This Section ends
by illustrating some of the approaches devoted to temporally extend the situation calculus.
Bettini (1997) suggests a variable-free extension with both existential and universal
temporal quanti cation. He gives undecidability results for a class of temporal languages
{ resorting to the undecidability results of Halpern and Shoham's temporal logic { and in-
vestigates approximated reasoning algorithms. Basically, he extends the ALCN description
logics with the existential and universal temporal quanti ers, but, unlike our formalism,
explicit interval variables are not allowed. The temporal quanti cation makes use of a set
of temporal constraints on two implicit intervals: the reference interval and the current one.
In this framework, the concept of Mortal can be de ned as:
:
Mortal = LivingBeing u 3(after). (not LivingBeing)
Schild (1993) proposes the embedding of point-based tense operators in a propositionally
closed Description Logic. He proved that satis ability in ALCT , the point-based temporal
extension of ALC , interpreted on a linear, unbounded and discrete temporal structure, is
PSPACE-complete. His ideas were applied by (Fischer, 1992; Neuwirth, 1993) in the Back
system. Note that a point-based temporal ontology is unable to express all the variety of
relations between intervals.
Baader and Laux (1995) integrate modal operators for time and belief in a terminological
system looking for an adequate semantics for the resulting combined language. The major
point in this paper is the possibility of using modal operators not only inside concept
expressions but also in front of concept de nitions and assertions. The following example
shows the notion of Happy-father, where di erent modalities interact:
[BEL-JOHN](Happy-father =: 9MARRIED-TO.(Woman u [BEL-JOHN]Pretty) u
hfuturei8CHILD.Graduate)
In this case, it is John's belief that a Happy-father is someone married to a woman believed
to be pretty by John, and whose children will be graduates sometime in the future. The
semantics has a Kripke-style: each modal operator is interpreted as an accessibility relation
on a set of possible worlds, while the domain of objects is split into (possible) di erent
domain objects, each one depending on a given world. This latter choice captures the case of
di erent de nitions for the same concept { such as [BEL-JOHN](A =: B ) and [BEL-PETER](A =:
C ) { since the two formul are evaluated in di erent worlds. The main restriction is that
all the modal operators do not satisfy any speci c axioms for belief or time. On the other
hand, the language is provided with a complete and terminating algorithm that should
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Artale & Franconi
serve, as the authors propose, \...as a basis for satis ability algorithms for more complex
languages".
There are Description Logics intended to represent and reasoning about actions following
the Strips tradition. Heinsohn, Kudenko, Nebel and Pro tlich (1992) describe the Rat
system, used in the Wip project at the German Research Center for AI (DFKI). They use a
Description Logic to represent both the world states and atomic actions. A second formalism
is added to compose actions in plans and to reason about simple temporal relationships. No
explicit temporal constraints can be expressed in the language. Rat actions are de ned by
the change of the world state they cause, and they are instantaneous as in the Strips-like
systems, while plans are linear sequences of actions. The most important service o ered
by Rat is the simulated execution of part of a plan, checking if a given plan is feasible
and, if so, computing the global pre- and post-conditions. The feasibility test is similar
to the usual consistency check for a concept description: they temporally project the pre-
and post-conditions of individual actions composing the plan, respectively backward and
forward. If this does not lead to an inconsistent initial, nal or intermediate state, the plan
is feasible and the global pre- and post-conditions are determined as a side e ect.
Devanbu and Litman (1991, 1996) describe the Clasp system, a plan-based knowledge
representation system extending the notion of subsumption and classi cation to plans, to
build an ecient information retrieval system. In particular, Clasp was used to repre-
sent plan-like knowledge in the domain of telephone switching software by extending the
use of the software information system lassie (Devanbu, Brachman, Selfridge, & Ballard,
1991). Clasp is designed for representing and reasoning about large collections of plan
descriptions, using a language able to express temporal, conditional and looping operators.
Following the Strips tradition, plan descriptions are built starting from states and actions,
both represented by using the Classic (Brachman, McGuiness, Patel-Schneider, Resnick,
& Borgida, 1991) terminological language. Since plans constructing operators correspond
to regular expressions, algorithms for subsumption integrate work in automata theory with
work in concept subsumption. The temporal expressive power of this system can capture
to sequences, disjunction and iterations of actions and each action is instantaneous. Fur-
thermore, state descriptions are restricted to a simple conjunction of primitive Classic
concepts. Like Rat, Clasp checks if an instantiated plan is well formed, i.e., the speci ed
sequence of individual actions are able to transform the given initial state into the goal state
by using the Strips rules.
We end up by reporting on the e orts made by researchers in the situation calculus
eld to overcome the strict sequential perspective inherent to this framework. Recent works
enrich the original framework to represent properties and actions having di erent truth
values depending not only on the situation but also on time. The work of Reiter (1996),
moving from the results showed by Pinto (1994) and by Ternovskaia (1994), provides a
new axiomatization of the situation calculus able to capture concurrent actions, properties
with continuous changes, and natural exogenous actions { those under nature's control. The
notion of uent { which models properties of the world { and situation are maintained. Each
action is instantaneous and responsible for changing the actual situation to the subsequent
one. Concurrent actions are simply sets of instantaneous actions that must be coherent,
i.e., the action's collection must be non empty and all the actions occur at the same time.
Pinto (1994) and Reiter (1996) introduce the time dimension essentially to capture both
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A Temporal Description Logic for Reasoning about Actions and Plans
the occurrence of the natural actions, due to known laws of physics { i.e., the ball bouncing
at times prescribed by motion's equations { and the dynamic behavior of physical objects
{ i.e., the position of a falling ball. This is realized by introducing a time argument for
each action function, while properties of the world are divided into two di erent classes:
classical uents that hold or do not hold throughout situations, and continuous parameters
that may change their value during the time spanned by the given situation.
More devoted to have a situation calculus with a time interval ontology is the work of
Ternovskaia (1994). In order to describe processes { i.e., actions extended in time { she
introduces durationless actions that initiate and terminate those processes. As a matter of
fact, processes become uents, with instantaneous events { Start(Fluent) and Finish(Fluent)
{ which respectively make true or false the corresponding uent, and with persistence
assumptions that make the uent true during the interval. For example, in a blocks world
the picking-up process is treated as a uent with Start(picking-up(x)) and Finish(picking-
up(x)) instantaneous actions that enable or falsify the picking-up uent.
10. Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was the design of a class of logical formalisms for uni-
formly representing time, actions and plans. According to this framework, an action has a
duration in time, it can have parameters, which are the ties with the temporal evolution
of the world, and it is possibly associated over time with other actions. A model-theoretic
semantics including both a temporal and an object domain was developed, for giving both
a meaning to the language formul and a well founded de nition of the various reasoning
services, allowing us to prove soundness and completeness of the corresponding algorithms.
The peculiar computational properties of this logic make it an e ective representation and
reasoning tool for plan recognition purposes. An action taxonomy based on subsumption
can be set up, and it can play the role of a plan library for plan retrieval tasks.
This paper contributes to exploration of the decidable realm of interval-based temporal
extensions of Description Logics. It presented complete procedures for subsumption rea-
soning with TL-F , TLU -FU and TL-ALCF . In addition, the subsumption problem for
TL-F was proven an NP-complete problem. The subsumption procedures are based on
an interpretation preserving transformation that operates a separation between the tem-
poral and the non-temporal parts of the formalism. Thus, the calculus can adopt distinct
standard procedures developed in the Description Logics community and in the temporal
constraints community. To obtain decidable languages the key idea was to restrict the tem-
poral expressivity by eliminating the universal quanti cation on temporal variables. While
a propositionally complete Description Logic with both existential and universal temporal
quanti cation is undecidable, it is still an open problem if it becomes decidable in absence
of negation. With the introduction of the homogeneity operator investigation of the impact
of a restricted form of temporal universal quanti cation in the language TL-F was begun.
Several extensions were proposed to the basic temporal language. With the possibility
to specify homogeneous predicates the temporal behavior of world states can be described
in a more natural way, while the introduction of the non-monotonic inertial operator gives
rise to some forms of temporal prediction. Another extension { not considered in this paper
{ deals with the possibility of relating an action to more elementary actions, decomposing
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Artale & Franconi
it in partially ordered steps (Artale & Franconi, 1995). This kind of reasoning is found in
hierarchical planners like Nonlin (Tate, 1977), Sipe (Wilkins, 1988) and Forbin (Dean,
Firby, & Miller, 1990).
Acknowledgements
This paper is a substantial extension and revision of (Artale & Franconi, 1994). The work
was partially supported by the Italian National Research Council (CNR) project \Ontologic
and Linguistic Tools for Conceptual Modeling", and by the \Foundations of Data Warehouse
Quality" (DWQ ) European ESPRIT IV Long Term Research (LTR) Project 22469. The
rst author wishes to acknowledge also LADSEB-CNR of Padova and the University of
Firenze for having supported part of his work. Some of the work carried on for this paper
was done while the second author was working at ITC-irst, Trento. This work owes a lot to
our colleagues Claudio Bettini and Alfonso Gerevini, for having introduced us many years
ago to the temporal maze. Special thanks to Achille C. Varzi, for taking time to review the
technical details of the paper and for his insightful comments on the philosophy of events,
and to Fausto Giunchiglia, for useful discussions and feedback. Thanks to Paolo Bresciani,
Nicola Guarino, Eugenia Ternovskaia and Andrea Schaerf for enlightening comments on
earlier drafts of the paper. Werner Nutt and Luciano Sera ni helped us to have a deeper
insight into logic. We would also like to thank Carsten Lutz for the helpful discussions we
had with him about temporal representations. Many anonymous referees checked out many
errors of previous versions of the paper. All the errors of the paper are, of course, our own.
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