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Preface
Let this work be a preface to all those that came before it, from
which the new approach is growing.
This is a work of metatheory of science from the perspec-
tive of a biologist concerned with evolutionary theory. The ques-
tions taken up are matters of ontology, but I am overwhelmingly
mindful that no such matters can be taken up without explicit
reference to the epistemological constraints making it possible
to approach them in the first place. In particular this work will
deal with representations of the things in the world (its "furni-
ture"—Bunge 1977) and their relations, and with how these rela-
tions give rise to and guide the processes the things are caught
up in. The paradigmatic process serving as an attractor for all
the statements in this work is "the evolutionary process."
The basic assumption behind this work is that the world
(and therefore nature, its representation) is unlimitedly com-
plex, as characterized in the very general metaphysics of lustus
Buchler (1966). Mandelbrot (1977) has provided a mathematico-
poetic picture of the material world that resonates well with
Buchler's. Biology and its associate sciences (as also, for exam-
ple geology and many-body physics) have become entangled in
this complexity with, so far, as little ability to negotiate it as a fly
a spider's web. In particular, biological nature is undercharac-
terized in our representations, and because of that so is the rest
of nature. We must recognize complexity before we can deal with
viii PREFACE
it. We shall find as an aspect of complexity that the world has

real discontinuities and, as a consequence of the "smallest en-
tity" necessarily appearing to be continuous at yet "smaller"
scales, that there are no nonarbitrarily designated fundamental
units.
What is required at this juncture is a general representa-
tion of the world, one having a structure capable of dealing with
transformations. While this work will concern itself primarily
with biology, the representation explored here will be applica-
ble to any science My attempt will be to display the world as a
determinate machine in conformity with the attitudes of biolo-
gists in the twentieth century, but I do not believe that the world
is such a machine nor will the system described herein be lim-
ited by that aim. Ultimately, we must seek extreme precision of
s t a t e m e n t — a kind of propositional calculus which in the pres-
ent work remains only an ideal. Precision, to be sure, distorts;
but nature without it is obscure. In science it may be the case
that a dozen different precise statements may be required to
express a reality conveyed by the connotation of a single in-
flected word in a conversation or performance of s o m e verbal
art. Our framework s h o u l d be one that could generate those
statements if need be. Arthur Koestler in 1978 called for a
"coherent philosophy of nature," and that is the general direc-
tion we must aim toward. Maritain (1951) reminds us that this
will be a discipline in between science and metaphysics.
Buchler can serve only as a starting point because he is too
general to be applicable even to science in general. It is time to
forge tools.
Our attempt must be to be able to make our statements
as complete as possible. It is this single requirement that leads
us by way of Bertrand Russell (1903) to discover the basic struc-
ture of the system we n e e d — a hierarchy of entities at different
levels of organization. N o statement referring to a given level
will be complete enough, and here we invoke the shadow of Kurt
Goedel (1931); every event, every statement about such an event,
requires, in particular, other events at a higher level of organiza-
tion, another statement referring to a higher level of organiza-
tion, to make it complete or to frame i t — t o give it a context that
will allow us to understand it or to judge its truth. Logicians a n d
philosophers have exercised great ingenuity to avoid this
PREFACE ÍX
"clumsy," " c u m b e r s o m e , " structure (Russell himself in 1910 with

his "axiom of reducibility"), but 1 fear scientists will not be a b l e
t o follow t h e m b e c a u s e they are involved with obdurate m a t t e r
which d o e s not allow itself to b e "reduced" at whim—their rep-
r e s e n t a t i o n s must b e of t h e c o n c r e t e material world.
Hierarchical structure is o n e realization of Buchler's
"principle of ordinality"—a particularly apt o n e for t h e s c i e n c e s .
Most biologists already acknowledge at least t h e pedagogical
usefulness of such a concept, but very few take it seriously in
their work. This is primarily b e c a u s e no useful framework exists
that would allow such application. However, such an approach
would a l s o at present be found somewhat foreign t o our habits
of thought because, for example, it would require a s much
thought to be devoted t o control or regulation a s t o (material or
efficient) causality, while we have for the most part been trained
to focus on the latter only. This would further require us to give
as much attention to o t h e r constraints on a process a s t o t h e
laws governing it—that is, t o what we are used t o seeing a s
mere contingencies. Here we may a l s o note that in t h e twentieth
century hierarchical a p p r o a c h e s have often been used a s a
springboard for attacks on reductionism (e.g. Morgan 1923;
S m u t s 1926; Needham 1943; Koestler 1967; Polanyi 1968); and
these, a s well a s episodic c o n n e c t i o n s with left-wing politics
(e.g. Novikoff 1945), have conspired t o make this kind of ap-
proach s e e m t o o risky, t o o far-out for many American biologists.
Reductionism in fact requires hierarchical structure in order t o
make s e n s e (Bock 1979), but its preferred focus on proximate
causality is a very limited way of dealing with such a rich tapes-
try. When faced with such even obviously complex problems as
t h o s e involving e c o s y s t e m s or the mind I think we can no longer
restrict our vision with this one-way attitude. (The political con-
nection t o a large extent involves t h e o p p o s i t e p r e f e r e n c e — t h a t
is, a belief that regulatory c h a n g e s in society can be m a d e that
would elicit positive social r e s p o n s e s from persons regardless
of t h e genetic and historical c a u s e s predisposing s o m e of them
toward antisocial or asocial behavior). A more c o m p r e h e n s i v e
perspective is needed.
The aim of this book is directed at chapters 7 and 8. The
others are preparations leading to them Without t h e rest of the
book t h e s e chapters would b e o p a q u e to most biologists.
X
PREFACE
Nevertheless, I believe the rest of the book makes a contribution

to hierarchy theory itself, which, as I found it, was not sufficient
to develop chapters 7 and 8 My own contributions here center
primarily on chapters 4 and 5. Evolutionary theory is one of
those complex subjects that even now requires a large frame-
work such as that developed herein to organize and articulate
its disparate parts. The idea that it is a subject requiring hier-
archical representation was nicely captured by Van Valen's
(1976a) maxim, "evolution is the control of development by
ecology." As a further point of departure we may quote Wright
(1964). "The task of science is not complete until it has followed
phenomena through all levels of the hierarchy, up and down as
far as possible, and after obtaining the best statistical descrip-
tion at each, has tied them all together."
It is my pleasure to acknowledge relevant conversations
or c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with the following persons: Jonathan Adler,
Howard Allen, Tim Allen, Mike Conrad, Joel Cracraft, Julie
Downey, Niles Eldredge, Mike Gochfeld, Marjorie Grene, Martha
Herbert, Steve Himes, David Hull, Bob Kaplan. M a r i o n n e Kirk,
lay Lemke, luan Carlos Letelier, Bill Livant, Paul Mankiewicz,
Les Marcus, Everett Olson, Ron Pilette, R. C. Richardson, Beth
Singer and Keith Thomson Rebecca Salthe proofread the man-
uscript, which was typed by Judy Steinberg. Lou Moriber and
George Fried s u p p l i e d support and encouragement. The quota-
tion from Eldredge and Salthe (1985) in chapter 7 is reprinted
with the kind permission of Niles Eldredge. Sketches that ac-
company openings for chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 have been
drawn by me, after the sketchbooks of Leonardo.
Evolving Hierarchical Systems

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Preface

it. We shall find as an aspect of complexity that the world has

"clumsy," " c u m b e r s o m e , " structure (Russell himself in 1910 with

Nevertheless, I believe the rest of the book makes a contribution

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