Political Psychology, Vol. 23, No.

4, 2002

Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory: A

Response to Oakes
Leonie Huddy
Department of Political Science
State University of New York at Stony Brook

A vibrant debate is a sure sign of a healthy theory. My current exchange with

Penelope Oakes (2002) on the application of social identity theory to political
phenomena provides clear evidence of the theory’s positive vital signs. We may
disagree over the extent to which social identity theory holds a specific road map
for political research, but we do not differ on the theory’s ultimate importance. Like
Oakes, I believe that social identity has valuable insights to offer political behavior
researchers. Indeed, I wrote my original critique of social identity theory not to
dampen but rather to stimulate psychological thinking and research on the theory’s
benefit to fields beyond social psychology. I hope that the current exchange will
provoke dialogue between social psychologists and political scientists and, in so
doing, enrich the theory and enhance its contributions to political research.
My original critique sprang from a concern over the relatively meager impact
that social identity theory has had on political research (Huddy, 2001). Oakes points
out that social identity theory has been applied to several areas of social psychology
with relevance for political psychology, including leadership, nationalism, consen-
sus formation, social protest, stereotyping, and so on. But only a handful of this
work is conducted by political psychologists or expressly political in content,
dealing directly with political outcomes such as protest against government actions
(Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, in press; Simon et al., 1998), political
rhetoric designed to influence voter decision-making (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996;
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), or identification with a major political party or ideology
(Abrams, 1994; Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995; Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1998; Kelly,
1989).
I do not want to create the impression that social identity theory has had no
impact on political psychology. There are several well-known political studies that
have drawn on social identity theory. For example, Miller and colleagues’ (Gurin,

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826 Huddy

Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981) concept of group
consciousness was based on social identity theory and the notion that group
identification, low status, and a sense of system blame are central to the develop-
ment of political action and consciousness. Yet, despite an explosion of theory and
research since work by Miller, Gurin, and colleagues in the late 1970s, the theory
has had relatively minor subsequent influence on political behavior research.
A recent search of JSTOR, the online journal database, yielded 27 articles in
political science journals (including the Journal of Conflict Resolution) that in-
cluded a reference to Tajfel; there were eight articles that included a reference to
self-categorization theory. This is a highly incomplete list because JSTOR includes
the major American and British political science journals but does not index a
number of relevant others, including Political Psychology. A search of Political
Psychology articles in PsycINFO yielded a total of 10 articles that referred to Tajfel
and social identity theory and 7 that referred to self-categorization theory across
all years. Taken together, this suggests that social identity theory has not had
extensive impact within political research, especially in political science. Contrary
to Oakes’ suggestion, I am not questioning the potential political contribution of
research on consensus or stereotyping from a social identity perspective, but rather
asking why the rich research tradition spawned by social identity theory within
social psychology has not proven to be more beneficial to the study of political
behavior.
One of the central concerns that dominated my original critique is that the
theory, especially self-categorization theory, places an undue emphasis on the
power of context to explain intergroup behavior. This emphasis on situations
ignores individual differences in identification, fails to consider the power of
enduring cross-situational forces conveyed by history and culture to shape group
boundaries and meaning, and neglects the frequently contested nature and meaning
of group membership. In addition, a central emphasis on situations to define and
shape the meaning of group membership has resulted in a highly fluid view of
political behavior that is at odds with a great deal of evidence in political psychol-
ogy on the remarkable stability in political attitudes and behavior over time and
across situations (Sears & Levy, in press). These concerns acquire greater force
within political psychology because the field is concerned with explanations for
why some groups turn to violent conflict while comparable groups in a similar
situation do not, or why members of the same group vary in their level of group
commitment and identity despite living in similar circumstances.
A key secondary, and related, concern is that an emphasis on situations has
produced research on the consequences of social identity once it has been acquired
within a specific setting, but has deemphasized research on the development of
identity over time and across situations. Obviously, if identities are highly situ-
ational and contextually fluid, it does not make a great deal of sense to study them
developmentally. But if identities have qualities that endure across situations, it
makes very good sense to examine individual differences in identity acquisition,
Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory 827

growth, and change. In responding to Oakes’ specific criticisms, I will return in

greater detail to these two central concerns—the power of situations, and the nature
and trajectory of identity development.

Subjective Identification and Measurement

Oakes describes my characterization of the minimal intergroup setting and the

effects of mere categorization as a simple “sound bite” that misses the underlying
importance of subjective identity within social identity theory. She points out that
Turner and other social identity theorists stressed identification, not categorization,
as the critical ingredient in the emergence of ingroup bias. Nonetheless, it is also
clear from Oakes’ comments that social identity researchers expected subjective
identities to arise with relative ease among participants in the minimal intergroup
setting—one of the key research paradigms used to test social identity theory—in
order for them to make sense of a meaningless situation. Subjective group identities
may not occur when individuals are categorized as group members but think of
themselves in personal terms, as happens when they allocate resources to them-
selves in addition to other ingroup and outgroup members in the minimal group
paradigm (Turner, 1975, 1978). But barring that situation, social identity re-
searchers have typically assumed the adoption of subjective identities in the
minimal group setting, and assumed that this internalization was a product of
the situation, varying little if at all among individual group members. Indeed, the
existence of ingroup bias in a broad array of minimal groups based on things as
meaningless as being randomly classified by the experimenter as someone who
over or underestimates the actual number of dots in an image made the attainment
of positive distinctiveness seem entirely trivial and led to the widespread conclu-
sion that salient categorization was responsible for ingroup bias (Brewer, 1979).
I may have, therefore, mischaracterized the statements of social identity
theorists by suggesting that mere categorization inevitably leads to ingroup bias.
But the notion that categorization plays a central role in the formation of ingroup
bias is perfectly consistent with the details of the minimal intergroup situation. If
the critical ingredient in the minimal intergroup situation is subjective identity, why
is it not measured directly as a subjective state? Moreover, a reliance on the minimal
intergroup situation places social identity theorists in the uncomfortable position
of having to infer subjective identity from evidence of ingroup bias. As Turner
(1978) noted, “ingroup favoritism must presuppose some process of active identi-
fication” (p. 106). But this is highly unsatisfying if the research goal is to understand
whether, and under what circumstances, ingroup identity leads to ingroup bias and
conflict, a common research problem within political psychology.
A reluctance to measure subjective identity directly, despite its theoretical
centrality, is not just a feature of studies conducted using the minimal group setting;
it also emerges in other types of social identity studies. Consider research by
Reynolds and colleagues (Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001) on the impact
828 Huddy

of authoritarianism on prejudice. For my current purposes, the research findings

are less relevant than the method used to assess group identities. Participants were
assigned to conditions in which their national, age, and gender identities were made
salient by asking them to provide key words that distinguished Australians from
Americans, females from males, and young from older people. The key analyses
assess the extent to which manipulated group salience moderates the impact of
authoritarianism on prejudice. No effort is made to assess the extent to which
individuals internalize their nationality, gender, or age. In this study, the situational
salience of group boundaries is the key analytic variable, not its subjective inter-
nalization, consistent with the strategy pursued in the minimal intergroup setting.
An emphasis on categorization at the expense of subjective identities has
hindered the development of scales and other measures of identity that are espe-
cially needed by political psychologists conducting survey-based research (Huddy,
in press). In a very welcome shift, social psychologists have begun to develop scales
that tap a subjective sense of identity (for reviews see Huddy, in press; Jackson &
Smith, 1999). Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992; Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, &
Broadnax, 1994) collective self-esteem (CSE) scale is one of the most widely used
of these measures, although there is no general consensus on a specific measure as
yet. As Oakes rightly points out, a number of social identity theorists such as
Ellemers, Branscombe, and their colleagues have used subjective identity measures
in their research for some time (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Ellemers,
van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz,
& Owen, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999; Wann & Branscombe, 1993).
More recently, self-categorization theorists have begun to include subjective
measures in their research (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Veenstra
& Haslam, 2000). This is a positive development that hopefully will lead to greater
consensus on the detailed measurement of subjective identities and will facilitate
research on identity development.

Meaning and Identity Development

At odds with my original concern that social identity theory has devoted very
little attention to identity development, Oakes argues that self-categorization
theory attempts “to specify exactly how subjective identification happens,” in
addition to explaining its effects, and suggests that this has been a major research
focus. She also argues that the meaning of group membership is a central compo-
nent of this process, despite my claims that social identity has ignored the meaning
of group membership. Our differences arise, in part, from a different approach to
meaning. According to Oakes, identity salience is based on an interaction between
individuals’ readiness to apply a category to themselves and the extent to which
the category fits their behavior and attitudes in a given situation (Oakes, 1996). But
this dynamic formulation captures a very central tension in self-categorization
Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory 829

theory between two kinds of meaning: one that is fleeting and situation-specific,
another that is more enduring and stable.
By meaning, I have stable category content in mind—content that is created
over time and across situations as a function of cultural and historical factors. And
it is this kind of meaning that I believe has been neglected by self-categorization
researchers because of the theory’s central emphasis on the immediate perceptual
setting. Within self-categorization theory, historical and cultural factors are rele-
gated to the realm of “fit” between the category and group members’ beliefs or
actions within a situation. To be fair, there are two kinds of fit that determine
category content and application. The first is comparative fit, which captures the
extent to which ingroup members are like each other and different from members
of an outgroup. This varies with perceptual context and the relative attributes of
ingroup and outgroup members. But identities are also adopted on the basis of
normative fit—expectations about the actions and behavior of typical group
members. Normative fit, and the stability it implies for identities, is closer to the
type of meaning I have in mind as crucial to an understanding of identity develop-
ment. But this aspect of meaning has not been analyzed very thoroughly within
self-categorization research and is, at times, at odds with the theory’s fluid and
contextual approach.

Context and Fluid Meaning

Self-categorization researchers stress the highly fluid nature of identities to

underscore the dynamic nature of perception and category content. In the extreme,
self-categorization researchers believe that “salient self-categories are . . . intrinsi-
cally variable and fluid, not merely being passively ‘activated’ but actively con-
structed ‘on the spot’ to reflect the contemporary properties of self and others”
(Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992, p. 5), as I noted in my original
critique. Other self-categorization studies exemplify this highly fluid approach to
identities (Haslam & Turner, 1992a, 1995; for a summary see Oakes, Haslam, &
Reynolds, 1999).
Undoubtedly the meaning of an identity is sufficiently varied to allow its
different facets to be emphasized in different situations. But Oakes et al. (1999)
went beyond this conception to state that “contextual variation [in categorization]
is not a matter of core stability and peripheral change” but rather “both categories
and attributes are context-specific, mutually defining outcomes of the categoriza-
tion process” (p. 71). This suggests little room for enduring concepts.
I am not alone in questioning the extent to which category meaning is a
function of perceptual context. Reicher, an original proponent of self-categoriza-
tion theory, parts company with Turner, Oakes, and others on this point (Herrera
& Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996, 2001). Reicher and colleagues argue
that an emphasis on the immediate perceptual context within self-categorization
theory cannot adequately explain the development of political categories because
830 Huddy

it leaves little room for their social and political definition. In Herrera and Reicher’s
words, “the definition of categories is not open to debate” (p. 982) within self-
categorization theory. In one of their studies, they analyzed understandings of the
Persian Gulf war and found that pro- and anti-war students viewed a videotape of
the war very differently, not because of the immediate perceptual situation (which
was held constant in this instance) but because they viewed the tape from very
different perspectives that mirrored competing elite constructions of the war
(Herrera & Reicher, 1998).
Herrera and Reicher’s (1998) research on the meaning of the Gulf war raises
another serious concern about the way in which meaning is handled within
self-categorization theory. Within political contexts, the meaning of groups is often
highly contested. Consider research on American identity. Individuals who support
less consensual, nativist aspects of American identity such as being Christian are
more likely to oppose policies designed to benefit new immigrants, view negatively
the impact of immigration, and believe it is difficult to become American without
adopting American customs (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Citrin, Wong, &
Duff, 2000). It would not be surprising to find similar differences in the meaning
of Australian, English, or Canadian identity, with comparable political conse-
quences. But self-categorization theorists tend to assume that identities have a
single shared meaning that may vary across situations—or at least among those
who share a common salient self-categorization—but is nonetheless consensual
within a given context (Haslam et al., 1999; for a similar argument see Reicher &
Hopkins, 2001).
The other vexing question raised by an emphasis on the contextual creation of
meaning is how existing group identities and their associated meaning influence
the interpretation of situations, or, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) put it, “how
categories make contexts” (p. 40). There is clear evidence, for example, that
strongly identified individuals, especially those in low-status groups, view social
inequalities as more pervasive within a given context—and are more likely to
express grievances about their circumstances—than less highly identified group
members (Huddy, in press). This is difficult to explain if grievances simply reflect
the realities of social context. It is easier to explain, however, if highly identified
individuals are assumed to internalize more completely the politicized meaning of
being a member of a disadvantaged group and to endorse associated beliefs about
discrimination and the systemic origins of inequality.

Normative Fit and Stable Meaning

Thus, self-categorization theorists argue that the meaning of an identity varies

with perceptual context, as conveyed by the comparative fit between a category
label and the relative attributes of ingroup and outgroup members. Yet this is
somewhat at odds with the notion of normative fit (another ingredient in identity
salience), which implies extreme stability in the meaning of an identity. This
Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory 831

tension creates confusion over the relative stability of identity salience and mean-
ing, and raises nagging questions about how identities and their content develop
and change. As Reicher and Hopkins (2001) noted, this creates an image “of a
world of constantly shifting contexts and constantly varying self-categories, but of
no systematic movement” (p. 40).
I had originally argued that groups are often treated as if they are immutable
within social identity theory, a claim challenged by Oakes. My concern is linked
to the way in which normative fit is handled by self-categorization researchers,
especially in studies in which characteristics such as age, gender, or nationality are
made salient and assumed to have a well-understood set of attributes (Oakes,
Turner, & Haslam, 1991; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Reynolds et al.,
2001). As an example, consider work by Reynolds et al. (2000) on the traits used
by Australian university and TAFE (vocational) students to describe themselves
and members of the other group. The researchers’ primary concern was to docu-
ment the link among trait valence, trait typicality, and ingroup bias. The central
point here is that the attributes of university and TAFE students were assumed to
be constant in this setting; a small control group of university students rated other
university students as intellectual, ambitious, and analytical whereas they rated
TAFE students as down-to-earth, practical, and realistic. These typical group
characteristics were not examined as a function of the immediate situation and were
effectively regarded as fixed in this research. My concern is that meaning is more
complex than is implied by this approach; it differs among individual group
members and can develop over time in response to external events (although not
necessarily in response to the details of every situation).
In summary, there is a general tension within self-categorization theory over
the extent to which identities are generally fluid or relatively stable in meaning.
The overall picture is one of ever-changing identities in the context of quite stable
group attributes. Unfortunately this lends little insight into how category meaning
develops over time, or in response to competing political rhetoric concerning the
qualities of group members. It also sheds little insight on identity development.
How can identities mean different things in different situations and produce
divergent consequences, even while anchored by very fixed and stable qualities?
Under what circumstances might a politician succeed in shifting the meaning of
political identity? Are there limits to the success of such attempts? What types of
individuals would be most susceptible to attempts to politically manipulate the
meaning of group identity? What types of political appeals or external events are
most likely to strengthen social identity? These questions are of interest to political
psychologists, but self-categorization theory does not offer any clear set of answers
to them at present.
832 Huddy

Accessibility and Individual Differences

Oakes argues that category salience, and hence identity development, is not
simply a feature of situations but rather is an interaction between category fit and
an individual’s readiness to apply a category in a given situation. This is an
important claim because I had originally criticized social identity theorists for
paying too little attention to individual differences in the process of identity
development. As described by Oakes, readiness to apply a category depends on
“the perceiver’s context-specific goals, priorities, values, perspective, and so
forth.” This is a very broad list, raising questions about whether the concept of
readiness allows for very precise predictions about identity adoption.
Self-categorization researchers have narrowed this list down to some extent,
by focusing on the preexisting strength of group identification as one of the central
characteristics that determines group members’ readiness to apply a category to
themselves (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Oakes et al., 1991; Spears et al., 1999;
Turner, 1999; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). There is some murkiness however over
whether readiness and, by extension, the strength of group identification is a facet
of individuals or of the collective. Haslam et al. (1999) stated that readiness or the
accessibility of a category “is conferred by societies, cultures, and ideologies” (p.
810), although this makes it more difficult to understand why identity differs in
strength among group members. Nonetheless, if we assume that readiness is a
feature of individuals, the concept of readiness places researchers in the odd
position of arguing that identities are quite variable across situations and yet are
based on an underlying, stable level of identification. In general, the origins of
identity strength remain untested and largely unexplained, creating a serious
problem for political psychologists who are keenly interested in understanding the
factors that govern identity strength.
Work by Spears et al. (1999) provides an exception to this trend, as noted by
Oakes. They argue that identity strength is a function of the combined forces that
influence identity salience within a given context. This is an interesting idea that
deserves closer empirical scrutiny. Does identity strength shift after an individual
has been placed in a situation in which the comparative context highlights a very
different aspect of group membership than embodied within usual stereotypes?
How long does this endure over time? Are strong group identifiers immune from
such effects? In one of the few studies to contrast identity strength with contextual
factors, Veenstra and Haslam (2000) clearly found that preexisting identity strength
had far greater impact on collective action among members of the Australian
Services Union than did the manipulated context in which some union members
were reminded of a current dispute between the government and the union move-
ment and others were not. More research along these lines is needed to examine
the relationship between identity strength and context and to illuminate the process
of identity development.
Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory 833

Gradations in Identity Strength

In my original critique, I argued that social identity theory does not allow for
shades of identity. Oakes counters that this is not the case, and that there are a series
of studies that have focused on the measurement of identity strength. Her claim is
true, as I note above. What remains in dispute is how well the theory allows for
such gradations in identity strength. I had originally criticized social identity theory
for viewing identity as either social or personal but not accommodating something
in between that might account for degrees of identity. This view is challenged by
Oakes, who claims that social identity researchers emphasize an identity continuum
that ranges from personal to collective.
At best, self-categorization researchers are ambivalent on this point. Reynolds
et al. (2001), for example, stated that “people can categorize themselves as
individuals (in contrast to other individuals) in terms of their personal identities, or
they can categorize themselves as a group (in contrast to other groups) in terms of
social identity” (p. 428). That sounds very all-or-none to me. They went on to claim
that there is actually a “psychological discontinuity” between acting as an individ-
ual and acting as a group member. In a similar vein, Oakes, Haslam, and Turner
(1998) have suggested that “shifts toward social identity produce depersonalization
of self-perception and behavior” (p. 77, emphasis in original). This does not leave
much room for a continuum. Turner (1999) allowed for the prospect of a continuum
by suggesting that self-categorization researchers have moved closer to the view
that both personal and social identities could be salient at the same time. Nonethe-
less, he went on to state that “the perceptual effects of the different levels [social
or personal] will still tend to work against each other as a function of their relative
strength” (p. 11).
Moreover, social identity researchers have typically viewed one’s placement
on this continuum as a function of situations, not individuals (Tajfel, 1978). Thus,
once behavior has fallen into the realm of the social, it is “to a large extent
independent of individual differences” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 44). In other words, once
group loyalties are evoked, there is uniform behavior among group members. An
intermediate sense of loyalty can arise as a function of situations—when feelings
of both personal and group loyalty are evoked—resulting in a middling sense of
affiliation. But a theory of group identity that rests heavily on the power of context
does not really explain why some individuals are more fully committed group
members than others, and why this commitment is relatively stable across situ-
ations. Thus, even though Tajfel referred to individual group members’ differing
levels of commitment, there is nothing in the theory that explicitly accounts for
this.
Whether personal and social identities are discrete or form part of a continuum
is especially critical to the notion of identity strength. If identities are either social
or personal, it is hard to understand why they would vary in strength among group
members. If, on the other hand, they reflect a mixture of personal and social identity
834 Huddy

attributes, it is easier to understand how some individuals might feel closer than
others to the typical group profile, resulting in grades of identity strength. A closer
examination of identity development would shed light on these issues and align
theory with the growing use among social identity researchers of scales that tap
subjective identity strength.
Further exploration of individual differences in identity acquisition also seems
indispensable to understanding degrees of identity strength. Oakes makes clear that
identity strength is not a function of “fixed aspects of cognitive structure or
personality.” But this resistance to examining individual differences in identity
strength hinders the application of self-categorization theory to political behavior.
The individual strength of ethnic and racial identities is quite stable over time. This
finding parallels evidence on the temporal stability of political beliefs and values
(Sears & Levy, in press). What causes this stability? It could be, as Oakes suggests,
that it derives from stable social reality and norms. But how does a strong identity
arise in the first place? Why do some group members adopt group membership
more readily than others? It will be difficult to answer these questions without
acknowledging differences among group members in the degree to which they fit
notions of a typical group member in some chronic sense. It is also worth
considering whether there are personality characteristics that propel some individu-
als toward group membership. When it comes to politically relevant identities such
as feminism, environmentalism, or conservatism, an analysis of individuals’ long-
standing political values and beliefs will play a central role in understanding the
adoption and development of group identity.

Social Identity Theory and Political Psychology

Work on social identity proceeds at a breathtaking pace within social psychol-

ogy (Turner, 1999). Research has taken several interesting and new directions that
hold considerable importance for political psychology. The movement away from
the minimal group studies is encouraging. The direct assessment of identity
strength is critical. In this respect, research by Ellemers and Branscombe on the
impact of identity strength is particularly welcome (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, &
Coleman, 1993; Schmitt et al., 2002; Spears et al., 1999; Wann & Branscombe,
1995). As an example, consider research by Branscombe et al. (1999) on the
interaction between threat and group identification. They uncovered evidence that
highly identified group members may react to threat with a show of solidarity,
whereas low identifiers scramble to distance themselves from the group. This
finding holds important implications for political psychologists.
The troubling reality, however, is that social identity theory has not accounted
well for the development of an enduring sense of identity strength that spans
situations. Social identity researchers tend to reject the view that such differences
arise from individual differences and instead list “momentary and sometimes more
long-standing crystallization of past contextual influences and ongoing alle-
Context and Meaning in Social Identity Theory 835

giances” (Spears et al., 1999, p. 61). But this is very vague for what may become
the central variable within social identity research. Acknowledging the prospect of
stable individual differences in identity strength does not negate the effects of
context completely; rather, it places clear limits on it. It also helps to sidestep the
problem of determining the causal role of identity strength when it is both a product
of the situation and shapes reactions to the same situation, when it “can be a
dependent and an independent variable” (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje 1999, p. 3).
Ultimately, social identity research is moving in a positive direction to ac-
knowledge the importance of preexisting identities and group norms both theoreti-
cally and empirically. But the theory needs greater flexibility in accounting for the
development of stable norms and identities. The continued emphasis within self-
categorization theory on the power of situations is highly limiting and hinders the
ability to study identity strength and meaning independently of specific situations.
Moving away from a singular emphasis on situations and the power of perception
as the cardinal influence on identity development and group-related behavior may
reduce the theory’s theoretical parsimony, but may increase its psychological
reality. This would certainly facilitate the acceptance of a social identity approach
among political psychologists.

AUTHOR’S ADDRESS

Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Leonie Huddy,

Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, NY 11794-4392. E-mail: leonie.huddy@sunysb.edu

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