Delhi Metropolitan Education

Judgement Analysis
S.P. Manocha v. State of M.P. AIR 1973 MP 84
In light of Writ of Mandamus

PREPARED BY:
TANISSHA GHATWAL
ENROLMENT NUMBER: 09451103520
2nd YEAR BBA.LLB, SECTION-2B
BATCH 2020-2025

PREPARED FOR:
Ms. SAKSHI AGARWAL
 S.P. Manocha And Anr. vs The State Of Madhya
Pradesh
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Date: 9 November, 1972
Equivalent citations: AIR 1973 MP 84
Bench: P Tare, J Verma

Brief Facts:

1. Petitioner No. 2 is the daughter of petitioner No. 1. She had applied for admission to one of
the Medical Colleges in the State for the M. B. B. S. course. She has not been admitted.
Hence this petition claiming a writ of mandamus against the respondents to admit her to one
of the Medical Colleges in the State.

2. The total number of seats to be filled this year in several Medical Colleges in the State was
fixed, admittedly, at 720 in all. A fixed percentage of seats out of the total number were
reserved for some specified categories.

3. The petitioner No. 2 falls in the general category. It is also accepted that in the general
category no candidate has been admitted to any of the Medical Colleges who may have
obtained less marks than petitioner No. 2. The minimum aggregate marks up to which
admissions have been made in the general category is 275 out of 500, whereas the petitioner
No. 2 has obtained 272 marks out of 500.

4. With regard to the Pre-Medical Examination held this year, the State Government had
prescribed a method to regulate the admissions and to ascertain the number of seats available
for allocation to the aforesaid different categories of applicants. This was done by the
'Madhya Pradesh Pre-Medical Examination Rules, 1972'. After the Pre-Medical Examination
was held, a clause in the Rules initially declared was modified with a view to provide
admission to many more candidates from amongst some of the reserved categories, but
strictly within the number of seats reserved for them.
8. The admitted position before us is that even after lowering of the qualifying marks in case
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates, the total number of candidates from
those categories admitted in all Medical Colleges in the State is only 63 as against the total of
216 seats reserved for them. The net result is that the remaining 153 seats which had been
initially reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
could not be filled from those categories and they have ultimately been filled up by admitting
candidates from the general category

9. The petitioners grievance is that but for lowering of the qualifying marks, another about 40
seats, in addition to the aforesaid 153 seats out of those reserved for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, would have also remained vacant so that a further number of 40 candidates
from the general category would have been admitted, and the petitioner No. 2 would have got
admission within this number. As such, the petitioners contend that the action of the
Government in so amending the rule after the Pre-Medical Examination was held was illegal
and unjustified and it has the effect of depriving petitioner No. 2 of her right to be admitted in
one of the Medical Colleges.

10. Shri R.S. Dabir, learned Counsel for the petitioners. He argues that there is a right in the
candidates from the general category to have all unfilled seats, reserved for these two
categories, converted into seats for the general category so as to enable more candidates
admitted from the general category. He contends that by the subsequent amendment as noted
above this right of candidates in the general category has been adversely affected after
holding of the examination and, therefore, the power to make such an amendment by
lowering the qualifying marks for these categories of candidates was not available. This right,
according to him, was in the nature of a vested right which accrued to the petitioner No. 2 as
also to all the candidates in the general category, so that it could not be taken away after they
had appeared in the Pre-Medical Examination.

11. To suggest that there is no impediment in granting a proper relief to the petitioners, Shri
Dabir also contends that the scope of Article 226 is wider than that of Article 32 so that a writ
under Article 226 is not confined only to the enforcement of fundamental rights but may also
be issued 'for any other purpose'. Accordingly, his suggestion is that even if a writ in the
nature of mandamus cannot be issued to grant relief in this case, then also a suitable writ,
direction or order suiting the exigencies of the situation can be devised to enforce the right
claimed by petitioner No. 2.
Issues Raised:

1. The first question to be seen is whether the petitioner No. 2 has any right to claim
admission as she alleges, either generally or under the aforesaid Rules. In case such a right
exists, whether it was a vested right which could not be defeated by amendment of the Rules
subsequent to the Pre-Medical Examination.

2. The second issue raised was that the amendment in rules could not be made after the Pre-
Medical Examination was held, so as to operate retrospectively.

3. Thirdly whether the principle of equitable estoppel is attracted to this case.

Laws Applicable:

1. Article 226 in The Constitution Of India 1949:

226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
and for any other purpose

 Article 226 of the Indian constitution is one of the key provisions, which has been
enacted with the object to protect the legal rights of a person and award remedies to
the aggrieved party. Thus, this Article empowers a person to move an application
before the high court for the enforcement of their legal right. Unlike Article 32, it is a
constitutional right and cannot be suspended even at the time of emergency. High
courts have comparatively narrow jurisdiction over the Supreme Court. Since the
invested power is discretionary in nature, the high court decides whether to issue a
writ or not for the particular fact in issue.
 Mandamus: The term implies ‘we command or the order’. In a nutshell, it is a writ
issued by an upper court to an inferior court or administrative or quasi-judicial
authority, which directs them to discharge their duties and condemn their inactivity. In
 other words, the writ of mandamus is an order by a superior court commanding a
person or a public authority (including the government and public cooperation) to do
or forbear to do something in the nature of public duty or in certain cases of a
statutory duty.

2. Article 29 in The Constitution Of India 1949:

29. Protection of interests of minorities

(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the
State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them

 This right has only for citizens of India which resides within the territory of the
country. As we know India has huge diversity. This article gives the right to every
citizen to protect and maintain their culture, language, and script. Every time minority
has fear about losing their identity and culture, which has ensured by article 29. The
second provision article 29(2) guarantees the right of a citizen as
an individual irrespective of the community to which he belongs.

3. Article 20 in The Constitution Of India 1949:

20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences

(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the
time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater
than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offence

 A literal interpretation of Article – 20(1) of the Indian Constitution would mean that
the safeguards provided under this article are given against conviction for an act or
omission which was not an offense under the law that existed at the time of the
commission and against any increased punishment for the same act for which the
 punishment was different at the time of the commission of the act. It is usually
claimed that Article – 20(1) invalidates ex post facto law.
 Article 20(1) safeguards the fundamental rights of every citizen and hence keeps the
spirit of the constitution alive, provided with the various judicial pronouncements
have provided justice to the victims and the prospective victims because of the
retrospective application of the law. Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India has
always been interpreted in wider terms than the principles incorporated in the
American Constitution which have been reluctant to prohibit the ex post facto laws
existing.

Ratio of the Case (including decision given on all the issues raised):

1. The first question to be seen is whether the petitioner No. 2 has any right to claim
admission as she alleges, either generally or under the aforesaid Rules. In case such a right
exists, whether it was a vested right which could not be defeated by amendment of the Rules
subsequent to the Pre-Medical Examination.

In respect to the first issue, whether petitioner No. 2 has any right to claim admission and
whether it was a vested right, court observed that the only educational right guaranteed under
the Constitution is contained in clause (2) of Article 29 which states that no citizen shall be
denied admission on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, in
addition of course to the general prohibition against discrimination between members of the
same class. Admittedly, no such question is involved in this petition. At present, leaving out
of consideration the Rules relied on in this case, it has rightly not been stressed on behalf of
the petitioner that there is any general right to be admitted to any educational institution. The
reason is that in the absence of any statutory provisions, an individual has no legal right to be
admitted to a college or similar institution. It is in the discretion of the authorities to admit a
person after he is approved. Accordingly, there being no such general right, a writ of
mandamus cannot be issued to admit a person to any college unless the right claimed has any
statutory basis. It has already been shown that there is no such right under the Constitution.
In the following cases similar judgement has been held were the court refuse to issue writ of
mandamus based on which court took it’s decision on this particular issue in this cases.
Referring to following cases:

 King v. The Benchers of Lincoln's Inn, (1825) 107 ER 1277

 Case Baylay, J
 In Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398 the Supreme
Court observed as follows:--

"It has not been shown that in exercising its powers the appellate authority discarded any
mandatory provisions of law. The utmost that has been suggested is that it has not carried out
certain executive instructions. ........................... But all these are only executive instructions
which have no statutory force. Hence, even assuming, though it is by no means clear, that
those instructions have been disregarded, the non-observance of those instructions cannot
affect the power of the appellate authority to make its own selection, or affect the validity of
the order passed by it."

 In Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 694

 In State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar Sarma, AIR 1965 SC 1196
 G. J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753

Accordingly the court held no authority to the contrary has been placed before us. Therefore,
it must be held that the petitioner No. 2 had no general right to be admitted to one of the
Medical Colleges in this State. As a matter of fact, it was not even necessary to disclose to the
candidates all the rules except those which lay down the necessary qualifications for
eligibility as a candidate for admission. The mere fact that the entire set of rules was made
public before the Pre-Medical Examination was held, would not, in our view, alter their basic
character.

It is settled law that non-compliance with such executive instructions which have no statutory
basis is not actionable.

2. Shri Dabir's contention that the amendment in rules could not be made after the Pre-
Medical Examination was held, so as to operate retrospectively.
It being admitted that the rules were merely executive instructions, they did not confer any
right, much less a vested right. The only prohibition against retrospective operation is to
avoid defeating a vested right. No such right is involved in this case.

 A similar question was considered in ATR 1959 SC 694 and their Lordships of the
Supreme Court held that an order issued under Section 43-A was a mere executive
instruction and was not law so that there was no change brought about in the law
during pendency of the appeal. In this view it was held that the validity of the order
passed by the appellate authority could not be challenged on the ground that it decided
the appeal on a law that was made subsequent to the issue of the permit, even after
accepting the contention that there was a fundamental right to carry on motor
transport business subject to reasonable restrictions upon that right by law.
 In a later decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 1196 their Lordships of the Supreme
Court also refer to Raman and Raman's case (supra).

From these decisions it is clear that then is no merit in the contention that the State
Government could not amend the aforesaid rules in the manner it did after the Pre-Medical
Examination was actually held. Accordingly, this contention must also be rejected.

3. Shri Dabir, as a last resort, confined the petitioner's claim within the narrow limits of
equitable estoppel. His argument is that acting on the representation made by the State
Government as contained in the aforesaid Rules, the petitioner No. 2 appeared in the Pre-
Medical Examination and, as such, it is now not open to the State Government to withdraw
that representation after the petitioner No. 2 suffered the detriment of appearing in the
examination.

 The decision in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 is
strongly relied on by Shri Dabir in support of his contention that the rule of equitable
estoppel applies. That was a case in which a merchant acting on a representation made
by the Government in an Export Promotion Scheme had made certain exports. That
scheme promised certain benefits to such exporters and the question Was whether a
merchant, who, acting on those promises had made certain exports, could be denied
the benefits promised under that scheme. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held
 in that case that so long as the scheme was in force, the Government was estopped
from going back on the representation made by it.

We are unable to appreciate at to how any detriment was suffered by petitioner No. 2 by her
mere act of appearing in the Pre-Medical Examination, which action was independent of the
actual number of seats available. It is beyond question that she would have appeared in this
examination in any case, and that she did not do so simply because there may have been a
chance of some reserved seats remaining unfilled and thereafter being converted into seats in
the general category. Therefore, it is difficult to visualize as to how any detriment was
suffered by petitioner No. 2 in the present case so at to apply the principle of equitable
estoppel. It was also observed that the present case is not a case of that type (Union of India
v. Anglo Afghan Agencies), and are unable to appreciate that any detriment has been suffered
by the petitioner No. 2 here.

In view of these facts alone the principle of equitable estoppel is not attracted to this case.

Critical Analysis:

Here pointing out the object of reserving seats for these backward classes was to ensure the
availability of a minimum number of seats to them and here it appears that the Government
after the Pre-Medical Examination was held, realized that a very negligible number of
candidates from that category had qualified for admission, so decided to lower the qualifying
marks for them. Even after this was done, in all only 63 candidates could be admitted as
against the total number of 216 seats available for them. Thus, the action taken by the
Government was only for the purpose of achieving the object of such reservation.

It was seen in this case that the grievance made by the petitioner no. 2 was not supported by
valid proof and arguments. Plus the petitioner's grievance in terms of the changes made for
rules for the reserved category affecting her admission seems to be an informal logic. Being a
candidate from general category her claim over the vacant seats for the reserved category is
vague. Even though there was a possibility for availability of vacant seats from the reserved
category and her mere change to get admission via them, such a possibility cannot be referred
or claim as a right, this was also reorganized by the court. Article 29 of Indian Constitution
protects ones right to education against discrimination on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, language or any of them, it is not mention in this case that any such discrimination was
done or her right to education was infringed. In terms of a writ of mandamus under Article
226 in this case, the same cannot be issued to the college as the rules mentioned in the
'Madhya Pradesh Pre-Medical Examination Rules, 1972' was not statutory but executive in
nature giving no rise to any right as claimed by the petitioner. As contends by the Shri Dabir
that the scope of Article 226 is wider, so a writ under Article 226 is not confined only to the
enforcement of fundamental rights but may also be issued 'for any other purpose', however
this term for any other purpose means for enforcement of a legal right or legal duty it does
not mean that the high court can issue a writ for any purpose it pleases. In case ‘State of U.P.
V. D.K. Singh (1986) 4 SCC 160’ it was held by Supreme Court that the High Court should
not interfere with matters of academics nature. With all this it can be inferred that the
judgement of Court for non issuance for writ of mandamus was valid and fair, and that the
court cannot entertain any petition on the ground that the High Court can issue a writ for any
other purpose too.