How To Design A Startup
How To Design A Startup
How To Design A Startup
Master’s thesis
Master of Business Administration
Mattias Enggaard
BED-3910, June 2023
Table of Contents
Foreword ................................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iv
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
4 Methods ............................................................................................................................ 14
5 Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 19
6.2 Theoretical perspective: The case startup seen through a change-endurance lens .... 34
6.3 Theoretical perspective: The founders’ ambitions seen through a translation lens ... 35
7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 40
References ................................................................................................................................ 41
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 45
ii
Foreword
With this Master’s thesis I conclude my MBA program (BED 3910) at the UiT School of
Business and Economics.
Designing an organization from scratch is an all-encompassing task. For a startup* 1, all pieces
are in play and need attention and decision-making repeatedly. My thesis is, for this reason,
also very broadly scoped. I acknowledge that this means that I sacrifice some depth and detail
– and to a certain degree academic rigor. However, I find the practical relevance important
and try to approach the challenges that the case startup, I study, is in fact dealing with.
I would like to thank the founders of the case startup for participating in interviews and
candidly sharing their perspectives.
Also, I would like to extend my appreciation to UiT for offering this study program online
making continued education flexible and accessible for groups of students – like myself – for
whom a traditional MBA program would have been infeasible. Håvar Brattli and Alexander
Utne have been accommodating supervisors throughout the process.
While the interviews were conducted in Norwegian all citations in the thesis are in English. I
apologize for any misrepresentation owing to my translation.
Mattias Enggaard
Copenhagen, Denmark
May 31, 2023
1
Key terms and concepts are marked with * and defined in Appendix A
iii
Abstract
How to design a startup? is a question of practical importance to the managers that are
building an organization from scratch.
Focusing on a case startup, this thesis seeks to holistically understand its organizational
development across five design dimensions (physical structure, visual design, organizational
culture, decision processes, and team* composition).
Being inspired by action research, the thesis aims at simultaneously describing and solving
the organizational design challenges of the case startup.
For each dimension, key discoveries are drawn from literature and compared to the
perspectives surfaced in interviews with the four founders of the case company. Across
dimensions, an overall good fit between literature and case organization is found. The
research on startup organizations offers rich knowledge that will help any practitioner
understand challenges and make research-based decisions.
The discussion addresses some of the areas where discrepancies between literature and
founder views prevail. With respect to knowledge culture and decision processes, the thesis
seeks to shape the organizational design of the case company by suggesting possible actions.
It also suggests adopting a role and personality perspective when seeking to integrate change-
persistence in future research on startup organizational design.
iv
1 Introduction
Many startups die within their first years (Eisenmann 2021) – failure to grow often translate
into failure to survive (DeSantola and Gulati 2017). As growth - or the lack of - has an
organizational dimension, I find it important to study how startups organize themselves to
ensure their survival and successful development.
This transition moves the startup from an organization pivoting around the founding team and
characterized by informality, loose structures, and fluidity. With the first market traction the
startup increases its discipline and structure preparing itself of rapid scaling, where informal
communication and decision-making may no longer be effective. (Picken 2017)
Along this transition the startup organization is iteratively redesigned. It must overcome many
organizational hurdles, but core among them are questions related to culture, people,
management, and processes (Picken 2017, Grimpe, Murmann et al. 2019, Kaehr Serra and
Thiel 2019).
However, according to DeSantola (2019): “…resent research tells a scattered and incomplete
story….of the internal organizations of entrepreneurial ventures as they develop”. This thesis
is a small contribution to this gap.
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1.2 A case-study
The aim of my thesis is to explore how the research literature can help create a solid basis for
the case company’s development as an organization and business. Being true to the all-
encompassing job of managers building a startup, my approach is holistic and touches upon
many dimensions of organizational design.
In September 2022, the startup’s management team announced a set of priorities that impact
the organization (Table 1). The priorities announced fall into three design dimensions which –
in combination with two extra dimensions - make up the focal areas of this study.
Table 1: Organization design dimensions of the startup management (source: case startup)
Dimension of Description
organization design
Physical structure The company had just onboarded staff in locations away from the headquarters.
(PS) It was announced that physical presence was preferrable leaving working from
home to special instances.
This was to be supported by paid lunch and noise cancelling headphones.
Visual design A visual design process was initiated with an external design company to be at par
(VD) with competitors acknowledging that great products do not sell themselves.
The process defined company values and led to the tag line: ‘Exploring future
landscapes – understanding tomorrow’.
Organizational Culture was a core component in a ‘learning organization’ goal.
culture* A combination of processes and activities (knowledge* sharing) were announced.
(OC) Reference was drawn to the company origins where finding technical solutions
involved steep learning curves.
Decision processes Not an announced priority by the startup management, but an overarching topic I
(DP) have added to the list.
While having a flat hierarchy, the main decision forum is the weekly management
forum made up of the four founders in combination with board meetings.
Team composition This perspective was not part of the management September 2022 announcement
(TC) but surfaced as a clear priority during first founder interview.
From this does not follow that the design decisions are carried through. One thing is planning,
but implementation and shaping of practices are very different matters. However,
organization design is a core feature – among several - in explaining how the order of things
has been and is being established. (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011)
From this problem statement follows that I will first explore the literature – both general
research-based knowledge around organizational design and specific literature on startup
organizations. I then compare key discoveries from the literature with the case startup seeking
to describe the current organizational design and help inform its development.
I disclose this to the reader, but I am also very aware that it influences my approach to the
topic as a student and researcher. On one side, it provides motivation and inside information
that strengthens my work. On the other side, it is also a bias in my selection and reading of the
literature, in my data collection, and analysis.
2 Empirical context
Launched in late 2019, the case startup has grown to a current team size of 15. It develops
software-as-a-service for nature risk management addressing climate change challenges for
business and society. Based on its commercial traction in the Norwegian market the company
attracted renewed seed funding mid-2022 and is now looking towards markets overseas.
With a four-person founder team, the functional divisions follow their role-split: CEO, CTO,
CCO, and COO2. However, all managers maintain overlapping responsibilities centered
around the technology development. This resembles the typical ‘early-stage startup’ of Picken
(2017) where all other employees report to a founder and a divisional structure around
functions is only emerging.
Similarly in accordance with Picken (2017), the case company is in a situation where further
growth and scope of products and markets calls for more staff and new skillsets implying that
many short- and medium-term organizational hurdles must be overcome.
2
Chief Executive, Technology, Commercial, Operating Officer, respectively
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3 Theoretical perspectives
This chapter summarizes my literature search and consists of five sections each addressing
findings on one organizational design dimension. The sections follow an identical structure:
I draw these propositions from the literature to first inform the interview guide. Secondly, the
propositions are taken into the analysis as a basis for describing the case startup and identify
similarities and discrepancies between the case and the literature (see 4.2 on study design).
Jacobsen (2021) regards choice of physical location a decision of decisive nature as its costly
to change and may affect access to resources. Trade-offs involve distance to resources such as
competence and talent clusters (proximity to sector peers and universities) but also
exclusion/inclusion into decision processes both instrumentally (making interaction easy or
difficult) and symbolically (distance between entities that are supposed to be apart).
Location across geography or building layout decides how tasks, functions, and people are
placed: Interaction is influenced by physical distance or distance measured in time across
locations, buildings, and floors (Jacobsen 2021). Face-to-face communication is a function of
such distance and research documents lower trust and cooperation at greater physical
distances (Nilsson and Mattes 2015).
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Physical structure may not be the easiest design element to modify. Micro changes within the
same location may be achievable for many organizations, but shifting physical structure
across geography is time and money consuming impacting not only ways-of-working but also
as for instance the everyday of staff and relationships with clients and partners.
Open creative labs3 are home to start-ups of many kinds (their main physical structure). A lab
may be driven by investors who try to stimulate an interactive and creative environment
promoting the development of their investees (community). Such labs are flexible structures
that regard innovation as a collective process and emphasize access to heterogeneous
knowledge as source of continued creativity. (Schmidt and Brinks 2017)
These investor-led labs are managed by for instance venture capitalists and target namely
startups within the digital economy. The startup may hand over an ownership share in return
of, e.g., access to and support of the lab. Collaboration is highly competitive and focuses on
the realization of business ideas under targeted monitoring and are, hence, not inclined to
develop close social links within the lab community. (Schmidt and Brinks 2017).
More generally, my literature search found that research within physical dimension of startups
tends to focus on clustering and innovation ecosystems in cities and regions. Relatively few
sources focused on startup physical structure.
3.1.3 Propositions
Based on the above literature extract, I conclude that a startup needs to focus on the physical
aspects of trust building among employees and in other relations. One reason for this is
resource scarcity, weaker formal hierarchy, and less established ways of doing business
3
Similar terms include co-working spaces and incubators.
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(Alriksson 2018). The startup needs to build close ties that transmit information and secure
access to resources leading to the following propositions concerning physical structure (PS):
PS1: The physical structure stimulates a way of working and underscores a tight social
work environment.
PS2: A growing organization and distributed work pose a challenge to the organization and
its ability to cooperate and work efficiently.
PS3: Being located within an investor-led open creative lab gives a community spirit
aiding company development and innovation.
PS4: Being spatially fragmented provides better access to trust-based, relational ties to
resources.
Creating a positive image by applying graphics and symbols is a way to express the
organization’s identity – identity being a planned and purposeful presentation of an
organization (Alessandri 2013) - and a way to shape the impressions of both internal and
external stakeholders (Moldenæs and Pettersen 2021).
Visual appearance is, however, only one element of an organization’s reputation and
corporate identity*. Many other factors influence the position of an organization in the eyes of
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stakeholders which makes visual design an indirect measure to manage reputation (Alessandri
2013). Further to this, planning and managing how stakeholders perceive and react to visual
design is challenging. This is due to a high level of subjectivity where sender’s intention
differs from receiver perceptions and behavior which again are affected of how stakeholders
interpret symbols and how they assess aesthetics. (Moldenæs and Pettersen 2021)
Visual design can be a shortcut to market entry: By mimicking visuals of established brands,
a startup may establish customer perceptions of the startup’s product and services through
subconscious association with the market leader (Baxter, Ilicic et al. 2018). Further, the
process of creating a visual identity may in itself be a shortcut for entrepreneurs to crystallize
what they stand for (Sumelius 2022) and find their market fit.
Nonetheless, an organization’s identity develops over longer periods of time and needs effort.
Both of these are factors which are in short supply in a startup that focuses on acute topics.
Branding tends to be of little priority for entrepreneurs who dive first into e.g. product
development (Bresciani and Eppler 2010). Ultimately, the neglect of visuals may negatively
impact growth prospects (Reijonen, Laukkanen et al. 2012, Odoom and Mensah 2019).
My literature search confirms the finding of Sumelius (2022) in that: “Previous research on
the correlation between visual identities and start-up performance is scarce”. More – but still
scarce – research has focused on the broader term ‘brand’ of which visual design can be seen
as a subcomponent.
3.2.3 Propositions
The literature stresses that visual design is a part of the long-term strategic management of
startups and may influence their access to resources and successful development. However,
the topic may be suffering lack of attention doing early phases. Combined these observations
lead to the following propositions on startup visual design (VD):
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VD2: Investment in visual design or the lack thereof may influence startup growth
projections especially by building credibility towards investors and customers.
Høyer, Madsbu et al. (2021) distinguish between institutional and instrumental views on
organizational culture design. The former deals with stakeholders’ fundamental perceptions of
a given organization which are difficult and risky to modify – risky because outcomes of a
design intervention may easily end up being unintended and difficult because norms and
attitudes are complex and emerges gradually when people interact. The latter emphasizes the
more superficial elements where organizations may design visions, state values, or configure
visuals to modify the organizational culture. The two perspectives differ on how much a
culture can be actively designed and how much it is more a matter of patient nurturing.
However, especially for new organizations, culture may more easily be shaped through
intentional design (instrumental view) when fundamental values and perceptions by default
are in the making. This compares to established organizations where culture has emerged and
solidified over time. And even for newer organizations, it may prove difficult to move beyond
superficial expressions of culture (value statements, e.g.) and actively design cultural layers
that affect – subconscious – behavior. (Wadel 2021)
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Turning to organizational knowledge that has a cultural element in the norms and practices
that govern knowledge behavior. This cultural element is closely linked to work processes
and activities that create and leverage knowledge and the infrastructure that captures, shares,
and helps apply it across the organization. (De Long 1997) These – more structural –
organizational traits may be easer to design purposefully than knowledge culture itself.
While still emerging, a growing body of literature has dealt with knowledge in startups
(Centobelli, Cerchione et al. 2017). Yet, this has been through the lens of knowledge
management* which encompasses systems, processes, and activities – and not culture per se.
Because of the resource scarcity of startups, leveraging intangible assets like knowledge and
human capital is a necessity. From this emerges the need to adopt knowledge management
systems. (Centobelli, Cerchione et al. 2017)
Sekliuckiene, Vaitkiene et al. (2018) conceptualize knowledge management along the startup
development phases. When moving from one phase to the next, processes of learning happen
repeatedly as the startup translates new problems into actions, undergoes learning-by-doing,
and get external response to decisions made. The authors argue that a startup should develop a
culture of learning and sharing knowledge from the early days to transition through the
development phases successfully.
3.3.3 Propositions
Organizational culture in general and culture related to knowledge may differ between
startups and many other organizations. Further, it may also be that an instrumental view of
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culture prevails among startups neglecting the dimensions are tacit and closer to norms and
values. This brings me to the following propositions on startup organizational culture (OC):
OC1: Startup culture is different from other businesses also with respect to knowledge.
OC2: Cultural design efforts must be a persistent effort and accompanied by changes in
other design elements to facilitate durable change.
OC3: An instrumental design effort is used to shape knowledge culture and keep ideas
flowing freely.
For instance, an ordered process around what Rommentvedt call ‘deliberation’ could ideally
involve stakeholders who have not formed their preferences, but through open communication
which is based on arguments and a common good-thinking they reach a situation of qualified
consensus. However, strategic thinking could jeopardize the notion of common good and
undermine consensus which may lead to processes of ‘negotiation’ towards a compromise or
‘voting’ for a majority decision.
The deliberation process is not a fixed recipe for real-life decisions that tend to be compound
and uncertain, but it may help to create some level of order and balance intentional and
unintentional decision-making (Rommetvedt 2021). To some extent the notion of order is
opposed to the ‘organized anarchy’ of the garbage can decision model (Cohen, March et al.
1972) where choice opportunities are chaotic and dynamic couplings of problems and
solutions.
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the decision basis. Quickly, the questions of ‘who’ is the decision maker(s) also involves a
process spanning both preparations and actual decision making. (Rommetvedt 2021)
However, startup decisions of an organizational design nature have also been studied. For
instance, Grimpe, Murmann et al. (2019) highlight the benefits of introducing middle-
management early in the life of the startup. The reason here is that founders tend to be caught
up with everyday operations preventing them from devoting themselves to the innovation
needed for a successful startup development. On the contrary, when professionalizing
management Kaehr Serra and Thiel (2019) highlight the risk of losing talent following
changes in organizational structure and behavioral norms.
York and Danes (2014) consider ways to improve decision-making in startups via a
systematic study of decisions processes. To reduce bias in a startup’s decisions, balance
between System 1 (intuition) and System 2 (reasoned and rational) decision styles is needed.
According to the authors, “[e]ntrepreneurs tend to be overly active, face time constraints,
and hence, tend to rely on intuition”, which increases the risk of bias and poor decisions.
3.4.3 Propositions
Many of the studies referred to above highlight the repeated and high-stake decision-making
in startups and the challenging conditions for doing so. These factors influence organizational
design leading to the below propositions on startup decision processes (DP):
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DP3: Decision-makers in startups are overloaded with management tasks which prevent
them from devoting enough time for innovation and development.
Team composition vary across ‘surface-level’ attributes (age, sex, race, role, reputation) and
‘deep-level’ attributes (personality, abilities, values, attitudes) (Bell, Brown et al. 2018).
In principle, heterogeneity in how teams are composed make sure that information sources
have greater variety than in homogeneous teams and - if information can be expressed openly
- more diverse teams reach better decisions (Mello and Ruckes 2006).
Often startups are rather homogeneous with respect to gender and professional backgrounds.
This may seem to be at odds with creativity and innovation ambitions, but is a natural
consequence of the social networks where new team members are recruited including friends
and old co-workers. Startup teams are formed of people who activity choose to work together
where the comfort of similarity may be more important than skillset. (Brattström 2019)
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Homogeneous teams risk having social and task-wise blind spots (Steffens, Terjesen et al.
2012), but may produce smooth operations as put by Brattström (2019): “…homogenous
teams are efficient and agile, which are important characteristics of successful startups.”
Lazar, Miron-Spektor et al. (2020) further this by calling for a balance between ‘interpersonal
attraction’ related to team homogeneity with ‘resource-seeking’ related to heterogenic
skillsets. This balance facilitates team success in both “shared understanding, aligned
aspirations, cohesion, and trust” and “processes (e.g., coordination and specialization
processes) for superior performance”.
Team in the sense applied above is mostly concerned with the founding team, however joiners
and board members “are also well-positioned to shape organizational behavior and
outcomes” (DeSantola 2019), but are less studied in the startup organizational research.
As a glue that keeps the team together, emotions around joy, passion, and energy may be
decisive for the team’s persistence especially during difficult times (Cardon, Post et al. 2017).
However, one common risk to startup team members’ wellbeing is stress connected to
extreme workloads, high degree of change, uncertainty and modest resources to ease the
stressors (Gapeyeva-Yukce, Saukkonen et al. 2022).
While change is the only constant for many startups, oftentimes roles, relationships, and
values are – nonetheless - surprisingly rigid. The startup organizational basics formed at the
very beginning stay unchanged despite that conditions do change. (Brattström 2019)
3.5.3 Propositions
Many of the above-mentioned studies express views along the line that ‘a startup is its team’;
the team is the most fundamental resource. Key discoveries from the research on the
composition of this team leads to the below propositions on startup team composition (TC):
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4 Methods
First, I show the overall study aim and design of the thesis before – secondly – turning to the
detailed methods applied.
In turn, the study is aimed at creating holistic understanding of a case startup’s organizational
development, focusing on the paint points raised of the managers of the case company
themselves (cf. the five dimensions given theoretical context in chapter 3 above).
By comparing key discoveries from the literature (cf. propositions also in chapter 3) with the
views of the case company founders, I seek to describe the startup. This is a literature-vs-case
mirror of similarities and discrepancies that builds understanding of the case organization. On
this foundation, actions can be forged aimed at shaping the startup going forward.
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Organizational design is an extensive research topic, but – for good reasons – focusing
mostly on established organizations. I explore the ‘coverage’ of organizational
literature with regards to startups specifically. How well are startups included in the
research on organizational design? This vast topic could be studied in multiple
literature reviews, but the step – while light touch - provides a search structure for
exploring the research.
For each of the five dimensions a set of propositions (in chapter 3 above) are lifted into
an interview guide (appendix B) seeking to test whether the literature findings are
‘relevant’ to the reality of the case startup. Does the research effectively describe the
reality of the case startup, and does it provide useful insight informing the design
efforts of the company?
I follow-up the interviews with an iterative dialogue with the case startup aimed a
forming ‘action’. These actions should be research-based and help the company shape
the ongoing organizational design. This third step extends beyond the thesis scope.
In my approach to the three steps, I will draw on a selection of methods. These are
summarized here and detailed in separate sections below. The applied methods comprise of:
Action research*: French and Bell (1995) describe this method as a process designed to
improve the functioning of an organization. It requires facts and data about the
organization for planning improvement actions while also generating research knowledge.
Case-study: The thesis focuses on one organization alone. Following Rendtorff (2010),
the approach is practical and serves to illustrate general tendencies observed in the
organizational literature.
Literature search: Creating the theoretical basis for analyzing the case organization across
five dimensions as reported in the chapter on theoretical perspectives (chapter 3 above).
Empirical data collection: Semi-structured interviews based on themes that reflect the
findings from the literature search.
Now, I turn to detailing each of the above methods which together form the basis for the
thesis work.
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4.3 Action research
With a dual role as student/researcher and employee of the case startup, I am one hand not a
‘neutral observer’ as my perceptions are tainted by own experiences and opinions. On the
other hand, I do know the organization from the inside and have a profound wish to turn
research finding into actions.
Hence, my approach is an instance of action research. French and Bell (1995) define this as
“…research on action with the goals of making that action more effective while
simultaneously building a body of scientific knowledge”.
The research is centered around solving problems and could involve a scientist that emerges
herself in a situation, diagnoses it, and makes recommendations that are intuitively derived. It
could as well involve the people who are to take action ensuring implementation and
recommendations that are feasible and workable. (French and Bell 1995)
Action research ideally goes through iterative cycles of planning, action, observation,
reflection, and re-planning. Such repeated learning may be used to understand and improve
practice. (Van Mierlo, Van Paassen et al. 2021)
Due to the time-wise limitation of my thesis work (February-May 2023), I only complete the
first rounds of iterative dialogue and action planning. Ongoing revision and learning will
follow after the submission of the thesis and not be documented here.
4
The section is based on Rendtorff (2010).
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By default, case studies are limited to single or low-number observations. It tones down
theoretical universality for the sake of meaningful applications with narratives, particularity,
and context. Cases are difficult to generalize from and pose an inherent risk of errors, which is
why new theory cannot be based on individual cases. Rather, cases should serve to illustrate
and nuance.
In social sciences, case studies have also been central for teaching purposes where an
organization is basis for discussions on actions options. The objective being to train students
in decision-making in the intersection between theory and reality.
Due to the real-life nature of cases, the researcher is directly part of knowledge generation and
interpretation. Through questions, experiences, and reflection the research turns plain facts
into meaningful narratives. One practical consequence of this is that a case study ought to
base itself on several sources (multiple interviewees, observations).
In its specificity and decision focus, I regard case studies as a natural fit to the action research
approach (section 4.3 above).
I carry out the search in Google Scholar using search terms (Table 2) for each of the
dimensions of organizational design. I review the first 30 hits for relevance on the level of
abstracts. Articles found relevant are shortlisted and subject to detailed scrutiny. Finally, I
review the citations of shortlisted articles.
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4.6 Semi-structured interviews5
The interviews focus on the four founders to gather information, explore the propositions, and
create a basis for action planning. Later, the interviewees will review actions. This implies
that they will influence the action research as active participants who subsequently will
implement the actions in real life.
Semi-structured interview use pre-defined topics, but allow for flexible explorations of
themes that emerge doing the session. Here, the structure is given in the interview guide
(Appendix B).
Interviews aim to gather personal views and interpretations of how things are constituted from
interviewees with relevant knowledge. It must be acknowledged that humans create meaning
and the interview data represent individual impressions of reality only. On a similar note, the
interviewers own perceptions are continuously being activated which calls for self-reflections
and critical views on ideas. To address this, I apply propositions (section 3) based on
literature findings and use the interviews to test them. This dynamic helps to challenge
perceptions of both interviewer and interviewees.
Semi-structured interviews can span probing interviews targeted at collecting data on topics
where little is known and all the way to in-depth interviews investigating narrower themes.
The thesis interviews are at the middle of this span with some depth, but also – at the expense
of detail - covering several organizational design dimensions at once. When pieced together,
the four interviews on the same case are, irrespectively, a source of empirical depth.
I carry out and transcribe the interviews in Norwegian and translate the quotes that are
presented in the thesis into English.
5
The section is based on Kristensen (2010)
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4.6.1 Informant selection
Organizational design shapes an organization and drives it towards its goals (cf. 1.3 above).
This implies a causality where designers of the organization can impact its outcomes.
Selecting the four founders of the case startup as interviewees builds on an assumption that
they are the organizational designers. In other words: Their views are the best representations
of the current organizational design, but also its roots and future trajectory.
Staff or other stakeholders could bring valuable information on the current situation. I choose
not to regard them as designers, but more as members or outside influencers with a less
instrumental importance. I do not carry out additional interviews with these groups.
While the case business carries similarities with other startups it has not been selected to be
representative. In line with the action research ambition (section 4.3 above), my study is
practically oriented and seeks to generate suggestions for design actions of the case startup.
And not the other way around: use the case to advance academic understanding of the field.
4.6.2 Ethics
As part of the interview introduction, recording of the interview and anonymity was presented
to the interviewees and the sensitivity of information discussed.
While neither I nor the interviewees regard the topics and the information shared to be of
sensitive nature, I opt not to disclose the company name and keep the informants anonymous.
This is done as an extra precaution and similarly both recordings and transcripts are kept on
password protected online storage where only I have access.
5 Analysis
In the analysis, I compare the propositions drawn from literature with the views held by the
interviewees on the organizational design of the case company. The analytical aim is to test
the relevance of the literature findings in the specific case. The chapter is divided into the five
dimensions of organizational design which were theoretically described above (cf. chapter 3).
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5.1 Physical structure
The interviews largely support the literature on startup organizational design regarding the
importance of and challenges related to the physical dimensions of the company.
The physical structure stimulates a way of working and underscores a tight social work
environment (PS1)
Spun out of the environment around the oil and gas sector in the Norwegian city of Bergen,
the case company was born local both in terms of founders, employees, clients, and investors.
It soon, however, extended its connections to other regions of the country – especially the
capital city of Oslo - and internationally. The spread has been driven by a mix of new staff,
projects, clients, and investors.
The founders – especially those in charge of technology and products – found great
importance in physical proximity. They created the company in a close physical environment
and saw no way around it when solving creative challenges as expressed by founder 2 (F2):
“The tech team needs to stick together. Also physically, to ensure good product development”
and expanded by founder 4 (F4): “Having a close professional environment – just shouting
across the table – is so much more efficient than being in different places”.
Even with the prospect of growing the developer team, their preference was to maintain the
structure as is with the team sitting together: “We mostly feel like building on the tech team
here in Bergen…Knowledge, technology, and innovation is right here” (F1).
The physical location was clearly on the mind of the founders, who articulated a desire to
protect and fight for the tight work environment that – in their eyes – had brought the
company to its current stage. On the question on whether the company could have made it this
far if the four founders had been in different locations, the answer was a clear: “No. I have no
doubt” (F1).
A growing organization and distributed work pose a challenge to the organization and
its ability to cooperate and work efficiently (PS2)
Growing from a headcount of two in 2020 to 15 in May 2023 and moving towards 20 through
an ongoing recruitment round, the case startup is still small but the changes have been and
will be substantial. In 2022, a small branch opened in Oslo with one full-time and two part-
time staff and I was hired to the team out of Copenhagen.
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In the interviews, the trade-offs of this organizational change surfaced: “It is my great
headache how we build good relations, environment, and organization in Oslo”. (F1)
The founder views also included the standpoint that the company should not grow
significantly in terms of staff, but rather maintain its innovative powers and “…do things
smart to advance rapidly” (F2).
Already today, large shares of well-defined development tasks are outsourced to externals.
This extra capacity is seen as “flexibility solution” (F2) to “balance out some resource
peaks” (F1) and only for front-end pieces of the development activities with fewer
complexities and innovation demands. Also, extending business reach through “good
partnerships” (F3) has served as a useful model already, and using other corporations’
platforms and sales networks could be a way forward securing a “lean” (F3) organization.
Concentrating more on the commercial aspects of the company, F3 was open to extend the
core team to other locations close to clients. He focused more on personality and ways-of-
working rather than location: “It largely depends on who you work with. With some it is
extremely easy to work remotely. With others it is much more demanding”.
Besides clients, access to talent was another factor driving the spread of the organization.
Here, the tech-focused founders emphasized the need to build small hubs in new locations:
“You need to be more than one. You need a small team” (F2) and further “It might be that
many of the bright minds we need are in Oslo, making us establish a twin environment there”
(F1).
In this, a more nuanced view of the physical structure emerges. It is not about the location
itself and the daily interactions and social ties, it is more about efficient face-to-face
communication and immediately solving complex issues around “a whiteboard….[or]…on a
run…and its very easy not to be fast when you have to call via Teams” (F1). And similarly:
“It is a must that the tech team sits together, there are so many discussions and interactions
that take place especially if you are creating something brand new” (F4).
Still, at the current development stage of the case startup, distributed work challenges remain
hypothetical: “When we are big enough and the core system is in place, it is more a question
of scaling and then you can be in different locations” (F4) and “We may still not have felt
entirely, how it is to have a very distant organization” (F3). While acknowledging the
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uncertainty of how the organization will proceed, all interviewees expressed a wish to protect
the successful core of the organization, keep it physically together, not grow for the sake of
growth but emphasize speed and efficiency instead.
Being located within an investor-led open creative lab gives a community spirit aiding
company development and innovation (PS3)
Sitting in an open creative lab among other startups, the case company has access to cheap
resources. Chief among these is low-cost rent, but also legal and financial services.
None of the interviewees mentioned a community feel, but the benefit of being close to peers
was highlighted: “It is really useful to chat with other startups – how they raise capital, hire
new staff, or choose server supplier” (F1).
Still, and in following the literature on investor-led labs, the value of being located in an open
creative lab remained transactional rather than emotional: “The main reason we are here is
the network with other companies and the networks Startuplab has and pushes us towards”
(F1). Several of the case startup’s first clients were found in the network around the lab.
The network element is also core to the lab’s self-image as expressed on www.startuplab.no:
“Our network is the core asset at StartupLab. Our team, members, alumni
and external network – consisting of engaged industry experts, serial
entrepreneurs, investors and scientists; actively share their network,
knowledge and experiences that benefit the group as a whole. We believe
this is what it takes to enable just a few people to create something great
in a short time span, that would usually require the work of hundreds.”
This, however, also means that the investor-led element is of less importance. The lab was an
initial investor in the case startup, but “…it has nothing to say. They [the lab] treat all the
companies equally” (F1) irrespective of ownership or just lab membership.
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on the US market also. This logic resonates more with the benefits of co-locations in spatial
clusters by Porter (1998).
At the time of forging the partnerships, physical proximity may not have been of obvious
importance, but in hindsight: “It could have been decisive. They know us well as they are also
located in Bergen. They met us on many occasions, which may have been a process of
maturing. It may have been the final straw” (F3).
Furthermore, the online tools have made it possible to run development projects across
continents: “…we have managed technical matters pretty well without being over there in
person” (F4).
Irrespective of this local dimension, the case startup does exemplify that spatial fragmentation
can provide access to resources through trust-based ties. Travelling to especially Oslo is of
growing importance as the company increasingly finds innovation partners and investors
there: “It does involve evermore travels. I must show up in person. It keeps you from
producing things, which is not optimal, but it is necessary” (F1).
Similarly, there is a believe that partner and client relationships require on-the-ground
presence: “…with respects to sales, a physical matchup is best…I do not believe you can
create anything in the UK from Bergen. You need to build a network” (F4). As the company
scales, spatial fragmentation will likely follow.
A thorough process around visual identity was only initiated in the company’s third year of
operation. Here, an external design company led a corporate and visual identity process
leading to new logo, graphics, tagline, homepage, etc.
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“We have worked with the new branding in over a year…it has to be insanely good” (F3) and
while visual identity has been given low importance in the company’s early stages that has
come to an end: “I doubt that any other startup in Norway of our size and stage, has put in so
much effort in branding as we have” (F3).
Visual design was not close to the hearts of all the four founders, but they and the board
supported allocating budget for the purpose without further ado. Nonetheless, it remains
without doubt that visual identity is relatively low on the to do-list: “...it is clear that if we
lacked funds, this would not have been prioritized” (F3). And even after having invested
substantially in visuals, impacts remain uncertain: “…hoping that the money are well-spent
even though we will never be able to prove it” (F4).
Timing-wise, this stage of the case company’s development is ripe for improving its visual
design: “We have the money…we have gotten sufficiently far, and the next capital round is
ahead of us. If we wait too long, it will end up being difficult to change stuff” (F4).
Investment in visual design or the lack thereof may influence startup growth projections
especially by building credibility towards investors and customers (VD2)
A statement as “I do find that branding is super important. It is one of the things that decide
whether you are successful or not” (F3) evidently supports the literature finding on the links
between visuals and startup growth. Further, the importance is underscored by external
stakeholders: “From investors we keep getting that branding is important” (F4).
However, there are some nuances to bring forward. The term branding is used by the
interviewees referring to corporate identity more broadly, rather than just visual identity
which was the context. Besides graphics and other design elements, corporate identity also
incorporates products, market positioning, company values, and strategy (Sumelius 2022).
Further, when asked about the impacts of the earlier poor visuals on the relationships with
investors or clients more nuances emerged: “We were very professional in creating our data
room [information library for potential investors]…which may have counterbalanced the fact
that we did not look too good visually” (F3) and further “It [visual design] has not surfaced
as anything super important. We have sold ourselves on delivering products fast” (F4). The
impression is that it has been possible to achieve a similar level of credibility by other means.
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Building credibility was, as pointed out in the literature, a key driver to the whole visual
identity process: “If it looks nice and well-made it creates credibility” (F4) and “Credibility
is the most important piece…we have to be taken seriously and maybe appear more solid and
more well-established than we really are” (F3).
Credibility has growing significance when the company moves beyond the reach of mouth
and into new segments and geographies: “If we no longer market ourselves through others
and have to rely on own platform under own logo…you need to appear advanced and
trustworthy” (F4) and “We can suddenly be head-to-head with actors like Google and we
need a super-strong brand” (F3).
Startup culture is different from other businesses also with respect to knowledge (OC1)
The idea that startup culture differs from other organizations resonates with the interviewees,
e.g., with respect to a very flat hierarchy: “…from one perspective, none of us are in fact
managers” (F4). However, emphasis is given to the role of innovative minds on a mission,
which also could be found in established organizations: “It is not about size at all…but you
need many innovative people” (F2).
Still, some traits are unique: “Ideas are converted much quicker here…there is a lot more
trial and error” (F4). Another area where the culture in the case startup distinguishes itself is
around the free flow of ideas: “In other organizations where I have worked before, people are
divided into separate departments, and they talk very little with someone from the other
side…you have to break such silos down to build something new” (F1).
As the organization develops, this culture may change: “When we are just a few it is very
easy as everybody needs to work with everything” (F1) and, further, “…such things are
important when you recruit…are they from a setting with a high degree of innovation” (F2).
However, increasing specialization and formalization of culture and knowledge can also be
seen as consequence of learning and improvements: “Best practice….when we have done
things in clever ways and agreed on a good process, we have to safeguard it” (F4).
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Cultural design must be a persistent effort and accompanied by changes in other design
elements to facilitate durable change (OC2) and An instrumental design effort is used to
shape knowledge culture and keep ideas flowing freely (OC3)
Keeping the knowledge flowing freely “…is actually the main focus of our company. We
have to work across disciplines to build the products we want. The geologist must talk to the
hydrologist. Technology must talk to sales” (F1). This comes down to each individual, too:
“We are in fact doing stuff we are not trained at. You must be your own teacher and
understand all the things coming at you” (F4).
To maintain the knowledge culture, the startup has initiated a meeting structure comprising of
weekly check-ins (15-30 min.), monthly knowledge sharing where staff present their own
work (30-60 min.), and quarterly deep dives (3-4 hrs.). Further to the internal structure, the
case company has undertaken an external communication effort centered around knowledge.
This involves both knowledge-based text on social media and more formal contributions to
journals. In accordance with literature, these are elements in an instrumental design effort,
which can be regarded as an emerging knowledge management system.
Between the lines, the interviewees expressed concerns that these structural efforts would
prove insufficient in keeping up a culture where knowledge flows easily: “It will be even
more important to gather everybody often enough for all of us to understand our products. It
is just something we need to focus on” (F1). The persistence of this effort remains to be seen,
making it impossible to compare it to the literature proposition on durable change.
In addition, for the interviewees, the knowledge culture ultimately resides with each and
every one: “…are you able to get the [knowledge] dynamic in the work environment right.
And that is very, very dependent on personalities” (F1). And on a similar note: “You need to
get hold of the 2% who are innovative and like change…you cannot transform people” (F2).
With this focus on individuals, a large part of the question of knowledge culture is left to a
matter of recruitment and team composition (section 5.4).
This culture translates into an amiable environment that tends to produce consensus decisions:
“It is perhaps mostly consensus. We have that culture among us. We know each other really
well and have worked together for ages.” (F3) and “We remain good friends despite
disagreeing much at times…none of us are afraid of speaking our opinion...That is what we
spend much time on at management meetings, to reach some kind of consensus” (F1).
Besides the ability to find consensus, the decision-making can also be characterized by
common-good thinking as described in the literature: “It is fairly easy. As a group, we largely
agree on the goals…If someone brings in a suggestion and it is not in conflict with the goals,
then we follow through” (F2). In all, this matches the decision process of deliberation (cf.
section 3.4.1 above).
So, on one hand: “It is always a lengthy discussion. On tech is relatively easy, but for
instance on hiring is more demanding discussions” (F1) and the other: “Our management
culture is probably more easy-going than elsewhere” (F3).
The general feeling it that the founders are good a taking qualified decisions and it is not a
tiresome process: “We have a very transparent setup – a strategic plan and activicies.
Decisions are just a matter of prioritizing activities” (F2). None of the interviewees
expressed lack of structure or consistency nor a high level of complexity or uncertainty,
which without it being stated explicitly could signal the reliance on intuitive reasoning.
However, the ease of decision-making may relate to the startup’s development stage: “Most
decisions have been fairly clear. No really tough decisions. Yet. So far, it has mainly been
small incremental decisions” (F4).
Decision-makers in startups are overloaded with management tasks which prevent them
from devoting enough time for innovation and development (DP3)
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The founders report spending ½-1 days each week on management tasks with a weekly
management team meeting as the pivotal activity. However, activities such as capital raises
and hiring can in certain periods consume much time.
Still, none of the founders feel overwhelmed with management and administrative tasks. On
the question of whether the share is reasonable they find it fair, potentially to the lower side of
what would be optimal as great priority is given to tech and clients: “I might have too little
focus on the management piece….I spend everything I have got on making the customers
satisfied and developing the products” (F1).
Nonetheless, the capacity of founders may implicitly impede growth at the current stage: “It
is the same persons who drive the technical and commercial development and who drive the
hiring process…it keeps us from seeing any rapid growth” (F4). From this perspective, the
company hires fewer people than it may have done otherwise simply because of time
constraints and the heavy investment needed to find and onboard new staff.
Still, in sum, the role split between the four founders leaves sufficient time for innovation and
development and for managing the organization. This is contrary to the literature proposition.
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The similarity also includes a shared work history from other startups, worldviews, and even
friendship: “We know each other and have been on a journey together. It works out well
between us…continue to be good friends” (F1) and “We agree on the basic philosophy. You
start out of a reason. We are united.” (F3).
However, the founders try to change the company profile especially with respect to gender:
“We are gender skewed, though trying the opposite in fact” (F1) and “It is a bit too
homogeneous. We are working on that” (F3).
Simultaneously, they also distinguish between surface-level and deep-level attributes (cf.
section 3.5.1 above) and basically regard themselves as very heterogeneous on the latter: “We
are white and male, yes, but we are also very different” (F2), “We are very diverse as
persons, our personalities, and abilities” (F3) and “I don’t see us as a homogeneous group.
When you meet us, you’ll feel we are very distinct” (F1).
Acknowledging that role requirements evolve as the business shifts, the founders appear open
to change or let go of their positions, and, thus, addressing one of the risks identified in the
literature: “I can surely move on and do other stuff. I am motivated by challenges not titles”
(F2) and “Time will show. It would be fun to learn something new. I have an appetite for
learning to be a real manager, but it is not something I must” (F1).
Protecting the innovative capabilities of the company may also require that an external
management is brought into the business: “If we continue to grow, we need someone on the
team who is a real executive manager without any technical responsibility” (F4).
Passion is defining for the team and for the organizational outcomes (TC3)
As for the other above propositions on team composition, there is also good alignment
between the literature and the interviewee perspectives with respect to the role of passion: “I
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have a burning passion for what I do…It has been a painful effort building what we have got.
Pitch black at times, but technology always has a solution” (F1).
Beyond being a fuel through difficult times, passion is also seen as a key design ambition for
the startup culture: “I am not afraid of an argument – or putting it behind me. We need an
organization that reacts on impulses. If not, we cannot be innovative” (F2) and “Most of us
on the management team are highly competitive and do whatever is needed. We try to let that
influence the culture we are building” (F1).
More specifically the discussion is divided into ‘coverage’ (section 6.1.1 below), ‘relevance’
(6.1.2), and ‘action’ (6.4). I also discuss the validity and limitations of the study (6.5).
In addition, I integrate two theoretical lenses (6.2 and 6.3) to give meaning to the observations
made. These lenses deal with the case startup in a change-endurance perspective and a
perspective of translation between early and current startup culture, respectively.
6
Number of results when ‘startup+organi*’ is entered into Google Scholar/Social Science Database, respectively.
7
Search results for ‘startup+”organizational design”’
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However, the focus of the current research is far from uniform. While not a full literature
review, my literature search on the dimensions of startup organizational design shows that
some areas are well-covered and others less so.
I speculate that some of the well-researched areas have particular interest from stakeholders in
the startup ecosystem*. This may for instance be the case of open creative labs/co-working
spaces/incubators (47,900/21,7008) where universities, governments, investors, or large
companies initiate a space for early-stage startups. The initiators may be motivated by
stimulating economic activity, innovation, or investment opportunities and request for
research-based insights as part of the process which drives up the publication figures.
On the other hand, some topics remain understudied. Relevant to the scope of this thesis are
the dimensions of visual identity (2,400/44010), and physical structure (5,400/45011).
DeSantola and Gulati (2017) also highlights the “…paucity of…work that has examined
cultural processes…” and “…much remains unknown about the employees who comprise the
organization’s lower levels” as examples of understudied dimensions of startup design.
The scientific literature may, thus, not cover all dimensions of startup organizational design
equally well, but in combination with a high number of books, articles, blogs, etc. there is lots
of information out there which can help one understand and shape the development of
startups. Bringing in research-based knowledge can be particularly important for startups as
they constantly are put in front of new challenges – also organizational – and startup
managers often do not have preexisting experience from similar issues (see also 6.4 below).
8
Search results for ‘startup+incubator’
9
Search results for ‘startup+"management team"’
10
Search results for ‘startup+"visual identity"’
11
Search results for ‘startup+"physical structure"’ of which many relate to structural topics within physics and not organizations.
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6.1.2 Relevance: Does the research effectively describe the reality of the
case startup, and does it provide useful insight informing the
design efforts of the company?
Overall, the propositions that I draw from the literature fit well with the design of the case
startup as expressed by the founders and presented in the analysis above (cf. chapter 5).
I recognize that this is in part the result of confirmation bias. As an employee, I have built my
own interpretations and views, which to a smaller or greater extent have influenced my
reading of the literature. This does not undermine the alignment of literature and case on
specific aspects. However, had I selected other design dimensions and identified different
propositions, the ability of the literature to describe the case may have been weaker.
Physical structure: The case startup is an example of an organization with a tight social
environment where co-location is important all the while its growth and distributed work
pose a challenge to the current ways of working. Being in an open creative lab is seen as
advantageous; not because of a community feel as much as due to the access to resources,
network, and peer experiences. Although time consuming, frequent travel is found to be an
effective means to build ties to partners and clients across geography.
Visual design: During the first years of the case startup, the visual identity was given little
attention. Now, the startup has upped its visual game significantly and finds it of great
importance in building credibility towards stakeholders. This is a clear example of the
impact of time when studying these new ventures. If I had looked at the same topic for the
same case company six months earlier, the observations would have been entirely
different. My study is a snapshot, but so are lots of the studies found in literature. For
many aspects of startup organizational development, longitudinal studies would give
valuable knowledge, but it remains only sparsely used in the research (DeSantola 2019).
Team composition: Based on formal traits such as education and professional experience
as well as gender and ethnicity, the founder team is very homogeneous. The founders
claim that homogeneity positively influences their ability to successfully create a business
and drive it forward. Simultaneously, the founders see themselves as a very heterogenic
group when looking at skills and personality, which they also find closely related to the
startup’s development till now. In addition, the roles of each founder had largely remained
the same over the first years. Balances and responsibilities have changed slightly, and they
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do appear to be open to shifts in roles going forward. This fluidity in roles may be
important for the ability of the business to adapt to new internal and external challenges,
which the original setup may not be suitable for. Finally, passion – interpreted by the
interviewees as both friendship between them and as a competitive drive to solve
challenges and make the company a success – has been characteristic for the organization;
not the least when times have been tough.
On other dimensions, the alignment was mixed. Here, some propositions are relevant in
describing the startup’s design, whereas others are off to a greater or lesser degree:
Organizational culture: The case company does exemplify a unique startup culture that is
not found in established organizations. However, according to two interviewees (F2, F4)
the case culture shares traits with any team on an innovation mission which is not limited
to startups. The founder team puts significant emphasis on the importance of a strong
knowledge and learning culture. They work with instruments (hiring and knowledge
sharing activities) in seeking to shape the culture and keep ideas flowing freely. Still, a
more holistic approach focusing on relations, norms, and ways-of-working in combination
with addressing the topic as a question of change management, may well be needed in
order to facilitate a durable culture with respect to knowledge (see also 6.3 and 6.4 below).
Decision process: The management team is clearly characterized by trust and its consensus
decisions are made based on common-good thinking. The founders convey the impression
that they are satisfied with their ability to make decisions, but from the interviews it remain
unclear how ordered and rational vs intuitive the processes are. I would have to dig deeper
and potentially observe decision processes to get a full picture. Nonetheless, as the
complexity of the business increases the decision-making ability becomes more and more
important. None of the founders feel overloaded with management and administrative
tasks. Contrary to the proposition drawn from literature, they found themselves able to
devote sufficient time to innovation, development, and clients. This could follow from the
fact that the case startup has a management team of four which spreads out the load
especially when compared to a total headcount of only 15.
Many of the identified studies in the literature do not prescribe how a startup should organize
itself but focus more on describing organizational patterns. This implies that the academic
literature does not directly provide plentiful inspiration that can shape the design of the case
company (inform action), but it does give perspectives that can help understand the startup’s
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situation. Based on this improved understanding, I seek to establish suggestions for actions
that the management team can implement (cf. 6.4 below).
The authors refer to research that describes how startups have a “…surprising heterogeneity
in the organizational design” owning among other things to the logics founders bring in early
on: What is put in place first may endure and affect development. However, a startup is also
likely to change away from for instance being a fluid organization and into a more specialized
one with larger administration and management as the complexity of tasks grows.
As a way to integrate endurance and change, DeSantola and Gulati (2017) describe how the
two perspectives can exist in parallel. One suggested form of integration assumes variation by
organizational feature: “…some aspects of the internal organization endure and some aspects
change during growth.”
I believe that the case I study in this thesis could represent an additional perspective to this
concept of feature variation. While the four founders represent different aspects of the
organization with some being more focused on tech and others more on commerce, they also
look differently on the organization with respect to change-endurance.
An example of this relates to the physical structure of the organization in a future with greater
headcount. Parts of the founder team obviously prefer to build the existing HQ team rather
than spread the organization across locations – especially with regards to technology
development (Panel A in Figure 2). This also means that the original structure and interaction
would have better chances to ‘endure’ growth.
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Other parts of the founder team emphasize the need to be close to clients for the sake of sales
and relationships but also technology co-development and support (Panel B). This view points
out that - as the organization grows - it sees itself in a more complex stakeholder landscape
and needs to ‘change’ its organization in response.
Figure 2: Illustration of parallel change (panel A) and endurance (panel B) perspectives in the founder team on
the topic of future physical structure – candles depict hypothetical company presence (source: own illustration)
According to Røvik (2007), the successful translator must able to first decontextualize the
design idea from the original organizational setting (sender) and then recontextualize the idea
to the receiving organization (receiver).
The lens of translation sheds light on the case startup’s ambitions of a learning culture. The
founder team wishes to maintain the ability to innovate through learning as in the early days
of the company when the team was only made up of the founders (cf. endurance as discussed
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above). In their communication to staff, direct reference to outside ideas have been made e.g.
on learning styles (Kolb 1984) and high performance organizational culture (UoR 2021).
The managers’ translation spans the early founder culture (sender: 2020-2021; Figure 3) to
the current mixed founder-employee culture (receiver: 2022-). In their decontextualization,
they emphasize the individual drive for learning as well as ownership of problems and
solutions as in the company’s first years. This is an effective story close to the purpose and
direction of the startup and substantiated by reference to research and best practice.
In the process of recontextualization into today’s organization, the founders express the
challenges of finding the right individuals and nurturing their approach to learning and tasks.
In fact, this concern was the main reason why the topic of team composition was added to the
scope of this thesis.
Further, the management team has put in place activities to ensure the implementation of the
idea (i.e., the learning culture from the young organization). These activities involve weekly,
monthly, and annual meetings where knowledge is shared.
It remains to be seen
whether the translation will
be successful, and if the
culture will persist.
fundamental parts of a
coherent recontextualization:
Including relations and motivation in the effort to translate and implement a learning culture
may increase the chances of success. As the headcount grows, it will only become more
important that the organization as a whole is designed to deliver on its objectives without the
involvement of a founder in each and every activity.
In many ways, the thesis could have benefited from leaving out the action research
perspective. The document at hand would have been clearer and more concise, potentially.
However, as an employee and student/researcher it has been a major share of my motivation
and approach to the work.
The clearest example of iteration - and of including the people who are to act into the research
- is the design dimension of team composition. This dimension was added to the scope based
on the first conversations around the thesis as it was high on the agenda of the founders.
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As a company that strives to build a strong learning and knowledge culture, I find it natural to
make learning around organizational topics a core component just as learning around
technology topics already is. This thesis is a part of that ambition – my findings are to be
presented and actions formed followed by re-iterative reflection and new action planning.
Hopefully becoming part of company DNA going forward.
Based on the above analysis and discussion, my suggestions for actions are two-fold:
1. Translating the early founder culture of learning and responsibility into today’s
organization should be extended to include additional elements:
a. Regarding it as a topic of change management (see also section 6.3 above)
b. Initiating way-of-working activities that address learning culture norms and
relationships between members of the organization, examples could be structured
peer training, learning considerations as part of staffing new projects, seeking
feedback from colleagues and clients, or using quality assurance as a lever.
I focus on these two areas of action because I find that the topics were given importance by
the founders (learning culture), but also that the literature may serve to enlighten some blind
spots which could grow in importance in the near term (both learning culture and decision
processes).
The thesis focusses on describing the development of a case organization and turning that
description into informed actions. Exploring the literature across multiple topics and
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contrasting it with four interviews – the full management team - gives a representative image
of the organization and its design. The applied theoretical lenses help give meaning to the
observations and piece together a useful description of the case organization.
This follows the understanding of study validity by Jacobsen (2005, pp19-20), where
collected data must be relevant to analyze the stated problem and that what is sought to be
measured, actually gets measured. Collecting data through interviews, furthermore, ensures
that informants are free to express their views on the problems being studied which increases
the validity of the approach (Jacobsen 2005, p129).
However valid, the data gathered from the interviews may have limited reliability. While they
are candid expressions of how the interviewees perceive the organization, they are also
snapshots on topics that are somehow unfamiliar to the informants.
The founders are of course very familiar with the startup and the design decisions made, but
they are also unexperienced organization builders that are not used to thinking along the lines
represented in the thesis.
Triangulation with observed practices, for instance in job interviews when hiring new staff or
on management meetings when the decision-making process unfolds, would significantly
improve the quality of the study. Similarly, adding an additional researcher to be part of the
thesis work would counteract biases related to my double role as employee and
student/researcher.
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7 Conclusion
How do you design a startup organization? As a minimum, it requires that you understand the
building blocks of the organization and its environment and can make well-informed and
well-reflected decisions on how to shape its development.
This thesis demonstrates that the research literature on startup organizational design offers
rich knowledge and good ‘coverage’ of startups, which will help any practitioner understand
challenges and make research-based decisions.
By comparing the case startup with key discoveries from the literature it is possible to
describe large parts of the startup’s organizational design. The literature ‘relevance’ for the
case is especially good for the design dimensions of physical structure, visual design, and
team composition. With respect to the design dimensions of organizational culture and
decision process the ability of the literature to describe the case organization is more mixed.
Further light is shed on the case startup through two theoretical lenses, namely change-
endurance and translation. These concepts provide meaningful perspectives on a central
challenge for the founders of the case startup: How to preserve the cultural core of the
company from the early days while adapting it to the current and future organization which is
larger, more diverse, and physically spread.
Even in a hectic startup everyday with large uncertainty and inexperience with organizational
design – and potentially even more so because of this – the thesis seeks to show that it is a
worthwhile investment exploring the challenges at hand and informing them with qualified
outside knowledge. The thesis suggests ‘actions’ within knowledge culture and decisions
processes that may help shape the development of the case startup.
Personally, I conclude the thesis with insights into the holistic design effort that my
workplace undergoes. While still small, the case startup has over the last year doubled staff
numbers and grown from sitting in one to sitting in multiple locations. Such fundamental
changes impact how employees and managers interact in so many ways. And while the
changes feel fuzzy, they are the result of a deliberate order and are formed by management
decisions (or the lack of).
I have an appetite for advancing the action research element of the thesis and feel equipped to
draw in research literature to best inform this continued exercise.
Page 40 of 47
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Appendix
A. Definitions of key terms and concepts
Action research Action research is a research method that aims to simultaneously investigate and solve an issue.
Brand A brand is an intangible concept that helps people identify a company (or product or individual). It can
be thought of as the personality of the company which is communicated with marketing tools such as
visual design.
Corporate identity A holistic term that describes how a company is viewed by stakeholders. Visual identify is an element
of corporate identity, but is also includes culture, strategy, values, products, and services.
Knowledge Combination of information and human context that enhances the capacity for action. It has multiple
levels (individual, group, or organizational level) and characteristics (explicit or tacit, or structured and
unstructured)
Knowledge Knowledge management is a process of identifying, organizing, storing, and disseminating information
management within an organization. It can be supported by knowledge management tools (databases, forums,
portals).
Organizational Culture may be defined as a common core referring to a shared frame of reference, including, among
culture other elements, beliefs, values, and norms, expressed in symbols and artifacts, through which
organizational members make sense of their world and by which their action is guided.
Organizational Planned shaping of formal organizations with a view to reach objectives. Organizations apply design in
design attempts to create a deliberate order related to culture, market offering, systems and processes, visual
brand, etc
Preferences The decision-maker has to a varying degree preferences to certain characteristics of an alternative
potentially enabling her to rank this alternative over another.
Startup Organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model
Startup ecosystem Universities, governments, investors, companies and other that provide resources, influence the
development of, but also buy the services and products of the startup
Team Two or more individuals who socially interact and are brought together to perform tasks and work
towards common goal(s) while having interdependence with respect to workflows, but also different
roles and responsibilities
Visual identity Visual identity is a company’s look and feel being a combination of company name, logo, typography,
color(s), etc. Visual identity is a prominent and recognizable part of a corporate identity and a touch
point for exchanges in the marketplace.
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B. Interview guide
Intro
1. Where do you see the company in two years? (size, location, ownership, products etc)
Physical structure
2. What are the benefits and challenges of having staff in multiple locations?
PS4 Being spatially fragmented provides better access to trust-based, relational ties to resources
Visual design
5. What has been the approach to logo, graphics, etc. till now?
VD1 Visual design is given low importance in early-stage .startups.
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Knowledge culture
7. Does culture differ in a startup compared to an established organization? Does this apply
specifically to knowledge?
OC1 Startup culture is different from other businesses also with respect to knowledge
8. How can knowledge affect the company’s development – and what can be done to
enhance these effects?
OC2 Cultural design efforts must be a persistent effort and accompanied by changes in other design elements to
facilitate durable change
OC3 An instrumental design effort is used to shape knowledge culture and keep ideas flowing freely.
Decision processes
10. How much time (%) do you spend on administration and similar tasks which are not
innovation, development, or commercial activities? Is that a fair share?
DP3 Decision-makers in startups are overloaded with management tasks which prevent them from devoting enough time
for innovation and development.
Team composition
11. Do you consider the team homogeneous, and how has this impacted development of the
company?
TC1 Homogeneity in team composition is common to startups and does influence development.
12. How has the role split in the founder group changed over time?
TC 2 Role and responsibilities stay largely unchanged.
13. How do you see passion or other positive emotions play out in the company?
TC 3 Passion is defining for the team and for the organizational outcomes.
Closing
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