Family Law Case Briefs

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, (1977)

Procedural History: Plaintiff was found in violation of her city’s housing ordinance for
occupying one of her grandsons, illegally. Plaintiff never removed the grandson and was
criminally charged. Plaintiff tried to dismiss the charges by arguing that her Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause was being violated but failed. Plaintiff was jailed and fined.
Plaintiff appealed the case to the Ohio Court of Appeals with the same argument and they
confirmed the trial court’s conviction. Plaintiff appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which
denied hearing Moore’s appeal causing the plaintiff to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Defendant argued that like in Belle Terre case, they have the authority to impose limits on the
residents of the single-family dwellings because they want to limit/minimize traffic, congestion,
and noise.

Facts: Defendant has a housing ordinance that limits the occupants of a single-family dwelling.
The ordinance also defines “family”, but because the plaintiff lives in the home with her son
Dale Sr., Dale’s son Dale Jr, and plaintiff’s other grandson by another one of her children John
Moore Jr., she doesn’t fit the definition of family.

Issue: Whether the City of East Cleveland’s housing ordinance that limited occupants of a
single-family dwelling violated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because Moore
housed one of her grandsons in the dwelling?

Holding: The Court held that because the freedom of personal choice matters in family life and
is one of the liberties protected in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the ordinance
is unconstitutional.

Rule: The Court used the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause to define extended family and
constitutionally recognized plaintiff’s grandson as a part of the family and refuted the
defendant’s argument to use Belle because the argument was for non-related individuals that live
together whereas the plaintiff’s other grandson is living with her.

Reasoning: One’s right to live as a family, whether extended or nuclear, is one's fundamental
right granted to them under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965)

Facts: Connecticut has statutes that banned the use and aid-and-abetting the use of contraception
that originated in 1879. This social policy was created to deter promiscuity and illicit premarital
and extramarital sexual relations. Plaintiff Estelle Griswold and C. Lee Buxton, M.D., were the
Executive Director and Medical Director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
challenged the law by distributing contraception to married patients, which was opened from
Nov. 1-10, 1961, when they were both arrested and charged for violating the statute.

Procedural History: They were found guilty and fined for violating the CT statute of
distributing contraceptives. The plaintiffs appealed, but all the state courts affirmed the
conviction. Plaintiffs appealed to The U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the law should allow
married patients to have the right to contraception based on their fundamental rights. Defendant’s
argument was that the statute has been in place since 1879 and that contraception is illegal.

Issue: Whether the CT Statute that banned the use and aid-and-abetting the use of contraception
violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of married persons? [Does the Constitution protect the
right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use
of contraceptives?]

Holding: The Court held that the CT statute discriminated against one’s fundamental right to
privacy within their marriage because the use and aid-and-abetting in the use of contraceptives to
deter illicit extramarital sexual behavior was narrowly tailored to achieve the result because CT
has other statutes that focus primarily on infidelity in marriages that does not invade on one’s
fundamental rights.

Rule: Under various Amendments in the Bill of Rights (1st, 3rd, 4th, and 9th), the CT statute
violated the sacred right to one’s privacy in a marriage. The various Amendments grant citizens
the protection from government interference. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech
and freedom to teach. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect against government invasions
in one’s home/life. The Ninth Amendment identifies that the first Eight Bill of Rights might not
encompass all the one’s rights and mentions that if the law infringes on one’s fundamental rights,
it is unconstitutional.

Reasoning: Marriage holds the value of being sacred and those in the union should have a “zone
of privacy”.

Dissenting: The justices did not agree with the law; however, made it clear that the Court’s issue
was not to agree or disagree with the law but to see whether the statute was in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They mentioned that changing these laws
were up to the legislative body but concluded that the government has a right to invade in one’s
privacy unless constitutionally prohibited, which was not specified in any of the Bill of Rights.
Essentially, if the law says that it’s a violation to use/aid-and-abet in the use of contraception
regardless of if you are married, then the Constitution cannot overrule that state law. However, if
two non-doctors were discussing contraception, then they would be protected by the First
Amendment.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972)

Facts: Massachusetts law specified that anyone who was not a medical doctor or pharmacist who
distributed any method of contraception is in violation; married persons can obtain contraception
to prevent pregnancy/diseases from medical doctors/pharmacists; and single persons can only
obtain contraception to prevent diseases from medical doctors/pharmacists. Defendant held a
lecture at Boston University on birth control/overpopulation where he exhibited articles on
contraception and gave a young woman vaginal foam.

Procedural History: Defendant was found guilty and convicted in a bench trial for his actions
of exhibiting and distributing contraceptives by the MA Superior Court. The defendant’s
argument was that he should have been allowed to distribute contraceptives to a single person
with the same rights as married women. The MA Supreme Judicial Court dismissed his
exhibition charge because it violated his First Amendment rights but sustained his distribution
conviction.

Issue: Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v.
Connecticut and protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Holding: The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed
to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection.

Rule: Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a state's laws must treat any
person in its jurisdiction the same way it would treat other people in similar circumstances
preventing the passing or enforcement of discriminatory laws.

Reasoning: If MA’s objective on limiting contraceptives is to protect one’s health, then it is

unconstitutional to discriminate against married versus single people. Married couples were
entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. Withholding that right to single
persons without a rational basis proved the fatal flaw.

Dissenting: Justice Burger dissents on the grounds that the question before the Court is whether
the defendant was in violation for distribution of contraceptives, which he was because he is not
a licensed personal based on MA statute that limits distribution to protect one’s health.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 2003

Facts: Texas “Homosexual Conduct” Law makes it a crime for same-sex persons to engage in
sexual activities. Harris County, Texas police officers were dispatched to a private residence in
response to a weapons disturbance where they observed plaintiff John G. Lawrence and Tyron
Garner engaging in sexual activities in the plaintiff’s home.

Procedural History: Plaintiff and Garner were arrested, charged, and convicted for violating the
Texas statute that criminalized same-sex sexual activities. Fourteenth District Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling. They appealed the charges arguing that the Texas statute violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Whether it is a crime under the Texas statute for two same-sex persons to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct in the privacy of their home, and whether the Texas statute
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? [Did the criminal convictions of
John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which
criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex
couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Did their
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests
in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?]

Holding: The Court held that same sex couples have a right engage in sexual conduct and a right
to liberty under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment without government
intrusion and overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.

Rule: Under the TX statute, same-sex persons were infringed upon their natural human right to
be sexually active. The Rule established in the Court was that the Constitution does not have a
place disenfranchising one from their natural right. The Court made it clear that the objective
was to focus on liberty and not whether they thought same-sex sexual acts were unmoral like the
TX statute does.

Reasoning: The case involved two consenting adults who should be given the privacy of their
intimate lives like any other heterosexual couple.

Dissenting: Justices dissented because they argued that the petitioners failed the rational-basis
test (did not prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate gov’t interest) and the
majority failed to apply strict scrutiny to the statute that criminalized homosexual sexual acts and
guaranteed them as fundamental rights.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1967

Facts: VA along with 15 other states banned interracial marriages between Black and white
races which started with the 1924 Racial Integrity Act. The District of Columbia does not have
an act that bans interracial marriages. Plaintiff Richard Loving (white man) traveled from VA to
DC and married his wife Mildred Jeter (Black woman). The two traveled back to their residential
state of Virginia where they were awakened by officers acting on an anonymous tip of an
interracial couple in cohabitation together, which was a violation of a VA law.

Procedural History: The plaintiff and his wife were charged with violating a VA law that
criminalized interracial marriages. The two were sentenced to one year in jail by a grand jury of
Circuit Court of Caroline County. The trial court suspended their sentence for a 25-year period if
the couple were to leave the state because the court argued that “God did not intend for races to
intermingle with one another.” The Lovings challenged the VA marital law for violating the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and were dismissed in the
Supreme Court of Appeals where the court ruled that states have the right to subject marital
regulation through the Tenth Amendment. The Lovings appealed. VA argued that the
criminalizing both races for being in violation of the law did not infringe upon the amendment
rights.

Issue: Whether the conviction of the VA law that criminalized interracial marriages violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by denying the Lovings the right to marry based on
race?

Holding: The Court held that denying the fundamental right to marry based on race deprived
VA’s citizens of liberty without due process. Because marriage is a fundamental right that every
person is given, states cannot infringe upon someone’s right to marry outside of their race, which
is discriminatory.

Rule: Under the Equal Protection Clause, which states that a state's laws must treat any person in
its jurisdiction the same way it would treat other people in similar circumstances preventing the
passing or enforcement of discriminatory laws, a state cannot discriminate upon one’s right to
marry based on race.

Reasoning: Upholding the Act of 1924 proves that the VA’s ban on interracial marriages
endorses the doctrine of white supremacy.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Zablocki v. Redhail (U.S. Supreme Court 1978)

Facts: WI has a statute that required residents who were behind on their child support must
obtain a court order granting them permission to marry in WI or any other state. To obtain
support by a court order, one must clear the back child support balance and prove that the child
will not likely “become” a public charge. WI’s defense is that it enforced those to pay their child
support makes them become responsible and eliminates welfare WI must pay. Defendant owes
$3700 in child support and was denied permission to marry.

Procedural History: Defendant was denied a marriage license and sued the district court, where
they held the WI statute unconstitutional. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: Whether the WI Statute which does not allow WI residents to marry in the state or
elsewhere if they are behind on their child support violates the right to marry?

Holding: The Court held that the WI statute is unconstitutional because it infringed upon one’s
fundamental right to marry.

Rule: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from removing
one’s right to marry because they are behind on their child support if they were not to infringe
upon a single person’s rights in the same manner.

Reasoning: Getting married and starting a family is one’s fundamental right and the WI statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it forbids those who were behind on their child
support from obtaining a marriage license when the State had other methods of obtaining child
support that did not infringe upon a fundamental right. Preventing one from marrying can
prevent one from having the financial access to satisfying their debt with two incomes compared
to one.

Dissenting: Justice Rehnquist argued that one’s ability to not pay child support and enforce
marriage as a fundamental right is offensive to the Constitution. The rational basis review for
States to legislate how families are regulated in reference to how their guardians support them
financially is constitutional.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Obergefell v. Hodges (U.S. Supreme Court 2015)

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant Obergefell met his long-term partner, John Arthur, over 20 years ago.
Arthur was diagnosed with ALS and the couple wanted to get married before Arthur died. They
flew from their residential state of OH to Baltimore, MD, where same-sex marriage was legal,
and were wed in a medical transport plane. Arthur died shortly after, and the plaintiff was denied
the right to be listed as a surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. OH is one of the states
that constitutes marriage as between a man and a woman.

Procedural History: Plaintiff sued the state officials for being in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and won in the district court but lost in the appeal because
the Appellate Court held that other states did not have to recognize same-sex marriages in other
states. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: Whether states must recognize same-sex marriage licenses for those that were filed out-
of-state?

Holding: The Court held that States cannot infringe upon same-sex couple’s right to marriage
and must allow same-sex couples to obtain a marriage license and recognize their out-of-state
marriage license.

Rule: Marriage is a fundamental right bestowed from Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Reasoning: Principles and traditions why marriage is a fundamental right 1) the right to choose
because it shapes one’s destiny, 2) two-person union is just like any other committed union, 3)
safeguard for children and families, and 4) marriage is a keystone of our social order.

Dissenting: Justices argued that states should have “state’s rights” because the Constitution does
not explicitly have an opinion on same-sex rights.
 Family Law Case Briefs

State v. Holm
Parties: State of UT (plaintiff-appellee) and Rodney Hans Holm (defendant-appellant)

Procedural History: Holm was found guilty of bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor and sentenced in UT Trial Court. Holm appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of
UT by arguing 1) he did not “purport to marry” Suzie b/c the phrase marry refers to legal matters
whereas this marriage was a religious matter, 2) his conviction infringed upon his fundamental
right to express his religion and that UT was prevented from limiting those interests, and 3)
under Lawrence his privacy should not be intruded upon by the State.

Facts: Holm was a member of the FLDS church, which allowed members to engage in
polygamous relationships/marriages. UT’s bigamy statute criminalizes those who are legally
married and claims to either marry or cohabitate with another person. Holm legally married
Suzie Stubbs in 1986. Holm then participated in two religious ceremonies, one with 32-year-old
Wendy Holm and another with 16 year-old Ruth Stubbs, who is Suzie’s sister. Suzie testified to
knowing the marriage wasn’t “a legal civil union” but believed to be married, wearing a white
“wedding dress”, and saying “I do,” to her religious ceremony vows. The two regularly engaged
in sexual intercourse, referred to each other as husband and wife, and Suzie had Holm’s second
child shortly after her 18th birthday.

Issue: Whether Holm’s conviction for bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor
violated his right to privacy within his marriage?

Holding: The US Supreme Court held that one, Holm’s conviction did not violate his right to
privacy within his marriage because the State does not and has “forever prohibited” polygamous
or plural marriages and two, Holm did “purport” to marry Suzie through their actions that were
stated in the facts.

Rule: Lawrence did rule the right to privacy for same sex couples but did not include sexual
conduct with minors. Also, the actual definition and legal definition (as it was used in the UT
bigamy law) of “marry” constituted both state-sanctioned and customary interpretations though
the marriage was not legally documented.

Reasoning: Marriages are the building blocks of society and that the laws that are passed to
support marriage must be laws that benefit society. Because society has viewed polygamous
marriages as non-beneficial to society, laws will not support the union.
 Family Law Case Briefs

Smith v. State

Parties: Smith (plaintiff-appellant) and State of TN (defendant-appellee)

Procedural History: Smith entered a guilty plea of incest and appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals of TN that because the Homosexual Privacies Act was ruled unconstitutional, her right
to privacy in an incestuous relationship was being violated which was granted to her by the TN
Constitution.

Facts: Smith established an incestuous sexual relationship when she was a minor.

Issue: Whether the appellant’s right to privacy is protected encompasses a guaranteed protected
“fundamental right” to engage in incestuous sexual activity?

Holding: The court held that the state reserves the right to enact legislation that forbids acts that
threaten or harm children or the family unit.

Rule: Under Griswold, the courts can look at society’s traditions when the Constitution does not
explicitly express one’s fundamental rights and a rational basis where the plaintiff must prove
that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate gov’t interest must be applied.

Reasoning: America has a long history of viewing incest, which is viewed as taboo because it
maintains stability by protecting younger family members from vulnerable situations that can
cause harm through exploitation.