Chapter 2 611 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 69

1tic relations. If
intensional and
)sitionally both
in terms of the 3.1 Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Worter etwas
:l to know pre- One of the recurrent problems that we observed in section 2 has to
Moreover, they do with how to characterize sentence meaning. In particular, we
relations, such have tried to focus on the reasonably clear name-bearer relation
of all this, ap- and adopt it as paradigmatic for all key semantic notions. But what
that "Pavarotti sentences denote and how one gets to such a denotation remain
arotti is French outstanding problems. Perhaps before trying exactly to identify the
y, that of mean- denotation of words (or morphemes), we should try to make some
and this latter · · progress toward a viable characterization of the semantic content of
re, this move in • sentences.
:uious ·semantic In fact, it is not even clear that the notion of denotation can be
e have leveled understo.od independently of sentence meaning. This is arguably
f the notion of a true even of the best understood referring expressions, like proper
~e have reached . · names. Consider how we could go about explaining the "meaning"
of the name Pavarotti to someone who doesn't know it. Two obvi-
;e or denotation ous possibilities would be pointing at the famous singer andgiving
m could play a a description of him. We can of course combine these two possi-
orne difficulties bilities in various ways as the circumstances require. But even if we
s; in particular, ..· use a simple ostension, or deixis (pointing), what our act expresses
~erence. We first.· is something like a complete utterance with roughly the same
tg the view that meaning as "This person is Pavarotti." So it would seem that we
In essence, we are dealing with a propositional kind of knowledge. Moreover, for
~tion to a theory the pointing to make sense, we must already be able to distinguish
Jsupposition) is and classify people from other objects. In other words, as Quine
1tions that seem (1960) argued, the perceptual stimuli from which deixis can be
~ounterintuitive · drawn are insufficient to characterize the objects that constitute the
mt of sentences · · frame of reference for our language. We can refer to something and
s. We then con~ . individuate it within a given background only by using a conceptual
1 appeals to the · system. It follows that in grasping the meaning of a word, any word,
1wever, also ap~ · forthe first time, we cannot get at it directly (whatever that may
lory of semantic involve). We never deal with labels and objects in isolation. We are
typically confronted with complex states of affairs in which objects
's constitute an stand in relations to other objects. Indeed, one can say that we ar-
cs in which the. . rive at objects via a process of abstraction that enables us to identify
we b~lieve that them as, say, causal structures, regularities across states of affairs.
:e has no use in What this suggests is that to get started, we should pursue units
loes. But we do , . more complex than name.s (or words); Language, as an information
... c6de, provides an association between two systems: what signifies
 Chapter 2 70

and what is signified. Sentences, as opposed to whole texts, appear

to be the smallest autonomous information units in a language
(with some qualification having to do with context dependency-
see below). Sentences comprise a category of well-formed struc-
tures capable of expressing thoughts that can stand on their own, of
describing whole situations. Thus, perhaps getting at sentence
meaning might be easier than getting at the meaning of other units.
What we mighttry to do is to define "S means p" precisely, where
S is a sentence. We might then be able to identify further crucial
semantic notions in terms of sentence meaning. This, in fact, is one
way of capitalizing on the famous (and controversial) dictum by
Frege that we use as title for this section: "Only in the context of a
sentence do words have meaning."
Before seeing how such a program might be pursued, we should
clear up some obvious problems. First, what are sentences? How do
we define them? For the time being, we will consider only ordinary
declarative sentences. We hope to be able to convince the reader
that the approach developed in connection with this kind of sen-
tence does extend to the other kinds. Second, it is a commonplace
observation that the content of (declarative) sentences can depend
on the situation, or context, in which they are uttered. Consider, for
example,
(16) I am tired.
What (16) can convey is going to depend partly on who the speaker
is and when the sentence is uttered. And there are, of course, many
other more complex ways in which what a sentence means de-
pends on the context (ways having to do with intersentential ana-
phora, focus, presuppositions, etc.). Trying to address fully the
issue of context dependency at this stage would complicate our task
considerably. Therefore, we adopt a simplification known as the
"fixed-context assumption." We assume that the context of use
(who the speaker is, what the time of the utterance is, etc.) is a
known quantity. Consequently, so-called indexicals such a:s I in
(16) come to have a definite reference and behave just like other
referential expressions (such as proper names). This assumption
will the_n be abandoned when we specifically address the issue of
indexicality.
Within these restrictions a conspicuous property of declarative
sentences is that they can be true or false in a given situation or
circumstance. Consider, for example, (17), and assume that its
 Chapter 2 70 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 71

e texts, appear context of utterance is known, say, September 10, 1986, in a class-
in a language room on the Cornell campus in Ithaca (as per the fixed-context
::lependency- assumption).
·formed struc- (17) The pope talked to Reagan between 3:00 and 4:00P.M. on
11 their own, of
September 9.
g at sentence
of other units. When is (17) true? Of course, even if the context is fixed, truth de-
ecisely, where pends on more: what the facts are. Sentence ( 17) is going to be true
further crucial if, in fact, the two relevant people were talking at the specified
, in fact, is one time. We may never know whether such an event actually took
.al) dictum by place. Perhaps neither of the protagonists has been seen at the des-
1e context of a ignated time. Perhaps they have been struck by amnesia concerning
the event described in (17). However, even though we may hick
ed, we should actual knowledge of facts, we know, for example, that a transatlan-
mces? How do tic phone . call could suffice for (17) to be true, but (17) would not be
only ordinary true if John Paul spent all the relevant time talking to Pavarotti. The
1ce the reader important thing to notice here is that though we might not know
.s kind of sen- what the facts are, we do know what they ought to be in order to
commonplace make the sentence true. This knowledge, we claim, is semantic
3S can depend
(and hence grammatical) in nature: it is constitutive of our knowl-
. Consider, for edge of what (17) means .
Conversely, someone who did not know what (17) means (for
example, a monolingual speaker of Russian) could not make use of
a specification of the facts to evaluate it. To judge whether (17) is
ho the speaker true, one needs not only knowledge ofthe facts; one also needs to
f course, many know what ( 17) means, to know something about the grammar of
lCe means de- the language. If we didn't know what (17) means, we would have
;entential ana- no clue as to what circumstances would mak~ (17) true.
.ress fully the Notice that we are not trying to provide effective criteria for
1licate our task checking the truth of sentences. We don't think that sem~ntics
known as the could or should aim so high. What we want to do is simpler. Are
:ontext of use there criteria to determine when it is appropriate to say that a sen-
e is, etc) is a tence is true? We think that there are. The examples illustrate them.
; such as· I in A declarative sentence like (17) describes a corner of reality, claims
just like other that a certain condition (John Paul's talking· to Reagan) obtains.
is assumption Saying "Sis true" amounts just to saying that the conditions that S
ss the issue of claims to obtain do obtain. Thus we have at least a criterion of
adequacy for the. predicate is true. It may seem a trivial one, but
of declarative consider that we don't have even that much for "S means p." The
·n situation or notion of truth, whatever_problems it may have, is a little bit clearer
sume that its than the notion of meaning.
 Chapter 2 72

Tarski (1935, 1944) has. shown that we can draw further con-
sequences from having a clear criterion of application for the truth
predicate. To give a characterization of this predicate for a whole
language, we need to have a theory that, for any S in L and any v,
gives us the following:
(18) Sis true in v if and only if (iff) p.
Here S is a structural description of a sentence of a language L, vis
a situation or a specification of the relevant facts, and p describes
the conditions that have to obtain for S to be true in v (that is, the
truth conditions for S). The reader may be worried by the fact that
we are. still relying in (18) on the notion of a situation (or circum-
stance), which gives rise to problems. We will show later, however,
that the way we use this notion in giving a truth definition is quite
unproblematic.
Sentences of the form (18) are called T-sentences. Now, if the
language contains only a finite number of sentences, then one
could simply list all the relevant T-sentences, and we could di-
rectly pair up all members of the syntactic category of sentences
with their truth conditions. But if the language contains an infinite
number of sentences, then a theory of truth must incorporate a
mechanism for generating all of the correspondingly infinite num-
ber ofT -sentences. Presumably, such a mechanism will have to be
based on the generative device that characterizes the syntax of the
language. In other words, a characterization of the truth predicate
for an infinite language must be compositional. As we shall see, to
obtain a compositional definition of truth for a sufficiently rich
language is not exactly trivial.
We should perhaps point out that we are not claiming that
meaning is completely exhausted by truth conditions. What we are
claiming is that if we ignore the conditions under which S is true,
we cannot claim to know the meaning of S. Thus, knowing the
truth conditions for S is at least necessary for knowing the meaning
of S. We cannot have the latter without the former. Suppose we did
not know whether sentence (19a) is true or false in the situation
represented in (19b).
(19) a. The door is closed.
b.
 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 73

lraw further Could we be said to know what (19a) means? We think not. But
then truth conditions must surely be a necessary component of
sentence meaning: there is no meaning without truth conditions.
In fact, various philosophers have gone beyond this and argued
that knowing the meaning of Sis jast knowing its truth conditions. 5
If that is so, one could propose the following definition:
(20) S means p =df S is true in v if and only if (iff) p.
What we have on the left hand side is quite obscure: an intensional
.relation involving an entity whose nature is unknown (p, viewed as
the meaning of S). What we have on the right hand side is a lot
11ation (or clearer: a biconditional between two sentences of our semantic
:>w later, however; metalanguage, "S is true in v" and p (viewed as a sentence
definition is quite , describing when this holds). From the perspective of definition
(20), a theory of sentence meaning (for a language L) is just a formal
device that compositionally generates all the T -sentences for L.
Perhaps before discussing this claim any further, we should see
what such a formal device would actually look like. We do so by
·.providing a phrase-structure grammar for an elementary fragment
ofEnglish and developing a Tarski-style truth definition for it.
:mst incorporate' a
lngly infinite nuin-
sm will have to ... j~2 The fragment F1
tS the syntax of the. The syntax of F1 is specified in terms of a very simple set of phrase-
the truth predicate structure rules and hardly requires any comment. The semantics of
. F1 corresponds essentially to the semantics of the propositional
calculus. Its design, however, differs from what can be found in
mos~ introductory logic textbooks, as the emphasis here is on the
not claiming that ac~U:al linguistic applications of propositional logic. The simplest
itions. What we are sentences in F1 are made up of noun-verb (N-V) or N-V-N se-
Ler which S is true, . quences. We shall call such sentences atomic. Complex sentences
Thus, knowing are obtained by conjoining, disjoining, and negating other sen-
,owing the meaning .tences. Even though the grammar of F1 is so simple, it generates
.er. Suppose we di~ ·.·ail infinite number of sentences.
lse in the situation
.· 3.2;1 Syntax of F1 In specifying the syntax of F1 , we use more or less
ha,ditional grammatical categories (S for sentences, VP for verb
>P,hrases, Vt for transitive verbs, Vi for intransitive verbs, etc.). These
· categories are adopted purely for pedagogical purposes. Discussing
syp.tactic categories and phrase structures goes beyond the limits of
the present work. As far as we can tell, any of the major current
··.theories of syntactic categories (such as X' theory, or extended
 Chapter 2 74

categorical grammars) can be adopted with the semantics that we

are going to develop.
The rules in (21) generate sentences like those in (22) and asso-
ciate with them structures like those in (23) for (22a).
(21) a. S---> N VP 6
b. S ---> S conj S
c. S---> neg S
d. VP---> VtN
e. VP---> Vi
f N ---> Pavarotti, Sophia Loren, James Bond
g. vi ---> is boring, is hungry, is cute
h. Vt ---> likes
i. conj ---> and, or
j. neg ---> it is not the case that
(22) a. Pavarotti is hungry, and it is not the case that James Bond
likes Pavarotti.
b. It is not the case that Pavarotti is hungry or Sophia Loren is
boring. ·
(Henceforth we simplify and freely use Loren and Bond for Sophia
Loren and James Bond, respectively).
(23) a.
s

s conj s
~s
1\
N VP
neg

N
~ VP

I
v.
A
vt N

Pavarotti
L I
is hungry and it is not the case that Bond likes Pavarotti
I
b. [s [s [N Pavarotti) [VP [vi is hungry)]] [conj and)
[s [neg it is not the case that) [s [N Bond) [vP [v1 likes]
[N Pavarotti]]))]
In (23a)the sy?tactic analysis of(22a) is displayed in the form of
a tree diagram (its phrase-structure marker, ,or P-marker for short).
 Chapter 2 74 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 75

antics that we In (23b) the same information is represented in the form of a

labeled bracketing. These two representations are known to be
(22) and asso- equivalent. Roughly put, each (nonterminal) tree node in (23a)
corresponds to a subscripted label in (23b), and the brackets to
which the label is subscripted represent the branches stemming
from the corresponding node. We switch between these two nota-
tions as convenience requires. To enhance readability, we also fol-
low the common practice of occasionally representing syntactic
structures incompletely, that is, showing only that part directly
relevant to the point we are trying to make.

3.2.2 Semantics for F1 As F1 generates an infinite number of sen-

tences, we can specify the truth condition associated with each
sentence only compositionally, by looking at the way it is built up
in terms of smaller units. We have to look at the semantic value of
tt James Bond such smaller units and provide an algorithm for combining them. If
p is a well-formed expression of F1 , we shall write [py for its
;ophia Loren is semantic value in circumstance v. For example, we will write
[Pavarotti] v for the semantic value of the expression Pavarotti in
circumstance v. What should [PavarottiY be? In F1 , just as in En-
and for Sophia-
glish, we will let the semantic value of Pavarotti in any circum-
stance v be the celebrated tenor in flesh and blood.
Our goal is to provide a fully explicit, that is, fully formalized,
specification of truth conditions for sentences in F1 • We will have
done this if we assign semantic values in each circumstance to all
lexical entries and give combinatorial rules that together with those
lexical values permit us to assign to each sentence S the truth value
of S in circumstance v. Thus, [SY will be the truth value of S in v.
---s We do not have to worry about what truth values are, so long as we

~
provide for distinguishing two of them. It is handy to use 1 for what
true sentences denote and 0 for what false sentences denote, but
VP
·these choices have no special significance. Thus [ S] v = 1 is just

VI
A N
shorthand for "S is true in v" or less naturally but equivalently "S
denotes 1 in v." Although it may look somewhat unfamiliar and
frightening at first, the mathematical notation is ultimately an
I
likes Pavarotti
I enormous convenience. To achieve formal explicitness without
using it would require much lengthier specifications and quite tor-
:l] tured prose, which would prove harder to understand in the long
[v1 likes] run. The combinatorial semantic rules and the semantic values for
lexical expressions will have to be chosen so that for any sentence
d in the form of S and circumstance v, whether [SY is 1 or 0 depends only on
arker for short). · the values in v of the lexical expressions occurring in S and the
 Chapter 2 76

semantic rules applied in interpreting S. What we present is just

one of several equivalent ways of carrying out this program.
A further preliminary point that should be noted is that some
terminal strings generated by the syntax of F1 are ambiguous. For
example, (22b) is associated with two distinct ·trees (or labeled
bracketings), namely,
(24) a. [s neg [s Pavarotti is hungry or Loren is boring]]
b. [s [s neg [s Pavarotti is hungry]] or Loren is boring]
These syntactic ambiguities correspond to semantic ones. (24a)
negates a certain disjunction, namely, that Pavarotti is hungry or
Loren is boring. Thus, (24a) is a way of saying that Pavarotti is not
hungry and Loren is not boring. But (24b) says that either Pavarotti
isn't hungry or Loren is boring. It follows, therefore, that if we want
to assign a unique semantic value to each sentence in any given
situation, we should interpret not terminal strings but trees (or
labeled bracketings). Thus, for any well-formed tree or labeled
bracketing~, [~r will be its semantic value in v. How can such a
semantic value be determined in general? Well, we first have to
assign a lexical value to every terminal node. Terminal nodes (or
lexical entries) are finite and can thus be listed. Then we look at the
syntactic rules of F1 • Each rewrite rule, say of the form A---+ BC,
admits as well-formed a tree of the form
A

B
A C

(or equivalently a labeled bracketing ofthe form [ABC]). We have

to specify the value of the tree whose root is A in terms of the
values of the subtrees rooted· in B and C. This means that the se-
mantic value for the terminal string dominated by A is determined
in terms of the values of the substrings dominated by B and C and
the way these substrings are put together. If we do this for every
syntactic rule in the grammar, we can interpret any tree admitted
by it. A definition of this kind (with a finite number of base clauses
and a finite number of clauses that build on the base clauses) is
called recursive.
We start off by assigning values to each. basic lexical entry. Our
Ns are all proper names, and we let them denote individuals. It is
less obvious what Vis, intransitive verbs; and Vts, transitive verbs,
should denote. Intransitive verbs, or one-place predicates, can be
 Chapter 2 76 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 77

esent is just used to say something about an individual. It is plausible, there-

~ram. fore, to associate an intransitive verb with a set of individuals in a
s that some circumstance; intuitively, this set includes those individuals of
Jiguous. For whom the verb can be truly predicated in the given circumstance.
(or labeled For example, [is boringy will bfil the set of individuals that are
boring in v. Transitive verbs can be used to say that one individual
stands in some relation to a second individual. We can associate
these expressions (two-place predicates) in a circumstance with a
ing]
set whose members are ordered pairs of individuals. Intuitively, an
ones. (24a) ordered pair is in this set in given circumstances iff the first mem-
:s hungry or ber of the pair stands in the relation designated by the verb to the
rarotti is not second member in those circumstances. For example, the love re-
1er Pavarotti lation can be thought of as the set of pairs (x, y) such that x loves y.
1t if we want We first specify the values for the members of N, Vi, and Vt. We
n any given assume familiarity with the concepts and notation of elementary set
mt trees (or theory; symbols and brief explanations appear in the appendix, but
3 or labeled readers who want a fuller discussion should consult an elementary
v can such a book on set theory (for example, Halmos (1960) or Stoll (1963)).
first have to
(25) For any situation (or circumstance) v,
.al nodes (or
re look at the
l(
Q' [PavarottiY = Pavarotti
·\)!fl.)
, ~-~)'I\ [Loren]v =Loren
'rm A--) BC, 1
[Bond] v = Bond
[is boring]v =the set of those individuals that are boring in v
(in symbols, {x: xis boring in v})
[is hungry]v = {x: xis hungry in v}
[is cuteY = {x: xis cute in v}
[likes] v = the set of ordered pairs of individuals such that
S']). We have the first likes the second in v (in symbols, { (x, y) : x likes y
terms of the in v})
: that the se-
As the semantics for F1 must be given in a (meta)language, we
; determined
choose English, enriched with some mathematics (set theory) ..
Band C and
Within this metalanguage we first stipulate that proper names are
his for every
associated with the respective individuals named by them. This
ree admitted
association does not depend on circumstances in the way in which
base clauses
the extension of a predicate like is hungry does. Thus, we assume
e clauses) is
for now that the reference of proper names is fixed once and for all
in a given language. The reader should not be misled by the fact
al entry. Our
that in ordinary natural languages there are many proper name
.viduals. It is
forms that denote more than one individual; ·for example, the
1sitive verbs,
form Jim Smith names many different men. This is a kind of lexical
:::ates, can be
 Chapter 2 78

ambiguity where the language contains a number of distinct proper

names that happen to have the same form; the distinct proper
names are pronounced and spelled the same. To keep matters sim-
ple, proper names in our fragment are not ambiguous; each form
denotes only one individual. The extension of a predicate, on the
other hand, can vary across circumstances. Such an extension in
different situations is determined by the predicate itself. The theory
thus exploits our competence as English speakers. There is nothing
circular about this, as throughout (25) on the left hand side of"="
we mention or quote the relevant words, and on the right hand side
we use them. The appearance of circularity would vanish if we
used English to give the semantics for a different object language,
say Italian.
Let us now turn to a consideration of the logical words and, or,
and it is not the case that. To understand how negation works, we
have to look at the truth conditions of sentences that contain neg-
ations. Intuitively, a sentence like "It is not the case that S" will be
true exactly when Sis false. We can represent this by means of the
following table:
(26) [SY [neg sy
(\~~'~ 1 0
\' ( / 0 1
' ;\()0 1 /

~\\\1\5 \ /A conjunction of the form "S and S'" is true just in case both S and
S' are true:
(27) [S]v [S']v [Sand S'Y
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0

In ordinary English discourse, conjunctions sometimes imply more

than the truth of both conjuncts; for example, "Bond jumped into
the waiting car, and he (Bond] chased the gangsters" suggests that
Bond's chasing the gangsters followed his jumping into the car. But
a speaker could go on and say "but not in that order" without con-
tradiction and thus such a suggestion is not part of what and itself
contribute's to truth conditions. We discuss pragmatic explanations
of such further implications in chapter 4.
For disjunction we seem to have an option. In natural language,
or sometimes seems to be interpreted exclusively (as in "Gianni
 Chapter 2 78 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 79

istinct proper was born in Rome, or he was born in Florence," where both dis-
.stinct proper 'juncts cannot be true) or inclusively (as in "Maria is very smart, or
> matters sim- she is very hardworking," which will be true even if Maria is both
1s; each form very smart and very hardworking). We might hypothesize that or is
iicate, on the ambiguous between an exclusive. and an inclusive interpretation.
extension in Note, however, that the inclusive or is more general than the ex-
lf. The theory clusive one. For any situation v, if either one of p and q is true, "p
ere is nothing orexc q" and "p orinc q'; will both be true in v. If, however, p and q
d side of "=" are both true, then "p orexc q" will be false, while "p orinc q" will be
ght hand side true. The state of affairs that we have can be illustrated by the fol-
vanish if we lowing diagram of situations:
iect language, (28)

rords and, or,

on works, we
. contain neg-
:J.at S" will be
means of the

Whenever such a circumstance arises, we can try the strategy of

assigning the more general interpretation to the relevant construc-
tion as its semantic value. The narrower interpretation would not
thereby be excluded and could then arise as the intended one by
se both Sand extrasemantic (pragmatic) means. For the time being, we will fol-
low this strategy without further justification but will try to justify
it more when we specifically discuss various pragmatic theories.
We therefore adopt the following semantics for or:
(29) [S]v [S']v [S or S']v
1 1 1
1 0 1
0 1 1
simply more
jumped into
suggests that
""' 0 0 0

Some of our readers will recognize (26), (27), and (29) as the truth
o the car. Bul tables familiar from elementary logic. We could use these truth
without con- tables directly to provide the truth conditions for complex sen-
hat and itself tences without assigning a semantic value for and, or, etc. However,
explanations it is quite easy to construct an abstract semantic value for each con-
nective that will achieve exactly the same results as the truth tables
tral language, in specifying truth values for sentences in which the connectives
.s in "Gianni occur. We can view the· connectives as functions that map truth
 Chapter 2 80

values (or ordered pairs of truth values in the case of conjunction

and disjunction) onto truth values.
A function is simply a systematic connection between specified
inputs and outputs such that for any given input there is a unique
corresponding output (see appendix for further discussion). We can
represent a function by indicating what output is associated with
each input. This is what we have done in (30) using the arrow
notation.
(30) For a:riy situation v,
[it is not the case that Y = [ 1 ----+ 0 J
0----+1
[andY= r<1, 1)----+ 11 .
(1, 0)----+ 0
(0, 1)----+ 0
(0,0)----+0

[orY = r~~:~~: ~1
(0,1)----+1.
(0, 0)----+ 0

We have chosen to regard the truth tables from elementary logic as

(truth) functions. We have then assigned these abstract objects as
the semantic values of logical words. This enables us to talk about
the meaning of conjunction: a function that maps truth values into
truth values. Notice that the value of logical words is in an inter-
esting way language-independent. Of course, the conjunction
operation expressed by English and will be expressed by other
forms in other languages. Nonetheless, languages generally appear
to provide constructions whose meanings correspond to the func-
tions we have associated with and, or, and it is not the case that.
Such meanings are thus strong candidates for semantic universals.
i, We have assigned a semantic value to the basic entries. At this
,I
point we need to provide an interpretive rule corresponding to each
syntactic rule. This will guarantee the interpretability of any tree
that is admitted by such rules (and consequently of any terminal
string generated by the language).
In what follows, we use category symbols for the trees they
dominate. Thus, for example, we use A to indicate the tree domi-
nated lJy A. And we use· [A B C] to indicate a tree dominated by A,
whose immediate constituents are Band C. Thus, [[A B CJY stands
for the value of a tree whose root is A such that B and C are A's
 Chapter 2 80 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 81

)f conjunction daughters. Furthermore, if g is a function and u a possible argument

for g, g(u) will indicate the result of applying g to u. The symb~l E
veen specified indicates set membership and is to be read "is an element of" or
're is a unique "belongs to." We follow standard practice in abbreviating if and
3sion). We can only if as iff The letters of the f011mulas in (31) indicate the corre-
;sociated with spondence with the syntactic rules in (21).
ing the arrow (31) a. [[s. N VPJY = 1 iff [NY E [VP]v and 0 otherwise
b. [[s sl conj SzJY = [conj]v( ([SlY,[SzY>)
c. [[s neg SJY = [negY([SY)
d. [[VP v, NJY = {x: (x, [NY> E [v,y}
e-j. If A is a category and a is a lexical entry or a lexical
category and~= [A a], then [~]v = [a]v

3.2.3 Some illustrations To see how this works, let us interpret the
sentence given in (22a). To facilitate this task, let us index every
node in the relevant tree:
(32)
1 s
mtary logic as
·act objects as
2 s 3 conj 4S

~s
1\
; to talk about
th values into 8

~
is in an inter-
conjunction
;sed by other 5N 6 VP 10 N 11 VP
terally appear
:l to the func- I A
L
12 V, 13 N
the case that.
ic universals.
1tries. At this Pavarotti is hungry
I
and it is not the case that Bond likes Pavarotti
I
nding to each Our interpretive procedure works bottom up. Here is a step by step
ty of any tree derivation of the truth conditions associated with (22a):
any terminal
(33) [5]v = Pavarotti, by (31e)
1e trees they [9]v = {x: xis hungry in v}, by (31e)
he tree domi- [6]v = {x: xis hungry in v}, by (31e)
ninated by A, [2]v = 1 iffPavarotti E {x: xis hungry.in v}, by (31a)
B C)] v stands [13Y = Pavarotti, by (31e)
md C are A's [1zr = { (x, y): x likes yin v}, by (31e)
 Chapter 2 82

[11Y {x: (x, [13]v) E [12]v}

c=
= {x: (x, Pavarotti) E { (x, y): x likes yin v}
= {x: x likes Pavarotti in v}, by (31d)
[1oy =Bond, by (16e)
[BY= 1 iff BondE {x: x likes Pavarotti in v}, by (31a) Exercise 2
[7Y = [1----; OJ, by (31e) and (30)
0----;1
[4Y = [1----; OJ ([BY), by (31c)
0----;1
[3Y = [(1, 1)----; 1], by (31e) and (30)
(1, 0)----; 0
(0, 1)----; 0
(0,0)----; 0
[1r = [<1, 1>----; 1] ( <[zr, [4r>), by (31b)
(1, 0)----; 0
(0, 1)----; 0
(0, 0)----; 0
Now suppose we are in a situation where Pavarotti is indeed
hungry and Bond does not like him. Call such a situation v'. We
thus have that Bond rj: {x: x likes Pavarotti in v'}. Therefore,
[B]v' = 0, by (31a). So [4Y' = 1, by (31c). Furthermore, Pavarotti E
{x: x is hungry in v'}. Therefore, [zy' = 1, by (31a). Thus,.
[l]v' = 1, since [andY'((l, 1)) = 1, by (30).
Suppose instead that we have a different situation, call it v 11,
where Pavarotti is hungry and Bond does like him. Then it is ea~y
to see that by performing the relevant computations, we get that
[4Y" = 0 and thus that [1Y" = 0. . .
This simple example shows how a Tarski-style truth definiti~n
provides a procedure that can associate the right truth conditiolls
with the infinitely many sentences of F1 with only a finite uutLou.u•c
ery. The truth conditions for a sentence S determine how,
particular facts, one can determine whether S is true or false as
function of the simpler expressions occurring in it. This is just
the procedure exemplified above does. For example, we have ..
how sentence (22a) comes out with different truth values ill
two different situations we have described. To illustrate
consider (22b) on the analysis given in (24a) and let v"' be a.
ation where Pavarotti is not hungry and Loren is boring. ·.
. vm·
is, let us assume that we have [Pavarotti is hungry] = 0
[Loren is boringy/11 = 1. Then, [[s Pavarotti :l.s hungry or
111
is boring]y'"=l, since [orY ((0,1))=1, by (30). And
 Chapter 2 82 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 83

quently, [(24a)y'" = 0, since [noty'" (1) = 0. Thus, sentence (22b)

yin v} on the analysis in (24a) is false in v 111 according to our procedure.

~'by (31a) Exercise 2 Compute the truth value of sentence (22b) on the analyses in (24a)
and (24b), repeated below, in the following three situations.
(22) b. It is not the case that Pavarotti is hungry or Loren is boring.
( 24) a. [ s neg [ s Pavarotti is hungry or Loren is boring]] '•J' ••
b. [ s[ s neg [ s Pavarotti is hungry]] or Loren is boring] : ' ,..
. )·
\"
Situation 1. Pavarotti is hungry; Loren is boring.
Situation 2. Pavarotti is not hungry; Loren is not boring.
Situation 3. Pavarotti is hungry; Loren is not boring.

One of our basic semantic capacities is that of matching sen-

tences with situations. For example, we can intuitively see, perhaps
after a bit of reflection, that sentence (22b) on anq.lysis (24a) is in-
varotti is indeed
deed false in a situation where Pavarotti is hungry, which corre-
situation v'. We
sponds to the results of our interpretive procedure. This shows how
1 v'}. Therefore,
our procedure can be regarded as an abstract representation of our
more, Pavarotti E
capacity of pairing sentences with the situations that they describe
by (31a). Thus,
and also how the theory makes empirically testable claims (since
the pairing of sentences with the truth conditions generated by the
tation, call it v",
theory can clash or agree with our intuitions).
n. Then it is easy
ions, we get that In fact, one way of understanding the notion of sentence content
that we are characterizing is the following. Sentence content can
3 truth definition be regarded as a relation between sentences and situations, or cir-
cumstances. Our notation [SY = 1 (or 0) can be interpreted as say-
truth conditions
ing that S correctly characterizes or describes (or does not correctly
fa finite machin-
describe) situation v. The meaning of sentences of a language Lis
mine how, given
adequately characterized by such a relation if the speakers of L be-
true or false as a
have as if they knew the value of [S] v as a function of the values
. This is just what
assigned in v to the lexical items in S for any situation or set of
>le, we have seen
circumstances v and any sentence S. To borrow a metaphor from
tth values in the
cognitive psychology, imported into the semantic literature by
illustrate further,
Barwise and Perry (1983), speakers of L are "at.tuned" to a certain
let v"' be a situ-
relation between sentences and circumstances. This is one way of
. is boring. That
mgry rill= 0 and
understanding what our theory is doing.
There is a further crucial thing that our theory can do: it can
hungry or Loren
provide us with a formal definition of entailment. Here it is:
30). And conse-
 Chapter 2 84

(34) S entails S' (relative to analyses ~sand ~S', respectively) iff

for every situation v, if [~sr = 1, then [~s~r = 1.
This is just a first approximation. Ultimately, we will want to re-
gard entailment as a relation between utterances (that is, sentences
in context), where the context crucially fills in certain aspects of
meanirig. Here the only feature of context that we are considering is
that it must specify a syntactic analysis for ambiguous terminal
strings (by means of prosodic clues, for example). In what follows,
we sometimes talk of entailment as a relation between sentences,
even if phrase markers (and ultimately utterances) are meant.
It should be clear that (34) is simply a way of saying that S entails
S' iff whenever S is true, S' also is; that is, it is a way of formally
spelling out our intuitive notion of entailment. This definition en-
ables us to actually prove whether a certain sentence entails an-
other one. Let us illustrate. Let us prove. that sentence (22b) on
analysis ( 24a) entails
(35) [s[s. it is not the case that Pavarotti is hungry] and [sit is not
the case that Loren is boring]]
To show this, we assume that (22b) is true on analysis (24a) and
show, using our semantic rules, that (35) must also be true. The
outermost connective in (24a) is negation. The semantics for nega-
tion, (31c), tells us that for any v if [(24a)]v = 1, as by our hypoth-
esis, then [Pavarotti is hungry or Loren is boring] v = 0. But the
semantics for or, (30), together with (31b), tells us that a disjunctive
sentence is false iff each disjunct is false. Thus we have that
[Pavarotti is hungry r = 0 and [Loren is boringy = 0. Now if this
is so, again by the semantics of negation we have that [it is not the
case that Pavarotti is hungry] v = 1 and [it is not the case that Loren
is boringr = 1. But ( 35) is just the conjunction of the latter
two sentences, and the semantics for conjunction thus yields
[(35)r = 1.
Let us show that (36a) does not entail (36b).
(36) a. [[it is not the case that Pavaiotti is hungry] or [Loren is
boring]]
b. [[Pavarotti is hungry] or [it is not the case that Loren is
boring]]
To show this we construct a situation, call it .v', such that (36aps
true in v' while (36b) is false'in it. Now, since we want it to be the
case tpat [(36b)Y' = 0, by the semantics for disjunction we must
 Chapter 2 84 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 85

ectively) iff have [Pavarotti is hungry] v' = 0 and [it is not the case that Loren is
l. boringy' = 0. By the semantics for negation this means that [Loren
is boring] v' = 1. Thus, v' is a situation where "Pavarotti is hungry"
.l want to re-
is false and "Loren is boring" is true. It is easy to see that in such a
is, sentences
situation (36a) will be true. This follows immediately from the
in aspects of
semantics for disjunction and the fact that "Loren is boring" (one of
onsidering is
the disjuncts) is true in v'. We have thus constructed a situation
ous terminal
where (36a) is true and (36b) is false, and hence the former does not
what follows,
entail the latter.
m sentences,
meant.
that S entails
y of formally
Exercise 3 @ Prove that "Pavarotti is hungry and Loren is boring" entails
"Loren is boring."
lefinition en-
e entails an-
(i) Prove that (35) entails (24a).

ace (22b) on
@ Prove that (36b) does not entail (36a).

l [ s it is not We can also define a number of other semantic notions closely

related to entailment, such as logical equivalence (what we also
called "content synonymy"), contradiction, and logical truth
;is (24a) and
(validity).
be true. The
tics for nega- (37) Sis logically equivalent to S' (relative to analyses Lls and
our hypoth- Lls') iff S entails S' (relative to ils and .1.8') and S' entails S
= 0. But the (relative toLls and Lls')·
a disjunctive (38) Sis contradicto.zy(relative to analysis As) iff there is no
re have that
situation v, such that [~sY = 1.
. Now if this
[it is not the ( 39) S is logically true (or valid) relative to analysis ils iff there is
se that Loren no situation where [ilsY = 0.
)f the latter To illustrate, let us show that the following is contradictory:
thus yields
(40) Pavarotti is boring, and it is not the case that Pavarotti is
boring.
Assume that there exists a v such that [(40)]v = 1. By the semantics
Loren is
for conjunction we have [Pavarotti is boringy = 1 and [it is not the
case that Pavarotti is boringy = 1. But the semantics for negation
Loren is
yields the result that the same sentence is assigned two distinct
truth values, which is a contradiction.
that ( 36a) is The preceding proof can be straightforwardly modified so as to
tit to be the show that the negation of (40) ("It is not the case that [Pavarotti is
.on we must boring and Pavarotti isn't boring]") is valid .
 Chapter 2 86

All these notions can be extended to relations involving not

simply sentences but sets of sentences:
(41) A set of sentences Q = {S 1 , ... , Sn} entails a sentenceS
(relative to analyses As,, ... , As" and As, respectively) iff
whenever in any situation v we have for all S' E .n, [As'r = 1,
we also have that [Asr = 1. (That is, any situation vthat
makes all of the sentences in Q true also has to make S true.)
(42) A set of sentences Q is contradictory (relative to analyses
As,' ... ' Asn) iff there is no situation v such that for all sEn,
[Asr = 1.

Exercise 4 @ Show that sentences (1) and (2) jointly entail (3).
(1) [[it is not the case that Pavarotti is hungry] or Loren is boring]
(2) Loren is notboring.
(3) Pavarotti is not hungry.
Show that (4) and (5) are contradictory.
(4) [[it is not the case that Bond is cute] and Pavarotti is boring]
(5) Bond is cute.
C. Let "v" be the standard inclusive or and "+" the exclusive
one. (And is expressed with "1\ .")If or in natural language is am-
biguous, a sentence like (6a), expressed more idiomatically in (6b),
would be ambiguous four ways; it would have the four readings
given in (7).
(6) a. John smokes or drinks, or John smokes and drinks.
b: John smokes or drinks or both.
(7) a. [smoke(j) v drink(j)] v [smoke(j) 1\ drink(j)]
b. [smoke(j) + drink(j)] v [smoke(j) 1\ drink(j)]
c. [smoke(j) + drink(j)] + [smoke(j) 1\ drink(j)]
d. [smoke(j) v drink(j)] + [smoke(j) 1\ drink(j)]
Consider now (8a) and (Bb).
(8) a. [smoke(j) v drink(j)]
b. [smoke(j) + drink(j)]
Prove that (7a-c) are all equivalent to (Ba) and that (7d)is equiva-
lent to (Bb). What does this result show about the hypothesis that
or is ambiguous between an inc~usive and an exclusive reading?
 Chapter 2 85 Denotation, Truth, and Meaning 87

volving not (From A. C. Browne, "Univocal 'Or'-Again," Linguistic Inquiry

17 (1986): 751-754.)

1Ce S
ely) iff We have shown that a theory of truth conditions enables us to
:, [As'r = 1, come up with a precise characterization of several key semantic
n vthat notions. Furthermore, such a theory enables us to derive as theo-
ake S true.) rems claims about semantic relationships (claims about what en-
malyses tails what, for example). To the extent that what the theory predicts
rallS E Q, (or yields as theorems) actually matches our intuitions, we have
confirming evidence for it. If, for example, it turned out that our
theory didn't allow us to show that "Pavarotti is hungry and Loren
is boring" entails "Pavarotti is hungry," the theory would be inad-
equate, as our intuitions clearly tell us that the .former sentence
does entail the latter. Thus, a truth-conditional theory appears to be
m is boring] a promising candidate as an approximation to a full-fledged theory
of meaning.

3.2.4 An alternative method for interpreting F1 What we have done in

specifying the semantics for F1 is to provide, for each syntactic rule
listed in (21), a corresponding semantic rule listed in (31). These-
lis boring]
mantics is defined recursively off the syntax. This is the standard
approach in treatments of formal languages and is the one adopted
the exclusive ·by Montague (1973) in his ground-breaking formal semantic treat-
nguage is am" . ment of (a fragment of) English. This rule-to-rule method of
tically in (6b), semantic interpretation offers interpretive procedures that are· spe-
cific to particular constructions.
Howev~r, if we look at our semantic rules, we see that there is a
lot of redundancy. The principle of interpretation for terminal
inks. nodes or lexical entries, the "base" for the recursion, is the same for
all basic expressions: the value they get is that assigned directly in
· situation v. And for phrasal nodes that do not branch, the intEnpre-
tation of the daughter is just passed up to the mother. Thus in a
· • . structure like (43), the value of run is passeq up all the way to the
. VP.

VP

v
I
I
run