Politics 528

The Study of Comparative Politics

Princeton University
Spring Term 2023

Thursday afternoon 1:30-4:20

Corwin 127

Professor Jennifer Widner

jwidner@princeton.edu

(Prof. Andreas Wiedemann is on leave but has contributed to the syllabus

and content of this course this term.)

Course Design and Objectives

POL528 is the second course in a two-semester sequence that surveys major topics in
comparative politics. It will help you engage with important subjects and questions in the
comparative politics subfield. The focus is on institutions and political behavior.

The overarching issue is the translation of popular preferences into policy, including both the
politics of policy choice and government performance. Representation, accountability,
coordination, and capacity are principal themes. The focus on political institutions and behavior
complements the first term’s treatment of the macro-foundations of states and regimes.

This course is designed for Ph.D. candidates in Politics and related fields. Each week we discuss
a subset of the scholarly literature, concentrating on a major theoretical controversy. We take up
methodological issues within the context of these substantive and theoretical works. The reading
selections develop a shared language and set of references that are foundational for a
professional career.

Course outline:

1. The Study and Design of State Institutions Feb 1

2. Executives & Assemblies Feb 8
3. Parties and Party Systems Feb 15
4. Comparative Political Behavior Feb 22
5. Collective Action and Social Movements Feb 29
6. Electoral Rules and Identity Politics Mar 7
7. Spatial Dimensions of Governance Mar 21
8. States, Markets, and Development Mar 28
9. Public Goods Provision, Clientelism Apr 4
10. Political Economy Apr 11
11. Inequality, Redistribution, and the Welfare State Apr 18
12. Bureaucratic Accountability Apr 25
Course requirements include three short response papers, one take-home mock general field
exam, and one short presentation, as well as active engagement in class discussions.

Participation: Please attend every class meeting, be prepared to discuss the readings, and
participate actively in class discussions. Participation counts as 35% of the final grade.

Three Response Papers: Each week, 2-3 students will take responsibility for introducing a
dimension of the subject. We will distribute a link to a google signup sheet on the first day of
class. Multiple students can write their response paper on the same week. For each week for
which you are responsible, write a 7-8 page response paper to the readings that:

 Identifies an important dispute or debate about the subject matter under consideration.
 Discusses the main strengths and weaknesses of at least two of the works that address this
matter.
 Highlights critical issues that need further development.
 Although the response paper should provide a very short overview of each author’s
argument, please use this opportunity to reflect on how the readings address important
issues, relate to one another, are flawed in particular dimensions, or can be developed or
improved in specific directions.
 At end of the response paper, you should attach a list of questions that you would like
to discuss further in class. In devising these questions, consider whether the scholarly
disputes/debates on this subject have been resolved, and what needs further analysis?
How do the readings speak to (or past) one another? What remains unclear or worthy of
further research or discussion?

For the weeks when you write a response, distribute your response to the instructor via email
by 9:00 am on the prior Tuesday. We will upload the response paper under each week’s
respective module. In class we will ask you to say a few words based on your response paper
during the discussion.

Each participant is expected to write three response papers over the course of the semester (45%
of your final grade--i.e., 15% each). We will distribute a signup sheet on the first day of class.

One Take-Home Mock General Examination. In past years, other instructors have found that
students appreciate the chance to engage with the subject in a mock general exam. We think this
exercise is a good idea. The mock exam acquaints you with the format and provides you with an
opportunity to analyze theoretical debates critically, creatively, and systematically. We will
distribute the mock exam after our Week 12 class and it will be due by 5 PM on dean’s date.
This exercise is open-book; the emphasis is on your creative synthesis of the material to address
the question posed. The exam counts for 15% of your grade.
Course Readings

Week 1 – February 1
Study and Design of State Institutions (prepare in advance of our course meeting)

 Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor (1996). “Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44: 936-957.

 Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Journal of Theoretical Politics, April 1989.

 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:
A Research Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics 2, 4 (2004), pp. 725-740.

 James Mahoney and Kathy Thelen. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency,
and Power. Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 1-37 (Introduction)

 Douglass North. 1990. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-69.

Optional
 Jacob Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State,” American
Political Science Review, 98, 2 (2004): 243-260.
Week 2 – February 8
Executives and Assemblies

 Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?”

from The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, pp. 3-48 (essay is longer, but focus on these pp. only)

 Matthew Shugart and John Carey. Presidents and Assemblies. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992. 1-4, 6-8, and 13.

 George Tsebelis. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in

Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal
of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325.

 Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, “Government Accountability in Parliamentary

Democracy,” in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds.,
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), pp. 279-96.

 José Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, “Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism,” British Journal of Political Science, 44, 3 (2014), pp. 515-544.

 Rory Truex, Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern

China. Cambridge University Press; 2016, introduction, pp. 1-14.

Optional
 José Antonio Cheibub and Svitlana Chernykh, “Are Semi-presidential Constitutions Bad
for Democratic Performance?” Constitutional Political Economy 20, 3-4 (2009), pp. 202-
229

 Timothy Colton and Cindy Skach, A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: The Russian
Predicament,” Journal of Democracy, 16, 3 (July 2005), pp. 113-126.
Week 3 – February 15
Parties and Party Systems

A gentle pre-read:
 Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro, “Misdiagnosing Democracy’s Ills,” chapter
one in Responsible Parties: Saving Democracy from Itself, Yale University Press, 2018,
pp. 1-25. (skim)

Main selections
 Carles Boix, “The Emergence of Parties and Party Systems,” in Carles Boix and Susan
Stokes, eds., Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2009), pp.499-521.

 Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller.
“A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American
Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 03 (2012): 571–97.

 Scott C. Flanagan and Russell J. Dalton, "Models of Change" in Peter Mair, ed., The
West European Party System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 232-246.

 Kitschelt, Herbert, and Philipp Rehm. “Party Alignments. Change and Continuity.” In
The Politics of Advanced Capitalism, edited by Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann,
Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 179–201. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 2015.

 Noam Lupu, “Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America.”
World Politics 66, 4 (2014), pp. 561-602.

 Winston Chou, Rafaela Dancygier, Amaney A. Jamal, “Competing for Loyalists?

How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting,” March 2021
Comparative Political Studies)

Optional
 Jonathan Rodden. 2019. Why Cities Lose. Chapters 1-3.

 Catherine E. De Vries and Sara B. Hobolt. Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of

Challenger Parties in Europe. Princeton University Press, 2020, Chapters 1 and 2.

 Grewal, Sharan, Amaney A. Jamal, Tarek Masoud, and Elizabeth R. Nugent. "Poverty
and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties." American
Journal of Political Science 63, no. 4 (2019): 859-874
Week 4 – February 22
Comparative Political Behavior

Representation

 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1967), pp. 1-13.

 Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy,

Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
pp. 1-54.

Turnout and vote choice

 Susan Stokes et. al. “Theories of Voter Participation: A Review and a New Approach,”
from Aytac and Stokes, Why Bother? Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests,
Cambridge University Press, 2019.

 Kasara, Kimuli, and Pavithra Suryanarayan. “When do the rich vote less than the poor
and why? Explaining turnout inequality across the world.” American Journal of Political
Science 59, no. 3 (2015): 613-627.

History, geography, and religion as influences

 Scott Mainwaring. 2006. “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes.” Journal of
Democracy 17 (3): 13–27.

 Gwyneth McClendon and Rachel Beatty Riedl, From Pews to Politics: Religious
Sermons and Political Participation in Africa, Cambridge University Press, 2019,
chapters 1, 2, 4 (optional—an experiment), 7 (overview).

Optional
 Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall. “Populism as a Problem of Social Integration.”
Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 7 (2020): 1–33.
Week 5 – February 29
Collective Action and Social Movements

[If you are not familiar with the collective action literature, read Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971), pp. 5-52 I assume that, for
many, Olson is familiar.]

 Pamela Oliver and Gerald Marwell, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A
Microsocial Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 1-13,
38- 57.

 Berman, Sheri. “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics
49 (April 1997), pp. 401-429.

 Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 29-42, 71-
105, 141-160. *

 Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European
Revolution of 1989,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1991), pp. 7-48. (if you have
not already read this piece, please skim for main ideas)

 Mark Beissinger, “‘Conventional’ and ‘Virtual’ Civil Societies in Autocratic

Regimes,” Comparative Politics 49, 3 (April 2017): 351-371.

 Mark Beissinger, The Revolutionary City: Urbanization and the Global

Transformation of Rebellion, selections: chapters 1 and 2, pp. 103, 149-150, skim
chapter 4, chapters 5, 6, and 7. (The reading load this week is fairly heavy in terms of
absolute pp., but the material skims fairly easily. We haven’t used the Revolutionary
City before, but it is now on the CP general examination list and it is highly relevant
to contemporary circumstances. Let’s give it a try!)

Optional

 Robert Bates, “The Impulse to Reform,” in Jennifer Widner, ed. Economic Change
and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1992.

 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China
Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American
Political Science Review 107, 2 (2013), pp. 326-343.
Week 6 – March 7
Electoral Rules and Identity Politics

 John Huber, Exclusion by Election, introduction

Ethnic politics

 Kanchan Chandra, “What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?” Annual Review of
Political Science 9 (2006), pp. 397-424.

 Daniel Posner, “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and
Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi,” American Political Science
Review 98, 4 (2004), pp. 529-545.

 Rafaela Dancygier. Dilemmas of Inclusion. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Chapters 2 and 6.

Gender politics

 Dawn Teele, Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women's Vote
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), pp. 15-47.

 Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth, “The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining
Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap,”
American Journal of Political Science 50, 1 (2006), pp. 1-19.

Optional (but highly relevant to contemporary politics)

 Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and
the Communist Collapse,” World Politics 59, 1 (2006), pp. 83–115.

Spring Break
Week 7 – March 21
Spatial Dimensions of Governance

 Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. author’s introduction, vol. 1 part 1

chapters 5-6 and last 3 sections of 8; vol. 1 part 2 chapter 6 sections 4-3; vol. 2 part 2
chapters 1-13; vol. 2 part 3 chapters 1-4, 13-14, 19. (very short excerpts)

 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown,

1964, chapters 1 and 2 (specific pp. TBA)

 Barry R. Weingast, “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving

Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 11, 1 (1995), pp. 1-31.

 Jonathan Rodden. 2006. Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal
Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-23, 250-81.

 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

2000), Chapter 8.

 Rikhil Bhavnani and Bethany Lacina, “Fiscal Federalism at Work? Central Responses to
Internal Migration in India,” World Development, 93 (2017): 236-248.
Week 8 – March 28
States, Markets, and Prosperity

 Charles E. Lindblom, “Incompetences of Authority and Market Systems” from Politics

and Markets, 1977. (useful quick read, optional)

Enabling environments and long-term legacies

 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The

Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.”
The Journal of Economic History 49, 4 (1989): 803–32. (covers some of the same
ground discussed in previous week)

 Engerman, Stanley L., et al. “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of

Development among New World Economies.” Economía, vol. 3, no. 1, 2002, pp. 41–88

 Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in
Africa,” American Economic Review, 101, 7 (December 2011): 3221-52

Developmental states

 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 5-30.

 Chalmers Johnson. “The Japanese Miracle” and “A Japanese Model?” from MITI and
the Japanese Miracle. Stanford University Press, 1982.

 Atul Kohli. State-Directed Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004,

chapters 1 and 3 (on South Korea).

Optional
 Nathan Nunn, “Shackled to the Past: The Causes and Consequences of Africa’s Slave
Trades,” chapter 5 in Jared Diamond and James Robinson, Natural Experiments of
History. Harvard University Belknap Press, 2011 (pp. 142-184).
Week 9 – April 4
Clientelism and Public Goods Provision

 Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers,
Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics, Cambridge University
Press 2013, chapter 1, pp. 92-95, chapter 4 (empirical test of theory in India,
Argentina, etc.) or chapter 8 (on why vote-buying died out in the UK and US)

 Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubin, “Parties, Brokers and Voter
Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor
Brokers,” American Political Science Review,110(1), February 2016:160-179

 Alesina, A., R. Baqir, and W. Easterly (1999) “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114(4): 1243-84.

 James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein “Why
Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” American Political Science
Review, 101(4) (2007): 709-725

 Lily Tsai. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision
in Rural China.” American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 355-372

 Volha Charnysh, “Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII

Displacement in Poland, American Political Science Review, February 2019 (online)

Optional
 Leonard Wantchekon. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Benin,” World Politics, 55, 3 (2003): 399-422.

 Prerna Singh, “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of

Indian States.” World Politics 67(3) (2015): 506-562.
Week 10 – April 11
Political Economy

 Peter A. Hall, and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001), pp. 1-68.

 Allan Drazen. The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years. NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 2000, v 15.

 Pepper D. Culpepper. Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe
and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, chapters 1 and 2.

 Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” The
American Political Science Review 100, no. 1 (2006): 69–84.

 Frieden, Jeffry A. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a

World of Global Finance.” International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 425–51.

 Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. “Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from
Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation,” American Political Science Review 106, 1
(2012): 81-102.

Optional
 Torben Iversen. “Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of
Money,” International Organization 52 (3) 1998: 469-504.
Week 11 – April 18
Inequality, Redistribution, and the Welfare State

 Gosta Esping-Anderson, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, 1999,

Chapters 1 (intro) and 5 (Comparative Welfare Regimes Re‐Examined).

 Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions:
Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others.” American Political Science
Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 165–81.

 Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.”
American Political Science Review 95, no. 4 (December 2001): 875–93.

 Shayo, Moses. “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy:

Nation, Class, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review 103, no. 02
(2009): 147–74.

 Ilyana Kuziemko, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva. “How
Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey
Experiments.” American Economic Review 105, no. 4 (April 2015): 1478–1508.

 Wiedemann, Andreas. 2021. Indebted Societies: Credit and Welfare in Rich

Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 and 5

Optional
 Ben Ansell, “The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the Welfare
State,” American Political Science Review 108, 2 (2014): 383–402.
Week 12 – April 25
Bureaucratic Accountability

Bureaucratic systems
 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) pp. 196-244.

 Agnes Cornell, Carl Hendrik Knutsen, and Jan Teorell, “Bureaucracy and Growth,”
Comparative Political Studies, 53, 14 (December 2020): 2246-82.

 Nicholas Kuipers. “Failing the Test: The Countervailing Attitudinal Effects of Civil
Service Examinations,” APSR, 2022, pp. 1-18.

Accountability to Voters
 Robin Harding and David Stasavage, “What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t) Do for
Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections,” Journal of Politics,
Volume 76, Number 1, January 2014.

Politics of Bureaucratic Discretion/Autonomy

 Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2002), chapters. 1-2, 6-7, (pp. 1-43, 139-209— We may have shortened this selection
slightly in e-reserves).

 Daniel Carpenter. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and

Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001,1-4, 14-36, 179-226, 253-257, 275-289.

A twist

 Alisha Holland, Forbearance as Redistribution, Cambridge University Press, 2017

chapters 1 (An Electoral Theory of Forbearance,” chapter 3 (What Enables Forbearance)
and chapter 7 (How Forbearance Ends)

Optional
 Keefer, Philip and David Stasavage. 2003. “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players,
Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy,” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 407-23.