NALSAR_PETITIONER[1]

17TH NALSAR- Justice B.R.
Sawney Memorial Moot
DDDDDDDDDDDDDD
th
17 NALSAR – JUSTICE B.R. SAWHNEY MOOT COURT, 2024
before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KADURU
IN THE MATTER OF
CIVIL NO. ______ OF 2024
(UNDER ART. 139 A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF

KADURU)
MS. G & Ors. .................................................................................................APPELLANT
versus
REPUBLC OF KADURU & Ors. .............................................................. RESPONDENT
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO
THE HON’BLE JUDGES IN JUDICATURE OF
SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF KADURU
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF of PETITIONER
Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 1

17TH NALSAR- Justice B.R. Sawney Memorial Moot
No table of contents entries found.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................................................................6
STATUTES...........................................................................................................................6
CASE LAWS.........................................................................................................................7
ARTICLES, BOOKS, JOURNALS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES..............................8
ONLINE SOURCES............................................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF FACTS...........................................................................................................10
ISSUES RAISED............................................................................................................................12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..................................................................................................13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.......................................................................................................16
ISSUE 1. Whether the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners (Solurans and Malurites)
challenging the Delimitation Act, 2023, and the Delimitation Order, 2023, are
maintainable before the courts?........................................................................................16
ISSUE 2. Whether the petitioners have the locus standi (legal standing) to approach
the courts to challenge the constitutionality of the Delimitation Act, 2023, and the
Delimitation Order, 2023?.................................................................................................22
ISSUE 3. Whether the Delimitation Act, 2023, violates the Constitution of Kaduru,
particularly in terms of the principles of equal representation, non-discrimination,
and proportional representation?.....................................................................................31
ISSUE 4. Whether the Delimitation Order, 2023, which implemented the

recommendations of the Delimitation Commission, is legal and in accordance with the
Constitution of Kaduru?....................................................................................................36


INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
S. NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM
1. & And
2. ¶/ Para Paragraph
3. AIR All India Reporter
4. Anr. Another
5. Assn. Association
6. DPSP Directive principles of State Policy
7. FRs Fundamental Rights
8. FT Foreigners’ tribunal
9. Govt. Government
10. HC High Court
11. Hon’ble Honourable
12. Ors. Others
13. SCC Supreme Court Cases
14. SCR Supreme Court Reporter
15. SC Supreme Court
16. Supp. Supplement
17. v. Versus
18. PIL Public Interest Litigation
19. Art. Article
20. Cl. Clause

21. Const. Constitution
22. Ed. Edition
23. http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
24. I.L.R. Indian Law Report
25. Ltd. Limited
26. Pg. Page.
27. Pvt. Private
28. r/w Read With
29. u/s Under Section
30. u/ss. Under Sections

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
S. NO. STATUTES
1. KADURU CONST. part I
2. KADURU CONST. Part II
3. KADURU CONST. Part III
4. KADURU CONST. Part IV
5. INDIAN CONST. Part IX
6. The Delimitation Act, 1952
7. The Delimitation Act, 1962
8. The Delimitation Commission Act, 2002
9. The Representation of People Act 1951
10. UP PANCHAYAT RAJ ACT
CASE LAWS
S. NO. CASE LAWS
1. Muthuraj v. The Chief Secretary

2. Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, AIR 1967 SC 669
3. Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331
4. Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P, (2019) 6 SCC 441
5. Roychan Abraham v. State of U.P, (2019) SCC OnLine All 3935.
6. Haji Abdul Gani Khan V. UOI, 2023) 11 SCC 432.
7. Anjani Kumar Srivastava v. State of U. P, 2017 (7) ADJ 112 (DB),
8. Ramakrishnan Mission v. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303,
9. Rashtriya Panchayati Raj Gram Pradhan Singh v. State of UP & Ors,
(2012) 12 SCC 331.

10. Vincent Paul Fernandes and Others v. State of Goa, Through Chief
Secretary and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2902.
11. The Chief Electoral Officer And vs Sunny Joseph
12. Sunny Joseph (pg 23 4th para)
13. Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala
14. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Raj Narain
15. Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Commissioner
16. Ponnuswamy vs Returning Officer
17. Association of Residents of MHOW vs Delimitation Commission of India
18. L. Chandrakumar vs Union of India
29. Vallabhbhai Kushalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 56 ELR 227.
20. M. Yellapa v. Delimitation Commission, 59 ELR 273.
21. Public Interest Committee for Scheduling Specific Areas and Anr v. Union
of India & Ors
22. RC Poudyal (supra)
23. Election Commission of India v. Mohd. Abdul Ghani & Ors, (1995) 6 SCC
721.
24. A.P. Scheduled Castes Welfare Association, Hyderabad and Others v. Union
of India and Others, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 140.
25. Mr. T. Nageswara Rao vs The Chairman, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 32865.
26. Pankaj Purohit v. Union of India, 2012 SCC OnLine Utt 2570.
27. State of U.P. & Ors. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti & Ors, 2016 SCC
OnLine Bom 9270.
28. The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Others v. The State of Orissa and
Others, (1961) 2 SCR 537
29. Shoaib Iqbal v. Union of India and Others., (2001) 3 SCC 221
30. Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others, (1999) 7 SCC 76
31. Sameer v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 675.
32. V.S.Sathyan vs The Election Commission of India. 2006 SCC OnLine Mad
1565
33. Institute of Law, Chandigarh v. Neeraj Sharma & Ors, 2014 SCC OnLine
SC 743.
34. Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012,
(2012) 10 SCC 1.
35. Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 6 SCC
548
36. Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1879
37. State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (2021) 8 SCC 401
38. Kayathi Jayapal Reddy v. State Election Commission, 2001 SCC OnLine AP
914
39. Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216

ARTICLES, BOOKS, JOURNALS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
S. NO. BOOK TITLE
1. HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th Ed. Universal Law Publishing

Co. 2012)
2. Committee on petitions report (5th):third Lok Sabha
3. Delimitation of parliamentary and assembly Constituencies order, 1976
4. Constitutional Law of India: By JN Pandey
5. Introduction to the Constitution of India: By DD Basu
6. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law,

By Justice A K Sikri
ONLINE SOURCES
S. NO. SOURCES
1. Hein Online
2. Manupatra
3. SCC Online
4. Westlaw Asia
5. Westlaw Classic

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The respondent humbly submits before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Republic of
KADURU under Article 139A of the Constitution of Republic of KADURU.
Article 139 A reads as follows:
139A. (1) Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are
pending before the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more High
Courts and the Supreme Court is satisfied on its own motion or on an application made by
the Attorney-General of India or by a party to any such case that such questions are
substantial questions of general importance, the Supreme Court may withdraw the case or
cases pending before the High Court or the High Courts and dispose of all the cases itself:
Provided that the Supreme Court may after determining the said questions of law return any
case so withdrawn together with a copy of its judgment on such questions to the High Court
from which the case has been withdrawn, and the High Court shall on receipt thereof,
proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment.
(2) The Supreme Court may, if it deems it expedient so to do for the ends of justice, transfer
any case, appeal or other proceedings pending before any High Court to any other High
Court.
The Respondents reserve the right to contend the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Republic of KADURU.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background and Context
The Democratic People's Republic of Kaduru (DPRK) achieved sovereignty in 2022 after
enduring a bicentennial period of colonial subjugation under the Birur Empire. A
multinational conglomerate, the Birur Empire had forcibly relocated diverse ethnic
populations, comprising Birurish indigenes and expatriates from Solur and Malur, to Kaduru,
thereby engendering profound ethnic discord. The Empire's policy of segregation,
encapsulated by the maxim "to each, their own," culminated in the establishment of ethnically
homogeneous enclaves, impeding inter-ethnic communion and exacerbating divisions among
the indigenous Kaduriga, Birurish, Soluran, Malurite, and other ethnic constituents.
Independence Movement
In the 1950s, the Kaduriga Independence Movement (KIM) materialized as a political entity
championing the entitlements of indigenous Kadurigans and secession from the Birur Empire.
Dissatisfaction burgeoned over the Birur Empire's ethnocentric apportionment system, which
dispensed governmental positions and educational prospects predicated on ethnic quotas. The
KIM repudiated this paradigm, contending that it conferred preferential treatment upon
minorities such as the Solurans and Malurites at the expense of the Kadurigans, who
comprised the demographic majority. The KIM advocated for augmented reservations for
Kadurigans, as the 1961 census enumerated them as constituting seventy-two percent of the
populace.
Formation of Independent Government

In 2020, the Birur Empire pledged to terminate colonial dominion over Kaduru, resulting in
the convocation of a Constituent Assembly mandated to formulate the nation's Constitution.
Significantly influenced by the Indian Constitution, the Assembly incorporated stipulations to
guarantee equitable representation within the legislative body. Upon attainment of
sovereignty in 2022, Ms. Sel Vartha of the KIM was designated interim Prime Minister. The
Delimitation Act, 2022, an early legislative enactment, instituted a Delimitation Commission
to effectuate uniform electoral distribution among constituencies, cognizant of the imperative
of commensurate communal representation.
Delimitation
The Delimitation Commission, constituted exclusively of KIM members and Kadurigas,

proposed a disproportionate allocation of legislative seats in favour of the Kaduriga populace,
precipitating vehement protests from non-Kaduriga segments of the society, notably the
Solurans and Malurites. The Commission's report, subsequently enacted into law by the
legislature, culminated in the Delimitation Order, 2023. These engendered legal proceedings
initiated by the Malurite and Soluran communities, impugning the constitutional validity of
the Delimitation Act and Order. Recognizing the commonality of the raised questions, the
Supreme Court of Kaduru has remitted the matters to a Constitution Bench for adjudication
on the admissibility of the writ petitions, the petitioners' standing, and the legality of the
impugned Delimitation Act and Order.

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1
Whether the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners (Solurans and Malurites) challenging the
Delimitation Act, 2023, and the Delimitation Order, 2023, are maintainable before the courts?
ISSUE 2
Whether the petitioners have the locus standi (legal standing) to approach the courts to
challenge the constitutionality of the Delimitation Act, 2023, and the Delimitation Order,
2023?
ISSUE 3
Whether the Delimitation Act, 2023, violates the Constitution of Kaduru, particularly in terms
of the principles of equal representation, non-discrimination, and proportional representation?
ISSUE 4
Whether the Delimitation Order, 2023, which implemented the recommendations of the
Delimitation Commission, is legal and in accordance with the Constitution of Kaduru?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
maintainable before the courts?
The petitioners assert that their Writ Petitions against the Delimitation Order, 2023 are fully
maintainable under the constitutional framework, as the Delimitation Commission’s actions
violate the principles of equality and fair representation by arbitrarily favouring one ethnic
group over others. They argue that constitutional restrictions on judicial review do not
entirely bar intervention, particularly when actions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or breach
fundamental constitutional principles. The delimitation process, distinct from the actual
conduct of elections, is subject to judicial scrutiny to correct unconstitutional and unjust
outcomes. The petitioners maintain that judicial intervention is necessary to address the
disproportionate allocation of seats, ensure adherence to democratic norms, and protect the
right to equal political participation for all citizens, thus preserving the integrity of the
electoral process and upholding the foundational principles of fair representation.
ISSUE 2. Whether the petitioners have the locus standi (legal standing) to approach the
courts to challenge the constitutionality of the Delimitation Act, 2023, and the
Delimitation Order, 2023?
The petitioners argue that their challenge to the Delimitation Order, 2023 is rooted in judicial
review principles and constitutional fairness, contending that Article 329 does not
categorically bar judicial intervention in delimitation matters, especially when actions involve
arbitrariness, mala fide, or constitutional violations. They assert that the Delimitation Order

unfairly favors one ethnic group, breaching the constitutional principles of equality and fair
representation, as established in judicial precedents like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State
of Tamil Nadu and Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India. The petitioners
emphasize that the Delimitation Commission's actions, which disproportionately allocate
seats, undermine democratic fairness and the integrity of elections, necessitating judicial
intervention. They assert that without judicial scrutiny, citizens would have no recourse
against unconstitutional and arbitrary delimitation decisions, thus safeguarding their right to
judicial remedy is crucial to uphold democratic governance and equal representation.
particularly in terms of the principles of equal representation, non-discrimination, and
proportional representation?
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the Delimitation Act, 2023, is in violation of the
Constitution of Kaduru as it contravenes the fundamental principle of equal representation,
which is integral to the democratic framework established by the Constitution. The Act's
provisions, which permit the over representation of native Kadurigas based on historical
considerations, are inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of population-based
delimitation and the principle of "one person, one vote, one value." While the rectification of
historical injustices may constitute a legitimate objective, the Petitioner contends that the
means employed by the Delimitation Act are disproportionate and result in invidious
discrimination against other ethnic communities, particularly the Solurans and Malurites. The
Act unduly dilutes the voting power of these communities, thereby infringing upon their
fundamental rights to equal representation and non-discrimination as guaranteed by the
Constitution of Kaduru. Accordingly, the Petitioner submits that the Delimitation Act, 2023,
is unconstitutional and must be invalidated to uphold the integrity of the democratic process
and ensure strict adherence to the principles enshrined in the Constitution.

recommendations of the Delimitation Commission, is legal and in accordance with the
Constitution of Kaduru?
The petitioners assert that the Delimitation Order, 2023, promulgated pursuant to the
Delimitation Commission’s recommendations, is patently unconstitutional and infringes upon
their fundamental right to equitable representation within the legislative framework. They
contend that the impugned order flagrantly contravenes constitutional mandates that require

proportional representation based on demographic criteria, systematically marginalizing

minority communities and excluding them from meaningful participation. This exclusion
constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice, as it denies these communities their
consultative and participatory rights in the legislative process. Furthermore, the appellants
argue that the composition of the Delimitation Commission is inherently flawed and biased,
disproportionately empowering the ruling party, thereby compromising the impartiality of its
decisions. The Commission’s actions, lacking appropriate scrutiny and oversight, are
described as arbitrary, procedurally unfair, and manifestly contrary to law. The petitioners
seek judicial intervention to nullify the order on the grounds of constitutional infractions,
procedural irregularities, and malfeasance in law.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
maintainable before the courts?
The petitioners respectfully submit that the Writ Petitions are unequivocally maintainable
under the constitutional framework and established legal principles governing judicial review,
particularly in the context of delimitation orders. The grievance at the heart of these petitions
stems from the Delimitation Order, 2023, which, the petitioners assert, violates fundamental
constitutional principles of equality and fair representation enshrined in the Kaduru
Constitution. The Delimitation Commission’s actions have led to an arbitrary and
discriminatory allocation of legislative seats, disproportionately favoring the Kadurigas
ethnic group while severely diluting the political representation of the petitioners and other
marginalized communities. These issues raise substantial constitutional questions that
demand judicial scrutiny, making the Writ Petitions fully maintainable.
It is a well-settled legal principle that while Article 329 of the Kaduru Constitution, along
with analogous constitutional provisions, places limitations on judicial intervention in
election-related matters, these restrictions are neither absolute nor all-encompassing. In the
case of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of Tamil Nadu1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India unequivocally held that judicial review remains permissible in instances where statutory
bodies, such as the Delimitation Commission, act in a manner tainted by mala fide,
arbitrariness, or in clear breach of constitutional principles. The Court further clarified that
the non-obstante clause in Article 329 does not create an impenetrable barrier against judicial
review when the actions of electoral bodies threaten to undermine the constitutional
imperative of free and fair elections. In the present case, the Delimitation Order, 2023 falls
squarely within these exceptions as it disproportionately allocates legislative seats to the
1
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 6 SCC 548

Kadurigas, thereby undermining the principle of “one person, one vote, one value” and
threatening the constitutional mandate of equal political representation.
The judgment in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India 2is particularly
instructive in this regard, as it affirms that Article 329 does not entirely preclude judicial
intervention in instances where a delimitation exercise produces manifestly unconstitutional
or unjust outcomes. The Delimitation Order, 2023 has resulted in a significant imbalance in
political representation, with the Kadurigas being over-represented while marginalized
groups such as the Malurites and Solurans face systemic under-representation. This skewed
representation violates the right to equality guaranteed under the Kaduru Constitution and
demands judicial intervention to correct this unconstitutional outcome. The present Writ
Petitions, therefore, serve as a necessary tool to challenge the Delimitation Commission’s
arbitrary and discriminatory actions, ensuring that the delimitation process conforms to
constitutional norms and principles of democratic fairness.
Additionally, the judgment in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz3, offers further support for the
maintainability of the Writ Petitions. In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted Articles
243O and 243ZG, provisions analogous to Article 329, and reiterated that while judicial
intervention is restricted during the conduct of elections, such limitations do not extend to
pre-election stages, including the delimitation process. The Court emphasized that statutory
bodies like the Delimitation Commission must act in strict adherence to constitutional
principles and that any deviation from these principles warrants judicial scrutiny. The
Delimitation Order, 2023, which disproportionately favors one ethnic group at the expense of
others, clearly violates these constitutional principles. The Fouziya Imtiaz ruling underscores
that when there are allegations of mala fides, arbitrariness, or constitutional violations, as in
the present case, judicial intervention is both permissible and necessary.
Furthermore, it is imperative to recognize that the constitutional bar on judicial intervention
under Article 329 was primarily intended to prevent interference with the actual conduct of
elections. However, it does not extend to delimitation exercises, which are distinct from the
electoral process. The Delimitation Order, 2023 is a pre-election administrative measure that
sets the boundaries for electoral constituencies and determines the allocation of seats within
the legislative framework. By challenging this order, the petitioners do not seek to disrupt or
interfere with any ongoing electoral process but rather to rectify a constitutionally flawed
delimitation exercise. This distinction is crucial in determining the maintainability of the Writ
Petitions, as they do not impede the election process but aim to ensure that elections are
conducted on a constitutionally sound and fair basis.
The petitioners also respectfully submit that the right to equal political participation is a
cornerstone of democratic governance, and any infringement of this right calls for judicial
intervention. The Delimitation Commission’s arbitrary allocation of seats has led to the
dilution of the voting power of marginalized ethnic groups such as the Malurites and
Solurans, constituting a systemic injustice that requires correction by this Hon’ble Court. The
Fouziya Imtiaz judgment reinforces the principle that judicial review is appropriate when the
2
Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1879
3
State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (2021) 8 SCC 401

actions of electoral authorities contravene constitutional mandates. The petitioners seek to

ensure that elections proceed on a foundation of democratic fairness and equal representation,
in full conformity with constitutional principles. Judicial intervention in the present case
would not obstruct the electoral process but would restore balance and fairness, ensuring that
the Delimitation Order, 2023 does not lead to unequal representation.
Furthermore, the petitioners submit that judicial review serves as a necessary safeguard
against the arbitrary exercise of power by statutory bodies, including the Delimitation
Commission. In Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of Tamil Nadu4, the Supreme Court
underscored the importance of judicial oversight in curbing abuses of power by statutory
bodies. Without such oversight, the Delimitation Commission could exercise its authority
unchecked, potentially leading to unconstitutional and discriminatory outcomes. The Writ
Petitions provide the only viable mechanism to challenge the systemic inequalities and the
disproportionate allocation of seats stemming from the Delimitation Order, 2023. Judicial
oversight is therefore indispensable to ensuring that the delimitation process adheres to
constitutional principles and that the rights of all citizens are protected.
Additionality, The case of Kayathi Jayapal Reddy v. State Election Commission and Anr 5. is
highly instructive in advancing the argument for the maintainability of the present Writ
Petitions, particularly in the context of judicial review of delimitation orders. The Hon’ble
Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy, was tasked with determining the
scope of judicial review under Article 243-O of the Constitution of India, which, akin to
Article 329, seeks to restrict judicial intervention in electoral matters. The court in this case
reiterated that the bar to judicial interference, as enshrined under Article 243-O, is not
absolute and does not preclude judicial scrutiny in all instances where a constitutional
authority’s decision-making process is questioned on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or
constitutional violations.
In the said case, the petitioner challenged the revised election program issued by the State
Election Commission under Article 243K, not on the grounds of questioning the election of
any returned candidate, nor disputing any law related to delimitation or allotment of seats.
Instead, the petitioner contended that the election process had been interrupted due to
circumstances beyond the control of the Election Officer. The challenge was essentially
against the decision-making process of the State Election Commission, and thus, the High
Court held that the petitioner’s grievances did not fall under the bar imposed by Article 243-
O.
The court further held that Article 243-O(a), while barring judicial review of the validity of
any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies, does not oust the jurisdiction of the
courts in instances where the actions of the Election Commission are arbitrary, mala fide, or
violative of constitutional provisions. This principle is in consonance with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar 6, where the Court had
observed that any challenge to the election process, which does not amount to “calling in
question an election” but rather seeks to facilitate the election’s completion, does not fall
under the prohibition imposed by Article 329(b). The bar on judicial review exists primarily
4
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 6 SCC 548
5
Kayathi Jayapal Reddy v. State Election Commission, 2001 SCC OnLine AP 914
6
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216

to prevent the interruption of election proceedings, and it does not apply where the petitioner
seeks to remove obstacles or correct the course of an election, especially if the Election
Commission’s actions are tainted by procedural irregularities or substantive legal breaches.
The court in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy extensively relied on the jurisprudence laid down in
Ashok Kumar, noting that judicial review can be sought when the decision-making process of
the Election Commission has been exercised in a manner that is arbitrary or in violation of
the constitutional principles of fairness and equality. The judgment reiterated that the courts,
while generally reluctant to interfere in electoral matters, can and should step in where the
actions of the Election Commission contravene constitutional mandates or are found to be
mala fide.
In the present case, the petitioners do not challenge the election of any returned candidate nor
seek to disrupt or delay the electoral process. Rather, the grievance pertains to the
discriminatory and unconstitutional nature of the Delimitation Order, 2023, which
disproportionately favors the Kadurigas ethnic group at the expense of marginalized
communities, thereby violating the principles of equality and fair representation as
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the
Delimitation Commission has acted in an arbitrary and mala fide manner by
disproportionately allocating seats to one ethnic group, thus undermining the democratic
process and the fundamental right to equal political representation.
The reasoning in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy is directly applicable to the case at hand. In both
instances, the petitioners are not seeking to challenge the outcome of an election but are
instead questioning the constitutionality of the delimitation process and its impact on equal
representation. The Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision provides a clear precedent
that judicial review is permissible when the petitioner seeks to ensure that the electoral
process is conducted in accordance with constitutional principles, without arbitrary or
discriminatory actions by the Election Commission or Delimitation Commission.
Moreover, the court in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy emphasized that judicial intervention is
justified when the decision-making process of the Election Commission is called into
question on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or constitutional violations. The High Court
observed that the power conferred upon the Election Commission, though broad, is not
unbridled, and judicial review serves as a necessary check on the exercise of such powers,
ensuring that constitutional authorities do not act beyond the scope of their mandate. In the
present matter, the Delimitation Order, 2023, by disproportionately favoring the Kadurigas
ethnic group, fails to uphold the principles of equality and fair political representation, thus
warranting judicial scrutiny.
The Hon’ble Court in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy further noted that judicial review does not
amount to questioning the election if it serves to facilitate the election process and ensure its
completion in a fair and just manner. This observation is particularly relevant in the present
context, as the petitioners seek a remedy to correct the arbitrary and discriminatory seat
allocation under the Delimitation Order, 2023, which, if left unaddressed, would result in an
unfair electoral process that undermines the constitutional guarantee of equal representation.
The petitioners’ challenge is not directed at delaying or disrupting the election but is intended

to ensure that the election is conducted in a manner that is free from bias and discrimination,
in accordance with the constitutional principles of equality and fairness.
The Hon’ble Court's ruling in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy establishes a clear precedent for
allowing judicial review of the Delimitation Commission’s actions when such actions violate
constitutional mandates. The principle that statutory bodies such as the Election Commission
are not immune from judicial oversight, especially when their actions undermine democratic
principles, is integral to the petitioners' case in the present matter. As such, the bar to judicial
review under Article 329(b) or Article 243-O cannot be invoked to preclude the petitioners
from seeking judicial scrutiny of the Delimitation Order, 2023, which has been framed in a
manner that is manifestly arbitrary and discriminatory.
In light of the above, the reasoning in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy decisively supports the
maintainability of the present Writ Petitions. The petitioners’ challenge to the Delimitation
Order, 2023, raises legitimate constitutional issues that require judicial examination,
particularly in the context of equal political representation and non-discrimination. The
Delimitation Commission’s actions, by disproportionately favoring one ethnic group, violate
the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and, as such, warrant intervention
by this Hon’ble Court. The precedent established in Kayathi Jayapal Reddy further solidifies
the argument that judicial review is both permissible and necessary in the present matter to
ensure that the electoral process is conducted in a fair and just manner, consistent with
constitutional principles
Finally, it is essential to highlight that the Writ Petitions do not seek to interfere with the
timing or conduct of elections. As the Supreme Court held in Election Commission of India v.
Ashok Kumar, judicial review can, in fact, facilitate the conduct of free and fair elections by
addressing unconstitutional actions that might otherwise undermine the integrity of the
electoral process. The challenge to the Delimitation Order, 2023 is focused on ensuring that
the foundation of future elections is constitutionally sound, preserving the right to equal
political representation for all ethnic groups. Therefore, the petitioners respectfully submit
that judicial intervention is warranted in the present case to correct the fundamental violations
embodied in the Delimitation Order and to safeguard the democratic process in Kaduru.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners humbly submit that the Writ Petitions are fully
maintainable, as they raise serious constitutional issues related to equal representation,
arbitrary decision-making, and the need for judicial oversight over the actions of the
Delimitation Commission. The disproportionate impact of the Delimitation Order, 2023 on
the petitioners' political representation and the broader constitutional framework provides
sufficient grounds for the present challenge before this Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE 2. Whether the petitioners have the locus standi (legal standing) to approach
the courts to challenge the constitutionality of the Delimitation Act, 2023, and the
Delimitation Order, 2023?

¶ The petitioners respectfully submit that their challenge to the Delimitation Order, 2023 is
grounded in the principles of judicial review and constitutional fairness, asserting their right
to approach the courts. First, the petitioners contend that [2.1] Judicial Review is Permissible
in Delimitation Matters under Article 329, particularly when the actions of the Delimitation
Commission involve mala fide, arbitrariness, or violations of constitutional principles.
Second, they argue that [2.2] Article 329 Does Not Completely Bar Judicial Intervention in
Delimitation Processes, especially when the Delimitation Order, 2023 breaches the right to
equality and fair representation by disproportionately favoring one ethnic group. [2.3] Third,
the Delimitation Orders Must Conform to Constitutional Principles of Equality and Fair
Representation, and the petitioners’ rights have been infringed due to unequal allocation of
seats. [2.4] Fourth, the petitioners rely on Judicial Precedents Mandating Intervention to
Uphold Democratic Fairness, asserting that courts must intervene when electoral processes
undermine fairness. Lastly, the petitioners emphasize that [2.5] The Petitioners’ Right to
Judicial Remedy Must Be Safeguarded, as Article 329 cannot bar them from seeking justice
for unconstitutional actions.
[2.1] Judicial Review is Permissible in Delimitation Matters
¶ The petitioners respectfully contend that judicial intervention in matters concerning

delimitation is not absolutely precluded under Article 329 or any analogous constitutional
provision, as posited by the respondents. In Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of Tamil
Nadu 7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court elucidated that while matters relating to delimitation and
elections typically fall outside the purview of judicial scrutiny, any act or order that impedes
the fairness of the electoral process or entails mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power remains
subject to judicial review. The Court held that actions undertaken by the Delimitation
Commission are not immune from judicial oversight where they fail to ensure the conduct of
free, fair, and democratic elections.
¶ Accordingly, the petitioners submit that their challenge to the Delimitation Order, 2023 is
both valid and meritorious. It is not intended to obstruct the electoral process but is instead
aimed at upholding the principles of fairness and equality in elections. The unjust allocation
of seats and ethnic favoritism manifest in the impugned order clearly undermine the core
tenets of democratic representation. Judicial intervention in this matter is necessitated to
correct arbitrary actions that would otherwise remain unchecked, thereby jeopardizing the
integrity of the democratic process in the Democratic People’s Republic of Kaduru.
7
(2020) 6 SCC 548

[2.2] Judicial Intervention Under Article 329 is Not Completely Barred in Delimitation
Processes
¶ The petitioners respectfully submit that Article 329 does not categorically preclude judicial
review of delimitation orders, particularly when such orders involve breaches of
constitutional principles. In Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India 8, the
Hon’ble Court recognized that while Article 329 limits the scope of judicial scrutiny, it does
not entirely divest the courts of their power to intervene. Specifically, judicial review remains
available when a delimitation exercise results in arbitrary, unconstitutional, or manifestly
unjust outcomes. The petitioners contend that the Delimitation Order, 2023, by over-
representing one ethnic group to the detriment of others, contravenes the right to equality and
fair representation enshrined in the Kaduru Constitution.
¶ Moreover, in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court stressed the
necessity of judicial oversight to prevent citizens from being left "at the mercy of the
Delimitation Commission." A complete bar on judicial review would deprive citizens of any
forum to raise legitimate grievances concerning unjust actions undertaken during delimitation
exercises. The Delimitation Order, 2023 embodies such arbitrary and unconstitutional
actions, meriting the Court's scrutiny.
¶ The petitioners further rely on State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz 9(2021), where the Court
clarified that Articles 243O and 243ZG, which mirror Article 329, do not impose an absolute
bar on judicial intervention. Judicial review is permissible where the actions of the
Delimitation Commission or other electoral authorities are mala fide, arbitrary, or contrary to
constitutional mandates. The petitioners argue that the Delimitation Order, 2023 undermines
the right to equal representation by reallocating seats unfairly, disproportionately favoring
one ethnic group while diminishing the representation of others, thus falling squarely within
the ambit of judicial review.
¶ Additionally, the Fouziya Imtiaz judgment highlights that the constitutional bar on judicial
intervention applies only during the electoral process itself and does not extend to actions
taken before the elections are initiated. In the present case, the petitioners challenge the
delimitation process, a phase that is distinct from the electoral process, rendering their
challenge both valid and timely. Furthermore, Fouziya Imtiaz confirms that the State Election
Commission (SEC) or any other related authority may be held accountable if there is a breach
8
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1879.
9
(2021) 8 SCC 401.

of constitutional or statutory obligations. The petitioners argue that the Delimitation

Commission has violated the constitutional mandate of equal representation and fairness by
over-representing certain groups, thereby warranting judicial intervention.
¶ Therefore, in accordance with the legal precedent set in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz, the
petitioners respectfully assert that this Hon’ble Court has the authority to review and rectify
the arbitrary and unconstitutional actions of the Delimitation Commission, thereby ensuring
that the electoral process is conducted in a manner that reflects constitutional values and
principles of fairness.
[2.3] Delimitation Orders Must Conform to Constitutional Principles of Equality and

Fair Representation
¶ The petitioners respectfully submit that the Delimitation Order, 2023 contravenes the
fundamental constitutional principles of equality and fair representation as enshrined in the
Kaduru Constitution. The essence of a democratic electoral process is the assurance that each
vote carries equal weight and that no ethnic group is systematically under-represented. The
Kaduru Constitution mandates that elections must reflect the principle of "one person, one
vote, one value", ensuring the equal political participation of all citizens.
¶ The petitioners assert that the Delimitation Commission has failed to uphold these
principles by disproportionately allocating seats in favor of the Kadurigas, providing them
with an overwhelming 68% of the seats in the Lower House, while unfairly under-
representing other ethnic groups, such as the Malurites and Solurans. This disproportionate
allocation of seats not only skews the democratic balance but also results in a significant
dilution of the voting power of the petitioners and other under-represented groups. The
systemic under-representation of these ethnic groups is in direct violation of the constitutional
guarantee of equal political rights, rendering the Delimitation Order, 2023 unconstitutional.
¶ In Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, the Hon’ble Court underscored

that delimitation orders must be consistent with constitutional values and should not favor
one group at the expense of another. Any order that skews representation to the detriment of
certain groups undermines the very foundation of equal political rights. The Constitution
guarantees that no group should receive preferential treatment in a manner that systematically
disadvantages others. Thus, an order that allocates seats in an unequal and discriminatory
manner—as the Delimitation Order, 2023 does—cannot stand.

¶ Moreover, the petitioners submit that the constitutional principle of equality is a cornerstone
of democratic governance. The Delimitation Commission is constitutionally obligated to
ensure that its actions do not infringe upon the rights to equality and fair representation. By
disproportionately favoring one ethnic group, the Commission has violated its duty to ensure
that the electoral process is fair, impartial, and representative of all communities. The over-
representation of the Kadurigas—despite their being only 68% of the population—at the
expense of other ethnic minorities is not merely a political issue but a constitutional violation.
[2.4] Judicial Precedents Mandate Intervention to Uphold Democratic Fairness
¶ The petitioners respectfully submit that judicial intervention is warranted to safeguard

democratic fairness in the present case. In Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar10,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that any action or decision that serves to facilitate the
completion of a free and fair election is not beyond the scope of judicial review. The Court
further ruled that orders that undermine fairness or equality in the electoral process may be
subject to judicial scrutiny, particularly when they are tainted by arbitrariness or mala fide
intentions. In the context of the Delimitation Order, 2023, the petitioners contend that the
disproportionate allocation of legislative seats fundamentally undermines the fairness of the
electoral process in Kaduru.
¶ The judicial precedents in this regard affirm that it is the duty of the courts to ensure that
electoral processes are conducted in accordance with constitutional principles and are free
from any arbitrary actions that threaten the integrity of elections. The petitioners submit that
the Delimitation Commission's actions in the present case were arbitrary and failed to adhere
to the constitutional principle of equal representation. By disproportionately allocating seats
in Favor of one ethnic group, the Commission has violated the tenets of democratic equality
and proportional representation.
¶ The petitioners respectfully argue that this Hon'ble Court’s intervention is necessary to
correct this imbalance and to ensure that the electoral process is conducted in a manner
consistent with democratic norms and constitutional principles. It is submitted that the
Delimitation Order, 2023 must be subjected to judicial review and appropriately amended to
reflect fair and proportional representation of all ethnic groups within Kaduru, thereby
preserving the democratic integrity of the electoral process.
[2.5] The Petitioners’ Right to Judicial Remedy Must Be Safeguarded
10
(2000) 8 SCC 216.

¶ The petitioners respectfully submit that their right to seek judicial remedy cannot be entirely
curtailed by the operation of Article 329, as such a restriction would undermine the
fundamental principles of democracy and justice. In Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of
Tamil Nadu, the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed that judicial review serves as a critical
safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power by statutory bodies such as the Delimitation
Commission. The Court held that judicial oversight is indispensable to ensuring that these
bodies act within the bounds of constitutional mandates and democratic principles.
¶ The petitioners submit that without the availability of judicial intervention, there would be
no effective mechanism to challenge unjust or unconstitutional delimitation orders, thereby
leaving citizens without recourse to address systemic injustices in the electoral framework.
The absence of judicial scrutiny would allow statutory bodies to arbitrarily manipulate
electoral boundaries, undermining the democratic process and violating the constitutional
rights of citizens. It is therefore imperative that the petitioners' right to a judicial remedy be
preserved to uphold constitutional governance and protect against abuses of power in the
delimitation process.
particularly in terms of the principles of equal representation, non-discrimination,
and proportional representation?
¶ The Counsel for the Petitioner respectfully contends that the Delimitation Act egregiously
contravenes the constitutional mandate, representing a profound and unjustifiable breach of
the foundational principles enshrined within the Constitution. The Act’s primary and most
glaring deficiency is its blatant disregard for the inherent and inalienable rights of minority
communities to proportionate and equitable representation within legislative bodies, a
cornerstone of democratic governance. By marginalizing these communities, the Act not only
subverts the spirit of the Constitution but also undermines the integrity of the representative
process. The Petitioners assert that the impugned legislation is patently arbitrary, devoid of
any rational nexus to the objectives it purports to achieve, and thus warrants judicial
annulment under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. These Articles enshrine
the fundamental rights to equality before the law, the freedom of speech and expression, and
the right to life and personal liberty, respectively, forming the bedrock of the Indian

constitutional framework. The Act’s arbitrary and discriminatory nature is further exacerbated
by its procedural infirmities and substantive inequities, which render it constitutionally
untenable.
¶ This contention is buttressed by a meticulously constructed two-pronged argument: Firstly,

the Delimitation Commission has entirely excluded minority communities from the
deliberative process, thereby violating their participatory rights and effectively silencing their
voices in a matter that directly affects their representation in the legislative assembly. Such
exclusion constitutes a clear breach of the principles of natural justice and undermines the
democratic fabric by denying these communities a platform to present their concerns or
influence the delimitation process. This exclusion is not merely procedural but strikes at the
heart of substantive representation, diminishing the legitimacy of the legislative framework
[3.1].
¶ Secondly, the Delimitation Commission’s actions have inflicted manifest prejudice upon
minority communities by failing to adhere to constitutionally prescribed norms and
principles, including those mandating proportional representation based on demographic
distribution. The Commission’s conduct reflects a disregard for the fundamental tenets of
equality, fairness, and impartiality, as it has neglected to ensure that minority communities are
afforded their rightful place within the legislative structure. This failure amounts to a
systematic erosion of the representational rights of these communities, compromising their
ability to participate meaningfully in the legislative process and exacerbating their historical
marginalization [3.2].
[3.1] Minority communities have been wholly disenfranchised from the Delimitation
Commission's deliberations, leading to a complete void in their representation.
¶ It is respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitution mandates equal
representation, yet the current configuration of the Delimitation Commission fundamentally
contravenes this principle by excluding minority communities from its composition, thereby
compromising its transparency and impartiality. While concerns regarding potential legal
disputes affecting the electoral process are not without merit, such apprehensions should not
eclipse the political entitlements of citizens, particularly those belonging to minority groups
who stand to be disproportionately disadvantaged by a redistricting scheme designed to
undermine their political influence. It is imperative that the rights of these minority

communities be restored, ensuring their inclusion and adequate legal representation within
the legislative framework.
¶ According to Articles 81(1) and 170(1) of the Constitution 11, the maximum limits are laid
down beyond which the total membership of the House of the People and of the State
Legislative Assemblies cannot go. Additionally, the minimum membership limit of the State
Legislative Assemblies is also laid down by the Constitution. These limits cannot be
transgressed and every delimitation authority, has to so fix the total number of seats in the
House of the People and in the Legislative Assembly of each State that such numbers 1
KADURU CONST. art.81(1) and 170(1). Under Article 81(2)(a)12, 2the Constitution has laid
down the basic principle for the allocation of seats to various States in the House of the
People. The number of seats in the House of the People shall be allotted to each State in such
manner that the ratio between that number and the population of the State is, so far as
practicable, is the same for all States, so that these seats are equitably distributed among all
States. However, an exception has been made under Article 81(2) 13, in the case of smaller
States whose population does not exceed six million, in order that their interests are duly
safeguarded in the matter of their adequate representation in the House of the People.
[1.1.2] Distinction from Meghraj Kothari Case and scope of scrutinization of the orders
passed by the Delimitation Commission.
¶ The Supreme Court also addressed the respondent’s reliance on the constitutional bench
judgment in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission (1966) 14to argue that there is a
complete bar on judicial review in delimitation matters. The Court clarified that the Meghraj
Kothari judgment restricted judicial intervention to avoid unnecessary delays in the election
process. However, this does not imply an absolute bar on judicial review. The Court
emphasized that constitutional courts could undertake judicial review within a limited scope
at an appropriate stage of the Delimitation Commission.
¶ In the case of Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod Versus Union of India and Ors., Civil
Appeal No.7930 Of 202415 court observed that “We, however, do not approve the view taken
by the High Court that the order of delimitation of constituencies, issued in exercise of
statutory powers under the Delimitation Act, is entirely insusceptible to the powers of judicial
11
INDIAN CONST. art. 81(1) & 170(1).
12
INDIAN CONST. art. 81(2)(a).
13
INDIAN CONST. art. 81(2).
14
Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission (1966), 1966 SCC OnLine SC 12.
15
Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod Versus Union of India and Ors., Civil Appeal No.7930 Of 2024 ,2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1879.

review exercisable under Article 22616 of the Constitution6. Although Article 32917
undeniably restricts the scope of judicial scrutiny re: validity of any law relating to the
delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, it cannot be
construed to have imposed for every action of delimitation exercise.”
[1.2] The Delimitation Commission exercised arbitrary powers.
¶ It is respectfully submitted that the report was a clear instance of gerrymandering designed
to benefit the ruling party at the Union and diminish the political voice of minorities in the
affected areas. The critical nature of the delimitation Commission can certainly work much
havoc and those minorities may not even get what they ordinarily would have got according
to their population. In the judgement of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) v. State of
Tamil Nadu (2020)18,the Supreme Court interpreted Articles 243O19 and 243ZG20 of the
Constitution. These articles, which mirror Article 329, were argued to place a complete bar on
judicial intervention. However, the Court in the DMK case rejected this argument, affirming
that constitutional courts could intervene, especially in cases involving mala fide or arbitrary
exercises of power. This precedent, along with its subsequent approval in the three-judge
21
bench judgment in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (2021), bolstered the Supreme
Court’s decision to permit judicial review of the Delimitation Commission’s orders.
¶It is further submitted that in the case of Ravinandan Singh v. Election Commission of
India, the Madhya Pradesh High Court was petitioned that the Election Commission may be
directed not to convert the Sidhi Parliamentary Constituency from general constituency to a
reserved constituency for the Scheduled Castes, under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976. The bar under Article 329(a) was
sought to be overcome on the ground that the Election Commission had not yet passed its
final order and that the High Court could intervene in the matter under Article 226. The High
Court held that if the population of the Scheduled Castes increases, the number of seats
reserved for them also correspondingly increases and the Commission was entitled to convert
the above constituency from a general to a reserved constituency.
[1.2.2] There was no alternative advisory Board Committee set up to review or cross
examine the orders passed by the Delimitation Commission.
16
INDIAN CONST. art. 226.
17
18
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020), (2020) 6 SCC 548.
19
INDIAN CONST. art. 243 O.
20
INDIAN CONST. art. 243 ZG.
21
(2021) 8 SCC 401.

¶ Section 13 of the R.P. Act, 1950 22, also provided that the Election Commission shall
formulate such proposals in consultation with parliamentary advisory committees in respect
of each State, which were to be set up by the Speaker of the provisional Parliament,
consisting of not less than three, and not more than seven members of Parliament
representing that State. Section 13(3) of the same Act provides that, every order made by the
President was to be laid before Parliament, as soon as may be after it was made, and was
subject to such modifications as Parliament might make on a motion made within 20 days
from the date on which the order was so laid. According to Sections 12 and 13 of the Act 23,
the orders made by the President from time to time could be altered or amended by him, after
consultation with the Election Commission and subject to such further modifications as
Parliament might make. Thus, as per laws, The Commission examines population data,
existing constituencies, the number of seats to be analysed, holds meetings with all the
stakeholders and submits its recommendation to the government but it submitted its' final
report and since KIM was in majority, the report was adopted the next day without taking into
consideration any form of scrutinization.
¶ It is to be further submitted that Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in
Virendra Pratap and Another v. Union of India and Others 24 where, agreeing that all
communities had a right to proportional representation under Articles 330 and 332 of the
Constitution, the court directed Election Commission to take appropriate steps to ensure their
representation in Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies of States. In the case of Mohd. Abdul
25
Ghani v. Election Commission of India seems to be the only exceptional case where the
Calcutta High Court intervened and directed a group of 16 mouzas to be excluded from one
constituency and tagged on to another adjacent constituency, because it considered those
villages as having become contiguous to the latter constituency owing to a change in the
course of the Ganges. These 16 mouzas, at the time of delimitation of the above
constituencies in 1975, were located on western side of the Ganges and formed part of
Murshidabad district and were included in Farakka and Aurangabad Assembly Constituencies
by the Delimitation Commission. Subsequently, the Ganges changed its course and these
villages now fell on the other side of the river and became contiguous to Kaliachak Assembly
Constituency in district Malda. The State Government changed the extent of the districts so as
to include these mouzas in Malda district taking them out of Murshidabad district.
22
Representation of the People’s Act, 1950, § 13, 1950 (India).
23
Representation of the People’s Act, 1950, § 12, 1950 (India).
24
Virendra Pratap and Another v. Union of India and Others, (2012) 11 SCC 764.
25
Mohd. Abdul Ghani v. Election Commission of India, (1995) 6 SCC 721.

Consequently, it was proposed to the Election Commission that the territorial extent of the
above constituencies may also be correspondingly changed.
[1.2.3] External Laws defining the scope of the Delimitation Act and overall intake on
the order passed by the Delimitation Commission.
¶In the United Kingdom, delimitation is conducted by independent Boundary Commissions,

and courts have generally avoided involvement. However, in R v Boundary 26Commission for
England (1983), the court emphasized that if institutions involved in the delimitation process
exercise arbitrary power, then “the courts can and will intervene in defence of the ordinary
citizen.” In the US, gerrymandering has been widely recognized as part of its political history,
and courts have been relatively more proactive in addressing it. In Shaw v. Reno 27(1993), the
court ruled that electoral districts whose boundaries can Shaw v Rennot be explained except
on the basis of race can be challenged as potential violations of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners in the case of Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal’s case 28reported in (2005) 5
SCC 665, along marked the infringement of the constitutional rights wherein The Court held
that the notification making the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 inapplicable to the State
of Assam by amending clause 2 of the said Order is unreasonable and arbitrary, violating
Article 14 19 of the Constitution of India29. In a similar situation in the present case, it can be
clearly seen that the Delimitation Commission has been utterly biased in forming the
committee for the delimitation exercise and not maintain post transparency as well, thus the
rights of the petitioners have grossly been violated.

recommendations of the Delimitation Commission, is legal and in accordance with
the Constitution of Kaduru?
¶ The learned counsel for the appellants respectfully contends that the Delimitation Order,
2023, promulgated pursuant to the recommendations of the Delimitation Commission, is
26
R v Boundary, [1983] EWCA Civ J0125-2.
27
Shaw v. Reno, 17 509 U.S. 630 (1993) .
28
Sarbananda Sonowal’s case, (2005) 5 SCC 665.
29
INDIAN CONST. art. 14 & art. 19.

patently ultra vires, unconstitutional, and constitutes a flagrant breach of the appellants'
fundamental right to equitable representation in the legislative framework. The impugned
order contravenes the stipulations enshrined in Articles 170 30, 33031, and 33232 of the
Constitution of India. Furthermore, the appellants were deprived of any participatory rights or
consultative voice in the constitution of the Delimitation Commission or the establishment of
a review mechanism to scrutinize the Commission's determinations. This contention is
fortified through a three-fold argument. - [4.1] Firstly, the order promulgated by the
Delimitation Commission fails to uphold the principles of equitable representation for
minority communities, as it disregards the rational population criterion that mandates
proportional allocation of seats commensurate with demographic distribution. The impugned
order, therefore, neglects the constitutional mandate of ensuring fair and just representation,
as it does not incorporate any provision for the allotment of seats to these communities,
thereby violating the maxim audi alteram partem33 by denying them due participatory rights
in the legislative process. [4.2] Secondly, the very constitution of the Delimitation
Commission is inherently flawed and tainted with bias, as it grants disproportionate influence
to the majority ruling party, effectively monopolizing the delimitation process in
contravention of the principles of impartiality. Notwithstanding these foundational
irregularities, the order issued by the Commission further deviates from the statutory
mandates of the Delimitation Act 34, which explicitly stipulates the provision of adequate
legislative representation for all communities, including those in Kaduru—a mandate that
was evidently never fulfilled. The Commission's actions, thus, amount to a breach of the
statutory objective of ensuring equitable representation, rendering its order manifestly
arbitrary and contrary to law. [4.3] Thirdly, the Delimitation Commission erred in their
judgement of adopting the report without leaving any scope of scrutiny whatsoever which
clearly indicates that their agenda was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair and unjust and hence
do not fall within the ambit of “procedure established by law.”35
[4.1] The Delimitation Commission's order contravenes the constitutional principle of

equitable representation by disregarding the proportional population criterion, thereby
denying minority communities fair legislative representation and violating the maxim
audi alteram partem through their exclusion from participatory rights:
30
31
32
33
Manupatra, Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Judex In Causa Sua: The Two Pillars of Natural Justice.
34
The Delimitation Act, 1972 (India).
35
Manupatra, Due Process of Law V/S Procedure Established by Law and India’s Position.

¶ It is most respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the order promulgated by
the Delimitation Commission egregiously contravenes the constitutional mandates
encapsulated within Articles 170, 330, and 332 of the Indian Constitution, which are
foundational to ensuring equitable representation in legislative bodies. Article 170 prescribes
the division of states into territorial constituencies, intricately tied to demographic
distribution, to uphold the principle of proportional representation in the state legislatures.
This provision ensures that each constituency reflects an equitable demographic ratio, thereby
preserving the integrity of representative democracy at the state level.
¶ Article 330 stipulates the reservation of seats in the House of the People (Lok Sabha) for
members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, thereby enshrining their right to
participate actively and effectively in the nation’s highest legislative forum. Similarly, Article
332 extends analogous provisions to state legislative assemblies, mandating the reservation of
seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, thereby safeguarding their statutory right to
legislative representation at the state level. These articles collectively uphold the
constitutional ethos of inclusivity, ensuring that historically marginalized communities are not
merely symbolically, but substantively represented within legislative processes.
[4.1.2] Procedural deficiencies have arisen due to the failure to take public objections
into account.
¶ It is humbly submitted that The Delimitation Commission’s order, by disregarding these

provisions, violates the constitutional doctrine of fair and equal representation, undermining
the democratic framework that strives to maintain a balanced and inclusive legislative
composition. In the case of Ashok Ganapat Jadhav and another v. State Election
Commission, Mumbai and others36, the court scrutinized the procedural lapses concerning the
non-consideration of public objections and the denial of an opportunity for the affected
individuals to be heard, which constitutes a violation of the cardinal principles of natural
justice. The court underscored that following the incorporation of Part IX into the
Constitution and the consequential amendments to Section 4 of the Bombay Village
Panchayats Act37, it has become a sine qua non that a pre-decisional hearing must precede the
issuance of any delimitation order. The court emphasized that any order promulgated by the
State Government concerning the delimitation of Village Panchayat areas or the bifurcation
of a Group Gram Panchayat into two distinct Village Panchayats necessitates strict adherence
36
Ashok Ganpat Jadhav & Anr v. State Election Commission, Mumbai & Ors, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1018.
37
Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958, § 4, 1958 (India).

to the audi alteram partem rule, thereby mandating an opportunity for the residents to be
heard. The constitutional imperatives and the statutory provisions of Section 4 unequivocally
establish the villagers' right to a fair hearing before the issuance of any delimitation directive
by the Government. Such disregard dilutes the representational rights of these communities
and disrupts the demographic parity envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, thereby
infringing upon the fundamental guarantees of participatory governance and legislative
equity. This Hon’ble Court is thus beseeched to recognize the imperative need to adhere
strictly to these constitutional mandates to preserve the sanctity of democratic representation.
[4.1.3] The allocation of seats by the Government was carried out with malice, resulting
in a complete violation of the rights of the minority community.
¶ The petitioners further would like to submit that under the Delimitation Act, 2022 38, the
Central Government has constituted Delimitation Commission. Referring to the provisions of
the said Act, it is submitted that the purpose of constitution of Delimitation Commission is to
readjust the allocation of seats in the House of People and the State Legislative Assemblies
and to determine the seats to be reserved in favor of all communities based on the census but,
abruptly the work of the Delimitation Commission was stopped. It is alleged that if the
Census figures are taken into consideration, more seats are likely to be reserved for other
marginalized communities as well as a result of which general seats will have to be readjusted
and allocated to those communities. Therefore, the petitioner has alleged mala fides on the
part of the government not go for reallocation of the seats in accordance with Census.
¶ The petitioners have alleged that the Delimitation Act has destroyed the constitutional rights
of the minority communities altogether and their fundamental right for the enforcement of
their constitutional rights without due process and without any regard or respect for the basic
structure and basic features of the Constitution. The court in the case of State of Goa v.
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh39, settled that actions of State with oblique or indirect object will be
attributed to “malice in law”, the court deciphered its’ interpretation via citing various
precedents in this case including mentioning the case of Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant
Vimalnath Narichania40, wherein SCC pp. 448-49, para 25 was summarised as follows:
25. “The State is duty-bound to act impartially and without ill will or malice, whether in fact
or law. "Legal malice" or "malice in law" refers to actions taken without lawful justification,
38
The Delimitation Act, 2022, Moot Proposition, 2022 (Kaduru).
39
State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (2021) 8 SCC 401.
40
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437.

constituting wrongful and wilful conduct devoid of reasonable or probable cause. This does
not necessarily imply personal spite or animosity but denotes a deliberate disregard for the
rights of others. When malice is ascribed to the State, it does not imply personal ill will but
rather an action undertaken with an ulterior or improper motive. It involves the exercise of
statutory authority for purposes that are extraneous to the intended legal objectives.” It
signifies a conscious breach of legal obligations, demonstrating a wilful disregard for the
rights of others, and is characterized by injurious acts reflecting a depraved inclination to
undermine those rights. By this act, a new situation unknown to democratic Constitutions is
engrafted onto our constitution resulting in postponing the constitutional rights guaranteed to
the communities contained under Articles 8141, 8242, 170, 331 and 332 from time to time and
ad-infinitum.
[4.2] The Delimitation Commission's constitution is fundamentally flawed and biased,

as it disproportionately empowers the majority ruling party, undermining impartiality.
Despite these foundational irregularities, the Commission’s order violates the
Delimitation Act’s mandate to ensure adequate representation for all communities,
including those in Kaduru. This failure breaches the statutory objective of equitable
representation, rendering the Commission's actions arbitrary and unlawful.
¶ It is respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, in alignment with the line of
reasoning adopted in the aforementioned case, the Apex Court further elaborated on the
constitutional provisions encapsulated within Articles 154 43, 16344, and 16645 of the Indian
Constitution. The Court underscored that the term "Government" refers specifically to the
State Government, and all executive powers vested in the Governor, except in instances
where the Governor is mandated by the Constitution to act at his discretion, are exercised on
the advice and assistance of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, any notification issued
by the Government or any general or special order promulgated by the State Government is
constitutionally an act of the Governor, effectuated through executive machinery. In the case
at bar, the Supreme Court meticulously addressed the pivotal issue of providing an adequate
opportunity for hearing to the affected villagers before the delimitation of the Panchayat was
effectuated. The Court referred to its precedential rulings in Visakhapatnam Municipality v.
41
42
43
44
45

Kandregula Nukaraju46, S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan47 (1980), Baldev Singh v. State of

Himachal Pradesh48, Sunderlal Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane49, and Atlas Cycle
Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana 50, wherein it was firmly established that any alteration in
the territorial jurisdiction of a local body, such as the merging or reconstitution of Gram
Panchayats, invariably results in civil consequences, thereby necessitating procedural
safeguards.
¶ The Apex Court held that the legal maxim audi alteram partem—one of the pillars of
natural justice—requires that reasonable opportunity be provided to the affected parties to
present their objections and be heard in such matters. The Court observed that this principle is
integral, especially given the significant civil consequences that arise from alterations to the
boundaries and jurisdictions of local self-governance bodies. The Supreme Court explicitly
noted:
“It was undisputed before us that the amalgamation of multiple villages under a single Gram
Panchayat, when previously governed by separate Gram Panchayats, entails civil
consequences. Nevertheless, as elucidated in the judgments of Visakhapatnam Municipality,
S.L. Kapoor, Baldev Singh, S.L. Bhatija, and Atlas Cycle, in exigent circumstances, even a
post-decisional hearing can suffice as compliance with the principles of natural justice,
thereby adhering to the doctrine of audi alteram partem.” Thus, the Court’s pronouncement
reinforced that while the provision of a pre-decisional hearing remains the preferred and ideal
procedural standard, the exigencies of urgent administrative action may permit post-
decisional hearings as a form of retrospective compliance with natural justice, ensuring that
the rights of the villagers are not entirely bypassed in the administrative process. This
approach reflects a pragmatic balance between the need for expeditious governance and the
preservation of fundamental rights to procedural fairness.
[4.2.2] The delimitation Commission did not take into account or consideration the
objections raised by the public against the orders passed by the Commission neither did
they called for any reviewal committee to reframe the agenda after taking into
consideration, the underlying interests of every community.
46
Visakhapatnam Municipality v. Kandregula Nukaraju, (1975) 2 SCC 773.
47
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379.
48
Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 449.
49
Sunderlal Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, 2000 SCC OnLine Bom 398.
50
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 278.

¶ The counsel for the petitioner urges that serious prejudice has been caused to all minor
communities and their basic fundamental right have been violated due to the fact that the
government authorities failed to comply with the underlying objectives envisaged under those
statutory provisions. In Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh,51 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a similar legal issue concerning the rights of villagers in the context of
administrative bifurcation. The case involved residents, predominantly agriculturists, who
challenged the legality of a government notification effecting the bifurcation of their village.
They contended before the High Court that they were denied an opportunity to voice their
objections to the notification. However, the High Court dismissed their challenge, prompting
the appellants to escalate the matter to the Apex Court.
On appeal, Justice Ranganath Misra articulated the Court's position, holding that:
“We concur with the appellants’ submission that, prior to constituting the notified area under
Section 256 of the Act, it was imperative for the State Government to afford the residents of
the locality an opportunity to be heard. The administrative decision of the State Government
should have been rendered only after duly considering the views and objections of the
affected villagers. The denial of such an opportunity constitutes a breach of the Rule of Law,
which underpins the governance of our society. It is pertinent to emphasize that the hearing
mandated by law need not necessarily be oral; it may suffice if objections are invited in
writing and adjudicated upon in a fair and judicious manner.”
[4.3] The Delimitation Commission's adoption of the report without allowing any scope
for scrutiny constitutes a significant error in judgment, reflecting an arbitrary,
unreasonable, and unjust approach that falls outside the bounds of “procedure
established by law.”
¶ It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that observation underscored by the
Courts at times remark the fundamental tenet that administrative actions impacting
individuals' rights must adhere to the principles of natural justice, particularly the maxim
audi alteram partem. The ruling emphasized that procedural fairness obligates the State to
engage with the affected parties by providing them a meaningful opportunity to present their
objections, even if not through oral hearings, but through an equitable process of inviting and
addressing written objections. The decision reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to upholding
the procedural safeguards that protect citizens against arbitrary administrative decisions,
51
Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1987) 2 SCC 510.

aligning with the broader constitutional mandate that every action of the State must conform
to the principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability.
¶ It is most respectfully submitted that in the case of Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress16 Ray, J. opined52: (SCC p.706, para 202), it was established by the
Court that, “It is now a well-settled legal principle that the audi alteram partem rule,
embodying the right to a fair hearing and intrinsic to the equality clause enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution, extends beyond quasi-judicial orders to encompass administrative
decisions that adversely impact the rights of individuals. This rule applies unless explicitly
excluded by the governing statute, regulation, or rule, a condition not present in this case. The
principles of natural justice are not intended to displace but rather to augment the statutory
framework, ensuring that procedural fairness is upheld alongside substantive legal norms.
Moreover, the rule of law, which permeates the constitutional fabric, necessitates rigorous
adherence to procedural and substantive justice, reflecting the constitutional commitment to
fairness, impartiality, and due process in all actions of public authorities.”
¶ The counsel for the petitioner seeks to emphatically challenge and conclusively resolve the
contention concerning the fourth issue, asserting that the orders promulgated by the
Commission ought to be unequivocally annulled by this Hon'ble Court. This is premised on
the fact that the said orders were rendered in blatant contravention of the doctrine of anti-
arbitrariness53, which constitutes the foundational cornerstone of the constitutional provisions.
The impugned orders flagrantly disregard the principles that underpin the constitutional
framework, thereby necessitating their immediate invalidation by this esteemed judicial body.
In the landmark judgment of Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of
201254, particularly in paragraph 184, the Hon'ble Court articulated that the State, its
instrumentalities, and their functionaries, when exercising their executive authority in matters
pertaining to trade, business, or contract-making, are obligated to prioritize public interest,
public purpose, and public good. This is grounded in the principle that every public office
bearer, acting on behalf of the State or its instrumentalities, is ultimately accountable to the
People, in whom the sovereign authority resides. Consequently, all powers conferred upon
the State are intrinsically intended to be exercised solely for the advancement of public good
and in the public interest.
52
Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600.
53
Institute of Law, Chandigarh v. Neeraj Sharma & Ors, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 743.
54
Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1.

In light of this, the concept of unfettered discretion vested in any executive authority is
fundamentally impermissible. The limitations on such discretion are encapsulated in clear,
transparent, and objective criteria or procedures that further public interest, purpose, and
welfare. Thus, a public authority is mandated to act with reasonableness, in good faith, and
based on lawful and pertinent considerations that serve public interest. The Court emphasized
that these criteria are not merely advisory but constitute essential checks on the exercise of
executive power, ensuring accountability and the alignment of all actions with the
overarching principles of public good.

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17TH NALSAR- Justice B.R.

Sawney Memorial Moot

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KADURU

CIVIL NO. ______ OF 2024

(UNDER ART. 139 A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF

MS. G & Ors. .................................................................................................APPELLANT

REPUBLC OF KADURU & Ors. .............................................................. RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF of PETITIONER

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 1

No table of contents entries found.

ARTICLES, BOOKS, JOURNALS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES..............................8

ISSUE 4. Whether the Delimitation Order, 2023, which implemented the

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 2

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 3

S. NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

3. AIR All India Reporter

6. DPSP Directive principles of State Policy

7. FRs Fundamental Rights

10. HC High Court

11. Hon’ble Honourable

12. Ors. Others

13. SCC Supreme Court Cases

14. SCR Supreme Court Reporter

15. SC Supreme Court

16. Supp. Supplement

18. PIL Public Interest Litigation

19. Art. Article

20. Cl. Clause

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 4

21. Const. Constitution

22. Ed. Edition

23. http Hypertext Transfer Protocol

24. I.L.R. Indian Law Report

25. Ltd. Limited

26. Pg. Page.

27. Pvt. Private

28. r/w Read With

29. u/s Under Section

30. u/ss. Under Sections

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 5

1. KADURU CONST. part I

2. KADURU CONST. Part II

3. KADURU CONST. Part III

4. KADURU CONST. Part IV

5. INDIAN CONST. Part IX

6. The Delimitation Act, 1952

7. The Delimitation Act, 1962

8. The Delimitation Commission Act, 2002

9. The Representation of People Act 1951

10. UP PANCHAYAT RAJ ACT

S. NO. CASE LAWS

1. Muthuraj v. The Chief Secretary

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 6

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Page | 7

ARTICLES, BOOKS, JOURNALS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

S. NO. BOOK TITLE

1. HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th Ed. Universal Law Publishing

3. Delimitation of parliamentary and assembly Constituencies order, 1976

4. Constitutional Law of India: By JN Pandey

5. Introduction to the Constitution of India: By DD Basu