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TECH AADHAAR DATA BREACH PRIVACY

UIDAI’s Aadhaar Software Hacked, ID


Database Compromised, Experts Confirm
Skilled hackers disabled security features of Aadhaar enrolment software,
circulated hack on Whatsapp
By Rachna Khaira, Aman Sethi, and Gopal Sathe
Sep 11, 2018, 12:38 AM EDT | Updated Sep 26, 2018

REUTERS An operator works on his table while enrolling villagers for the Unique Identification (UID) database system at an enrolment
centre in Rajasthan.

NEW DELHI—The authenticity of the data stored in India's controversial Aadhaar identity
database, which contains the biometrics and personal information of over 1 billion Indians,
has been compromised by a software patch that disables critical security features of the
software used to enrol new Aadhaar users, a three month-long investigation by HuffPost
India reveals.

The patch—freely available for as little as Rs 2,500 (around $35)— allows unauthorised
persons, based anywhere in the world, to generate Aadhaar numbers at will, and is still in
widespread use.

This has significant implications for national security at a time when the Indian government
has sought to make Aadhaar numbers the gold standard for citizen identification, and
mandatory for everything from using a mobile phone to accessing a bank account.

ALSO READ: The Aadhaar Judgement Of The Supreme Court Is Out On Wednesday.
What Is It All About?

A patch is a bundle of code used to alter the functionality of a software programme.


Companies often use patches for minor updates to existing programmes, but they can also
be used for harm by introducing a vulnerability—as in this case.

HuffPost India is in possession of the patch, and had it analysed by three internationally
reputed experts, and two Indian analysts (one of whom sought anonymity as he works at a
state-funded university), to find that:

The patch lets a user bypass critical security features such as biometric
authentication of enrolment operators to generate unauthorised Aadhaar
numbers.

The patch disables the enrolment software's in-built GPS security feature (used to
identify the physical location of every enrolment centre), which means anyone
anywhere in the world — say, Beijing, Karachi or Kabul — can use the software to
enrol users.

The patch reduces the sensitivity of the enrolment software's iris-recognition


system, making it easier to spoof the software with a photograph of a registered
operator, rather than requiring the operator to be present in person.

The experts consulted by HuffPost India said that the vulnerability is intrinsic to a
technology choice made at the inception of the Aadhaar programme, which means that
fixing it and other future threats would require altering Aadhaar's fundamental structure.

"Whomever created the patch was highly motivated to compromise Aadhaar," said Gustaf
Björksten, Chief Technologist at Access Now, a global technology policy and advocacy
group, and one of the experts who analysed the patch at HuffPost India's request.

"There are probably many individuals and entities, criminal, political, domestic and foreign,
that would derive enough benefit from this compromise of Aadhaar to make the investment
in creating the patch worthwhile," Björksten said. "To have any hope of securing Aadhaar,
the system design would have to be radically changed."

Bengaluru-based cyber security analyst and software developer Anand Venkatanarayanan,


who also analysed the software for HuffPost India and shared his findings with the NCIIPC
government authority, said the patch was assembled by grafting code from older versions
of the Aadhaar enrolment software—which had fewer security features— on to newer
versions of the software.

NCIIPC, or National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre, is the nodal agency
responsible for Aadhaar security.

Venkatanarayanan's findings were confirmed by Dan Wallach, Professor of Computer


Science, and Electrical and Computer Engineering, at Rice University in Houston, Texas.

"Having looked at the patch code and the report presented by Anand, I feel pretty
comfortable saying that the report is correct, and it could allow someone to circumvent
security measures in the Aadhaar software, and create new entries. This is pretty feasible,
and looks like something that would be possible to engineer," Wallach said.

MINT VIA GETTY IMAGES The hack reduces the sensitivity of the iris-recognition system in the UIDAI's Aadhaar enrolment software

Indian authorities have declined comment, despite HuffPost India reaching out to both
NCIIPC and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) on more than one occasion
since July this year.

While NCIIPC requested a copy of the patch, which HuffPost India provided in the same
month, the agency has declined to share its findings. UIDAI did not respond to HuffPost
India's mails.

A SERIES OF PRAGMATIC CHOICES

The genesis of the current hack lies in a decision, made in 2010, to let private agencies
enrol users to the Aadhaar system in order to speed up enrolments. That year, Mindtree, a
Bengaluru-based company, won a contract to develop an official, standardised enrolment
software — called the Enrolment Client Multi-Platform (ECMP)— that would be installed onto
the thousands of computers maintained by these private operators.

Apart from private enrolment agencies, the UIDAI also signed enrolment agreements with
"common service centres" — village-level computer kiosks that help citizens access
common e-governance services such as pensions, student scholarships etc. By February
2018, these centres were responsible for enrolling 180 million Indians.

ALSO READ: This Uzbek National Was Arrested Last Year With An Aadhaar Card
Believed To Be Forged. It's Still Valid On The UIDAI Website

This decision to install the software on each enrolment computer, said cyber security expert
Björksten, "puts the running of critical components of Aadhaar in the hands of the enemies
of the system".

A more secure choice would have been a web-based system in which all software would
be installed on the UIDAI's own servers and enrolment operators would have a user name
and password to access the system.

(A useful analogy is the difference between Microsoft Word — which is installed on


computers — and web-based Google Docs, which is hosted online by Google, and users
simply log on to use the service.)

B. Regunath, a software architect who led the team at Mindtree that worked on the project,
said a web-based enrolment software for Aadhaar was not practical at the time because
many parts of the country had very poor Internet connectivity.

"People were cranking up generators just to light up power and do the enrolment. How can
they do an online upload of those packets?" asked Regunath, who has since moved to a
senior technical position at Flipkart.

"We launched and issued the first Aadhaar card just three months after being selected,"
Regunath said, recalling that the launch was done urgently to meet a publicly announced
deadline, without all the software features in place.

To compensate for handing effective control of the enrolment process to thousands of


operators scattered across the country, Regunath's team added security features to the
software — most prominently, a feature that required all operators to log in to the software
by first providing their own fingerprint or iris scan. Any laptop being used had to first be
registered with the UIDAI as well.

"We added a feature to check if the operator is certified, fixed people meddling with the
system, we added a feature to check if the enrolment guys are running pirated or un-
updated versions of Windows," Regunath said.

The UIDAI had also mandated that each computer used for enrolment was attached to a
GPS device to ensure enrolment was done within the physical confines of the authorised
centres.

Yet by early 2017, these carefully considered security features were bypassed by an
elegant software hack that began circulating among the private enrolment operators
empanelled to register a billion Indians to the Aadhaar database.

SCREENSHOT/ YOUTUBE

The use of this patch was so widespread that a YouTube search for "ecmp bypass" reveals
hundreds of videos of private operators offering step-by-step guidance on how to subvert
the UIDAI's security protocols.

"This is a straightforward, business-like, and utilitarian hack," said Björksten, the security
analyst. "Having examined the entirety of the code, it is my opinion that the patch is the
work of more than one coder."

Mindtree, the company that first developed the software, has acknowledged a list of
queries sent by HuffPost India. The story will be updated once they respond.

INSTALLING THE AADHAAR HACK IS AS SIMPLE AS CUT AND


PASTE

Sourcing the patch is as easy as gaining access to one of thousands of WhatsApp groups
where the patch, and the usernames and passwords required to login to the UIDAI's
enrolment gateway, are sold for as little as Rs 2,500.

Payments are made through mobile wallets linked to phone numbers that quickly go dead
after the transactions are complete.

Using the patch is as simple as installing the enrolment software on a PC, and replacing a
folder of Java libraries using the standard Control C, Control V cut-paste commands familiar
to any computer user.

Once the patch is installed, enrolment operators no longer need to provide their fingerprint
to use the enrolment software, the GPS is disabled, and the sensitivity of the iris scanner is
reduced. This means that a single operator can log into multiple machines at the same
time, reducing the cost per enrolment, and increasing their profits.

Bharat Bhushan Gupta, a 32-year-old former enrolment operator from Jalandhar, said
operators like him were paid only Rs 30 per enrolment, so many operators began using the
patch to make a little more money, charging between Rs 100 and Rs 500 in their own
capacity. Gupta said he had not used the patch, and had written to the UIDAI CEO and
others in the authority about its existence.

HuffPost India could not establish just how many enrolment centres used the patch, but
even the UIDAI has admitted that the enrolment process has been marred by corruption. In
2017, the UIDAI said it had blacklisted 49,000 enrolment centres for various violations, and
in February 2018, the UIDAI terminated all contracts with common service centres as well.

Henceforth, only banks and government institutions like the postal service can enrol
Aadhaar users. As a consequence, tens of thousands of young men, with rudimentary
education but great familiarity with the Aadhaar system, were put out of work.

REUTERS A file photo of a woman going through the process of finger scanning for the Unique Identification (UID) database
system, also known as Aadhaar, at a registration centre in New Delhi, India, on 17 January 2018.

"We can't even make minimum wage," said Gupta, who used to run his own common
service centre. "When they closed the enrolments, we had already formed WhatsApp
groups through which we could help each other to use the software, and in these groups,
there were some people who were offering new software that could be used to look up
anyone's information."

In interviews, out-of-work operators claim they can still use the hacked enrolment software
to generate enrolment ids (the first step in the Aadhaar registration process) and have tied
up with sources working in authorised centres who complete the registration process for a
fee.

WHO IS BEHIND THE AADHAAR HACK?

While the hack is being used by village-level computer operators, with no formal
knowledge of programming, security researchers like Björksten and Venkatanarayanan say
the hack represents a significant investment in time and resources — suggesting
sophisticated well-trained adversaries.

"I get the sense that the patch does just the minimum needed," Björksten said. "The
programmers have cut corners by utilising previous versions of the Aadhaar code. This is a
straightforward, business-like, and utilitarian hack."

"This patch has been created to be used, not just for the purpose of security research, or to
highlight the security problems with the Aadhaar system." said Björksten.

"They have used some of the files from earlier versions of the Aadhaar software, which did
not have these security features, and they have also made changes that remove other
security checks," Venkatanarayanan said.

The changes are specific and targeted.

Apart from the changes mentioned previously, an analysis of the patch code by Björksten
and Venkatanarayanan reveals one change that marginally reduces the fail-rate for iris
recognition, resulting in more positive matches and making it possible to spoof the system
with a high-resolution photograph.

Another change extends the duration of each login session — reducing how often a
username and password needs to be entered, and thereby reducing security.

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE AADHAAR HACK?

The software patch is unusual in that it doesn't seek to access information stored in the
Aadhaar database, but rather looks to introduce information into it.

This, experts said, creates a whole new set of problems and could defeat many of
Aadhaar's purported aims, such as reducing corruption, tracking black money, eliminating
fraud and identity theft. It also means that the Aadhaar database is vulnerable to the same
problems of ghost entries as any other government database.

ALSO READ: With A Rubber Stamp Of His Thumb, Aadhaar Officer In Maharashtra Was
Running A Money-Making Scam

"If anybody is able to create an entry in the Aadhaar database, then potentially the the
person can create multiple Aadhaar cards. Then the same person can siphon off rations of
multiple people," said Rajendran Narayanan, Assistant Professor, Azim Premji University,
Bengaluru. "Since there are fixed quotas for rations, this would mean that several genuine
beneficiaries would be excluded."

Similar problems can be introduced in all government schemes, Narayanan said.

HINDUSTAN TIMES VIA GETTY IMAGES

"There's a parallel between what's happening in India with what's happening in America,"
said Wallach of Rice University. "Not every American is born in a hospital, where a tonne of
documentation is created automatically upon their birth. Many Americans, particularly poor
Americans, give birth at home, where there's less documentation.

"This has recently become a problem for Americans born in the Rio Grande Valley, on the
border between Texas and Mexico, where apparently some midwives were creating
fraudulent documentation for non-Americans. The current response is an over-reaction to
this, denying citizenship to rightful Americans in an attempt to remove an unknown number
of frauds."

"The connection to India is pretty straightforward," he said. "India is trying to 'document' its
citizens and they face a variation on the same problem as in America where many of the
benefits of civil society are built on a bedrock of citizenship, but that citizenship itself can
be a shaky foundation."

Ultimately, the very existence of the patch reveals that the Aadhaar framework, like any
networked framework, is vulnerable, despite repeated assertions by UIDAI officials to the
contrary.

This most recent vulnerability is an illustration of how extending Aadhaar to services and
purposes it was never designed for has compromised the security of the entire project.

Ananth Padmanabhan, a fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, said that from 2008 to
2011, Aadhaar shifted from being a purely government project to one that increasingly
relied on participation by private players, without addressing the security implications of
giving poorly supervised private individuals the capability to access the "end-point" — ie,
the computers that connect to the UIDAI servers.

"Many cyber hacks happen on account of endpoint vulnerabilities," Padmanabhan said,


"And by opening up the national identity database to private actors for easy on-boarding,
the powers that be have exponentially heightened security threats."

The UIDAI has now responded, dismissing the report. You can read HuffPost India's
rebuttal.

Suggest a correction

AADHAAR DATA BREACH PRIVACY TECH UIDAI

By Rachna Khaira,
Principal Correspondent (Tech & Privacy)

Aman Sethi,
Editor-in-Chief, HuffPost India

and

Gopal Sathe
Editor, Technology.

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This article exists as part of the online archive for HuffPost India, which closed in 2020. Some features are no longer enabled. If you
have questions or concerns about this article, please contact indiasupport@huffpost.com.

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