Logic the Art of Defining and Reasoning

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LOGIC : The Art of Defining
and Reasoning
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JOHN A. OESTERLE, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
LOGIC: The Art of Defining

and Reasoning
Second Edition
PRENTICE-HALL, INC.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
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Second printing.June, 1964
© 1953, 1963 by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be

reproduced in any form, by mimeograph or any other means,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-10990
Printed in the United States of America
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ONUUP
WIFE
23694
PREFACE
The aim of this second edition remains unchanged from that of the
original: to present briefly the basic doctrine of logic for an introductory
course. The book is based principally upon the Organon of Aristotle
wherein the diverse parts of logic have been set in their proper order.
The text also relies upon the major commentators on Aristotle, es¬
pecially St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Albert the Great, who in their turn
drew upon the Arabs; modern sources have also been taken into account.
So far as possible, logic is presented in ordinary language; however,
some of the terminology of logic has been sanctioned so completely by
time and use that it has become a necessary part of the vocabulary of a
logic text. In general, only the most essential matter is included in the
text in order to concentrate on the points that should be covered in any
introductory course. The workbook form has been adopted to insure at
least a minimum amount of exercise for developing an orderly frame of
mind.
The division of logic according to the three acts of the intellect is
taken from the Commentary of St. Thomas on Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics, an excerpt of which appears in the Appendix. Part One, The
Logic of Simple Apprehension, has been entirely rewritten without de¬
parting, however, from the numbering of the chapters and the basic
order contained in the original edition. Thus, definition remains the
most important topic in the first part; it manifests most completely
the way in which we know a simple object and serves, therefore, as the
principle of order for this first part. The material on the predicables, the
categories, and division has been expanded, with more select examples,
questions, and exercises. The opening chapter has also been expanded
Vlll PREFACE
and contains a more basic approach to the important doctrine of the

sign-
Part Two, The Logic of Composition and Division, has also been en¬
tirely rewritten. The chapter on truth and falsity, which began Part Two
in the original edition, has been dropped; the following chapter on the
proposition contains whatever explanations are needed. Emphasis on
supposition as a property of the parts of the proposition has been re¬
tained, an understanding of which is necessary not only for the structure
of the proposition, but also for certain modern problems raised about
the truth and falsity of propositions and their opposition. The validity
of the Square of Opposition is explicitly defended against certain objec¬
tions raised about it. Contraposition is treated, but as a combination of
relations of propositions rather than as a distinct relation.
In Part Three, The Logic of Reasoning, the following chapters remain
the same as in the original edition: Argumentation, Reduction of Syllo¬
gisms to the First Figure, Induction, Argumentation Materially Con¬
sidered, and Sophistical Reasoning, although the exercises and many of
the questions have been changed. The chapter formerly on the ab¬
breviated syllogism has been expanded to include the syllogism with a
causal premise (the epicheirema), the sorites, and the dilemma.
Throughout this text, as in the original edition, there is no treatment
of symbolic logic. The author remains convinced that any attempt to
include modern symbolic and Aristotelian logic within the confines of
a single introductory presentation is almost certain to be an insufficient
and even misleading treatment. Neither approach to logic is then
adequately presented. Aristotelian logic in the context of symbolic logic
is misunderstood and reduced to “class” analysis; symbolic logic, in an
Aristotelian context, is not fully represented for what it aims to achieve—
a skillful and purely mechanical operation on symbols according to rules
of computation. In the judgment of the author, the two approaches
differ more than they agree, and the attempt to combine them within
the limitations of one semester tends to do disservice to both. For this
reason, the text considers only the logic which serves as the common
method of philosophy and of knowledge generally, the various sciences
having in addition their proper methods.
Many acknowledgments are in order for the present and past editions
of the text. I am grateful to the many users of the former edition who
have communicated their reactions either to me or to the editors of
Prentice-Hall; as far as possible, their valuable suggestions have been taken
into account. I am indebted to Fr. John Klopke, C.PP.S., St. Joseph’s
College, Rensselaer, Indiana, for having prepared supplementary exer¬
cises which were used in both editions. I am further obligated to Fr.
William Baumgaertner, St. Paul Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota, and to
PREFACE IX
Fr. Henri DuLac, Head of the Department of Philosophy at the College

of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, for their painstaking and careful
consideration of the text of both editions. To Professors Thomas De
Koninck and Harry Neilsen, present colleagues at the University of
Notre Dame, I am likewise grateful; to the former, for valuable assistance
in the opening chapter and suggestions for other parts, to the latter for
material relating to fallacies and particularly for the second exercise on
fallacies. To all I express my regrets for whatever shortcomings still re¬
main.
J.A.O.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface viii
Introduction xv
I THE LOGIC OF THE FIRST ACT
OF THE INTELLECT: SIMPLE APPREHENSION
CHAPTER ONE
Signs, Words, and Concepts 3
CHAPTER TWO
The Predicables 13
CHAPTER THREE
Distinctions Preliminary to the Categories 27
CHAPTER FOUR
The Categories 35
CHAPTER FIVE
Division 49
CHAPTER SIX
Definition 63
XI
XU TABLE OF CONTENTS
II THE LOGIC OF THE SECOND ACT

OF THE INTELLECT: COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Proposition 81
CHAPTER EIGHT
Divisions of the Proposition 89
CHAPTER NINE
Supposition 103
CHAPTER TEN
Opposition of Propositions 115
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Obversion of Propositions 133
CHAPTER TWELVE
Conversion of Propositions 141
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
The Compound Proposition 153
III THE LOGIC OF THE THIRD ACT
OF THE INTELLECT: REASONING
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Argumentation 167
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
The Syllogism 171
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Principles and Rules of the Syllogism 181

TABLE OF CONTENTS Xlll
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
Reduction of Syllogisms to the First Figure 201
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
The Compound Syllogism 211
CHAPTER NINETEEN
Abbreviated and Expanded Syllogisms 219
CHAPTER TWENTY
Induction 231
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
Argumentation Materially Considered 237
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
Sophistical Reasoning 253
APPENDIX
Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, Lesson I, on

Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 269
INDEX 275
INTRODUCTION
MEANING AND DIVISION

OF LOGIC
What is logic and why should we study logic? We might begin

our answer to this question by observing that everyone naturally desires
to know. This self-evident statement simply means that a human being
is so constituted that he cannot help wanting to know. A human being
is a knowing being.
But what kind of knowing? We know in various ways. For example, I
know that a dinner is cooking by smelling it. I know that a man is in a
chair by looking at him. I know what New York looks like by remember¬
ing my visit there a year ago. In a more complex way than in any of the
preceding examples, I know that sooner or later I shall die; even more, I
know that every man dies and why every man must die.
What kind of knowing do we mean, then, when we say that everyone
naturally desires to know? In the sense that every human being is so
constituted that he cannot help wanting to know, every kind of knowing
is included. But if we take the statement to mean the kind of knowing
with which a human being is distinctively concerned, then the statement
applies properly to the last kind of knowing. The last kind of knowing
is reasoned knowing.
What do we mean by reasoned knowing? It is that kind of knowing
by which we find out why this or that is so. Thus, if someone asks me
why every man must die—why every man is mortal—I have to give him
some reason for accepting the statement as true. In brief, I have to prove
it. This kind of knowing is distinctively human knowing, for we do not
go about proving to horses or cows or even apes that they, too, must die,
xv
XVI INTRODUCTION
although it is just as true that they die as it is that human beings die.
All human beings, then, in varying degrees, want to know why things
are so. An evident sign of this is that even as children we frequently ask
for the why of things. We are insatiably curious. This universal wonder
of human beings is never entirely smothered, although we often dis¬
regard its promptings. As the ancient Greeks declared, wonder is the
starting point of knowledge. Wonder is the starting point in the sense
that we wonder what can be the explanation or cause of the things that
we are continually observing. It is only when we do know the cause of a
thing that our wonder ceases about that thing, for only by knowing the
cause is our wonder fully satisfied.
Now logic is nothing else than the art that guides us in coming to
know something previously unknown to us. Logic, then, is an instrument
for helping us to find out why things are as they are. An axe is an instru¬
ment for cutting down a tree. A sharp axe is an efficient instrument for
cutting down a tree. The power of thinking is an instrument for knowing
the why and wherefore of things, but thinking sharpened by skill in logic
is an efficient instrument for scientific knowing. We thus have at least
a preliminary answer to what logic is and why we should study it. If every
human being wants to know, in some degree, and if logic is an indis¬
pensable means of obtaining knowledge more easily, more surely, and
more efficiently, then the study of logic is of use to every human being.
Let us now investigate in greater detail what logic is about and how
we reason in a logical way. Suppose that you were walking down a street
on a wintry day after a heavy snowfall. The sun is out and shining
brightly. You notice the shining of the sun in particular because your
eyes are bothered by the reflection of the sun on the snow. The thought
might occur to you how much the snow reflects the light of the sun.
This thought, in turn, might call your attention to the whiteness of the
snow. You would recognize at once that the whiteness of the snow was
the reason for the bright reflection of the snow in your eyes.
In this very ordinary example, you have informally gone through a
reasoning process. You started with the statement Snow reflects light.
You proceeded almost immediately to give the reason why snow reflects
light, namely, Snow is white. The first statement follows from the sec¬
ond statement, and the two statements can be put down in the fol¬
lowing order:
Snow is white.
Therefore, snow reflects light.
The word “therefore” indicates that the second statement follows as a
conclusion from the first. Now if you analyze these two statements, you
will notice that there is a third statement implicitly contained in them, a
statement containing the words “white” and “light.” This third state-
INTRODUCTION XVII
ment would read: White reflects light. You would then have three state¬
ments, appearing in the following order:
White reflects light.

Snow is white.
Therefore, snow reflects light.
This full argument is called a syllogism. It is a movement of our

power of reasoning that grasps the truth of a conclusion by seeing the
truth and connection of the two propositions leading to the conclusion.
Logic guides us in knowing how to construct an argument like this, a
kind of knowing, as we shall see, that is demonstrative knowledge. But
to know what a syllogism is, and how to construct a syllogism, we have
to know the parts of a syllogism, just as we have to know the different
parts of a house in order to build a house.
The most immediate parts of a syllogism are the propositions of which
it is composed. Logic will help us understand what propositions are, and
what their relation is to each other, so that from them we can make
good arguments, or syllogisms, and thus demonstrate what we know.
There are, however, other parts of a syllogism besides propositions.
Words, which signify concepts, also make up a syllogism; for instance,
“snow,” “light,” and “white” were parts of the syllogism given above.
Words, in fact, are parts of propositions as well as parts of syllogisms.
The words “snow” and “white” are parts of the proposition Snow is
white. “Snow” and “white” are also parts of the syllogism given above,
but they are parts of a syllogism differently from the way in which they
are parts of a proposition, as we shall see later.
The syllogism given above was chosen deliberately to bring out the
need of knowing the parts of a proposition before knowing the whole
proposition; it also brings out the need of knowing the parts of a syllo¬
gism before knowing the whole syllogism. Clearly we have to know what
various words mean before we put them into propositions, and we have
to know whether propositions are true before we can construct a sound
argument out of them. Thus, in the given syllogism, we have to know
what “snow” means and what “white” means—we have to be able to
define the things—before we can determine whether the proposition is
true or not. And then, before we can give a full syllogism, we must
further know the structure of a proposition, and how to determine when
a proposition is true. Finally, in giving the full syllogism, we have to
know how to relate propositions to each other and infer a conclusion
from them.
We can now see the extent of an elementary course in logic. There
are three main topics to be considered: (1) definition, (2) proposition,
and (3) syllogism. Each of these belongs to a different act of the human
intellect.
XVJI1 INTRODUCTION
Definition is known by the act of simple apprehension. The act of

simple apprehension is the way in which we grasp a simple object, such
as man or dog or horse. This is the first act of the human intellect, and
we express these simple notions by definitions. We must know such
simple objects first before we can combine simple objects into the com¬
plex structure of a proposition. In short, we must know the definitions
of dog and animal before we can combine them into the proposition
Every dog is an animal.
The proposition (also called an enunciation) is known by the intel¬
lectual act of composition and division, in which truth or falsity is found.
Hence, if we combine or compose two terms, as in Every dog is an
animal, we have an affirmative proposition. If we divide or deny two
terms of each other, as in No horses are dogs, we have a negative
proposition.
The syllogism is known by the act of reasoning, in which we proceed
from one thing to another. More specifically, by knowing two propo¬
sitions as true and as related in a certain way to each other, we reason
to a third proposition concluding from them. Thus, by knowing Every
mammal is an animal and Every cow is a mammal, we arrive at the
reasoned knowledge Every cow is an animal.
Let us recall here that we originally spoke of logic as the art that
guides us in coming to know the unknown. There are, actually, only
two kinds of unknown objects: a simple object, such as man, and a
complex object, such as Man is artistic. Let us relate the two kinds of
unknown objects to the three acts of the intellect listed above.
As we have seen, a simple object is made known by the first act of the
intellect, which we called simple apprehension. The principal means of
knowing a simple object is by defining it. A sign that we know the simple
object man is the definition that we give of man. Since the purpose of
the first act of the intellect is to arrive at definitions, this act is guided
by the part of logic that we call the art of defining.
A complex object is made known by means of argumentation. But
argumentation requires two additional acts of the intellect: the act of
composition or division and the act of reasoning. Hence, the second act
of the intellect combines the simple objects that have been made known
by the first act of the intellect in definition. It combines them by affirm¬
ing one simple object of another; it divides them by denying one of the
other. If such a combination or division is not self-evident, then it must
be manifested by argumentation, and because of this, a third act of the
intellect is necessary. The third act is the reasoning process by which we
proceed from propositions made known by the second act of the intellect
to a conclusion following from these propositions.
From this discussion we can now give a definition of logic and the
INTRODUCTION XIX
principal divisions of logic. Logic is the art that directs the three acts
of the intellect. The division of logic, finally can be outlined as follows:
Object Made Known By Acts of the Intellect Logic
Simple Definition Simple Apprehension (Part One)
^ . . (Composition or Division (Part Two)
Complex Argumentation )t> o. -n. \
r ° (Reasoning (Part three)
I
THE LOGIC OF
THE FIRST ACT
OF THE INTELLECT:
SIMPLE APPREHENSION
CHAPTER ONE
SIGNS, WORDS, AND
CONCEPTS
Experience teaches us that we know in two basically distinct

ways. The first way is by sensation. We are familiar enough with the way
we know by our external senses, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or
touching. In such knowing we are limited to the here and now; when
we know colors or sounds we know them at a particular time and place
(for example, this apple as now red). We also have internal sense cog¬
nition, such as imagination and memory, whereby we begin to transcend
some of the limitations of the external senses. We can recall by memory
what someone looks like or what a piece of music sounds like. By imag¬
ination, we can represent to ourselves the face of an individual who never
existed or we can make up musical sounds never heard before.
We are also aware from experience that we have intellectual knowing.
It wholly exceeds what we know by sensation. The senses will convey to
me a good deal of information about a particular person, for example, his
visual appearance. By intellectual cognition, I can know not only what
sort of person he is (for example, honest, witty, or studious), but also
what it is to be a human being at all, what man is by nature.
Our sense and intellectual knowing usually go on simultaneously; in
the very seeing of a person we also at once form some understanding of
him. It is easy enough, consequently, not to distinguish the two suffi¬
ciently. Upon reflection, however, we recognize that our intellectual
knowing is primarily abstractive in character. Let us understand, first
of all, the word “abstract” as a verb, for we are speaking of the process of
knowing. To abstract means commonly to separate, to put aside while
3
4 SIGNS, WORDS, AND CONCEPTS
retaining something else. Applied to intellectual knowing, to abstract

is to leave aside whatever is singular and material about an object while
retaining a grasp of the nature of that object or, more simply, a grasp
of what the object is. Thus we abstract what it is to be man, however
vague at first, from our experience of individual men. Hence we recog¬
nize from our experience that our sense knowing directs us to what is
singular and material about objects, whereas our intellectual knowing
directs us to grasping what these objects are—what their natures are,
which we know as universal or common to many. Our very language
reveals this distinction of sense and intellect; singular expressions like
this man or this color relate more to sense, while common or universal
names like man or color relate more to intellectual knowing.
In beginning the study of logic, we presuppose these common observa¬
tions about our two basic ways of knowing. It may already be evident
from the Introduction that logic considers intellectual knowing and has
no direct concern with sense knowing. It is relevant to logic, however, to
take into account the distinction between the two fundamental ways by
which we know, for our intellectual knowing presupposes and depends
upon our sense knowing.
The Notion of a Sign
The intimate relation between sense and intellectual knowing in

man, as well as the fact that all our knowledge originates in sense, can
be most readily seen in the notion of a sign and the role the sign plays
in our knowing. Logic is constantly treating signs in one way or another,
and semantics, the study of signs, is an important part of logic. We shall
confine our semantic treatment, however, to the definition of the sign,
the different kinds of sign, and the significance of signs for our knowing
and for logic in particular.
A sign may be defined initially as that which, over and beyond the
impression it produces on the senses, brings to the mind something other
than itself.
In this definition of a sign, emphasis is put on the phrase “on the
senses.” The relevance of this emphasis lies in the fact that the true
nature of the sign cannot be understood without underlining sense know¬
ing. True enough, the word “sign” will have more than one meaning, just
as there is more than one kind of sign, but the first and proper meaning
of a sign refers to the sign as grasped by sensation; this fact also reiterates
that human knowing, in which signs play so central a role, originates in
sense knowing.
The very notion of a sign brings out the point that in knowing we are
necessarily led from one thing to another. It belongs to the nature of a
sign to refer us to something other than itself. Moreover, this passage
SIGNS, WORDS, AND CONCEPTS 5
from one thing to another is immediate; this immediacy of reference to
something else sets off the sign from a full blown argument, such as the
syllogism, wherein we must be led to something else by means of a
middle term known first in itself before referring us to something else.
The Natural Sign
The notion of a sign is first and best verified in what is called a

natural sign. It is the natural sign which most evidently leads us from
one thing to another immediately. Some examples of a natural sign will
bear this out. Smoke, by its very nature, refers to fire and immediately
brings to mind the thought of fire. A groan is similarly a natural sign of
pain, footprints the natural sign of the former presence of an animal or
man, thunder the natural sign of a storm.
These examples manifest how such signs naturally refer us to some¬
thing other than themselves. However, we need to draw a distinction be¬
tween purely natural signs, such as we have indicated so far, and signs
which, though also having their signification by nature, in addition betray
some intention or desire of communication. Let us refer again to the ex¬
ample of a groan as a purely natural sign of pain, uttered only because of
the intensity of pain. If a groan, in addition, were uttered by someone
with the desire to communicate this feeling to others, we would then have
a natural sign by intent. This distinction between a purely natural sign
and a natural sign by intent, though a seemingly slight one, is neverthe¬
less of importance. Vocal sound as simply signifying emotion is a purely
natural sign, but vocal sound uttered purposely to convey anger or fear
is a natural sign by intent. Such signs can be employed by both animals
and human beings. Natural signs by intent are aimed principally at the
sense of hearing, and upon such signs rests the first appeal of poetic and
musical art; they are also addressed to the sense of sight, as in many ges¬
tures.
The Conventional Sign
Wholly distinct from any natural sign is the conventional sign.

What makes a sign conventional is the fact that it owes its signification
to human reason and will as opposed to nature. Consequently, the rela¬
tion between such a sign and what it signifies is made deliberately,
and even arbitrarily, by human will. Conventional signs are artifacts, that
is, objects devised and formed by human reason. Thus traffic lights are
conventional signs for the flow of traffic; the sound of bells for the be¬
ginning and ending of class periods.
Conventional signs are potentially infinite in number and variety,
for man constantly devises many signs of this kind to assist him in
knowing and communicating. Some of them are wholly arbitrary, as

symbols in mathematics. Others, though remaining quite conventional,
are nonetheless limited in their arbitrariness since there is something
remotely natural about them. For example, words are conventional signs
in that the meaning of words is imposed by human institution; still,
insofar as words are first realized in sound, there is an appropriateness in
the signification of words, which is absent in a pure symbol such as oo
signifying infinity. However, we shall call all signs conventional which
rest wholly on human institution, whether words, symbols or traffic
lights. Let us not overlook the fact that the conventional sign shares all
the characteristics of the natural sign except the source of meaning—by
human institution in the first case, by nature in the other. Both are first
of all something sensed, and both lead one to something other than
themselves.
A distinction, however, may be drawn between the purely conven¬
tional sign so far discussed and what might be called a conventional sign
by custom. Consider the difference between the word “cross” as signify¬
ing Christianity and an artifact such as a cross, signifying Christianity.
Both retain the conventional character of a sign in that the signification
arises by human institution. The conventional sign by custom, however,
rests to some extent on the basis of some custom or tradition. We thus
have a number of signs originating from national customs, religious cus¬
toms or even from matters relating to etiquette.
The Formal Sign
This last type of sign involves a very extended meaning of the

word “sign.” There is little left of the definition of the sign as we first
gave it. What is retained, however, is the important element in the
notion of a sign, that of referring the mind to something other than
itself.
What sets off the formal sign from the foregoing types is that it is an
interior sign, that is, a sign within a knowing power. Since we have only
two main kinds of knowing power, there are only two formal signs. The
formal sign within sense knowing is the image. The formal sign within
the intellectual knowing power is the concept. Both are therefore pure
means of knowing, never objects known first in and by themselves as are
natural and conventional signs, but only pure instruments by which we
know everything we know.
We can perhaps best contrast formal signs, on the one hand, with
both natural and conventional signs, and on the other by giving a further
definition of sign. A sign is that which represents something other than
itself to a knowing power. The formal sign, reducible either to an image
or a concept, only represents something other than itself to a knowing
power; a natural or conventional sign also represents something other
than itself, but any such sign is also itself an object to be known and
must first be known in order to grasp what it signifies.
A final contrast may be helpful. A footprint is a natural sign repre¬
senting the former presence of an animal of some kind, but it is also a
physical object itself. I grasp this physical object by means of an image
and a concept. The image and concept of the footprint are formal signs;
the footprint itself is a natural sign. From this we see that we grasp all
natural and conventional signs through formal signs, but we do not
thereby confuse the different kinds of signs.
Words and Concepts
Our primary interest in developing the notion of the sign is to

see how a distinction in kinds of sign helps us to see a distinction be¬
tween words and concepts.
The most perfect conventional sign is the word. It is the indispensable
means we have for communicating thought, for any intellectual com¬
munication between human beings must in the end be through words.
Every conceivable system of signs other than words, any set of symbols,
ultimately acquires meaning and is basically communicable by means
of words, whatever other advantages special symbols may have for par¬
ticular purposes. The word is distinctively a human sign—on the one
hand, it retains all the characteristics of the first meaning we gave of
the sign, thus reflecting the human way of knowing by being first a
sensible sign; on the other hand, its very purpose is to convey something
intellectual, and thus refer us to something other than itself, that is,
thought. The word is the witness to thought.
The word, then, is a conventional sign imposed to signify a thought
or concept. The concept, as we have seen, is a formal sign. The basic
distinction between word and concept is therefore one between conven¬
tional and formal signs.
The important consequence emerging from the distinction between
words and concepts is that words never directly signify objects or things,
but signify them only via concepts. A given word conventionally or arbi¬
trarily signifies the concept of the object we know. The word “dog,” for
example, is imposed by us to signify our concept of a certain kind of
animal.
This conventional signification that words have in relation to concepts
explains why there is not a simple one-to-one relation between words
and concepts. Often enough, one word does signify only one concept of
one object, as the word “man” is imposed to signify our concept of what
it is to be a human being.
Nonetheless, one word can signify two diverse concepts of two diverse
things—precisely because words are arbitrary signs. The word “race” can
signify the concept of a contest of speed and the concept of a nation of
people.
Further, two different words can signify one and the same concept.
This is most evident in the diversity of human languages; French words
signify the same concepts as English words, otherwise translation would
be impossible. Even within one language, we have synonymous words;
for example, “wealth” and “riches” both signify the concept of abundant
possessions.
Our stress on the distinction between words and concepts, namely that
words arbitrarily signify concepts and that words relate to things only
through an intermediary thought, must not lead us to a too simplified
notion of the relation of words-concepts-things. We must take into ac¬
count that the way words, through concepts, signify things does not
necessarily lead us immediately to know things wholly and distinctly for
what they are. The point is that words signify things in the way things
become known to us and are present in our minds. For example, we can¬
not suppose that the word “man” at the outset necessarily refers us to
what human nature is in itself; the word “man” immediately refers us
to the notion of “man” as it is present in our mind, and by means of this
mental representation, to what we understand as man. We therefore see
that we can name things only to the extent we know them; if there is a
difference between you and me with regard to what the word “man”
signifies, it is a difference in the way we know the object in question, not
a difference of the object itself. In this way, we see a need for logic,
namely the aid logic as an art can provide us in coming to know better,
and in a more orderly way, what otherwise would remain relatively un¬
known or imprecise. This aid is needed even in regard to the most simple
objects we know, and hence the first part of logic, culminating in the art
of definition, is ordered to helping us know better even the simple ob¬
jects of our experience.
It is clear, therefore, that logic needs to consider words, not for the
reason that grammar treats words, but for the basic reason that without
words we could not express the things we conceive. It remains true that
logic is more basically concerned with things as they are conceived in the
mind, but since we express our concepts most fully, most perfectly, by
words, logic must constantly take words into account in their role as
instruments for expressing and communicating concepts.
Questions -*** Chapter One
1. Distinguish the two distinct ways by which we know.

2. Explain how human intellectual knowing is primarily abstractive in
character.
3. How does language reveal the distinction between sense and intellectual
knowing?
4. How is the sign initially defined? How does this definition relate to the
distinction between sense and intellectual knowing?
5. What is a natural sign? Give some original examples.
6. Distinguish between a purely natural sign and a natural sign by intent.
Illustrate with original examples.
7. What is a conventional sign? Distinguish between the natural sign and
the conventional sign.
8. What is the difference between a purely conventional sign and a conven¬
tional sign by custom?
9. Explain the formal sign. Contrast it with the natural and the conventional
sign.
10. Why is the word the most perfect conventional sign?
11. Explain the relation between words and concepts.
12. Explain the different relations between words and concepts.
13. Do words, through concepts, manifest things distinctly? Explain.
14. Why do we need logic to help us grasp simple objects?
L
Exercise Chapter One
Classify the following signs as natural or conventional. If purely natural,

write N; if natural by intent, write NI. If purely conventional, write C; if
conventional by custom, write CC.
- 1. Sound of a bell as signifying the end of a boxing round.
_ 2. Fever as signifying illness.
_ 3. Snoring as signifying sleep.
_ 4. Snoring as signifying feigned sleep.
_ 5. The word “white” as signifying a certain color.
_ 6. Shaking hands as signifying departure.
_ 7. A shout as signifying the attracting of attention.
_8. Roman collar as signifying a priest.
_ 9. A will as signifying one’s last testimony.
_10. $ as signifying dollars.
_11. Booing as signifying disapproval.
_12. Trembling as signifying fear.
_13. A shadow as signifying the outline of a body.
_14. Lilies as signifying Easter.
_15. Blushing as signifying embarrassment.
_16. The word “hello” as signifying a greeting.
_17. Barking of a dog as signifying some danger.
_18. A salute as signifying a sign of respect.
_19. Sound of a singing voice as signifying a certain emotion.
_20. A yawn as signifying boredom.
11
CHAPTER TWO
THE PREDICABLES
We have just finished considering words and concepts, their

place and role in logic, and the relation between them. The treatment of
words and concepts is a natural beginning for the logic of the first act of
the intellect since logic aims to order our concepts which we express in
words. We have also considered signs, for the notion of signification
helps us to clarify the relation of words, concepts, and things.
The logic of the first operation of the intellect is concerned with ob¬
jects as apprehended simply. The simplicity or incomplexity of these
objects refers to the way in which an object is first known. Man, for
instance, is a complex thing, yet we first apprehend what man is as a
kind of whole that we name but which remains to be analyzed. A simple
object, so understood, may therefore be known by a single concept stand¬
ing for something quite determinate; but the same object may then be¬
come known through several concepts ordered in such a way as to express
the determination of that same object distinctly, thus setting it off more
sharply from other objects. This is what we achieve in defining. A
definition will be composed of two or more concepts expressed in words,
each of which can be predicated of one and the same simple object now
being defined. But we must have the right words, for not any word will
do; some words, in particular, are more appropriate than others for de¬
fining whatever is definable. For instance—putting aside for the time the
specific question of definition—an essential predication (“Man is an
animal”) is more telling than an accidental one (“Man is white”).
Now the several relations which refer these concepts or words to what
they are said of are called predicables. In fact it is because we form such
relations that we are able to predicate. Thus we notice in some cases that
what is said of one thing can likewise be said of another quite different
13
14 THE PREDICABLES
thing. For instance, “Man is an animal” and “Horse is an animal.” Com¬

paring this one something, namely “animal,” to horse and man, we form
in our mind a one-to-many relation. Animal itself, of course, which we
say of man and horse, is not such a relation; the concept of animal is
what we relate to horse, man, or any other kind of animal. The relation
is based on what is predicated and on what this is predicated of, but it is
distinct from either. Something, for example, animal, is predicable in
virtue of a relation.
It is because we are able to form in our mind a relation from “man”
to “Paul,” to take another example, that we can say—we are able to
predicate—“man” of “Paul.” All predicables are formed in this way; all
ways of saying one thing of another imply certain relations we form
in our mind. Perhaps such a mental relation can be clarified by pointing
out that when we know man, we know through some likeness of the
known—in this case, of man—in our mind, but there is no likeness be¬
tween the relation in our mind and that apropos of which the mental
relation is formed. In other words, there is no resemblance between what
we first conceive as man and the relation of reason we form about man
as predicable of many individuals. This is why it is so difficult to under¬
stand a predicable like “species”—which is what “man” is as related to
“Paul”—as distinct from a natural species. We can draw something like
a man, but we can sketch nothing like a predicable species. Nonethe¬
less we do relate something common or universal to some singular per¬
mitting us to say for instance, “Paul is a man” or “this rose is a flower”;
we also relate something universal to something else universal permit¬
ting us to say “man is an animal,” “snow is white,” and so on. In fact
we say many things of many things and do so inevitably. In logic we
reflect on what we are doing when we predicate one thing of another,
and we are thereby led to consider what are the ways in which we can
say one thing of another; hence, the predicables are simply these ways
in which we can say one thing of another.
There are various types of such one-to-many relations which render
some things predicable of others, and each has its proper name. What
they have in common is the universality expressed by “one-to-many.”
Therefore, we must now consider the notion of universal.
The Universal
In its general and familiar meaning, “universal” is something that

is one and at the same time common to many. A dictionary will point out
that “universal” includes or covers all, that is, all one type. Thus we
speak of universal suffrage, meaning the participation of many in one
basic right, the right to vote. In this broad meaning, universal is taken
as opposed to singular, for by “singular” we mean that which is restricted
to one single thing only.
THE PREDICABLES IS
Language reflects this distinction between universal and singular, not
to mention countless degrees of universality. “Body,” for instance, can
be said of both natural bodies (for example, animals, plants and stones)
and artificial bodies (for example, bricks and statues). The word
“animal,” on the other hand, signifies less widely, being confined to
natural bodies endowed with sensation. Again, “man” can be said only
of individuals of a single kind. This is enough to show that there are dis¬
tinct types of universality or predicability. They are not contrived; we
discover them by applying to the way we talk in attributing one thing to
another.
The examples just given show that there are distinct types of pred-
icability, such as “body,” “animal,” “man.” What they have in common
is that, in every case, the universal can be predicated of the individ¬
ual. It can be true to say of one and the same individual, “This is a
man,” “This is an animal,” “This is a body.” But this man, Paul, can be
said of nothing else. (With respect to the point we are now making, it
does not matter that many individuals are named “Paul.” In each in¬
stance the name “Paul” is imposed to designate one person, and the fact
that many persons have this same name makes the name ambiguous, not
common to many individuals. To avoid this ambiguity, we add middle
and last names and even “Jr.” to emphasize the individuality of the
name.) The grammatical equivalent of the logical distinction we are here
referring to as universal and singular is the common noun and the proper
noun.
Distinct kinds of predicability so far referred to can be represented in
the following way:
Body
/ \
natural artificial
/ v.
living non-living
/ \
animal plant
man brute
A
Paul, Peter . . .
We have already observed that the more universal can always be pred¬
icated of whatever is beneath it, even down to the unpredicable indi-
16 THE PREDICABLES
vidual. The very notion of predicable must now be brought out as well as
the difference between the various types of predicability.
Notion and Division of Predicable
We have already somewhat informally stated what a predicable

is. Let us now say it once again but with a little more precision. A pred¬
icable is a relation involved in saying something one of many. Any of
the many is called an inferior, which may be some individual considered
as less than a universal (and thus “man” is said of “Paul”), or some
other universal considered as an inferior, either because it is less universal
(as “animal” is said of “man”) or because it is subjected to another
universal though there be no difference in universality (as “grammatical”
is said of “man”).
From the foregoing, it is evident that what we are defining as a pred¬
icable must always be something one related to something else in such
a way that one can be said of the other, as in “Man is an animal,” and
ultimately to an individual, for instance, “Paul is a man.” However, the
relation involved is irreversible, for we do not say “Man is Paul,” but the
other way around. Now, although we can make a predication of absolute
identity, as in “Man is man,” or “Paul is Paul,” we do not have therein a
predicable relation since we are not saying one thing of another, but one
and the same thing of itself. Logic deals only with formal predicates, those
which predicate an otherwise unexpressed determination of the subject,
and not with mere predicates of identity. The former throw new light
on the subject, are of interest to science and always mean a one-to-many
relation, whereas the relation of absolute identity has but two terms.
Furthermore, we never say something less universal of something more
universal; we do not say, for example, “animal is a dog,” but the other
way around.
We can now show that there are five and only five predicables; that.is,
there are only five distinct ways of being able to say one thing of another.
Despite the fact that in all conversation there are countless instances of
saying one thing of another, these instances reduce to five ways of re¬
lating some universal to an inferior. We shall see that there are five
ways of doing so—implying five such logical relations—by considering
essential and non-essential connections of universals with their inferiors.
By an essential connection, we mean that something predicated in a uni¬
versal way says something about what its inferior is. By a non-essential
connection, we mean that a universal says, not what an inferior is but
what belongs in some way to the inferior. Thus it is essential to say of
Paul that he is a man. It is not essential to say of Paul that he is a
musician; he would still be a man without being a musician.
Before going to the division of the predicables, let us note again that
THE PREDICABLES 17
the logical predicable is a relation of universality. Now, it is not the rela¬

tion of universality which is predicated, but rather something one upon
which the relation is founded, such as “animal.” Otherwise we would be
saying that “animal” is a relation invented by our mind and that this
relation itself is predicated. If this were so, then, in predicating a rela¬
tion, we would be forming still another relation, and so on to infinity,
meaning that we could never say anything of anything. In other words,
the relation is called a predicable, not as if it were what is predicated, but
because it relates what is predicated to its inferiors.
The kinds of essential connection
1. Genus. We can see a connection between the word “general”

and the word “genus.” Hence if we are saying Y of X as a genus we
realize at once that Y will tell us what X is in a general way. To say
“animal” of “man” is to say what man is essentially, yet still only gen¬
erally, since “animal” can also be said of “fish,” “horse,” and so forth.
More precisely, then, we can understand the predicable genus as a
relation of universality in virtue of which something one can be said of
many that differ specifically, as “animal” is said of different types of
animal. Clearly, then, the predicable genus expresses an essential con¬
nection since it is used to answer the question of what a thing is. Just as
plainly, however, that which is said by way of genus answers this question
incompletely because, as we have seen, what is said by way of genus
expresses only in part what a thing is. To be man is to be animal, but to
be animal is not wholly to be what man is.
2. Species. The word “species” in its logical sense is related to deriva¬
tives of the word which have related though looser meanings. We are
aware of what we mean by “special,” “specific,” “specifying,” and the
like. Consequently, if we are saying Y of X as a species we see that Y
must be a name that will communicate what X is in a specific way. Thus
to say “dog” of “Fido” is to say what Fido specifically is, whereas to say
“animal” of “Fido” does not express the type of animal Fido is.
The predicable species, then, is a relation of universality in virtue of
which something one can be said of many that differ only in number,
that is, of many differing no more than individually. Like the predicable
genus, the predicable species is used to answer the question of what a
thing is. But the predicable species is used to answer this question com¬
pletely, namely to express what kind of individual this is. Specifically,
Paul is a man and Fido is a dog. There are cases, however, where a proper
name is lacking or unfeasible; a case in point would be “This rose is a
rose.”
3. Specific Difference. To know how “man” is said of “Paul” and
“animal” of “man” is to achieve orderly knowledge, though still vague, of
18 THE PREDICABLES
simple objects by means of the logical relations of species and genus which
we form in our mind as instruments to help us put order in our way of
knowing things. But how do we come to distinguish man from dog given
that we say “animal” of each? What is their difference? In what way will
this difference be said as compared to genus and species? To predicate
something as a “difference” implies a new type of relation, a new kind
of predicable. There are of course many differences which we can cite to
distinguish between man and dog, but it would be best if we could
settle on the most basic difference of all.
Predication of the specific difference, therefore, involves a relation of
universality in virtue of which something is predicated in a way that sets
one thing apart from another, not fust as distinct in number but as dif¬
ferent in kind. It expresses that which differentiates one species from
another; it distinguishes one kind of thing from another, or any other,
in the same genus. We say “rational” of “man” to differentiate man
specifically from any other species in the genus of animal. Could we dis¬
cover (which we rarely can) the true specific difference of whatever is
predicable in the way of species we would have the most determinate
knowledge we can get of that species.
Note that while talking of the logical species we have been using the
word “species” in two different meanings. We must now point this out.
To say “Man is a species” can mean two things: that he is an animal of
a special kind (which is not the business of logic), or that man as known
is predicable thanks to the logical relation, namely that of species, which
is in and of the mind (and this is the species that logic considers).
It might be noted, further, that some say the division of predicables
we are dealing with belongs to a pre-evolutionary, static, conception of
nature. But this observation is neither here nor there. If an individual
organism is expected to develop into a given kind but changes to an un¬
expected kind, then, were we not faced with a new kind of thing, could
there be evolution in any significant sense? Furthermore, the statement
just referred to distinguishes “conception” into evolutionary and pre-
evolutionary, that is between a genus (conception) and differences
(evolutionary and pre-evolutionary), thus bringing us face to face with
the three types of predicables we have just explained above.
The kinds of non-essential connection
More often, as our experience readily reveals, we do not know

a Y as predicable of X in the essential ways noted above. This is particu¬
larly true of the predicable specific difference, which presupposes being
able to arrive at a quite distinct knowledge of a simple object—a knowl¬
edge that in fact we rarely achieve. We can, however, still say one thing
THE PREDICABLES 19
of another which, though not expressing something essential, is none¬

theless quite informative. What distinguishes the following two pred-
ieables from the foregoing ones is that they serve, not to say precisely
what something is, but what belongs to something, and can therefore
help to set off one kind of thing from another.
1. Property. A common meaning of the word “property” refers to an
exclusive possession we have to the use and enjoyment of an object. For
example, we say that the house that belongs to me is my property. The
predicable propertv is related to this meaning. When we say Y of X in
such a way that Y belongs in a very exclusive way to X we have ex¬
pressed something as “proper” to X.
The predicable property has a rigorous meaning. It is defined, in a
strict sense, as a relation of universality in virtue of which something is
said of a species as belonging only, necessarily, and always to that species
and to every individual of that species. T hus defined, a property is con¬
vertible or interchangeable with the species of which it is a property. For
example, “able to speak” (that is, able to use language as expressing
thought) is said of man as a property; whatever is man is able to speak
(even if some impediment prevents actual speech) and whatever is able
to speak is a man.
Property is often understood, even logically, in a looser way. In a less
strict sense, it signifies merely that which belongs to something always
without belonging only or necessarily to it. This adaptation of the mean¬
ing of property is made, for example, in the experimental sciences and
often in ordinary speech. However, we shall retain the strict meaning
defined above. This definition of property may seem to confuse property
with specific difference. However, we can always distinguish between the
two in the following way. Logically speaking, the specific difference is
used in saying what a species is, what sets it apart from another. When
we predicate something by way of specific difference (“by way of specific
difference” is not the difference predicated; for instance, “rational” is a
difference, not the “predicable” which is a relation) there is one and only
one specific difference for the kind of thing of which this difference is
said. The predicable property, as we have seen, is not used to express
what a species is, but what belongs exclusively to a species, and for a
given species we can have a number of properties. Furthermore, what is
predicated as the specific difference, when we know it, is the reason
for a property, and not the other way around. Thus, because man is
rational, man is able to speak. A property thus follows as an effect from
what a species is, and hence rigorous though a property is, it is still not
expressing an essential connection in the sense explained above.
2. Accident. The word “accident” may first suggest to us an event
that occurs without one’s foresight or expectation. This is not the mean-
20 THE PREDICABLES
ing of the predicable accident, though it has some relation to what we

mean by predicable accident. When we say Y of X as an accident, Y
expresses what may “happen” to X, that is, what may belong to X. We
understand the predicable accident, therefore, in relation to the pred¬
icable property, as implying a negation. If some characteristic belongs
to X not always, or not necessarily, or not only, such a characteristic is
understood to be an accident of X.
More precisely and more positively, the predicable accident is a uni¬
versal relation implied when something is attributed to a species as that
which belongs contingently to that species and to the individuals of that
species. Hence an accident is a characteristic that can come to be or
disappear without the destruction of the species in which it is found.
The color man has is an accident in this sense of the term, for whatever
color man has, such a color does not necessarily characterize man, nor is
it always found in man, nor does it belong only to man. It is evident that
the predicable accident is the one we most often use because most of the
time our knowledge of simple objects is limited.
As a general comment on the predicables, let us recall that of them¬
selves they do not reveal knowledge of real objects, just as no logical
instrument of itself does, but are relations in our mind that enable us to
set order in our knowledge of the common and distinctive determina¬
tions of things outside the mind. No real object is a logical predicable of
any type. But by means of the predicables, these relations in our mind,
we can come to know what we say about real objects in an orderly way.
In addition to this function of the predicables, they are of special aid in
constructing definitions, as we shall see later.
Questions Chapter Two
1. Relate the doctrine of the predicables to definition.

2. Express the common meaning of “universal” as opposed to “singular,”
and give examples of each.
3. Explain how we come to know the distinct types of predicability and
what they have in common.
4. Clarify the common notion of a predicable.
5. How in general do we distinguish between an essential connection that
a universal has with its inferiors, and a non-essential connection?
6. Explain the meaning of the predicable genus and give several original
examples.
7. Distinguish the meaning of the predicable species from that of genus,
and give several original examples of the predicable species.
8. Compare the predicable specific difference with the other predicables
which have essential connections with inferiors.
THE PREDICABLES 21
9. Explain the rigorous meaning of the predicable property. Distinguish this
meaning from a looser meaning of property.
10. How do we distinguish the predicable property from the predicable
specific difference?
11. Distinguish the predicable accident from the predicable property.
12. How do the predicables function as logical instruments?
Exercise I <~X< Chapter Two
State which predicable the word on the right is in relation to the word on the
left. Ask yourself what the word on the right tells you about the word on
the left; if something essential, then it is genus, species, or specific difference;
if non-essential, then it is property or accident. If the word on the right can¬
not be a predicable, leave answer blank.
— -- 1. Henry—man
-2. Justice—virtue
— - 3. Bee—able to produce honey
_ 4. Pistol—weapon
_ 5. Radiator—hot
_ 6. Living being—ability to reproduce itself
_ 7. Door—house
_ 8. Lassie—dog
_ 9. Grass—green
_10. Tree—oak
_11. Man—able to learn grammar
_12. Horse—four-legged
_13. Cow—animal
_14. Animal—sentient
_15. Snake—poisonous
____16. Red—color
__ 17. Man—capable of wit
___18. Table—chair
_19. Quarter—Money
_20. This rose—rose

23
Exercise II Chapter Two
After each of the following, write characteristics which are predicable. Indi¬
cate which predicable each characteristic is. Give at least two characteristics
for each item. No. 1 is given as a model.
1. John Jones man (species) handsome (accident)
2. Democracy
3. Dog
4. Freshman
5. Chemistry
6. Gold
7. Fido
8. Man
9. Logic
10. Tree
25
**«*«♦«
CHAPTER THREE
DISTINCTIONS PRELIMINARY
TO THE CATEGORIES
The categories, which we shall consider in the next chapter, are

the most universal genera under which our knowledge of things can be
ordered. In treating the predicables, we have already noticed how names,
signifying our concepts of objects, become more universal as we pass
from the species “man” said of an individual to the genus “animal” said
of “man,” to the genus “living” said of “animal.” Eventually we come
to a highest, or most universal, genus—“substance” in the present in¬
stance—and such a most universal genus is a category under which all
lesser universals of that kind are found. We shall investigate the category
of substance, and other such categories, in detail in the following chap¬
ter.
However, before we can treat the categories we must consider certain
distinctions which we need in order to establish the categories. These
preliminary distinctions are traditionally called the “antepredicaments.”
This name derives from “predicaments,” a synonym for “categories,” and
the prefix “ante,” indicating points to be considered beforehand. Hence
the antepredicaments are certain distinctions which have to be taken up
in advance of the predicaments, or categories. We shall consider three
distinctions which serve as conditions needed for determining the cate¬
gories.
I. Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Names
We have had occasion already to discuss how words signify our

conceptions of various objects. By the very fact that words are imposed
27
28 DISTINCTIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE CATEGORIES
arbitrarily with respect to the concepts they represent, we can see readily
that while on the one hand our concepts cannot be tied down in a
mechanical fashion to words, on the other hand this same arbitrary con¬
nection gives rise to different ways in which words will convey our
thought.
The normal and expected way in which words signify concepts is in a
univocal manner. A univocal name or word is one that is imposed on
many objects as signifying the same nature in each. A univocal name
therefore keeps exactly the same meaning in the many contexts in which
it may appear. Thus we retain one and the same meaning for the name
“animal” when it is said of horses, dogs, lions, elephants, and the like.
Similarly, any individual dog has the same nature of dog as any other
individual dog, and hence the name “dog” is univocal when said of
individual dogs. Thus we see that every genus said of its species and
every species said of its individuals is understood in a univocal way, and
while univocal names are not restricted to these examples, they are
evident instances in logic for what we mean by the univoeal signification
of a name.
Not all words have the same meaning whenever they are used. Indeed,
a word in one context can signify one sort of thing and quite another in
a different context, and while the varying contexts usually prevent our
confusing the different meanings of the same word, nonetheless out of
context the word becomes equivocal in its signification. Hence, an
equivocal name is one that signifies different natures. The name “race”
apart from any context is equivocal for it signifies (1) a tribe of people
or a nation, and (2) a contest of speed.
Clearly, a name that becomes equivocal is unfortunate, primarily be¬
cause equivocal names are of little use in formulating definitions; and,
of course, equivocal names tend to defeat the purpose of communication.
We call attention to them in logic in order to be on guard against them.
In fact we should always take pains to avoid leaving words equivocal.
We can usually accomplish this by making clear the context in which
the multiple-meaning word appears, thereby dissipating the equivocation.
There is, perhaps, one saving feature about the fact that names can be
equivocal. It is precisely because a word by chance has utterly unrelated
meanings that one is able to make puns, that is, make a play upon the
words one understands. And thus Shakespeare makes a play upon “under¬
stands” itself in The Two Gentlemen from Verona; when Speed says to
Launce, “I understand thee not,” Launce claims Speed is a blockhead,
for, “look thee,” Launce says, “I’ll but lean, and my staff understands
me.” The witty effect of a pun is an indication at once of a freedom and
a servitude the mind has in dealing with the words it uses to express
itself. The freedom, a somewhat negative one, consists in the mind’s
being able to use a word arbitrarily with respect to what it signifies; the
DISTINCTIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE CATEGORIES 29
servitude arises from the fact that the mind cannot get away from
words.
Yet not all diversity of signification by one and the same word is
wholly ambiguous and misleading, as in equivocal names. Somewhat mid¬
way between the univocal name which retains absolute sameness of
meaning and the equivocal name with utter difference of meaning lies
the analogous name. An analogous name is one that signifies different
natures (wherein it resembles the equivocal name) but is imposed
primarily on one nature and secondarily on others with reference to the
first. We may thus speak of an analogous name as having a proportional
sameness in meaning, for “analogous” means “proportional.” When,
for example, I refer to a musical composition as “religious,” I am Psing
“religious” in an analogous sense, a meaning which presupposes the
primary meaning of “religious,” devotion in the worship of God; we
speak of the musical composition as religious because it is of such a
kind as to move the listener to devotion.
Contrary to the equivocal signification of names, the analogous sig¬
nification of names is not an unhappy state of affairs. Many of our most
important and most fundamental words become analogous in significa¬
tion, such as “good,” “true,” and “beautiful.” (Indeed, it is by means of
analogous names that we are able to express what knowledge we can
attain of God without falling into anthropomorphism—the fallacy of
making names common to God and creature univocal, or into sheer
agnosticism—the fallacy of supposing that names said of God and
creature are purely equivocal.) Moreover, we give words analogous mean¬
ings because our knowledge has advanced from one thing to another
with dependence upon what is first known; the several related meanings
of an analogous word represent this movement. Thus a name’s primary
signification will be related to something most evident to us, and will
subsequently be extended to signify something less evident. For example,
the word “light” first means that which allows us to see with our eyes
and then becomes extended to signify that which allows us to under¬
stand, and so we speak of “the light of the evidence.” But from the
point of view of logic, the univocal name is the one that leads us most
determinately to an object, though as we advance in the philosophical
sciences the analogous name takes on increasing importance.
In relation to the categories in particular, the distinction of univocal,
equivocal, and analogous names is important because only natures as
univocally signified are to be put in categories.
II. Complex and Incomplex Expressions
An incomplex (simple) expression stands for a concept which

signifies one nature. Normally an incomplex expression is one word, for
example, “dog,” “color,” or “quantity.” The word may be an adjective

as well, such as “brown,” “heavy,” or “intelligent,” or a verb, such as
“running” or “to think.” Nouns, verbs, and adjectives are considered to
be categorematic words—words which, taken by themselves, signify dis¬
tinct concepts of objects. Syncategorematic words—prepositions, most
adverbs, conjunctions and articles—signify only in conjunction with
categorematic words. Hence a phrase like “in this tree” is an incomplex
expression since only one categorematic word is in the expression.
We can, of course, consider two or more natures present at once and
in some way ordered to each other; they can then be signified by a
unified expression. Consequently, a complex expression signifies two or
more natures present at once. “Brown dog” is a complex expression since
it signifies two distinct natures present at once, being brown and being
dog.
The distinction between incomplex and complex expression is obvious.
Its importance lies in the fact that in the logic of the first act of the in¬
tellect we have to give a good deal of attention to incomplex expressions
as signifying simple objects. They are not first in intention and im¬
portance, however, for definition is the measure of the first part of logic,
and definition involves complex expressions. But in particular and for our
immediate purpose, only incomplex expressions, signifying simple objects,
can be used when we come to classify objects in the categories.
III. Existence in a Subject and Predicable of a Subject
Some of the things we know exist in some subject and are pred¬
icable of a subject. Just what do these phrases “exist in a subject” and
“predicable of a subject” mean? To exist in a subject means that some¬
thing requires a subject in order to be at all, and this is precisely what is
meant by accident in a philosophical meaning of the word. A shape or a
color does not exist all by itself but must be the shape or color of some¬
thing, that is, of some subject, as a man or dog or stone. Existence in a
subject is therefore equivalent to being an accident.
Predicable of a subject, on the other hand, means something else. This
phrase signifies that something we know can be said or predicated of a
subject. But to be able to be said of a subject, as we saw in the preceding
chapter, means that the thing we know must be universal. Only in the
way that something universal is common to many can an object be pred¬
icable, as “dog” is common to many individual dogs and “white” is
common to many individual subjects in which it is found.
Now, given these meanings of the phrases existence in a subject and
predicable of a subject, we can relate them to each other in four possible
ways. Let us first simply combine the two phrases and ask: What is it
that both exists in a subject and is predicable of a subject? Since “exists
DISTINCTIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE CATEGORIES 31
in a subject” means accident and “predicable of a subject” means uni¬
versal, we have universal accident, for example, a color or shape or action,
which needs a subject such as man or dog in order to exist. Thus “white”
is predicable of the many subjects in which it is found, and hence is a
universal as well as an accident.
On the other hand: What is it that both does not exist in a subject
and is not predicable of a subject? If something does not exist in a sub¬
ject, then of course it must be the subject itself, that is, the substance.
Hence “not to exist in a subject” is to be a substance. If something is
also not predicable of a subject, by that fact it cannot be universal, other¬
wise it would be predicable of a subject, that is, communicable to many.
Hence it is not universal, but singular; it is not found in many, but is
something one and only one. Now when we combine not existing in a
subject and not predicable of a subject, we have singular substance, for
example, Paul, this man, this stone, and so on.
We can still combine the two phrases in two other ways, by negating
one but not the other. What is it that does not exist in a subject yet is
predicable of a subject? From the meaning of these two phrases, we see
that we now have universal substance, for example, man, dog, stone,
tulip, and so on, for “man” is a subject and is still common to, and hence
predicable of, individual subjects, in this case, individual men. We may
also have the reverse combination, something that exists in a subject but
is not predicable of a subject, and we then have singular accident, for
example, Paul’s tan, this shape, Fido’s weight, and so on, which require
a subject of existence but are peculiar to one subject and to no other.
Hence we can summarize the four relations we have made in the fol¬
lowing way:
Universal accident: Whatever exists in a subject and is predicable of a
subject (both phrases remain positive).
Singular substance: Whatever does not exist in a subject and is not
predicable of a subject (both phrases are negative).
Universal substance: Whatever does not exist in a subject but is pred¬
icable of a subject (the first phrase is negative, the second positive).
Singular accident: Whatever exists in a subject and is not predicable
of a subject (the first phrase is positive, the second negative).
With respect to the categories, these four relations help us to see the
difference between substance and accident, for the categories are consti¬
tuted of substance and accidents. The distinction is also drawn between
singular substance and universal substance and, as we shall see, only
universal substance is taken into consideration in the categories. Like¬
wise, the distinction is made between singular accident and universal
accident and, again, only the latter is relevant to the categories. Finally,
existence or non-existence in a subject is a distinction in ways of being
or existence, whereas predicable or not predicable of a subject is a dis¬

tinction in the intentional order, that is, the order of knowledge.
Questions Chapter Three
1. Explain the significance of the word “antepredicaments”?

2. When does a word signify univocally?
3. When does a word signify equivocally?
4. When does a word signify analogously?
5. What advantage is there in the analogous signification of names?
6. What is the distinction between incomplex and complex expressions and
why is this distinction important for logic?
7. What do the phrases “existence in a subject” and “predicable of a sub¬
ject” mean?
8. What is the relevance of the distinction between “existence in a subject”
and “predicable of a subject” for logic?
Exercise #41 Chapter Three
Classify the following words as univocal, equivocal, or analogous.
--- 1. Pitcher as signifying a container of water and

a baseball player.
-- 2. Tragic as signifying a condition of man and a

type of accident.
-- 3. Athlete as signifying a swimmer and a wrestler.
__ 4. Metal as signifying iron and copper.
_ 5. Nerve as signifying a band of living tissue and

pluck.
_ 6. Pit as signifying the hard stone of a fruit and

a hole in the ground.
_ 7. Literature as signifying prose and poetry.
_ 8. Date as signifying a fruit and a point or period

of time.
_ 9. Walk as signifying a movement and a path¬

way.
_10. Moral as signifying a state of man and the

quality of a work of art.
_11. Emotion as signifying love and hatred.
_12. Peck as signifying a fourth part of a bushel

and a quick, sharp stroke of a beak.
_13. Beautiful as signifying a person and the com¬

plexion of a person.
_14. Number as signifying odd and even.
__15. Story as signifying an anecdote and a set of

rooms on the same floor.
_16. Green as signifying color of grass and color of

a tie.
33
17. Perch as signifying a kind of fish and a bar for
birds to roost on.
18. Run as signifying swift movement and a score

in a baseball game.
19. Human as signifying man and woman.
20. Poker as signifying a metal rod for stirring a

fire and a card game.
34
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CATEGORIES
In investigating the categories, we continue to examine the

means of knowing simple objects in a more distinct and orderly way. To
set order among objects as known is the purpose of logic. The underlying
question throughout this first part of logic is to realize what is involved
in asking a question such as What is X? where X stands for any simple
object, such as man, circle, and so forth. The "what it is” of any simple
object is a more concrete way of referring to what is also called the
nature or essence of a thing. Through our concepts we apprehend di¬
rectly though vaguely what X is, that is, the nature we signify by some
name. But our aim is to know how to define a given X precisely and the
categories will be a means to this.
We have already seen how the predicables are involved in answering
the type of question just raised. But the predicables are mere relations of
universality. The point now is: What do they relate? To set out those
relations we had to show how in fact some names are more or less uni¬
versal and some individual. We could not do this without grasping some¬
thing of the nature of the objects used in illustration. But our chief con¬
cern was with predicability, that is, with the very relations of universality
based upon things signified by such names.
Turning to the categories, our purpose is to reduce the various natures,
which can be invested with relations of predicability, to what is most
universal, and yet at the same time keep them distinct. How are we to
set order in a general way—though still remote insofar as a given nature
such as man is concerned—among the many types of things we can
predicate? No matter how many these may be, can they be gathered into
some ultimate generalities?
The fact that in treating the categories we deal with the way various
35
36 THE CATEGORIES
natures are ultimately and irreducibly divided one from the other does
not mean that logic is about man, horse, fly, and so forth. We are still
concerned with relations formed by our reason, but the types we are now
concerned with differ sharply from those of predicability. This can be
shown by an example. In the predicables we were concerned with rela¬
tions of universality to inferiors, exhibited by examples such as animal
as predicable of man, man of Paul, and so on. Let us now note that
something common is said in another way of Paul, this horse, this fly,
this tree, this stone. And what they have in common is that each of them
cannot be said of anything else; each of them is thus called a substance.
Moreover, many things can be said about them, and these are what we
shall call predicamental accidents. We can say about Paul that he is tan,
six feet tall, the son of Peter, living at such an address where he is now
sitting down, rocking in his chair, holding the newspaper, protesting the
noise, in his bathrobe. Now these are various ways of being and, as we
know and talk about them, they are modes of predication, and it is these
various modes of predication, corresponding to various ways of being,
that we are going to order into categories. If, however, we meant by
categories the modes of being in themselves, these would belong to the
subject of metaphysics; it is their modes of predication which fall under
logic.
At this juncture, we must be careful to point out the difference be¬
tween predicable and predicate. A predicable is not what we say of some¬
thing directly, for, as we saw, this would mean that “man” predicated by
way of species, would be a relation of reason. It is the nature man that is
said of Paul, and this nature, not the relation attached to it, is what is
predicated. And in this particular respect, the predicate “man” belongs
to a category. A man, on the other hand, is not the same as his size, nor
is this the same as his color, nor is his being here and now the same as
being Paul, nor is his relationship or his posture what Paul himself is.
These are diverse predicates, each of which is said of Paul in a typical
way. The various modes of predication, corresponding to various modes
of being, can be brought under one or another supreme genus or category.
We thus begin to see how we can order natures—the “what” we know
of things—under a supreme genus. When we come to know one supreme
genus as distinct from another, we shall be able to put one nature under
one supreme genus and another nature under another supreme genus.
The initial test of our knowledge of various natures consists precisely in
knowing in which category it belongs. True enough, knowledge of the
natures themselves is not provided by logic but by our common ex¬
perience of objects, our “prescientific” knowledge. Logic, however, pro¬
vides us with the ordering principle—the classification of all natures ac¬
cording to their logical genera and species under supreme genera. As our
knowledge of objects increases, through study of them in other sciences
THE CATEGORIES 37
as well as by our ever-widening experience, we shall find that the logical

ordering of the categories will help us develop our knowledge in an
orderly way.
Hence there are two principal reasons for studying the categories in
logic. The first reason, already alluded to, is that the study of the cate¬
gories provides the means to an orderly grasp of objects. The second
reason is that knowledge of the categories is useful for definition. Know¬
ing the supreme genus in which a nature is found is the first step in
coming to know a nearer or more proximate genus which, as we shall
see, is necessary for definition.
Conditions Required for Determining the Categories
Before examining specifically what the categories are, we have to

consider the conditions which must be observed in establishing cate¬
gories and in placing natures in categories.
(1) Whatever is in a category must be a simple object, something
known in a simple way and therefore something one. Hence, we see the
relevance of the distinction made in the previous chapter between the
incomplex expression, which signifies a simple object in a simple way and
the complex expression. Thus what is signified by the complex expression
“white horse” is excluded because two distinct natures would be signi¬
fied.
(2) Artificial objects, such as the shaping of some natural material,
are excluded because what they are or signify is dependent on the mind
of the artist relative to whose intention they would have to be defined.
Thus a chair, with respect to the material from which it is made, goes
in the category of substance, but the complex that results from the ma¬
terial and the shape—the artifact itself—is outside of any given category.
(3) Whatever is in a category must be signified by a univocal name.
Again we see the relevance of a distinction made in the previous chapter,
the distinction of univocal, equivocal, and analogous names. If a name
is equivocal, two different natures are signified, and the equivocation is
removed by considering each nature separately. Univocal signification is
required in order to specify one distinct type of nature.
(4) Since a category is an ultimate predicate, with other predicates of
the same kind placed under it, then only something that can be predi¬
cated of something other than itself can be a category or something in a
category. As we saw in the preceding chapter, only what is universal—
what is predicable of a subject—can be a category or in a category. Conse¬
quently, a singular object, whether a substance or an accident, is thereby
excluded. A singular substance, for example, Paul, can be predicated of
itself by a predication of identity, but not of another as of a subject.
The singular, therefore, is an ultimate subject of predication but not
38 THE CATEGORIES
itself a predicate, and hence is not properly in a predicament or a cate¬

gory.
(5) A nature to be listed in a category must be finite, thereby exclud¬
ing God and whatever is formally unlimited from the categories. That
which is infinite in perfection cannot be limited to any one genus of
being, as the definition of genus in logic shows.
The Ten Categories
Before we list the ten categories, the ten supreme genera first
laid down by Aristotle, we must return to another distinction we made in
the previous chapter. This distinction is the one between what exists in
a subject and what does not exist in a subject. As we saw, this distinction
manifests the difference between accident (which, to exist, must exist
in something else, that is, must have some subject for its existence) and
substance (which is the subject of the existence of every accident, at
least ultimately).
We are aware of this fundamental distinction in the determinations a
thing has from ordinary experience. If we were to take a real subject, Paul,
and ask ourselves how many different kinds of distinct determinations he
shares that can be predicated of him, we would discover (a) that some
designate his essence as a subject, and (b) that others are found in him
as in a subject. The former we call substantial predicates, the latter acci¬
dental. We recognize that for Paul to be a man is different from his
being tall or handsome. We would discover also that the accidental
predicates could be grouped into nine categories corresponding to their
different ways of being in the subject, as qualifying it, giving it parts, re¬
lating it to another, and so on.
In the light of these general but basic notions derived from our com¬
mon experience, let us now list the different supreme genera of objects—
the categories—with a brief explanation and some examples of each.
1. Substance
The logical meaning of substance is not only that which does

not exist in something else (that is, in a subject) but also that which is
predicable of something else. This explanation of substance, first of all,
distinguishes substance from any accident, which must exist in some¬
thing else. To say, in addition, that a substance is predicable of some¬
thing else is to point out that substance is taken here as universal. We
thus distinguish substance as a category, substance as universal, from
singular substance which, being the ultimate subject of predication, is
not strictly the category of substance since a category is a supreme univ¬
ocal predicate.
THE CATEGORIES 39
Examples of natures in the category of substance are: man, dog,

flower, mineral, stone.
2. Quantity
Like all supreme genera or categories, quantity cannot be strictly

defined, as we shall see when treating definition. We may, however,
understand the category of quantity as the order of the homogeneous
parts of a substance. Quantity accordingly divides into discrete and con¬
tinuous. Discrete quantity consists of actually distinct parts, as the
units of a number, or one whole number as distinct from another. Con¬
tinuous quantity is that whose parts are joined in some common term, as
a line, surface, or solid. While a number is made up of parts constituting
a single whole, a line is divisible into parts which are always divisible in
their turn.
Examples of quantity are: ten, fifteen, forty; line, triangle, circle.
3. Quality
Quality is an accident which determines a substance to be so and

so, that is, to possess in more or less degree a distinctive attribute or char¬
acteristic. Quality comes from the form of a substance in contradistinc¬
tion to quantity, which comes from the matter of a substance. The great
extent of the category of quality can be grasped best by indicating the
four species of quality.
(a) Habit and disposition. This type of quality designates a sub¬
stance as well or badly disposed, referring particularly to certain qualities
of the mind. By the name “habit” we refer to a quality firmly estab¬
lished. If the habit is good in the sense of disposing a human substance
well, then the habit is either an intellectual virtue, such as science, or a
moral virtue, for example, justice or fortitude. If a habit badly disposes,
then it becomes either something like error, or a moral vice such as dis¬
honesty or cowardice. The name “disposition” refers to a quality not
firmly established and hence easily changeable, such as opinion or con¬
tinence.
(b) Capacity or incapacity. Capacity is that sort of quality which is
a proximate principle of operation, thereby disposing a substance for
operation. The various powers a substance has, for example, intellectual,
moral, physical, are capacities enabling a substance to act—hence the
potency or the ability to think, to will, and to see. An incapacity is a
deficiency in some power, such as being feeble-minded, having weak
vision, or being unable to lift a weight.
(c) Sense qualities. Such qualities, affecting our powers of sensation,
are perhaps the most obvious types of quality. All colors, for example,
40 THE CATEGORIES
would be sense qualities, as well as the various sounds, flavors, odors, and
tangible qualities.
(d) Figure and form. Figure is that type of quality which terminates
the quantity of substance. Figure limits the quantity of substance to a
particular shape, as spherical, circular, or triangular. Form, insofar as it
is taken as distinct from figure, refers to a certain perfection and beauty
of the termination of quantity in a natural object, that is, the perfection
and beauty of the shape of an object, such as a nose, a hand, or a tree.
4. Relation
Relation (“reference to something”) is the reference of one

thing to another. What reality the category of relation has is nothing else
than this very reference to another—we might call it a “looking to an¬
other.” The obvious examples of this category are relations between per¬
sons, such as fatherhood, motherhood, sonship. Other examples are
superiority, equality, smallness, double, high, great.
5. Action (Activity)
Action is the doing of something to something else. Not any sort

of action is thus implied, but only that sort of acting which is transitive,
that is, an action coming from an agent ordered to producing some
effect extrinsic to the agent. Examples in this category are to hit, to
throw, to run, or jumping, heating, fighting.
6. Being passive (Passivity)
Being passive is the receiving of action from something else. The

name of this category is usually given as “passion,” but the name “pas¬
sion” is ambiguous, and its more familiar meaning of a feeling or an
emotion does not refer to this category at all, but to the category of
quality. Being passive in the sense of the sixth category is confined to a
substance s being acted upon, and hence we express examples of this
category by saying to be hit, to be thrown, or being heated, being kicked.
7. When
The category When has an obvious reference to time, but When

is not time although it presupposes time, that is, it presupposes the now
or present instant as dividing past from future. Wffen as a category is an
accident existing in a substance, and hence to predicate when of a subject
gives a distinct determination to that subject. What are such predicates?
We would answer with examples like yesterday, now, last year, in the
twentieth century.
THE CATEGORIES 41
8. Where
As the category When has a reference to time so the category

Where has a reference to place. Here again, however, what we predicate
in relation to a subject is precisely where a substance is. Accordingly,
this category is an accident existing in a substance resulting from the sub¬
stance’s being in a certain place, as here, in the room, at home, in bed.
9. Position
Position (usually in the sense of “posture”) is the order of

parts in a whole. Accordingly, a substance may remain where it is but
have a different order of its parts, that is assume different positions, as
sitting, kneeling, leaning, or sprawled out. Note that such verbs do not
express action or movement going on (and hence the category of action)
but a posture assumed. Action is required to assume a position, but the
position as assumed is not action going on.
10. Habit
The name of this last category unfortunately is almost equiv¬

ocal. It does not mean here the species of quality we described above—
which refers to mental and moral habits. This last category is related to
the first meaning of “habit” given in the dictionary—habit as “dress,
garb, or attire.” More precisely, this last category refers to that which
results from a person’s being clothed, thereby designating principally an
accident peculiar to human beings. This category therefore sets off man
distinctively from other animals which have by nature (feathers or
hooves) what man provides for himself by the invention of reason. This
category also extends to the wearing of ornaments and armaments. Ex¬
amples of this category, then, are wearing a hat, being bejeweled, being
armed.
The Postpredicament of Opposition
As the name “postpredicamen-t” suggests, we now consider a

mode which follows upon the placing of objects in the predicaments or
categories. In other words, in virtue of seeing where natures go in the
categories, we notice that one nature becomes opposed to another, and
thus opposition arises between natures when categorized. Actually, there
are a number of postpredicaments in virtue of establishing natures in the
categories (for example, how one nature is “prior” to another or how one
is “simultaneous” with respect to another), but we shall limit our in¬
vestigation to the postpredicament of opposition because of its special
42 THE CATEGORIES
importance and because of its relevance for subsequent distinctions in

logic.
There are four kinds of opposition between natures when categorized.
This division of opposition is an analogous division in which contradic¬
tion is the primary analogue. Contradiction is opposition simply speak¬
ing since it simply takes away what the other posits. The other opposi¬
tions are such insofar as they participate in contradiction, that is, in the
negation of the other. Hence the kinds of opposition are listed in order
of decreasing strength of opposition.
Opposition therefore means, in a most general way, some sort of nega¬
tion, that is, a certain lack of communicability or an incapacity of some
kind. Two things are said to be opposed not only because they are
different but because one is somehow the negation of the other, imply¬
ing thereby the impossibility or incapacity of either one to be the
other. Hence, the greater the negation or incapacity, the greater the
opposition.
1. Contradictory opposition
Contradictory opposition is the most fundamental and primary

kind of opposition. It is an opposition of being and non-being as such,
a perfect simple negation. It is an absolute opposition between some¬
thing affirmative and something negative, manifesting an absolute in¬
capacity, and without any intermediary. It is realized primarily in an
opposition between an affirmative and a negative statement, for instance,
“Paul runs” and “Paul does not run.” We shall examine such contradic¬
tory opposition between statements when we discuss propositions in
Part II.
We can, however, apply contradictory opposition to our knowing of
simple objects. In the category of substance, for example, we can oppose
in a contradictory manner “man” and “non-man” under the genus
“animal” and likewise “animal” and “non-animal” under the genus
“living.” It is evident that in any category we can thus make a contra¬
dictory opposition by taking a simple object and applying an absolute
negation to it by the prefix “non.” Any simple object always has at least
contradictory opposition applicable to it; other kinds of opposition do
not have this universality of application.
2. Privative opposition
Privative opposition is an opposition between a form and the

lack of that form in a subject that is capable of possessing it. It is an
opposition of being and non-being in a subject, and hence may be called
“improper contradiction.” The negation is limited to a given subject; it
THE CATEGORIES 43
is not an incapacity of being absolutely but only of being in a certain

way. Thus we speak of a privative opposition between hearing and deaf¬
ness with reference to the ear. We thus see how this type of opposition
is restricted in comparison to contradictory opposition. We can only
speak of privative opposition when we refer to a denial of a characteristic
which should be present in a subject naturally capable of having that
characteristic. Thus we can speak of a lack of courtesy with reference to
someone who can and should have this quality. On the other hand, we
cannot refer, if we use names carefully, "insensitive” as meaning “lack
of sensitivity” to something like a stone although we could speak of a
stone as “non-sensitive.”
As the name “insensitive” suggests, privative names are often expressed
by such distinctive prefixes as “in,” in “insane,” or “il” as in “illiterate”
or “dis” as in “dishonest.” True enough, common speech may not always
use such prefixes in a precise privative meaning, yet these prefixes are
properly imposed to convey a privative meaning. Likewise, some suffixes
are so imposed, as “less” in “careless.”
3. Contrary opposition
Contrary opposition is an opposition between two positive terms

signifying extremes of difference within the same genus, each of which
excludes the other from the same subject. It is therefore an opposition of
being and being, in the same subject. Contrary opposition may be under¬
stood as improper privation, since one contrary implies the privation of
the other, but the privation is only an incapacity of a subject’s having
both contraries at the same time. There is therefore less incapacity and
less opposition than in privative opposition. Odd and even, for example,
are contraries in the subject of number; both are positive terms and yet
one implies the privation of the other. Further, every number is either
odd or even and there is nothing in between.
However, not all contrary opposites are without some intermediary in
the way odd and even are without an intermediary. White and black,
understood as extremes of difference with respect to color, have the inter¬
mediate of grey or, in a broader sense, many intermediates of different
kinds of color.
By way of contrasting the three kinds of opposition so far covered, we
can illustrate with the word “intelligent.” The absolute denial of “in¬
telligent” is “non-intelligent,” with no restriction of the opposition. The
denial of “intelligent” by “unintelligent” understood precisely in a priva¬
tive sense is a restricted negation, referring to the absence of intelligence
when it should be present in a subject capable of being so. The denial of
“intelligent” by “stupid” excludes “intelligent” by the presence of the
opposite extreme, namely, a low degree or dullness of intelligence. What
44 THE CATEGORIES
sets off contrary opposition from the two foregoing ones is an opposition
between two positive terms.
4. Relative opposition
Relative opposition, the least kind of opposition, is an opposition

in which the pairs of opposites mutually refer to each other, and by the
fact that they mutually refer to each other are only “relatively” opposed.
Still, it is an opposition, an opposition of two positive terms in a subject
but here the subject is only incapable of having the two in the same
respect. In relative opposition, we thus have least incapacity and least
opposition. We may thus speak of “whole” and “part” as opposite, but
clearly in a diminished sense; yet a negation remains in the sense that
the two are not capable of being a subject in the same respect.
We thus see that names in relative opposition are found primarily in
the category of relation. This restriction sets off relative opposition from
contradictory opposition, found in every category, and from privative
and contrary opposition, both of which are found in at least several
categories.
Questions Chapter Four
1. In what does the logical consideration of the categories consist?

2. Distinguish between predicable and predicate.
3. Why are the categories studied in logic?
4. What conditions must be observed in placing natures in the categories?
5. Explain the category of substance and give original examples of natures
in this category.
6. Explain briefly each of the categories of accidents and give original
examples of natures in each category.
7. Show how contradictory opposition is an absolute and fundamental kind
of opposition.
8. Explain privative opposition and show how it differs from contradictory
opposition.
9. Explain contrary opposition and show how it differs from privative
opposition.
10. Explain relative opposition. How does it differ from contrary opposition?
Exercise I iHhS» Chapter Four
State in which category each of the following primarily belongs. If a word

does not signify something that can be placed in any category, or not in any
one category, leave the line opposite it blank.
_ 1. lion .21. being put down
. 2. bent over .22. bemedaled
. 3. Monday .23. besmeared
4. minus .24. donkey
. 5. in bed .25. fragrant
. 6. bedtime ,26. non-substance
. 7. statue .27. deafness
8. smiting .28. at once
9. gallon .29. at school
-10. whole .30. marriage
.11. being scolded .31. folded up
.12. being costumed .32. arithmetic
.13. honey .33. parallelogram
.14. fourfold .34. largeness
.15. elliptical .35. perpendicular
16. ten chairs .36. handful
.17. strength .37. intermediate
18. boxing .38. wood
19. ability to box .39. cutting
.20. fraternity .40. above
45
Exercise II •Hh& Chapter Four
State the kind of opposition the following pairs of words signify. If no kind
of opposition is realized, leave the line blank.
- -1. Christian—non-Christian
-2. mare—colt
-3. white—black
-4. large—small
- 5. social—unsocial
-6. dog—non-animal
— _ 7. beginning—end
_ 8. tasty—tasteless
_ 9. running—non-running
_10. related—unrelated
_11. relative—non-relative
_12. sweet—sour
_13. grass—green
_14. moral—immoral
_15. moral—non-moral
_16. plus—minus
_17. heating—cooling
_18. love—hate
__19. speaking—being dumb
__20. sense—nonsense
47
*❖* CHAPTER FIVE
DIVISION
Division is an important means of knowing a simple object, for

when we divide an object into its parts we know better and more dis¬
tinctly the object we are dividing. Moreover, when we study the different
sciences, we need to divide the subject of the science which is at first
only vaguely known. For instance, geometry deals with the continuum,
which we can divide into line, surface and body, thereby achieving more
distinct knowledge of what the science is about. Or again, the subject of
natural science is changeable being, which is divided into living and
non-living, and living in turn into animal and plant, and so on.
We have seen in the preceding chapter that the categories constitute
the highest genera in which we can put the natures we know. The modes
of opposition, which we also treated there, are useful for dividing these
genera because, as we shall see, the members of a division should be
opposed to each other. It is evident, therefore, that relating and oppos¬
ing natures to each other within a category is a result of division. Thus,
within the category of substance we can divide substance into corporeal
and non-corporeal by opposing the parts in a contradictory manner. We
can further divide corporeal into living and non-living; living in turn
into animal and non-animal; animal into vertebrate and non-vertebrate.
We can then change our mode of opposition and divide vertebrate into
mammal, reptile, bird and fish. In this way we see how the logical process
of division is a way of making more manifest an object somehow already
known; division is therefore nothing else than the distributing of some
whole into its parts.
The great philosophers have often employed the art of logical division
as a means of knowing both one object as distinct from another and also
what is included under one object and not under another. Throughout
49
50 DIVISION
his Dialogues Plato makes use of division. In the Sophist, for example,
in order to know more distinctly what an angler is, Plato starts with the
genus art and divides within that genus until he reaches the art of
angling; in a parallel way, to make known what a sophist is, he divides
the genus art in another way to reach the art of sophistry. Aristotle in his
work On the Soul divides the soul according to its powers into nutritive,
appetitive, sensory, locomotive and intellective. Then he can divide liv¬
ing things according to the powers they have; for example, plants have
only nutritive powers, all animals have one or more sensory and appe¬
titive powers as well as nutritive powers, and so on.
The most immediate purpose of division is to aid us in making good
definitions, which we treat in the next chapter. Division is necessary for
definition because, by dividing a whole into its parts, such as a genus into
its dividing differences (animal, for example, into rational and irrational)
we arrive at a more distinct knowledge of that whole, and are provided
with the elements by which a species is to be defined.
Apart from the purpose of constructing a definition, division also pro¬
vides the basis for outlining. Outlining is usually a division of a topic, a
reading assignment, a lecture, or even a whole book, rather than a di¬
vision of a simple object, but in its adaptation outlining applies in a
flexible way the principles and rules of logical division. Almost anyone,
especially teachers and students, finds outlining an indispensable method
of preparation for lectures, study, or reading assignments, and for a num¬
ber of occasions in no way academic at all. By knowing the logic of
division one is able to make better and more useful outlines.
We can present the logic of division most simply by considering it
from the standpoint of the rules of good division (which establish the
technique of dividing) and then examining the kinds of division we can
make.
The Rules of Division
1. The dividing parts must be inferior, that is, less universal than
that which is divided.
Clearly, if we are dividing an object, each dividing member will

have to be less than what we are dividing. Since “less” in the context of
logical division means “less universal,” then of course the object capable
of being divided logically must be some universal nature, or at least an
object conceived as universal. We thereby eliminate a singular object,
which is not properly subject to logical division. We also eliminate singu¬
lars as dividing members, for singulars are a matter of counting not of
dividing.
Consequently, to speak of dividing something universal into less uni-
DIVISION 51
versal parts as dividing members means first of all to divide a genus

into its species. Thus we divide animal into the species man and brute,
or we could divide color into its various species or kinds. The division
of a genus into its species is, as we shall see shortly, only one kind of
division, only one way of dividing a whole into its parts. Whatever the
kind of division, however, the rule still holds that each dividing member
must be less than the whole divided.
2. The dividing parts must exhaust, that is, fully and adequately
divide, some object.
This rule is easy to understand but often hard to apply. The

relevance of the rule is, of course, obvious, for not to give all the dividing
members is in effect to miss the whole point of making a division as a
means of knowing an object adequately. For example, we have an ade¬
quate grasp of predicable, as far as division is concerned, only when we
know it has the five dividing members of genus, species, specific dif¬
ference, property, and accident. This is an exhaustive division, for there
are no other possible ways of saying one thing of another. On the other
hand, to divide flower into rose, tulip, and lily would violate this rule
and leave us with an inadequate grasp of flower.
The difficulty of applying this rule arises with the example of trying to
divide flower into its various kinds. Who, indeed, could make an ex¬
haustive division of flower in this way? This difficulty, nevertheless, can¬
not permit us to avoid observing this rule. Fortunately, the two succeed¬
ing rules will enable us to see how we can avoid the difficulty this rule
raises. For the moment, let us note that in order not to violate the rule
we should avoid trying to make a division which commits us to too many
dividing parts, or leads us into trying to divide an object when we do not
know sufficiently what the dividing parts are.
A corollary of this rule is that any division must have at least two di¬
viding members. Since what is divided must be a whole of some kind,
then at least two parts will have to appear as dividing members. No
doubt, no one would ever suppose that a division could only have one
dividing member, but in the application of division to outlining, a single
dividing member is sometimes given, possibly because one overlooks the
fact that outlining is an application of logical division.
3. The dividing members must be formally opposed to each

other such that each part excludes the other.
We see, first of all, the relevance of this rule for a good division.
If a division results in something being in one dividing member which is
52 DIVISION
also in another, we have failed to set off distinctly the parts of the whole
we are dividing. If, for example, we divide vertebrate into mammal, bird,
reptile, fish, and canine, we commit the fallacy of an overlapping division
since canine as a dividing part is already included under mammal.
In order to insure the observance of this rule, we need only recall the
different kinds of opposition we examined in the preceding chapter, for
any one of those four oppositions will sufficiently distinguish one divid¬
ing member from another. Overlapping is best avoided by seeing that
dividing members are contained immediately under the genus.
We can, first of all, make a division by contradictory opposition. Under
a given whole which we are dividing, we can always oppose one part of
the whole to another by stating the contradictory. For example, we can
divide religion into Christian and non-Christian. Such a division is
always an easy one to make and at the same time it is a certain way of
achieving an exhaustive division since there can only be two dividing
members in a division by contradiction. This division is also known as a
division by dichotomy, a word deriving from the Greek meaning “to cut
asunder,” hence a cutting into two dividing members one of which is
always the contradictory of the other. Thus we see an easy way of ob¬
serving the foregoing rule which requires us to give an exhaustive di¬
vision. True enough, such a division is often not very revealing, and can
easily be used to excess. On the other hand, the division by contradiction
is quite legitimate and, at certain times, is an effective method of divid¬
ing, particularly if one wishes to emphasize what is signified by the posi¬
tive name and exclude all else which is not for one reason or another of
relevant concern under the contradictory negative.
We can also make use of division by privative opposition, as in the
division of man into sane and insane, insinuating by this division the
opposition between the perfection and lack of a perfection that a given
object should possess. Contrary opposition enables us to divide an
object according to the extremes of difference within the same genus, as
in the division of number into odd and even, or the division of taste into
sweet and sour. To this type of division is reduced the division of an
object into formally different parts, for example, the division of color
into its formally different kinds or species. The members of such a di¬
vision will approach one extreme or the other of the contraries which
limit the genus, and it is for this reason that the division of a whole into
formally different parts is reduced to division by contrary opposition.
There is, finally, division by means of relative opposition. By a relative
opposition we mean the division of an object into parts which mutually
or comparatively refer to each other. Thus we can divide distance into
long and short; color into light and dark.
DIVISION 53
4. One and the same basis must be kept throughout the division.
A basis of division is the foundation or the point of view taken

in making a division. It is the consideration we have in mind in making a
division, which may not be explicitly stated but which is revealed by the
dividing members we select. Any division of a genus into its species, as
in the division of color into the various kinds of color or tree into the
various kinds of tree presupposes having in mind an essential considera¬
tion of an object. On the other hand, we may have in mind a more
accidental consideration, as the division of man according to color or a
division of book according to size. Often in outlining, we explicitly state
the basis for making a division. Thus in outlining the program of a
political party, we may state as I under this topic, the tariff policy, with
further division; then II, the foreign policy, with further division, and
so on.
What this rule specifically seeks to guard against is the fallacy known
as “shifting the basis of division.” To take an obvious example of such a
violation we cannot, while dividing man according to education, include
dividing members according to profession or color.
Consequently logic, as an instrument of science, will insist that: (a)
we do not shift the basis of division in a given division, (b) we do not
shift the kind of division in one order of divisions, and (c) as far as
possible we keep the same basis of division in a series of divisions and
subdivisions.
In this connection, however, we must distinguish between division
and co-division. A division, as we have been discussing it, consists in di¬
viding an object adequately according to one point of view. A co-division
consists in dividing an object completely according to one basis and then
in another division dividing the same object according to another basis
of division. Thus we can divide government in one way according to its
different kinds, and then in a different division divide government ac¬
cording to its various powers. In an outline form, the distinct bases of
division are often explicitly stated, as in the example of outlining the
program of a political party on the basis of its tariff policy and then on
the basis of its foreign policy.
We must also take into account the distinction between a division and
a subdivision. A subdivision is simply a division made of a dividing mem¬
ber of a division. Thus we can divide automobile (the complexity of an
artificial object does not preclude its being divided or defined) according
to various price ranges and then, under the medium price range, divide
into different kinds or makes (which, incidentally, are not singulars).
Here we have gone from one point of view in the main division to a
different point of view in the subdivision. It is preferable, however, to
54 DIVISION
keep the same basis of division when passing from the main division to
a subdivision, especially when employing division in a science. But some¬
times, as in the example just given, and when we are not treating a
matter scientifically, we can take a different basis for dividing a dividing
member.
The Kinds of Division
We distinguish kinds of division according to the different ways

in which we can divide a whole into parts. In treating division so far, we
have tended to emphasize division in terms of the most perfect kind, the
division of a genus into its species. The other kinds of division, though
less perfect from the standpoint of the notion of logical division, are
nonetheless extremely useful and perhaps more familiar to us.
1. Division of a universal whole into subjective parts
This is the fundamental kind of division, in terms of which the

rules of division are primarily stated. It is the division of a genus into its
species, the division of a more universal nature into its less universal parts,
which parts are precisely kinds of the whole being divided. It is in this
way that we divided animal into the species man and brute. We could
also go on to divide brute (now considered as a genus) into the various
kinds of brute animal. Any category can be divided in this way, since in
any category we can divide a genus into its species, for example, color
into its various kinds, triangle into its various kinds, and so on.
The distinguishing mark of this kind of division is that the whole
which is being divided can be predicated of each of its parts, for example,
man is animal. Hence we see the significance of calling this a division of
a universal whole into subjective parts, for animal is a universal whole
communicable to its parts, and each of its parts is a subject of which the
whole can be predicated.
2. Division of an integral whole into its composing parts
We now consider a different kind of whole and a different kind

of part. This kind of whole has parts which, taken together, make up or
constitute a whole with respect to the functioning of the whole, or form
a whole with respect to the component parts necessary for the complete¬
ness of the whole.
Let us contrast the kind of whole in this division with the kind of
whole given in the first kind of division. In the first kind of division, the
division of a universal whole, the whole is communicated with respect to
its nature to each part, and thus when we divide government into dif-
DIVISION 55
ferent kinds of government we have the nature of government realized

in each kind. In the second type of division, the division of an integral
whole, the whole is not realized according to its nature in each part but,
rather, each part contributes something to the fullness of the whole. Thus
we can divide government into executive, legislative, and judiciary parts
each of which is necessary for the full and adequate operation of govern¬
ment.
Consequently, in a division of an integral whole into its composing
parts, we cannot predicate the whole of any of its parts. We cannot say
that the executive is the government as though realizing the very nature
of government. Rather, the executive needs to be completed by the com¬
plementary legislative and judiciary parts, that is, functions, of govern¬
ment.
3. Division of a whole accidentally into its parts
In general, an accidental division divides a whole on the basis of

something that is neither essential nor integral to that whole. To say that
a division is accidental is not to suggest that such a division is un¬
important. An accidental division is often useful and revealing as well as
important; moreover, it is the type of division most frequently used. The
different kinds of accidental division will bring out the different ways an
object can be divided in an accidental way.
(a) Division of a subject (usually a substance) according to its acci¬
dents. Most of the time this division consists in dividing something in
the category of substance on the basis of some other category. Thus, we
can divide man on the basis of quantity into size or weight, or on the
basis of quality into differences of color or moral quality.
(b) Division of an accident according to its subjects. This type of
accidental division is the reverse of the preceding one. For example, we
can divide sensation (in the category of quality) according to the sub¬
jects in which-it is found, into man and brute animal.
(c) Division of an accident according to its accidents. At first sight,
such a division might seem less important or less useful since it is even
more accidental than the foregoing ones. Nonetheless, when we recall
that we can divide something in one category of accident on the basis of
some other category of accident, we can see that such divisions are re¬
vealing and have considerable usefulness and importance for us. Thus
we can divide art (in the category of quality) according to the category
of When into ancient, medieval, and modern; we can divide something
in the category of action according to relation into fast and slow; we
can divide a quality, for example, intelligence, according to quantitative
measurement, and so on.
56 DIVISION
Questions Chapter Five
1. Show how division is related to the modes of opposition and to the

categories.
2. What is the most immediate purpose of division as far as logic is con¬
cerned?
3. Explain the relation between division and outlining.
4. Explain the meaning and importance of the first rule of division.
5. What precaution do we have to bear in mind with respect to the second
rule of division?
6. Explain the ways in which dividing members are formally opposed to
each other.
7. What is a basis of division and why must it be kept throughout a
division?
8. Distinguish division, co-division, and subdivision. Illustrate with original
examples.
9. In a division of a whole into subjective parts, what kind of whole and
parts are involved and what is the distinguishing mark of this kind of
division?
10. How does a division of an integral whole into composing parts differ
from a division of a universal whole into subjective parts?
11. Explain and contrast the division of a subject according to accidents and
an accident according to its subjects, with original examples of each.
12. Explain the division of an accident according to its accidents, with orig¬
inal examples of each.
Exercise I Chapter Five
In the following items state whether the divisions are good or bad. If bad,
explain why. Note that each item should include both the dividing parts and
that which is divided, though not in any given order.
-. 1. univocal, equivocal, name, analogous
- 2. tree, non-elm, oak
- 3. cancer, internal, external
_ 4. action, passive, substance, when, where, habit, quantity,

quality, position
_ 5. number, continuous, discrete, quantity, triangle
_ 6. technical, book, non-technical
_ 7. Chicago, north, south, east, west
__ 8. German, French, Spanish, Latin, romance language
__ 9. privative, contradictory, opposition, relative, contrary
_10. Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, religion, non-Jewish
_11. dollar, dime, money, nickel, cent
_12. totalitarian, government, democratic
57
Exercise II ►♦•hSh*. Chapter Five
Make a good division of the following topics, carrying the division through
at least two subdivisions. The fourth possibility is left open as a choice. (This
exercise may be done in outline form.)
1. Animal
2. American government
3. Education
4.
59
Exercise III Chapter Five
In Plato’s dialogue the Sophist,* Theaetetus and the Stranger try to find
out what an angler is by the process of division. On a separate sheet of paper
reproduce the division given in the following passage (abbreviated in part):
Stranger. Let us begin by asking whether an angler is a man having art or

not having art, but some other power.
Theaetetus. He is clearly a man of art.
Str. And of arts there are two kinds?
Theaet. What are they?
Str. All arts are either acquisitive or creative; in which class shall we place
the art of the angler?
Theaet. Clearly in the acquisitive class.
Str. And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts; there is ex¬
change, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; and the
other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be
termed conquest?
Theaet. That is implied in what has been said.
Str. And may not conquest be again subdivided? Open force may be
called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further
divided: into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.
Theaet. Yes, if both kinds exist.
Str. Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things having no
special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small matters, may be
omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting. And
animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land-animal hunting
and water-animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?
Theaet. True.
Str. And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other
in the water?
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is
included. The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name
of fishing. And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two prin¬
cipal kinds?
Theaet. What are they?
* This extract from the Sophist is taken from the Jowett translation with the per¬
mission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford, England.
61
Str. There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which takes
them by blow.
Theaet. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
Str. As to the first kind—all that surrounds and encloses anything to
prevent egress, may be rightfully called an enclosure; for which reason twig
baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed “en¬
closures.” And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture
with enclosures, or something of that sort?
Theaet. Yes.
Str. The other kind, which is practised by a blow with hooks and three¬
pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking.
There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a
fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or spearing by firelight.
And the fishing by day is called by the general name of barbing, because the
spears, too, are barbed at the point.
Theaet. Yes, that is the term.
Str. Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from
above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged
spears are mostly used.
Theaet. Yes, it is often called so.
Str. Then now there is only one kind remaining. When a hook is used,
and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the
spear, but only about the head and mouth, and is then drawn out from below
upwards with reeds and rods:—What is the right name of that mode of fish¬
ing, Theaetetus?
Theaet. I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.
62
CHAPTER SIX
DEFINITION
The logic of simple apprehension—the art we need to aid us in

knowing even simple objects or natures—culminates in definition. We
have referred before to this culminating effect of definition in relation to
apprehending simple objects, but it may be desirable now to summarize
what we have so far covered in relation to the art of definition.
Even the distinction between words and concepts is relevant to defini¬
tion, for unless we see that words are unintelligible without reference to
our notions of things, we shall fail to see the primary purpose of defini¬
tion which is to explain the natures of things themselves. Strictly speak¬
ing, we do not in logic seek to define words (even though perforce we
must use words); we seek to define what words, through concepts, refer
to, the real natures we come to know. In brief, we must address ourselves
to the task of defining what the natures are of things we know through
experience; we are not merely substituting one word for another or one
set of conventional signs for words we seek to know.
The predicables move us on toward the task of constructing a defini¬
tion. Each predicable is at least something by way of setting forth what
we can say of an object we wish to understand. What is predicable as a
genus says something, though incompletely, about what an object is;
what is predicable as species says what the nature of a given individual
is; what is predicable as a property, though not telling us what an object
is, does point out a characteristic belonging only, necessarily, and always
to the object in question, and such knowledge is of great value in helping
us to come to know the object.
To be precise about the way in which words signify our notions of
things, we must take into account how words signify univocally, thus
putting aside the equivocal and even the analogous signification words
63
64 DEFINITION
can also have. To be precise, further, about the simple apprehension of

things signified by words, we benefit by knowing the categories, those
ultimate genera in which we can locate any object that we can define.
Finally, we can employ the art of division as a means of knowing, since
within any category we can divide and thus determine the nearest genus,
or at least a near genus, which affords us the best opportunity for start¬
ing to construct the definition that will provide us with a full explana¬
tion of the object we seek to know.
True enough, the content of any definition we give will not come from
logic, as we have pointed out before, but from knowledge gained from
our common experience or from any of the many sciences we come to
possess. What logic does do for us, and the importance of this contribu¬
tion of logic cannot be overlooked, is provide us with the means and
technique of ordering what knowledge we have so as to aid us in coming
to know better what we otherwise would know imperfectly; and in addi¬
tion to this, the art of logic enables us to manifest what we know in an
orderly manner.
A definition is a complete, or at least an adequate, explanation of what
a simple object is, and thus we see how the foregoing material in this
first part of logic contributes to our now being able to form a definition.
More specifically, a definition is a composite expression which explains
the nature of a thing or, failing that, a composite expression which
enables us to distinguish sufficiently one object from another. If we can
define an object well—if we can explain what an object is at least enough
to set it apart from any other—we thereby know it well and manifest well
our knowing of it. It is to such an explanation of a simple object that the
logic of definition is ordered.
Our procedure will be the following in setting forth the doctrine and
technique of definition. We shall first present the rules of definition,
the procedure which must be followed to insure good definition. We
shall then distinguish the kinds of definition, the different ways in which
a simple object can be adequately explained and understood.
The Rules of Definition
1. The definition should be composed of a genus and a dif¬

ference
We apply here, in the rules of definition, the meaning of genus

and difference as we first explained these words in discussing the pred¬
icables in Chapter Two. By “genus” we mean that which says something
essentially about the thing it can be said of, though incompletely. Thus
“animal” tells us something essential about “man” but is incomplete in
the sense that though “man” must be “animal,” still “animal” does not
DEFINITION 65
express wholly what “man” is, otherwise “man” would be confused with
“dog.” Nevertheless, “animal” contributes to our understanding of what
man” is, for what “man” is includes being what animal is. Some genus
therefore, either proximate or remote, enters into any definition of what
something is. Indeed, when seeking to give a definition of any simple
object, we almost spontaneously think of some genus. What, for ex¬
ample, is a tulip? We think at once of flower. What is a dog? We think
at once of animal. Hence, our first step in starting to define some simple
object is to think of the genus under which the object falls, a genus
which, in turn, is in one of the categories we have already established.
The difficult part of constructing a definition lies not in finding a
genus but in securing some difference, that is, something which will set
off the object we are defining from any other object in the same genus.
The word “difference” here is taken more broadly than the “specific dif¬
ference” we described as a predicable. Of course, if we can determine
what the specific difference is of the object we seek to define, we shall
assuredly give the most essential definition possible, as “rational” added
to the genus “animal” essentially defines “man.” Most of the time,
however, we cannot know the essential difference of the object we wish
to define. Hence, in this first rule of definition, we take “difference”
broadly to signify not only a specific difference, but any sort of dif¬
ference which will sufficiently set off the object we are defining from any
other object within the same genus. The various sorts of difference we
can employ in place of a specific difference will be distinguished when
we discuss below the different kinds of definition.
Let us therefore understand this first rule of definition to mean the fol¬
lowing. In constructing a definition, we should pick some genus, prefer¬
ably as proximate a genus as possible, in which the object to be defined
can be located. Then we should search for the most revealing difference
we can find to set off this object from any other in the same genus. If a
specific difference is available, such a difference should be used; if not,
some other characteristic should be used that will sufficiently perform
the function of differentiating the object. Hence it is possible to have
more than one definition of the same nature or object, depending on the
sort of difference used.
2. The definition and the definitum must be convertible
The force of this rule will be understood if we merely reflect

that in seeking to give a definition of some simple object our aim is to
give a wholly adequate explanation—a complete meaning—of that
object. If we do give such a complete meaning, we have thereby ex¬
pressed just what this object is, and in turn this means that the definition
wholly sets off the object being defined from any other possible object.
66 DEFINITION
Consequently, it follows that the definition and what is being defined,

the definitum, must be interchangeable with each other, that is, con¬
vertible.
Suppose that we define man as an animal capable of learning grammar.
If this definition really expresses adequately what man is as distinct from
any other animal, then we may say that whatever is man is capable of
learning grammar, and likewise, whatever is an animal capable of learn¬
ing grammar is man. On the other hand, if we were to define man as a
two-footed animal, we would recognize at once that since not every two-
footed animal is man, this lack of convertibility indicates that we have
not sufficiently explained what man is so as to set man off from any other
animal.
Convertibility of definition with definitum is, clearly, a sound rule for
constructing a good definition. Negatively, it is an effective criticism of
inadequate definitions, and can be used as a quick and certain way of
showing the inadequacy of a definition whenever one is offered to us.
3. The definition should signify more clearly than the definitum
The purpose of a definition is to manifest what the definitum is

so that we can apprehend better the object in question. The most ob¬
vious violation of this rule consists in employing in the definition words
that are unfamiliar, strange, complicated or unduly technical. The re¬
nowned Samuel Johnson, perhaps with tongue in cheek, defined a cough
as “a convulsion of the lungs, vellicated by some sharp serasity,” and a
network as “anything reticulated or decussated, at equal distances, with
interstices between the intersections.” If we take such definitions
seriously, they would violate this rule of definition, since the language
employed fails to manifest to a person in ordinary command of language
what a cough is or what a network is.
On the other hand, we have to allow for what we might call technical
definitions, that is, definitions given in the context of a certain science
where a special vocabulary is presupposed. Thus, when we defined the
predicable specific difference as “a relation of universality in virtue of
which something is predicated in a way that sets one thing apart from
another, not just as distinct in number but as different in kind,” we pre¬
supposed some logical vocabulary. The physicist or the mathematician
or the psychologist likewise presupposes a special vocabulary. Allowing,
then, for the context in which a definition is given, the language in the
definition should be reasonably intelligible and not notably obscure or un¬
familiar.
Further, a definition should avoid metaphorical and figurative lan¬
guage. A metaphor like Pascal’s description of man as a “thinking reed”
may be an arresting image of man that suggests a great deal about man’s
DEFINITION 67
composite nature, yet it does not express in the literal way a definition
demands, what man is; in fact, unless one has a satisfactory definition of
man to begin with, the force of Pascal’s figure is lost. Metaphor is the
valuable instrument of the poet, not the logician.
The rule also eliminates, rather obviously, ambiguous or equivocal
words (which confuse rather than set off and distinguish) and negative
words and expressions (which say what something is not rather than
what it is). To define love in terms of not hating is hardly helpful.
Nevertheless, there are times when one’s only recourse in defining may
be negative expressions, as in definitions of objects whose difficulty may
preclude any adequate positive formulation, or in definitions of things
that are themselves understood as negative or privative, for example, a
definition of a spinster or a bachelor. Such instances are by way of ex¬
ception.
Finally, this rule directs us to avoid including in the definition the
word signifying the definitum or any derivative of it. To define a logician
as “one skilled in logic” would be such a violation. True enough, the dic¬
tionary often seems to do just that, but in adding the phrase “one skilled
in logic” after the word “logician,” the dictionary is not defining, but
merely showing that the word “logician” is a derivative of the word
“logic.” For the definition, one must go to the word from which the
derivative comes, in this case “logic.” However, the dictionary does not
primarily seek to give definitions in the precise logical sense of the term,
but to express the meaning of words as they have come to be used by
most people or by some authorities.
4. The definitum must be universal
The first rule has already pointed out that the definition must
contain a genus and some kind of difference. If something as a genus
appears in the definition then clearly what is being defined, the defini¬
tum, must be a species in some sense, and therefore something universal.
Negatively, this rule eliminates the singular, which cannot be defined
in any proper sense of the term, since th6 material singular, as such,
is unintelligible. An individual object shares a nature, but it is not
the nature, and what we define is always some sort of nature which
we understand as universal. No doubt, a great deal can be said and
described about an individual, but all the information we can convey
about an individual object will not constitute a definition expressing
what it is, for it shares what it is with other individuals of the same
nature. A singular thing, strictly speaking, is indefinable.
Let us add here, as a corollary, that an object may also be too universal
to be defined. In listing the categories, we noted that each category,
properly speaking, cannot be defined. We now see why. A category is a
68 DEFINITION
supreme genus, and hence we have no genus above it which we could

use in the definition of a category (“being,” which transcends the cat¬
egories, cannot be a genus in the strict meaning of the term).
The Kinds of Definition
We can divide broadly all definitions by contradictory division

into essential and non-essential. Such a division is revealing in that it
emphasizes the primary and perfect kind of definition—the essential—by
way of opposition to all other kinds of definition, which do not express
precisely what a thing is, that is, the essence. Such a division also suggests
that the name “definition” becomes analogous when signifying an essen¬
tial definition and any other kind of definition, for to define by explain¬
ing precisely what the nature is, differs in meaning from defining by ex¬
plaining what belongs to the nature or what is a cause of the nature.
In listing the kinds of definition, however, we shall adopt a positive
basis of division, while keeping in mind the point that the essential
definition is the primary kind and that the other kinds depart from the
basic knowledge which the essential kind provides.
1. Essential definition
An essential definition (sometimes called a “real” definition in

that it expresses what an object really is) expresses precisely what the
object which we are defining is. To express what something is strictly,
we have to state in the definition the proximate genus and the specific
difference. Rational animal is such a definition of man, for animal is the
nearest genus to man we can have in the category of substance, and
rational differentiates man in species (hence specific difference) from
any other kind of animal. Again, if we wish to define “animal,” we would
put living being as the proximate genus and sentient as the specific dif¬
ference, thus differentiating in species any animal from any plant, which
is also a living being.
The very structure of the essential definition—a proximate genus and
a specific difference—is a clear sign of the perfection it has in mode of
defining. Its very perfection, however, precludes our being able to form
definitions in this way very often. Only somewhat rarely can we know
objects this well. Nonetheless, the essential definition is the model we
should have in mind in formulating our knowledge of simple objects,
however infrequently we attain it. At the same time, let us note that
while an essential definition has the perfection we have indicated, we
do not thereby maintain that an essential definition expresses everything
which can be known about an object. Man is much else besides rational
animal—the essential definition makes no claim to completeness—yet
DEFINITION 69
whatever else man also is, what man first of all is, is rational animal, and
it is such a basic grasp of the nature of something that the essential
definition manifests.
2. Definition by property
The definition by property approaches the essential definition in

strictness, for we recall from our treatment of property as a predicable
that it is an attribute belonging only, necessarily, and always to the es¬
sence. A property, however, will not express what the definitum is but
that which is connected in a certain way with it. Consequently, to define
by stating in a definition a genus and a property will be quite different as
to what definition means from stating a proximate genus and a specific
difference.
A further contrast between essential definition and definition by
property may be noted. There can be only one essential definition for a
given object, but there may be a number of definitions by property of the
same object. The only essential definition of man is “rational animal.”
We may also define man by a number of definitions by property, for
example, “an animal capable of learning grammar,” “an animal capable
of humor,” “an animal that cooks its food,” and so on.
In the notion of definition by property, we retain in logic the strict
meaning of property, an attribute belonging only, necessarily, and always
to a nature. Definition by property as used in various sciences is some¬
times broadened in meaning so as to retain only the meaning of
“always,” without having to imply “necessarily” and “only.” Thus a
scientist may define something like oxygen as a colorless gas, and as an
odorless gas, which characteristics always belong to oxygen but not neces¬
sarily nor only, as far as we know.
3. Definition by cause
A cause can be placed in a definition as a type of difference

which sets off what we are defining from any other object. Let us under¬
stand here by “cause” that upon which something depends for its ex¬
istence or for its coming to be. We may note here also the division of
cause into intrinsic and extrinsic. To illustrate this division and to ex¬
plain briefly the meaning of the different kinds of cause, let us consider
the causes of an ordinary object like a chair.
Clearly, for the chair to be and to come to be as well, some material
such as wood is required. Hence the name “material cause,” indicating
that out of which something is made or from which it is. But to be
specifically a chair, and not a bed or a table, the material has to be
formed in a certain way; hence the name “formal cause” to indicate what
70 DEFINITION
sort of object the material is formed into. Material and formal causes
thus constitute the intrinsic causes of the chair, what the chair is as an
object.
In addition, the chair needs to be brought into being, and for this we
need someone who makes the chair. We call such a cause an “efficient”
(or “agent”) cause, for without such a cause operating the chair would
not now be. Finally, we have the purpose for which the chair is made,
namely to be an object in which one can sit comfortably. Such a cause
is known as the “final cause.” The efficient and final causes are the
extrinsic causes of an object—what brings the chair into existence and
what it is for.
All causes may be used to express the definition of an object, but
in any case, a definition by cause has to include at least one of the
extrinsic causes, and we shall so mean a definition by cause here. Such a
way of formulating a definition is especially useful for defining artificial
objects where the final cause is clearly manifest. On the other hand, it is
important to note that if we can define a natural object by all four causes,
we thereby give the most complete definition possible—more complete,
in fact, than the essential definition which gives only the equivalent of
the intrinsic causes (for “rational animal” can also be understood as the
formal and material causes of man). In effect, then, a definition by all
four causes (when such a definition can be given) will include the es¬
sential definition but will complete it in the sense of bringing in extrinsic
causes as well.
4. Definition by accident
We understand “accident” here as the predicable accident,

namely a characteristic that belongs to more than one nature, or that may
not be necessarily connected with a nature, or that may not always be¬
long to a nature. It is enough for a characteristic to be regarded as an
accident if any one of the foregoing three alternatives is realized. Thus
“white” is an accidental characteristic of snow because it does not belong
only to snow although it may always be found in snow and may even
be necessarily connected with snow. On the other hand, “white” is also
an accident of man and in a much more evident way as an accident, since
“white” does not belong only to man, is not necessarily in man, and is
not always in man. We thus see that “accident” has a wide range of
meaning.
Definition by accident is difficult in one sense and easy in another. It is
difficult to make a good definition by accident because an accident is not
related only, necessarily, and always to an object, and so it is hard to ob¬
serve the second rule of definition on convertibility. For this reason, a
definition by accident usually has to be expressed with two or more acci-
DEFINITION 71
dents standing in place of the difference. Thus, if we were trying to

define dog, with “animal’’ as the genus, it would not be enough to state
“carnivorous” for the difference; we would have to add “domesticated”
and something like “barking” and perhaps other characteristics as well.
Definition by accident is easy, or at any rate easier than other types
of definition, because we know things first by means of their acci¬
dents. In addition, although no rule of definition may be directly
violated, nevertheless the definition by accident can apply the rules of
definition in a more flexible manner than other types, for in a definition
by accident we are often able to set off sufficiently what we are defining
without being forced to the kind of rigor the other types of definition
demand.
5- Definition by name
Finally, we have a type of definition that is least revealing of all,

yet nonetheless useful for certain occasions. The definition by name is of
two types. It may simply explain the meaning of a word in an etymolog¬
ical manner, that is, show the origin of a word by analyzing the word into
its parts. Thus philosophy may be defined as “love of wisdom” by show¬
ing that the name derives from two Greek words meaning “love” and
“wisdom.” Secondly, a definition by name may simply show the common
meaning a word has. Thus one may define soul in a nominal way as “the
principle of life,” since this meaning is the one that has been generally
attached to the word and is acceptable for ordinary purposes.
Questions ►M** Chapter Six
1. Summarize the material of the logic of simple apprehension which leads

to knowing the art of definition.
2. In the first rule of definition, what function does genus play in construct¬
ing a definition?
3. What is the meaning of difference in the. first rule of constructing a
definition?
4. Illustrate with an original example the second rule of definition. How is
this rule effective in a negative way for establishing a good definition?
5. Explain the different ways in which a definition might signify less clearly
than the definitum.
6. When are technical definitions justified? Illustrate with some example
you have run across in your studies.
7. Why must the definitum be universal?
8. Why is the singular indefinable?
9. How can an object be too universal to be defined?
72 DEFINITION
10. What is the relevance of dividing all definitions into essential and non-
essential?
11. What is the structure of an essential definition? Wherein lies its per¬
fection?
12. Compare a definition by property with an essential definition.
13. Explain the four causes and construct an original example of a definition
by extrinsic causes.
14. Explain the sense in which a definition by accident is difficult and the
sense in which it is easy. Give an original example of a definition by acci¬
dent.
15. What are the two types of definition by name?
Exercise I Chapter Six
In the definition, given at the right of each definitum, encircle the genus
and underline the difference. On the lines at the left, state the kind each
definition is.
1. Man: an animal capable of speech
2. Scale: a device used to measure the weight of

an object
3. Man: a featherless, furless, two-footed animal
4. Target: an object used to test one’s skill with

a weapon
5. Sign: that which represents something other

than itself to a knowing power
6. Business: a word deriving from “busy” and

“ness,” meaning one’s rightful work or per¬
sonal concern
7. Animal: a sentient, living being
8. Gold: the most malleable metal
9. Net: a fabric woven into meshes used for

catching fish, birds, and so forth.
10. Knife: an instrument consisting of a thin

blade usually of steel, fashioned to a handle,
having a sharp edge and used for cutting
11. Mammal: an animal that nourishes its young

with milk
12. Horse: a large, solid-hoofed, herbivorous,

domesticated animal
73
Exercise II *❖* Chapter Six
On this page, write out five definitions of objects you know sufficiently well
to give good definitions. Indicate the kind of definition you are using.
75
Exercise III Chapter Six
The paragraph below is taken from an article on chemistry in the Encyclo¬

paedia Britannica, with permission of the editors. It illustrates how the
human mind naturally tends to work along the principles we have studied
in the logic of the first act of the intellect. The author has used techniques
of opposition, division, and definition to bring out the nature of his subject.
Read it and answer the questions appearing after it.
Chemistry is the natural science which has for its province the study of the com¬
position of substances. In common with physics it includes the determination of
properties or characters which serve to distinguish one substance from another, but
while the physicist is concerned with processes in which the molecules remain intact,
the chemist is restricted to those processes in which the molecules undergo some
change. For example, the physicist determines the density, elasticity, hardness, elec¬
trical and thermal conductivity, thermal expansion, etc.; the chemist, on the other
hand, investigates changes in composition, such as may be effected by an electric
current, by heat, or when two or more substances are mixed. A further differentiation
of the provinces of chemistry and physics is shown by the classifications of matter. To
the physicist matter is presented in three leading forms—solids, liquids, and gases;
and although further subdivisions have been rendered necessary with the growth of
knowledge, the same principle is retained, namely, a classification based on properties
having no relation to composition. The fundamental chemical classification based on
properties of matter, on the other hand, recognizes two groups of substances, namely,
elements, which are substances not admitting of analysis into other substances, and
compounds, which do admit of analysis into simpler substances. . . .
1. In what category does chemistry belong?
2. In what genus does the author put chemistry?
3. What is the genus and what is the difference in the definition given of
chemistry?
4. What rule does the definition of chemistry seem to violate?
5. Outline how chemistry and physics differ with respect to the study of the
composition of substances.
77
6. What kind of opposition does the author use in the division he makes
between elements and compounds?
7. Which rule does the definition given of elements seem to violate?
78
II
THE LOGIC OF
THE SECOND ACT
OF THE INTELLECT:
COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PROPOSITION
A proposition is a composite expression (that is, speech) that

signifies what is true or false.
This definition can be expanded in the following way. Strictly speak¬
ing, we should be defining here an enunciation rather than a proposition.
Both an enunciation and a proposition have this in common that each
is an expression signifying a composition or division which the mind
makes with respect to simple objects upon which a judgment of truth or
falsity follows. The difference is that an enunciation is such a composite
expression taken absolutely or by itself whereas a proposition is a com¬
plex expression understood in the context of an argumentation, that is, a
complex expression proposed for proving some conclusion or the con¬
clusion itself proposed as proved true. However, the formality of this
distinction has been lost in modern times and, following modern usage,
we shall call any composite expression which signifies something as true
or false a proposition whether it occurs by itself or in the context of an
argumentation such as the syllogism.
The logic of the first act of the intellect, simple apprehension, helps us
to understand simple objects in a more distinct and orderly manner-
such understanding being apart from truth and falsity. Truth and falsity
arise only when we combine one simple object with another (A dog is
an animal) or divide one object from another (A dog is not a cat). The
formation of a composition or a division in the mind is expressed for¬
mally by the verb “to be.” Hence in stating that a proposition signifies
what is true or false, we mean that one simple object is combined with
another or set off from another by means of the verb “to be” and such
an expression signifies what is or what is not so, that is, what is true or
false.
81
82 THE PROPOSITION
In referring to a proposition as true or false, we are saying that the

proposition is a sign of true or false understanding; that is, a proposition
is an oral or written expression of what we know as true or false. Conse¬
quently, truth or falsity is in the mind as in a subject (and it is this truth
or falsity which the proposition is signifying). In turn, however, since
the mind in knowing primarily depends upon what is real, the real is the
cause of the truth which is in the mind. The meaning of “truth” is thus
varied. With respect to our mode of knowing, we think of “truth” first
in the sense in which a proposition is true, and while this meaning of
“truth” is first for us, nevertheless such truth is dependent upon our
knowing, which in turn must be measured by reality itself.
Let us now examine the genus given in the definition of a proposition,
a composite expression or speech. A composite expression, speech em¬
ploying more than a simple name, is an orderly group of words. We may
therefore define a composite expression as a whole whose parts signify
something separately. We thereby distinguish any composite expression
from a simple name signifying a simple object, such as man, tree, or
dog. Thus even white dog is already a composite expression; so also is a
complete sentence or a proposition. We are thus led to distinguish be¬
tween a perfect (complete) composite expression and an imperfect (in¬
complete) composite expression.
A perfect composite expression generates a complete meaning in the
mind of the hearer; it is an expression which can stand independently
with regard to the meaning it conveys. The grammatical equivalent of
the perfect composite expression is a complete sentence. An imperfect
composite expression fails to generate a complete meaning in the mind
of the hearer; it leaves one in suspense because of the incompleteness of
meaning. The grammatical equivalent of the imperfect composite ex¬
pression is a phrase or a clause or any incomplete sentence.
The Kinds of Perfect Composite Expression
It is the perfect composite expression which interests us since

the proposition is a perfect composite expression. But not every perfect
composite expression is a proposition, and hence to understand more pre¬
cisely what the proposition is, we need to distinguish the different kinds
of composite expression.
There are five types of perfect composite expression. One kind is a
command, an imperative mode of expression, as in Shut the door! An¬
other kind is a wish or request, as in Please pass the salt. A third kind is
a question, an interrogative mode of expression, as in Who is knocking
at the door? A fourth kind is an exclamation, a vocative mode of expres¬
sion, as in Heaven help me! The fifth kind, finally, is the proposition,
the enunciative mode of expression with which we are concerned in
THE PROPOSITION 83
logic. The enunciative mode of expression which characterizes the

proposition brings out clearly what the definition of the proposition is
stating—an enunciating of what is true or false. To enunciate Every book
is interesting is to assert something which is either true or false. Again,
we have a grammatical equivalent for the proposition, the declarative
sentence.
The Elements of a Proposition
The elements of a proposition are the name and the verb. We

speak of a name in logic rather than a noun, for under name we include
not only the noun, but the adjective and pronoun as well. We shall
shortly see precisely what we mean by the verb in logic. The division of a
proposition into name and verb is a division of an integral whole into its
composing parts; this type of division implies that for the completeness
of a proposition both the name and the verb must be included.
A name is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no
part of which is significant separately.
Vocal sound is given as the genus in the definition. The name is there¬
fore understood as oral, not so as to exclude the written name, but to
emphasize that the first meaning of “name” is the spoken word, for
which the written word is a substitution. The point of stating vocal
sound as the genus, however, is to distinguish a name from any non-vocal
sound that still might signify in some way, as the sound of thunder signi¬
fies an approaching storm.
The remainder of the definition is made up of four distinguishing char¬
acteristics constituting the difference of the definition. Significant dif¬
ferentiates the name from any nonsignificant vocal sound, such as the
uttering of nonsense sounds—the brillig and the toves of Lewis Carroll’s
Jabberwocky (even though Humpty-Dumpty claimed he could make
them significant). By convention differentiates the name from vocal
sounds that signify naturally, such as the groans or screams of a person in
distress. Without time differentiates the name from the verb in the sense
that a name signifies something not measured by time. The verb, on the
other hand, signifies with time, since it signifies motion, either coming
from an agent or received in a patient, and time is the measure of this
motion. The name does not signify what is in motion, although what the
name signifies is subject to motion. Thus the name man signifies what is
subject to motion, but not motion going on, and in this sense the name
signifies without time. The last part of the difference given in the defini¬
tion, no part of which is significant separately, differentiates the name
from any composite expression, for example, wise man, in which the
parts of a whole do signify something separately.
A verb is defined as, that which signifies with time and is a sign of
84 THE PROPOSITION
those things predicated of another. This definition expresses only what

distinguishes the verb from the name; in other respects, the definitions of
name and verb agree, for example, having the same genus, vocal sound.
As we noted above in the definition of a name, to signify with time
means the following: since motion, both active and passive, is measured
first and principally by time, the verb, which signifies this active and
passive motion, signifies with time. We stress with, because time, taken
absolutely, is signified by a name, such as time, year or day. To be even
more precise, we must also say that the verb, in signifying with time, must
signify in the mode of action, and not simply action itself. For example,
in the proposition Walking is good exercise, “walking” signifies action
itself but not action going on, and hence signifies as a name and not
as a verb. Thus what is formal about the verb is its signifying with time
in the sense of signifying action going on which is measured by time.
The verb is also the sign of something predicated of a subject. Because
the subject of a proposition always signifies that in which something in¬
heres, the verb (signifying in the manner of an action, whose nature is
to inhere) is posited on the part of the predicate of the proposition.
Hence it is that the verb always signifies a predication; further, by means
of the verb we imply or connote the composition or separation of subject
and predicate.
We may also speak of the parts of a proposition as the subject, the
predicate, and the verb copula. For example, in the proposition White is
a color, “white” stands as the subject (that of which something is predi¬
cated); “color” stands as the predicate (that which is said of something
else, that is, of the subject); and “is” stands as the verb copula (as the
sign of the joining of predicate and subject). The clearest way to express
these parts in a proposition is to use the present tense of the verb to be
for the verb copula, as we just did in “White is a color.” This form of
the proposition (called by some logicians the “logical form” of the
proposition) enables us to bring out most clearly the function of the
verb copula as the sign of predication. Thus, is as a verb copula means
to be in, not to be absolutely; in other words, the verb copula signifies
first of all a mode of inherence, not a mode of simple existence, except in
a proposition like Paul is, where it signifies in both ways.
It is not necessary that a proposition be expressed in this explicit way.
Paul has a fever is just as much a proposition as Paul is one who has a
fever. The latter way is sometimes preferable, inasmuch as certain rela¬
tions between propositions are more evident if propositions are so ex¬
pressed.
Questions Chapter Seven
1. State the definition of a proposition and show why the proposition must
belong to the logic of the second act of the intellect.
THE PROPOSITION 85
2. Explain how truth is in the proposition, and how it is in the mind.

3. Explain the meaning of composite expression or speech.
4. List the different kinds of perfect composite expression, explaining each
and illustrating with an original example.
5. What kind of division is used in dividing the proposition into name and
verb, and why is it that kind of division?
6. Define name, giving a brief explanation of the parts of the definition.
7. Precisely how does the verb differ from the name?
8. Explain the relation of the verb to time.
9. Analyze a proposition according to subject, predicate, and copula, using
an original example.
10. What does “is” as a verb copula first of all mean? Given this meaning,
is the proposition Shakespeare is a great poet true?
Exercise Chapter Seven
In the following composite expressions, write Yes if the composite expression

is a proposition. No if it is not. In those that are propositions, underline the
subject once and the predicate twice.
- 1. Every rose is beautiful.
-- 2. Make the world safe for democracy.
- 3. I am hopeful.
_4. Keeping one’s sanity is not always easy.
_ 5. Hand me the book.
_6. Some sentences are not propositions.
_ 7. Give me your word of honor.
_ 8. Some books which are not novels are interesting.
__ 9. Anyone who thinks he is clever is not clever.
_10. Logic is a course that is needed for other studies.
_11. The building that is on the opposite side of the street is not
the one you are to enter.
_12. The question is whether we should pass the motion or not.
_13. O, that I might study logic forever!
_14. That he cannot follow instructions is a liability.
_15. Henry is taller than George.
87
*❖* CHAPTER EIGHT
DIVISIONS OF THE
PROPOSITION
Now that we have defined proposition in general and have con¬

sidered the elements of a proposition, we can investigate the different
kinds of proposition. The different kinds of proposition are established
according to various bases of division, and result in co-divisions of the
proposition.
I. According to Unity
The unity of a proposition is determined on the basis of the type

of unity expressed by the mind in forming a proposition. Such a unity is
either absolute or relative.
A proposition is absolutely one when it signifies one thing said un¬
qualifiedly of one other. Such a proposition is called a categorical proposi¬
tion. A dog is an animal is a categorical proposition because one thing,
“animal,” is said of another, “dog.” Multiplicity of concepts or of words
does not necessarily destroy this absolute unity of composition pro¬
vided the multiplicity still expresses one thing said of one other, that is,
that it still signifies only one predication. Thus, Every rational animal is
capable of learning grammar is a categorical proposition despite a multi¬
plicity of words.
A proposition is relatively one when it signifies a composition which
is one by conjunction. Such a proposition is called compound (some¬
times hypothetical) in that it signifies two or more propositions joined
together by some connective expression. In a later chapter we shall ex¬
amine the compound proposition further and divide it into its various
89
90 DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION
kinds. For the present, we can take as an example a conditional type of

compound proposition: If man is rational, then man is able to make
works of art. Such a proposition does not have simple unity of composi¬
tion in the mind, but only qualified unity, for it combines what is many
into a qualified unity.
The categorical and the compound proposition differ in two other
principal respects—according to a difference of the parts each proposi¬
tion has, and according to a difference of type of copula. The parts of the
categorical proposition, as we saw in the last chapter, are the name and
the verb, expressed also as the subject, predicate, and verb copula. The
parts of the compound proposition are categorical propositions joined
together by connectives of some kind. The difference on the part of the
copula arises from two meanings of a copula, that is, two meanings of
“that which connects.” The categorical proposition joins its subject and
predicate by means of a verb copula. The compound proposition joins its
parts by means of a non-verb copula, that is, by such connectives as “if-
then,” “either-or,” “and,” and so forth.
II. According to Quality
On this basis of division, a proposition is divided into affirmative

and negative. The phrase “according to quality” signifies a division ac¬
cording to kind, and hence this division is one of genus into species. It
is, accordingly, the essential division of a proposition, a division of a
whole into subjective parts, because affirmative and negative proposi¬
tions differ in their very manner of relating the predicate to the subject.
An affirmative proposition is one in which the predicate is united with
the subject, and hence is an act of composition. The proposition Man is
rational is affirmative because “rational” is combined with “man” by
means of the affirming verb copula “is.”
A negative proposition is one in which the predicate is divided or
separated from, the subject, and hence is an act of division. The proposi¬
tion A dog is not a cat is a negative proposition because “cat” is denied
of “dog.” A negative proposition may also be expressed as No dog is a
cat, for we understand by such a proposition an act of division or denial
in the sense that we are not combining “cat” with “dog” even though the
negative particle “no” is not directly next to the verb copula in position.
The distinction between affirmative and negative propositions is un¬
doubtedly a clear enough one, but sometimes it may not be immediately
evident whether a proposition is really affirmative or negative. Let us
notice, first of all, that this division of the proposition applies to the
categorical proposition, since the division turns on whether one thing is
predicated of another or not. The compound proposition, because its
copula is not a verb but a connective, will therefore be affirmative regard-
DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION 91
less of whether the categorical parts composing it are affirmative or nega¬

tive. Thus the proposition If man is not rational, then man is not gram¬
matical is an affirmative compound proposition because the connective
joins categorical propositions into one whole even though the categorical
propositions are both negative in this instance.
In categorical propositions, it is always the verb copula which de¬
termines whether the proposition is affirmative or negative. This precision
must be borne in mind because a categorical proposition can contain
more than one verb, but only one of the verbs can function as the
copula, that is, as a sign of combining or separating a logical predicate
from a logical subject. The proposition Persons who are not friendly are
unsociable has both “are not” and “are” in it, but only the “are” stands
as the verb copula, since in this proposition we express an act of com¬
bining “unsociable” with “persons who are not friendly,” and hence the
proposition is affirmative, not negative.
The word “unsociable” in the foregoing example brings up another
point to notice in dealing with affirmative and negative propositions.
“Unsociable” is a negative word, but a negated subject or a negated
predicate will not make the proposition itself negative unless the verb
copula expresses negation. Thus Non-citizens are ineligible to vote is an
affirmative proposition despite the negative expressions in it, neither of
which affects the verb copula.
III. According to Quantity
The basis for this division of the proposition is the quantity of

the subject of the proposition; whatever the quantity of the subject of
the proposition, the quantity of the proposition is as a whole.
We have already distinguished words as signifying what is singular or
what is universal. In the logical sense of the term (distinct from the
grammatical sense) the singular is that which is not of such a nature as
to be predicable of many, but is said only of itself. We express the
singular by a proper name, like Paul, or by some designating phrase, such
as, this man. Accordingly, a singular proposition will have a singular sub¬
ject of which something is either being affirmed, as in Paul is intelli¬
gent, or is being denied, as in This man is not honest.
The universal is that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of
many. The division between universal and singular is therefore an ex¬
haustive one, since everything we know either can or cannot be predi¬
cated of many. However, when what is universal is the subject of a
proposition, then something in turn can be predicated of this universal
in three distinct ways.
First of all, something can be predicated of a universal subject uni¬
versally. The predicate is then said of the subject in such a way that it
is enunciated of the subject as being in all of its singulars. Thus Every

man is an animal is a universal proposition in the sense that “animal” is
said of “man” as realized in every' singular. A negative proposition can
also be universal, as in No plant is an animal, for in this act of division
we deny “animal” universally of “plant,” both as to the nature “plant”
and the individuals in which “plant” is found.
Next, something can be predicated of a universal subject particularly.
The predicate is then said of the subject in such a way that it is enun¬
ciated of the subject as restricted to some individual or individuals. A
particular proposition, therefore, is a proposition whose subject stands
for a vague individual, as in Some man is wise, and Some man is not
wise, or as standing for more than one but not all in a universal sense,
as in Some men are wise, Some men are not wise.
Finally, something can be predicated of a universal subject without a
modifying quantitative sign, that is, indefinitely. In the proposition Man
is wise, the predicate is said of the subject but not in such a way that it
is enunciated of the subject as explicitly being in all of its singulars. Even
though the subject of Man is wise is universal in the sense of common to
many, nevertheless without some quantitative modifier of the subject,
for example, “every,” “all,” “no,” and so on, the predicate is not said of
that universal subject in a universal way. In other words, the indefinite
proposition is one in which the subject is left undetermined as to quan¬
tity, not being explicitly universal or particular, as in Man is wise or Man
is not wise.
We have, therefore, four types of propositions according to quantity:
singular, universal, particular, and indefinite. As we have indicated, the
sign of the quantity of the proposition is posited on the part of the subject,
and normally there is little difficulty in determining the quantity of the
proposition. However, a few instances might be troublesome. A negation
placed before a proposition has the effect of changing both the quantity
and the quality of a proposition. Thus, Every man is good is a universal
affirmative proposition, but Not every man is good is a particular nega¬
tive proposition, for the “not” denies both universal quantity and affirma¬
tive quality. In this connection, it must be noted that the proposition
Every man is not good is also a particular negative proposition and not,
as it might look superficially, a universal negative proposition. The uni¬
versal negative proposition can only be expressed unequivocally as No
man is good.
Consequently, in determining the quantity of any proposition, con¬
sider whether the predicate is affirmed or denied of an individual subject,
or of a universal subject either taken universally, indefinitely, or particu¬
larly. This consideration requires examining a proposition carefully so as
to understand precisely what is being enunciated. Too often propositions

are regarded mechanically and carelessly; for example, one can sup¬
pose that a proposition like Every rose is not red is universal because
one fails to understand carefully just what the proposition is expressing,
which in this instance is not that no rose is red, but that not every rose
is red.
IV. According to the Matter of the Proposition
This division of the proposition is based on what the words

signify with respect to the relation of the predicate and subject. Such an
introduction of “matter” into logic is not at all foreign to logic since
logic primarily is an instrument we use in order to acquire knowledge.
True enough, the knowledge we acquire of real objects is beyond the
reach of logic itself, but nonetheless certain determinations on the part
of what is signified in a proposition are the concern of logic. The follow¬
ing distinctions are instances of such determinations.
A proposition has necessary matter when the predicate is in the sub¬
ject per se, that is, when the predicate belongs to the essence of the
subject and is therefore related necessarily to the subject. The proposition
Man is grammatical has necessary matter because the predicate “gram¬
matical” is necessarily connected with the nature of man, that is, with
what man is.
A proposition has impossible matter when the predicate is per se
repugnant to the subject, that is, when the subject and predicate are
necessarily incompatible with each other. The proposition A man is a
stone has impossible matter because the predicate “stone” cannot belong
to the subject “man.”
A proposition has contingent matter when the predicate is neither per
se in the subject nor per se repugnant to the subject, that is, when the
predicate is such that it may or may not belong to the subject. The
proposition Man is white has contingent matter because the predicate
“white” may or may not be in the subject “man.” In other words, there
is no necessary relation between the subject and the predicate in a prop¬
osition having contingent matter.
The doctrine on the predicables is helpful in distinguishing what
kind of matter is in propositions. If the predicate of a proposition is said
as a predicable genus, species, specific difference, or property, then
the predicate is in necessary matter as related to the subject. If the
predicate of a proposition is said as the predicable accident, then the
predicate is in contingent matter in relation to the subject. If a predicate
cannot be related to any predicable, then the predicate is in impossible
matter, that is, it cannot be related to the subject.
V. According as the Mode of Composition is Expressed or Not
This division of the proposition is based on whether or not

the modality of a proposition is explicitly expressed.
A simple proposition (also called de inesse) is one that does not ex¬
press explicitly the mode of composition in the proposition. It is this
type of proposition that we have been considering so far in this chapter.
A modal proposition is one in which the verb copula is modified by
a sign indicating in what mode the predicate belongs or does not belong
to the subject. There are four modes that can be expressed in a proposi¬
tion: necessity, impossibility, possibility, and contingency.
Let us consider the proposition Man is grammatical. Although, as we
saw in the preceding section, this proposition has necessary matter,
nevertheless it does not express explicitly the modality of the proposition,
that is, it does not state that man necessarily is grammatical. Conse¬
quently, Man is grammatical is a non-modal, or simple, proposition.
This proposition becomes modal when one of the four modes is ex¬
plicitly expressed—It is necessary that man is grammatical.
In order to understand the structure of a modal proposition, we dis-
tinguish the dictum from the mode. The dictum of a modal proposition
is the composition of predicate and subject. The mode is the manner
or modality of that composition. Thus, in the modal proposition It is
necessary that man is grammatical, the composition “man is gram¬
matical” is the dictum and “it is necessary” is the mode.
In terms of this distinction, we can define the modal proposition as a
proposition with its dictum modified. In the proposition It is necessary
that man is grammatical, “it is necessary” modifies the dictum “man is
grammatical.”
A modal proposition can be expressed in different ways grammatically.
We can say It is contingent that man is white, That man is white is
contingent, or Man is contingently white. These propositions differ only
grammatically. As far as logic is concerned, all are equally modal propo¬
sitions and all are the same modal proposition.
A modal proposition is made negative by negating the mode. The
quality of the modal proposition is not affected by the quality of the
dictum. Thus the modal proposition It is not contingent that man is
grammatical is a negative modal proposition because the mode is negated
even though the dictum remains affirmative. On the other hand, the
modal proposition It is contingent that man is not white is an affirma¬
tive modal proposition even though the dictum is negative.
The contingent and the possible are often synonymous in meaning.
There is a distinction between them, however, which it is sometimes im¬
portant to make. The word “contingent” expresses the meaning of what
may or may not be, as in the modal proposition It is contingent that man
walks. The contingent is thus opposed to the necessary. The word “pos¬
sible,” when distinguished from the contingent, means what can be as
opposed to what cannot be-, in this precision, the possible is opposed to
the impossible, and not to the necessary (as the contingent is). Thus, we
can say It is possible that man is an animal as well as It is necessary that
man is an animal, but we cannot say It is contingent that man is an
animal.
It is sometimes important to express a proposition modally in order
to bring out distinctions which would otherwise be ignored or lost. Some
difficulties arise in making some propositions explicitly modal and in
opposing modal propositions to each other, but these considerations are
beyond the scope of an elementary text in logic.
Questions Chapter Eight
1. When does a proposition have an absolute unity of composition?

2. When does a proposition have a relative unity of composition?
3. Explain the two other principal respects in which the categorical and
compound propositions differ.
4. Why is the division of the proposition according to quality the essential
kind of division?
5. Distinguish clearly between the affirmative and the negative proposition,
using original examples.
6. What must be negated in order that a proposition be negative? Show
with original examples how certain propositions might seem to be nega¬
tive when they are affirmative and affirmative when they are negative.
7. What is the basis of division of the proposition according to quantity?
What is the difference between singular and universal?
8. Explain what is meant by predicating something of a universal subject
universally, indefinitely, and particularly, using original examples.
9. Explain what is meant by a proposition in necessary, impossible, and
contingent matter, supplying original examples of each.
10. Distinguish the mode from the dictum in a modal proposition.
11. What makes a modal proposition affirmative or negative?
12. Distinguish the difference between the modes of contingency and pos¬
sibility.
Exercise I *Hh$* Chapter Eight
Classify the following categorical propositions as affirmative or negative; as

singular, universal, indefinite, or particular. Note carefully how the predicate
is being enunciated of the subject according to the analysis given in the
chapter, that is, how the predicate is said of the subject quantitatively.
_ 1. Every horse is an animal.
- 2. Some man is not honest.
__ 3. George is an able-bodied citizen.
_ 4. Not every flower is beautiful.
_ 5. No event in history is totally unimportant.
_ 6. Any man is capable of humor.
_ 7. Every logic text is not infallible.
_ 8. Man is gullible.
_ 9. Whoever pays his debts is trustworthy.
_10. Sometimes winters are mild.
_11. Pink cows puzzle sober men.
_12. All liars are no good.
_13. Whatever is virtuous is good.
_14. Some persons are non-voters.
_15. This student is conscientious.
_16. Not all who have the appearance of wisdom

are wise.
_17. Every indefinite proposition is not ambiguous.
-18. One out of every four drivers exceeds speed

limits.
_19. One who is industrious works conscientiously.
.20. One man is not the same as another.

97
■ ^ -
Exercise II Chapter Eight
State what kind of matter each of the following propositions has.
_ 1. Dogs breathe.
_ 2. Man is capable of cooking food.
_ 3. A circle is square.
_ 4. Animals sweat.
_ 5. Apples are red.
_ 6. A sinner is a saint.
_7. Not all men are courageous.
_ 8. Grass is green.
-9. The diagonal of a square is commensurable

with its side.
_10. Man dies.
99
Exercise III *>*>*> Chapter Eight
Express the propositions in Exercise II as true modal propositions.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
101
*❖* CHAPTER NINE
SUPPOSITION
The role of supposition in logic can be best appreciated if we

first recall the relation of language to thought. As we have already
stressed, words are necessary in order to express what we conceive. But
words as words are restricted to the limitations of a material medium and,
along with any other sign directly sensed, can never adequately or fully
convey the range of our thought. What we can intellectually know is
ever able to exceed the capacity of oral and written expression, and the
attempt to tie thought down to a system of signs known directly by the
senses, however flexible a verbal language or system of symbols may be, is
doomed to ultimate failure. Though we have to think by means of
sensible images of some kind, nevertheless thought itself transcends the
order of oral or written expression.
We have already seen an instance of this transcendence of thought
over language when, in considering the relation of words to concepts, we
recognized that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence between
words and concepts. What is most notable in this respect is that the
mind deals freely with words, given the arbitrary connection between
words and concepts. The mind attaches nuances of meaning to one
word; the mind constantly extends the meaning of a word in an analo¬
gous manner. Moreover, we are continually faced with the necessity of
coining words to convey new conceptions.
The suppleness of the human intellect in dealing with words is
further shown by the logical doctrine of supposition. Broadly speaking,
supposition refers to the manner in which the mind, while attending to
the meaning a word has, can nevertheless use this word to stand for dif¬
ferent things or in different respects. More specifically, the logical doc¬
trine of supposition concerns the use to which words can be put within
103
104 SUPPOSITION
the context of a proposition. We thus see that supposition is a property

following upon the parts of a proposition, a property attaching to words
as they stand for (the meaning of “suppose” here) the subject or the
predicate of a proposition in varying ways.
Signification and Supposition
It is necessary at the outset to distinguish clearly between sig¬

nification and supposition, which we have anticipated to some extent,
but which still needs to be expressed more fully. The signification of a
word is simply the meaning a word has come to have, the concept to
which it is referred. The supposition of a word—what the word is to be
used for as a propositional term—presupposes the signification of a word
for the obvious reason that we cannot tell how to use words in a proposi¬
tion unless we know what the words mean.
An ordinary example points up this difference. The word “man” signi¬
fies our concept or notion of human nature—what it is to be man even
if such a notion remains vague and imprecise. This meaning of “man”
remains the same whether the word is considered by itself or appears in
the context of a proposition. The supposition of “man”—an application
of the word—cannot arise until we make use of the word in a proposition,
as in Man is wise. In addition to the meaning of the word “man” (the
same meaning it has apart from a proposition) the word now takes on
the property of standing in a certain relation to other words in the
proposition. In our example, it is used in particular to stand for the
subject of the proposition, just as “wise” takes on the property of stand¬
ing as the predicate, related in a certain way to the subject “man” by
means of the copula “is,” joining the two in an act of predication.
The primary question arising about the supposition of words in a
proposition is the following. Presupposing the signification of “man,”
can it be used as a subject in a proposition when a word like “wise” is
being predicated of it? Is that word, given its signification, capable of
standing, in relation to the copula and the predicate, as a logical subject?
The Definition of Supposition
We can now state precisely the definition of supposition. Sup¬

position is the verification of a word used for an extreme of a proposition
in relation to the requirements of the copula. We have already suffi¬
ciently explained what is meant by the use of a word as an extreme of a
proposition. Having distinguished supposition from signification, we
went on to show that a word, in addition to its signification, can stand
for either extreme of the proposition, the subject or the predicate.
SUPPOSITION 105
The phrase “in relation to the requirements of the copula” needs
further comment. This part of the definition does not of itself resolve
the question of whether a proposition is true or false. The proposition as
a whole is verified as true or false by comparing what is expressed by the
act of composition or division with reality. The truth or falsity of a
proposition presupposes both the signification of the words in a proposi¬
tion and the supposition of such words as parts of the proposition.
What the phrase means is that the supposition of words in a proposi¬
tion depends on the sort of existence implied by the copula. Since the
verb copula signifies with time, the kinds of existence in question are
past, present, or future. In particular, therefore, before we can determine
whether a proposition is true, we must see if the word standing as the
subject can be used in relation to the kind of existence signified by the
copula. Accordingly, when the copula signifies a definite period of time,
the word or words standing as the subject must stand for something exist¬
ing at that time.
For example, in the proposition Washington was president of the
United States, “Washington” can be used as a subject given that the
copula signifies a time at which the subject existed. On the other hand,
Washington will be president of the United States is a proposition with
a non-supposing subject, for given what “Washington” signifies, in this
case the first president, it cannot be used as the subject of a proposition
wherein the copula signifies with future time. This proposition therefore
becomes false, but it is only one way in which a proposition becomes
false. Actually, most false propositions have words which can stand as
subjects in relation to the copula, for example, Every dog is a horse.
Hence the process of verifying whether a proposition is true remains
distinct from the process of verifying whether a word can be used as a
subject, even though the two considerations are related.
In the light of what we have said, we can state the following rule:
every affirmative proposition which has a non-supposing subject is false.
Such a proposition does not thereby become “meaningless,” as is some¬
times thought, otherwise we would not be able to verify it as false. This
rule is stated in terms of the affirmative proposition. The reason for this
restriction is that a negative proposition, being an act of denial, avoids
the problem of having the subject agree with the copula in manner of
existence. Hence, the proposition Washington is not president of the
United States is a true proposition by the very fact that Washington
does not now exist.
A proposition, however, may have a copula signifying in a manner not
restricted to past only, present only, or future only; the copula may
signify with eternal existence in the sense of an existence independent of
a period of time. For example, in Man is an animal, the “is” does not
106 SUPPOSITION
signify in a manner limited to the present time only, but as transcending

any particular period of time. Such propositions, which have a subject
signifying a nature understood as universal, always satisfy the require¬
ments of the copula, and hence such propositions always have supposing
subjects.
The importance of the doctrine of supposition can hardly be ade¬
quately brought out in an elementary treatise in logic and within the
limits brevity imposes. Failure to recognize the subtle ways in which the
mind can use its verbal expressions leads to easy sophism and error.
Failure to recognize the role supposition plays in the construction of a
proposition gives rise to some so-called “logical paradoxes.” Many of
these follow from not distinguishing types of supposition, from not keep¬
ing distinct real existence, imaginary existence, existence of something
only in the mind, and impossible existence; or from not seeing the dif¬
ference in role of the supposition in affirmative and negative propositions,
and so on. An introductory text cannot go on to investigate such con¬
siderations, interesting as they are. However, two more important matters
pertaining to supposition must be dealt with, though in a summary
fashion.
The Kinds of Supposition
We shall consider two of the divisions which can be made of

supposition. The first division is based on what the subject of the prop¬
osition is standing for in relation to the predicate; this division gives us
the kinds of supposition. The second division, which we shall treat under
a separate heading, is based on the different ways a universal name is
distributed when standing as a subject or a predicate.
With respect to the first division, supposition is divided into proper
and improper supposition.
Proper supposition is the use of a word as a subject to stand literally
for what it signifies in relation to the predicate. Thus in the proposition
A lamb is an animal, “lamb” stands properly for a certain kind of animal.
Improper supposition is the use of a word to stand metaphorically for
what it signifies in relation to the copula, as in The Lamb of God takes
away the sins of the world, where “lamb” stands for Christ, but not
properly. The metaphor, however fruitful as a poetic device, is designated
as improper supposition in logic, not as meaning “wrong,” but as alien
to what the word stands for properly. It is precisely because metaphor is
the use of a word literally signifying one object, but applied to another
by a certain likeness, that it is an instance of supposition, though in an
alien manner. Although foreign in this way to a strictly logical use of
terms, metaphorical supposition is at times highly desirable and even
necessary, especially when we cannot know an object literally for what
it is but only by way of similitude. It should also be noted in this con-
SUPPOSITION 107
nection that the predicate is often said metaphorically of the subject as

well.
Proper supposition, with which we are concerned in logic, is divided
further into personal, simple, and material.
Personal supposition is the normal way words stand as subjects in a
proposition in relation to the predicate. In the proposition Man is an
animal, “man” stands both for what man is, the nature, and for individ¬
uals of that nature—the nature immediately and individuals mediately,
that is, by means of the nature. As we have suggested, most propositions
use words in this way; the name “personal” suggests that the word not
only stands for the nature, but also for individuals, that is, “persons.”
The following two types of supposition are unusual ways in which
words stand as subjects.
Simple supposition is the use of a word to stand for what it im¬
mediately signifies, a nature, without including what would be mediately
signified, the individuals of that nature. Contrast the propositions Man
is an animal and Man is a species. In the former example, “man” stands
for the nature and the individuals of that nature; in the latter example,
“man” stands only for the nature, prescinding from the individuals in
which the nature is actually realized. Hence, while we can go legiti¬
mately from Man is an animal to Paul is an animal, we cannot go validly
from Man is a species to Paul is a species.
Material supposition is the use of a word to stand simply for itself
as a word. In this case the word is used merely to represent itself, apart
from what it signifies. Thus, in the proposition Man is a monosyllable,
we use “man” with respect to its matter, its material supposition—its
sound in this instance.
Distribution of the Subject and Predicate in Propositions
The distribution of the subject and predicate in a proposition

refers to the supposition of a universal name in a proposition. Distribu¬
tion is therefore the consideration of whether the supposition of a uni¬
versal name includes all the individuals under it, or only some. A
universal name is distributed if it stands for all the individuals. It is
undistributed if it stands for only some of the individuals under it. The
question of whether a name is distributed or undistributed does not
arise with respect to the use of a singular name or expression.
There are four rules governing the distribution of words in a proposi¬
tion.
1. Every universal proposition distributes the subject
A universal proposition, as we have seen, is one whose subject is

modified by some universal sign; consequently, the subject of any uni-
108 SUPPOSITION
versal proposition is distributed, that is, the subject of a universal prop¬

osition is used to stand for all individuals under it. For example, Every
man is an animal, No man is a stone.
We must take into account, in this connection, a distinction between
a subject that supposes universally and one that supposes collectively.
A subject that supposes universally stands for each and every individual
under it, as in Every man is an animal, because the universal subject is
distributed to all the individuals included under it. A subject that sup¬
poses collectively stands for a group of individuals taken, not individually
and separately, but together as an aggregate whole, as in The apostles
were twelve in number. Here the predicate “twelve in number” applies
to the group of apostles, but obviously not to each member of the group.
It is well to note also that the universal proposition is better expressed
in the form Every man is an animal than in the form All men are
animals. The use of “every” with a grammatically singular verb expresses
the distribution of a universal name to each and every singular included
under it. The use of “all” with a plural verb does not express this dis¬
tribution so clearly. The word “all” has a certain ambiguity which can
lead to a confusion of the universal with a class. A class of objects is like
a collective term; the name of the class cannot be predicated of the in¬
dividual members of the class. Thus, we can speak of a team, an extrinsic
grouping of a number of persons, but we cannot predicate such a class of
any individual person or even of “person” as a universal name. Now, the
first meaning of the word “all” is “the whole of,” signifying the amount
of, as when we say “All the wheat. . . .” The second meaning of “all”
is “the whole number or sum of,” as in “All the apostles were twelve.”
It is only in its third meaning that “all” signifies in such a way that it
distributes a universal name to each and every singular included under it,
as in All men are animals. Hence, the use of “all” for the distribution of
a universal name is not incorrect, but when so used it must be taken only
in its third meaning.
2. Every particular proposition has an undistributed subject
A particular proposition is one whose subject is modified by a

sign denoting the vague individual or some individuals, for example.
Some man is wise (Some men are wise), or Some man is not wise (Some
men are not wise). The sign of particularity explicitly indicates that the
name it modifies is not taken as standing for all individuals, but only
some.
An indefinite proposition, whose subject has no quantitative modifying
sign, is treated as having an undistributed subject. Thus, the proposition
Man is wise has an indefinite subject and is sufficiently verified by a
particular instance, and thus the subject “man” stands as undistributed.
SUPPOSITION 109
3. Every negative proposition distributes its predicate
A proposition is negative when the copula is negative. The nega¬

tive copula always makes the predicate universal in distribution, for the
predicate of a negative proposition is universally separated from what¬
ever the subject is. For this reason the predicate of every negative prop¬
osition must stand as distributed. For example, No man is wise or Some
man is not wise.
4. Every affirmative proposition has an undistributed predicate
A proposition is affirmative when the copula is affirmative. The

reason for this fourth rule is perhaps made most evident by considering
what would occur if the predicate of an affirmative proposition were
taken as distributed. Thus, in the proposition Every dog is an animal, if
“animal” were taken as distributed, then one would have to maintain
that every dog is every animal and even that each dog is every animal,
which is patently false, and is certainly not intended by one who asserts
such a proposition. What one does intend to assert is that every dog is an
animal without extending “animal” to all the individuals in which that
nature is found. One does take “animal” in this instance, as a whole,
that is, as universal in meaning, but one does not intend the universal
to stand universally, that is, one does not intend to extend the universal
name universally to each and every individual. Hence we see why the
predicate of any affirmative proposition must be taken as undistributed.
The foregoing is evident enough whenever the predicate is itself more
universal than the subject, as “animal” is more universal than “man,” for
we could not attain an act of identity in predication if the more universal
name were taken in its full universality. But even if the predicate were
the same in universality as the subject, it would still follow that the
predicate must be taken as undistributed. Thus, in Every man is rational,
if, as before, “rational” were taken as distributed, then one would be
bound to maintain that each and every man is every rational being, which
again is false and contrary to what one intends to assert by this proposi¬
tion. Hence the rule holds unqualifiedly, that every affirmative proposi¬
tion has an undistributed predicate.
Questions <+*+> Chapter Nine
1. What does the doctrine of supposition show about the relation of

thought to language?
2. Distinguish between signification and supposition and illustrate the dif¬
ference.
3. Define supposition and explain the parts of the definition.
110 SUPPOSITION
4. When does a proposition have non-supposing parts?

5. In what sense may we say that a verb copula can signify with eternal
existence?
6. Distinguish between proper and improper supposition.
7. Distinguish personal supposition from both simple and material sup¬
position, illustrating with original examples.
8. State the four rules of distribution using original examples.
9. What is the difference between a subject that supposes universally and
a subject that supposes collectively?
10. Why must the predicate of an affirmative proposition always be un¬
distributed? Illustrate.
Exercise I *** Chapter Nine
Indicate whether the subjects in the propositions are in personal, simple,

material, improper supposition or none at all.
_ 1. Every senator is a citizen.
_ 2. Animal is the genus of dog.
_ 3. Soldiers are courageous.
_ 4. Napoleon is not in Russia.
_ 5. Every circle is a square.
_ 6. Cat rhymes with bat.
_ 7. Isosceles is a kind of triangle.
_ 8. Life is but a walking shadow.
_ 9. A lion is four-legged.
_10. Lion is four-lettered.
_11. An infinite line is inconceivable.
_12. The King of France is bald.
_13. Justice is a type of virtue.
_14. The root of all evil is money.
_15. Man is rational.
Ill
Exercise II Chapter Nine
Classify the subjects and predicates of the following propositions as dis¬

tributed or undistributed. Put D for distributed and U for undistributed
above each subject and predicate.
1. Every horse is an animal.
2. Some politician is ambitious.
3. Not every logician is clever.
4. No test is easy.
5. Virtue is difficult.
6. Whatever is moral is commendable.
7. All citizens are not intelligent.
8. Every human being is capable of speech.
9. Each soldier is responsible.
10. Candy is fattening.
11. Some music is not inspiring.
12. Any human being is open to persuasion.
13. Every animal is not dangerous.
14. Four out of every five citizens favor health insurance.
15. Some logic students are non-freshmen.
16. Not everyone who seeks public office is ambitious.
113
17. No non-veteran is unsympathetic about aid to war victims.
18. Some men steal.
19. Running is hard on the heart.
20. Everyone who responds to the draft call is not a hero.
114
CHAPTER TEN
OPPOSITION
OF PROPOSITIONS
Opposition is a property of the proposition as a whole and is

thus distinct from supposition, a property of the parts of a proposition.
Just as a word does not have supposition unless it is used in a proposition,
so a proposition cannot be said to take on the property of opposition
unless it is related to another proposition. We thus move from a con¬
sideration of parts of a proposition related to a proposition as a whole,
to a proposition as a whole related to another proposition as a whole.
Accordingly, opposition as a property of the proposition is defined as
the affirmation and negation of the same predicate in regard to the same
subject. The immediate condition required by this definition of opposi¬
tion is that the same word be used as the subject and the same word be
used as the predicate in the two propositions. Thus, the propositions
Every man is wise and No man is wise are opposed because the same
predicate “wise” is affirmed and denied of the same subject “man” (the
quantitative modifiers, as we shall see, need not be the same). On the
other hand, Every man is honest and No man is wise would violate the
definition of opposition of propositions because even in words the same
predicate is not being affirmed and denied of the same subject.
The mere appearance of the same words as subject and predicate of
the two propositions, however, is not a sufficient guarantee that two
propositions will be in opposition. In addition, the same words must be
used with the same signification and the same supposition. By the same
signification we mean that the words must signify univocally and not in
any equivocal sense, that is, a word must continue to refer to the same
concept. The two propositions Some instrument is dull and Some instru-
115
116 OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS
merit is not dull would not be in opposition if “dull” means lacking bril¬
liance of color in one proposition and lacking a sharp cutting edge in the
other.
By the same supposition we mean that the words standing as the sub¬
ject or predicate in the two propositions must retain the same kind of
supposition. Thus two propositions will not be in opposition if the sub¬
ject or predicate of one proposition is used in proper supposition and
the subject or predicate of the other is used in improper or metaphorical
supposition—or, further, if the subject in one proposition is used in
personal supposition and the subject of the other in simple supposition.
The Division of Opposition
The division of opposition gives us the different kinds of opposi¬

tion, different ways of affirming and denying the same predicate in regard
to the same subject. It is based on the division of the proposition accord¬
ing to quality (affirmative or negative) and quantity (singular, universal,
particular, or indefinite).
In contradictory opposition one proposition denies absolutely

what the other asserts. Consider the proposition Paul is wise. The contra¬
dictory of it is a simple denial—Paul is not wise. Contradictory opposition
is also complete opposition in truth and falsity, that is, whichever of the
two propositions is true, the other is false.
Consider the proposition Every man is wise. What will its contradic¬
tory be? Since contradiction consists in a simple denial, we can negate
the whole proposition by putting a negative in front of it—Not every
man is wise, which is the same as saying Some man is not wise. Suppose
that we have the proposition No man is wise. To contradict it, we make
a simple denial of it by saying that it is not the case that no man is wise,
which is the same as asserting Some man is wise.
We thus see that every universal proposition is contradicted by an
absolute denial, resulting in the assertion of a particular proposition hav¬
ing the opposite quality. (A universal proposition is also contradicted by
a singular proposition having the opposite quality, for example, Every
man is wise is contradicted by This man is not wise; No man is wise is
contradicted by This man is wise.) Clearly, the relation can be reversed,
that is, a particular proposition, affirmative or negative, is contradicted
by a universal proposition having the opposite quality. Thus the contra¬
diction of Some man is wise is a simple denial which in effect says that
it is not the case that some man is wise, which is to assert No man is
wise. Similarly, the contradiction of Some man is not wise is the simple
OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS 117
denial that it is not the case that some man is not wise, which is to assert
Every man is wise. Throughout all these instances of contradictory op¬
position, the complete opposition of truth and falsity remains: whichever
of the two propositions is true, the contradictory of it is false.
Two propositions are in contrary opposition when, although

they differ in quality, they nevertheless agree in universal quantity. Thus
the proposition Every man is wise is in contrary opposition to the prop¬
osition No man is wise. At first glance, it might seem that contrary op¬
position is more absolute than contradictory opposition because it is an
opposition between the extremes of “every” and “no.” Though a more
sweeping opposition in this respect, it is not an absolute denial in the
way contradiction is, because contrary opposition is an opposition in
truth only, whereas contradictory opposition is an opposition in both
truth and falsity.
In saying that contrary propositions have an opposition in truth only,
we mean that whenever one contrary is true the other must be false, but
if one contrary is false it does not always follow that the other must be
true. Thus, if it is true that every man is wise, it has to be false that no
man is wise; similarly, if it is true that no man is wise, it has to be false
that every man is wise. However, such opposition does not hold if we
know only that one of the contraries is false, for then the other contrary
does not have to be true, but could be false. Thus sometimes when one
proposition is false, for example, No man is an animal, then its contrary
is true, Every man is an animal; other times, however, when one proposi¬
tion is false, as in Every man is honest, its contrary is also false, No man
is honest. Hence, from the standpoint of the mode of signifying (that is,
abstracting from the actual content of propositions as signified by words)
we have to say that when one contrary is false, the other may be true or
false and accordingly remains unknown as far as the mode of signifying
is concerned. Thus contrary propositions do not have the complete op¬
position in truth and falsity that contradictory propositions have, since
contrary propositions have opposition in truth only. Contrary opposition
is also more restricted in that the opposition is only between universal
propositions. The universal affirmative proposition is contrary to the
universal negative, and the universal negative is contrary to the universal
affirmative; no other propositions are in contrary opposition.
3. Sub-contrary opposition
Two propositions are in sub-contrary opposition when they differ

in quality but agree in particular quantity. For example, the proposition
Some man is wise is in sub-contrary opposition to the proposition Some

man is not wise. Two propositions in sub-contrary opposition have only
an opposition in falsity and not in truth. Accordingly, if it is false that
some man is wise then it must be true that some man is not wise; if,
however, one sub-contrary is true the other need not be false, for it
could be true depending on what is signified when words are used in the
propositions. From the standpoint of the mode of signifying, therefore,
while we can always go from the falsity of one sub-contrary to the truth
of the other, we cannot go from the truth of one sub-contrary to the
determinate truth or falsity of the other, and consequently the other
proposition remains unknown.
We can now see, when comparing the three kinds of opposition with
each other, that opposition is realized in decreasing strength as we
proceed from contradictory to contrary to sub-contrary. In contradictory
opposition, one proposition absolutely denies the other, for in contra¬
diction there is complete opposition in truth and falsity. In contrary
opposition, there is opposition in truth only. In sub-contrary opposition,
there is opposition in falsity only. In the latter two kinds of opposition,
therefore, some propositions will remain unknown as to their determinate
truth or falsity.
It should be noted, however, that sub-contrary opposition departs
from the definition of opposition, which requires affirmation and nega¬
tion of the same predicate of the same subject. The subject of a par¬
ticular affirmative proposition may not stand for the same thing as the
subject of a particular negative proposition, and vice versa. This is be¬
cause the subject of a particular proposition is not taken for some deter¬
minate singular, but indeterminately for any, and in this way the two
subjects of particular propositions may not stand for the same thing.
For example, in Some man is wise and Some man is not wise the “Some
man” may not stand for the same thing in both propositions.
However, the rule of truth and falsity for sub-contraries—when one is
false the other must be true—can be shown to hold in virtue of con¬
tradictory and contrary oppositions. Thus if Some A is B is false, we
know its contradictory No A is B is true. We then know Every A is B,
by contrary opposition, is false. From Every A is B as false we can then
go to its contradictory Some A is not B as true. We thus see, despite
the fact that sub-contrary propositions of themselves are not strictly in
opposition, that whenever one sub-contrary proposition is false the other
is always true.
The Relation of Subaltemation
In comparing the three kinds of opposition as we have just done,

we notice that there is another relation between propositions. Rather
than going from Every dog is an animal to the contradictory Some dog
is not an animal, we could go instead to Some dog is an animal (or we

could go directly from No dog is an animal to Some dog is not an
animal). This is precisely the relation of propositions known as sub¬
alternation.
Subalternation of propositions, therefore, is a relation in which two
propositions agree in quality but differ in quantity. Thus the two
propositions Every man is wise and Some man is wise are in a relation
of subalternation whether from the universal to the particular or from
the particular to the universal, as are also the propositions No man is
wise and Some man is not wise. In subalternation, if the universal
proposition is true, the particular proposition under it is true; if it is true
that every man is wise then it must be true that some man is wise, and
the same holds with negative propositions. However, if we only know
that the particular proposition is true, the universal need not be true but
could be false, and hence is unknown.
It is clear, of course, that the relation of subalternation is not a relation
of opposition. As we have seen, opposition of propositions requires that
one be affirmative and the other negative; in subalternation, proposi¬
tions agree in quality, that is, both are affirmative or both are negative.
Furthermore, they do not have an opposition in either truth or falsity,
for both are either true at once or false at once—true at once when going
from universal to particular, or false at once when going from particular
to universal; otherwise their truth or falsity remains unknown. None¬
theless, subalternation is treated along with opposition because it is a
relation which inevitably arises, as we see when we use the visual aid
known as the Square of Opposition.
The Square of Opposition

Every man is aoise. M> ?nan is wise
The Square of Opposition is a helpful device for representing con¬

cretely the three relations of opposition and the relation of subalterna¬
tion in propositions having universal names as the subject and predicate
(a proposition having a singular name is not properly represented on

the Square).
The letters A, E, I, O stand for different kinds of propositions. The
letter A stands for the universal affirmative, the letter E for the universal
negative, the letter I for the particular affirmative, and the letter O for
the particular negative proposition.
The lines of the Square represent the following relations. The diagonal
lines AO and El represent contradictory opposition. The line AE repre¬
sents contrary opposition. The line IO represents sub-contrary opposition.
The parallel lines AI and EO represent the relations of subalternation.
Rules for Truth and Falsity
Although we have already covered the rules for truth and falsity
of propositions in opposition and subalternation, they can now be con¬
veniently summarized in relation to the Square.
Before stating the rules for truth and falsity, we must keep in mind
that these rules hold only if the subjects and predicates of the proposi¬
tions retain the same signification and the same supposition. Words with
equivocal signification or with diverse kinds of supposition in opposed or
subalternated propositions violate the relations concerned, as we have
already stressed.
Moreover, the relations on the Square are to be understood as holding
among propositions having universal names as subjects and predicates,
and not words standing for classes. By a class, we mean a grouping of
objects together without any intrinsic or essential unity. Thus the ex¬
pression “all the men in this room” denotes a collection of men acci¬
dentally grouped together as being in a certain room; it does not signify
a nature as the name man does. The distinction between a word stand¬
ing for a class of objects and a word signifying as a universal name is
important in order to disassociate problems and considerations which are
not relevant from the valid relations of opposition and subalternation.
In particular, this distinction is needed to remove as irrelevant, as far
as the Square is concerned, the problem of what has been called the null
class. Thus it has been maintained that the so-called A proposition “All
the men in this room are married” is to be regarded as true, even if there
were no men in the room, on the assumption that such a proposition
does not require the existence of any members of its class; and then, of
course, the contrary, “No men in this room are married” would also be
true. It would then seem to follow that the rule concerning the opposi¬
tion of contraries, that one must be true and the other false, would not
hold (and similar difficulties could be raised about the relation of sub¬
contrary opposition and subalternation).
As a consequence of the foregoing view only the opposition of contra-
diction remains valid. But this view rests upon the arbitrary assumption
that A and E propositions cannot imply actual existence of individuals
while I and O must imply actual existence of individuals. However, there
is no reason why the human mind has to be tied down by this un¬
necessary restriction; and the arbitrary character of this restriction is
shown by the fact that A and E propositions can also imply actual ex¬
istence of individuals (and in any normal sense do) while I and O can
also not imply actual existence of individuals (for example, the truth of
some dinosaur’s being a reptile is unaffected by the extinction of all such
reptiles).
The pertinent point, consequently, about the validity of the relations
of opposition and subalternation reduces basically to what we empha¬
sized at the outset—certain conditions have to be observed in order to
have propositions in opposition or in subalternation. The words must
retain the same meaning in the propositions. Moreover, and even more
important, the words must be used in the same way, that is, they must
apply in the same way. Hence, the rules on truth and falsity for the
relations of propositions as expressed by the Square of Opposition hold
if the same supposition (personal or simple) is maintained for any given
instance taken, and if the distinction between a word standing for a class
and a word signifying as a universal name is preserved.
Two propositions in contradictory opposition cannot be true at

the same time or false at the same time. In the opposition of contradic¬
tion, therefore, whenever one proposition is true, the other proposition is
false, and whenever one proposition is false, the other is true.
Two propositions in contrary opposition cannot be true at the

same time. In the opposition of contrariety, whenever one proposition is
true, the other is false; however, when one proposition is false, the other
may be true or false. In the latter case, we cannot determine from the
mode of signifying alone whether the second proposition is true or false,
and in this sense we designate it as “unknown.” Consequently, when¬
ever one of a pair of contraries is false, the other remains unknown.
3. Sub-contrary opposition
Two propositions in sub-contrary opposition cannot be false at

the same time. In the opposition of sub-contrariety, whenever one
proposition is false, the other is true; however, when one proposition is
true, the other may be true or false, and hence is designated as “un¬
known.” Two indefinite propositions, one affirmative and the other
negative, follow the same rule for truth and falsity as two propositions
in sub-contrary opposition.
4. The relation of subalternation
Whenever the universal is true, the particular is true, and when¬

ever the particular is false, the universal is false. In the relation of sub¬
alternation, whenever a universal affirmative proposition is true, the
particular affirmative under it is true. Similarly, whenever the universal
negative proposition is true, the particular negative under it is true.
Further, whenever the particular affirmative proposition is false, the
universal affirmative above it is false. And whenever the particular nega¬
tive proposition is false, the universal negative above it is false.
However, if the particular affirmative proposition is true, the universal
affirmative may be true or false, and hence is unknown; and if the par¬
ticular negative proposition is true, the universal negative is unknown.
Likewise, if the universal affirmative proposition is false, the particular
affirmative under it is unknown; and if the universal negative proposition
is false, the particular negative under it is unknown.
The rules for truth and falsity in subalternation can be summarized
in the following way: Descend with truth; rise with falsity. In other
words, one can go in truth from universal to particular and in falsity from
particular to universal. The opposite of either (Descend with falsity; rise
with truth) results in an unknown proposition.
Formal Relations of Propositions
Opposition and subalternation are formal relations of proposi¬

tions, that is, relations considered from the standpoint of mode of signi¬
fying and apart from what the words in the propositions signify. Such
formal relations can be expressed most evidently by using letters symbol¬
izing the subjects and predicates of the propositions, for example, the
opposition of contradiction as Every A is B and Some A is not B. From
this formal relation of contradiction alone, we know that of the two
propositions, one must be true and the other must be false. We cannot
tell, from the formal relation alone, which of the propositions is the true
one, but only that whichever of the two is taken as true the other must
be false.
As we have seen, a proposition is designated as unknown when its
truth or falsity cannot be determined by formal relations alone. In con¬
tradiction, however, no proposition is ever unknown in that sense,
because contradiction is a complete opposition in truth and falsity; that
is, one proposition is always true and the other always false. Apart from
contradiction, a relation can arise in which one of the propositions will
not necessarily be true or false, and hence unknown. Thus in contrary
opposition, when Every A is B is taken as false, we cannot tell, by the
formal relation alone, whether No A is B is true or false, and hence it is
unknown.
In putting propositions into words, we bring in explicitly the matter of
propositions, “matter” in the sense of what is signified. We could then
determine the truth or falsity of propositions on the part of matter as
well as on the part of the formal relation. For example, we can express
a contradictory opposition in words by opposing Every man is just to
Some man is not just. When propositions are thus expressed in words,
of course the formal relation of contradiction still holds so that we can
state that if one proposition is true the other is false. Over and beyond
this, what is signified by the words enables us to see that in this case
the proposition Some man is not just is actually the true proposition
while Every man is just is the false one. For such knowledge, however,
we must go beyond the knowledge logic gives us; we then have to rely
on our experience of reality or the knowledge we acquire from other
sciences. This fact brings out the basic instrumental character of logic,
that it is a common method of the human mind and must be propor¬
tioned to the demands of the science in which it is used.
Consequently, whether propositions are expressed in letters or in
words, we shall emphasize the formal aspect, the mode of signifying
rather than what is signified, when dealing with opposition, subalterna¬
tion and other relations taken up in Part II.
Questions Chapter Ten

1. Distinguish opposition from supposition.
2. Define opposition.
3. In what way must words be the same, and have the same signification in
opposition?
4. What is meant by words having the same supposition in opposition?
5. What is the basis for the division of opposition?
6. Give the definition of contradictory opposition and illustrate with at
least three examples.
7. Give the definition of contrary opposition and illustrate.
8. Why is contradictory opposition greater than contrary?
9. Give the definition of sub-contrary opposition and illustrate.
10. What difficulty can be raised about sub-contrary opposition? How is it
resolved?
11. What is the relation of subalternation?
12. Why is subalternation not opposition?

13. What do the letters A, E, I, O stand for in the Square of Opposition?
14. Show how distinction in kinds of supposition takes care of the problem
of the null class.
15. Distinguish between a word standing for a class and a name signifying
as a universal.
16. State the rules of truth and falsity for the three kinds of opposition.
17. What is meant by designating a proposition as unknown?
18. State the rules of truth and falsity for subalternation.
19. What is meant by formal relations of propositions?
20. What does the matter of a proposition (that is, what is signified by
words) add to the formal relations?
Exercise I *❖* Chapter Ten
Put True, False, or Unknown in the following spaces.
1. If I is false, then O is_
2. If E is true, then A is_.
3. If A is true, then O is_
4. If O is true, then E is_
5. If A is false, then I is_
6. If O is false, then A is_.. _
7. If A is false, then E is_
8. If E and O are both false, then I is______
9. If O is true and if A is false, then I is_
10. If O is unknown and if I is true, then E is______
11. If I is true and if A is false, then E is_.
12. If E is false and if O is true, then A is _ and I
is_
In the following three examples, put True or False for the first proposition,
and then add True, False, or Unknown for the remaining propositions.
13. If I is , then A is . E is O is
14. If A is , then E is . I is O is
15. If E is , then A is , O is , I is
12S
Exercise II Chapter Ten
Answer the following with True, False, or Unknown.
1. If it is true that every apple is sweet, then
(a) Some apple is sweet is_
(b) No apple is sweet is_
(c) Some apple is not sweet is_
2. If it is true that some sports are strenuous, then
(a) All sports are strenuous is_
(b) Not all sports are strenuous is_
(c) No sports are strenuous is_
3. If it is false that not every statesman is wise, then
(a) Some statesman is wise is_
(b) Every statesman is wise is_
(c) Some statesman is not wise is_
(d) No statesman is wise is_
(e) This statesman is wise is_
4. If it is false that no martyr is courageous, then
(a) Some martyr is courageous is_

9
(b) Not any martyr is courageous is_
(c) This martyr is courageous is_
(d) Not every martyr is courageous is_
(e) Every martyr is courageous is_
(f) Every martyr is not courageous is_
(g) This martyr is not courageous is-

127
Exercise III Chapter Ten
Put an X before any statement which correctly answers the first line.
If the universal affirmative proposition is true, it is necessary for

_1. the particular negative to be false.
_2. the particular affirmative to be true.
_3. the universal negative to be true.
_4. the singular negative to be true.
_5. the universal negative to be false.
_6. the indefinite affirmative to be true.
_7. the indefinite negative to be unknown.
If the particular affirmative proposition is true, it is possible for

_1. the universal affirmative to be true.
_2. the universal affirmative to be false.
_3. the universal negative to be true.
_4. the particular negative to be false.
_5. the universal affirmative and the particular negative to be true

simultaneously.
_6. the universal negative to be unknown.
_7. the particular negative to be true.
If the universal negative proposition is false, it is impossible for

_1. the universal affirmative to be true.
_2. the singular affirmative to be false.
_3. the indefinite negative to be true.
_4. the particular negative and particular affirmative both to be true.
129
5. the particular negative and particular affirmative both to be false.
6. the universal affirmative to be true.
7. the particular negative and the universal affirmative to be false

simultaneously.
8. the particular affirmative to be unknown.
130
Exercise IV *H*4 Chapter Ten
Determine whether the following propositions are correctly related according

to the rules of truth and falsity. If correctly related, write Valid; if not,
write Invalid.
1. If it is true that No X is Y, then it is false that

Every X is Y.
2. If it is true that Some X is not Y, then it is false

that Some X is Y.
3. If it is false that Some X is not Y, then it is false

that No X is Y and true that Every X is Y.
4. If it is true that Not every X is Y, then No X is Y

is unknown although Every X is Y is false.
5. Take the position that No man is wise is true. Then

Not every man is wise is true, Every man is wise is
false, and Some man is wise is false.
6. If it is true that Some student is witty, then it is

false that No student is witty and true that Every
student is witty.
7. If it is false that No test is easy and if it is also false

that Every test is easy, then it is true that Some
test is easy but false that Some test is not easy.
8. If it is true that Men are honest, then it is unknown

about No men are honest although false that Men
are not honest.
9. We know it is true that This statement is correct.

We then know it is false that Not every statement
is correct.
10. Suppose it is true that All virtue is desirable. Then

it would have to be false that No virtue is desirable
and false that Some virtue is not desirable.
11. Suppose I do not know whether it is true or false

that All logic texts are stimulating. Yet I am confi¬
dent it is true that Some logic texts are stimulating.
I can then be assured that it is false that No logic
texts are stimulating.
131
12. Paul holds it as true that Some men are honest. He
then has to hold that Some men are not honest is
also true.
13. If it is false that Some honey is not sweet, then it is

false that No honey is sweet, true that Some honey
is sweet, true that All honey is sweet, and false that
Not all honey is sweet.
14. If it is true that Some drama is not interesting but

unknown whether Some drama is interesting, then
it must be true that No drama is interesting and
false that All drama is interesting.
15. If I am not certain it is false that Every A is B but

am certain it is false that Some A is B and true
that Some A is not B, then I should be certain it is
false that No A is B.
16. If it is false that Every student is not courteous,

then it is true that Every student is courteous, false
that No student is courteous, true that Some
student is courteous, and false that This student is
not courteous.
17. If it is false that Money is not the root of all evil,

we still do not know whether it is true or false that
All money is the root of all evil.
18. If it is true that Some judges are elected and if it is

true that Some judges are not elected, then we
know it is false that All judges are elected but true
that No judges are elected.
132
CHAPTER ELEVEN
OBVERSION
OF PROPOSITIONS
Obversion of propositions is a second property of the proposition

as a whole, another way by which one proposition as a whole is related
to another proposition as a whole.
In the relation of opposition, we saw that two propositions become
opposed to each other if one is affirmative and the other negative, with
the words remaining the same in signification and in supposition. In
obversion, as we shall see shortly, while the subject and predicate of the
two propositions must retain the same supposition, and the subject must
retain the same signification, the predicate in one proposition will be the
negation of the other. A further difference between opposition and
obversion is that when opposed, two propositions destroy each other,
while in obversion two propositions confirm each other even though one
is affirmative and the other negative.
This apparently paradoxical character of obversion of propositions is
removed by considering just what the obversion of propositions means.
We can illustrate most readily what obversion means and what it con¬
sists in by contrasting obversion with opposition. The two propositions
Some students are not seniors and Some students are seniors are in sub¬
contrary opposition. The two propositions Some students are not seniors
and Some students are non-seniors are in a relation of obversion. In both
opposition and obversion, one proposition is negative and the other
affirmative. In opposition, however, the same subject and predicate are
kept, while in obversion the predicate of one proposition is always the
negation of the predicate in the other proposition.
133
134 OBVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
Obversion is therefore a property of the proposition, a relation of

equivalence between two propositions. It consists in making two proposi¬
tions which differ in quality equivalent in meaning by adding a negative
particle to one of the two propositions. In obversion there is never a
change of quantity; if the original is universal the obverted form is
universal, if the original is particular the obverted form is particular, and
so on.
The Rules of Obversion
1. Change the quality of the proposition
A change in quality of propositions is a change from affirmative

to negative, or from negative to affirmative. Accordingly, if we have an
affirmative copula in the original proposition, then its obverted form
must have a negative copula. If the original proposition has a negative
copula, then its obverted form must have an affirmative copula.
2. Negate the predicate
If a proposition has a positive term as the predicate, then its

obverted form must have a negative particle before the same predicate.
If, however, the original proposition already has a negative particle affect¬
ing the predicate, then its obverted form must still negate the already
negated predicate. This double negation has the effect of making the
predicate of the obverted proposition positive again.
Let us take some examples of obversion of propositions and see how
the rules apply. Suppose that the original proposition is Every A is B. To
obtain the obversion of this proposition we simply apply the two rules.
We change the quality of the proposition by going from an affirmative
to a negative proposition. We negate the predicate by adding a negation
to the predicate of the obverted form. The obverted form thus becomes
No A is non-B. With propositions using words, we would go from Every
voter is a citizen to No voter is a non-citizen.
In applying the second rule of obversion, it is important to note that
the negative sign is applied to the predicate, not to the copula. We must
also keep distinct the negative sign non from the negative sign not. The
negative sign non should always be used with a predicate or a subject
of a proposition. The negative sign not should always be used in connec¬
tion with the copula.
It might seem correct to use instead of non such negative prefixes as
in and un. For example, one might obvert Every student is patriotic to
No student is unpatriotic. The difficulty with such a procedure is that
negative signs other than non frequently signify privative or contrary
OBVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS 135
opposites rather than the contradictory opposite required in obversion.

Thus the word “unpatriotic” does not signify “non-patriotic” in a contra¬
dictory sense, but in a privative and perhaps with an intensive sense,
which alters the meaning of the second proposition in relation to the
first. It is necessary, therefore, to use the negative particle non in making
obversions.
In obversion it is especially important to recall that the correct form
of the universal negative proposition is No A is B, and not Every A is
not B nor Not all A is B. The last two expressions signify particular nega¬
tive propositions. Hence, the following obversion would not be valid
(because of the change in quantity): Every student is patriotic to
Every student is not non-patriotic.
If the original proposition is a universal negative proposition, we apply
the two rules in the following way. We change the quality of the proposi¬
tion from negative to affirmative and we negate the predicate of the
original proposition. Thus No A is B is obverted to Every A is non-B, or
No alien is a voter to Every alien is a non-voter.
In particular propositions, we apply the two rules in the same way. We
obvert Some A is B to Some A is not non-B. If the original proposition
is negative, we obvert to an affirmative proposition with a negated predi¬
cate, for example, Some A is not B to Some A is non-B. Indefinite and
singular propositions can also be obverted. Students are intelligent is
obverted to Students are not non-intelligent. James is wise is obverted to
James is not non-wise.
The process of obversion can begin with a proposition that already
has a negated predicate, for example, Some students are non-citizens.
The first rule is applied, as before, by changing the proposition to a nega¬
tive one. The second rule calls for negating the predicate. We could
simply put another non before the already negated predicate, but since a
negative sign destroys whatever follows it, one negative sign destroys the
other, thus making the predicate positive. Hence, Some students are
non-citizens obverts to Some students are not citizens.
Rules of Truth and Falsity in Obversion
Since the relation of obversion makes the obverted proposition

equivalent in meaning to the original proposition, the rules of truth and
falsity reduce to two. If the original proposition is true, the obverted
proposition is true; if the original proposition is false, the obverted prop¬
osition is false.
The relation of obversion is of restricted though significant value. It
is not as valuable as the relation of opposition where we can test our
consistency of knowing by contrasting propositions with each other (for
example, we cannot consistently hold both contrary propositions to be
136 OBVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
true). In the relation of obversion, there is only a process which enables

us to express a given proposition in its equivalent form.
However, there is a certain value in knowing the relation of obversion,
for people sometimes use obverted expressions as a means of communica¬
tion, and since the meaning of an obverted expression is not as direct and
clear as the original from which it derives, the process of obversion can
be used to change the obverted expression back to its original form. For
example, the obverted proposition Some students are not non-seniors is
more clearly expressed by changing it to its equivalent form, Some
students are seniors.
It may also be noted that there is a tendency on the part of some per¬
sons to suppose that they can avoid being held to the truth of a prop¬
osition by stating it in an obverted form. Thus, one might suppose that
in stating as true No politician is non-partisan he does not also have to
hold as true Every politician is partisan. As we have seen, however, from
the rules of truth and falsity in obversion, if one of the two propositions
is held as true, the other must also be held as true. In asserting No poli¬
tician is non-partisan, one is committed to holding Every politician is
partisan.
One final point can be made about the advantage of knowing ob¬
version. As we have just seen, negative prefixes before words tend to be
a source of confusion or at least tend to obscure the expression of what
is meant. Thus the proposition Some politicians are not non-partisan
has the drawback of compounding negative particles, which could be
further compounded if one expressed himself by saying Some non-poli¬
ticians are not non-partisans. Far from encouraging such utterances, logic
seeks rather to eliminate them. By the process of obversion, an excess of
negative signs can be removed, at least in part. After we have examined
conversion in the next chapter, we shall see that it is possible to remove
all needless negative signs by a combination of obversion and conversion,
that is, by contraposition.
Questions Chapter Eleven
1. Contrast obversion with opposition.

2. Define obversion.
3. State the two rules of obversion and illustrate with original examples.
4. Why must the negative sign in obversion be non?
5. What are the rules of truth and falsity in obversion?
6. Why is obversion of limited value?
7. What are the advantages in knowing the relation of obversion?
Exercise I Chapter Eleven
Obvert the following propositions.
1. No X is Y__
2. Some X is not Y_
3. No X is non-Y_
4. Every X is Y__
5. Some X is non-Y_
6. Some X is Y______
7. Some non-X is Y_
8. Every X is non-Y_
9. Every non-X is non-Y_
10. No non-X is non-Y_
Exercise II Chapter Eleven
Put in words each of the original propositions in Exercise I. Then obvert each
of the propositions.
137
Exercise III Chapter Eleven
Obvert the following propositions.

1. All sports are strenuous.
2. Some criticism is not desirable.
3. No stone is living.
4. Some citizens are non-conservative.
5. Every Christian is non-pagan.
6. This man is not a criminal.
7. Some non-students are not non-citizens.
8. No non-bankers are lenders.
9. All books are not non-interesting.
10. Every non-animal is non-mammal.
139
**« CHAPTER TWELVE
CONVERSION
OF PROPOSITIONS
Conversion of propositions is defined as an exchanging of the

subject and predicate while retaining quality and truth. In the converted
proposition, therefore, the extremes of the original proposition have been
reversed in position. Thus in the proposition No man is a stone, by ex¬
changing the subject and predicate in position we obtain the converted
proposition No stone is a man.
The conversion of propositions is the third property that follows upon
the proposition as a whole. We have already treated the first two proper¬
ties—opposition and obversion—and have distinguished them from each
other. Let us now distinguish fully between conversion and obversion.
In obversion, the obverted proposition differs from its original in
quality while still remaining equivalent in meaning because of the
negated predicate. In conversion, as the above definition indicates, the
converted proposition is the same in quality as the original but the sub¬
ject and predicate are interchanged in position, as we saw in converting
No man is a stone to No stone is a man. Conversion is thus wholly dis¬
tinct from obversion. However, these relations have the following char¬
acteristic in common—they do not result in any real advance in knowing,
that is, a new and distinct truth in a second proposition is not derived
from the first. Rather, the two propositions in either relation are merely
different formulations of the same truth or the same falsity. Conse¬
quently, they are not to be regarded as inferences in the proper sense of
the term, which pertain to argumentation, which we shall discuss in
Part III.
141
142 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
The Kinds of Conversion
1. Simple conversion
Simple conversion is the exchange of the subject and predicate

in a proposition without any change in quantity. Thus, we convert a
universal negative proposition simply and obtain a universal negative as
the converted proposition; No plant is an animal converts to No animal
is a plant. Similarly, Some voter is a citizen converts to Some citizen is a
voter.
2. Accidental conversion
Accidental conversion is the exchange of the subject and predi¬

cate in a proposition with a change in quantity. We convert a universal
affirmative proposition accidentally by changing Every rose is a flower to
Some flower is a rose. The question naturally arises as to whether we
might not convert the universal affirmative proposition simply, for ex¬
ample, Every rose is a flower to Every flower is a rose. There are two
reasons why we cannot convert the universal affirmative proposition
simply.
The first reason is that the definition of conversion requires that truth
be kept in the process of conversion. The example just given reveals
that in converting the true proposition Every rose is a flower we obtain a
false proposition Every flower is a rose.
A second and more important reason must be adduced, however, for
there are some instances wherein the simple conversion of an A proposi¬
tion could result in a true proposition. This second reason will explain
why even in such instances the simple conversion of an A proposition is
never formally valid. The basis for the invalidity of such conversion is
the distribution of subject and predicate in a proposition, which we have
already treated in connection with supposition. In every universal af¬
firmative proposition, it will be recalled, the subject is taken as dis¬
tributed and the predicate as undistributed; in Every A is B, “A” is taken
as distributed and “B” as undistributed. In converting Every A is B to
Every B is A, while “A” can validly change from a distributed position
to an undistributed position, “B” cannot validly change from undis¬
tributed to distributed. To go from a name not used with distribution to
all individuals, to a name used with distribution to all individuals is
clearly invalid. Consequently, whether the A proposition in a converted
form is true or false, the process always involves a fallacy.
CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS 143
Rules of Conversion
The rules of conversion, like those of obversion and opposition,

presuppose the same kind of supposition being kept throughout the
process; if personal supposition is presumed in the original then personal
must be kept in the converted form, or simple supposition in both.
1. Every universal negative proposition converts simply
Since the subject and the predicate of the universal negative

proposition have the same distribution (both are distributed), they can
simply be changed in position. For this reason, the universal negative
proposition converts simply.
It may be noted, however, that the universal negative is the one prop¬
osition which can convert both simply and accidentally. No A is B can
convert to No B is A and also to Some B is not A, for in the latter in¬
stance no violation of distribution is involved. However, the rule is stated
in terms of simple conversion because a simple conversion achieves more
than an accidental conversion.
2. Every particular affirmative proposition converts simply
Since the subject and predicate of the particular affirmative

proposition have the same distribution (both are undistributed), they
can be changed in position simply. For this reason, the particular affirma¬
tive proposition converts simply: Some diplomat is a statesman to Some
statesman is a diplomat; Some man is intelligent to Some intelligent
(being) is a man.
3. Every universal affirmative proposition converts accidentally
In the universal affirmative proposition, the subject and predicate

do not have the same distribution, for the subject of a universal proposi¬
tion is distributed, the predicate of an affirmative proposition undis¬
tributed. Hence they cannot be exchanged simply. However, they can
be changed in position accidentally, as we have seen, by changing the
quantity of the proposition. In changing the proposition from universal
to particular, we keep the predicate undistributed by making it the subject
of a particular proposition. Because of such considerations, the universal
affirmative proposition accidentally converts: Every dog is an animal to
Some animal is a dog.
The position is sometimes taken by logicians that if the predicate of a
proposition is a definition (or a property) of the subject then an A
proposition can be converted simply, for example. Every man is a ra-
CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
tional animal to Every rational animal is a man. True enough, when

treating definition in Part I we gave as a rule that the definition should
be convertible with the definitum. However, the formality there is dif¬
ferent from our present consideration. In defining, we are only consider¬
ing an object of simple apprehension; we are not predicating but explain¬
ing what something is. Conversion is a property of the proposition and
presupposes the act of predication. As we saw in Chapter 9 when dis¬
cussing the rule for an undistributed predicate in an affirmative proposi¬
tion, the predicate cannot be said as distributed, for if it were we would
have to hold that because “rational animal” is said as distributed of
“every man,” it would follow that this individual man, Paul, is every
rational animal. Hence, although “rational animal” as a definition is
convertible with man, it is not simply convertible under the formality of
a predicate said of a subject. Accordingly, “Every man is a rational
animal” converts as a proposition to “Some rational animal is a man”
even though “Every rational animal is a man” is also true.
4. The particular negative proposition never converts validly
The subject and the predicate of the particular negative proposi¬

tion have different distribution. The subject is undistributed and the
predicate is distributed. Consequently, if we exchange the subject and
predicate of a particular negative proposition simply, we would have the
undistributed subject of the original proposition becoming the dis¬
tributed predicate of the converted proposition. Thus in converting Some
A is not B to Some B is not A, “A,” which is undistributed as a subject,
becomes distributed as a predicate.
Unlike the similar problem which arose with the universal affirmative
proposition, we cannot eliminate the difficulty by an accidental con¬
version, by a change in quantity. If we try to change the quantity, we can
only change to the universal negative proposition, for we must keep the
same quality in conversion. Thus we might try to convert Some A is not
B to No B is A, but again “A” goes from undistributed to distributed.
There is no way, consequently, to prevent the invalid change from
undistributed to distributed in the conversion of a particular negative
proposition. For this reason, the particular negative proposition never
converts validly.
Rule of Truth in Conversion
There is only one rule concerning truth and falsity in conversion

of propositions—if the original proposition is true, the converted proposi¬
tion will be true. No rule can be stated for the conversion of false
propositions because their conversion does not always result in false
propositions. Thus the conversion of a false universal affirmative proposi¬
tion sometimes results in a true proposition and other times in a false
one. The conversion of the false proposition All flowers are yellow is the
true proposition Some yellow (things) are flowers. The conversion of the
false proposition All dogs are cats is the false proposition Some cats are
dogs.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that false universal negative and false
particular affirmative propositions are always false in their converted
forms. This cannot be shown, directly and only by conversion, but by a
combination of opposition and conversion. For example, Some cats are
dogs is a false proposition. But we know that its contradictory No cats
are dogs is true. We know, further, that this proposition converts to No
dogs are cats as true. We know, finally, that the contradictory of this last
true proposition is the false proposition Some dogs are cats. By this com¬
bination of opposition and conversion, therefore, false universal negative
and false particular affirmative propositions are always false in their con¬
verted form.
A few additional remarks may be added here by way of facilitating the
process of conversion. Propositions should be expressed in “logical form”
in order to insure a correct conversion. If the original proposition is not in
“logical form,” at least the conversion of it must be so expressed. Thus
the proposition No supporter of democracy advocates totalitarian rule
converts to No one who advocates (or “No advocate of”) totalitarian
rule is a supporter of democracy.
Indefinite propositions are assimilated to particular propositions in
conversion since the distribution of subject and predicate is taken as the
same. Man is an animal converts to Some animal is a man. The in¬
definite negative proposition, like the particular negative, does not validly
convert, and for the same reason the particular negative does not.
The principal use of conversion is found in the study of the syllogism.
As we shall see, in Chapter 17 on the reduction of syllogisms to the first
figure, conversion is used there to change some less evident moods of the
syllogism to more evident moods.
Conversion is useful in another respect, for in knowing when con¬
versions are valid we shall avoid the tendency to make incorrect con¬
versions. The most frequent fallacy of this kind is the simple conversion
of the universal affirmative proposition. Suppose, for example, it were
true that every intelligent person has a high forehead; it is an easy error
to convert simply and suppose that it is also true that every person with
a high forehead is intelligent. Again it is easy to suppose that because
some wrestlers are not boxers it follows that some boxers are not wrest¬
lers. Both propositions are in fact true, but the one does not follow as
the conversion of the other.
m CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
Contraposition
The relation of contraposition is a result of obversion and con¬

version. It is not, therefore, a simple or direct relation in the sense that
obversion by itself is or conversion by itself is. Contraposition actually in¬
volves three steps. Let us take as the original proposition All roses are
flowers. The first step consists in an obversion—No roses are non-flowers.
The second step consists in a conversion—No non-flowers are roses. The
third step consists in another obversion—All non-flowers are non-roses.
These three steps result in the one relation of contraposition—All roses
are flowers by contraposition becomes All non-flowers are non-roses.
Given the truth of the original, the contrapositive will always be true. As
a one-step procedure, contraposition may therefore be defined as exchang¬
ing the subject and predicate of a proposition with the addition of nega¬
tive particles to both while retaining the quantity and the quality.
Since contraposition is a complex relation—the reduction of three
steps combining obversion and conversion into one step—it must be kept
distinct from either obversion by itself or conversion by itself. In other
words, the conversion of a proposition is one relation, the obversion is
another relation, whereas contraposition combines these two relations
into a single rule or process. The conversion of All roses are flowers is
Some flowers are roses. The obversion of All roses are flowers is No roses
are non-flowers. The contraposition of All roses are flowers is All non¬
flowers are non-roses.
The relation of contraposition is of minor importance, its value con¬
sisting only in the abbreviation of separate relations of obversion and
conversion into one step. Contraposition is restricted to A propositions
and O propositions. The contraposition of the O proposition Some
citizens are not voters is Some non-voters are not non-citizens. Contra¬
position thus multiplies negations and in this respect is of little use or
importance. The value lies, rather, in reversing the process. For example,
if one is faced with an awkwardly expressed proposition in the A or O
form, for example, All non-citizens are non-senators, by reversing the
process of contraposition we know at once that this proposition is
equivalent to All senators are citizens.
Questions <**>+> Chapter Twelve
1. Define conversion. Illustrate with an example.

2. How does conversion differ from obversion?
3. Do conversion and obversion advance our knowing? Explain.
4. Explain simple conversion.
5. Explain accidental conversion. Why must the universal affirmative
proposition convert accidentally?
6. Show how the rules of distribution explain the rules of conversion.

7. Why does conversion hold only for true propositions?
8. How can we justify the fact that false E and O propositions are always
false in their converted forms?
9. Do indefinite propositions convert? Explain.
10. Define contraposition and illustrate with an original example.
Exercise I Chapter Twelve
Convert the following propositions. If not convertible, write None.
1. Every A is B_
2. Some A is B_
3. No A is B_
4. Some A is non-B_
5. Every non-A is non-B_
6. No non-A is B___
7. Every A is non-B_
8. Some non-A is B_
9. Some A is not non-B_
10. Not every A is non-B_
Exercise II Chapter Twelve
Give the contraposition of the following propositions.
1. Every X is Y-
2. Some X is not Y_
3. Every X is non-Y_
4. Some non-X is not non-Y-
5. All elephants are animals--—-----
6. Some Asians are not Caucasians_
7. Not all non-Christians are pagans_
8. All non-novels are not non-books_
149
Exercise III *** Chapter Twelve
Convert the following propositions.
1. No penny is a dime.
2. Some garment is a coat.
3. Some students are non-sophomores.
4. Every monkey is a mammal.
5. All fabrics are woven.
6. Trees are leafy.
7. Men die.
8. Whoever immediately thinks he has the answer thinks hastily.
9. No non-magician is a wizard.
10. Some disciples surpass masters.
151
11. Whatever is useful is true.
12. Some small animals conquer large animals.
152
*♦* CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE COMPOUND
PROPOSITION
When considering the divisions of the proposition in Chapter 8,

we first divided the proposition according to unity into categorical and
compound. In succeeding chapters we have been primarily concerned
with the categorical proposition. We shall now examine the compound
proposition and distinguish its various kinds.
A compound proposition, as we have seen, is one by conjunction, sig¬
nifying a complex composition in the mind. The compound proposition
has a non-verb connective as its copula, uniting categorical propositions
as its parts. The most obvious, though not most important, example of
a compound proposition is one which merely joins together two cate¬
gorical propositions by the connective “and”: A representative is
elected every two years and a senator is elected every six years.
The compound proposition is divided, first, into explicitly and im¬
plicitly compound propositions. An explicitly compound proposition is
one whose complex composition is fully revealed in the expression of the
proposition, as in the example just given. An implicitly compound prop¬
osition is one that might appear at first sight to be only a categorical
proposition but actually is a disguised compound proposition, capable of
being resolved explicitly into two or more categorical propositions. For
this reason, implicitly compound propositions are sometimes called “ex-
ponibles,” that is, propositions which can be exposed into many. For
example, Man alone is an animal capable of learning grammar might
seem to be a categorical proposition. On the contrary, the proposition is
implicitly compound because it signifies a complex composition in the
153
154 THE COMPOUND PROPOSITION
mind. As we shall see shortly, it can be resolved into two distinct cat¬
egorical propositions. The key word “alone” is the sign of the implicitly
complex composition of the proposition, and such a proposition will
always have some key word signifying the complex composition.
Explicitly Compound Propositions
1. The conditional proposition
A conditional proposition is a compound proposition in which

two categorical propositions are joined by the connectives “if-then.”
Sometimes only the “if” is expressed, with “then” pre-supposed. Thus
If a stone is a body, it has weight is a conditional proposition. The first
part of the conditional proposition (the “if” part) is called the ante¬
cedent. The last part (the “then” part) is called the consequent. The
relation of the two parts of the conditional proposition is called the
sequence.
The truth of a conditional proposition requires that the sequence be
good, that is, valid. What is meant by the sequence being good is that
in a true conditional proposition the second part of the conditional
proposition must follow necessarily from the first. If the second part does
not follow necessarily from the first, then the conditional proposition is
not true, that is, the sequence is not valid.
We have been making use of the conditional proposition in treating
the rules of truth and falsity for relations of opposition. We say, for
example, that if the universal affirmative proposition is true, then the
particular negative is false. This is a true or valid conditional proposition
because the second follows necessarily from the first. But to say “if the
universal affirmative is false, then the universal negative is true,” is a
false or invalid conditional proposition because the second does not
follow necessarily from the first.
We are understanding the conditional proposition in its strict sense
when we say that the consequent must follow with necessity from the
antecedent. The conditional proposition so understood is sometimes
referred to as formal (or ordinary) implication by which it is dis¬
tinguished from a looser sense of the conditional proposition referred to
as material implication. In material implication, a consequent need not
follow necessarily from the antecedent. Hence, in material implication,
any antecedent “implies” any consequent with the sole exception that
a true antecedent cannot imply a false consequent. Such a broad mean¬
ing permits the following to be regarded as a true conditional prop¬
osition—If Lincoln was assassinated, then Australia is a continent; it
permits even this, If Lincoln is alive, then Australia is an island.
THE COMPOUND PROPOSITION 155
In our consideration of the conditional proposition, we shall under¬

stand the conditional proposition only in its strict and proper sense, that
is, “if-then” means the consequent must follow with a real necessity
from the antecedent.
2. The disjunctive proposition
A disjunctive proposition is a compound proposition in which

two categorical propositions are joined by means of the connective
“either-or,” sometimes with only “or.” Thus Either a number is odd or it
is even is a disjunctive proposition; or we might say more simply A num¬
ber is odd or even. The difficulty of using “or” alone is that the word is
ambiguous, for it can mean either a strict disjoining of two propositions,
as in the example we have just given, or it can mean merely an alternative,
as in Bill or Bob can do the job. Some logicians settle on the alternative
meaning of “or” even when used with “either,” and regard this meaning
of “either-or” as the connective of the disjunctive proposition or, more
properly, of the alternative proposition. Such a proposition is then re¬
garded as true when one and possibly both alternatives are true. Let us
agree to call this an alternative proposition, using “or” in the weaker
sense, and thus distinguish it from a disjunctive proposition in the strict
sense.
We shall put aside the alternative proposition and consider only the
disjunctive proposition. The disjunctive proposition asserts that two
categorical propositions cannot both be true at the same time nor both
false at the same time, that is, one must be true and the other false. Thus
Either this man is innocent or he is guilty is a true or valid disjunctive
proposition, since one of the two propositions must be true and the
other false. On the other hand, Either a man is a teacher or he is witty
is a false or invalid disjunctive proposition, since one could be neither or
both.
3. The copulative proposition
A copulative proposition is a compound proposition in which

two or more categorical propositions are joined by a connective such as
“and.” Thus Eisenhower left the presidency in 1961 and was succeeded
by Kennedy is a copulative proposition. For a copulative proposition to
be true, both categorical propositions composing it must be true. If
either of the composing categorical propositions is false, or both, the
copulative proposition is false. Thus Franklin Roosevelt was elected in
1932 and completed four terms of office is a false copulative proposition.
The copulative proposition is only a material connection of categorical
propositions. It presents no formal relation of propositions such as we
have in the conditional and in the disjunctive proposition. Its value de¬
pends solely upon the truth of its joined parts. Nevertheless, knowledge
of the structure of the copulative proposition is useful for certain oc¬
casions. For example, a true-false test sometimes includes copulative
propositions, and it is important to bear in mind that such a proposition
is not true unless both parts are true as categorical statements.
Implicitly Compound Propositions
1. The exclusive proposition
The exclusive proposition is one that contains such words as

“only” or “alone” or “none but.” These words, signifying exclusion,
usually qualify the subject of a proposition. We have already mentioned
as an example Man alone is an animal capable of learning grammar. We
resolve this implicitly compound proposition into an explicitly com¬
pound proposition, a copulative proposition combining two categorical
propositions: Man is an animal and no other animal is capable of learn¬
ing grammar. In resolving the exclusive proposition, there will always be
two explicit propositions, one affirming that the predicate belongs to the
subject and the other denying that the predicate belongs to any other
subject. This is all contained implicitly in the signification of such a word
as “alone” or “only.”
The exclusive proposition can be resolved in a more evident manner
than the way just given. Consider, for example, Only students are fresh¬
men. Instead of resolving it into an affirmative and a negative proposi¬
tion as we did above, we can express the resolution more clearly as
Students are freshmen and all freshmen are students. We are justified in
resolving in this manner because All freshmen are students is equivalent
in meaning to None other than students are freshmen (the negative
proposition we would have used had we resolved the exclusive proposition
as we did the first time in obtaining No other animal is capable of learn¬
ing grammar). We show this equivalence by a combination of obversion
and conversion. We should note first that None other than students are
freshmen is the same as saying No non-students are freshmen. No non¬
students are freshmen can be converted to No freshmen are non-students,
which is then obverted to All freshmen are students. Hence, while the
exclusive proposition is resolved directly into an affirmative and a nega¬
tive proposition, it can be resolved more clearly into two affirmative
propositions.
2. The exceptive proposition
The exceptive proposition is an implicitly compound proposition

that contains such words as “except” or “but” (the latter only as a prep-
THE COMPOUND PROPOSITION 157
osition). In an exceptive proposition, something contained under the

subject is removed from the predicate. Thus, All students except seniors
take physical education is an exceptive proposition, for in relation to the
predicate, “seniors” is removed from what would be otherwise a universal
subject. This proposition is resolved into No seniors take physical educa¬
tion and all other students take physical education. The latter proposi¬
tion could also be expressed as All non-seniors take physical education.
In general, then, when a proposition is stated in the form “All X ex¬
cept (the part) Y is Z,” the two propositions to be explicitly expressed
are: No Y is Z and every non-Y is Z, it being understood that Y and
non-Y are under the same whole X. It seems preferable to express the
second proposition in the form Every non- rather than All other.
The Truth of Implicitly Compound Propositions
The rule for the truth of implicitly compound propositions is

the same as the rule for the truth of copulative propositions since, as we
have seen, implicitly compound propositions are resolved into a copu¬
lative proposition. Hence, the implicitly compound proposition is true
only if every part of it is true. Since implicitly compound propositions
can easily be mistaken for categorical propositions, which make only one
assertion, it is important to keep this rule of truth in mind and not
accept an implicitly compound proposition as true unless both assertions
in it are true.
Questions i**X*<* Chapter Thirteen
1. How does the compound proposition differ from the categorical?

2. How are explicitly and implicitly compound propositions primarily dis¬
tinguished?
3. What is a conditional proposition? Illustrate.
4. Distinguish “antecedent,” “consequent,” and “sequence” in the condi¬
tional proposition.
5. When is a conditional proposition true or valid?
6. Distinguish formal implication and material implication.
7. What is a disjunctive proposition?
8. Distinguish a disjunctive proposition from an alternative proposition.
9. When is a disjunctive proposition true?
10. What is a copulative proposition?
11. When is a copulative proposition true?
12. Describe the exclusive proposition.
13. Show how and into what sort of explicitly compound proposition the
exclusive proposition is resolved.
14. Justify resolving Only citizens are voters into Citizens are voters and all
voters are citizens.
15. Explain the exceptive proposition.
16. What is the rule of truth for implicitly compound propositions?
REVIEW EXERCISES FOR PART II
Review Exercise I 4hH> Part II
I. Classify the subjects and predicates of the following propositions as dis¬

tributed or undistributed (D or U); and classify the propositions according
to quantity and quality.
Subj. Pred. Quantity Quality
1. Every oak is a tree. _ _ _ _
2. Some lion is wild. _ _ _ _
3. Artists are not soldiers. _ _ _ _
4. Every lily is a non-tulip. - - - -
5. Not every book is a novel. _ _ _ _
6. Sugar is sweet. - - - -
7. No non-student is a grad¬
uate. - - - -
8. No quality is quantity. - - - -
9. All fruit is not sour. - - - -
10. Every non-lily is not a
tulip. - - - -
II. If the following propositions are valid conversions of propositions 1-10

above, write Valid; if not write Invalid.
11. Some non-tulip is a lily. _
12. No quantity is quality. _
13. Not everything sour is fruit. _
14. Some graduate is not a non-student. _
15. Every tree is an oak. _
16. Some wild being is a lion. _
17. Soldiers are not artists. _
18. No tulip is a non-lily. _
19. Not every novel is a book. _
20. Some graduate is a student. -
160
Review Exercise I Part II
(Continued)
III. Write the kind of opposition the propositions below have in relation to
propositions 1-10 in I. If no opposition is indicated, write None.
21. Some quality is quantity. _
22. No oak is a tree. _
23. All fruit is sour. _
24. Artists are soldiers. _
25. No lily is a non-tulip. _
26. Some lion is not wild. _
27. Some quality is not quantity. _
28. Some non-student is a graduate. _
29. Sugar is non-sweet. _______
30. No non-lily is a tulip. _
31. Every non-lily is a tulip. -
32. All artists are soldiers. -
33. Some book is a novel. -
34. This lily is not a non-tulip. -
35. Some tree is an oak. -
36. Every quality is quantity. -
161
Review Exercise II *HhJ* Part II
In the following items, determine first what sort of relation is in the state¬
ment (opposition, obversion, conversion, contraposition, or some combina¬
tion). Then determine whether the rules of truth and falsity are followed.
The whole statement is to be marked Valid only if each proposition (ex¬
cept any preceded by if) follows correctly from any preceding proposition;
otherwise, write Invalid.
_1. If it is true that No X is Y, then Every X is Y is false,

Some X is Y is true, and Some X is not non-Y is true.
_ 2. If it is true that Every X is Y, then Some Y is X is

true, Some X is Y is true, and Some X is not Y is false.
_ 3. If it is false that Every X is Y, then it is false that

Every Y is X.
_ 4. If it is true that Some X is not Y, then it is true that

Some non-Y is not non-X.
_ 5. If it is false that No men are clever, then it is false that

All men are non-clever, true that Some men are clever,
and true that Some men are not clever.
_ 6. If you hold it is true that Some fruit is not ripe, then

you have to hold it is false that No fruit is ripe.
_ 7. If it is true that Some salesmen are honest and if it is

true that Some salesmen are not honest, then it is false
that No salesmen are honest and false that All sales¬
men are honest.
._ 8. If it is true that No poems are essays, then it is true

that Some poems are not essays, false that All poems
are essays, true that All poems are non-essays, and true
that Some non-essays are poems.
_9. If it is true that Some non-horses are not non-mammals,

then it is true that Some mammals are not horses,
true that Some mammals are non-horses, and false that
No mammals are non-horses.
_10. It is false that All rulers are despots, then it is true

that Rulers are not despots, unknown whether Some
rulers are despots, but true that Some despots are not
rulers.
_11. If it is true that Every flower is not red, then it is false

that Some flower is red, and false that Every flower is
red.
162
12. If it is true that This man is guilty, then it is true that
Some man is not guilty.
13. If I know it is true that Every lawyer is a non-doctor,

then I know it is true that No lawyer is a doctor, but
I do not know whether it is true or false that Some
lawyer is not a non-doctor.
14. If it is false that Not all trees are leafy, then it is true
that All trees are leafy, true that No trees are non-leafy,
false that Some trees are non-leafy, and false that Some
trees are not leafy.
15. Take the following proposition as true. No sailor is a

soldier. Convert it. Then obvert the conversion. Then
give the contraposition of the obversion. Then give the
obversion of the contraposition:
16. Take the following proposition as false: Some X is Y.

Can you, by valid relations of opposition, obversion,
or conversion arrive at No non-X is Y as false?
163
Ill
THE LOGIC OF
THE THIRD ACT
OF THE INTELLECT:
REASONING
*** CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ARGUMENTATION
As we start Part Three, it may be well to refer again to the

order of logic and indicate what we are to consider in this last part.
As we saw in the Introduction, logic is the art that guides us in com¬
ing to know the unknown from what is previously known. An un¬
known object is either simple, as tree, man, or redness, or complex, as
Man is artistic. A simple object is known by the first act of the intellect,
the act of simple apprehension. The simple object is most perfectly
manifested in a definition. We have covered this in Part I.
A complex object is made known by means of argumentation. Argu¬
mentation requires two additional acts of the intellect: the act of com¬
position or division, and the act of reasoning. The act of composition or
division is the second act of the intellect, and we have treated this in
Part II. Having considered the proposition, its various kinds and
properties, we can now proceed to the third act of the intellect—reason¬
ing. Reasoning is needed to manifest fully an unknown complex object.
We shall now treat reasoning and especially the syllogism, which is the
perfect type of argumentation.
An argumentation is a process of reasoning. In the act of reasoning,
as distinct from the other acts of the intellect, we acquire knowledge of a
new truth by means of truths already known. Now, some truths are ob¬
tained independently, some in subordination to others. We obtain truths
independently of each other by composition or division, that is, by
composing a predicate with a subject or by dividing a predicate from a
subject, as in the second act of the intellect.
Other truths are obtained from truths subordinated to each other. In
the reasoning process, the third act of the intellect, we arrive at a new
truth by relating and subordinating several truths. For example, we can
167
168 ARGUMENTATION
say Every animal is mortal and Every human being is an animal. By re¬
lating these two truths or propositions to each other and by subordinat¬
ing the second proposition to the first, we arrive at a new truth, Every
human being is mortal. This subordination is according to the universal¬
ity of the propositions, not according to their greater or lesser importance.
Reasoning consists essentially in this movement from one truth to
another, that is, in a discursive operation. We call the third truth a
“new” truth because we know it as true by means of the two previously
known truths.
An argumentation is defined as a composite expression in which, one
thing being given, another follows. In the example in the preceding para¬
graph, the first two truths constitute something as given, and the third
truth follows from them. What is given is called the antecedent; what
follows is called the consequent.
In the example used, the first two truths constitute the antecedent in
such a way that one of the truths is subordinated to the other. The sub¬
ordinated truth is the second proposition, Every human being is an
animal. It is the subordinated proposition because it is lesser in univer¬
sality than the first proposition. Every animal is mortal is the first
proposition, to which the second is subordinated, because the first is
greater in universality. The third proposition, which follows from the
other two as a conclusion from them, is the consequent. The consequent
concludes the act of reasoning. The full argumentation, in terms of ante¬
cedent and consequent, is the following:
Every animal is mortal. ) .

Every human being is an animal. ) \an^ecedent)
Every human being is mortal. (consequent)
We also speak of the act of reasoning as an act of inference. Inference

is the act of passing from the antecedent to the consequent. Hence we
speak of inferring the consequent from the antecedent, or the conclusion
from premises.
An inference (or sequence) may be valid or invalid. A valid inference
occurs when the antecedent really infers the consequent, that is, when
there is a real connection and dependence of the consequent upon the
antecedent. An invalid inference occurs when the antecedent only
appears to infer the consequent, that is, when there is no real connection
and no dependence of the consequent upon the antecedent. When an
inference is valid or invalid will be considered later.
We can, however, state certain general principles of argumentation.
First, a false consequent cannot follow from a true antecedent. The
reason for this is that the consequent is contained implicitly within the
antecedent, and hence, if the antecedent is true, the consequent inferred
ARGUMENTATION 169
from it will have to be true. However, a true consequent may follow from
a false antecedent. This does not mean that a false antecedent causes a
true consequent precisely as the consequent is true but, rather, that a true
consequent can be accidentally connected with a false antecedent. In
other words, a false antecedent can cause a consequent to follow, but can¬
not cause the consequent to follow as true. For example, the antecedent
Every flower is an animal and Every dog is a flower—a false antecedent-
causes the consequent Every dog is an animal to follow, but does not
cause that consequent to follow as true, that is, the antecedent is not the
cause of the truth of the consequent.
There are two kinds of argumentation: deductive and inductive. De¬
ductive argumentation is the same as the syllogism. We have been using
a syllogism as an example of argumentation. It should be emphasized that
deductive argumentation, or the syllogism, proceeds properly from the
more universal to the less universal; the syllogism, therefore, properly re¬
mains on the plane of universality. The example we have been using
makes this clear.
Every animal is mortal. (more universal)

Every human being is an animal. (less universal)
Therefore, every human being is mortal. (conclusion)
Inductive argumentation, which is the same as induction, proceeds

from singulars to the universal. Induction proves that a characteristic
belongs to a common subject by producing corresponding singulars. For
example, we argue from the fact that this man is capable of speech, and
another man is capable of speech, and so of all individual men, to the
universal Every man is capable of speech.
Let us now consider argumentation in detail. We shall treat the
syllogism at some length, because it is the perfect type of argumentation.
Induction, the second and less perfect type of argumentation, will be
considered after the syllogism.
Questions Chapter Fourteen
1. State the order of the three parts of logic and the relation of the third
part to the other two.
2. How does the act of reasoning differ from the other acts of the intellect?
3. What do we mean by arriving at a “new” truth in the act of reasoning?
4. What is an argumentation?
5. Explain the antecedent and the consequent of an argumentation. Illus¬
trate with an example.
6. What is meant by “inference”?
7. When is an inference valid? When is it invalid?
170 ARGUMENTATION
8. Why cannot a false consequent follow from a true antecedent?

9. How can a true consequent follow from a false antecedent?
10. What are the two kinds of argumentation? Define each kind.
11. Deduction has sometimes been defined as that which proceeds from the
universal to the singular. Criticize this definition.
12. Illustrate an inductive argumentation with an original example, and
show how it exemplifies the meaning of induction.
*❖* CHAPTER FIFTEEN
THE SYLLOGISM
The syllogism is a composite expression in which, certain things

being stated, something else necessarily follows. The syllogism is an
argumentation composed of three propositions. The “certain things
being stated” refers to the two propositions which function as premises;
the “something else necessarily follows” refers to the third proposition
which follows as a conclusion from the two premises. Thus:
Every C Ts B. I (certain thin§s bein§ stated)

Therefore, every C is A. (something else necessarily follows)
This definition of the syllogism is given by Aristotle in the opening

chapter of the Prior Analytics and also in the Topics. It is a definition of
the syllogism on the part of form, and is common in the sense that this
form of the syllogism can be considered by itself as well as in the varied
matter in which it is realized. Hence, whether a syllogism is examined
only on the part of its form, or as realized in a demonstrative syllogism,
a dialectical, or any other, this common definition will hold.
Thus it is that in developing the syllogism on the part of form in the
Prior Analytics, Aristotle will speak in the following manner: If A is
predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must be predicated of all C. This
way of speaking does not mean that Aristotle understands the syllogism,
thus formally expressed, as a hypothetical or conditional syllogism. (We
shall examine the distinctive character of the conditional syllogism in
Chapter 18.) He expresses himself in this way in order to preserve the
generality of the form and principles of the syllogism so that whether
the syllogism is realized in demonstrative matter or dilaectical matter,
171
172 THE SYLLOGISM
the common definition and principles of the syllogism will hold. An¬
other reason for Aristotle’s using the word “if” may be adduced. Since
he is developing the different figures of the syllogism, he is equivalently
saying that if you arrange the syllogistic terms in one way, as in the
example we have given, you have the first figure; if in another way, the
second figure; and if in still another way, the third figure, as well as dif¬
ferent moods in each figure, as we shall see shortly.
Consequently, as far as the form of the syllogism is concerned, it does
not matter whether we express the syllogism as “If A is predicated of all
B, and B of all C, A must be predicated of all C,” or “All B is A, All C
is B, therefore All C is A.” Even if we express the syllogism in words,
this common form remains:
If substance is predicated of every animal,

and animal of every dog,
substance must be predicated of every dog;
or
Every animal is a substance.

Therefore, every dog is a substance.
Even when treating the syllogism formally, that is, in a common way,
we may still distinguish the matter and form of the syllogism. “Matter”
and “form” now take on an artistic meaning, for the syllogism is a work
of human art, not something purely natural. Hence, just as any work of
art, servile, fine or liberal, has a matter or material out of which the
work is made and a form which “shapes” the material in a certain way,
so also the syllogism. We shall treat first the matter, then the form, of
the syllogism as it is common to different kinds of argumentation.
The Matter of the Syllogism
We distinguish between the proximate matter and the remote

matter of the syllogism.
The proximate matter is the three propositions of the syllogism. The
first two propositions of the syllogism are called the premises, that is,
propositions leading to a conclusion. The third proposition of the syllo¬
gism is called the conclusion. The word “therefore” introduces the con¬
clusion, as a sign of the inference.
The two premises are considered as major and minor. The major
premise has the predicate of the conclusion appearing in it. The minor
premise has the subject of the conclusion appearing in it. The reason the
premise containing the predicate of the conclusion is called the major
premise is that the predicate of the conclusion is taken as greater in uni¬
versality than the subject. For this reason, too, the predicate of the con-
THE SYLLOGISM 173
elusion, as it appears in the major premise, is called the major extreme.

The other premise is called the minor premise because it contains the
subject of the conclusion, which is taken as less universal than the predi¬
cate of the conclusion. Hence the subject of the conclusion, as it appears
in the minor premise, is called the minor extreme. The conditions of the
major extreme as more universal and the minor extreme as less universal
are verified directly only in the most perfect type of syllogism, one con¬
taining three universal affirmative propositions. With this terminology
added, let us look at the example of a syllogism we have already given.
(major extreme)
Every animal is a substance. (major premise)
(minor extreme)
Every dog is an animal. (minor premise)
(minor) (major)
The remote matter is the three syllogistic terms of the syllogism. A

syllogistic term is the subject or predicate into which propositions are
resolved. The verb copula is not one of the syllogistic terms; it serves,
rather, to connect them.
The syllogistic terms, accordingly, are the major, the minor, and the
middle term. Each of these terms appears twice, and no more than twice,
in a syllogism. As we have seen, the term standing as the predicate of
the conclusion and appearing in the major premise is the major term or
extreme. The term standing as the subject of the conclusion and appear¬
ing in the minor premise is the minor term. The term found in each of the
premises, uniting the major and minor terms, is the middle term. The
middle term has two functions. First, it is the link between the major
and minor terms. Second, it is the term that is middle in universality
and in position in the premises. Tnese two functions of the middle term
are both realized in the perfect type of syllogism, which we can illustrate
as follows:
(middle) (major)
Every B is A
(minor) (middle)
Every C is B
(minor) (major)
Therefore, every C is A.
or
(middle) (major)
(minor) (middle)
(minor) (major)
174 THE SYLLOGISM
Let us recall that the major premise is defined as the one having the
predicate of the conclusion in it, and that the minor premise is defined
as the one having the subject of the conclusion in it. These definitions
indicate the order to look for in examining a syllogism. The logical order
of reasoning suggests that the major premise should appear first in the
syllogism even though we often find syllogisms in which the minor
premise is first. As long as we are aware which term is major and which
minor, the position of major and minor premises does not matter as far
as the validity of the syllogism is concerned. Hence, when analyzing the
structure of a syllogism, the conclusion should be examined first in order
to determine the major term (the predicate of the conclusion) and the
minor term (the subject of the conclusion). From this, we can de¬
termine which premise is the major and which the minor.
The Form of the Syllogism
The form of the syllogism is constituted by mood and figure.

The mood of the syllogism arises from the disposition of the propositions
of the syllogism according to quality—affirmative and negative—and
according to quantity—universal and particular. For example, if we have
a syllogism composed of three universal affirmative propositions, the
mood of the syllogism will be wholly universal affirmative, which we can
express by the symbols, A-A-A.
It is evident that we can have a variety of moods in a syllogism, de¬
pending upon the quality and the quantity of the propositions making
up the syllogism. Thus, we can have A-A-A as a mood, or E-A-E, or
I-A-I, or E-I-O, and so forth. As we shall see later, only certain moods
are valid in a syllogism. When giving the mood alone, without adding
the syllogistic terms, we shall always presuppose the logical order of
reasoning—major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Hence, the
mood E-I-O means that the major premise is a universal negative
proposition, the minor premise is a particular affirmative, and the con¬
clusion is a particular negative.
The figure of a syllogism arises from the location of the terms in the
syllogism. Since the middle term appears twice in the premises, the
figures of the syllogism are derived from the various possible locations
of the middle term in relation to the major and minor terms.
For example, we can relate the three terms of a syllogism in such a
way that the major is affirmed or denied of the middle, and the middle
is affirmed (though never validly denied, as we shall see) of the minor.
In this way, we obtain the first figure of the syllogism. Thus, let the major
term be “animal,” the middle term “mammal,” and the minor term
“man.” By affirming the major term of the middle, we get:
THE SYLLOGISM 175
Every mammal is an animal.
By affirming the middle term of the minor, we get:
Every man is a mammal.
From these two premises, we get as a conclusion:
Every man is an animal.
In symbols, we get the following arrangement of terms, which consti¬

tutes the first figure:
B - A
C - B
C - A
Consequently, when the middle term stands as the subject of the

major premise and the predicate of the minor premise, we have the first
figure of the syllogism. The first figure of the syllogism is called the
perfect figure because in this arrangement of terms, the middle term is
middle in universality and has the middle position in the premises. As
subject of the major premise and predicate of the minor premise, the
middle term clearly stands between the major and minor extremes. In
this figure, the position of the major extreme is the position of greatest
universality and that of the minor the position of least universality, as is
evident with affirmative propositions. The first figure is thus the figure
most evident to us.
However, we can have other arrangements of terms in a syllogism. The
middle term can be affirmed and denied of both the major term and the
minor term. The middle term thus stands as the predicate of both
premises. Thus, let “animal” be the middle term, “stone” the major
term, and “horse” the minor term. By denying “animal” of “stone,” we
get:
No stone is an animal.
By affirming animal of horse we get:
Every horse is an animal.
No horse is a stone.

tutes the second figure of the syllogism:
176 THE SYLLOGISM
A - B
C - B
C - A
In this arrangement of terms, the predicate of the conclusion stands as

the subject of the major premise. The appearance of the symbol A in the
subject position of the major premise (A — B) is necessitated by the
middle term’s being in the predicate position of both premises. Hence,
the predicate of the conclusion will have to appear in the subject posi¬
tion of the major premise. For this reason, and particularly because the
middle term does not occupy the middle position, the second figure is
less evident and less perfect than the first.
We can have still another arrangement of terms in a syllogism. The
major term can be affirmed or denied of the middle term, and the minor
term can be affirmed (though never validly denied) of the middle term.
The middle term thus stands as the subject of both premises, and the
major and minor as the predicates. Thus, let “water” be the middle term,
“salty” the major term, and “liquid” the minor term. By affirming “salty”
of “water” we get:
Some water is salty.
By affirming “liquid” of “water,” we get:
All water is liquid.
Some liquid is salty.

tutes the third figure of the syllogism:
B - A
B - C
C - A
In this arrangement of terms, the subject of the conclusion stands as

the predicate of the minor premise. The appearance of the symbol C in
the predicate position of the minor premise is necessitated by the middle
term’s being the subject of both premises. Hence, the subject of the
conclusion has to appear in the predicate position of the minor premise.
Here, again, the middle term does not occupy the middle position, and
thus the third figure, like the second, is less evident and less perfect than
the first figure.
THE SYLLOGISM 111
The Problem of a Fourth Figure
It might seem as though there could be a fourth figure of the

syllogism, as though we could arrange the terms in such a way that the
middle term could be put in the predicate position of the major premise
and in the subject position of the minor premise, as follows:
A - B
B - C
C - A
Now it is true, as we shall see later when discussing the rules which
guarantee the validity of a syllogism, that a syllogism with this arrange¬
ment of terms commits no fallacy and is therefore valid. For this reason,
most logicians include this arrangement of terms as a fourth figure.
However, if one attends to the meaning of syllogistic terms, and if one
consistently regards the syllogism as composed of propositions wherein
one is making an act of predication (as distinct from simply regarding
the syllogism as a mechanical placing of words or symbols in an arbitrary
manner), then such a fourth figure for the syllogism can be legitimately
excluded.
The reason for excluding a fourth figure of the syllogism is the fol¬
lowing. A syllogism is constructed to represent an order of judgment
which in a perfect logical form proceeds from what is more universal to
what is less universal. Thus a major term is to stand for what is major or
greater in universality according to predication and position; a minor
term for what is lesser in universality; and a middle term for what is in
between the two extremes in universality. The arrangement of terms in
a fourth figure wholly inverts this order. What stands as a major term
is in fact put in the position of minor universality; what stands as a
minor term is put in the position of major universality; and what is sup¬
posed to be middle in universality is put in the position of being greater
in universality than the major term and at the same time is put in the
position of being less in universality than the minor term. Such an ar¬
rangement of terms, indeed such a confusion of terms, makes no syllo¬
gistic sense. The fact that an argument can still be valid in a fourth
figure is not because of such an arrangement of terms but in spite of the
arrangement.
True enough, the second and third figures are also open to objection,
at least to the extent that the middle term no longer is in the position
of being middle in universality. We have already pointed out that these
figures are less evident and less perfect as syllogistic figures than the first.
Hence Aristotle thinks it worth while to reduce syllogisms in those
figures to the first, the evident and perfect manifestation of syllogistic
178 THE SYLLOGISM
principles and rules. We shall examine the reduction of syllogisms in

other figures to the first in Chapter 17. However, the second and third
figures only lose one of the functions of the middle term (its position
as middle) while retaining the other function; nor do those figures con¬
fuse the major and minor terms with each other (whereas the so-called
fourth figure confuses all three terms syllogistically).
Accordingly, a further argument for there being only three figures is
that the middle term syllogistically can only be (1) between the ex¬
tremes, (2) outside the extremes, and (3) inside the extremes—the three
respective figures. The fourth figure would have the middle trying to
function at once as outside the extremes and inside the extremes, which
predicationally does violence to a middle term.
To put the problem of the fourth figure in another way:
Every man is an animal.

should conclude to:
Every man is a substance.
and not to:
Some substance is a man.
The first conclusion puts the syllogism into the first figure with the
minor premise first and the major premise second. The second con¬
clusion would put the syllogism in a fourth figure. Actually, however,
we see that because of the confusing arrangement of terms in a fourth
figure, we do not fully prove what has been laid down in the premises,
for Some substance is a man is not equivalent to Every man is a sub¬
stance, which the premises have established and from which such a
conclusion should follow. Consequently, moods in the so-called fourth
figure either conclude inadequately (as in the example just cited) or are
more logically expressed in the first figure by converting the premises in
two of the moods and the conclusion in the other two.
Let us add here only that a fourth figure of the syllogism should not
be confused with the first figure when it concludes indirectly. We shall
refer to this matter of the first figure concluding indirectly at the end of
the next chapter.
Questions Chapter Fifteen
1. What is the definition of a syllogism? Explain the definition.

2. Explain why Aristotle’s way of speaking about the syllogism in the
THE SYLLOGISM 17 9
Prior Analytics refers to the common form of the syllogism and not to
merely one kind of syllogism, that is, the conditional.
3. What is the proximate matter of the syllogism?
4. Is every proposition a premise? Explain.
5. Distinguish between the major and minor premise.
6. What is the major extreme; the minor extreme?
7. What is the remote matter of a syllogism?
8. What are the syllogistic terms?
9. How do we tell which is the major premise of a syllogism?
10. What is meant by the mood of a syllogism?
11. What is meant by the figure of a syllogism?
12. How are the terms of a syllogism arranged in the first figure of the
syllogism?
13. Construct a syllogism in the first figure, using the mood E-A-E with X
as the middle term, Y as the minor term, and Z as the major term.
14. Why is the first figure called the “perfect” figure?
15. How are the terms arranged in the second figure of the syllogism?
16. Construct a syllogism in the second figure, using the mood E-I-O, with
X as the middle term, Y as the minor term, and Z as the major term.
17. How are the terms of a syllogism arranged in the third figure?
18. Construct a syllogism in the third figure, using the mood I-A-I, with X
as the middle term, Y as the minor term, and Z as the major term.
19. How would the terms of a syllogism be arranged in a fourth figure and
what difficulties does such an arrangement of terms lead to?
20. What argument can be given for there being only three figures of the
syllogism?
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
PRINCIPLES AND RULES

OF THE SYLLOGISM
In the preceding chapter, we considered the definition of the

syllogism, and the matter and form of the syllogism. We shall now ex¬
amine the syllogism from the standpoint of validity, that is, we shall
determine when the various moods of the syllogism are valid in the dif¬
ferent figures. We want to know, in other words, when the form of
syllogistic reasoning is valid apart from any particular matter, not by
excluding all matter from the syllogism—for any syllogism must have its
proximate and remote matter—but by analyzing the form of reasoning in
the syllogism. For example, we shall determine whether the mood A-A-A
is valid in all three figures, or in none of them, or in one or two of them,
and so with the other moods, regardless for the time being of whether
we are reasoning about God, man, or the elements.
Throughout this examination, however, we must bear in mind that
the syllogism, as a kind of argumentation, rests on the possibility of truly
predicating something one of many; for unless we can use a universal
in this way, we cannot have a middle term, and without the middle term
we cannot have a syllogism. How can we conclude that C is A unless
there is some middle term B with which both C and A are identified,
that is to say, in which one of these terms is predicated of B, and B, in
turn, is predicated of the other? In other words, why is A predicated of
C (C is A)? Only because A is predicated of B and B is predicated
of C.
We shall see more fully why this is so by considering the fundamental
principles upon which every syllogism rests.
181
182 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM
The Fundamental Principles of the Syllogism
The two fundamental principles express the relation of a uni¬

versal to its inferiors, a relation every syllogism must presuppose in order
to be valid.
The first principle is stated in the following way: Whatever is
affirmed universally of a subject or a whole is affirmed of everything
contained under that subject or whole. This principle is known in an
abbreviated form as the dictum de omni (literally, “what is said of all”).
Thus, whatever is affirmed universally of animal (for example, sub¬
stance) must be affirmed universally of everything contained under
animal. Hence, since Every animal is a substance, then Every dog is a
substance, for “dog” is contained under “animal,” of which “substance”
has been affirmed universally.
The second principle is stated in the following way: Whatever is
denied universally of a subject or a whole is denied of everything con¬
tained under that subject or whole. This principle is known in an ab¬
breviated form as the dictum de nullo (literally, “what is said of none”).
Thus, whatever is denied universally of animal (for example, stone)
must be denied universally of everything contained under animal.
Hence, since No animal is a stone, then No dog is a stone, for “dog” is
contained under “animal,” of which “stone” has been denied uni¬
versally.
The principles dictum de omni and dictum de nullo are directly veri¬
fied only in the first figure; this direct verification is another sign that
the first figure of the syllogism is the perfect figure.
The Rules of the Syllogism
The rules of the syllogism are based upon the fundamental prin¬
ciples of the syllogism. The rules help us to apply the fundamental
principles more easily; they help us to determine more readily what
moods are valid in the three figures of the syllogism. Actually, if we were
acute enough logically, we could determine the valid moods of the
syllogism from the principles alone, for every deductive argument is valid
in virtue of the fundamental principles. The task, however, is simplified
by these rules of the syllogism, which we shall now consider.
1. A syllogism must have only three terms
As we have seen, the terms of a syllogism are the major, minor,

and middle. Since two terms are related to a middle term, and then are
related to each other, each term appears twice in a syllogism. Each term,
used twice, must have the same signification and the same supposition;
otherwise there will be the fallacy of four terms.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM 183
No one would suppose that the following example is a valid syllo¬

gism:
Every B is A.
Every D is C.
Therefore, every D is A.
In this example, we obviously have the fallacy of four terms; in fact,

we do not have a middle term at all. But the following example, ex¬
pressed in words, might seem to be a valid syllogism:
Animal is genus.
Man is an animal.
Therefore, man is a genus.
This syllogism, however, also has the fallacy of four terms, although it
might seem to have only three terms. The supposition of the middle
term “animal” changes, for in the major premise, “animal” is used in
simple supposition, while in the minor premise it is used in personal
supposition. Hence, this syllogism really has four terms after all, and is
therefore invalid.
Violations of this first rule of the syllogism are practically always con¬
fined to syllogisms expressed in words. Symbols such as A, B, and C,
since they abstract from particular matter, always presuppose the same
signification and supposition. But when we argue in words, as we norm¬
ally do, then this first rule must be kept constantly in mind, for it is easy
to fall into the fallacy either of using words which are equivocal in
meaning or, as in the example given, using words which differ in sup¬
position.
It is evident from this first rule that the middle term can never appear
in the conclusion. Since each term can appear only twice in a syllogism,
and since the middle term must appear in both premises (otherwise it
would not be a middle term), the middle term can never validly appear
in the conclusion. This point is sometimes stated as a separate rule of
the syllogism, but its connection with this first rule is close enough to
warrant its being included in it. The following syllogism is invalid
because of the presence of the middle term in the conclusion:
No murderer is a saint.
Every murderer is a criminal.
Therefore, no saint is a murderer.
2. Any term distributed in the conclusion must also be dis¬

tributed in the premises
The premises are the cause of the conclusion. As an effect, the

conclusion cannot have more than is contained in the premises, which
are its cause. If a term is distributed (used universally) in the conclusion,

but is undistributed (used particularly) in the premise, then the effect is
greater than its cause. The fallacy consists in having more in the con¬
clusion than is set forth in the premises. The following syllogism violates
this second rule:
Every B is A. (Every senator is a citizen.)

No C is B. (No governor is a senator.)
Therefore, no C is A. (Therefore, no governor is a citizen.)
In this example, the term A (citizen) is distributed in the conclusion,

since the predicate of every negative proposition is distributed. But this
same term is undistributed in the major premise, for the predicate of
every affirmative proposition is undistributed. Hence, the conclusion
does not follow. In other words, what is true of some citizen is not neces¬
sarily true of every citizen. In this example, the fallacy concerned the
major term, but it could apply to the minor term as well, as in:
No B is A. (No square is a circle.)

Every B is C. (Every square is a figure.)
Therefore, No C is A. (Therefore, no figure is a circle.)
3. The middle term must be distributed at least once
No relation can be established between the major and minor

terms in the conclusion unless the middle term is distributed at least
once. If the middle term were undistributed in both premises, no
identity would be established between the middle term and the other
two terms in the premises, and hence no conclusion would follow. The
following is an example of a syllogism in which the middle term is un¬
distributed in both premises:
Every A is B. (Every dog is an animal.)

Every C is B. (Every cat is an animal.)
Therefore, every C is A. (Therefore, every cat is a dog.)
4. From two negative premises, no conclusion follows
If a syllogism has two negative premises, then the premises ex¬

plicitly deny any relation of identity between the middle term and the
other two terms. Since the premises tell us nothing about any possible
relation of the middle term with the major and minor, we cannot tell
whether or not the major and minor are related to each other. Hence
nothing can be proved from two negative premises, as the following
example shows:
PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM m
No B is A. (No plant is an animal.)
No C is B. (No horse is a plant.)
It might seem as though two negative premises should yield a negative

conclusion. Suppose that someone were to argue: No tree is a stone; no
horse is a tree; therefore, no horse is a stone. Does not this conclusion
seem to follow as true? The conclusion, of course, is true, but its truth
is not caused by the premises. Although it is true that no tree is a
stone and true that no horse is a tree, we have no identity established
through the middle term by which we can prove that no horse is a stone.
A negative conclusion demands an affirmative premise; we must in the
premises identify the middle term with, for example, the minor term as
well as deny the middle term of the major in order to prove that the
major must be denied of the minor in the conclusion. A syllogism must
always rely on the dictum de omni; the dictum de nullo presupposes the
dictum de omni. The dictum de omni alone suffices for an affirmative
conclusion whereas a negative conclusion requires both the dictum de
omni and the dictum de nullo; syllogistically, negation presupposes
affirmation. Consequently, we can prove the truth of No horse is a
stone by showing that something universally affirmed of “horse” is
universally denied of “stone,” as in the following:
No stone is an animal. (Animal is denied of stone.)

Every horse is an animal. (But animal is affirmed of horse.)
Therefore, no horse is a stone. (Therefore, stone is denied of horse.)
5. The conclusion always follows the weaker part
This rule expresses the general point that the conclusion cannot
be stronger, that is, contain more, than the premises set forth. Conse¬
quently, any weakness in the premises has to be reflected in the con¬
clusion. The “weaker part” means: (1) a particular proposition, which
is weaker than a universal proposition; (2) a negative proposition, which
is weaker than an affirmative proposition. Hence, if one premise is uni¬
versal and the other particular, the conclusion will have to be particular.
If one premise is affirmative and the other negative, the conclusion will
have to be negative. If one premise is both particular and negative, the
conclusion will have to be both particular and negative; similarly, if one
premise is particular and the other premise negative, the conclusion will
have to be both particular and negative.
The following example violates this rule of the syllogism by drawing
an affirmative conclusion, even though true, from a negative premise:
Every B is A. (Every scientist is a human being.)

No B is C. (No child is a scientist.)
Therefore, every C is A. (Therefore, every child is a human being.)
In addition to the foregoing five rules, sometimes the following is

given: From two particular premises, no conclusion follows. While this
point is handy to know for a quick examination of the validity of a
syllogism, it adds nothing to the rules already given. Every time a
syllogism has two particular premises, either the middle term will be
undistributed or else a term will be distributed in the conclusion and un¬
distributed in the premise. Hence, this statement about two particular
premises does not merit being formulated as a distinct rule.
The Determination of the Valid Moods of the Syllogism
In the light of the principles and rules of the syllogism, we can

now determine which moods are valid in the different figures of the
syllogism. In any one figure there are sixteen possible moods, or com¬
binations of premises of different quality and quantity, from which a
conclusion might be drawn:
A A A A EEEE IIII OOOO

A E I O A E I O A E I O AEIO
The letters given in these sets of columns are to be read downwards,

with the top letter standing for the major premise and the one under it
for the minor premise. Thus, in the first set, the second column has A at
the top and E at the bottom, and stands for a universal affirmative major
premise and a universal negative minor premise. A column having 1-0
stands for a particular affirmative major premise and a particular negative
minor premise.
A conclusion can be drawn validly from each of these combinations
of premises only if no rule, and consequently no fundamental principle
of the syllogism, is violated. Since there are three figures, with sixteen
possible moods in each figure, there is a total of forty-eight possible
moods. However, not all of these moods are valid. To determine which
of these are valid, we shall examine the sixteen moods of the first figure,
then the moods of the second figure, and, finally, the moods of the third
figure, testing them with the principles and rules of the syllogism.
We shall work this out fully as an exercise at the end of this chapter.
As an introduction to this exercise, we shall try working out a few of the
moods now. Suppose that we want to determine whether the mood
E-A is valid in the first figure. We know that the first letter stands for
the major premise, the second for the minor premise, and that E stands
for a universal negative proposition, A for a universal affirmative proposi-
tion. As we have been doing, we shall use the letters A, B, and C for
the syllogistic terms: A for the major term, B for the middle term, and
C for the minor term. We are therefore investigating the following mood
in the first figure:
No B is A. (E)
Every C is B. (A)
The question now is: Can we validly get a conclusion from these two
premises?
No B is A. (E)
Every C is B. (A)
Therefore? (?)
First, let us refer to the fundamental principles of the syllogism to see

whether a valid conclusion can be drawn from these premises. In the
major premise, we are stating No B is A. A is being denied universally of
B and hence of whatever is included under B (the dictum de nullo). In
the minor premise, we are stating Every C is B. B is being affirmed
universally of C and hence of everything included under C (the dictum
de omni). C is therefore included under B. But A is denied of B and of
everything under B. Therefore, A is denied also of C:
No B is A. (A is denied universally of B.)

Every C is B. (B is affirmed universally of C.)
Therefore, no C is A. (Therefore, A is denied universally of C.)
We conclude, then, that No C is A can be drawn as a valid conclusion

from a universal negative major premise and a universal affirmative
minor premise in the first figure.
Showing the validity of a syllogism this way, through its fundamental
principles, is the most intelligible way to make the reasoning process
evident. We can also test the validity of a syllogism through the rules,
which are applications of the principles. Let us now test the same syllo¬
gism with the rules:
No B is A.
Every C is B.
Therefore?
Notice first that the major premise is negative. The fifth rule tells us
that the conclusion always follows the weaker part. We recall that the
negative proposition is weaker than the affirmative. We can, then, elim¬
inate A and I propositions as possible conclusions, since they are affirma¬
tive. This leaves E and O propositions as possible conclusions. Since
both of the premises are universal, and since we always want to prove as
much as possible, we should try an E conclusion:
No B is A.
Every C is B.
Therefore, no C is A.
Since we are using symbols instead of words (emphasizing the form

of the syllogism), the first rule will never be violated, for we can always
presuppose the same signification and supposition with the three sym¬
bols. When investigating the syllogism formally, therefore, we can
eliminate any consideration of the first rule of the syllogism.
The second rule states that any term distributed in the conclusion
must also be distributed in the premises. The conclusion has two
distributed terms (the subject of a universal proposition is always dis¬
tributed and the predicate of a negative proposition is always dis¬
tributed). Hence, we shall have to check both the major and minor
terms in the premises. The major term A is the predicate of a negative
major premise and is, therefore, distributed. The minor term C is the
subject of a universal minor premise and is therefore also distributed.
Hence, the second rule is observed.
The third rule states that the middle term must be distributed at least
once. In the major premise, the middle term is the subject of a universal
proposition and therefore is distributed. The third rule is thus satisfied.
We could note that the middle term is undistributed in the minor
premise, since the middle term there stands as the predicate of an
affirmative proposition. But this does not matter, since the rule only
calls for the middle term to be distributed once, and the middle term
is distributed in the major premise. If the middle term were also dis¬
tributed in the minor premise, the rule would still be observed, since
it only calls for the middle term to be distributed at least once; the
rule does not exclude the distribution of the middle term in both
premises.
The fourth rule states that no conclusion follows from two negative
premises. The syllogism we are considering has only one negative prem¬
ise, and hence the fourth rule is not violated.
The fifth rule states that the conclusion must follow the weaker part.
As we noted at the outset, this syllogism has a negative major premise,
which is weaker than an affirmative premise. The conclusion of this
syllogism is negative and is therefore following the weaker part. Hence,
the fifth rule is satisfied.
Since all the rules of the syllogism are observed, we may conclude that
the following mood is valid in the first figure of the syllogism:
No B is A.
Every C is B.
We might add that it is not necessary to consider an O conclusion in

this mood, for an E proposition, being universal, includes the O proposi¬
tion, which is particular. We are always to draw the stronger conclusion
when we can.
Let us consider another mood, this time A-A in the second figure:
Every A is B.
Every C is B.
Therefore?
It is worth noticing at once that both premises are affirmative. When

a syllogism has two affirmative premises, a negative conclusion can never
be validly obtained (the dictum de omni would be violated). And al¬
though no rule of the syllogism states this point explicitly, we know it
indirectly from the rule that the conclusion always follows the weaker
part. Since both premises are affirmative, there is no negative, that is,
weaker part, for the conclusion to follow. Therefore, the conclusion will
retain the strength of the premises—it will be affirmative. Furthermore,
if we tried to draw a negative conclusion from two affirmative premises,
we would always violate either the second or third rule of the syllogism.
Hence, we can eliminate an E and an O proposition as possible valid
conclusions. We have A and I propositions left as possibilities. Since
both premises are universal, let us try an A conclusion:
Every A is B.
Every C is B.
Therefore, every C is A.
Here, again, we need not concern ourselves with the first rule of the
syllogism since we are using symbols, which retain the same significa¬
tion and supposition. The second rule states that any term distributed in
the conclusion must be distributed in the premises. In this syllogism, we
see that only the subject of the conclusion is distributed (for it is the
subject of a universal proposition; the predicate, being the predicate of
an affirmative proposition, is undistributed). Hence, we need to check
only the minor term C in its premise. This is also the subject of a uni¬
versal proposition, and is therefore distributed. The second rule is thus
satisfied.
The.third rule states that the middle term must be distributed at least
once. In the major premise, the middle term stands as the predicate of an
affirmative proposition and is therefore undistributed. But in the minor

premise, the middle term is also the predicate of an affirmative proposi¬
tion and is again undistributed. Hence, the middle term in this syllo¬
gism is undistributed in both premises. The third rule of the syllogism
is thus violated.
There is no point in continuing with the other rules of the syllogism,
for the violation of one rule is enough to make the syllogism invalid.
And it will be of no help to try an I proposition as the conclusion, for
the middle term will still be undistributed in both premises. We have
already eliminated E and O propositions as conclusions. We conclude,
then, that A-A cannot yield a valid conclusion in the second figure.
Syllogisms Concluding Indirectly
Before proceeding to the questions and exercises at the end of

this chapter, let us notice that some syllogisms can conclude indirectly.
An indirect conclusion occurs when the major term appears as the sub¬
ject of the conclusion and the minor term appears as the predicate, as
in the following example:
Some B is A. (Some texts are books.)

No C is B. (No novels are texts.)
Therefore, some A is not C. (Therefore, some books are not novels.)
In the first figure, the valid moods leading to an indirect conclusion

are: A-A-I; E-A-E; A-I-I; A-E-O; and I-E-O. (Valid moods leading to an
indirect conclusion in the second and third figures are of no distinct
value.) Of the five valid moods in the first figure, the first three can be
obtained by a direct conclusion in the first figure (A-A-I is included
under A-A-A). In the first figure, then, there are really only two com¬
binations of premises yielding an indirect conclusion worth noticing:
Every B is A.
No C is B.
Therefore, some A is not C.
and
Some B is A.
No C is B.
Therefore, some A is not C.
These two moods are properly called the “indirect moods” of the first
figure. No indirect mood of concluding constitutes a distinct figure, but
is simply the consequence of a particular mood in a given figure. There
are, therefore, indirect moods but not indirect figures, and only two
moods of the first figure concluding indirectly have any distinct value.
This value consists only in obtaining a conclusion that could not other¬
wise be reached directly. However, we shall consider only moods which
conclude directly in the three figures.
Finally, as we noted in the preceding chapter, the indirect mood of
the first figure is not to be confused with a so-called fourth figure. The
indirect mood of the first figure still keeps the major term as major,
the minor as minor, and the middle as middle, merely inverting the
major and minor terms in the conclusion. The so-called fourth figure, on
the contrary, confuses the very meaning of a middle term, a major term,
and a minor term.
Questions Chapter Sixteen
1. Upon what does the syllogism, as a type of argumentation, primarily

rest?
2. Explain and illustrate the first principle of the syllogism.
3. Explain and illustrate the second principle of the syllogism.
4. What is the relation of the rules of the syllogism to the principles of the
syllogism?
5. How do we commit the fallacy of four terms?
6. Why can we not have a term distributed in the conclusion when it is
undistributed in the premise?
7. Why must the middle term be distributed at least once?
8. If I have as premises No B is A and No C is B, why does it not follow
that No C is A?
9. How is one proposition “weaker” than another?
10. Why is it not necessary to give as a rule that from two particular premises
no conclusion follows? Illustrate.
11. Determine whether the mood A-O-O is valid in any figure.
12. Why is the mood A-A-A not valid in the second figure? Why not in the
third figure?
13. What is meant by a syllogism concluding indirectly?
14. Distinguish the first figure as concluding indirectly from a fourth figure.
Exercise I Chapter Sixteen
This is an exercise for determining the valid moods of the syllogism. In this
exercise, first work out the conclusions to the combinations of premises for
Figure I. These combinations are given with the major premise at the top
and the minor premise at the bottom. The lines drawn at the bottom of the
rows of letters separate the premises from the possible conclusions that can
be obtained. Work out the combinations in the order given, that is, do A-A
first, then A-E, then A-I, and so on. If a conclusion can be validly drawn,
put the letter standing for the kind of proposition (A, E, I, or O) underneath
the combination of premises. If no conclusion can be validly drawn, leave the
space blank. Do Figure II and Figure III in the same manner, observing the
different arrangement of terms for each figure.
After the valid moods have been established for each figure, answer the
two questions asked under each figure. The answers to these questions give
the special rules of the syllogism, that is, rules that apply specifically to each
figure.
Figure I
AEIO AEIO AEIO AEIO
After the valid moods have been established state what kind of proposition
(universal, particular, affirmative or negative) must always appear:
(a) as the minor premise in Figure I_
(b) as the major premise in Figure I_
Figure II
AEIO AEIO AEIO AE[0_
After the valid moods have been established, state what kind of proposition
must always appear:
(a) as one of the two premises in Figure II___.
(b) as the major premise in Figure II__
Figure III
AEIO AEIO AEIO AEIO
After the valid moods have been established, state what kind of proposition
must always appear:
(a) as the minor premise in Figure III_
(b) as the conclusion in Figure III-
193
■ii V '•
1 ■
Exercise II Chapter Sixteen
Write in the conclusions to the following syllogisms when conclusions can

be obtained validly and directly. If no conclusion follows, draw a line and
state which rule is violated. If a conclusion can be validly obtained, indicate
at the right the mood and figure. In each example, the major premise is stated
first, the minor premise second.
1. No X is Y.
Every Z is X.
2. Every X is Y.
Some Z is X.
3. Some Y is X.
No Z is Y.
4. Every Z is Y.
Every Z is X.
5. No X is Y.
Some Z is X.
6. No X is Z.
Some Y is not Z.
195
7. Some Z is not X.
Every Z is Y.
8. Not every X is Y.
Some Z is X.
9. No X is Y.
Some Z is Y.
10. Every Y is X.
Every Z is X.
11. No Z is X.
Some Z is Y.
12. Not all Y is X.

All Y is Z.
196
Exercise III *Hh$* Chapter Sixteen
Determine whether the following syllogisms are valid or invalid. If a syllo¬

gism is invalid, state the rule which is violated.
1. Every argument is a work of reason.

Every syllogism is an argument.
Therefore, every syllogism is a work of reason.
2. Some students are not clever.

All freshmen are students.
Therefore, some freshmen are not clever.
3. No Christian worships idols.

Some pagans worship idols.
Therefore, some pagans are not Christians.
4. Some propositions are affirmative.

All propositions are composite expressions.
Therefore, some composite expressions are affirmative.
5. Some experts are highly paid.

No teachers are highly paid.
Therefore, some teachers are not experts.
6. Not every lawyer is competent.

Every man is not a lawyer.
Therefore, every man is not competent.
7. Every rose is beautiful.

Every rose is a flower.
Therefore, some flower is beautiful.
8. Every snake is a reptile.

Every reptile is an animal.
Therefore, every snake is an animal.
197
9. All senators are citizens.
Not all men are citizens.
Therefore, not all men are senators.
10. Every horse is a mammal.

Every horse is four-legged.
Therefore, every four-legged animal is a mammal.
11. All tricks are dishonest.

All card players win tricks.
Therefore, all card players are dishonest.
12. No quality is a quantity.

Every color is a quality.
Therefore, no color is a quantity.
13. No flower is a mineral.

Every flower is a substance.
Therefore, no mineral is a flower.
14. Every general is a soldier.

No general is an admiral.
Therefore, no admiral is a soldier.
15. No child is an adult.

Every child is a human being.
Therefore, some human being is an adult.
16. No tyrants are statesmen.

Some men are tyrants.
Therefore, some men are not statesmen.
198
Exercise IV Chapter Sixteen
Consider the following propositions as conclusions. Construct premises to

prove them validly in any appropriate figure. This is an exercise designed to
acquire skill in finding a middle term, that is, in thinking of a good reason
why the conclusion is true. For a universal affirmative conclusion, find a
middle term less universal than the major but more universal than the minor.
For a universal negative conclusion, find a middle term which belongs wholly
to one extreme and is denied wholly of the other.
1. Every composer is an artist.
2. No representative is a senator.
3. Every flower is a living being.
4. No fish is a mammal.
5. Not every genius is a mathematician.
199
6. Some lawyers are trustworthy.
7. Every boxer is muscular.
8. No proposition is a syllogism.
9. Some men are not just.
10. No circle is a square.
200
«* CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS
TO THE FIRST FIGURE
In the preceding chapter we have emphasized that the first

figure is the perfect figure and that the second and third figures are im¬
perfect, departing from the evident realization of syllogistic principles
and the syllogistic arrangement of terms. As a consequence, the four
moods of the second figure and the six moods of the third figure are
imperfect in comparison to the four moods of the first figure. We can
manifest this point concretely by comparing the following three moods,
one in each figure of the syllogism:
Fig. I Fig. II Fig. Ill

No B is A. No A is B. No B is A.
Some C is B. Some C is B. Some B is C.
Some C is not A. Some C is not A. Some C is not A.
It is clear that an argument is more evident in the first figure than in

the second or third, principally because the middle term occupies the
middle position in the first figure. It is clear also that the mood in Figure
II could be changed easily to the mood in Figure I by converting the
major premise:
Fig. II Fig. I
No A is B. » No B is A.
Some C is B. Some C is B.
Some C is not A. Some C is not A.
201
202 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS TO THE FIRST FIGURE
Likewise, the mood in Figure III could be changed easily to the mood
in Figure I by converting the minor premise:
Fig. Ill Fig. I

No B is A. No B is A.
Some B is C. -> Some C is B.
Some C is not A. Some C is not A.
We call such an operation the reduction of a syllogism to the first

figure, that is, the reduction of the imperfect moods of the second and
third figures to the perfect moods of the first figure. We can reduce all
the moods of the second and third figures to those of the first figure.
However, not all the imperfect moods reduce so easily to the perfect
moods as the examples we used. In both cases we only had to convert a
premise simply, to make the reduction. If we were to go through all the
imperfect moods and reduce them to the perfect moods, we should find
that in some cases we convert both conclusions and premises simply and
in other cases we convert premises accidentally. We should discover also
that in two cases the premises would have to be changed around, that is,
transposed. And in two other cases it would become apparent that the
only reduction possible is by contradiction.
It would be a stimulating exercise to go through all the imperfect
moods (except A-0-0 in Figure II and O-A-O in Figure III, which
present special difficulties) and figure out how each imperfect mood is
reduced to a perfect mood in the first figure. The following model could
be used as an example:

Therefore, no stone is a dog.
How can this mood in Figure II be reduced to a perfect mood in

Figure I?
Let us notice first that the middle term in Figure I has to be in the
subject position in the major premise. The middle term is “animal.”
The simplest solution would be to convert the major premise, Every
dog is an animal. But this proposition is a universal affirmative, and can
only be converted accidentally to Some animal is a dog. The syllogism
would then appear as follows:
Some animal is a dog.

This syllogism, though now in Figure I, is invalid. The term “dog” in

REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS TO THE FIRST FIGURE 203
the conclusion is distributed, but is undistributed in the major premise.
Furthermore, the conclusion is universal, whereas the major premise is
particular; the conclusion is not following the weaker part. This solution,
therefore, will not work.
However, the universal negative proposition, the minor premise in our
original syllogism, will convert simply: No stone is an animal to No
animal is a stone. The syllogism would then appear this way:

No animal is a stone.
But this syllogism is not in Figure I. In fact, the middle term is in

the predicate position in the major premise and in the subject position in
the minor premise, which is an unsyllogistic order, that is, the middle
term is in the most universal position in the major premise and in the
least universal position in the minor premise. It cannot properly func¬
tion as a middle term in such a position.
However, if we change the premises around, we shall get the middle
term in its right position in Figure I:
No animal is a stone.
In changing the premises around, we are making the major premise

of Figure II the minor premise of Figure I, and the minor premise of
Figure II the major premise of Figure I. Consequently, we are also
changing the major term in Figure II to the minor term in Figure I,
and the minor term in Figure II to the major term in Figure I. For this
reason, we shall also have to convert the conclusion in Figure II, No
stone is a dog, to No dog is a stone, to make it the conclusion in Figure
I.
The reduction is now complete and can be diagrammed in the follow¬
ing way:
Figure I Figure II
Every dog is an animal. -- ---*■ No animal is a stone.

J ° converted to
No stone is an animal. " ” Every dog is an animal.
Therefore, no stone is a dog. comerted to ^ Therefore, no dog is a stone.
We can also use a formula designed to make the reduction of syllo¬

gisms relatively quick and easy. An ingenious list of Latin names has been
devised to facilitate the reduction of imperfect moods to perfect moods.

These names signify, by means of their vowels, the valid moods of each
f the syllogism:
Figure I
A —A —A Barbara (major, minor, conclusion)
E —A —E Celarent
A —I —I Darii
E —I —0 Ferio
Figure II
E —A —E Cesare
A — E —E Camestres
E—I—O Festino
A—0 — 0 Baroco
Figure III
A —A—I Darapti
E —A —O Felapton
I —A—I Disamis
A — I — I Datisi
O —A —0 Bocardo
E —I —O Ferison
The names also signify, by means of certain consonants, how to re¬

duce the moods of the second and third figures to those of the first
figure. The first letter of each name in the second and third figures tells
which moods of the first figure these imperfect moods reduce to. Thus,
Cesare in the second figure is to be reduced to Cehient in the first;
Disamis in the third figure is to be reduced to Darii in the first.
In addition, certain consonants within the names tell what process
to use in reducing the imperfect moods to the perfect moods. These
consonants are: s for simple conversion; p (per accidens in Latin) for
accidental conversion; m (mutatio in Latin) for changing the premises
around, that is, transposing them; and c for reduction by contradiction.
These consonants always refer to the vowels preceding them.
Let us now use an example. The name Disamis signifies the following:
(1) This mood of the third figure is to be reduced to Darii in Figure I.
(2) The major premise I is to be converted simply (DiS). (3) The
minor premise A is to be changed in position with the major premise
(aM). (4) The conclusion is to be converted simply (iS). Thus, we see
that every letter in the word Disamis signifies something. Now let us
work it out with an example.
D
Some voters are soldiers. I
S
All voters are citizens. A

M
Therefore, some citizens are soldiers. I

S
We want to reduce this syllogism to Darii in Figure I. We convert

the first premise to:
Some soldiers are voters. (DIS)
We exchange the position of the premises.
All voters are citizens. (AM)

Some soldiers are voters.
We convert the conclusion simply, and thus get the full syllogism in
the perfect mood Darii in Figure I:
All voters are citizens.

Some soldiers are voters.
Therefore, some soldiers are citizens. (IS)
It should be noticed that the argument is in better logical order in

Figure I than in Figure III. The middle term is in the middle position
in Figure I. Furthermore, the major premise of the argument is really
All voters are citizens, as in Figure I, because it is more universal.
Let us take another example, this time of reduction by contradiction,
which is more difficult because it is not direct. It is an indirect reduction
showing, through a perfect mood of Figure I, that the imperfect mood
is valid. There are only two cases of reduction by contradiction—Baroco
in Figure II and Bocardo in Figure III. Let us take Baroco in Figure II,
where B signifies reduction by means of Barbara in Figure I, and c
signifies reduction by contradiction. Let us use the following syllogism:
B
R
Some Americans are not citizens. O
C
Therefore, some Americans are not voters. O
This reduction, because it is by contradiction, assumes that an op¬

ponent admits the premises of the argument but denies the conclusion.
If he denies the conclusion, then he holds the contradictory of the con¬

clusion to be true, namely, All Americans are voters.
We now take the opponent’s position and construct a syllogism in
Barbara out of it. Remember that the opponent has admitted the
premises but denied the conclusion. Hence, we can take the original
major premise as it is:
All voters are citizens.
To this we add the contradictory of the conclusion—which the

opponent claims is true:
All Americans are voters.
Drawing the conclusion from these premises, we now have this

syllogism:
B
R
B
All Americans are voters. A
R
Therefore, all Americans are citizens. A
But notice that the conclusion All Americans are citizens contra¬
dicts the original minor premise in Baroco, Some Americans are not
citizens. The opponent, however, has admitted the truth of that premise.
He cannot contradict his own position. Hence, he cannot deny the
original conclusion in Baroco while admitting the premises. Therefore,
the original syllogism in Baroco is valid, and is shown to be so indirectly,
by the process of contradiction, through the perfect mood of Barbara.
The other imperfect moods of the syllogism can be reduced to the
perfect moods in similar ways. The process of reduction is useful chiefly
for showing the superiority of Figure I, wherein reasoning is manifested
according to perfect logical order and in the most evident manner.
Questions ❖❖❖ Chapter Seventeen
1. Why is the first figure the perfect and most evident one?
2. Why were the Latin names Barbara, Celarent, and so forth, devised?
3. Explain the signification of the vowels and the consonants in the Latin
names.
4. What does the reduction by contradiction show?
5. What is the usefulness of reducing syllogisms to the first figure?
Exercise •Hh$> Chapter Seventeen
Reduce the following syllogisms to the first figure.
1. Every A is B.
Some C is not B.
Therefore, some C is not A.
2. Every B is A.
Every B is C.
Therefore, some C is A.
3. Every A is B.
No C is B.
4. No sinner is virtuous.
Every saint is virtuous.
Therefore, no saint is a sinner.
5. Some concessions are not justified.

All concessions are compromises.
Therefore, some compromises are not justified.
209
❖** CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
THE COMPOUND
SYLLOGISM
The syllogism can be divided into categorical and compound

(hypothetical). In Chapter 8, we also divided the proposition into cat¬
egorical and compound. This division of the syllogism follows upon the
division of the proposition. We shall now consider the compound syl¬
logism and its two principal kinds.
A compound syllogism is one in which the major premise is a com¬
pound proposition while the minor premise is a categorical proposition.
The minor premise either affirms (posits) or denies (destroys) one of
the parts of the compound proposition standing as the major premise.
The conclusion depends upon what the minor premise affirms or denies
in relation to the major premise.
If man is rational, then man is capable of speech.

Man is rational.
Therefore, man is capable of speech.
In this example, what stands as a major premise of the syllogism is a
compound proposition, specifically a conditional proposition. The minor
premise is a categorical proposition which, in this instance, affirms the
antecedent of the conditional proposition. The conclusion, also a cat¬
egorical proposition, thereupon affirms the consequent of the conditional
proposition.
The difference between the categorical syllogism and the com¬
pound syllogism becomes evident. The categorical syllogism, relying
upon the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo, argues to a con¬
clusion by the predication of major and minor terms in relation to a
211
212 THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM
middle term. In the compound syllogism, there are no major, minor, and
middle terms. The compound syllogism depends, not upon a connection
of terms, but upon a connection of propositions related conditionally or
disjunctively. The categorical syllogism, in virtue of good form and
appropriate matter, demonstrates the truth of a conclusion following
from premises. The compound syllogism does not demonstrate the truth
of a conclusion, but merely shows that something follows under a condi¬
tion or qualification laid down in what stands as the major premise. The
name syllogism is therefore analogous, if not equivocal, as signifying a
categorical and a compound syllogism.
The compound or hypothetical syllogism is divided into the condi¬
tional and the disjunctive syllogism. This division is based on whether
the major premise of the compound syllogism is a conditional or a dis¬
junctive proposition; and to these two main kinds all types of compound
syllogism can be reduced.
The Conditional Syllogism
The conditional syllogism is the more important kind of com¬

pound syllogism, and is the type we have been using so far to exemplify
the compound syllogism. It has a conditional proposition standing as the
major premise and a categorical proposition as the minor premise. As we
have seen before, a conditional proposition has an antecedent and a
consequent, as in If six is divisible by two, then six is an even number.
The “if” part of the proposition is the antecedent and the “then” part
is the consequent. A conditional proposition asserts that the antecedent
cannot be true without the consequent also being true, and thus im¬
plies a necessary connection between the antecedent and the conse¬
quent. It does not categorically state that what is asserted in the ante¬
cedent is true but only that if what is asserted is taken as true, then the
consequent following upon it must be true as well. A causal or necessary
implication between the antecedent and the consequent is therefore
presupposed in a strictly conditional proposition. From this meaning
and structure of the conditional proposition, the conditional syllogism
is constructed. Taking a deliberately obvious example, let the major
premise of a conditional proposition be:
If a man walks, then a man moves.
The minor premise, a categorical proposition, then affirms the ante¬

cedent:
A man walks.
THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM 213
The conclusion, another categorical proposition, then must affirm the

consequent (since the conditional major premise lays down a necessary
connection between the antecedent and the consequent):
Therefore, a man moves.
This necessary connection between the antecedent and the conse¬

quent, however, is not reversible; that is, the consequent does not in
turn necessarily entail the antecedent. Hence, to affirm the consequent
in the minor premise and then affirm the antecedent in the conclusion
is an invalid conditional syllogism:

A man moves.
Therefore, a man walks.
It is clear that the truth of the consequent does not imply the truth of
the antecedent, for a man can move without walking. This error in
reasoning is known as the fallacy of affirming the consequent. We can
therefore formulate the following as the first rule for validly concluding a
conditional syllogism:
When the minor premise affirms the antecedent, the

conclusion validily affirms the consequent.
The above examples and remarks take care of the instances wherein
one is proceeding in a conditional syllogism by affirming. But what is the
situation if one denies rather than affirms in the minor premise, and then
denies in the conclusion? Let us consider the only two possibilities:

A man does not walk.
Therefore, a man does not move.
or

A man does not move.
Therefore, a man does not walk.
The first possibility turns out not to be valid, for a man’s not walking
does not entail a man’s not moving, since one may not be walking and
still moving. The second possibility is valid, for if a man does not move a
man cannot possibly walk. We thus arrive at the second rule for validly
concluding a conditional syllogism:
When the minor premise denies the consequent,

the conclusion validly denies the antecedent.
The Disjunctive Syllogism
A disjunctive syllogism has a disjunctive proposition standing as

the major premise and a categorical proposition as a minor premise. The
minor premise either affirms or denies one of the two alternatives set
forth in the disjunctive major premise. Two examples of a disjunctive
syllogism are the following:
Either ten is an even number or it is an odd number.

Ten is an even number.
Therefore, ten is not an odd number.
A liberal college education is sought primarily for itself, or merely as a

means to something else.
A liberal college education is not sought merely as a means tc omething
else.
Therefore, a liberal college education is sought primarily for itself.
The first example is an instance of a disjunctive syllogism in which

the minor premise affirms one of the two alternatives and the con¬
clusion denies the other. In the second example, the minor premise
denies one of the alternatives and the conclusion affirms the other. These
are the only two ways of validly concluding a disjunctive syllogism (that
is, minor affirms or minor denies) although each of these ways can affirm
or deny either of the alternatives, and in this sense there are four pos¬
sibilities for concluding a disjunctive syllogism validly:
Minor Affirms: Minor Denies:

X is either A or B. X is either A or B.
X is A. X is not A.
Therefore, X is not B. Therefore, X is B.
X is either A or B. X is either A or B.
X is B. X is not B.
Therefore, X is not A. Therefore, X is A.
In the disjunctive syllogism, the major premise must contain a strict

disjunction. Such a strict disjunctive proposition asserts that one and only
one of the two alternatives can be true, that is, both alternatives cannot
be true and both cannot be false. Consequently, the question one should
always ask in examining the disjunctive syllogism is: Does the major
premise contain a strict disjunction or is there a third possibility? If the
disjunction is a strict one, then when the minor premise is true (by
affirming or denying), the conclusion necessarily follows as true (by do-
THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM 215
ing the opposite). If the disjunction is not a strict one, the conclusion
does not necessarily follow:
Either armaments must be reduced or war will result.

Armaments have been reduced.
Therefore, war will not result.
This syllogism is not valid because the disjunction in the major

premise is not a true one, appealing though it may seem. Unfortunately,
armaments can be reduced and war can still follow. Even though reduc¬
tion in armaments may likely reduce the risk of war, the disjunction
given in the major premise does not posit exclusive alternatives; the
conclusion, therefore, may have a certain plausibility, but not the cer¬
tainty that the strict disjunctive argument should have.
We have been explaining the disjunctive syllogism in terms of
strict alternatives, sometimes called exclusive alternatives, in which, as
we have seen, one of the alternatives is true, but not both. Another kind
of disjunctive syllogism is also recognized by most logicians, a syllogism
which has as its major premise a weak disjunctive proposition, that is, a
proposition with inclusive alternatives. In this meaning of a disjunctive
syllogism (sometimes known as an alternative syllogism), at least one of
the alternatives is true, but both may be true. The following would be an
example of a valid weak disjunctive syllogism:
Either this statesman is a fool or he is a traitor.

This statesman is not a fool.
Therefore, he is a traitor.
It must be noted that the minor premise denies one of the two al¬
ternatives of the weak disjunction. The weak disjunctive syllogism can
be concluded validly only by denying in the minor premise and affirming
in the conclusion, precisely because a weak disjunction states that one
alternative is true, and possibly both. Hence, while denying one of two
such alternatives leads necessarily to affirming the other, the affirming of
one does not lead to a denial of the other in the conclusion. Therefore,
this way of proceeding in the weak disjunctive syllogism is invalid.
While recognizing the distinction between a disjunctive syllogism
with exclusive alternatives and one with inclusive alternatives, our point
of emphasis is the strong disjunctive syllogism, the syllogism setting
forth exclusive alternatives.
Questions Chapter Eighteen
1. Define a compound syllogism.

2. Distinguish between the categorical syllogism and the compound syllo¬
gism.
3. Show how the conditional syllogism is based on the conditional proposi¬

tion.
4. State the two rules for validly concluding a conditional syllogism, with
original examples for each.
5. Explain the structure of a disjunctive syllogism.
6. Give the four valid moods for concluding a disjunctive syllogism.
7. Upon what does the validity of the disjunctive syllogism primarily depend?
8. Distinguish between a strong disjunctive syllogism, one having exclusive
alternatives, and a weak disjunctive syllogism, one having inclusive al¬
ternatives.
Exercise *** Chapter Eighteen
If valid syllogisms can be constructed from the following conditional and

disjunctive propositions, write them out. If not, state why not.
1. If n is any even whole number, n plus 1 is an odd number.
2. If flour is bleached, its vitamin content is diminished.
3. If horses are animals, then horses pull wagons.
4. If an automobile is out of gasoline, it will not start.
5. If a senator votes against his party, he will not be re-elected.
6. If a man is not breathing, then he is dead.
7. Either the accused is innocent or he is guilty.
8. Either Paul is sitting or he is standing.
217
9. Either this student is intelligent or he is dishonest.
10. Either this man is honest or he is not.
218
**•> CHAPTER NINETEEN
ABBREVIATED AND
EXPANDED SYLLOGISMS
There are various way of formulating or expressing a syllogistic

argument. Sometimes we can abbreviate a syllogistic argument and
other times expand it but, as will be evident, abbreviation and expansion
are only accidental modifications of the basic syllogistic structure. One
type of expanded argumentation, the dilemma, is a combined disjunctive-
conditional argument; the others are variations of the categorical syl¬
logism. We shall consider only the most useful forms.
The Abbreviated Syllogism
The abbreviated syllogism is a categorical syllogism minus one

of its propositions. The missing proposition is usually a premise although
it could be the conclusion. An example of an abbreviated syllogism is:
No ape is a human being, because no ape is capable of speech.
According to present usage, the name “enthymeme” signifies any
abbreviated syllogism. In Aristotelian logic, however, the name “enthy¬
meme” originally signified only a specific type of abbreviated argument,
one proceeding from probabilities or signs. Such a type of argu¬
ment is used principally by the rhetorician. Thus, in a rhetorical argu¬
ment designed to arouse political conviction, one might argue that Jones
is worthy of public office because his family life is exemplary. Rather
than state the full argument, which would not appeal so directly or force¬
fully to one who is to be convinced in political matters, the arguer omits
the premise which contains the universal reason for his conclusion. The
219
220 ABBREVIATED AND EXPANDED SYLLOGISMS
complete syllogism would be: Whoever has an exemplary family life is

worthy of public office; Jones has an exemplary family life; therefore,
Jones is worthy of public office. Actually, enthymemes as used by rhet¬
oricians do not usually have the universality necessary for a true syl¬
logism, and for this reason most enthymemes cannot be expanded into a
syllogism having necessarily true propositions. However, they suffice for
the purpose of political persuasion where likelihood is enough to gain the
point.
From such a way of stating a syllogism in a shortened form, the name
“enthymeme” has been extended to signify any abbreviated syllogism,
demonstrative or dialectical in content, as well as political and rhetorical.
Usage has somewhat sanctioned this extended meaning, but we shall
keep the distinction between abbreviated syllogism and the particular
type of abbreviated syllogism known as the enthymeme, found prin¬
cipally in rhetorical argumentation.
It is important to consider the abbreviated syllogism because we con¬
stantly use this informal and condensed way of expressing syllogistic
reasoning. Although it is quite all right to speak informally in this way,
nevertheless we need to recognize the full process of reasoning implied
in an abbreviated syllogism in order to avoid falling into errors of reason¬
ing. Hence we must know how to analyze abbreviated syllogisms and
how to expand them quickly.
Let us take an example of an abbreviated syllogism and examine the
procedure for expanding it into a full syllogism, after which we can test
its validity. Let us use the example we have already given—No ape is a
human being, because no ape is capable of speech. We are stating as
true No ape is a human being. We are also stating why it is true—
because no ape is capable of speech. The first statement is the proposition
we are trying to prove, and consequently is a conclusion. The second
statement is a reason for the conclusion, and consequently is a premise.
This example, then, is an abbreviated syllogism with a missing premise.
The procedure for explanding an abbreviated syllogism can be reduced
to the following.
1. Look for the conclusion first
There are two ways of discovering which of the two propositions

in an abbreviated syllogism is the conclusion.
The first way is to examine the structure of the thought expressed. The
conclusion is always the proposition to be proved. A premise, on the
contrary, is always a reason proving the conclusion. In the example, we
wish to prove that no ape is a human being by means of the proposition
that no ape is capable of speech. Once we know which statement is to
ABBREVIATED AND EXPANDED SYLLOGISMS 221
be proved, namely the conclusion, then we not only know that the other
proposition is a premise, but we also know which premise it is. In the
example—No ape is a human being, because no ape is capable of
speech—we know that the given premise is the minor premise because
the subject of the conclusion, the minor term, is repeated in the given
premise. We can now construct the missing major premise by com¬
bining the predicate of the conclusion with the middle term: Every
human being is capable of speech. Finally, we can arrange the three
propositions in their correct syllogistic order, and check for validity.
Every human being is capable of speech, (the missing major)

No ape is capable of speech, (the given minor)
Therefore, no ape is a human being, (the given conclusion)
The second way of discovering which of the two propositions is the

conclusion is to look for key words in the abbreviated syllogism. These
key words will introduce a conclusion or a premise. Such words as
“therefore,” “hence,” and “consequently” introduce a conclusion:
Logic is a liberal art, and therefore logic is useful.
Such words as “because,” “since,” “for” (as a conjunction) introduce

a premise. They signify a causal connection and therefore a premise,
since the premises are the cause of the conclusion. For example:
No dog is a stone, because every dog is an animal.
or
Because every dog is an animal, no dog is a stone.
2. If there is no conclusion, the abbreviated syllogism contains

two premises
An abbreviated syllogism with two premises is not nearly so

common as one with a premise and a conclusion. We detect an ab¬
breviated syllogism with two premises either negatively or positively:
negatively, by the absence of the key words which introduce a premise
or a conclusion and positively, by such key words as “and” or “but,”
which serve to join premises. For example:
Every gentleman is courteous and every student is a gentleman.

The Syllogism with a Causal Premise
This type of expanded syllogism is a syllogism in which either

premise proposes a reason for what the premise is stating, hence the
designation causal premise, since such a premise contains a proof for its
own assertion.
Every senator is a democratic politician, because

every senator is elected to office;
but no tyrant is a democratic politician;
therefore, no tyrant is a senator.
The major premise, in effect an abbreviated syllogism, is expanded in

the manner any abbreviated syllogism is.
Everyone elected to office is a democratic politician.

Every senator is elected to office.
Therefore, every senator is a democratic politician.
The conclusion of this syllogism functions also as the major premise

of another syllogism, the principal one in the complex argument.
Every senator is a democratic politician.

No tyrant is a democratic politician.
Therefore, no tyrant is a senator.
The causal premise is more often the major premise of the syllogism,
the reason being that the major premise of an argument is usually the
premise needing further discussion or proof and upon which the argu¬
ment as a whole primarily depends. However, the minor premise may also
be a causal premise in this sort of syllogism, either along with the major
premise or by itself. If both premises are causal, then the conclusion of
the major causal premise is the major premise in a third and last syl¬
logism, and the conclusion of the minor causal premise is the minor
premise in the last syllogism.
The syllogism with a causal premise is often called an epicheircma.
Here again, as with the name enthymeme, a name originally imposed
with a certain meaning by Aristotle has changed. Aristotle used epi-
cheirema to signify a dialectical syllogism, an argument proceeding from
probable premises. The reason for extending the meaning of “epi-
cheirema” to a syllogism having a causal premise may relate to the fact
that the dialectical syllogism does not have self-evident or demonstrably
true premises (thereby inviting further argumentation); consequently,
the syllogism with a causal premise, requiring an expansion of argument,
came to be called an “epicheirema.”
The Sorites
The sorites is an expanded syllogism, actually a series of syl¬

logisms (a “heaping together” of syllogisms) so constructed that the
predicate of a first proposition becomes the subject of a second proposi¬
tion with the predicate of the second proposition becoming the subject
of a third proposition, reaching finally a conclusion which unites the
subject of the first proposition with the predicate of the last proposition.
This type of sorites is called the Aristotelian sorites; the term “sorites” is
not one Aristotle actually used, although he refers to this type of reason¬
ing in the Prior Analytics. An example would be the following:

Every B is C. (Every animal is a living being.)
Every C is D. (Every living being is a body.)
Every D is E. (Every body is a substance.)
Therefore, every A is E. (Therefore, every dog is a substance.)
The validity of the sorites depends upon the validity of all the cat¬
egorical syllogisms from which the sorites is constructed, and hence we
have to draw the implicit conclusion of each categorical syllogism and
then use each conclusion as a minor premise of the next syllogism:

Therefore, every A is C. (Therefore, every dog is a living being.)
Every A is C. (Every dog is a living being.)
Therefore, every A is D. (Therefore, every dog is a body.)
Every A is D. (Every dog is a body.)
To be valid, the Aristotelian sorites must employ universal premises,

except for the first one, which may be particular; this rule is necessary in
order to avoid the fallacy of the undistributed middle term. Further, no
premise can be negative except the last premise, otherwise one will run
into a major term distributed in the conclusion but not in its premise.
The Aristotelian sorites develops, as is evident, by proceeding with the
minor premise first, the major premise second, and then the conclusion.
A sorites could proceed in the opposite manner, with the major premise
first, the minor premise second, and then the conclusion. Such a sorites
is called the Goclenian sorites (named after Goclenius, who commented
on Aristotle’s work in the sixteenth century).

Every C is D. (Every living being is a substance.)

The expansion again consists in drawing the implicit conclusions:
Every D is E (Every body is a substance.)

Therefore, every C is E. (Therefore, every living being is a substance.)
Every C is E. (Every living being is a substance.)
Therefore, every B is E. (Therefore, every animal is a substance.)
Every B is E. (Every animal is a substance.)
In the Goclenian sorites, only the last premise may be particular, other¬
wise the middle term would become undistributed. Further, only the
first premise, the one containing the predicate of the ultimate con¬
clusion, can be negative, otherwise one will run into a major term dis¬
tributed in the conclusion but not in its premise. These two rules are
the reverse of the rules for the Aristotelian sorites, as would be expected
since the position of the premises is reversed.
The Dilemma
The dilemma is an expanded form of a syllogism that is usually

employed against someone else. The word “dilemma” derives from the
Greek, meaning a double assumption. Consequently, a person put in a
dilemma is presented with two alternatives either of which will con¬
clude against him. In its most typical form, the dilemma combines a dis¬
junctive proposition with two conditional propositions each of which
leads to the same conclusion.
Either A or B.
If A, then C.
If B, then C.
Therefore, whether A or B, C follows.
Either war is to be waged or a compromise must be reached.

If war is waged, the total destruction loses the cause.
If a compromise is reached, the appeasement loses the cause.
Therefore, whether war is waged or a compromise is reached, the
cause is lost.
The dilemma can be attacked either by denying that the alternatives

are completely opposed (by denying that the disjunction is complete)
or by showing that one of the two alternatives does not lead to the same
conclusion as the other. Thus in the foregoing dilemma one might argue
that an alternative other than war or a compromise is possible. Or one
might argue that war will not result in so total a destruction as to lose
the cause; or one might argue that reaching a compromise does not
necessarily mean appeasement.
As we have indicated, the dilemma is primarily an argument of attack,
and since it is not easy to construct a wholly valid dilemma, the one
who is faced with a dilemma should always look for one of the ways by
which the dilemma may be broken. Since dilemmas mostly relate to
action and the practical order rather than to something theoretical, it is
usually not too difficult to find a way out of a dilemma. One may also
find a certain use in posing a dilemma for himself, not so as to be caught
in it but to see more clearly the consequences which would follow from
taking certain positions either theoretically or practically.
Questions ❖❖❖ Chapter Nineteen
1. What is an abbreviated syllogism?

2. What is the distinction between an enthymeme and an abbreviated
syllogism?
3. Why is it important to consider the abbreviated syllogism?
4. How do we discover the conclusion of an abbreviated syllogism?
5. What key words introduce premises? Why do they introduce premises?
6. How can we tell when the conclusion is missing from an abbreviated
syllogism?
7. Describe the structure of a syllogism with a causal premise.
8. Write out an original example of a syllogism with a causal premise, and
expand it.
9. How is an Aristotelian sorites constructed?
10. What two rules must be observed in the Aristotelian sorites? Why must
they be observed?
11. How is a Goclenian sorites constructed?
12. What two rules must be observed in the Goclenian sorites? Why must
they be observed?
13. Describe the structure of a dilemma.
14. Write out an original example of a dilemma. Judge whether your di¬
lemma could be broken (if so how) or not.
Exercise I •MHfr Chapter Nineteen
Expand the following abbreviated syllogisms. State whether they are valid or
invalid; if invalid, explain why the argument is bad or give the rule violated.
1. No X is Y; therefore, no X is Z.
2. Every X is Y, because every X is Z.
3. Since every Z is X, every X is Y.
4. Every murderer is a criminal, because every murderer takes the life of an

innocent person.
5. Because all sports are contests, some contests are strenuous.
6. All men are good drivers but no women are men.
227
7. Every intellectual is impractical, since every impractical person hesitates
to act.
8. No freshmen are mature, for some freshmen do not assume responsibility.
9. No Communist is democratic, because no Communist allows political

opposition.
10. John Jones is a reactionary, because John Jones believes in free enter¬
prise.
228
Exercise II Chapter Nineteen
Expand the following into explicit categorical syllogisms, and check for
validity.
1. Every C is A, because every C is B.

Every D is C.
Therefore, every D is A.
2. Some X is Y, since some X is Z.

No W is Y.
Therefore, some W is not X.
3. No S is T.
Every R is S.
Every Q is R.
Every P is Q.
Therefore, no P is T.
4. Every liberal art is necessary, for every liberal art is ordered to acquiring
knowledge.
Logic is a liberal art.
Therefore, logic is necessary.
229
5. No liars are saints, because all liars are sinners. Some men are liars, be¬
cause some men say as true what they know to be false.
Therefore, some men are not saints.
6. All oaks are trees.

All trees are plants.
All plants are bodies.
Some bodies are living.
Therefore, all oaks are living.
230
CHAPTER TWENTY
INDUCTION
In Chapter Fourteen we treated argumentation in general and

made the division of argumentation into its two main kinds: deductive
and inductive. Deductive argumentation is the same as the syllogism,
which we have discussed.
We shall now consider induction, but before treating induction di¬
rectly, two points should be stressed. The first is the reason for treating
induction after deduction. Since the syllogism is the fundamental kind
of argumentation, induction must be studied and understood in relation
to the syllogism. We cannot, in fact, understand the validity of the
formal consequence that belongs to induction except in relation to the
syllogism, where the formal consequence is perfectly realized. From the
standpoint of argumentation as such, induction is less perfect.
The second point is that a logical analysis of induction is concerned
with only a few fundamental notions. To appreciate this, it is necessary
to distinguish between the consideration of induction as a mode of argu¬
mentation, which belongs to logic, and the application of induction in
various branches of philosophy and experimental science. The latter
consideration is more complex and deservedly needs extensive elabora¬
tion. But such a treatment of induction does not belong in a logic text,
particularly an elementary logic text. It is the business of the logician
simply to analyze induction as a mode of reasoning; this common mode
of inductive reasoning is then applied variously in the different sciences.
We defined induction in Chapter 14 as an argumentation proceeding
from singulars to universals. By “singulars” we understand primarily the
singulars perceived by sense. More broadly, “singulars” also means “less
universal,” in which case induction is understood to proceed from the
less universal to the more universal; for example, we could conclude
231
232 INDUCTION
from examining the different kinds of motion that motion is always

between contraries. In the primary meaning of induction, however, we
proceed from the singulars known by sense to a universal judgment. The
“universal” in the definition refer to universal judgments drawn from
singular instances.
All argumentation, whether syllogistic or inductive, rests upon a con¬
nection of terms. Let us recall that the middle term has two functions:
(1) it connects the extremes, and (2) in the perfect figure of the syl¬
logism, it is also middle in universality. Hence, a syllogism in the first
figure proves that two extremes (a subject and a predicate) are identified
with each other by means of a term, which is middle in universality, with
which they are identified. Thus, if we are proving that Z is X in the
perfect figure of the syllogism, we do so by reason of a middle term Y,
with which they are identified and which is middle in universality.
Induction establishes a relation between one extreme and a middle by
means of the other extreme. In induction, the two functions of the
middle are distinct. Let us take the terms X, Y, and Z again. Induction
proves that X belongs to Y by reason of Z. Here Y functions as a middle
in universality (that is, X is said of Y and Y is said of Z), and Z, as an
extreme, has the function of connecting X and Y in the conclusion. Let
us notice, then, the essential opposition between the syllogism and induc¬
tion. In the perfect figure of the syllogism, the term used to connect the
terms of the conclusion is also a true universal which is middle in uni¬
versality. In induction, however, the term used to connect the terms of
the conclusion is not a true universal, but an enumeration of singulars.
It is the absence of a truly universal middle term to connect the terms of
the conclusion that essentially distinguishes induction from the syl¬
logism. An inductive argument would thus appear as follows, first in
symbols, and then in words:
Every Z is X.
Every Z is Y.
Therefore, every Y is X.
Peter, Paul, James, John, and all other individuals are mortal.
Peter, Paul, James, John, and all other individuals are all men.
Therefore, every man is mortal.
In the first proposition, the subject is an enumeration of the indi¬

viduals. We make this enumeration the subject of the characteristic
mortal that we want to conclude of it. In the second proposition, we
again use the enumeration of individuals as the subject, but we now
identify it with the universal all men. In the conclusion, we can then
predicate mortal of the universal that embraces the enumeration of the
singulars, every man.
INDUCTION 233
The complete enumeration of the singulars is necessary for the validity

of the formal consequence of induction. Bv this we do not mean that we
have to count all the singular instances or have experience of each of
them. We mean, rather, that the form of induction requires that the
note of universality be present in the enumeration. It is sufficient, for
universality, to say “and all others” after the actual particular instances
we cite, for this is all that is required for universality on the part of the
form of logic. For universality on the part of matter, however, we must
go to the things signified to justify the universality assumed for the form
of inductive argumentation. The considerations on the part of matter
will determine whether our induction is certain or only probable. The
following induction, because of the matter, will be only probable.
In September of this year, last year, the year before that, etc., the first frost
has occurred.
What we say of September of this year, last year, the year before that, etc.,
can be said of every September.
Therefore, every September brings the first frost.
Our concern with induction, however, is only with the universality

required by the form of logic. The universality required on the part of
matter is considered in more advanced courses in logic and in the dif¬
ferent sciences as they employ induction. For example, in the experi¬
mental sciences induction gives only probability of varying degrees be¬
cause the experimental method has no way of establishing the necessary
connection of the predicate with the subject. In some branches of
philosophy, particularly in moral philosophy, inductive argumentation
is often probable rather than certain.
We have spoken of induction as a form of reasoning less perfect than
the syllogism. The syllogism is the perfect form of reasoning because a
necessary consequence is established through the middle term, which
functions as a truly universal middle connecting the extremes. The neces¬
sity of the consequence in inductive reasoning, however, is evident to us
only as we see that it participates virtually in the more perfect form of
the syllogism. By reducing induction materially to the syllogism, we
shall see how it participates virtually in the syllogism.
We speak of this as a material reduction because we could never re¬
duce the inductive form of argumentation to the syllogistic form. The
reason for this is that the syllogism uses a truly universal middle to prove
a mediate proposition, a proposition whose terms admit of a mean; but
induction uses an extreme, the enumeration of the singulars, to prove an
immediate proposition, a proposition whose terms admit of no true
mean.
Reducing induction materially to the syllogism, then, means arrang-
234 INDUCTION
ing the terms of induction in common syllogistic form, that is, so that
the fundamental principles of the syllogism will apply. We do this
by the simple conversion of the second premise of the inductive argu¬
ment.
Thus, the inductive argument:
Every Z is X.
Every Z is Y.
is materially reduced to:
Every Z is X.
Every Y is Z.
We are permitted to convert simply the second premise of the induc¬

tive argument to the second premise of the syllogism because of the
identity established between the enumeration of singulars (Z) and the
universal nature found in the singulars (Y). However, this is not a
reduction to the syllogism in its proper sense, for in the restatement of
the inductive argument in syllogistic form, there is not a true middle term
for the syllogism, but only the enumeration of singulars (Z) substitut¬
ing for the middle term. The reduction does indicate, nevertheless, how
the verification of the formal consequence in induction must depend
upon the fundamental principles of the syllogism, and that complete
enumeration of the singulars is necessary for the consequence of the
inductive form.
The primary purpose of induction is to make first principles and im¬
mediate propositions evident. We grasp the terms of first principles by
seeing them inductively in several instances, as, for example, we know
the immediate truth of Every whole is greater than its part by seeing
several instances of it. Thus, induction enables us to grasp first principles
with certainty. This is necessary because we use first principles as
premises of the primary syllogisms upon which all other syllogisms
depend.
Questions Chapter Twenty
1. Why is induction treated after deduction?

2. To what extent does logic treat inductive argumentation?
3. Define induction. Explain the word “singulars.”
4. How does induction prove a conclusion?
INDUCTION 235
5. In induction, what term is used to show the connection of the terms of

the conclusion?
6. What is the essential distinction between induction and the syllogism?
7. In what way is the complete enumeration of singulars necessary in in¬
duction?
8. What do we mean by the “complete enumeration of singulars”?
9. Distinguish between universality on the part of form and universality on
the part of matter.
10. How is universality on the part of matter established in induction?
11. Why is there only a material reduction of induction to the syllogism?
12. Why can the second premise of an inductive argument be converted
simply?
13. How does induction depend on the syllogism?
14. What is the primary purpose of induction?
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
ARGUMENTATION MATERIALLY
CONSIDERED
Thus far we have considered argumentation primarily on the

part of form, the syllogistic form and the inductive form of reasoning.
Since an elementary text in logic should include certain things pertaining
to the matter of logic, we must now take up, at least in a summary man¬
ner, argumentation on the part of matter. The consideration of the
matter of argumentation is more difficult and extensive than the con¬
sideration of the form, and therefore constitutes the main part of an
advanced course in logic. Nevertheless, a text in logic would be incom¬
plete without a consideration of scientific demonstration, and other
major distinctions made on the part of the matter of argumentation.
This order of considering argumentation with the emphasis first on
the form, and then on the matter, is given by Aristotle in his Prior
Analytics and Posterior Analytics. The word “analytics” signifies the
resolution of the conclusion of a scientific proof back to its principles.
Hence, to know scientifically is to see a thing in its causes and principles.
For example, we know scientifically that every human being is mortal
when we grasp the cause of human death, namely the inevitable separa¬
tion of the principles of human nature, body and soul.
Resolution of the conclusion on the part of form is called “prior
analytics.” This resolution is prior because we can abstract the common
form of reasoning, which is more known to us than its realization in a
given matter. Resolution of the conclusion on the part of matter is called
“posterior analytics.” This resolution is posterior because it is less known
to us. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle considers the most perfect kind
237
238 ARGUMENTATION MATERIALLY CONSIDERED
of matter in which the form of reasoning can be realized, namely, neces¬

sary matter.
We shall divide this chapter according to the several kinds of matter
in which argumentation is found. First we shall treat demonstration, that
is, reasoning in necessary matter; then dialectics, which is reasoning in
probable matter. We shall also consider rhetorical argumentation and
poetic argumentation. Since logic must also treat defective reasoning, we
shall consider, in a separate chapter, sophistics, that is, fallacious reason¬
ing.
I. Demonstration
Demonstration is an argument leading to a necessary conclusion.

The syllogism used in this kind of reasoning is demonstrative. The
demonstrative syllogism produces science in the strict sense. Science,
according to the subject possessing it, is called either “doctrine” or
“discipline.” “Doctrine” means science as possessed by a teacher, that is,
by one who, knowing scientifically, assists in producing science in an¬
other. “Discipline” means the receiving of science by one who learns
from another, that is, by a student from a teacher.
The prerequisites for demonstration
The human intellect obtains science in a discursive manner, by

proceeding from the knowledge of one thing to that of another. Dis¬
cursive knowledge proceeds from pre-existing knowledge to the knowl¬
edge of a conclusion, for the human intellect advances by going from
something already known to something not yet known. We must pre¬
suppose, then, the knowledge that something is so and also what it is;
otherwise, we could not advance to the knowledge of something else.
But we must determine more precisely what these prerequisites are for
demonstration.
In a perfect demonstration we seek a conclusion in which a property
is affirmed of its subject, as in the following example:
Every rational animal is capable of speech.

Every man is a rational animal.
Therefore, every man is capable of speech.
In the conclusion, the property capable of speech belongs necessarily,

only, and always to the subject man. We see that this is true because of
the premises in which the definition of man serves as the middle term,
and is the cause of the connection of the property with the subject in the
conclusion. Consequently, we must have foreknowledge of the following
three things for demonstration:
ARGUMENTATION MATERIALLY CONSIDERED 239
(1) Principles (premises)

(2) Subject
(3) Property
We must have foreknowledge of the premises in the sense that we

must know that the premises are true. We must have foreknowledge of
the subject in the sense that we must know the real definition of the
subject—what it is. The foreknowledge of the property need only be a
nominal definition, that is, what it is by name, since we can see the
necessary connection between the property and the subject without
having to know the real definition of the property. The real definition of
the property becomes evident in the conclusion of the demonstration
where it is predicated of its proper subject.
Definition of demonstration
Let us state first what we mean by “science” in its strict sense.

It is the kind of knowledge whereby we know that on which a thing
depends, that it is the cause of that thing, and that nothing else can ac¬
count for the thing. This is to know the proper cause of a thing. More
briefly defined, science is certain knowledge through causes.
We can now define demonstration; and first according to its final
cause. Demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. It causes
science in us, not only as an act, but as a habit, a permanent disposition.
We shall define demonstration, secondly, on the part of matter.
Demonstration is a syllogism containing premises that are true, primary,
immediate, prior to, better known than, and causes of the conclusion.
Notice that the definition of demonstration on the part of matter
follows from the definition according to its purpose. Thus, from the
kind of conclusion sought, that is, a scientific conclusion, we deduce the
kind of premises required. Hence we define demonstration on the part
of matter in terms of premises that are true, primary, immediate, and
so forth.
The premises must be true because, although a true conclusion can
follow from false premises, a true conclusion can be proved only from
true premises. The truth of a premise is proved by making it stand as a
conclusion following from other true premises. It is evident that not
every premise can be proved to be true, for such a process would be
infinite. If one thought that every premise had to have its truth demon¬
strated, he would logically have to hold that nothing could be proved,
for the demonstrated truth of any premise depends upon proving the
truth of something prior to it, and this on something else prior, and so
on infinitely. Consequently, nothing could be unqualifiedly proved,
which is to say, really demonstrated. But since we know that some
propositions can be demonstrated to be true, and that there are some

premises true without proof, that is, self-evident, it follows that there is
not an infinite regress in demonstration.
Self-evident propositions are the ultimate premises from which all
demonstration is derived. A self-evident proposition is one in which
the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. For example, in
Man is an animal, animal forms part of the essence of man. Now, if the
essence of both the predicate and the subject is known to us, then the
proposition is self-evident to us. Propositions of this kind are the ulti¬
mate premises, the first principles of all demonstration. Some of these
propositions are self-evident to all, for example, that every whole is
greater than its part. Others are self-evident only to some, namely, to
those who examine and study the nature of what stands as the subject
and as the predicate. For example, the proposition Ideas are not in space
is self-evident to those who understand what ideas are and what space is.
But if the essence of what the predicate and subject of a proposition
signify is not known to us, and if the predicate is contained in the essence
of the subject, then such a proposition is self-evident in itself, but not
to us; for example, the proposition God exists. This proposition, not
being self-evident to us, has to be proved.
Now in the very first demonstration concerning a subject, we pred¬
icate the definition of the subject in a self-evident proposition. We use
this definition of the subject to demonstrate that a property inheres in
the subject. We then use this property to show the connection between
a second property and the subject.
We have said, in the definition of demonstration, that the premises
must be true. They are true either as proved or as self-evident. Further,
the premises must be primary, in the sense that any syllogism can be
ultimately reduced to the first premises, the self-evident propositions
that prove all other propositions. The premises must be immediate in
the sense that they have no middle term by which they are proved, since
they are indemonstrable. This refers again to self-evident propositions.
The premises are also prior to the conclusion in the sense that they
must be prior in their truth, for it is by knowing the truth of the prem¬
ises that we know the truth of the conclusion. The premises are better
known than the conclusion because, according to our mode of knowing,
we must proceed to a new truth from truths we already know. The
premises, finally, are causes of the conclusion because of the middle
term, which unites the premises and therefore produces the conclusion
as an effect.
Kinds of demonstration
Demonstration is an analogous notion. The principal kind is

demonstration by proper cause (propter quid demonstration). It is this

kind that we have discussed so far because, in an analogous notion, we
must start with the primary analogate, the other analogates having mean¬
ing only in relation to the primary one. The secondary kind of demon¬
stration is demonstration that something is (quia demonstration).
Demonstration by proper cause gives the proximate cause for the
identification of the predicate with the subject in the conclusion. We
have this kind of demonstration when the middle term is the definition
of the subject. Through such a middle term, we prove that a property
belongs to the subject in the conclusion. The following is an example
of a demonstration by proper cause:
Every rational animal is capable of humor.

Every man is a rational animal.
Therefore, every man is capable of humor.
Demonstration that something is proves the truth of the conclusion

without manifesting the proximate cause of this truth. This kind of
demonstration proceeds from an effect in the premises, to the cause in
the conclusion. Thus, we argue from the existence of a watch, as an
effect, to the existence of the art of watchmaking, as a cause, in the con¬
clusion.
Demonstration that something is can also proceed from a remote
cause in the premises to an effect in the conclusion. Thus, animal is a
remote cause of grammatical in man, for animal is the genus of man;
it is a remote cause in predication; that is, man, who is an animal, is
grammatical. However, we cannot argue that because something is an
animal, therefore it is grammatical—the cause is too far removed. We
may, however, argue that because something is not an animal, therefore
it is not grammatical. Hence, demonstration from remote cause consists
chiefly in showing the truth about something negatively.
We also divide demonstration accidentally into a priori and a pos¬
teriori. An a priori demonstration proves the effect from the cause. Thus
we prove from the nature of man that he is capable of making works of
art. An a posteriori demonstration proves the cause from the effect. Thus
we prove from an examination taken by a student the extent of his
knowledge when taking the examination.
Let us compare the two divisions of demonstration we have given.
The primary division is demonstration by proper cause and demonstra¬
tion that something is, because it is based upon the kind of truth ob¬
tained. The division into a priori and a posteriori demonstration is a
secondary and accidental division, based upon whether our reasoning
starts from the cause or the effect. Demonstration by proper cause, since
it proceeds from cause to effect, will always be a priori demonstration.
Demonstration that something is will be a priori demonstration if it

proceeds from remote cause to effect; if it proceeds from effect to cause,
it will be a posteriori demonstration.
Demonstration is the final cause of logic. Everything considered in
logic is taken up ultimately to achieve demonstrative argument. In fact,
it is only through demonstration that we get science, strictly speaking.
It is not easy to achieve demonstration nor are we able to use it very
frequently, since it presupposes knowledge and certitude not often pos¬
sible to man. We should, nevertheless, understand what demonstration
is. We should be able to distinguish the different kinds of demonstration
as they are used in various parts of philosophy; in mathematics, where
demonstration is most manifest for us; and in other sciences. But since
most of our knowledge is probable rather than certain, opinion rather
than science, we must next examine dialectical argumentation.
II. Dialectics
Dialectical reasoning is like demonstrative reasoning in that it

employs the syllogistic form, directly deducing conclusions from prem¬
ises. A dialectical syllogism differs from a demonstrative syllogism in at
least two ways: (1) A dialectical syllogism deduces conclusions from
probable premises, the conclusion sharing in the probability of the
premises; a demonstrative syllogism deduces certain conclusions from
certain principles. (2) A dialectical syllogism produces opinion in the
mind of the knower, whereas a demonstrative syllogism produces science
in the mind of the knower. Opinion is the assent to something because
of a probable motive or reason, but with fear that the opposite may be
true. Hence, a dialectical syllogism, most simply defined, is probable
argumentation.
We are defining dialectics here in relation to the primary form of
argumentation, deductive (syllogistic) argumentation. Now just as
demonstrative argumentation is either deductive or inductive, so dia¬
lectical argumentation is either deductive or inductive. In demonstrative
argumentation, we use induction to arrive at certain principles. In dia¬
lectical argumentation, we use induction to arrive at probable principles.
However, we shall treat dialectical argumentation primarily in terms of
the deductive (syllogistic) form of reasoning.
We argue dialectically when we reason from probable principles which
are generally held. By “generally held,” we mean that they are held by
men commonly, or by a majority of men, or by experts in various fields.
Hence, we adhere to the principles, not on the strength or evidence of
their truth, since this is not certain, but upon their likelihood or upon
their general acceptance by others. In demonstrative argument, on the
contrary, we adhere to the principles because of their own truth and evi-
dence, and it makes no difference who or how many hold such principles.
It follows, then, that where we can have truth and certainty in the prin¬
ciples, we should employ demonstrative argumentation, and not confuse
it with dialectical argumentation. On the other hand, if we cannot have
truth and certainty in our principles, then we should not use demon¬
strative, but dialectical argumentation.
Let us now outline the doctrine of dialectical argumentation—the
general nature and method by which conclusions are deduced from
probable principles. The consideration of how dialectical argumentation
is applied in the different sciences is not our concern in logic.
A dialectical syllogism, like any other syllogism, infers a conclusion
from the connection of terms in the premises. Although the conclusion
of the dialectical syllogism is only probable, nevertheless the probable
conclusion follows necessarily, by reason of the form, from the premises.
Consider, for example, the following syllogism:
Every citizen honors his country.

Every voter is a citizen.
Therefore, every voter honors his country.
This syllogism is dialectical because it is only a probable truth that

every citizen honors his country. In virtue of the probable truth of the
major premise, it is only probably true, as an inference, that every voter
honors his country. Nevertheless, because of the connection of the terms
in the syllogism, the conclusion necessarily follows on the part of form.
Notice, then, that in a dialectical syllogism we are inclined to accept the
conclusion as true, although not without a kind of fear that the opposite
may be true.
A dialectical syllogism is made up of dialectical propositions just as a
demonstrative syllogism is made up of scientific propositions. A scientific
proposition is a proposition that is certain, excluding completely the
opposite possibility, as, Every human being is mortal. A dialectical
proposition is a proposition that is probable, not excluding, therefore,
the opposite possibility, as in Every mother loves her child. Let us note,
however, that a scientific proposition may be treated as dialectical by a
person who does not recognize the proposition as scientific. Thus, God
is an immaterial being is a scientific proposition, but may be treated as
dialectical by a person who does not have adequate knowledge of God.
A syllogism is made up not only of propositions, which compose or
divide simple objects, but also of simple objects themselves known by
definitions. A demonstrative syllogism uses definitions of simple objects,
which explain natures adequately as they are known in different sciences.
Such a definition manifests the principles of a nature as it is studied in
a niven science. For example, in moral science the definition would have
to reveal the voluntary nature of human acts, whereas in psychology the

definition would have to reveal the vital nature of human acts. How¬
ever, in a dialectical syllogism we can use definitions of simple objects
that are inadequate in a given science. If, in psychology, we were to
define man as a featherless, furless, biped animal, this definition would
be dialectical because it does not define man adequately in terms of his
proper principles, but inadequately in terms of common accidents.
It should be added that a definition can be dialectical in one science
and scientific in another. If, in psychology, anger is defined as a desire
for revenge, this definition would be dialectical. It defines anger in terms
of principles of moral science rather than those of psychology. It would
be an adequate definition in moral science.
Dialectical argumentation will concern a dialectical problem. A dia¬
lectical problem is an inquiry about the composition of the objects sig¬
nified in the proposition. It asks whether the objects are to be united or
not. For example, Is two-footed animal a definition of man, or not? is a
dialectical problem. There are as many dialectical problems as there are
dialectical propositions. The dialectical problem adds the note of inquiry
to the dialectical proposition. It inquires about something on which men
either hold no opinion for or against, or where common opinion clashes
with that of authorities, or where authorities differ among themselves.
Dialectical problems also include questions difficult to answer because
they are vast and complicated, for example, whether complete natural
happiness is attainable or not.
Furthermore, every dialectical proposition or problem concerns a
predicate which is either a property, a definition, a genus, or an acci¬
dent. These are not to be taken merely as the predicables in the first act
of the intellect; they are, rather, the actual predicates from which the
dialectical propositions or problems are formed. Although, according to
its universality, animal is an instance of the predicable “genus” (insofar
as animal can be said of inferiors), nevertheless it is not an actual pred¬
icate until we state a proposition or a problem, for example, Is man an
animal, or not?
Having discussed the kinds of dialectical problems, we shall now list
the various means needed for reasoning dialectically. There are four
common means of reasoning about problems.
The first and most important is the choosing and determining of
probable propositions from which to argue. As we have seen, we may
take opinions generally held, as being likely sources of argument, or we
may construct an argument based upon the authority of one qualified
in the field. We may also take from a science some proposition that
admits of common application to other sciences. For example, from the
logical principle that contraries pertain to the same genus, we can argue
that a doctor should know both health and disease.
The second means of dialectical argumentation is the ability to dis¬

tinguish the various senses in which a particular expression is used. Thus,
we should know how to test the meaning of a word to see whether it
retains the same meaning or is ambiguous. For example, we can show
that the word “sharp” has more than one meaning by examining the
meaning of its contraries. If its contraries have diverse meanings, then
we can argue that “sharp” also has diverse meanings. Thus, in the case
of a musical note, the contrary of sharp is flat, while in the case of a
blade, the contrary of sharp is dull. Since its contraries have various
meanings, the word “sharp” will also have several meanings, correspond¬
ing to the meanings of its contraries.
The third means of dialectical argumentation is the discovery of the
difference of things. For example, we might start with the common
principle that wherever there are contraries, opposite effects are to be
expected. We notice such a diversity of effects in observing the actions
of the good man and the bad man, and from this we can conclude that
the good man is contrary to the bad man.
The fourth means of dialectical argumentation is the investigation of
the likenesses of things. Thus, we can propose an argument resting upon
a similarity between things that are in some way different. For example,
we can argue that as A is to B, so C is to D, or, as an image is to the
power of sensation, so a concept is to the power of thinking. An argu¬
ment based upon similarities is very useful for induction, in which we
argue from the enumeration of similar cases to a universal statement.
This kind of argument is frequently used by the experimental scientist.
A treatise on dialectics should now discuss the particular means of
argumentation that are proper to each of the four predicates mentioned
above, namely, property, definition, genus, and accident. We shall not
go into detail on these in an elementary treatment of dialectics. Such a
treatment, however, would discuss the ways of testing whether a given
predicate is a property, a definition, a genus, or an accident, of its subject.
Thus, in the case of a property, we should discuss whether the predicate
is stated so as to be coextensive with the subject and so on.
Dialectical argumentation is useful in at least three ways. It has the
immediate and obvious use of developing skill in argument. By knowing
the means of dialectical argumentation, we see how to lay down a plan
of inquiry and pursue it to a tentative resolution of the problem. Sec¬
ondly, dialectical argument is useful for meeting opinions held by various
persons. We learn to detect views that are matters of opinion, and to
deal with them dialectically in order to see what truth or error is in them.
Thirdly, dialectical argument is of special use in philosophy, for by it
we can raise difficulties on both sides of a question and thus dispose the
ground for a demonstrative resolution of the question, if one can be
made. Dialectical argument is especially needed to explain and defend
the first principles of a science, since the first principles of a science can¬
not be demonstrated. It defends the self-evidence of such principles by
meeting any attacks or objections that may be raised against the primacy
and evidence of these principles. For example, we can defend the prin¬
ciple of contradiction dialectically.
Dialectical argumentation has a particularly important application
today in the experimental physical sciences, where the inductive argu¬
ment is dialectical. The universal necessity of most statements in these
sciences is neither evident nor certain, but only probable. For example,
we do not see why atoms have to move at the speed they do, but from
several observations we construct a universal law stating that they do.
We then grant its universal application.
From the knowledge of dialectical argumentation, we derive the more
common notion of a dialectical process, whether in reasoning or in
reality. In reasoning, the process means arguing both sides of a question,
thus arriving at a resolution as to the more probable position or the one
that more closely approaches the truth. As long as the process is only an
approach to the truth, it remains dialectical.
The gradual approach to the knowledge of physical natures is also a
dialectical process. We cannot know the proper nature, principles, and
causes of many concrete things in the physical order, but we can ap¬
proach closer and closer to a real knowledge of them dialectically by
proposing theories or probable explanations, and then verifying them
through experimentation, making better theories that explain more than
the former theories, again verifying them, and so on. As with all dialec¬
tical procedure, we can approach closer to a real explanation in terms of
proper causes, but we shall never be able to achieve this unless we are
able to use demonstrative argumentation.
This notion of process toward a term has also been applied to the
real order in the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of the Flegelians. They
employed this process to explain the unfolding of universal being into
the many particular kinds of being that now exist. The Communistic
notion of the necessity of violent revolution between classes in order to
arrive at a new social and economic order is another application of a
dialectical process. Since this process is one that will continue to be
repeated in an ever new form, it is dialectical in nature. Hence arises the
significance of the phrase “dialectical materialism” as applied to the doc¬
trine of Communism.
III. Rhetorical Argumentation
Rhetorical and dialectical argumentation have much in com¬

mon. Both deal, more or less, with all things, not being limited to one
kind of subject matter. Both discuss and defend either side of a question.
and hence both proceed from probabilities, not from certainties. They
proceed from common principles, not from proper principles. On all
these points, dialectic and rhetoric differ from demonstrative argu¬
mentation.
Dialectic and rhetoric differ from each other in the following ways.
Dialectic is an instrument for discussion and dispute in philosophy and
in science, whereas rhetoric is an instrument for convincing people
generally. Dialectic, for the most part, is concerned with universal ques¬
tions and problems, abstracting from singular circumstances of person,
place and time. Rhetoric is especially concerned with moral and political
questions, which are often restricted to singular circumstances of person,
place, and time. Dialectic tends to use a strict and contracted form of
argumentation; rhetoric, a looser and more expansive form. Dialectic
uses reasons for proving points; rhetoric in addition involves the passions
and hence persuades rather than proves.
Rhetoric, consequently, is defined as the ability to employ, in any
given situation, the available means of persuasion. By rhetorical argu¬
ment, we seek to persuade someone on almost any subject. The
rhetorician argues by using the enthymeme and the example. The en-
thymeme is the rhetorical syllogism and is the more effective kind of
persuasion. It is an argumentation proceeding from probabilities or
signs. The enthymeme has the form of an abbreviated syllogism, that
is, a syllogism without one of its premises. When used by the rhetorician,
the enthymeme usually lacks the universality necessary for a proper
syllogism.
For example, we might argue that John Jones should not be elected
mayor because he has lived too short a time in the city. This is an
enthymeme arguing from the probability, omitted in the enthymeme,
that those who have lived too short a time in a city should not be elected
mayor. As we have mentioned, the enthymeme does not usually have the
universality necessary for the true syllogism, but it is intended to satisfy
only for persuasive purposes. An example of an enthymeme arguing from
a sign is, John Jones is guilty because he trembles. The condition of
trembling is taken as a sign of guilt. It is evident, from this instance, that
the rhetorical syllogism persuades rather than proves.
The argument from example is like an inductive argument. When
two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the
other, the more familiar one can be used as an example to manifest
the other one. The following would be an argument of this kind. If the
United States spends 70 per cent of its peacetime budget on arms, it will
go to war, because Germany under Hitler did this and went to war. The
instance of Germany under Hitler (or France under Napoleon) serves as
a familiar example to manifest a presumed parallel situation. The argu-
ment from example differs from a strict inductive argument in that

induction derives its proof from all the particular cases, whereas the
argument from an example argues from one or more particular cases to
another case.
There are three modes of persuasion. The first depends upon the per¬
sonal character of the speaker who, in speaking, makes us regard him as
an upright person, for we are more readily inclined to believe honorable
persons than others. The character of a person is usually his most ef¬
fective means of persuasion. The second mode of persuasion is the power
of arousing the proper emotions in the listeners, for as we are emotionally
inclined so are we likely to judge. The third mode of persuasion is the
speech itself, the proof or apparent proof contained in the persuasive
argument.
Accordingly, the prerequisites for a good rhetorician are the following.
He must be able to reason logically, for although rhetoric aims to stir the
emotion of the listener so as to persuade him to accept a position, still
the rhetorician must employ reasoning to accomplish such persuasion.
The rhetorician must understand human character and what makes hu¬
man character good, for the rhetorician has the obligation to persuade
men to accept what is just or honorable or good. Finally, the rhetorician
must know the emotions, their different kinds, and how they are aroused,
for persuasive argument relies upon an arousing of the emotions in order
to move a person to accept a position, and to act.
There are three kinds of rhetoric, determined in relation to the lis¬
tener. If the listener is one who must judge future events, then the
rhetoric is political. For example, the listener may be a member of a legis¬
lative body, who must decide political issues, or he may be an ordinary
citizen, who must decide for whom to vote. The purpose of political
rhetoric is to show the expediency or harmfulness of a certain course of
action.
If the listener is one who must judge past events, then the rhetoric
is forensic or juridical. The listener may be a juror in the courtroom who,
in hearing a case, must judge the goodness or badness of an action done
previously. The purpose of forensic rhetoric is to establish the justice or
injustice of a certain action.
If the listener is one who is judging what is taking place at the mo¬
ment, and is concerned only with the present, the rhetoric is ceremonial.
The listener may be hearing a speech at some banquet or other public
occasion, where a testimonial is being given to an outstanding citizen.
The purpose of ceremonial rhetoric is to praise or censure a human being.
Rhetorical argument is useful, for it is often the only way in which a
point can be established, either because the point itself is too obscure or
inevident to be manifested in any other way, or because some persons
cannot be convinced at all except by persuasive argument. Further,

through rhetoric we know how to use persuasion on both sides of a
question, not in order that we may in practice employ it to make some¬
one believe that what is wrong is right, but in order that we may see
clearly what the issue is and so be able to refute an unfair argument.
Finally, rhetoric is a means of defending oneself by argument, and there
are times when one should defend himself. Frequently, rhetoric is the
only kind of argument possible, and one should use it at such a time, for
one has a right to use rhetoric for any good purpose.
One should not, therefore, look down on rhetorical argument, or think
that all such argument is bad or unfair because it has been employed
perversely. For although great injury has been done by those who have
abused rhetoric, great good has also been accomplished by those who
have used it rightly.
IV. Poetic Argumentation
Although it may seem strange to include it in logic, poetics is

nevertheless a part of rational philosophy and, in fact, is a distinct kind
of argumentation. The purpose of all argumentation is to lead one to a
new truth from previous knowledge. Poetry, although the weakest form
of argumentation, does lead us to new truths. In doing so poetry has its
own means of inducing assent to truth. As a part of rational philosophy,
poetics should consider at least the means the poet uses, the objects the
poet represents, and the end of poetry. We shall be using the terms
“poetics” and “poetry” in a generic sense, as referring to any work of
fine art employing words and sounds as means of representation.
The poet seeks to induce assent to truth by a pleasing representation
of truth. Just as forms and colors are used by the painter in his repre¬
sentations, so words and sounds are used by the poet. He uses words
chiefly to compose metaphors and similes, whereby, because of the lack
of intelligibility in contingent things, a poetically imaginative meaning
is read into things. He uses sounds in a pleasing manner by the employ¬
ment of rhyme, alliteration, rhythm, and so on.
Now the poet presents his truth in terms of an image, for men
naturally delight in images. Indeed, in the very making of the image,
the poet makes his meaning. Hence, one will attain this truth, not
directly in itself, but in the image that the poet presents. By repre¬
senting the image in a pleasing manner, the poet leads one to agree with
his judgment. For example, Shakespeare induces us to accept the
universal judgment that uncontrolled ambition can lead to a man’s
downfall by giving us a particular representation of this in the person
and action of Macbeth. From the acceptance of this particular repre-
sentation we are led to accept the universal judgment. We realize that

what has happened to Macbeth could happen to ourselves or to anyone.
The image of the poet is in the rational order; his image is presented
in words, which can be known only by the intellect. In an intimate union
of sense and intellectual knowing lies the strength and appeal of the
poet, for while he does attain something universal, he attains it strik¬
ingly, vividly, and familiarly, as it is realized in the singular. We see, as it
were, the universal concretized. Through the image in words, a truth is
conveyed, a truth contained in a judgment. Herein, then, lies the sig¬
nificance of the phrase “argument of the play” that we find stated as an
introductory summary in a program. This rationality of the poetic image
is not attained by the images of the other fine arts. For this reason,
poetry is the most intellectual of the fine arts and is the only one that
has argumentation, properly speaking.
The objects the poet represents are human actions of agents who are
necessarily either good or bad, since it is the first property of human
action to be good or bad. Consequently, in his work of representing
human actions, the poet must present a judgment bearing on the
morality of these acts; the poet cannot abstract from the first property
of human action. This does not mean, however, that he “moralizes” art
in the sense of imposing morality upon art, but that in treating the
proper matter of his art he must, as artist, observe faithfully the nature
of that matter, namely, that some human actions are good and others
are bad. He has the obligation as artist to represent good human action
as good and bad human action as bad.
The intrinsic end of poetry is to represent truth and to cause delight
in the knowledge of this representation. In realizing this end, the poet
also introduces an order into the movement of the passions. For example,
in a tragedy the poet arouses and resolves the appropriate emotions of
pity and fear. We experience a certain satisfaction in this exercise of the
emotions and a relief from the turbulent disorder often found in them.
The extrinsic end of poetry is to make men disposed to acquire virtue
and to avoid vice. This is accomplished both by the acceptance of the
judgment made by the poet and by the ordering of the passions (the
poetic catharsis of the emotions). More men are led to the acquiring
of virtue through representations than they are through reasoning
bearing directly on morality. Accompanying this extrinsic end, there is
the recreational effect of release from the cares and frustrations of
everyday life. By introducing something of a rational order into a course
of events, the poet relieves the irrationality that we often face in our
daily lives.
Questions Chapter Twenty-One
1. What does “analytics” mean? Explain prior analytics and posterior

analytics.
2. Why is argumentation considered first on the part of form?
3. What does it mean to know in a “discursive” manner?
4. Is the following a perfect demonstration? Explain.
Every animal is living.
Therefore, every dog is living.
5. Of what things must we have foreknowledge in order to demonstrate?
In what does the foreknowledge consist in each case?
6. Define science in the strict sense.
7. Define demonstration on the part of matter. What is the relation of this
definition to the definition of demonstration according to final cause?
8. Can a true conclusion follow from false premises? Explain.
9. Can every premise be proved true? Explain.
10. When is a proposition self-evident? Give examples.
11. Explain how premises are “prior” to the conclusion, “better known”
than the conclusion, and “causes” of the conclusion.
12. What is the principal kind of demonstration? Illustrate with an example.
13. What is the meaning of “demonstration that something is”?
14. What is the difference between a priori demonstration and a posteriori
demonstration? What kind of division of demonstration is this?
15. How does the division of demonstration into proper cause and that some¬
thing is compare with the division of demonstration into a priori and a
posteriori?
16. How does a dialectical syllogism differ from a demonstrative syllogism?
17. Explain the following statement: “We argue dialectically when we reason
from probable principles which are generally held.”
18. Does a probable conclusion follow probably from the premises? Explain.
19. What is a dialectical proposition?
20. When is a definition dialectical?
21. What is a dialectical problem? How does it differ from a dialectical
proposition?
22. From what predicates are dialectical problems formed?
23. What are the four common means of dialectical argumentation? Give
examples of each kind.
24. In what ways is dialectical argument useful?
25. What is a “dialectical process”? How is it applied to the real order?
26. What do dialectical and rhetorical argumentation have in common?
27. How does rhetorical argumentation differ from dialectical argumentation?

28. Define rhetoric.
29. What is an enthymeme?
30. From what does an enthymeme argue?
31. Explain the argument from example.
32. What are the modes of persuasion? Which do you think would be most
effective? Why?
33. What are the prerequisites for a good rhetorician?
34. Explain the three kinds of rhetoric.
35. How is rhetorical argument useful?
36. Why is poetry considered in logic?
37. How does the poet use words and sounds?
38. Explain the role of the image in poetry. How does the poetic image
lead to an assent to truth?
39. In what sense must poetry as art be moral?
40. What are the intrinsic and extrinsic ends of poetry?
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
SOPHISTICAL
REASONING
Sophistical reasoning appears to be genuine reasoning but ac¬

tually is fallacious. Sophistics, therefore, is that part of logic concerned
with the defective syllogism. A sophistic argument is a syllogism that
seems to infer a conclusion from probable premises but, because of one
fallacy or another, does not really do so. The defect in the argument
occurs either on the part of matter alone or on the part of both matter
and form.
A person who deliberately uses such fallacious reasoning is called a
“sophist.” A sophist is one who would rather appear to be wise than be
wise without appearing so; he wishes to appear wise for his own per¬
sonal gain. A sophist argues for the sake of refuting his opponent,
rather than for the sake of truth. He will pursue a point fallaciously
rather than admit that he is in error. The art of the sophist, as Aristotle
explains, is the semblance of wisdom without the reality. By intention,
therefore, the sophist deceives.
Now it is clearly not the aim of a student of logic to become a
sophist. But it is the business of the student of logic to recognize a
sophist, and to avoid fallacies in his own reasoning as far as possible.
Let us therefore examine the kinds of fallacious reasoning in order to
uncover the sources of fallacy in argumentation.
Fallacies are divided into fallacies of language (arising from the abuse
of words) and fallacies apart from language (arising from the abuse of
reasoning about things). We shall consider fallacies of language first,
because they are the most frequent source of sophistic argumentation.
253
254 SOPHISTICAL REASONING
Fallacies of Language
1. Fallacy of equivocation
Equivocation is the use of a word with two diverse meanings. If

an argument is constructed in which one of the terms, most frequently
the middle term, is used with two different meanings, the argument con¬
tains the fallacy of equivocation, as in the following example:
Whatever is immaterial is unimportant.

Whatever is spiritual is immaterial.
Therefore, whatever is spiritual is unimportant.
The equivocation in this example consists in using immaterial with

one meaning in the major premise and with quite another meaning
in the minor premise. This is also called the “fallacy of four terms,”
which was referred to in the rules of the syllogism in Chapter 16. In his
Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle uses the following example, with an
equivocation in the minor term:
A man who has recovered is well.

The sick man has recovered.
Therefore, the sick man is well.
2. Fallacy of amphiboly
Amphiboly (literally, “ambiguous speech”) is an ambiguity in a

phrase or in the grammatical structure of a sentence. Dangling modifiers,
pronouns with ambiguous antecedents, and misplaced modifiers are
occasions of misunderstanding that lead to fallacies in logic. For ex¬
ample, in the sentence He told his father that he was afraid it is not
clear who is afraid; it could be the father or the one who told his father.
A less obvious, though more serious, ambiguity in grammatical structure
occurs in the following argument:
Every judgment of man is liable to error.

God’s judgment of the people of Sodom was a judgment of man.
Therefore, God’s judgment is liable to error.
In this example, judgment of man in the major premise is used to

signify the judgment man himself makes, which is fallible. In the minor
premise, judgment of man is used to signify a judgment God makes of
man.
SOPHISTICAL REASONING 255
3. Fallacy of composition and division
This fallacy consists in combining objects in the conclusion that

were not combined or taken together in the premises, or vice versa. Such
a shift may occur also from one premise to the other. Consider the fol¬
lowing argument:
Three and two are odd and even.

Five is three and two.
Therefore, five is odd and even.
In the major premise, three and two must be taken separately so as

to mean that three is odd and two is even. In the minor premise, five
is three and two only if three and two are taken together. Because of this
shift from the separation of three and two in the major premise to the
composition of three and two in the minor premise, the conclusion does
not properly follow.
4. Fallacy of accent
The fallacy of accent arises through a difference in accentua¬

tion of the same word and results in an ambiguity of meaning. The word
“invalid” carries two quite different meanings according to whether the
accent is placed on the first or second syllable. Likewise with the word
“incense,” for it is one thing to incense a person, at a religious service
for example, and quite another to in cense a person.
Emphasis upon different words within a sentence often gives rise to
various meanings that easily cause misunderstanding. In the question
What is your friend doing? a different meaning is implied each time the
emphasis is put on a different word.
5. Fallacy of form of expression
The fallacy of form of expression arises when things different in

meaning are expressed in the same form. .For example, the word “in¬
attention” is like the word “intention” in form, but “inattention” has a
negative meaning whereas “intention” has a positive meaning. Hence,
one would be misled by the form of expression if he were to argue that
“intention” must be a negative word because it begins with the same
prefix that “inattention” does.
Fallacious arguments of this kind are sometimes quite serious. A well-
known instance occurs in John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism. In Chapter
4 of the book, he gives the following argument:
The only proof capable of being'given that an object is visible, is that

people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people
hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I
apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desir¬
able, is that people do actually desire it.
Mill’s argument is that what is seen is visible, what is heard is audible,

and therefore what is desired is desirable. But “visible” means what is
actually seen and “audible” means what is actually heard, whereas “de¬
sirable” means what is worthy of desire. The argument presumes that
because “desirable” has the same form of expression as “visible” and
“audible,” it is the same in meaning.
Fallacies Apart From Language
1. Fallacy of accident
The fallacy of accident confuses an accidental attribute with

what is essential to a thing, or confuses an accidental predicate with an
essential predicate. For example, the predicate white is said accidentally
of man, since it does not belong to the essence of man to be of this or
that color. However, arguments are frequently given in which the color
of man is confused with what is essential to man. Racism, as argued and
practiced in various countries, is based on the fallacy that the accident of
color, or of race, constitutes an essential difference between human
beings.
Aristotle uses the following as an example of the fallacy of the acci¬
dent: The product of a small number and a small number would have
to be a small number; ten is a small number; one hundred is ten times
ten; therefore, one hundred is a small number. It is accidental to the
number one hundred that it be regarded in groups of tens, and although
the groups are small in number, the number itself is not small.
Another example sometimes given is the confusion of the abuse of a
thing with the use of a thing. One might thus argue, fallaciously, that no
one should be allowed to drink wine because people get intoxicated by
it. Likewise, one might argue, fallaciously, that private property is evil
because it leads to selfishness or to the excessive accumulation of wealth.
2. Fallacy of relative to absolute
This fallacy argues from what is true only relatively, or quali-

fiedly, to what is true absolutely, or without qualification. We can also
understand this fallacy as arguing from the truth of the particular to
the truth of the universal. We are all familiar with arguments purporting
to show that all members of a nation or religion are evil, or super¬
stitious, or ignorant, because a few of the members are.
In general, this fallacy consists of using a proposition, which has a

qualified meaning, as though it applied in all circumstances and with¬
out restriction. One thus argues fallaciously that the commandment
“Thou shalt not kill” forbids fighting for one’s country. But the meaning
and context of the commandment forbids killing an innocent person
unjustly, that is, murdering. Again, one may argue that freedom is an
absolute good, without recognizing that necessary and justifiable limita¬
tions may be placed upon freedom in different times and circumstances.
The fallacy in this argument is the assumption that freedom is an
absolute good rather than a good relative to an end.
3. Fallacy of ignoring the issue
This fallacy consists of refuting a point that is not the point in

question, or of proving something that is not the point of issue. An
example of this fallacy is the argument that a liberal education is not
practical because it does not result immediately in a cash dividend.
The fallacy of ignoring the issue is committed in various ways. One
may confuse the person with the issue (argument ad hominem) by
arguing that one’s opponent cannot know the meaning of justice, since
he never practices it. One may use emotional or physical force (argument
ad baculum) by threatening an opponent, thus seeking to make him
concede the point through fear. One may use an appeal to an audience
(argument ad populum) by arousing passion and prejudice, thus seeking
to settle the matter emotionally rather than upon its own merits. One
may use an argument from misplaced authority (argument ad verecun-
diam) by arguing from the authority a man has in one field as though
it held equally well in another. For example, one might seek to prove
or disprove freedom of the will from the authority of an experimental
scientist.
4. Fallacy of begging the question
This fallacy consists in presupposing in the premises the con¬

clusion that has to be demonstrated from the premises. Thus, one might
argue that to return borrowed money is right because justice is a virtue.
But justice as a virtue means that one should give to others what is due
to them. Therefore, one cannot assume in the premises that justice is a
virtue, since he is trying to prove that a certain action is right, that is,
virtuous, in the conclusion.
Arguing in a circle is an extended form of begging the question. A
circular argument occurs when a premise is used to prove a conclusion,
and then the conclusion is used to prove the premise. For example, one
might try to arrive at the existence of God from the idea of God as exist-
ing in the human mind. If he then tried to argue the reliability of the
human powers of knowing from the existence of God, he would be
arguing in a circle.
5. Fallacy of the consequent
This fallacy consists in supposing that because the consequent

necessarily follows from the antecedent, then the antecedent necessarily
follows from the consequent. Thus, because it is true that if X is then
Y is (from antecedent to consequent), one might also suppose the
reverse, that if Y is then X is (consequent to antecedent). Hence, one
might argue, if whenever it rains the ground is wet, then if the ground
is wet it has rained.
We considered the relation of the consequent to the antecedent when
we discussed the conditional syllogism in Chapter 18. Just as there are
two valid ways of concluding the conditional syllogism, so there are two
invalid ways, which we shall recall here. In affirmative arguments, the
fallacy of the consequent arises by affirming the consequent in the minor
premise and then affirming the antecedent in the conclusion, as in the
following:
If something is generated, it has a beginning.

The human soul has a beginning.
Therefore, the human soul is generated.
In negative arguments, the fallacy of the consequent arises by denying

the antecedent in the minor premise and the consequent in the con¬
clusion:
If something is generated, it has a beginning.

The human soul is not generated.
Therefore, the human soul does not have a beginning.
6. Fallacy of the false cause
The fallacy of the false cause supposes that something is the

cause of an effect when in reality it is not. Thus, something might be as¬
sumed to be a cause merely because it is prior in time. This particular
form of the fallacy is often referred to as post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after
this, therefore because of this); for example, morning comes after night,
therefore morning is caused by night. Again, one might suppose that
what accompanies an action is the cause of that action. For example,
because one’s arms swing when walking, therefore the swinging of the
arms is the cause of the walking. Or, finally, one might suppose that a
condition is a cause, for example, that light is the cause of seeing.
7. Fallacy of the complex question
This fallacy puts questions in such a way that any answer given
implies more than a simple admission. The question asked is usually a
complex one to which a simple “Yes” or “No” cannot be given. Thus,
someone might ask: “Was the impeachment of President Andrew John¬
son justifiable and constitutional?” The answer seems to be that it was
constitutional but not justifiable, and in such a case a simple answer of
“Yes” or “No” would not suffice.
Under this fallacy is included a question so worded as to place the
answerer in an unfair, if not impossible, position. The famous question
“Have you stopped beating your wife?” is an instance of this type of
fallacy. If one answers “Yes” to the question, he implies that he has
been beating his wife. If he answers “No,” he implies that he is still
beating her. This type of question is called a “leading question” and is
ruled out of court in legal debates.
Exercise I on Fallacies Chapter Twenty-Two
There is no exhaustive classification of fallacies since the ways of making

errors in reasoning are without limit. Hence, it is not so important to name
the kind of fallacy as to see that a process of reasoning is fallacious and how
it can be refuted. In each of the following, examine the reasoning to see
where the fallacy lies and how it can be refuted. If possible, name the kind
of fallacy.
1. Whoever is mean is nasty.

All virtue consists in a mean.
Therefore, all virtue consists in being nasty.
2. All senators are Republican and Democratic.

John Jones is a Senator.
Therefore, John Jones is Republican and Democratic.
3. Students should be allowed to look at their texts during examinations.

After all, surgeons have X rays to guide them during operations, lawyers
have briefs to help them during trials, and carpenters have blueprints to
guide them when they are building a house. Why, then, should not
students be allowed to look at their texts during an examination?
4. From nothing, nothing comes.

Creation is defined as a coming from nothing.
Therefore, creation is nothing.
5. A large elephant is a large animal.

Therefore, a small elephant is a small animal.
6. The following is an item from a newspaper lost and found column. Lost:
One umbrella by an old man with a carved, ivory head.
261
7. Either it is snowing or it is not snowing.
It is snowing.
Therefore, it is not snowing.
8. The more you study, the more you know.

The more you know, the more you forget.
The more you forget, the less you know.
Therefore, the more you study, the less you know.
9. Every human being has two parents, four grandparents, eight great-
grandparents, sixteen great-great-grandparents, and so on. Thus, the
further back one goes the more ancestors one has, and hence more
people. From which I conclude two things: (1) the population is de¬
clining, and (2) the human race could never have begun with only two
people.
10. The sacraments should be received frequently.

Matrimony is a sacrament.
Therefore, matrimony should be received frequently.
11. A crime is an offense against the law. Without laws there would be no
crime. Therefore, it would be better for society to do away with all laws.
12. Two halves are better than three quarters. You go to a university for
three quarters. I go to a university for two halves. Therefore, I go to a
better university.
13. Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well.

Robbery is worth doing well.
Therefore, robbery is worth doing.
14. Congress passed the measure in record time and it was immediately
flown to the President who was fishing in Florida waters for his sig¬
nature.
262
15. Customer: Do you serve crabs in this restaurant?
Waitress: Yes, we serve anyone.
16. Have you stopped cheating in examinations?
17. It is clear that since human beings are free agents, the free enterprise
system is the only one in conformity with human nature.
18. Brown argues that we need stricter marriage laws. How can he be in
favor of that when he is a bachelor?
19. Mrs. Smith rules Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith rules the city commission. The
city commission rules the people. Hence, Mrs. Smith rules the people.
20. My grandfather was quite a fighter. He fought with Roosevelt and his
Rough Riders; he fought with Commodore Dewey; he fought with
General Pershing. Grandpa just couldn’t get along with anybody.
21. If farmers were satisfied with federal aid and control, and they are not;
if federal finances were in as good condition as those of most school dis¬
tricts, and they are not; then federal aid and control of education might
be feasible.
22. No one regards it as criminal if hundreds of people work to create a

bomb that will murder thousands of people. Why, then, should it be
a crime for me to murder just one person?
23. It was reported in the newspaper that a former track star became an
editor of a religious publication and pushed its circulation from 1,000 to
35,000. His subscribers did not like the way he had done it because he
had printed pin-ups in the publication. The editor replied: “I shall con-
263
tinue to use pin-ups where appropriate. After all, 35,000 people can’t be
wrong.”
24. According to a recent report in the newspaper, the governor has declined
to participate in the coming election. Even though he was elected to his
high office as a Republican by Republican voters, he now refuses to
return the compliment by assisting in the election of a Republican mayor.
This action is an endorsement by implication of the Democratic candi¬
date.
25. Twelve per cent of the American people feed the entire United States.
Eighty-four percent of the Russian people are needed to feed the whole
of Russia. It follows, therefore, that the remaining sixteen per cent of
the Russian people must outnumber the remaining eighty-eight per
cent of the American population.
26. Advertisement: In your hour of need, you can rest assured with the
personal, understanding service you get from Smith’s Funeral Home.
27. The difference between the capitalist and the communist may be put as
follows. The capitalist loves money above everything else. The com¬
munist loves human beings. Therefore, the capitalist locks up money
and the communist locks up human beings.
264
Exercise II on Fallacies Chapter Twenty-Two
Examine the following address on astrology. Indicate which passages you

regard as fallacious, and why you regard them as fallacious; or write a general
critique of the address.
I should like to speak to you briefly about astrology and in particular to

explain its foundations. It has sometimes been claimed by unscientific as¬
trologers that the stars and planets compel our every action. As a scientific
astrologer, my first task is to correct that impression. The stars do not compel.
They impel. There is a distinction here which I am sure you are all subtle
enough to grasp without my pausing to explain it. I shall go on therefore to
talk about how we know they impel, and about how they impel.
Strangely enough, the main support for the truth of astrology came upon
the scene only recently, several thousands of years after men began to practice
our most ancient of sciences. Modern physics teaches us that the stars are huge
bodies, some of them thousands of times the size and mass of our own sun.
Now these great bodies are constantly giving off vibrations. Ask any as¬
tronomer and he will tell you, for example, that the stars are the source of
cosmic rays whose power in terms of electron-volts is fantastically high; nor
is there reason to suppose that cosmic rays are the only kinds of vibrations
stars emit, or even that they are the strongest. Well, astrologers have known
for centuries how great is the force of stellar vibrations. The rediscovery of
such forces in modern times occasions no surprises on our part.
Now what about these vibrations? Did it ever occur to you how sensitive
an instrument the human body is? And as for the mind and nervous system,
you must have realized long ago that these are most intricate and responsive,
capable of being affected powerfully by a new idea or by words of someone
long dead. Go to a physiologist or psychologist and question him about the
machinery of our minds and brains if you doubt me.
Next, put these two facts together: first, the incalculable forces involved
in the vibrations given off by stars; and second, the exceedingly frail and
responsive machinery of the human mind and nervous system. How can any
man in his right mind deny the likelihood that so delicate an instrument
should respond to so gigantic an influence? Doesn’t the seismograph at Ford-
ham register earthquakes in the sea of Japan? Of course; yet the seismograph
is not nearly so sensitive as the human mind that wrought it, nor are the
greatest earthquakes comparable in force to the vibrations given off by a star.
It stands to reason, therefore, that the colossal vibrations of the stars and
planets we are born under must set their stamp somehow on each human
being. The truth of astrology is this: over the centuries these character¬
shaping influences have gradually been measured so that today astrology be¬
longs among the exact sciences. Every newborn child’s personality, plastic
at birth, is given its character and cast by the peculiar configuration of
heavenly bodies at the time of the child’s birth. This principle has the addi¬
tional merit of explaining why no two persons are exactly alike. Even with
so-called identical twins, the moment of birth is not the same, and with the
passing of even a few minutes the star-picture can change significantly. We
know, then, that astrology is an exact science, because if an accurate horo¬
scope is given but fails to agree with the facts of a person’s life, it can only
265
be because the person has made some kind of error in reporting his time or
place of birth.
People who dislike astrology will sometimes say, out of malice, that the
stars’ distances are sufficient to make the effects of their vibrations negligible.
This is easily refuted. First, the space between earth and the stars is nearly
a vacuum, empty enough to let vibrations pass almost undiminished in vigor.
Second, the Chicago exposition in 1935 was opened by a ray of light from
the star Arcturus hitting a photoelectric cell. If a star as remote as Arcturus
can open a fair in Illinois, it is very careless to argue that the stars are too far
away to affect our lives.
266
APPENDIX
EXCERPT FROM COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON
ARISTOTLE’S POSTERIOR
ANALYTICS*
LESSON I
1. As Aristotle says at the beginning of the Metaphysics, the

human race lives by art and reason. In making this point the Philosopher
touches upon a property that differentiates man from other animals,
for their actions are prompted by a kind of natural instinct, whereas man
in his actions is directed by a judgment of reason. Hence, the various
arts serve to facilitate and order the accomplishment of man’s actions.
In fact art is precisely a particular ordering of reason as to the way
human acts, through determinate means, may reach their intended end.
Now reason can not only direct the acts of the inferior powers of
man, but also its own. Indeed to reflect upon itself is peculiar to man’s
intellective power, for the intellect comprehends itself and, similarly,
reason can reason about its own act. Hence, just as reason by reason¬
ing about manual acts, has devised the art of building for example, which
enables man to exercise an act of this kind easily and in an orderly way,
so it is necessary to have an art which directs the very act of reason so
that man, in reasoning, may proceed in an orderly way, and without
error.
2. This art is logic, that is, rational science. It is rational not only
because it involves reasoning, for this is common to all arts, but because
it concerns the very act of reason itself as its proper matter.
3. Hence logic is regarded as the art of arts, because it directs us in
the act of reasoning from which all arts proceed. Accordingly, the parts
of logic must correspond to the diverse acts of reason.
4. There are three acts of reason. The first two of these are of reason
as it is a kind of understanding.
The first action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or
* This translation is based on the text of the Leonine Edition of the Opera Omnia
of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vol. I, pp. 138-140; Commentary on Aristotles’s Posterior
Analytics, Lesson I, nn. 1-6.
269
270 Aristotle’s posterior analytics
incomplex things. By this action it conceives what a thing is. . . .

Aristotle treats the doctrine ordered to this operation of reason in his
book on the Categories.
The second operation of the intellect is the composition and division
of what is apprehended, wherein there is truth and falsity. Aristotle
treats the doctrine ordered to this operation in his book On Interpreta¬
tion.
The third act of reason is the one that is distinctive of reason,
namely to proceed discursively from one thing to another so as to arrive
at knowledge of what was previously unknown from what is already
known. The rest of Aristotle’s logical works are ordered to this act of
reason.
5. It should be noted that the acts of reasoning are similar, in some
respect, to the acts of nature. Hence in this also art imitates nature so
far as possible. Now there is a threefold diversity in the acts of nature.
In some cases nature acts necessarily, in such a way that it cannot fail.
In others, nature operates in a regular fashion but can sometimes fail
to bring about its act. In the latter, therefore, there is a twofold act:
one, which occurs for the most part, as when a perfect animal is gen¬
erated from seed; the other, when nature brings about something dis¬
advantageous, as when, because of the corruption of some principle, a
monster is generated.
These three diversities are found in the acts of reasoning. There is a
process of reasoning which induces necessity, in which one cannot fail
to reach truth. The certitude of science is acquired by a process of
reasoning such as this. There is another process of reasoning in which
the truth is inferred for the most part, not, however, necessary truth.
The third process of reasoning is one in which reason is defective with
respect to truth because some principle which should be observed in
reasoning is violated.
6 . The part of logic devoted to the first process is called judicative
because a judgment having scientific certitude is attained. And since
we cannot have a sure judgment about effects, without a resolution to
first principles, this part of logic is called Analytics, that is, the reso¬
lutory part. Now the certitude of judgment attained by resolution is
either from the form of the syllogism alone, and the book of the Prior
Analytics, which deals with the syllogism absolutely, is ordered to this,
or from the matter also, because per se and necessary propositions are
used, and the book of the Posterior Analytics, which deals with the
demonstrative syllogism, is ordered to this.
The part of logic which is called inventive is devoted to the second
process of reasoning, for certainty does not always accompany invention.
Hence a judgment is required in order to have certitude about what
comes from discovery. Just as in the natural things which act for the
Aristotle’s posterior analytics 271
most part there is a certain gradation (for in proportion as the power

of nature is stronger the more rarely does it fail with respect to its
effect), so in that process of reasoning which is not in every way cer¬
tain, there is a gradation corresponding to the degrees of certitude. Ac¬
cordingly, even though science is not attained by this process, some¬
times faith or opinion is, because of the probability of the propositions
from which the reasoning proceeds. In this case, reason is totally in¬
clined to one part of a contradiction, but is still uneasy about the other.
The Topics or Dialectics is ordered to this kind of reasoning, for here
Aristotle treats the dialectical syllogism which proceeds from probable
propositions.
Sometimes, however, faith or opinion is not completely attained, but
only a kind of suspicion, in that reason is not wholly inclined to one part
of a contradiction, although it inclines more to one than the other. The
Rhetoric is ordered to this kind of reasoning.
But sometimes there is only an evaluation based on some representa¬
tion, inclining one toward a part of a contradiction, as when a man is
brought to abhor certain food if it is represented to him in the likeness
of something loathsome. The Poetics is ordered to this kind of reason¬
ing, for the poet leads us to something virtuous through an appropriate
representation.
All of this pertains to rational philosophy, for to induce one thing
from another belongs to reason.
The part of logic devoted to the third process of reasoning is called
sophistic (in which reason is defective with respect to truth because some
principle which should be observed in reasoning is violated). Aristotle
treats this in the book Sophistical Refutations.
INDEX
INDEX
A B
Abbreviated syllogism, 219-221 Barbara, Celarent, etc., 204-206
Abstract, 1-2 Basis of division, 53-54
Accident: Begging the question, 257
as a predicable, 19-20 Being passive (category), 40
predicamental, 36
singular and universal, 31 C
Accidental conversion, 142 Capacity (species of quality), 39
Action, 40 Categorical proposition, 89-90
Affirmative proposition, 90-91 Categorical Syllogism (see Syllogism)
“All,” 108 Categorematic word, 30
Alternative proposition, 155
Categories, 27, 35-41
Alternative syllogism, 215 Cause, 69-70
Amphiboly, 254 Circular argument, 257-258
Analogous name, 29 Co-division, 53
“Analytics,” 237 Collective supposition, 108
Antecedent: Complex expression, 30
of argumentation, 168-169 Complex question, 259
of conditional proposition, 154— Composite expression, 82
155
of conditional syllogism, 212-
Composition and division, fallacy of.
255
214
Antepredieaments, 27-32
Compound proposition:
distinguished from categorical,
a posteriori demonstration, 241
89-90
a priori demonstration, 241
explicitly, 154-156
Argument:
implicitly, 156-157
ad baculum, 257
Compound syllogism, 211-215
ad hominem, 257
ad populum, 257 Concept:
ad verecundiam, 257 as formal sign, 6-7
Argumentation: as related to word, 7-8
demonstrative, 238-242 Conditional proposition, 154-155
dialectical, 242-246 Conditional syllogism, 212-214
in general, 167-169 Consequent:
poetic, 249-250 of argumentation, 168-169
rhetorical, 219-220; 246-249 of conditional proposition, 154—
Aristotelian sorites, 223 155
275
276 INDEX
Consequent (Continued) Distribution, 107-109; 183-184

of conditional syllogism, 212-214 Division:
fallacy of, 258 kinds of, 54-55
Contingent matter, 93 by opposition, 52
Contingent proposition, 94-95 rules of, 50-54
Contradictory opposition:
applied to division, 52 E
of propositions, 116-117 Enthymeme, 219-221; 247
of simple objects, 42 Enunciation, 81; 82-83 (see Proposi¬
Contraposition, 146 tion)
Contrary opposition: Epicheirema, 222
applied to division, 52 Equivocal name, 28-29
between simple objects, 43-44 Example, 247-248
of propositions, 117 Exceptive proposition, 156-157
Conventional sign, 5-7
Exclusive alternatives, 215
Conversion:
distinguished from obversion, 141 Exclusive proposition, 156
kinds of, 142 Existence as implied by copula, 105
in reduction of syllogisms, 201— Existence in a subject, 30-31
205 Exponible proposition, 153-154
rules of, 143-144 Expression:
Copula: complex, 30
in categorical and compound composite, 82
propositions, 90 imperfect, 82
element of the proposition, 83-84 incomplex, 29-30
not a syllogistic term, 173
as signifying with time, 105-106 F
Copulative proposition, 155-156 Fallacy:
of accent, 255
D
of accident, 256
Deduction, 169 of affirming consequent, 213; 258
Definition: of amphiboly, 254
culmination of first part of logic, of begging the question, 257
63-64 of complex question, 259
kinds of, 68-71 of composition and division, 255
rules of, 64-68 of equivocation, 254
de inesse proposition, 94 of false cause, 258
Demonstration: of form of expression, 255
of four terms, 182-183
definitions of, 238
of ignoring the issue, 257
kinds of, 240-242
of relative to absolute, 256
Dialectical process, 246
Falsity, 81-82
Dialectical reasoning, 242-246
Dictum de nullo, 182, 185, 187 Figure (species of quality), 40
Dictum de omni, 182, 185, 187 Figure of syllogism, 174-178
Dilemma, 224-225 Form (species of quality), 40
Disjunctive proposition, 155 Formal implication, 154
Disjunctive syllogism, 214-215 Formal relation of propositions,
Disposition, 39 122-123
Distinctions preliminary to cate¬ Formal sign, 6-7
gories, 27-32 Fourth figure of syllogism, 177-178
INDEX 277
G Minor term, 173-178

Modal proposition, 94
Genus:
Mood of syllogism, 174
as a category, 36, 38
as predicable, 17 N
Goclenian sorites, 223-224
Name:
H analogous, 29
Habit: element of proposition, 28-29
category of, 41 equivocal, 27-28
species of quality, 39 univocal, 27-28; 37
Hypothetical proposition (see Com¬ Natural sign, 5
pound proposition) Necessary matter, 93
Hypothetical syllogism (see Com¬ Negative proposition, 90-91
pound syllogism) Non-supposing subject, 105
I O
Identity predication, 16 Object:

Ignoring the issue, 257 complex, 167
Image: simple, 167
as formal sign, 6-7 Obversion:
of the poet, 250 distinguished from conversion,
Immediate propositions, 240 141
Imperative expression, 82 distinguished from opposition,
Impossible matter, 93 133
Inclusive alternatives, 215 rules of, 134-136
Incomplex expression, 29-30 Opinion, 242
Indefinite proposition, 92 Opposition (postpredicament), 41-
Indirect moods of syllogism, 190-191 44
Induction: Opposition of propositions:
definition of, 169; 231 definition of, 115
dialectical, 242 division of, 116
reduced materially to syllogism, rules for truth and falsity in, 120—
233-234 122
as a type of argumentation, 169 Outlining, 50
Inference:
P
as act of reasoning, 168
properly belongs to argumentation, Particular proposition, 92
141 ' Passivity (category), 40
Interrogative expression, 82 Personal supposition, 107
Persuasion, 186 (see Rhetoric)
M
Poetic argumentation, 249-250
Major extreme, 173 Position (category), 41
Major premise, 172-176 Possible proposition, 94-95
Major term, 173-178 Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 258
Material implication, 154 Postpredicament, 41-44
Material supposition, 107 Predicable:
Metaphor, 66-67; 106 distinguished from category, 36
Middle term, 173-178; 232 distinguished from predicate, 36
Minor extreme, 173 notion and division of, 13-20
Minor premise, 172-176 Predicable of a subject, 30-31
278 INDEX
Predicaments (see Categories) Sequence:

Predicate: in a conditional proposition, 154
distinguished from predicable, 36 in reasoning, 168
as part of proposition, 84 Sign:
Premises, 172-178; 239 conventional, 5
Prerequisites for demonstration, conventional by custom, 6
238-239 formal, 6
Privative opposition: natural, 5
applied to division, 52 natural by intent, 5
of simple objects, 42-43 notion of, 4
Proper supposition: Signification:
definition of, 106 distinguished from supposition,
kinds of, 107 104
Property: of signs, 5-8
foreknowledge of in demonstra¬ Simple conversion, 142
tion, 239 Simple object, 167
as a predicable, 19 Simple (de inesse) proposition, 94
Proposition: Simple supposition, 107
definition of, 81 Singular:
distribution of terms in, 107-109 accident, 31
divisions of, 89-95 as distinct from universal, 14-15
elements of, 83-84 how indefinable, 67
Propter quid demonstration, 241 proposition, 91-92
substance, 31
Q Sophistical reasoning, 253-259
Quality: Sorites, 223-224
as a category, 39-40 Species:
of propositions, 90-91 logical vs. natural, 18
Quantity: as predicable, 17
as a category, 39 Specific difference (predicable), 17-
of propositions, 91-93 18
Quia demonstration, 241 Speech (see Composite expression)
Square of opposition, 119
R
Subalternation of propositions, 118-
Reduction of syllogisms, 201-206 119
Relation, 40 Sub-contrary opposition of proposi¬
Relation of universality, 17 tions, 117-118
Relative to absolute, fallacy of, 256— Subdivision, 53-54
257 Subject:
Relative opposition: foreknown in demonstration, 239
applied to division, 52 as part of proposition, 84
between simple objects, 44 Substance:
Rhetoric, kinds of, 248 category of, 38-39
Rhetorical argumentation, 246-249 singular and universal, 31
S Supposition:
definition of, 104
Science, 239-242 distinguished from signification,
Scientific proposition, 243 104
Self-evident propositions, 240 kinds of, 106-107
Sense qualities, 39-40 of terms in a syllogism, 183
INDEX 279
Syllogism: Universal proposition, 91-92

abbreviated, 219-221 Universal substance, 31
alternative, 215 Univocal name, 27-28; 37
compound, 211-215
concluding indirectly, 190-191 V
definition of, 171
determination of valid moods, Verb:
186-190 as copula, 84
dialectical, 222 element of proposition, 83-84
form of, 174-176 posited on part of predicate, 84
matter of, 172-174 Vocal sound, 83
principles of, 182 Vocative expression, 82
reduction of to first figure, 201—
W
207
rules of, 182-186 When (category), 40
with a causal premise, 222
Where (category), 41
Syncategorematic word, 31
Whole:
T accidental, 55
integral, 54-55
Term (syllogistic), 173 universal, 55
Truth, 81-82; 167-168 Wish (type of expression), 82
Word:
U
categorematic and syncategore¬
Unity of proposition, 89-90 matic, 29-30
Universal, 14-15 as conventional sign, 6-7
Universal accident, 31 as related to concept, 7-8
Date Due
BC 108 .035 1964
Oesterle, John A. 010101 000
Logic : the art of definin
63 183 00
TRENT UNIVERSITY
BC108 .^35 19^4
-Qasi^rla^_john A.
.
—-L©£ie.—_
DATE ISSUED TO
23694
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:
23694
^0 Oesterle, John A
108 Logic. 2d ed.
$35
1964
Trent
Univerwty

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NUNC COCNOSCO EX PARTE

LOGIC: The Art of Defining

Second printing.June, 1964

© 1953, 1963 by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-10990

Printed in the United States of America

and contains a more basic approach to the important doctrine of the

Fr. Henri DuLac, Head of the Department of Philosophy at the College

I THE LOGIC OF THE FIRST ACT

OF THE INTELLECT: SIMPLE APPREHENSION

Signs, Words, and Concepts 3

Distinctions Preliminary to the Categories 27

II THE LOGIC OF THE SECOND ACT

Divisions of the Proposition 89

Opposition of Propositions 115

Obversion of Propositions 133

Conversion of Propositions 141

The Compound Proposition 153

III THE LOGIC OF THE THIRD ACT

OF THE INTELLECT: REASONING

The Syllogism 171

Principles and Rules of the Syllogism 181

Reduction of Syllogisms to the First Figure 201

The Compound Syllogism 211

Abbreviated and Expanded Syllogisms 219

Argumentation Materially Considered 237

Sophistical Reasoning 253

Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, Lesson I, on

MEANING AND DIVISION

What is logic and why should we study logic? We might begin

White reflects light.

This full argument is called a syllogism. It is a movement of our

Definition is known by the act of simple apprehension. The act of

SIGNS, WORDS, AND

Experience teaches us that we know in two basically distinct

retaining something else. Applied to intellectual knowing, to abstract

The Notion of a Sign

The intimate relation between sense and intellectual knowing in

The Natural Sign

The notion of a sign is first and best verified in what is called a

The Conventional Sign

Wholly distinct from any natural sign is the conventional sign.

knowing and communicating. Some of them are wholly arbitrary, as

The Formal Sign

This last type of sign involves a very extended meaning of the

Words and Concepts

Our primary interest in developing the notion of the sign is to

Questions -*** Chapter One

1. Distinguish the two distinct ways by which we know.

Exercise Chapter One

Classify the following signs as natural or conventional. If purely natural,

- 1. Sound of a bell as signifying the end of a boxing round.

_ 2. Fever as signifying illness.

_ 3. Snoring as signifying sleep.

_ 4. Snoring as signifying feigned sleep.

_ 5. The word “white” as signifying a certain color.

_ 6. Shaking hands as signifying departure.

_ 7. A shout as signifying the attracting of attention.

_8. Roman collar as signifying a priest.