P L D 1993 Lahore 21
P L D 1993 Lahore 21
P L D 1993 Lahore 21
versus
PLD 1973 Lah. 304; PLD 1965 SC 68 and PLD 1976 SC 37 rel
---- Art.199 --- A party against whom an order without jurisdiction has been made may
ignore it and may not have it formally set aside in appeal or revision under the statute
under which it was purportedly made and this fact will no disentitle him from
challenging the same in collateral proceedings.
JUDGMENT
Through this Constitutional petition, the petitioner Mst. Rehmat Bibi has
assailed the order, dated 16-3-1992, of Mr. Muhammad Aslarn ShamL Judge, Special
Court, Lahore, constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special
Courts) Act, 1975, whereby while agreeing with the report of the Investigating Officer
and after hearing the Special Public Prosecutor he discharged respondents 6 to 13 from
the case registered against them vide A F.I.R. No. 287/91, dated 2-10-1991, under
section 365/365-A/452/342/218/ 109/34 P.P.C., on the direction of this Court.
2. Brief facts relevant for the decision of this writ petition are that the petitioner
filed Writ Petition No.7622 of 1991, for the recovery of her two sons, namely,
Muhammad Rafiq and Muhammad Sharif, from the illegal detention of S.H.O. P.S.
Samanabad and Saadat Mehdi S.I. of the same police station. Vide order dated 8-9-
1991, two bailiffs were deputed to recover the said detenus. In pursuance of the
aforesaid order, the two detenus, were recovered and produced before this Court on 9-
9-1991. After recording the statements of the two detenus and the respondents, this
Court directed that a case should be registered against the delinquent police -officers
and others; hence the aforementioned F.I.R. was registered on 2-10-1991.
2. As the case was exclusively triable by the Judge of Special Court, therefore, the
challan , was submitted in his Court as required under section 5(l) of Suppression of
Terrorist Activities Act, 1975. Section 5 of the Act is reproduced in extenso for facility
of reference:-
Provided that the Special Court may extend the time within which such report is to be
forwarded in a case where good reasons are shown for not doing so within the time
specified in this subsection.
(3) The Special Court may directly take cognizance of a case triable by such Court
without the case being sent to it under section 190 of the Code."
In this case on 16-12-1991, the challan was submitted in the Special Court against the
accused persons. As some of the accused were not arrested; hence the words
"incomplete challan" were used. The learned Judge' on 8-1-1992, took cognizance of
the matter and started with the proceeding of the case Thereafter on 24m2-1992, a
report was made for the discharge of the accused and the learned Judge agreeing with
the report passed the impugned order referred to above.
3. This petition was admitted to regular hearing on 5-5-1992 and notice was issued -
to the respondents. Respondent No.6 filed a detailed written statement in this case.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Judge, Special
Court in haste passed the order which is contrary to the record, as the High Court while
directing the registration of the case passed that order after recording the statements of
numerous persons and the learned trial Judge did not consider even any part of the
statements before passing the impugned order. He further urged that the learned Judge,
Special Court took cognizance on 8-1-1992, as contemplated under section 5(1) of the
Act and the report submitted by the police' after the taking of cognizance by the Court
would not result into discharge of the accused persons and has placed reliance on PLD
1976 Lah. 574, wherein the learned Judges placing reliance on PLD 1973 Lah.304,
held that once the final report is submitted under section 113 of the Code, then the
evidence collected by the police after that would be taken into consideration by the
Court under section 540 of the Code and not otherwise.
In the end, learned counsel submitted that as police personnel were involved in
this case, the 1.0. wilfully twisted the facts and evidence collected during the
investigation and by an elaborate report which amounts to decision of the case
submitted report for the discharge of the accused persons to the Special Judge, Special
Court. The 1.0. by critically examining the evidence collected during the investigation
has assumed the function of the trial Court which is not permissible under the law,.
hence on this score alone, the impugned order is liable to be declared as without lawful
authority and of no legal effect.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 6, on the other hand, has submitted that no
doubt the learned Judge took cognizance 'of the case on 84-1992, on the basis of
incomplete challan and thereafter on a final report under section 173, the Court
discharged the accused agreeing with the finding of the 1.0. who was a senior officer of
the rank of D.S.P., appointed by the D.I.-G. Range Crime, Lahore. He submitted that
under the Scheme of the Code, there is no concept of discharge, in fact, it was an order
of the acquittal of the accused persons as contemplated under section 249-A or section
265-K of the Code, because the 1.0. after thorough probe submitted the final report
under section 173 of the Code recommending that the charge is groundless, so the
accused may be acquitted; hence these proceedings cannot be challenged by way of
Constitutional Petition, because the proper procedure has been given in section 7 of
1975 Act, Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 wherein power
has been given to the Provincial Government to file an appeal against that acquittal.
Ch. Muhammad Afzal Wahlah appearing for respondent No.10 submitted that
the writ petition is not competent in the present form, because the impugned order
could be assailed through a revision petition under the provisions of the Code, apart
from adopting the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent No.6.
6. Learned Law Officer, who was present on the direction of the Court for
assistance, frankly conceded that the impugned order was passed in haste without
application of conscious mind by the learned Judge after taking cognizance of the case
on 8-1-1992; hence this order is not sustainable in the eye of law; in the alternative he
argued that the trial Court had the jurisdiction to acquit. the accused if he finds that the
charge is groundless. In the circumstances, though the learned Judge has not
specifically mentioned the word 'acquittal', but he might have exercised his powers
under the same provision. The Law Officer however, conceded that the writ petition is
permissible in this case, because the impugned order can be equated as an
administrative order, if it is treated as cancellation of the F.I.R. of the case, though it is
not specifically mentioned, by the learned Judge as envisaged by the provisions of the
Police Act and Rules.
7. 1 have examined the respective submissions of the learned counsel at, length.
Before taking into consideration the various contentions of the learned counsel for the
parties, I would like to point out the difference as contemplated by section 5 of 1975
Act and the procedure laid down in the Code itself, which has got the sanction of
section 5(2) of the Code, which reads:--
"5(2). All offences, under 'any other law shall be investigated, be inquired into, tried
and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any
enactment for the time being in force, regulating the manner or place of investigating,
inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences."
N.H.Q./R-61/L
Petition accepted.
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