THE GHANA GOVERNMENT

DENNIS AUSTIN
Tutorial Advisor, Dept. oj Extra-mural Studies, University College of Ghana.

WHEN the Gold Coast became independent in March 1957, it

was under a pattern of government modelled on British practice—
a constitutional sovereign, a Westminster-style parliament,
a two-party system (at constituency level and in the national
assembly), an anonymous public service and an independent
judiciary. How firmly established was this modern apparatus
of government at the time of independence, and how effective
has it proved to be during the past two years ?
Colonial legislative and executive councils existed in the
Gold Coast for over a century; African government from time
immemorial. Mr. Martin Wight (in 1946) traced the origins of
the legislative council in the Gold Coast back to 18^0 and found
that, from a very early time, there were African representatives
who took part in its meetings. Wight also thought, at the time
of writing, that there was "no intrinsic disharmony between the
indigenous institutions of the Gold Coast and the imported
Western representative system"—a judgment which the Coussey
Committee accepted as being still valid in 1949. When, in the
same year, the Convention People's Party under Dr. Nkrumah
began to show the strength of popular feeling that existed out-
side (and often against) the system of Native Authorities, different
arguments were used to link the present Ghana government with
its Gold Coast past. Mr. Apter, for example, has written
quite a lot (in terms not always easy to understand) about the
'secularisation' of traditional institutions, and the 'bestowal of
legitimacy' on modern forms of government; and these pro-
cesses he explains, not by the development of early legislative
councils, but by the magic of Nkrumah's person and leadership.
Yet it is difficult to see government in Ghana in 19^9 as being
in any direct line of succession to earlier forms, to see any
organic connection between the legislative councils of 18^0 to
19^0 and the party dominated assembly which replaced them.
To read the debates of the 192^-^0 legislative councils, and then
to watch the Ghana parliament at work, is to measure the
distance travelled by the country during the riots and disturbances
of 1948-^0. And to explain the rise of the CPP in terms of
Nkrumah's "personal charisma" acting as a "primary functional
GHANA GOVERNMENT 91
vehicle of institutionalisation'' hardly does justice to the party's
powers of organisation or its ability to adapt itself so rapidly
from being a nationalist movement in opposition to the sober
tasks of a party government in power. In terms of practical
support at the polls, for example, the CPP had to fight for its
victories: they did not come by the magic of charisma:
CPP Votes Seats Non-CPP Votes Seats
I9S4 391,817 68 3 J 4,903 33
19^6 398,141 66 299,116 33
(Note: there were three unopposed (CPP) seats in 19^4, five
in 1956.)
The fact is that there was a sharp break in Gold Coast political
development as a result of the 1948 riots. Even at the time, it
was clear that the violence of the trade boycott, and the mass
demonstrations in many of the southern towns, were of a different
order from the kind of discontent expressed before the war by
Ratepayers' Associations, farmers' councils and youth con-
ferences. The riots, which pointed the way via the Watson
Commission and the Coussey Committee to the declaration of
Positive Action in January 19^0, marked the beginnings of mass
party organisation, held together by a network of local branches,
with a nationally directed policy and a broad emotional appeal.
In previous years, agitation had been conducted against particular
abuses, to remedy specific grievances: after 1948, the colonial
system itself was condemned in general terms. When the CPP
was formed in 1949 it did not campaign for constitutional reform
but 'freedom'. And because British officials, chiefs and the
somewhat dated 'intelligentsia' had been closely associated on the
old legislative councils, the party was suspicious of the effective-
ness of constitutional action. Its leaders had to justify, to the
growing mass of its followers, their decision to contest elections
to be held under the Coussey constitution—which Nkrumah had
already labelled as being "bogus and fraudulent". " T o remain
any longer merely as agitators from the platform'', said the party's
election manifesto, "would spell national disaster . . . Our
entry into the Assembly in full strength will open up better
opportunities to struggle for immediate self-government."
The Coussey constitution did not look a very attractive pro-
position, especially after the legislative council and the United
Kingdom government had added their amendments. (The
party's newspaper, The Accra Evening News, called it a "toothless
gift horse.") Nor did it look like being an effective instrument
92 AFRICA SOUTH

of modern government. For the members of the Coussey

Committee had made what proved to be a last attempt to com-
bine Native Authority institutions with (now) a quasi-cabinet
system of government. With the entry of the CPP, however,
into political life, and in 'full strength' in the new Assembly, the
Coussey constitution was turned upside-down. Designed to
meet the requirements of a pre-party age, it became a weapon of
party use. Despite the political immaturity of the party
(none of its leaders or parliamentary rank-and-file had had any
previous 'training* on the old legislative council), despite its
difficult minority position in the Assembly (where until 1954
representatives of semi-traditional councils plus European
officials and 'special members' outnumbered party supporters),
despite, too, the obligation to respect the conventions of a two-
party system where no national party opposition existed—the
CPP was able to use the clumsy assembly machinery of the
Coussey constitution to advance its own programme of 'im-
mediate self-government'.
Then, early in 19^4, troubles multiplied. As the proba-
bility of independence became more certain, claims were
revived by displaced although still powerful traditional leaders,
in alliance with regional cum tribal groups, to their own share of
'self-government'. Both in the elections of 19^4, however, and
in those of 1956, the CPP was given a strong mandate for its
policy of a strong centralised unitary government. And, by
1957, a modern (British-patterned) parliamentary system was in
full operation. But it was as unlike the advisory colonial
councils which had existed hitherto, as the CPP, with its
disciplined central committee, its rough and tough organisers
and nationalist mass following, was unlike the earlier political
congresses and debating clubs.
It is against this background that government in Ghana in
19 £9 should be seen, with the conventions and machinery of
British government having been accepted 'on approval', not as
the end-product of a long process of constitutional evolution.
How, then, have they stood the test of use during the past two
years ?
It seems clear that parliament itself has come to stay. At
the very least it is useful as an instrument of party control at
national and constituency levels (through the prestige and salaries
it gives its members) and as a convenient forum in which to
explain party policy. But a party which has always valued
GHANA GOVERNMENT 93
efficient organisation was quick, too, to grasp the effectiveness
of action through parliament. It is interesting to see how
readily the CPP adopted the technique of the special select
committee, and the government-appointed commission of
enquiry, as a basis for radical legislation. In this way, parlia-
ment is probably as useful to the CPP as it was to the Tudors.
Its representatives keep the government informed about what is
happening in the country, and its legislative powers are used as a
final weapon of authority against the government's opponents—
against the private wealth and privileges of monasteries in
Tudor England, and local chiefdoms in Ghana. " T h e function
of parliamentary democracy under universal franchise, historic-
ally considered, is to expose wealth to the attack of the people.
It is a sword pointed at the heart of the property owner."*
In Ghana, it has been made a sword pointed especially at the chief
and tradition—where tradition is a rival to the authority of
government; and parliament itself has been made an instrument
for the transfer not of wealth or property, but power from the
chief to the party.
Where is the basis, then, for a two party system? There were
six or seven party groups at independence although, in practice,
in each region there was usually a straightforward rivalry between
the CPP and allied non-CPP supporters. At the end of 1957,
the government forced the latter—a loose association of regional,
confessional (Moslem), and neo-tribal groupings to amalgamate,
by the passage of the ' Avoidance of Discrimination Act' which
made it illegal for such sectional parties to exist. The act
followed the sudden Ga protest movement in Accra (the
Ga Shijimo Kpee), and when the National Liberation Movement
was still quite powerful in Ashanti. During 195"^/£6, and up to
the eve of independence, the N.L.M.—with its allies, the North-
ern People's Party, the Togoland Congress and the Moslem
Association Party—threatened the whole structure of govern-
ment by a refusal to accept the national assembly in Accra as the
final arbiter of who should govern the country. And in the
months following independence the CPP struck out, more
ruthlessly than most observers expected, at every attempt to
weaken the authority of the central government. One may
note here—ignored by critics of the government's actions—
that in order to be a parliamentary democracy, and to run a
democratic parliamentary system, it is necessary first to be a
*Aneurin Bevan's *ln Place cf Fear' Page 6
94 AFRICA SOUTH

nation. And the CPP understood this difficulty the more

easily perhaps in that, other than the large overseas trading
companies and the various church organisations, the party was
the only effective association of a national character in the
country.
One of the problems, therefore, which should be noted since
independence, is that of finding a legitimate stand for the
opposition—including opposition to the steady monopolising of
all authority by the party in power. However difficult it may
be to undertake from scratch the task of running a parliamentary
machinery of government, it is less than that of learning and
playing the part of a constitutional opposition. When parlia-
mentary institutions have been abruptly introduced and put to
work, as in Ghana, the opposition has to accept the delicate
position of perpetual critic without ever having known the
responsibilities of power, and without much chance of enjoying
them in the forseeable future. And it becomes doubly difficult
if, again as in Ghana, the opposition has to defend itself against
the charge that, having hampered the struggle for self-govern-
ment, it should not assume any right to share in its benefits.
The temptation is strong, in such a situation, to use extra-
parliamentary methods——violence, where force can intimidate
the government, or the machinery of the courts, in a series of
constitutional cases, to humiliate and thereby discredit the
government.
But of the many handicaps which face the opposition in Ghana,
the most serious is probably lack of funds. In Britain, each of
the main parties can keep going financially by virtue of its con-
nections with organized labour (and the TUC political levy)
or organized capital (with its private sources of party wealth).
In Ghana, the opposition financed its campaigns, in part at least,
by tapping the revenue of friendly Native Authorities (from stool
lands, rents, chiefs' salaries etc.). But this laid both open to the
charge (as recent commissions of enquiry have shown) of mis-
using public funds and exceeding customary or statutory powers.
Yet individual contributions are difficult to come by for a party
out of power, which has nothing to offer by way of material
inducements or benefits, and at best are inadequate for running a
modern party organisation.
From almost every standpoint, therefore, the CPP has dom-
inated the political scene since independence. And it has
extended its control over its allies—the trade unions, whose
GHANA GOVERNMENT 95
TUC genera] secretary is a m e m b e r of the party's national
executive, the farmers (through the Ghana Farmers' Council),
the youth (through its youth leagues and W o r k e r s ' Brigade), and
the market w o m e n ' s associations. The attraction of p o w e r is
strong, and it is n o t easy to see its limits. But, in 19^9, how has
this growth of the party's authority affected the non-political
sections of g o v e r n m e n t — i n particular, the public service and the
judiciary?
Perhaps the t i m e is too short in which to be able to judge
accurately but, so far, the party has respected, by and large, the
British concept of a neutral civil service and judiciary. Both are
staffed by a m i x t u r e of British and African officials and judges;
each is watched over by a statutory Public (or Judicial) Service
Commission. Criticisms are made that g o v e r n m e n t jobs go to
the 'fighters for freedom' rather than those w h o m e r i t t h e m , b u t
such charges apply m o r e to the public c o r p o r a t i o n s — t h e Cocoa
Marketing Board, the Industrial D e v e l o p m e n t Corporation and
the Agricultural D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n — t h a n to t h e main
body of the civil service. T h e administration has n o t had an
easy time, w i t h the pressure of n e w legislation, and the d e p a r t u r e
of many of its overseas officers on generous 'abolition t e r m s ' of
retirement. But it has b o r n e the strain well. And it is far
from being a party p r e s e r v e : t h e r e are, for example, senior
African civil servants at the highest level w h o are at least neutral
and probably antipathetic to m u c h that the C P P stands for and
does. T h e r e is also very little enthusiasm for the C P P among
students at the University College, most of w h o m enter govern-
ment service. But the party is apparently u n c o n c e r n e d about
either group and is remarkably detached in its recognition of the
need for administrative efficiency.
Charges of partiality and g o v e r n m e n t interference in the admin-
istration of justice are heard less often, if only because the
courts in Ghana, far m o r e than the political machinery of govern-
ment, have had a steady continuity of g r o w t h and practice.
Appointments have b e e n m a d e since independence of senior
African and European magistrates to the bench w h i c h have
quite clearly n o t b e e n party appointments. (Appeals still g o ,
for that m a t t e r , to the Judicial C o m m i t t e e of the Privy C o u n c i l ) .
Nevertheless t h e r e has b e e n an unfortunate tendency in r e c e n t
months for t h e courts to b e b r o u g h t into politics via the constitu-
tion. T h e 19 £j constitution is n o t an easy d o c u m e n t to i n t e r p r e t ,
being b o r n of b i t t e r political differences. It contains w h o l e
96 AFRICA SOUTH

sections concerned with safe-guarding the position and powers of

chiefs and the proposed regional assemblies and houses of chiefs.
And since these clauses w e r e the price of opposition agreement to
the constitution as a w h o l e , they are naturally a source of friction
still b e t w e e n the CPP and the United Party. But to drag the
constitution through the courts, with each side straining the
interpretation of these vaguely w o r d e d clauses, may in the end
damage m o r e than the loser, and bring the judiciary itself into
question. Constitutional storms tend to be dangerous; for one
is never quite sure what will be left standing w h e n the storm
abates.
Lastly, the question of a republic. T h e r e is very little to add
to what m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t have already said: that the
question of replacing the office of Governor-General (there have
been t w o holders of the office since independence, b o t h British)
by that of a President within a republican system is n o t particularly
high up on the list of probabilities. But, it is on the list. The
m o r e interesting speculation is w h e t h e r D r . N k r u m a h will want
eventually to see a ' w o r k i n g P r e s i d e n t ' , as in Tunisia and
Guinea, o r a constitutional head, as in India. Very little has been
heard o n this, although no d o u b t m o r e will be said before 1960/61
w h e n the first post-war independence elections are d u e .
The most immediate p r o b l e m s , however, are n o t those which
concern the o u t w a r d form of the constitution, b u t its day to day
w o r k i n g . W i t h Indonesia and Iraq and the Lebanon in m i n d , the
g o v e r n m e n t can justly congratulate itself o n having maintained its
hold on the country since independence w i t h o u t losing its
immense popularity, and with the m i n i m u m of force. There
is no danger of a military junta imposing its will. T h e CPP has
probably been right to stress t h e dangers of disunity, and the need
for closer ties b e t w e e n each part of t h e c o u n t r y . But, admitting
this need, can the party also recognise the usefulness of criticism
and opposition w h e n it is genuinely offered in the national
interest? And can the opposition find a national platform—and
sufficient patience—from w h i c h to offer such advice? These
are perhaps the questions to be answered one way or the other
in the coming few years.