The Primal Fundraiser

The Primal
Fundraiser:
Game Theory and The
Natural Origins of
Effective Fundraising
The Fundraising Myth & Science Series: Book III
Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D.
Professor
Director of Graduate Studies in Charitable
Financial Planning and CH Foundation Chair in
Personal Financial Planning
Texas Tech University
Copyright © 2022 Russell N. James III
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 979-8-54-723139-1
The Fundraising Myth & Science Series
Book I: The Storytelling Fundraiser: The Brain,

Behavioral Economics, and Fundraising Story
Book II: The Epic Fundraiser: Myth, Psychology,

and the Universal Hero Story in Fundraising
Book III: The Primal Fundraiser: Game Theory

and the Natural Origins of Effective
Fundraising
Book IV: The Socratic Fundraiser: Using

Questions to Advance the Donor’s Story
PROFESSOR RUSSELL JAMES
THE PRIMAL FUNDRAISER
CONTENTS
Introduction: The Matryoshka doll 1
1 Primal fundraising and subjective 9

similarity: I’m like them!
2 Primal fundraising and reciprocal 19

alliances: I’m with them!
3 Primal fundraising and capacity for 33

reciprocity: I’m with them because
they’re important to me!
4 Relationship is the foundation of primal 49

fundraising: I’m with them because we’re
partners!
5 Primal fundraising leads with a gift: I’m 61

with them because I’m important to
them!
6 Impact, gratitude, and reciprocity in 79

primal fundraising: I can make a
difference!
7 Heroic donation displays in primal 91

fundraising: I can be your hero, baby!
8 The heroic donation audience in primal 105

fundraising: I need a hero!
9 Primal fundraising delivers practical 119

value with external identity: This is
totally worth it!
10 The power of community in primal 137

fundraising: I’m not just giving, I’m
sharing!
11 Social norms in primal fundraising: 151

People like me make gifts like this!
12 Primal fundraising delivers transcendent 169

value with internal identity: I believe in
this!
About the author 191

INTRODUCTION:
THE MATRYOSHKA DOLL
This series started with The Storytelling

Fundraiser. That introduced fundraising and the
science of story. Next was The Epic Fundraiser. That
focused on a specific story: the monomyth. Now we
begin The Primal Fundraiser. This explores the
natural origins of philanthropy.
These three topics are like a Russian nesting

doll. Each doll contains a smaller doll hidden inside
it.
The first part was the surface doll. It focused

on story words and simple experiments. The results
were objective. The science was “hard” science.
Inside that doll was another. It took a turn to

the subconscious. It explored myth: the universal
hero’s journey. It explored psychology: Jung’s hero
archetype.
1
But inside that doll is yet another. (Don’t

worry! It’s the last doll. The final book focuses only
on practical applications.)
Into the rabbit hole

The attraction to the hero’s journey is deep and
primal. It connects with myth and psychology. But
the attraction goes further. It taps into the natural
origins of mankind.
Professor Jim Dillon writes,

“Given the pervasive presence of the primal
vision monomyth across culture and time, it is
reasonable to conclude that there are powerful
structuring forces within the human psyche
that incline it to cast the meaning of human
existence, suffering, and healing in these three-
part primal vision terms.” 1
The hero archetype, like other archetypes,

originates in natural selection. Carl Jung explains
that an archetype is,
“An inherited mode of functioning,
corresponding to the inborn way in which the
chick emerges from the egg, the bird builds its
nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the motor
1Dillon, J. J. (2010). The primal vision: The psychological effects of creation

myth. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 50(4), 495-513. p. 507.
2
ganglion of the caterpillar, and eels find their

way to the Bermudas.” 2
The reason that the archetype is universal is

that it’s genetic. 3 The study of naturally selected
behavior is called ethology. Psychiatrist Anthony
Stevens writes,
“Ethology and Jungian psychology can be
viewed as two sides of the same coin … it is as if
ethologists have been engaged in an
extraverted exploration of the archetype.” 4
Or, as Jung describes,

“All those factors, therefore, that were essential
to our near and remote ancestors will also be
essential to us, for they are embedded in the
inherited organic system.” 5
The following chapters explore these natural

origins. These origins underlie philanthropy in
general. But they also underlie the donor’s hero story
in particular.
2 Jung, C. (1953-1978). On the nature of the psyche. In H. Read, M. Fordham, &

G. Adler (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (20 vols). Routledge. Volume
XVIII, para. 1228.
3 “Jung maps the psyche as a spectrum, with the archetype at the ultraviolet
end and the instinct at the infrared end…. Imagine a line running through the
psyche and connecting instinct and spirit at either end of it. This line is
attached to archetype on one end and to instinct at the other.” Stein, M.
(1998). Jung's map of the soul. Open Court. Ch. 4.
4 Stevens, A. (2001). Jung: A very short introduction. [Kindle Edition]. Oxford
University Press. p. 52.

5 Jung, C. (1953-1978). On the nature of the psyche. In H. Read, M. Fordham, &
G. Adler (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (20 vols). Routledge. Volume
VIII, para. 717.
3
Why jump in?

Look. I get it. This type of theoretical inquiry
feels far removed from everyday fundraising. 6 But
this isn’t just about academic theory. It’s about
effective fundraising. It may be down the rabbit hole.
But it’s still about being a better fundraiser tomorrow
than you were yesterday.
This book can help in two ways. First, it gives

you the “secret code” for philanthropic behavior. This
is different than just learning a few fundraising tips
and tricks. A tactic may have worked for someone
else. Understanding the “why” beneath the “how”
does more. It shows when a tactic will or won’t work
for you. It shows what to expect in any new scenario.
Once you understand the rules of the game,

new is not scary. New causes, new messages, new
donors, or new media aren’t a problem. The
underlying principals still apply. The “how” may
change. The “why” stays the same. 7
Second, it deepens understanding and

confidence in effective strategies. It shows
triangulation. Each book takes a dramatically
different approach. But these different approaches
6 This relates to a fundamental reason why academic researchers and

practitioners often fail to communicate. Academics tend to focus on the
“Why?” questions. Practitioners tend to focus on the “How?” questions.
7 More formally, a deductive, theory-based approach can add to inductive,
experience-based findings. A deductive theory (ideally one supported by past

observations and experiences) can be used to predict future outcomes using
new techniques in new scenarios.
4
don’t lead to different conclusions. Instead, they

converge.
The “one big thing” in fundraising remains the

same: Advance the donor’s hero story. Gaining
deeper knowledge fits this same story. It matches the
fundraiser’s role as the hero’s guiding sage.
What’s ahead?
The hero’s journey is an attractive story. (See
Book II in this series: The Epic Fundraiser.) It also
contains the steps for identity enhancement. That
journey progresses through, 8
These same steps also create the ideal donor

experience. Further, each step connects to natural
origins. This book explores those connections. The
8 Joseph Campbell uses a three-step circular illustration with this description:

“A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region
of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and
a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious
adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man.”
Campbell, J. (1949/2004). The hero with a thousand faces (commemorative
ed.). Princeton University Press. p. 28.
I label these steps as follows:
The beginning point of “the world of common day” is “original identity.”
“Venturing forth into a region of supernatural wonder” is “challenge.”
“Fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won” is
“victory.”
“The hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to
bestow boons on his fellow man” is “enhanced identity.”
I apply this both to a scenario where the charitable gift serves as part of the
final step in the heroic life story and where the gift request itself constitutes
the challenge that promises a victory delivering enhanced identity.
5
following chapters match this sequence of steps. Each

chapter title gives the topic. Each subtitle gives the
emotional statement we want donors to feel.
Step 1: Connect with original identity

1. Primal fundraising and subjective similarity:
I’m like them!
2. Primal fundraising and reciprocal alliances:

I’m with them!
3. Primal fundraising and capacity for reciprocity:

I’m with them because they’re important to
me!
4. Relationship is the foundation of primal

fundraising:
I’m with them because we’re partners!
5. Primal fundraising leads with a gift:

I’m with them because I’m important to them!
Steps 2 & 3: Present a challenge that wins a

victory
6. Impact, gratitude, and reciprocity in primal
fundraising:
I can make a difference!
7. Heroic donation displays in primal fundraising:
6
I can be your hero, baby!
8. The heroic donation audience in primal

fundraising:
I need a hero!
Step 4: Deliver an enhanced identity

9. Primal fundraising delivers practical value with
external identity:
This is totally worth it!
10. The power of community in primal

fundraising:
I’m not just giving, I’m sharing!
11. Social norms in primal fundraising:

People like me make gifts like this!
12. Primal fundraising delivers transcendent value

with internal identity:
I believe in this!
7
8
1
PRIMAL FUNDRAISING AND SUBJECTIVE

SIMILARITY:
I’M LIKE THEM!
Story works
In fundraising, story is powerful. Story works
better than formal descriptions. Story works better
than facts and figures. Simply, story works better
than non-story.
But for an effective fundraising story, we need

something more. It’s not enough to tell a story. We
need to tell the donor’s story.
The donor’s story works

A compelling ask includes,
9
When does a story become the donor’s story?

This happens when the donor identifies with its
characters and values. Fundraising starts with
identity. Donors identify with characters they feel are
like them.
Screenwriter Robert McKee explains it this

way:
“Empathetic means ‘like me.’” 1
In brain research, donations involve taking another’s
perspective. 2 They also involve empathy for the
other’s situation. 3 Both steps are easier when donors
feel the other person is like them.
This feeling of similarity is powerful in

fundraising. To understand why, we need to go back.
Way back. All the way back to natural origins.
Natural origins
In 1964, W. D. Hamilton presented a genetic
model for giving. 4 Giving doesn’t help the donor. But
it can help the donor’s genes. Giving is genetically
helpful when,
My Cost < (Their Benefit X Our Similarity).
1 Mckee, R. (1997). Story: Substance, structure, style and the principles of

screenwriting. ReganBooks. p. 141.
2 Hare, T. A., Camerer, C. F., Knoepfle, D. T., O'Doherty, J. P., & Rangel, A.
(2010). Value computations in ventral medial prefrontal cortex during

charitable decision making incorporate input from regions involved in social
cognition. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(2), 583-590.
3 Id.
4 Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 17-52.
10
The math is easy. More benefit means more

giving. Thus, need or impact matters. But so does
similarity.
This simple model matches some findings.

Similarity in
● Behavior
● Location, or
● Appearance
correlates with genetic similarity. 5 Sharing these

factors also increases cooperation and altruistic
sharing. 6
People often give more to those who are like

them in some way. In experiments, giving increases
when the donor and recipient share
● Political views
● Religious views
● Sports-team loyalty, or even
● Music preferences. 7
5 Rushton, J. P. (1989). Genetic similarity, human altruism, and group

selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(3), 503-518.
6 Id.
7 Ben-Ner, A., McCall, B. P., Stephane, M., & Wang, H. (2009). Identity and in-
group/out-group differentiation in work and giving behaviors: Experimental

evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1), 153-170.
11
Similarity is subjective
Hamilton’s math is simple. But people are
complex. A specific similarity with another is an
objective fact. But its importance is not objective. Its
importance is subjective.
Not every similarity counts. It must trigger a

feeling that the other person is “like me.” It must
trigger identification. Important similarities are
identity-defining similarities.
Suppose a giver and receiver share a likeness.

They might both be Catholic. Or from Ohio. Or
Hispanic. If a donor identifies with the factor,
emphasizing it will help. Otherwise, it won’t. That’s
why some similarities matter and others don’t.
In one experiment, people could donate to

rebuild after a hurricane. 8 But different people saw
different photos of damage. The victims in the photos
were white, or black, or obscured. Which pictures
worked better? It depended.
Potential donors were asked, “How close do

you feel to your ethnic or racial group?” Those
answering, “very close” or “close,” gave more when the
pictured victims matched their own race. For those
answering, “not very close” or “not close at all,” the
result reversed. They gave more when the victims did
not match their own race.
8Fong, C. M., & Luttmer, E. F. (2009). What determines giving to Hurricane

Katrina victims? Experimental evidence on racial group loyalty. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2), 64-87.
12
Race mattered. But identity determined how it

mattered. Objective similarity mattered. But
subjective feelings determined how it mattered. 9
Similarity with charities

Similarities with a beneficiary can make a
difference. But in fundraising, the donor doesn’t give
directly to a beneficiary. The donor gives to a charity.
This creates another chance for shared identity.

The donor can still identify with a beneficiary. But he
can also identify with the charity and its agents. 10
For example, a donor might give to famine

relief through his church. But he might never have
given directly to a famine relief charity. The famine
9 See also, Carboni, J. L., & Eikenberry, A. M. (2021). Do giving circles

democratize philanthropy? Donor identity and giving to historically
marginalized groups. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 32, 247-256. p. 247. (“Findings show giving circle
members and those not in giving circles are both more likely to give to a
shared identity group – related to race, gender, and gender identity – leading
to bonding social capital. However, giving circle members are more likely than
those not in giving circles to give to groups that do not share their identity,
suggesting giving circles also encourage bridging social capital.”)
10 One study of donors to a Division I athletic department found that
organizational identification mediated the effects of other marketing

programs on donations. The researchers explained,
“… this study found that fans who were satisfied with [the athletic
department’s philanthropic Corporate Social Responsibility]
initiatives on an athletic department website were more likely to be
identified with the athletic department. In turn, a fan’s identification
with the athletic department affected his or her online donation
intentions to the athletic department.” (p. 610)
Hwang, G., Kihl, L. A., & Inoue, Y. (2020). Corporate social responsibility and
college sports fans’ online donations. International Journal of Sports
Marketing and Sponsorship, 21(4), 597-616.
13
victims might be identical. The impact might be

identical. But the charity is different. Sharing
identity with the charity can motivate a gift.
A donor can also identify with the fundraiser.

Sharing similarities can help. In experiments, people
are more compliant if the requester shares
● The same birthday
● Fingerprint similarities, or
● The same first name. 11
One study examined 27 years of major gift

proposals at a major research university. 12 When
female major gift prospects were solicited by female
fundraisers, they
● Were more likely to give,
● Gave larger amounts, and
● Were more likely to make subsequent gifts.
Another study looked at a university’s

fundraising phone calls. Alumni were more likely to
give to student callers who shared their same
● Field of study 13
11 Burger, J. M., Messian, N., Patel, S., del Prado, A., & Anderson, C. (2004).
What a coincidence! The effects of incidental similarity on compliance.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(1), 35-43.
12 Adams, C. C. (2017). Gender congruence and philanthropic behavior: A
critical quantitative approach to charitable giving practices. [Dissertation].

University of Missouri-Columbia.
https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/handle/10355/62238
13 Bekkers, R. (2010). George gives to geology Jane: The name letter effect and
incidental similarity cues in fundraising. International Journal of Nonprofit and

Voluntary Sector Marketing, 15(2), 172-180.
14
● First name, or even

● First letter of their first name. 14
This also happened when the alumnus’s name started

with the same letter as the university’s name.
Another study found a similar result. It asked

for donations for an education project. If the project
was led by a teacher with the donor’s first name,
giving doubled. 15
The importance of name matching might seem

odd. But one’s name is central to one’s identity. In
fundraising, identity-defining similarities are
powerful.
Fundraising and subjective similarities

Identity-defining similarity makes giving
attractive. Similarities can be shared with
beneficiaries or charity personnel. But this shared
identity is not fixed. A fundraiser can influence it.
She 16 can,
● Reference and remind donors of similarities.
14 This difference was 40.9% vs. 19.5%

15 Munz, K., Jung, M., & Alter, A. (2017). Charitable giving to teachers with the
same name: An implicit egotism field experiment. ACR North American
Advances, 45.
http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/v45/acr_vol45_1024370.pdf
16 As a convention for clarity and variety, throughout this series the
donor/hero is referred to with “he/him/his” and the fundraiser/sage is

referred to with “she/her/hers.” Of course, any role can be played by any
gender.
15
● Shape perceived similarities through Socratic

inquiry.
● Build perceived similarities through donor
experiences.
● Suggest giving options that match with
identity-defining similarities.
Some similarities are obvious. But the real

power comes from similarities that matter to the
donor. These connect with the donor’s identity-
defining characteristics.
How can a fundraiser discover these? By

listening. Powerful fundraising begins by asking
questions and listening. Appreciative inquiry can
uncover the donor’s life story and values. These
reveal the donor’s identity-defining traits. They show
the similarities that matter to the donor.
Armed with this information, the fundraiser

can match the giving challenge with the donor’s
identity. A gift can support specific projects. It can
help specific people. It can advance specific values.
This can link the first two steps in the journey:
A fundraiser can uncover these identity-

defining factors. But she can do more. She can
influence them. Asking what’s important to the donor
changes attitudes. It highlights the importance of
these issues. In experiments, asking donors about the
16
importance of causes or projects increases support. 17

Asking donors to recall life story connections to a
cause does the same. 18 These Socratic processes
change donor attitudes.
Donor experiences can also build shared

identity. Events can create a sense of shared group
membership. They can enhance feelings of similarity.
Marketing, too, can emphasize shared identity. Any
experience that makes the donor think, “I’m like
them” is powerful.
Summary
Similarities matter. They matter for the
beneficiary. They matter for the charity. Ultimately,
helping people or organizations like “us” is
compelling. But this “us” is not set in stone. The
donor subjectively defines this “us” group. However
the donor defines it, being part of “us” is powerful.
17 James, R. N., III. (2018). Increasing charitable donation intentions with

preliminary importance ratings. International Review on Public and Nonprofit
Marketing, 15(3), 393-411.
18 James, R. N., III. (2015). The family tribute in charitable bequest giving: An
experimental test of the effect of reminders on giving intentions. Nonprofit

Management and Leadership, 26(1), 73-89; James, R. N., III. (2016). Phrasing
the charitable bequest inquiry. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary
and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(2), 998-1011.
17
18
2
PRIMAL FUNDRAISING AND RECIPROCAL

ALLIANCES:
I’M WITH THEM!
Effective fundraising starts with identity.

Compelling fundraising story connects the donation
story with the donor’s story. When does a story
become the donor’s story? When the donor identifies
with its characters and values.
In fundraising, identifying with others is

powerful. It’s what turns “them” into “us.” It’s what
turns “giving” into “sharing.” A donor identifies with
others for two reasons:
1. I am like them.
2. I am with them.
The first reflects subjective similarity; the

second, alliances. Both are rooted in natural origins.
19
Natural origins of giving: I am like them

Altruism means I give away something valuable
to help another. Why would natural selection lead to
this behavior? The first explanation is similarity: I am
like them. This is the simple math from Hamilton.1 I
give if
This approach is simple. Most altruism in animals

matches this model.
Natural origins of giving: I am with them

But what if we’re not related? How could
natural selection lead to altruism? I give up
something valuable. It helps you, but it costs me.
And you are not at all like me. In natural selection,
this seems like a bad idea.
But now let’s add a wrinkle. Suppose our world

becomes better if we both act this way. This changes
things. Altruism is still costly. But in the long run, it
could benefit me. It could also benefit others similar
to me. This opens the possibility for alliances. This
opens the possibility for reciprocal altruism.
Let’s play a game

We have a dilemma. Altruism costs the donor.
But if everyone does it, everyone is better off.
1Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal

of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 17-52.
20
(Otherwise, altruism outside the family would never

make sense.)
Biologists model this dilemma with a game. 2

Let’s start with two players. My choice is this. I keep
everything and get a larger reward. Or I give and get a
smaller reward.
That’s an easy choice. The answer is simple:

Don’t give. Now suppose my gift helps the other
player more than it costs me. The answer is still
simple: Don’t give. With an unrelated player,
changing the payoff doesn’t matter.
Adding a new twist changes the game. Now,

the other player also faces the same choice. If we both
give, we both become better off. A simple trade now
makes sense.
But a new problem changes the game once

more. Suppose each must choose before knowing
what the other player will do.
Here’s an example. Both players face these

payoffs:
2Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science,

211(4489), 1390-1396; Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a
good model of reciprocal altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4), 211-
222; Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly
Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
21
They don’t give They give

I give I get 0 points; We each get 2
they get 3 points
I don’t give We each get 1 I get 3 points;
point they get 0
If we both give, we both win. (We each get 2

points. The total is 4 points.) If I give and they don’t,
they win big, and I lose big. (I get 0 points. They get
3 points. The total is 3 points.) If neither gives, we
both lose. (We each get 1 point. The total is only 2
points.)
This simple game captures the core issue. 3

Reciprocal altruism is possible. It is beneficial. But it
requires an alliance. It requires trust. Why? Because
I must act before I know what the other player will do.
3 The tradeoff scenario is also called the prisoner’s dilemma. Of course,

reciprocity need not be altruistic. It can be simple mutualism. Suppose it
takes two cavemen to bring down a wooly mammoth. If I (as a caveman)
cooperate with the other person, I get a reward. If I don’t, I won’t. That’s not
altruism; that’s mutualism. Altruism occurs when I lose something in order to
benefit an unrelated other. The choice presented in the prisoner’s dilemma
isn’t mutualism. The choice here is altruism because no matter what the
other player does, I am personally better off if I don’t give. But if we both
give, we create additional shared benefit. This is the challenge of altruism. It
costs me to behave altruistically. But the world becomes better for everyone
if we all behave this way. For a detailed discussion of this game, see Boyd, R.
(1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of reciprocal
altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4), 211-222.
22
The little game that could

This little game is powerful. Biologists use it to
model reciprocal altruism across the natural world. 4
Research finds reciprocal altruism in
● Vampire bats 5
● Vervet monkeys 6
● Sea bass 7
● Minnows 8
● Guppies 9
● Fig wasps, 10 and
● Tree swallows. 11
It arises in “fungi, plants, fish, birds, rats, and

primates.” 12 Giving is natural. Specifically, reciprocal
4 See Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation.
Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396; Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's
dilemma a good model of reciprocal altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-
4), 211-222; Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The
Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
5 Wilkinson, G. S. (1984). Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature,
308 (5955), 181.

6 Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1984). Grooming, alliances and reciprocal
altruism in vervet monkeys. Nature, 308 (5959), 541-543.

7 Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science,
211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1394.

8 Milinski, M., Kulling, D., & Kettler, R. (1990). Tit for tat: Sticklebacks
(gasterosteus aculeatus) ‘trusting’a cooperating partner. Behavioral Ecology,

1(1), 7-11.
9 Dugatkin, L. A., & Alfieri, M. (1992). Interpopulational differences in the use
of the tit-for-tat strategy during predator inspection in the guppy, Poecilia

reticulata. Evolutionary Ecology, 6(6), 519-526.
10 Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation.
Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1395.

11 Lombardo, M. P. (1985). Mutual restraint in tree swallows: a test of the Tit
for Tat model of reciprocity. Science, 227 (4692), 1363-1365.

12 Carter, G., Chen, T., & Razik, I. (2020). The theory of reciprocal altruism. In T.
Shackelford (Ed.), The SAGE handbook of evolutionary psychology. Sage.
23
giving is natural. The little game is powerful because

it captures the underlying, primal donation decision.
But it can also model modern giving. Consider

this situation. Suppose my neighborhood is raising
money to refurbish its park. Four different outcomes
match those in the game.
1. Everyone gives a lot. The park will be
beautiful. Property values will go way up.
Everyone will win.
2. I don’t give, but everyone else still does. I come
out even further ahead. Property values still go
up, but it costs me nothing.
3. I give big, but others don’t. I lose. It will cost
me a lot, but improvements will be limited.
Property values won’t go up much.
4. Finally, if nobody gives, nobody benefits.
Property values won’t change.
These four outcomes match the game. The game

models my modern donation tradeoffs. It turns out
this little game is quite flexible. We’ll see that, with
small variations, it can model
● Impact
(“Experiments demonstrate that fungi, plants, fish, birds, and rats can enforce
mutual benefit by contingently altering their cooperative investments based
on the cooperative returns, as predicted by the theory of reciprocal
altruism.”); See also, Carter, G. (2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal
Behavior and Cognition, 1(3), 368-386. p. 368. (“evidence shows that fungi,
plants, fish, birds, rats, and primates enforce mutual benefit by contingently
altering their cooperative investments based on the cooperative returns, just
as predicted by the original reciprocity theory.”)
24
● Gratitude
● Publicity
● Threat or opportunity
● Tax deductions
● Lead gifts
● Matching gifts
● New donor attrition
● Recipient similarity
● Prospect development
● Donor benefits
● Crisis appeals
● And more.
Winning strategies
It starts with a simple choice. Give or don’t.
But with many rounds and many players, the game
gets complicated. Giving costs. Without reciprocity,
it’s never repaid. So, winning means predicting
reciprocity. That’s tricky. But it starts with an
unbreakable natural law. It starts with this:
Giving must be seen by partners who are able
and willing to reciprocate.
Without this, reciprocity is impossible.

Without this, giving always loses. Observers must be
able and willing to reciprocate. Thus, two factors
encourage giving in the game:
25
1. Audience capacity.
This answers, “Are they able to reciprocate?”
2. Reciprocity signals.
This answers, “Are they willing to reciprocate?”
These are rules for the primal-giving game.

These are also rules for the modern fundraising game.
We’ll look at both in depth. But first, it’s important to
recognize something.
That’s not how people think

OK, I get it. These games might be fun. But
there’s a problem. Maybe you’ve sensed it already.
You might be saying,
• “That’s not how people think!” or
• “Nobody plays this silly Sudoku game before
donating.”
Fine. I’ll concede. This isn’t how people think.

(Well, maybe professors do. But we don’t count as
real people.) Here’s the thing. Natural selection isn’t
based on what people think. It’s based on what they
do.
It’s how they act

Can we predict where a cow will graze? Yes.
How? With a spatial lag regression model.
Specifically, one including elevation, slope, cover, and
26
distance from fence, roads, and water. Don’t believe

me? Read the academic paper. 13
But is that how cows think? Are cows secretly

doing calculus? 14 Probably not. But cows do graze
optimally. The ones who didn’t died out long ago.
Optimizing behaviors replicate. Failing

behaviors don’t. A model that identifies optimizing
behavior will predict actions. This is true even if it
isn’t “how” a creature thinks. 15 Natural origins might
not predict how people will think. They do predict
how people will act.
The game predicts actions. But the game’s

math calculations are not how people think. Indeed,
they shouldn’t be. Slowly making such deliberative
calculations is inefficient. Instead, these reactions are
quick. They’re embedded deep in fast, intuitive,
13 Sawalhah, M. N., Cibils, A. F., Hu, C., Cao, H., & Holechek, J. L. (2014).
Animal-driven rotational grazing patterns on seasonally grazed New Mexico
rangeland. Rangeland Ecology & Management, 67(6), 710-714.
14 Maybe Gary Larson was right!
https://imgflip.com/memetemplate/173580524/Far-Side-Cows-Car
15 “A key insight of evolutionary theory is that natural selection produces
seemingly strategic behaviors that are economically rational, even if the

mechanisms are different from those that facilitate human decision-making.”
Carter, G., Chen, T., & Razik, I. (2020). The theory of reciprocal altruism. In T.
Shackelford (Ed.), The SAGE handbook of evolutionary psychology. Sage.
The “calculated reciprocity error” is the idea that reciprocal altruism can’t
apply to simple creatures because it requires “an understanding of game
payoffs and the ability to keep score, plan ahead, and delay gratification.” But
it doesn’t. It requires only the behavior, not the understanding. Carter, G.
(2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 1(3), 368-
386.
27
emotional systems. 16 Zoologist Gerald Carter

explains,
“Calculated reciprocity in humans often
appears ‘instinctive,’ subconscious, and
context-specific. Rather than relying on
strategic self-control, many human prosocial
behaviors are fast, intuitive, and built into our
basic emotions ... Reasoning through a logic
puzzle is slow and difficult compared to the
way insight is quickly gained about the same
logical problem framed as a social exchange.” 17
How people think is with social emotion, not

math. But the math still predicts behavior. In each
case, the game works. It matches experiments. It
matches real-world donor behavior. It matches
effective fundraising practice.
It’s how they act even when it doesn’t make

sense
But wait a second. Often donors aren’t
expecting any actual reciprocity or returned favors.
And they certainly know the beneficiaries aren’t
16 Rand, D. G. (2016). Cooperation, fast and slow: Meta-analytic evidence for a

theory of social heuristics and self-interested deliberation. Psychological
Science 27(9), 1192-1206; Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., Kraft-Todd, G. T., et
al. (2014). Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation. Nature
Communications, 5(3677), 1-12.
17 Carter, G. (2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal Behavior and
Cognition, 1(3), 368-386.
28
related to them. So, why are reciprocity and similarity

signals still important?
Giving behavior didn’t develop in the modern

world. It developed in a smaller, more communal
world. In that world, reciprocity was real.
Responding to reciprocity signals could even impact
survival.
In the modern world, things may be different.

These ancient signals may no longer make sense
logically. But the power of the signal remains. It
remains because it’s hard wired. Changing the
environment doesn’t change the power of the signal.
An example from biology illustrates this. In the

1940s, a biologist was working with herring-gull
chicks. 18 Chicks begged for food by pecking on a
parent’s beak. Noticing a red dot on the beaks, he
painted this on a flat stick. The chicks pecked at the
red dot on the stick.
But then things got weird. He made a striped

metal rod with even stronger contrast. The chicks
went for it. They loved it so much, they ignored the
parent’s natural markings. 19
Here’s another example. The female fritillary

butterfly’s fluttering wings attract males for mating.
18 Tinbergen, N., & Perdeck, A. C. (1951). On the stimulus situation releasing

the begging response in the newly hatched Herring Gull chick (Larus
argentatus argentatus Pont.). Behaviour, 3(1), 1-39.
19 Id. p. 35.
29
In nature, faster fluttering shows better health and a

more attractive mate. But in the lab, a rotating
cylinder creates super-fast fluttering. It turns out,
male butterflies prefer the high-speed cylinder to
actual female butterflies. 20
These “supernormal” stimuli are odd

examples. 21 But they show an underlying idea.
Preferences develop in the original natural setting.
But they continue even after the setting changes. 22
They continue even if they no longer make sense.
Prehistoric man had no international relief

charities or institutional advancement offices. But the
giving signals selected in prehistory still matter
20 Magnus, D. (1958). Experimentelle Untersuchungen zur Bionomie und

Ethologie des Kaisermantels Argynnis paphia L.(Lep. Nymph.) I. Über optische
Auslöser von Anfliegereaktionen und ihre Bedeutung für das Sichfinden der
Geschlechter. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 15(4), 397-426.
21 Staddon, J. E. R. (1975). A note on the evolutionary significance of
"supernormal" stimuli. The American Naturalist, 109(969), 541-545. For an

example in humans, see Morris, P. H., White, J., Morrison, E. R., & Fisher, K.
(2013). High heels as supernormal stimuli: How wearing high heels affects
judgements of female attractiveness. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(3),
176-181.
22 This is known as the concept of ecological rationality.
“Importantly, the mind was designed by the average consequences

of natural selection in ancestral environments, and so it is not
necessarily guided by information about the prospective profitability
of a potential relationship that is actuarially rational in the present ...
But the mind's mechanisms may be ecologically rational. In an
ecologically rational mind, psychological mechanisms are triggered
by the presence of cues associated with ancestral challenges and
opportunities.” (Citations omitted.)
Sznycer, D., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2019).
The ecological rationality of helping others: Potential helpers integrate cues of
recipients' need and willingness to sacrifice. Evolution and Human Behavior,
40(1), 34-45. p. 35.
30
today. 23 They still matter, even if they no longer make

sense.
The signals still matter

Instead of birds and butterflies, let’s look at
people. In the game, the unbreakable natural law of
giving starts with,
“Giving must be seen ...”
Gift visibility works. But here’s where it gets

weird. It works even if it isn’t real. Just posting a
picture of watching eyes nearby increases donations. 24
The results get even more extreme. One

experiment put three dots on fundraising appeal
letters for a public library. 25 The three dots were
arranged either as a “pyramid,”
23 “For example, humans treat one-shot economic games as if they might be

repeated, which makes sense given that most social interactions in the human
ancestral environment would be repeated (Delton et al., 2011).” Carter, G.,
Chen, T., & Razik, I. (2020). The theory of reciprocal altruism. In T. Shackelford
(Ed.), The SAGE handbook of evolutionary psychology. Sage.
Citing to,
Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2011). Evolution of
direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot
encounters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(32), 13335-
13340.
24 Bateson, M., Nettle D., & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched
enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters, 2, 412-414;

Haley, K. J. & Fessler, D.M.T. (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect
generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior,
26, 245-256.
25 Krupka, E. L., & Croson, R. T. (2016). The differential impact of social norms
cues on charitable contributions. Journal of Economic Behavior and

Organization, 128, 149-158
31
or as “eyespots”:
Letters with “eyespots” generated more than

three times the donations of those with a “pyramid.” 26
Of course, this isn’t logical. But it is predictable. The
ancient signals still drive behavior. The do so even
when they no longer make sense. When we flip that
switch, we get a response.
Conclusion
The primal-giving game matters. This little
game shows when reciprocal altruism works. It shows
when it works in the big game of survival.
In prehistory, we won that game by paying

attention to these signals. The modern world is
different. But playing the modern fundraising game
still requires paying attention to these ancient signals.
Next, we’ll explore one of those signals.
26 Id. p. 154. t. 1.
32
3
PRIMAL FUNDRAISING AND CAPACITY FOR

RECIPROCITY:
I’M WITH THEM BECAUSE THEY’RE IMPORTANT TO
ME!
It starts with a question

In nature, sustainable giving to unrelated
others does occur. But it happens only with reciprocal
alliances. These alliances start by answering a
question:
Who is able and willing to return a favor?
Predicting who is able involves many factors:

● Who is likely to have a shared future with me?
(Who is near me? Who is stable?)
● Who has strength (or other valuable resources)
to share?
● Who can observe my giving?
33
Answering these gets complex. But biologists often

model these using a simple game. 1
The primal-giving game

The game is this. Two unrelated players both
face these same payoffs.
they get 3 points
point they get 0
Each must choose to give, or not, before

knowing what the other will do. The game has an
unbreakable law. It is this:
Without this, reciprocal altruism fails. Giving

costs. Thus, if a gift’s audience can’t reciprocate,
giving always loses. As capacity to reciprocate grows,
so can giving.
One-round game
Suppose there is only one round of this game.
In that case, giving would break the first law. My
giving is never seen by a partner with capacity to
1Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of

reciprocal altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4), 211-222.
34
reciprocate. They must decide to give before they see

my choice. After they see my choice, the game is over.
Giving is possible. But reciprocity is not. In

this scenario, we have no future together. The right
play is simple. Don’t give. Ever. Without reciprocity,
giving always loses.
Invisible giving
The game must have more than one round.
Otherwise, giving never makes sense. What if the
game had multiple rounds, but no one could tell if I
gave or not? Again, giving would break the first law.
If other players never see my gifts, they can’t respond
to them. They can’t reciprocate. Without reciprocity,
giving always loses.
One-night stand
Now suppose my giving is visible, but only to
the other player. Reciprocity is possible, but only if I
encounter this player again. What if we will never
meet again? Giving would break the first law. We
have no shared future. This player has no capacity for
reciprocity. Without reciprocity, giving always loses. 2
2“With two individuals destined never to meet again, the only strategy that
can be called a solution to the game is to defect always despite the seemingly
paradoxical outcome that both do worse than they could have had they
cooperated.” Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of
cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1391.
35
Capacity for reciprocity in the game

In this game, the audience’s capacity to
reciprocate is simple. It’s just the number of future
game meetings. If I’ll meet them in 0 future games,
they can’t reciprocate. If I’ll meet them in 1 future
game, they can. If I’ll meet them in 10 future games,
they can reciprocate 10 times more.
Chance fits in the game, too. If there’s a 1%

chance I’ll meet them in 1 more game, I probably
don’t care. But if there’s a 10% chance I’ll meet them
in 100 more games, I probably should care.
Capacity for reciprocity in nature: Strangers

vs. neighbors
In nature, reciprocal altruism starts with the
same question: Do we have a shared future? (In other
words, will we play future reciprocal games?) The
formal idea is this:
“The shadow of the future makes it ecologically
rational for organisms to cooperate, rather
than cheat or exploit each other. In part, this is
because an act of defection now lowers the
probability of receiving a stream of benefits in
the future if one’s partner responds to
defection in kind.” 3
3Sznycer, D., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2019).
40(1), 34-45. p. 35.
36
In the game, this “shadow of the future” is

simple. It’s the expected number of future
interactions. In nature, this number is high for
neighbors and low for strangers. Researchers explain,
“There are two quite different kinds of
interaction: those in neighboring territories
where the probability of interaction is high, and
strangers whose probability of future
interaction is low.” 4
Neighbors have a shared future. Strangers

usually don’t. Among neighbors, the capacity to
reciprocate is high. Among strangers, it is low.
Animals will form reciprocal alliances with neighbors.
They’ll do so even with competing neighbors. But
they won’t do this with strangers. 5
One example of mutual sharing happens in the

ocean. Small cleaner fish will eat parasites off larger
fish. The larger fish don’t eat the cleaners, although
they could. Both sides benefit. But this doesn’t
happen everywhere. It happens only when there are
stable neighborhoods. Researchers explain,
“Aquatic cleaner mutualisms occur in coastal
and reef situations where animals live in fixed
home ranges or territories. They seem to be

211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1395.
5 See, e.g., Getty, T. (1987). Dear enemies and the prisoner's dilemma: Why
should territorial neighbors form defensive coalitions? American Zoologist,

27(2), 327-336.
37
unknown in the free-mixing circumstances of

the open sea.” 6
Some places – such as the open ocean – have

no neighborhoods. Without stable neighbors,
repeated interactions are rare. Without this shared
future, reciprocal helping disappears.
In nature, sustainable giving starts with a

shared future. This requires stable neighbors. For
example, ants have many reciprocal relationships with
other species. Ant colonies stay in one place. In
contrast, honeybees don’t have such relationships. 7
Honeybee colonies often relocate.
Reciprocal altruism starts with this question:

Do we have a shared future? With unstable
neighbors, expected future meetings decline. With
unstable neighbors, reciprocal altruism fails. 8
Charity strangers
So, what do games, fish, ants, and bees have to
do with fundraising? In each case, sustainable giving
starts by answering, “Do we have a shared future?”

211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1394
7 Id. p. 1394; Wilson, E. O. (1971). The insect societies. Bellknap.
8 Examples of inter-species cooperation must be based exclusively on
reciprocity, as similarity is impossible. However, the importance of

neighborhoods increases even more for intra-species cooperation because
neighbors tend to also have a higher probability of genetic relatedness. See
Eshel, I., Samuelson, L., & Shaked, A. (1998). Altruists, egoists, and hooligans in
a local interaction model. American Economic Review, 88(1), 157-179.
38
Stable neighbors have a future together. Passing

strangers don’t.
Some charities see the big “open ocean” of

generic prospects. They think success lies there. They
like their own story. So, their thought is this:
“Just throw our message as far and wide as
possible! The potential is unlimited!” 9
This sounds good. And, yes, the charity can

“reach” many prospects. But it reaches them as a
stranger.
Approaching another as a stranger doesn’t

encourage sharing. (Nature says, “Strangers make
bad partners.”) Thus, this “open ocean” approach
isn’t initially rewarding. Professor Adrian Sargeant
explains,
“It typically costs nonprofits two to three times
as much to recruit a donor than they will give
by way of a first donation.” 10
Nevertheless, this strategy can eventually work.

But it works only if the charity then becomes a stable,
9 Or, as Greg Warner calls it, the “spray and pray” method. See Warner, G.
(2018). Engagement fundraising: How to raise more money for less in the 21st
century. MarketSmart.
10 Steinberg, R., & Morris, D. (2010). Ratio discrimination in charity
fundraising: The inappropriate use of cost ratios has harmful side-effects.

Voluntary Sector Review, 1(1), 77-95. p. 86.
Citing to,
Sargeant, A. (2008). Donor retention: What do we know and what can we do
about it? Association of Fundraising Professionals,
www.afpnet.com/content_documents/Donor_Retention_What_Do_We_Kno
w.pdf
39
reciprocal neighbor. The charity must create a shared

future with the donor. In the game, this means
ongoing reciprocal interactions.
Charity neighbors
Call it engagement. Call it relationship. Call it
community. These are all good social-emotional
words. But in the game, they simplify to one thing.
These are the expected number of future reciprocal
interactions. Increase this and giving makes sense.
Eliminate this and it doesn’t.
How can a charity increase future reciprocal

interactions? There are many ways. Maybe it’s
building a mutually supportive community of board
members. Maybe it’s creating compelling volunteer
activities. Maybe it’s hosting attractive gatherings.
But let’s start simple. Want to succeed in

fundraising? Go see donors. 11 Bring a gift. Neighbors
do that. Good ones do it regularly.
It sounds simple. But it’s rare because it’s hard

work. Staying in the office is easier. Pontificating
about branding style guides is more fun. But answer
this: “What works in the primal-giving game?”
The game isn’t about marketing corporate-

speak. Instead, it depends on a number. It depends
on the expected number of future reciprocal
11For an excellent description of this concept see, Tumolo, J. (2017). Go see

people: Grow your fundraising program. Independently published.
40
interactions. This starts with a simple question: “Do

we have a shared future together?”
Charity neighbors and strangers in legacy

giving
“Go see donors?” Really? Is that it? No. But it
starts there. Many charities fail to take this first step,
even with potentially large donors.
Consider legacy giving. The estate gift is

normally, by far, the largest gift a donor will ever
make. 12 And yet, charities often react to learning of
such a planned gift – by disappearing.
Modern campaign metrics use a “count it and

forget it” approach. A charity learns it is in the
donor’s will. So, it declares victory, and then
disappears. Fundraisers receive no credit for
maintaining the relationship. The neighborly visits
stop. This changes the answer to, “Do we have a
shared future?” It changes the expected number of
future reciprocal interactions. What happens then?
The gift goes away. 13
12 Decedents in 2007 with estates of under $2 million, $2<$5 million, $5<$10

million, $10<$50 million, $50<$100 million, and $100 million+, produced
estate gifts averaging 3.5 times, 20 times, 25 times, 28 times, 50 times, and
103 times, respectively, their average annual giving in the last five years prior
to death.
Steuerle, C. E., Bourne, J., Ovalle, J., Raub, B., Newcomb, J., & Steele, E. (2018).
Patterns of giving by the wealthy. Urban Institute. Table 4.
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99018/patterns_of_givi
ng_by_the_wealthy_2.pdf.
13 For data on the end-of-life instability of charitable estate components, see
James, R. N., III., & Baker, C. (2015). The timing of final charitable bequest
decisions. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing,
20(3), 277-283.
41
One study looked at decedents from several

large charities’ legacy societies. 14 What happened
during their last two years of life? About one in four
received no communications from the charities.
Among these people, half removed their gifts. But for
those who got at least one communication, fewer than
a quarter removed their gifts.
This seems obvious, right? Stay connected to

your donors. But even among these large charities, it
often didn’t happen. And when it didn’t, the gifts
went away.
Neighbor strength and stability in nature

Reciprocal altruism works best with a strong,
stable neighbor. In the game, sharing with a player
who is about to leave makes no sense. This changes
the answer to the question, “Do we have a shared
future?” In nature, weakness or sickness usually ends
reciprocal cooperation.
Researchers explain,
“The ability to monitor cues for the likelihood
of continued interaction is helpful as an
indication of when reciprocal cooperation is or
is not stable…. Illness in one partner leading to
reduced viability would be one detectable sign
14 Wishart, R., & James, R. N., III. (2021). The final outcome of charitable
bequest gift intentions: Findings and implications for legacy fundraising.

International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 26(4),
e1703.
42
of declining [future interactions]. Both

animals in a partnership would then be
expected to become less cooperative.” 15
This occurs even at the microscopic level. In a

“microbiome mutiny,” formerly helpful bacteria
become harmful when a host becomes seriously ill. 16
The strategy makes sense. A partner who is likely to
expire can’t offer long-term reciprocity. Reciprocal
altruism no longer works.
In the game and in nature, sharing works best

with a strong, stable partner. This is true for people,
too. In experiments, people are more likely to share
with a high-status player. 17 Even in primitive tribes,
high-status members receive more gifts of food. 18
15 Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation.

Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1395.
16 Rózsa, L., Apari, P., & Müller, V. (2015). The microbiome mutiny hypothesis:
can our microbiome turn against us when we are old or seriously ill? Biology
Direct, 10(1), 1-9.
17 Ball, S., & Eckel, C. C. (1998). The economic value of status. The Journal of
Socio-Economics, 27(4), 495-497. They’re also more likely to join a high-status

person in supporting a cause. See, Ebeling, F., Feldhaus, C., & Fendrich, J.
(2017). A field experiment on the impact of a prior donor’s social status on
subsequent charitable giving. Journal of Economic Psychology, 61, 124-133.
18 Hames, R. (2017). Reciprocal altruism in Yanomamö food exchange. In L.
Cronk, N. Chagnon, & W. Irons (Eds.), Adaptation and human behavior: An

anthropological perspective (pp. 397-416). Routledge. (“Research in
hierarchical societies (Betzig 1988; Bird and Bird 1997) clearly shows that high-
status households receive disproportionately more and give
disproportionately less in food exchanges.”)
Citing to,
Betzig, L. (1988). Redistribution: Equity or exploitation. In L. Betzig, M. B.
Mulder & P. Turke (Eds.), Human reproductive behavior: A Darwinian
perspective (pp. 49-63). Cambridge University Press;
Bird, R. L. B., & Bird, D. W. (1997). Delayed reciprocity and tolerated theft: The
behavioral ecology of food-sharing strategies. Current Anthropology, 38(1), 49-
78.
43
Charity strength and stability in fundraising

For real world fundraising, the results are
similar. Donors give more to strong, stable
charities. 19 Studies using financial data from
thousands of charities confirm this. One reports that
fundraising success is predicted by a charity’s
“Ability to continue to operate and provide
charitable services in the event of changed
economic circumstances.” 20
Another concludes,
“Donors want to know whether the
organization can continue to operate in the
future.” 21
But wait. Shouldn’t large donations go to the

neediest organizations? Nature says no. Nature says
share with the strongest, most stable partners.
Do large donations go to the neediest

organizations? Of course not. More than two-thirds
of all donations over $1 million go to universities that
19 Trussel, J. M., & Parsons, L. M. (2007). Financial reporting factors affecting

donations to charitable organizations. Advances in Accounting, 23, 263-285;
Parsons, L. M., & Trussel, J. M. (2008). Fundamental analysis of not-for-profit
financial statements: An examination of financial vulnerability measures.
Research in Government and Nonprofit Accounting, 12, 35-56.
20 Parsons, L. M., & Trussel, J. M. (2008). Fundamental analysis of not-for-
profit financial statements: An examination of financial vulnerability

measures. Research in Government and Nonprofit Accounting, 12, 35-56. p.
35. (Also see p. 52, “Our results suggest that contributions are positively
associated with a charitable organization’s ability to continue to operate …”)
21 Trussel, J. M., & Parsons, L. M. (2007). Financial reporting factors affecting
donations to charitable organizations. Advances in Accounting, 23, 263-285. p.

268.
44
hold large endowments or foundations that are large

endowments. 22 In 2019, nine of the ten largest
charitable gifts went to such groups. 23
Stability is particularly important for estate

gifts. Death reminders increase giving to a charity
when it is described as making a “lasting” – rather
than an “immediate” – impact. 24 Among those with
estates over $5 million, 78% of charitable dollars go to
permanent foundations. 25 Over a quarter of all
charitable bequests to education go to just 35 of the
wealthiest, oldest, and most stable private schools. 26
As in nature, strength and stability attract giving.
Showing charity strength and stability

Strong, stable charities attract major gifts. If
you have it, emphasize it. Be careful though. This
isn’t just about, “Aren’t we so great?” It’s still about
the donor. It’s about answering, “Do we have a shared
22 See, e.g., Coutts and Co. (2015). Coutts million pound donors report.
http://philanthropy.
coutts.com/en/reports/2015/united-states/findings.html and
http://philanthropy.coutts.com/en/reports/2015/united-
kingdom/findings.html
23 Yakowicz, W. (2019, Dec. 29). The biggest philanthropic gifts of 2019.
Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/willyakowicz/2020/12/29/the-top-10-
philanthropic-gifts-of-2019
24 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Tost, L. P., Hernandez, M., & Larrick, R. P. (2012). It’s
only a matter of time: Death, legacies, and intergenerational decisions.

Psychological Science, 23(7), 704-709.
25 Raub, B. G., & Newcomb, J. (2011, Summer). Federal estate tax returns filed
for 2007 decedents. Statistics of Income Bulletin, 31, 188-191.

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11essumbulestatereturns.pdf (among
decedents in 2007 with estates of $5 million and above, 78% of charitable
dollars went to private foundations).
26 Fleischer, M. P. (2007). Charitable contributions in an ideal estate tax. Tax
Law Review, 60, 263-321. p. 303.
45
future together?” Strength and stability messages can

help. They help when they show that, “Donors can
make a lasting impact here.” They help when they
show that, “We can have a long future together.”
But what if the charity is new? In experiments,

just using permanence language to describe impact
can help. 27 Also, when a charity doesn’t have
permanence, it can sometimes borrow it.
It can borrow it from other supporters. A

community of wealthy and committed donors has
strength and stability, even if the charity is new.
Strong, stable supporters encourage giving by others.
Research experiments show this. People are more
likely to donate after seeing a high-status player give
than after seeing a low-status player give. 28
A charity can even borrow permanence from

other organizations. In experiments, the chance to
endow a permanent fund can dramatically increase
donations. 29 Even a new or unstable charity can offer
this. It can create a fund held by a strong community
foundation.
27 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., Tost, L. P., Hernandez, M., & Larrick, R. P. (2012). It’s
only a matter of time: Death, legacies, and intergenerational decisions.

Psychological Science, 23(7), 704-709.
28 Kumru, C. S., & Vesterlund, L. (2010). The effect of status on charitable
giving. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(4), 709-735.

29 James, R. N., III. (2019). Encouraging repeated memorial donations to a
scholarship fund: An experimental test of permanence goals and anniversary

acknowledgements. Philanthropy & Education, 2(2), 1-28.
46
Conclusion
In the game, giving depends on a question:
“Will we play future reciprocal games?” In other
words, “Do we have a shared future?” In nature, and
in fundraising, the same question applies.
There are many ways to show, “Yes, we have a

shared future.” There are many ways to build
community. There are many ways to be a strong,
stable neighbor. Pick your favorite. But the
underlying game still matters. When a charity wins
the primal-giving game, it wins the fundraising game.
47
48
4
RELATIONSHIP IS THE FOUNDATION OF PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I’M WITH THEM BECAUSE WE’RE PARTNERS!
In nature, giving to unrelated others can be

sustainable. But it requires some form of reciprocity.
This need not be immediate. It need not be
proportional. It can be a different size or type. It can
occur much later. But it starts by answering a
question:
Who is able and willing to return a favor?
Answering this simple question can get complex.
Able and willing

As seen in the last chapter, predicting who is
able involves many factors:
● Who is likely to have a shared future with me?
(Who is near me? Who is stable?)
● Who has strength (or other valuable resources)
to share?
49
● Who can observe my giving?
Predicting who is willing is even more

complicated. In real life, people use signals to predict
the type of relationship. The relationship then defines
reciprocity expectations.
Answering “What will this person do?” starts

with “Who is this person to me?” Is the person a
loved one, friend, neighbor, stranger, or enemy? This
defines reciprocity expectations. In a scale, it might
look like this:
Loved one (lover, spouse,

close family)
Friend
Helpful
Teammate
reciprocity
Colleague
Neighbor
Community member
Customer
Transactional
Merchant
reciprocity
Stranger
Harmful Competitor
reciprocity Enemy
Relationship signals are reciprocity signals.

Move up this scale and sharing increases. 1 Move
1 In experiments, giving to family members always exceeds giving to non-

family members. At each level as the relationship becomes more tenuous –
friend, group member, outsider, competitor – giving falls. Ben-Ner, A., &
Kramer, A. (2011). Personality and altruism in the dictator game: Relationship
to giving to kin, collaborators, competitors, and neutrals. Personality and
Individual Differences, 51(3), 216-221; Scaggs, S. A., Fulk, K. S., Glass, D., &
50
down and sharing decreases. Then it disappears.

Then it turns to warfare.
Relationship and giving

Effective fundraising builds higher, “helpful
reciprocity” relationships. These relationships build
trust.2 They support giving. This is nothing new in
fundraising advice. The emphasis on love and passion
led Dr. Beth Breeze to comment that,
Ziker, J. P. (2017). Framing charitable solicitations in a behavioral experiment:

Cues derived from evolutionary theory of cooperation and economic
anthropology. In M. Li, & D. P. Tracer (Eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
Fairness, Equity, and Justice (pp. 153-178). Springer.
2 The relationship between trust in a charity and willingness to donate is well
established in research. See, e.g., Alhidari, I. S., Veludo-de-Oliveira, T. M.,

Yousafzai, S. Y., & Yani-de-Soriano, M. (2018). Modeling the effect of
multidimensional trust on individual monetary donations to charitable
organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 47(3), 623-644, p.
623. (“Data were collected in Saudi Arabia … Individuals’ trust in charitable
organizations affects both the intention to donate and future monetary
donation behavior.”); Chapman, C. M., Hornsey, M. J., & Gillespie, N. (2021).
To what extent is trust a prerequisite for charitable giving? A systematic
review and meta-analysis. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
08997640211003250; Hager, M. A., & Hedberg, E. C. (2016). Institutional trust,
sector confidence, and charitable giving. Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector
Marketing, 28(2), 164-184; Küchler, L., Hertel, G., & Thielsch, M. T. (2020,
September). Are you willing to donate? relationship between perceived
website design, trust and donation decisions online. In Proceedings of the
Conference on Mensch und Computer (pp. 223-227); Middleton, G. H., & Lee,
H. T. (2020). Non-profit organization’s innovative donor management-the
identification of salient factors that drive donor loyalty. Asia Pacific Journal of
Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 14(1), 93-106; Sargeant, A., & Lee, S. (2004).
Trust and relationship commitment in the United Kingdom voluntary sector:
Determinants of donor behavior. Psychology & Marketing, 21(8), 613-635;
Taniguchi, H., & Marshall, G. A. (2014). The effects of social trust and
institutional trust on formal volunteering and charitable giving in Japan.
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations,
25(1), 150-175.
51
“The ‘how to fundraise’ literature risks being

classified as romance if computers ever
displace librarians.” 3
It’s not a shocking new idea. “Relationship”

works. The fundraising books agree. But there’s a
problem. As Dr. Breeze explains,
“Telling fundraisers to ‘build relationships’
(Burnett, 2002; Burk, 2003), to ‘love’ their
donors (Pitman, 2007), and to treat the process
‘like a romantic courtship’ (Green et al., 2007,
p. 121) is of limited value without insights or
examples of precisely how this can be
achieved.” 4
So, what exactly do we do? And what do we

not do?
Let’s start with what not to do. Sustainable

fundraising requires relationships of helpful
reciprocity. We can ruin these relationships by
1. Acting with no reciprocity or
2. Acting with transactional reciprocity.
3Breeze, B. (2017). The new fundraisers. Policy Press. p. 100

4Id. p. 118. Citing to,
Burk, P. (2003). Donor-centered fundraising. Burk and Associates Ltd.
Burnett, K. (1992/2002). Relationship fundraising (2nd ed.). Jossey-Bass.
Green, F., McDonald, B., & van Herpt, J. (2007). Iceberg philanthropy:
Unlocking extraordinary gifts from ordinary donors. The FLA Group.
Pitman, M. (2007). Ask without fear: A simple guide to connecting donors with
what matters to them most. Standish and Wade Publishing.
52
No reciprocity means no giving

Giving to unrelated others does happen in
nature. It can even include giving to those of other
species. But these all start with some form of
reciprocity. This reciprocity need not be similar in
● Amount
● Kind, or
● Timing.
It can be
● Smaller
● Different, or
● Much, much later.
These are no problem. But without some kind

of reciprocity, giving always loses. In nature, giving
outside the family without any reciprocity is deadly.
It’s an unnatural act.
When a charity asks donors to give without any

signals of reciprocity, it’s asking donors to perform an
unnatural act. It might have clever advertising. It
might have a detailed marketing plan. But
underneath it all, it’s sending primal messages. It’s
saying,
• “We’re not here to help you!”
• “We’re not partners!”
• “Sharing with us is foolish!”
53
No marketing plan can overcome those underlying

signals.
Transactional reciprocity excludes

generosity
The next step above no reciprocity is
transactional reciprocity. This fits
merchant/customer norms. Exchanges are brief and
“strictly contingent.” Any trade must immediately
benefit both sides.
Such relationships can be beneficial. But here’s

the problem for fundraising. Transactional
relationships don’t include generosity.
Transactional behavior in anthropology

Across human cultures, whenever a
relationship becomes transactional – or “strictly
contingent” – giving stops. Anthropologist Raymond
Hames explains,
“Ethnographers studying people as diverse as
foragers (Mauss, 1967) and Irish smallholders
(Arensberg, 1959) have long noted that
attempts to [strictly] balance exchanges are
tantamount to ending … relationships.” 5
5 Hames, R. (2017). Reciprocal altruism in Yanomamö food exchange. In L.

Cronk, N. Chagnon, & W. Irons (Eds.), Adaptation and human behavior: An
anthropological perspective (pp. 397-416). Routledge. p. 411.
Citing to,
Arensberg, C. M. (1959). The Irish countryman: An anthropological study. P.
Smith;
Mauss, M. (1967). Essai sure le don. The gift: Forms and functions of exchange
in archaic societies. Norton. (This is a translation of the 1923 essay)
54
This isn’t just for people. Zoologist Gerald

Carter explains,
“Similar to humans, nonhuman primates
cooperate in a more contingent manner with
less bonded partners.” 6
Following transactional norms signals a

strictly contingent relationship. It signals the absence
of a sharing or helping relationship. It kills
generosity.
Transactional behavior in the movies

What’s so bad about being transactional? The
classic 1960 movie The Apartment gives an example.
A cheating husband is trying to restart an affair with a
younger woman. The following scene shows how
much of a heel he is. He leaves his family on
Christmas Eve to meet her for a rendezvous. He says,
“I have a present for you. I didn’t quite know
what to get you -- anyway, it’s a little awkward
for me, shopping – so, here’s a hundred dollars
-- go out and buy yourself something.”
She starts crying, begins to take off her coat
and says, “Okay ... as long as it’s paid for ...” 7
6 Carter, G. (2015). Cooperation and social bonds in common vampire bats.

[Ph.D. dissertation]. University of Maryland, College Park, MD. p. 23.
7 Wilder, B. & Diamond, I. A. L. (1960). The apartment. [Movie script].
https://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/apartment.html
55
It’s a cringe-worthy Hollywood moment. His

behavior is “transactional.” The relationship drops
from “lovers” to “merchant selling goods.”
Making a relationship transactional isn’t just a

problem in anthropology or Hollywood romance. It’s
a problem for charities.
Transactional behavior in charities

I often share research findings with nonprofit
groups. Once, I was talking about which words and
phrases work best with donors. A frustrated manager
interrupted, “But I just want their money. Can’t I tell
them that?”
Of course, that doesn’t work. Try selling

anything with this line. Suppose you walk into a
business. On the wall in bold lettering is their motto:
“We just want your money.”
How would you feel?
No business would be this foolish. So how do

charity administrators go so wrong? It’s an issue of
worldview. From their perspective, their
“relationship” with donors is this:
“We’re great!”
“Therefore, people should give us things.”
“Because we deserve it. (Because we’re so
great!)”
56
“Our part in a relationship? Just keep being

our fantastic selves!”
“And, oh yes, keep reminding people how
wonderful we really are.”
Have you ever known someone like this? How

would you like to be in a relationship with them? If
you found yourself in that relationship, how long
would you stay? Why do you think donor retention is
so low?
In this worldview, donors are just an ATM.

Helping an ATM makes no sense. It only reduces
transactional efficiency.
The cheating husband in The Apartment

explains,
“Go out and buy yourself something. They
have some nice alligator bags at Bergdorf’s.”
His “present” is efficient. Transactional norms are
efficient. But they contradict sharing relationships.
Ultimately, they destroy generosity.
One research study analyzed key factors

underlying successful major gift “asks.” 8 The secret?
It started with this:
“First, they are made within relationships of
trust rather than as a result of a transactional
approach.”
8Breeze, B., & Jollymore, G. (2017). Understanding solicitation: Beyond the
binary variable of being asked or not being asked. International Journal of
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 22(4), e1607.
57
Tiny signals
Even small signals in word choice make a
difference. Leading with formal, technical, financial,
and contract terms sends a signal. It signals an arms-
length, market, strictly contingent relationship. It
signals a transactional relationship. In experiments
(reviewed in other chapters 9), these signals
consistently reduce generosity.
Small signals can hurt. But they can also help.

They can reflect a helpful relationship. They can even
reflect love. In one experiment, solicitors for a
muscular dystrophy charity changed the phrase on
their T-shirts. Changing from “DONATING =
HELPING” to “LOVING = HELPING,” increased
donations by more than half. 10
An experiment for African famine relief placed

donation boxes in 14 bakeries. Changing the headline
on the box from either “DONATING = HELPING” or
no headline to “DONATING = LOVING,” nearly
doubled donations. 11
9 See Chapter 10. Using family words not formal words in fundraising story and
Chapter 4. Math problems in fundraising story: Motivations & barriers in Book
I of this series, The Storytelling Fundraiser: The Brain, Behavioral Economics,
and Fundraising Story.
10 Guéguen, N., Jacob, C., & Charles‐Sire, V. (2011). The effect of the word
“loving” on compliance to a fundraising request: Evidence from a French field

study. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing,
16(4), 371-380.
11 Guéguen, N., & Lamy, L. (2011). The effect of the word “love” on compliance
to a request for humanitarian aid: An evaluation in a field setting. Social

Influence, 6(4), 249-258.
58
An experiment for a children’s charity changed

the shape of the donation box. Changing the box from
either round or square to heart-shaped nearly doubled
donations. 12
One massive experiment involved 540,000

Alaska residents in a statewide giving campaign. A
third received postcards beginning a donation request
with “Make Alaska better for everyone.” These had no
impact on giving. Another third instead received
postcards beginning with, “Warm your heart.” These
people were 6.6% more likely to give. They also gave
23% more money. 13
Signals, even small ones, indicate the

relationship. The relationship defines giving norms.
Signaling transactional relationships undermines
generosity. Signaling emotional relationships
supports generosity.
Let’s get practical

We’ve looked at relationship concepts. We’ve
looked at what not to do. But how precisely do we
build these relationships? In the next chapter, we’ll
look at several practical examples. We’ll see how it’s
actually done in the real world. And we’ll see how one
simple strategy underlies it all.
12 Guéguen, N., Jacob, C., & Charles-Sire, V. (2011). Helping with all your heart:
The effect of cardioids cue on compliance to a request for humanitarian aid.
Social Marketing Quarterly, 17(4), 2-11.
13 List, J. A., Murphy, J. J., Price, M. K., & James, A. G. (2021). An experimental
test of fundraising appeals targeting donor and recipient benefits. Nature

Human Behaviour, 5, 1339-1348.
59
60
61
5
PRIMAL FUNDRAISING LEADS WITH A GIFT:

I’M WITH THEM BECAUSE I’M IMPORTANT TO THEM!
Lead with a gift: The primal-giving game

Biologists model sustainable giving in nature
with a game. 1 This primal-giving game models
reciprocal altruism. 2
What’s the best strategy in this game? To

answer this question one professor held an
international computer gaming tournament. With
many rounds and many players, strategies got
complicated. How complicated? He explains,
1This is known as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. For example, two
players both face these payoffs:

I get 0 points; We each get
I give they get 3 2 points
We each get 1 I get 3 points;
I don’t give point they get 0
where each must choose before knowing what the other will do.
2 Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of
62
“An example is one which on each move

models the behavior of the other player as a
Markov process, and then uses Bayesian
inference to select what seems the best choice
for the long run.” 3
So, what worked? When – as in nature –

winners replicate and losers don’t, this complexity
disappeared. One strategy always won. Lead with a
gift, then act reciprocally. 4
This result attracted a lot of attention. So,

another, much larger tournament was held. The
winner? Same answer. Every alternative – no matter
how complex – eventually lost to this simple strategy.
Another version of the game added a twist. It

allowed for miscommunication. Sometimes sharing
was reported as not sharing. In this version, a new
winning strategy emerged. Lead with two gifts, then
act reciprocally. 5 To play the game yourself, go to
https://ncase.me/trust/
Lead with a gift: Back to relationships

So, how does game theory apply to real-world
fundraising? Start with this:

211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1393.
4 Id.
5 This “generous tit-for-tat” offsets the problem of accidents or
miscommunications that might otherwise create a negative reciprocity

tailspin. Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992). Tit for tat in heterogeneous
populations. Nature, 355(6357), 250-253.
63
1. Go see donors.
2. Bring a gift.
When bringing a gift, make sure it’s a good one.

What does that mean? A good gift signals a “helpful
reciprocity” relationship. These relationships are
personal. They encourage generosity. Transactional
relationships are different. They aren’t personal.
They don’t include generosity.
A good gift says several things:

● This is not transactional.
● This is personal.
● I care enough to know what you like.
● I want to make you happy.
Not all gifts are good. Cash rarely works. It’s

transactional, not personal. In experiments, cash
benefits can actually reduce giving. 6
A “gift” given as an explicit trade is not a gift.

It’s a transaction. In experiments, these strictly
contingent “gifts” can also reduce giving. 7
6 For an example where cash payments reduce charitable behavior, see Ariely,
D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation
and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review,
99(1), 544-55. For an example where the promise of cash payments reduce
guilt and increase satisfaction for those who don’t support the charity see
Giebelhausen, M., Chun, H. H., Cronin Jr, J. J., & Hult, G. T. M. (2016). Adjusting
the warm-glow thermostat: How incentivizing participation in voluntary green
programs moderates their impact on service satisfaction. Journal of
Marketing, 80(4), 56-71.
7 Newman, G. E., & Cain, D. M. (2014). Tainted altruism: When doing some
good is evaluated as worse than doing no good at all. Psychological Science,
64
A financially costly gift can be risky. It can

send financial or transactional signals. It can trigger
unwanted feelings of financial obligation. For
charities, it can also feel wasteful.
But a gift can be valuable without feeling costly.

This is because in a social context, “cost” means extra
cost. Consider the same gift with different “extra”
cost.
• Social gift: “I own a condo on Padre Island. It’s
empty during spring break. You can use it as
my gift to you.”
• Awkward gift: “I went on Airbnb and rented a
condo for you on Padre Island during spring
break. You can use it as my gift to you.”
The gift value is identical. But in one case, it

feels uncomfortable. In the other, it doesn’t. The
difference is the extra cost.
Lead with a gift: A simple fundraising

example
Games and theory are fine. But let’s get
practical. What actually works in fundraising? When
I first became a college president, I wanted to know
the answer. I started by looking at schools with our
same religious affiliation. Usually age, endowment,
25(3), 648-655; Zlatev, J. J., & Miller, D. T. (2016). Selfishly benevolent or

benevolently selfish: When self-interest undermines versus promotes
prosocial behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
137, 112-122.
65
alumni, and tuition predict contributions. 8 And this

was true for our schools, too. Except for one.
One small school was raising money out of all

proportion to its size. It had only one or two frontline
fundraisers. Although located in rural Tennessee, it
received major gifts from across the country. I had to
find out why. So, I went there to see what was going
on.
The long-time fundraiser explained his unique

approach. He had a disabling condition. Sometimes,
he had “bad days” when he couldn’t work. There was
no way to predict when this would strike. So, he
couldn’t do the one thing that all other fundraisers do.
He couldn’t reliably keep appointments.
Here was his solution. He would fly to a

location with a list of donors in the area. He would
drive to the first house. He would knock on the door.
If the donor was home, he would hold out his card,
introduce himself and say,
“Since I was in the area visiting other friends of
the school, the president asked if I would drop
off this small gift to thank you for your years of
support.”
If the donor was busy, this took no more than a

minute of their day. But here’s the reality: He was
always invited in.
8See, e.g., Terry, N., & Macy, A. (2007). Determinants of alumni giving rates.
Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 8(3), 3-17.
66
During the visit, he learned about the donor’s

history with the school. He updated them on the
latest happenings. Because this was a religious
school, he would ask about their lives and ask to pray
with them. The meeting ended by leaving behind a
request “from the president” to consider a specific gift.
But this always came with an explanation that no
decision should be made on that day.
These little meetings became more powerful

because he returned every year. He knew their lives,
their families, their connections, and their charitable
passions. If the donor wasn’t home, he would simply
leave the gift with a personal, handwritten note.
He explained to me,
“I see more donors than any five fundraisers I
know. The reason is simple. No dead time. If
a meeting runs long or short or the donor isn’t
home, it doesn’t matter. As soon as it’s done, I
drive to the next home.”
Harold Seymour recounts another “old school”

example of door knocking. American Cancer Society
canvassers began,
“Good afternoon! I have here your copy of
cancer’s ‘Seven Danger Signals.’ May I come
in?” 9
9 Seymour, H. (1999). Designs for fund-raising (2nd ed.). The Gale Group. p. 77.
67
The point isn’t that these are universal

solutions for fundraising. 10 The point is that these
achieved,
1. Go see donors.
2. Bring a gift.
And they worked.
Game theory: Able and willing to reciprocate

This strategy matches the game. First, consider
the previous chapter on capacity for reciprocity. 11 Do
personal visits change the “predicted frequency of
future meetings?” Yes.
Mentioning other friends of the school in the

area fits, too. How can a charity in rural Tennessee
become a “neighbor” to a donor in California? It
visits. It visits every year. It reminds donors that
other community members are nearby as well.
Next, consider reciprocity signals. The visit

leads with a gift. The gift is delivered personally. It’s
presented as not financially costly. (“I was already in
the area visiting others.”)
The visit emphasizes personal connections. It

includes appreciative inquiry and listening. Every
10 He shared a story how one school with a similar religious affiliation in
Malibu, California explained that such a strategy wouldn’t work with their
high-net-worth donors. He said, “I didn’t want to argue, but I looked at their
list of top donors, and a third of them were people I had been visiting this way
for years.”
11 See Chapter 3. Primal fundraising and capacity for reciprocity: I’m with them
because they’re important to me!
68
piece signals a personal, social relationship. Although

a gift request is left behind, the response is purposely
postponed. This prevents any transactional ending to
the visit. It keeps things social.
Lead with a gift: A big fundraising example

So, that’s cute. But maybe what works for a
tiny little religious school doesn’t apply to you? OK.
How about a big prestigious university? NYU went
from near bankruptcy, raising only about $20 million
per year, to completing the nation’s first billion-dollar
campaign. Naomi Levine explains how it happened in
her book. 12
In it, she describes her process of working with

a prospect. The purpose of the first meeting, usually a
breakfast, was to ask for their advice on some
university policy. The conversation would uncover
their connections or interest with different university
programs. The goal was to schedule a campus visit.
At this campus visit, the prospect would

● Take a tour
● Have lunch with the president, and
● Visit with faculty in areas of interest.
The next goal was to then involve them in some

aspect of the university. Levine explains,
12Levine, N. B. (2019). From bankruptcy to billions: Fundraising the Naomi

Levine way. Independently published.
69
“If there was going to be a concert or film

festival at the Tisch School of the Arts, we
would invite them to that. If there was a
seminar at the Law School, we would invite
them to that. If we had an advisory committee
on filmmaking, we would, if appropriate, invite
them to sit on that committee.”
This all took place well before any donation

request. She explains,
“The quicker you ask, the less money you will
receive.”
Game theory: Willing to reciprocate

Consider how this series of experiences builds
the right relationship.
● The charity signals that the donor is valued.
(We need your advice.)
● It leads with social gifts. (Have lunch at our
place. Take a tour. Meet the president.)
● It follows with a personally meaningful
experience. (The lecture, concert, or advisory
committee is carefully selected to match their
interests.) This gift shows, “We care enough to
know what you like.”
This process repeatedly signals a helpful

reciprocity social relationship.
● The prospect gives socially. (He gives advice
and participates.)
70
● He receives socially. (He receives honor,

events, meals, and experiences.)
● This sharing exchange is always non-
transactional.
● The gifts are not presented as financially costly.
(The extra cost of inviting this person to an
event is minimal. 13)
● The process is far removed from any financial
donation request.
Game theory: Able to reciprocate

Giving in the primal game has an unbreakable
law:
The previous social signals help build relationship.
They suggest a willingness to reciprocate. What
about the ability to reciprocate? The tour and
experiences help here as well. They display the
university’s attractive features.
But reciprocity goes further. It can come not

only from the nonprofit, but also from a supporting
community. How does this work? At these meetings
with prospects, the fundraiser rarely went alone.
Levine explains,
13 Note that leading with a gift is still costly. The lunches, tours, meetings, and
events cost money. Even when the “extra” cost is small, the total cost is still
substantial. So, just like in the game, if the prospect never gives back
financially the charity definitely loses.
71
“if a person was in real estate, we would discuss

what real estate person should meet with him.
If he was in insurance or finance, we would
think of people who we felt were his peers and
someone that he would respect. During the
twenty years that Larry Tisch [billionaire
owner of CBS television] was chairman, he
joined most of those meetings.”
Notice how the process created a supportive

audience with enormous capacity. This wasn’t just the
wealthy charity itself – displayed during the tour. It
was also important professional “neighbors.” It was
even a recognized billionaire. All of these pieces work
together to signal ability and willingness for
reciprocity.
What’s the point?

These stories show practical examples of
strategies that worked. Some worked for small
charities. Others worked for large ones.
The point isn’t that any approach is the

universal solution for fundraising. The point is that
the primal game matches reality. Sending signals that
giving will “be seen by partners who are able and
willing to reciprocate” works. Leading with a gift is a
great signal of reciprocity. And it works.
Postscript: Special events

A practical application of the game
72
Understanding the primal-giving game

provides guidance. It can help answer practical
questions. Let’s look at a contentious one: Are special
events a good idea in fundraising?
Some people love them. Some people loathe

them. So, who’s right? The first problem is
definitions. There are two types of “fundraising”
events. An event can “lead with a gift.” Or it can “lead
with a transaction.”
Special events: Leading with a gift

A personal invitation to an attractive event can
be effective – if it’s a gift. It can signal a social,
“helpful reciprocity” relationship – if it’s a gift. It can
connect a donor with meaningful parts of the charity.
It can provide recognition, honor, and gratitude after
a donation. It can build a donor community that
supports future donations. It can do these things – if
it’s a gift.
These events aren’t transactional. They are a

gift to attendees. (The cost is paid by the charity or a
donor.) Because they aren’t profitable, these events
can’t be the end goal. And that’s a good thing. This
shows that the important work is not just the event.
The important work is the whole fundraising process.
Special events: Leading with a transaction
73
Transactional events are different. They charge

fees, provide a service, and generate revenue. They
can make a profit. The profit can help the charity.
Transactional events are easy to sell. The event

timing creates a deadline. This helps motivate sales
requests. People with no idea how to fundraise can
sell event tickets or table sponsorships. These are just
consumer products with a charitable hue.
Administrators like these events. They provide

an immediate quid-pro-quo return. And that’s the
problem. Even when these “work,” they work only
transactionally. Just a bit more income than cost is a
“success.” One group of researchers noted,
“Special events are generally accepted to be the
least cost-effective way for nonprofits to raise
revenue.” 14
Compared to actual fundraising, special event

sales are inefficient. Some accounting professors have
even found charities that hide these inefficient
numbers. 15 Charities move these barely profitable
events into separate entities. This protects the
charity’s own efficiency ratings.
Transactional events vs. social relationships
14 Krawczyk, K., Wooddell, M., & Dias, A. (2017). Charitable giving in arts and
culture nonprofits: The impact of organizational characteristics. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 46(4), 817-836. p. 828. table 2.
15 Neely, D. G., & Tinkelman, D. P. (2013). A case study in the net reporting of
special event revenues and costs. Journal of Governmental & Nonprofit

Accounting, 3(1), 1-19.
74
But don’t such events lead to great

relationships and later donations? Not really.
Instead, they signal a completed, transactional
relationship. 16 Think about it. Suppose a new work
colleague says to you,
“The wife and I are hosting a big New Year’s
Eve party. We’ll have great food and drinks
and even a local band! We would love to have
you come.”
How do you feel? What does this signal about

your relationship? Then he adds,
“Tickets are $75. You can buy in advance or
pay at the door.”
Now, how do you feel? How does this change

the signal about your relationship?
Research supports this feeling about

transactional events. One study used in-depth
qualitative interviews. It examined a “successful and
well-run” money-making charity event. It found that
the event,
“Had little effect on participant’s relationship
with the charity.” 17
16 This also risks blunting the donation impulse by providing a marginally-
beneficial, transactional option that apparently fulfills the reciprocity

obligation.
17 Woolf, J., Heere, B., & Walker, M. (2013). Do charity sport events function
as “brandfests” in the development of brand community? Journal of Sport

Management, 27(2), 95-107. pp. 95 & 104.
75
Another study looked at over 10,000 nonprofit

tax returns. It found that increasing revenue from
special events had almost no impact on later
donations. 18 In fact, increasing operations revenue
(people paying for the nonprofit’s services) actually
worked better. This created more than twice as much
donations growth as increasing special events revenue
did.
These transactional events don’t help

fundraising. There’s another problem. They have a
hidden cost. They can strain staff resources. Worse,
they can be an attractive distraction for fundraisers.
Event work is urgent. (People are coming!)

And it’s relatively easy. (Don’t believe me? Advertise
for an entry-level “event coordinator” or “fundraiser”
with identical pay. Compare the response.) But
urgent and easy doesn’t mean it’s important. It
doesn’t mean it helps with real fundraising.
And the answer is … it depends

This mixed reality of special events matches
theory and research. It also matches the wisdom of
experience. As Naomi Levine explains, her feelings
could be negative:
“Most special events, especially dinners and
galas, were not cost effective …. In addition,
the details of any dinner or gala are
18Krawczyk, K., Wooddell, M., & Dias, A. (2017). Charitable giving in arts and
culture nonprofits: The impact of organizational characteristics. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 46(4), 817-836. p. 828. Table 2.
76
tremendous and also require a great deal of

staff time.” 19
Or they could be neutral:

“[If] the event is used as a way of soliciting gifts
prior to the dinner, or if the dinner is
sponsored by an organization or person, then it
might be viewed as worth the amount of time,
effort, and costs involved.” 20
Or they could be very positive. This happened with an

award dinner recognizing top donors because,
“Donors enjoy such rewards and deserve it.” 21
These mixed feelings match the game. “Sold”

events signal a transactional relationship. They
produce, at best, small, transactional wins. “Gifted”
events signal a personal, helpful relationship. They
can deliver recognition and gratitude. This can
produce transformational wins.
Conclusion
Leading with a transaction can be a way to earn
an immediate profit. But it’s not a good way to
encourage generosity. Leading with a gift won’t earn
an immediate profit. But it is a great way to
encourage generosity.
19 Levine, N. B. (2019). From bankruptcy to billions: Fundraising the Naomi

Levine way. Independently published. p. 53.
20 Id. p. 53.
21 Id. p. 41.
77
This winning first step is the same in the game

and in the real world. Leading with a gift works. 22 In
both the primal-giving game and in modern
fundraising, the answer is the same:
1. Go see donors.
2. Bring a gift!
22The strategy of “leading with a gift” is by no means limited to fundraising. A

crass application is covered in the movie Tin Men about siding salesmen in the
1960s. The great salesman, Bill Babowsky, explains,
“You want to get in good with people ... you want to win their
confidence? Good thing to try ... get a five dollar bill, take it out
when the guy's not looking, drop it on the ground. Ask the guy if he
dropped his bill … Right away this guy is thinking you must be one
hell of a nice guy ... you're in. You've got him for whatever you want
now.”
Levinson, B. (1986). Tin men. [Movie script]. p. 41.
http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Tin_Men.pdf
78
79
6
IMPACT, GRATITUDE, AND RECIPROCITY IN PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE!
The “one big thing” in fundraising is this:

Advance the donor’s hero story. The previous book in
this series explored this in detail.
The universal hero story (monomyth)

progresses through four steps:
The compelling donation experience includes

these same steps. It starts by connecting with
identity. This can come from the following:
1. I am like them. (This is subjective similarity.)
2. I am with them. (This is reciprocal alliances.)
80
Biologists model reciprocal altruism with a

game. 1 This primal-giving game can include simple
alliances. But the game can do more. It can also
include challenge and victory. It can include
enhanced identity. It can include similarity and even
heroism. But all this requires “leveling up” the simple
game.
Impact
In the simplest primal-giving game, impact is
fixed. And it’s identical. Two unrelated players face
the same payoffs. Each must choose before knowing
what the other will do. However, payback is possible
because players can meet again. The payoffs are
these:
they get 3 points
point they get 0
Giving is costly. But it helps the other player

more than it costs. If I give 1 point, the other player
gains 2.
1Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of

81
Now suppose the impact of my gift changes.

The payoffs might instead become these:
I give I get 0 points; I get 2 points;
they get 23 they get 22
point they get 0
Now, my gift has a higher impact. If I give 1

point, the other player gets 22 points. This might
come from low cost. (The gift costs me $1. But a
matching grant means the recipient gets $22.) Or it
might come from high need. (The recipient’s benefit
from $1 is 22 times my benefit from $1). How might
this change alter gameplay?
Impact and gratitude

Impact is great. But in the game, or in nature,
why would unrelated players even care? Let’s go back
to the first law. In the primal game, giving has an
unbreakable law:
Impact matters because it can lead to gratitude.

Gratitude matters because it can lead to reciprocity.
Impact →
Gratitude →
Willingness to return a favor
82
A person expressing gratitude sends a signal.

Gratitude signals their view of
● The impact of the gift
● The value of the relationship, and
● Their willingness to reciprocate.
This gameplay matches experimental research.

Increasing impact works in donation experiments. 2
Expressing gratitude does, too. 3 Both work by
supporting reciprocal social relationships. 4
2 See, e.g., Shehu, E., Clement, M., Winterich, K., & Langmaack, A. C. (2017).
“You saved a life”: How past donation use increases donor reactivation via
impact and warm glow. In A. Gneezy, V. Griskevicius, and P. Williams (Eds.),
NA - Advances in Consumer Research (Vol. 45). Association for Consumer
Research, p. 270-275. p. 272.
http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/v45/acr_vol45_1024372.pdf (“past
donation use increases the perceived donation impact, then induces warm
glow which translates into a higher intention to donate in future”)
3 See, e.g., Andreoni, J., & Serra-Garcia, M. (2021). The pledging puzzle: How
can revocable promises increase charitable giving? Management Science,

67(10), 5969-6627, p. 5969 (“If expressions of gratitude are then targeted to
individuals who select into pledges, reneging can be significantly reduced and
contributions significantly increased.”) Or, for pro-social behaviors more
generally, see the review in McCullough, M. E., Kilpatrick, S. D., Emmons, R. A.,
& Larson, D. B. (2001). Is gratitude a moral affect? Psychological Bulletin, 127,
249-266.
4 Sznycer, D., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2019).

40(1), 34-45. See also, Grant, A. M., & Gino, F. (2010). A little thanks goes a
long way: Explaining why gratitude expressions motivate prosocial behavior.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(6), 946-955.
83
Impact encourages giving. Now consider the

opposite. Suppose my gift has no impact. Payoffs
become these:
I don’t give I get 1 point; I get 3 points;
Now, there is no reason to expect gratitude.

My gift makes no impact. It does nothing to justify
reciprocity. This gift makes no sense.
The hidden impact problem

What if I’m not sure of the other player’s
payoff? I see the payoffs as these:
they get ? they get ?
I don’t give I get 1 point; I get 3 points;
they get ? they get ?
Should I give or not? It’s hard to know. There

isn’t enough information. But with multiple rounds, I
could test with a small gift.
Suppose I make a test gift and get silence. This

signals no impact. It signals no willingness for
reciprocity. Playing this game with this player makes
no sense.
84
Suppose I make a test gift and get a report of

impact and a meaningful expression of gratitude. I’ve
learned something about the other player’s payoff.
I’ve also received a reciprocity signal. Playing this
game with this player does make sense.
The pro forma response

Not every response is meaningful. A “thank
you” can be powerful. 5 But only if it signals gameplay.
In the game, expressing desire for a social, helpful-
reciprocity relationship is meaningful. Why? Because
it signals gameplay. Not all gift responses do this.
Suppose I get a receipt that’s just stamped

“thank you.” Or maybe only months later a “thank
you” call comes. But it’s not from the charity. It’s
from an outside telemarketing firm. The caller says
things like,
● “This call may be monitored or recorded for
quality assurance,” and
● “If you have any questions regarding your
donation, please call member services.”
Do these signal a social, helpful-reciprocity

relationship? Probably not. 6 Do these reveal
5 Andreoni, J., & Serra-Garcia, M. (2021). The pledging puzzle: How can
revocable promises increase charitable giving? Management Science, 67(10),
5969-6627.
6 Suppose to save time a newlywed couple hired a telemarketing firm to
contact each person who gave a wedding gift. The hired telemarketer says,
“thank you for your wedding gift.” Technically speaking, this would qualify as
a “thank you” or “donor acknowledgement.” However, it certainly does not
express either impact of the gift or a willingness for a helpful reciprocity social
relationship. The intuitive understanding of the inappropriateness of such a
85
information about my gift’s impact? Probably not.

These don’t work in the game. So, it’s no surprise that
testing finds they don’t work in real-world
fundraising, either. 7
The new donor problem

The hidden impact problem in the game often
matches the new donor experience. They get a
request. But they aren’t sure about the outcomes. So,
they make a test gift.
How well do charities manage this hidden

impact problem? Not well. About 70% of first-time
donors to a charity never give to that charity again. 8
The game suggests why they are failing. Authentic
signals of gift impact and gratitude work. Silence
doesn’t.
“thank you” in this social context also applies to the social context of a
charitable giving relationship.
7 An experiment tested this type of “worst case” scenario, where the calls
from an outside telemarketing firm were made 5-7 months after the donation
and included variations of these phrases. Although donations were still higher
among those who actually received the calls than those who didn’t, the overall
effect for being on the list of those who were at risk of potentially being
contacted in the experiment was not statistically significant. See, Samek, A. &
Longfield, C. (2019, April 13). Do thank-you calls increase charitable giving?
Expert forecasts and field experimental evidence. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3371327
8 https://bloomerang.co/retention (“‘Over 70% of people that we recruit into
organizations never come back and make another gift, so we’re caught on this
treadmill where we have to spend lots of money on acquisition which most
nonprofits lose money on anyway, just to stand still.’ Professor Adrian
Sargeant”); See also Levis, B., Miller, B., & Williams, C. (2019, March 5). 2019
fundraising effectiveness survey report. (Reporting 20% retention of new
donors in the first 12 months.)
86
How well does game theory match reality? In

one large study, lapsed donors explained why they
quit giving. The top three reasons related to the
charity were these:
● “I feel that other causes are more deserving.”
[Impact]
● They “did not acknowledge my support.”
[Gratitude]
● They “did not inform me how my money had
been used.” 9 [Impact]
In the primal game, impact is important.

Gratitude is important. Without these, game strategy
says, “Play with someone else.” In fundraising, the
same rules apply.
Impact vs. reciprocity: The false gratitude

problem
Gratitude reflects willingness to return a favor.
Unless. Unless the signal is false. Suppose the other
player expresses gratitude. But later, when they could
easily return a favor, they don’t. The reciprocity
signal was fake. Gratitude signaled future game play.
But it was a false signal.
That’s how the game works. What about the

real world? What happens when reciprocity fails?
9Sargeant, A. (2001). Managing donor defection: Why should donors stop

giving? New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising, 2001(32), 59-74. p. 64.
table 4.1. (I omit non-charity causes such as donor finances, death, relocation,
or inability to remember making the initial gift. However, this last reason may
also relate to charity’s lack of impact reporting or gratitude expression.)
87
One study of over half a million donations to a public

university gave an answer. 10 If the university failed to
admit a donor’s child, the donor quit giving.
Logically, this shouldn’t have happened.

Donors knew that donations were not part of the
admissions process. But the emotion is hard to
overcome. The university had a chance to help, and it
didn’t. The relationship is broken. Only a fool gives
to a player who won’t return a favor.
Impact vs. reciprocity: The charity crisis

problem
The game is about predicting ability and
willingness to return a favor. Impact can help by
signaling higher willingness to return a favor. Unless.
Unless it also signals lower ability to return a favor.
A charity may find that an organizational crisis

appeal “works.” The charity is in trouble. The need is
desperate. The gift will make a big impact. The
appeal raises quick cash.
But this also cannibalizes the future large gift.

It signals that the charity is unstable. This is now a
less trustworthy player. They might leave the game
anytime. Stable charities attract major gifts. Unstable
charities don’t.
10 See, Meer, J., & Rosen, H. S. (2009). Altruism and the child cycle of alumni
donations. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1(1), 258-286.
88
The conflict disappears if the crisis is not an

organizational crisis. A stable charity can appeal on
behalf of others in need. This doesn’t suggest that the
charity is at risk. This is a crisis. But it’s not an
organizational crisis.
The conflict also disappears if the charity faces

an opportunity rather than a crisis. The gift still
makes a big impact. But the charity isn’t signaling
instability.
Impact vs. reciprocity: Weird results

Impact is important. But in the game, it’s
important only as a reciprocity signal. Understanding
this helps to explain some weird results.
In experiments, describing another player as

needy increases giving to them. 11 Unless. Unless the
other player had already shared money with the
potential donor in a previous round. In that case,
donors still give a lot. But they give the same,
regardless of need. 12 The researchers explained,
“When the stranger is very willing to sacrifice
[to help the potential donor], their need does
not appear to matter.” 13
11 “In the low need condition, the stranger is living a normal, happy life. In the
high need condition, the stranger has experienced costly medical diﬃculties
recently that are making completing school diﬃcult.” Sznycer, D., Delton, A.
W., Robertson, T. E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2019). The ecological rationality
of helping others: Potential helpers integrate cues of recipients’ need and
willingness to sacrifice. Evolution and Human Behavior, 40(1), 34-45. p. 42.
12 Id. p. 40. Figure 2.
13 Id. p. 40.
89
Need can signal reciprocity willingness. But

actual reciprocity behavior makes the signal
redundant. The signal no longer matters.
Impact vs. reciprocity: Matching gift vs. lead

gift
Reciprocity signals also help to explain the
unusual power of lead gifts. The simple primal-giving
game matches funding for a shared project, such as a
neighborhood park. The project benefits the group.
But there’s always a temptation not to give, hoping
that others will take care of it.
How can a donor make a large gift in a way that

encourages others to give, too? One approach is to
promise a “matching” gift. A donor commits that for
every dollar another donor gives, he will match it with
his own gift. The impact of the other donor’s gift is
doubled. This works. 14
A different approach is to make a lead gift. A

donor simply announces his large gift to help fund the
project. Here’s the weird thing. This also works. 15
14 Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2003). Rebate versus matching: Does how we
subsidize charitable contributions matter? Journal of Public Economics, 87(3-
4), 681-701; Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2006). Subsidizing charitable giving
with rebates or matching: Further laboratory evidence. Southern Economic
Journal, 72(4), 794-807; Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Subsidizing
charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and
rebate subsidies. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 234-252; Karlan, D., List, J. A.,
& Shafir, E. (2011). Small matches and charitable giving: Evidence from a
natural field experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 95(5-6), 344-350.
15 Ebeling, F., Feldhaus, C., & Fendrich, J. (2017). A field experiment on the
impact of a prior donor’s social status on subsequent charitable giving. Journal

of Economic Psychology, 61, 124-133; Kubo, T., Shoji, Y., Tsuge, T., & Kuriyama,
90
In fact, an announcement of a lead gift works

better than an announcement of a matching gift of the
same size. This is true in both real-world fundraising
and lab experiments. 16
What’s going on?
The promise of a match can help. But it creates

no reciprocity obligation. It’s contingent. It says, “If
you don’t give, I won’t either.”
The lead gift is different. I lead with a gift that

helps you (or something you care about). I give,
hoping for your response. If you don’t give, you
violate reciprocity norms. I gave; you left me holding
the bag. Everyone can see that you are a bad partner.
The promise of a match helps. But it sends a

contingent signal. A lead gift helps more. It sends a
stronger signal.
K. (2018). Voluntary contributions to hiking trail maintenance: Evidence from a

field experiment in a national park, Japan. Ecological Economics, 144, 124-128.
16 Epperson, R., & Reif, C. (2019). Matching subsidies and voluntary
contributions: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 33(5), 1578-1601; Huck,

S., & Rasul, I. (2011). Matched fundraising: Evidence from a natural field
experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 95(5-6), 351-362; Huck, S., Rasul, I.,
& Shephard, A. (2015). Comparing charitable fundraising schemes: Evidence
from a natural field experiment and a structural model. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2), 326-69; Rondeau, D., & List, J. A. (2008).
Matching and challenge gifts to charity: Evidence from laboratory and natural
field experiments. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 253-267.
91
Adding similarity to the game

So far, the game has included only unrelated
players. In that version, I care about the other player
only to the extent that it affects me. Things change if I
feel that the other player is like me.
This returns us to Hamilton’s simple math. 17 I

give when
In the original game, both players faced these payoffs.

I give I get 0 points; they We each get 2
get 3 points
point they get 0
Now, suppose I treat the other player as a

brother. This equates to 50% similarity. Based on
Hamilton’s genetic math, I now count 50% of their
benefit. My payoffs change to these:
17Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.

92

I give I get 1.5 points I get 3 points
(my 0 + 50% of (my 2 + 50% of
their 3); they get 3 their 2); they get 2
I don’t give I get 1.5 points I get 3 points
(my 1 + 50% of (my 3+ 50% of
their 1); they get 1 their 0); they get 0
Before, giving was costly for me. Now, it’s not.

But it still makes the world a better place. More
giving still means more total points. Adding similarity
makes giving more attractive.
It also makes impact more important. With

unrelated players, impact is important only indirectly.
It affects the game only through reciprocity. But with
related players, it also has a direct effect. It directly
benefits someone who is like me.
Conclusion
Compelling fundraising story starts with
identity. It starts by identifying with another.
Identifying with others can come from two sources:
1. I am like them. (This is subjective similarity.)
2. I am with them. (This is reciprocal alliances.)
In natural selection, giving has the same two

origins: similarity and reciprocal alliances. The
expanded game models both.
93
We’ve taken a deep dive into natural selection

principles. We’ve come back with story principles.
The biologist’s game and the storyteller’s game start at
the same place. They both start with identity.
But for transformational gifts we need to “level

up” the game once more. It’s time to move beyond the
natural origins of the donation. It’s time to explore
the natural origins of the heroic donation. The next
chapter looks at this.
94
7
HEROIC DONATION DISPLAYS IN PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I CAN BE YOUR HERO, BABY! 1
Something’s missing. You might have noticed.

The last few chapters played the primal-giving game. 2
But they didn’t focus on heroes. Now, it’s time to get
back to the “one big thing” in fundraising: Advance
the donor’s hero story.
The heroic donation is an ideal. It’s an extreme

form of philanthropy. The principles from the primal-
giving game can still apply. But the game must
change. It must become more extreme.
1 Iglesias, E., Barry, P., & Taylor, M. (2001). Hero [Recorded by E. Iglesias]. On
Escape [CD]. Interscope. (Chorus: “I can be your hero baby. I can kiss away the
pain. I will stand by you forever. You can take my breath away.”)
2 This is known as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. For example, two

95
Extreme outcomes
Suppose I am Player 1 with these payoffs:
P2 gives for the
P2 doesn’t give rest of his life
P1 gives P1 gets -100 P1 gets -50
points; P2 gets 25 points; P2 gets 0
P1 doesn’t P1 gets 0 points; P1 gets 0 points;
give P2 gets -∞ points P2 gets -∞ points
My gift has a high impact. If I don’t give, the

other player gets -∞ points. He dies. But my gift is
costly.
Reciprocity is possible. But it can’t justify the

gift. Even with the other player’s lifetime of return
giving, my result is still negative. (Here, the gift costs
100 points. We might interact 25 more times. Each
time he might benefit me 2 points. But 25 X 2 is only
50. 50 points is still less than the 100-point cost of
the gift.)
In this game, there is only one rational move

for me. Don’t give.
A new problem
Now, suppose we each face 50/50 odds of
being either Player 1 or Player 2. Still, if Player 1 acts
rationally, he won’t give. Whoever ends up as Player 2
will die.
96
Is there a better alternative? Yes. We could

make a “mutual insurance” pact. We could both agree
to give in a time of crisis. We could agree to support
the other in an emergency, even if it were personally
harmful. We would both survive.
Here’s the problem. No courts enforce these

agreements. At the crisis point, giving is always a bad
idea. Cheating is always the logical choice. This isn’t
just a dilemma in the game. It’s a key issue in natural
selection.
A new solution
In the primal world, survival often depended
on a special type of reciprocity. 3 This was not the
transactional reciprocity of market exchange. This
was friendship reciprocity. It was used only among
close friends and family.
Friendship reciprocity was mutual insurance.

In time of need, a friend would help. This happened
even if the help could never be fully paid back. This
reciprocity was un-transactional.
Transactional reciprocity was fine. If you were

rich and times were good, it might be all you need.
But if everything fell apart, only friendship insurance
3Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker's paradox: Other
pathways to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. Proceedings of the
British Academy, 88, 119-144.
97
could save you. Professors John Tooby and Leda

Cosmides explain,
“For hunter-gatherers, illness, injury, bad luck
in foraging, or the inability to resist an attack
by social antagonists would all have been
frequent reversals of fortune with a major
selective impact. The ability to attract
assistance during such threatening reversals in
welfare, where the absence of help might be
deadly, may well have had far more significant
selective consequences than the ability to
cultivate social exchange relationships that
promote marginal increases in returns during
times when one is healthy, safe, and well fed.” 4
Losing the transactional reciprocity game was

annoying. Losing the friendship reciprocity game was
deadly.
The problem with the solution

So, the solution is simple, right? Just have as
many friendship insurance relationships as possible.
No. That doesn’t work.
The first problem is cost. Friendship insurance

is mutual insurance. Getting unconditional help in a
crisis is great. But giving it is costly.
The second problem is trustworthiness.

Friendship reciprocity with someone who was able
4 Id. p. 132.
98
and willing to deliver in a crisis was critical to

survival. Friendship reciprocity with someone who –
at the moment of crisis – couldn’t or wouldn’t deliver?
That was costly and sometimes deadly.
Tooby and Cosmides explain,

“Although receiving the benefits of friendship
reciprocity was critical, fulfilling the
obligations of this mutual insurance was costly.
Thus, maintaining successful friendships by
projecting oneself – and accurately
ascertaining a partner – as a valuable and
“true” friend rather than a “fair weather” friend
in advance of a crisis was an important and
difficult task central to survival probability.” 5
Separating powerful “true” friends from weak

or “fair weather” friends meant life or death. But how
could you tell the difference in advance of a crisis?
And how could you convince others which kind of
friend you would be in a crisis?
Heroism to the rescue

Heroism solves this problem. Heroism signals
trustworthiness for a mutual insurance partner. In a
crisis, a hero will save you. A hero is
● Able and willing
● To deliver transactionally unjustified
protection
5 Id.
99
● In a time of crisis or need.
Heroism must be sacrificial. A sacrificial act

signals willingness to protect in a crisis. It signals
willingness without transactional justification.
If the act is not risky or costly, it doesn’t do

this. If it’s self-interested or transactional, it sends
the opposite signal. Sacrifice signals willingness to be
a reliable friendship insurance partner.
Heroism must actually protect. Attempting,

but failing, to protect another might signal
willingness. But it doesn’t signal ability to protect in a
crisis. Only a successful protector displays true
friendship insurance reliability.
Heroic philanthropy
A hero displays sacrificial protection. 6 A heroic
donation is this:
a sacrificial gift that protects the donor’s
people or values in a crisis.
6 Philip Zimbardo, Professor Emeritus at Stanford and Founder/President of

the Heroic Imagination Project, explains that heroes can be ordinary people
“who engage in extraordinary actions to help others in need or in defending a
moral cause, doing so aware of personal risk and loss, and without
expectation of material gain for their action.” Zimbardo, P. (2017). Foreword.
In S. T. Allison, G. R. Goethals, & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), Handbook of heroism and
heroic leadership. Routledge. p. xxi.
Similarly, Franco, et al. (2011) define heroism as, “Heroism is the
willingness to sacrifice or take risks on behalf of others or in defense of a
moral cause.” In Franco, Z. E., Blau, K., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2011). Heroism: A
conceptual analysis and differentiation between heroic action and altruism.
Review of General Psychology, 15(2), 99-113. p. 113.
100
It includes the hero’s journey steps.
Heroic philanthropy in a crisis

Heroism signals trustworthiness as a
friendship insurance partner. It shows reliability in a
crisis. This is easy to demonstrate when there is real
peril. But in a safe, modern world such extreme
circumstances are rare.
What else can work? In some cases,

philanthropy can. It can show the ability and
willingness to deliver transactionally unjustified help
and protection. In the right circumstances, it can do
more. It can show this in an extreme or crisis setting.
Heroic philanthropy in experiments:

Sacrifice
Suppose a charity could offer one of two ways
to donate. One way is safe and easy. The other
requires pain and effort. Logically, the first option
will work better, right? Not necessarily.
In one study, people received money they could

anonymously keep or share with a group. 7 Any
7Olivola, C. Y., & Shafir, E. (2013). The martyrdom effect: When pain and
effort increase prosocial contributions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
26(1), 91-105.
101
donated funds were doubled. However, for some

people, donating required a painful task. It required
keeping both hands submerged in painfully frigid
water for 60 seconds.
The result? Those in the painful donation

situation gave significantly more money. They were
more than twice as likely to donate all their money.
Mathematically this makes no sense. Adding

pain to a donation should not result in more
donations. But by the logic of heroism, this makes
perfect sense. The painful contribution scenario
created an opportunity for heroic donations. Giving
everything matched the heroic opportunity. No
surprise then, these 100% donations increased the
most.
In another experiment, people could also

donate to a charity and have their donation matched.
For some, donating required attending a charity
picnic. This was the “easy-enjoyable” condition.
Others, instead, would have to complete a five-mile
run. This was the “painful-effort” condition.
The result? People in the painful-effort

condition offered to donate three times as much as
those in the easy-enjoyable condition. 8 Again,
requiring painful effort for the donation increased
giving.
8Id. Experiment 4. In another test, Experiment 1, the average donation was

nearly twice as much.
102
But there was a way to make this effect

disappear. When experimenters offered both options
at the same time, almost no one chose the painful-
effort option. The researchers explained,
“The presence of an easy alternative for
donating (the picnic) stripped away the
meaningfulness of the painful-effortful
contribution process (the 5-mile run).” 9
When the painful-effort donation was the only

way to give, it created the opportunity for a heroic
donation. But when the painful effort became
unnecessary, it was no longer heroic. It was pointless.
It became meaningless. 10 The opportunity for
heroism vanished.
Heroic philanthropy in experiments:

Protection
Heroism must be sacrificial. But it must also
protect. It must defend from a threat. This is
different than helping those who aren’t in peril. This
difference shows up in experiments.
In one, donors would have their gift matched.

For some, donating required attending a picnic. For
others it required a 30-hour fast. When the cause was
famine relief, the results were as before. Those
9 Id. p. 95.
10 The researchers statistically confirmed this meaningfulness explanation.
Those offered only the painful-effort option rated the contribution as
significantly more meaningful than those in the easy-enjoyable condition. This
meaningfulness difference largely explained the difference in willingness to
contribute.
103
assigned to the painful-effort condition offered to

donate twice as much.
However, this effect reversed when the cause

changed. Instead of helping those in peril (famine
relief) the cause was changed to building a park. 11
Now, donations were lower in the painful-effort
condition. The heroism effect disappeared.
A park is nice. But it isn’t protecting anyone

from peril. It provides no potential for a great victory.
A gift might still be sacrificial. But it isn’t heroic.
In heroic philanthropy, the type of charitable

project matters. Painful-effort giving didn’t work well
for a new park. But it worked great whenever the
cause protected others in peril. It worked when the
cause was
● Tsunami victims 12
● Hurricane Katrina victims 13
● Victims of war and genocide, 14 or
● Starving children. 15
A heroic gift displays both “sacrifice” and

“protection.” Heroic philanthropy needs both parts.
When the donation opportunity provides both parts
11 Olivola, C. Y., & Shafir, E. (2013). The martyrdom effect: When pain and
effort increase prosocial contributions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
26(1), 91-105.
12 Id. Experiment 1A
13 Id. Experiment 1B
14 Id. Experiment 4
15 Id. Experiment 5
104
(required sacrifice + protector role), donations are

higher. When it is missing either part (pointless
sacrifice or non-protector role), donations are lower.
Real world fundraising

Adding extreme circumstances to donations
that protect others in peril works in the lab. But this
isn’t just a matter of lab experiments. It shows up in
real world fundraising. The ice-bucket challenge
raised more than $115 million for the A.L.S.
Association. 16 World Vision’s 30 Hour Famine –
requiring extended fasting – has raised over $170
million. 17 Charity runs are ubiquitous.
But torturing your donors is not the point.

(Unless you’re into that. In that case, some
fundraising events even require walking barefoot on
burning coals or broken glass. 18) The point is that the
behavior gives insight into core donor motivations.
Heroic donation opportunities can be compelling. But
it helps to know why.
16 Rogers, K. (2016, July 27). The “Ice Bucket Challenge” helped scientists
discover a new gene tied to A.L.S. The New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/health/the-ice-bucket-challenge-
helped-scientists-discover-a-new-gene-tied-to-als.html
17 World Vision. (2014, February 19). World Vision 30 hour famine rallies youth
nationwide to fight hunger this weekend. [Website].

https://www.worldvision.org/about-us/media-center/world-vision-30-hour-
famine-rallies-youth-nationwide-fight-hunger-weekend
18 Birks, B. (2006, October 25). Sedgley firewalk. BBC.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blackcountry/content/articles/2006/10/24/fireandglas
s_feature.shtml
Haverhill News. (2004, October 21). Firewalkers blaze a trail for charity.
http://www.haverhill-uk.com/news/firewalkers-blaze-a-trail-for-charity-
1621.htm
105
Knowing why shows the underlying rules.

Knowing the rules helps. It helps in small-gift lab
experiments. It helps in small-gift fundraising events.
The next chapter looks at how it helps in major,
transformational gifts.
106
8
THE HEROIC DONATION AUDIENCE IN PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I NEED A HERO! 1
Biologists model sustainable giving in nature

with a simple game. 2 The heroic donation comes
from an extreme version of this game.
1 Steinman, J. (1983). Holding out for a hero [Recorded by B. Taylor]. On Faster

than the speed of night [CD]. Columbia Records. (Chorus: “I need a hero. I'm
holding out for a hero 'til the end of the night. He's gotta be strong. And he's
gotta be fast. And he's gotta be fresh from the fight.”)

This is known as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. For example, two

107
The numbers game

In the extreme version, two players each risk
becoming either Player 1 or 2. The payoffs are these:
P2 gives for the
P2 doesn’t give rest of his life
P1 gives P1 gets -100 P1 gets -50
points; P2 gets 25 points; P2 gets 0
P1 doesn’t P1 gets 0 points; P1 gets 0 points;
give P2 gets -∞ points P2 gets -∞ points
Each player faces the chance either to save

(Player 1) or be saved (Player 2). But saving the other
player means taking an unrecoverable loss. If players
choose rationally, Player 1 won’t give. Player 2 will
die. One of the players will be Player 2. So, one of
them will die.
There is an alternative. Both players could

agree to a “mutual insurance” pact. This is called
friendship reciprocity. 3 Both agree to deliver
transactionally unjustified aid in a time of crisis.
Both players would survive.
But there is a problem. At the time of need,

there is no way to enforce the agreement. At the point
of crisis, giving is irrational. It’s a losing move. Thus,
picking the right friend is both critical and difficult.
3Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker's paradox: Other
108
The simple game has an unbreakable law:

In the extreme game, the law still applies. But

now, potential partners are those who are able and
willing to save in a crisis. They are willing to do so
even when it’s sacrificial. Simple reciprocity no longer
works. Only friendship reciprocity can help.
The natural game

The game models the natural world. In the
natural world, friendship reciprocity relationships are
critical to survival. 4 But they are tricky.
The dilemma is this:

● Having a reliable friend is valuable. Having a
fair-weather friend is not.
● Being a reliable friend is expensive. Being a
fair-weather friend is not.
4“Many nonhuman animals possess long-term cooperative social bonds that

are functionally analogous to human friendships. Such long-term cooperative
social bonds (henceforth – social bonds) are well described in chimpanzees
and baboons (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012), and there is also evidence for their
existence in macaques, capuchin monkeys, elephants, feral horses, hyena,
dolphins, bats, corvids, and mice (Braun & Bugnyar, 2012; Carter & Wilkinson,
2013c; Fraser & Bugnyar, 2012; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012; Weidt, Hofmann,
König, 2008; Weidt, Lindholm, & König, 2014). Field studies have
demonstrated that strong social bonds provide clear fitness benefits (e.g.,
Cameron, Setsaas, & Linklater, 2009; Schülke, Bhagavatula, Vigilant, & Ostner,
2010; Silk et al., 2010).” Carter, G. (2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal
Behavior and Cognition, 1(3), 368-386. p. 374.
109
Picking a “fair-weather” friend means when the

crisis comes, you die. Picking a loyal – but powerless
– friend has the same result. Being a “fair-weather”
friend isn’t costly. But actually saving a friend means
taking a permanent loss.
This dilemma leads to strategies. It leads to

natural rules for picking mutual insurance partners.
Professors Tooby and Cosmides originated the
evolutionary theory of friendship reciprocity. 5 They
write that the evolutionarily optimal selection of
friends depends on the following:
1. “Number of friendship slots already filled.”
2. “Who emits positive externalities?”
3. “Who is good at reading your mind?”
4. “Who considers you irreplaceable?”
5. “Who wants the same things you want?” 6
These factors reflect a close, mutually

beneficial relationship. They show who is valuable to
you. They show who is invested in you. They show
who is with you.
5 Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker's paradox: Other
6 Id. 136-137.
110
These factors also reflect emotional bonding.

This bonding distinguishes a fair-weather friend from
a reliable friend. At the moment of crisis,
● A fair-weather friend acts rationally.
● A reliable friend acts emotionally.
The fundraising game

A charity can structure giving opportunities to
allow heroic displays. 7 A donor can be seen to
sacrificially protect his people or values. He can even
do it in an extreme setting. This can signal reliability
as a friendship insurance partner.
A charity can do more. It can build a

community of powerful friends. This creates an ideal
audience for a heroic display.
Even more, a charity can act as a reliable

friend. It can become an ideal audience for a heroic
display. But how? How can a charity become an
attractive friend?
The answer starts with the evolutionarily

optimal factors. These can also apply to the charity.
Does the charity,
1. Fit with the donor’s other charity
relationships? [“Number of friendship slots
already filled”]
7See Chapter 7. Heroic donation displays in primal fundraising: I can be your

hero, baby!
111
2. Provide access to valuable relationships or

benefits? [“Emits positive externalities”]
3. Understand the donor’s values and
preferences? [“Good at reading your mind”]
4. Value the donor personally? [“Considers you
irreplaceable?”]
5. Share the donor’s goals and values? [“Wants
the same things you want?”] 8
Answer “no” to any of these questions, and a

major gift is unlikely. Of course, these evolutionary
theorists weren’t writing about major gifts
fundraising. But the rules of the game still apply.
A simple example
One fundraiser for a law school shared this
story.
“I heard that one of our donors was in the
hospital. So, I stopped by just to visit. He
joked about me hoping to collect on the estate
gift. But you know, ever since that meeting,
our relationship completely changed. He has
been much more strongly connected to the
school. That little visit made a huge impact.” 9
British Academy, 88, 119-144. p. 136-137.
9 (2016, June 2). Personal communication. ABA Law School Development
Conference, San Diego, CA.
112
Can visiting a donor in the hospital work?

Theory says, “Yes.” 10 Showing support during a time
of need signals friendship insurance reliability.
In a primitive context, this timing is key. It is

precisely when fair-weather friends will vanish.
Anthropologists explain,
“Individuals who are sensitive to current
probability payoffs have incentive to renege on
exchange commitments to a disabled exchange
partner when they are most in need …
prolonged injury or illness renders an
individual incapable of reciprocating at a time
when he or she is most in need of
investment.” 11
Showing solidarity is nice. But showing

solidarity during a time of need is more meaningful.
It helps separate true friends from fair-weather
friends.
A simple answer
Signals of helpful, social-emotional
relationships encourage generosity. Signals of
transactional relationships don’t. We can see this in
game theory. We can also see it in evolutionary
theory.
10 “These ancient habits would induce modern humans to treat medical care
as a way to show that you care. Medical care provided by our allies would
reassure us of their concern.” Hanson, R. (2008). Showing that you care: The
evolution of health altruism. Medical Hypotheses, 70(4), 724-742.
11 Sugiyama, L. S., & Sugiyama, M. S. (2003). Social roles, prestige, and health
risk. Human Nature, 14(2), 165-190. p. 168.
113
But a fundraiser can get the same answers

without math or biology. Just ask, “What would a
good friend do?”
This simple question is powerful.

Q: Should I actually visit donors?
A: What would a good friend do?
Q: Should I call?
Q: Should I write a personal note?

Q: It’s so cheap to just spam the donor’s inbox.

Should I do that?
What are successful major gifts fundraisers

like? Theory predicts it. Research confirms it. They
tend to excel at friendship-related skills.
Dr. Beth Breeze studied personal skills in

fundraising. 12 Her three-year research project found
the most important factors. These included,
12Pudelek, J. (2014, July 10). Eleven characteristics of successful fundraisers

revealed at IoF National Convention. Civil Society.
114
● “High emotional intelligence”

● “An ability to read people”
● “A great memory for faces, names, and
personal details”
● “A tendency to engage with people” even
outside their job, and
● “A love of reading” particularly “popular
psychology books.”
Experience confirms this, too. Naomi Levine

led America’s first billion-dollar fundraising
campaign. She describes the successful fundraisers
behind it. They,
“Had to be ‘interesting well-read people’ so that
donors would enjoy talking and relating to
them, for fundraising is not primarily about
‘asking people for money’ … It is the cultivation
of people. It is developing relationships.” 13
Time and behavior

Building charity friendship alliances takes
time. CASE suggests donor cultivation of 2 or 3 years
before making a major gift request.14 If this were just
https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/eleven-characteristics-of-successful-
fundraisers-revealed-at-iof-national-convention.html
13 Levine, N. B. (2019). From bankruptcy to billions: Fundraising the Naomi
Levine way. Independently published. p. 31.

14 CASE (Council for Advancement and Support of Education). (2013).
Fundraising fundamentals. CASE.

http://www.case.org/Publications_and_Products/Fundraising_
Fundamentals_Intro/Fundraising_Fundamentals_section_7/Fundraising_Fun
damentals_section_73.html
115
a transaction, such a time commitment would make

no sense. No one needs 3 years to gather
transactional data. But these major gifts are not
simple economic transactions. Again, Levine
explains,
“When you sit down with someone and try to
develop a relationship, you can’t just say, Oh,
Mrs. Jones, would you give me $100 million?
That’s not the way it works. It’s a slow process.
The quicker you ask, the less you get.
Developing relationships and trust often takes
a long time.” 15
Of course, developing such relationships is not

just a matter of waiting for time to pass. The charity
must actually behave as a friend. It must signal that it
is able and willing to act as a reliable friend.
At the moment of crisis, cheating is the

rational choice. Friendship reciprocity is a bet. It is a
bet that a friend will behave non-rationally. Signaling
a close, personal, emotional relationship builds
friendship alliances. Signaling a dispassionate,
formal, detached relationship kills them.
The heroic donation audience

The crucial relationship can be with the charity.
But it can also be with other supporters. They can be
15McCambridge, R. (2013, July 25). Naomi Levine: Insights from a master of

fundraising. Nonprofit Quarterly. https://nonprofitquarterly.org/insights-from-
a-master-naomi-levine-on-the-fundamentals-of-fundraising/
116
potentially valuable friends. They can be the key

audience for the heroic gift. Levine explains,
“Fundraisers can’t go out on their own and
raise the money. Who did I know? Did I know
all the affluent people in New York City?
Obviously not. The board gave me names.
They made suggestions ... They were not going
to give to me; obviously, they were going to
give to people with whom they had a
relationship. Peers are important. A board
gives you such relationships.” 16
High-capacity fellow donors make an ideal

audience for heroic donation displays. Such an
audience encourages transformational gifts.
The “one big thing”

The one big thing in fundraising is still the
same: Advance the donor’s hero story. The natural
origins of heroism, and the heroic donation, come
from friendship reciprocity.
The heroic donation displays friendship

insurance reliability. But this display is pointless
without the right audience. It requires an audience of
potentially valuable friends. It requires an audience
with the ability and willingness to save in a crisis.
The charity can build this audience of reliable

partners. It can also act as a reliable partner. This
16 Id.
117
creates an environment that supports the heroic

donation. This helps to advance the donor’s hero
story.
Postscript: What about friends with benefits?

A hero is a sacrificial protector. A heroic gift
demonstrates sacrificial protection. This signals
attractiveness as a mutual insurance partner. Does
this “attractiveness” extend to romantic partnerships?
In one experiment, women rated the

attractiveness of different men. But they didn’t get
pictures. Instead, they got only behavioral
descriptions of the men. 17 The result? Women
generally preferred altruists for friendships and long-
term relationships. But that wasn’t enough.
They reserved the highest attractiveness ratings

for men showing heroic altruism. The ideal
combination was “dependably brave and altruistic.” 18
Consider this in terms of mutual insurance. Such
men,
● Could be predicted (“dependably”)
● To deliver transactionally unjustified aid
(“altruistic”)
● In a crisis (“brave”).
17 Kelly, S., & Dunbar, R. I. (2001). Who dares, wins. Human Nature, 12(2), 89-
105.
18 Id. p. 102.
118
In the 80’s, Bonnie Taylor sang, “I need a

hero.” 19 Apparently, others share her feelings!
Men also seem to respond to this. In one

experiment, heterosexual men donated twice as much
to charity when observed by a woman rather than by a
man. 20
Still, the best display is not just altruism but

heroic altruism. Thus, reading a romantic scenario
significantly increased men’s willingness to engage in
heroic helping. For example, they indicated greater
willingness to run into a burning building to save a
trapped victim. 21 But they only insignificantly
increased their willingness to engage in mundane
helping. For example, it had little impact on their
willingness to work at a homeless shelter.
Heroism displays friendship insurance

reliability. This encourages all types of friendship
reciprocity relationships, even romantic ones!
19 Steinman, J. (1983). Holding out for a hero [Recorded by B. Taylor]. On

Faster than the speed of night [CD]. Columbia Records.
20 Iredale, W., Van Vugt, M., & Dunbar, R. (2008). Showing off in humans: Male
generosity as a mating signal. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(3), 386-392.

21 Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Sundie, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Miller, G. F., &
Kenrick, D. T. (2007). Blatant benevolence and conspicuous consumption:

When romantic motives elicit strategic costly signals. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 93(1), 85-102.
119
120
9
PRIMAL FUNDRAISING DELIVERS PRACTICAL VALUE

WITH EXTERNAL IDENTITY:
THIS IS TOTALLY WORTH IT!
The noble dream

Small nonprofits have needs. Often, it’s
obvious. The furnishings are a bit ragged. The space
is cramped. The conditions are spartan. But it’s fine.
All this just makes the great struggle faced by the
heroic leaders more noble.
Besides, one day that big gift will come in. One
day, a passing wealthy donor will recognize their
plight and write a million-dollar check!
Look, I understand. It’s fun to engage in

magical thinking. People buy lottery tickets every day.
And besides, the struggling nonprofit is doing good
things; it deserves a big gift. This makes the fantasy
particularly alluring. It feels almost plausible.
And yet, that gift never actually comes. Why

not?
121
The crass reality

This administrator-hero story feels noble. But
sometimes this can be a barrier to understanding. It
makes it harder to see the obvious. So, let’s consider
something much less noble.
Suppose a friend asks for your help. Her

brother runs a used car lot. But he’s struggling.
Perhaps you could stop in and give him some advice?
So, you visit. The furnishings are a bit ragged. The
space is cramped. The conditions are spartan.
The manager says, “Things are tight right now.

But one day we’ll make a million-dollar sale. Then
things will change around here.”
You respond, “Really? Wow! So, where is this

million-dollar car?”
The manager hesitates.
“Million-dollar car? Well, we don’t have one of

those on the lot. But, you know, when that customer
walks in with a million dollars to spend, we’ll figure
something out. This place will really take off when
that happens.”
You ask, “So, you’re waiting for a million-dollar

sale. But you don’t have a million-dollar car to sell?”
122
He responds, “You know, you make a good

point. Here, let me fix that.”
Taking a pen, he changes the sign on one of the

cars to read $1,000,000.
You say, “But that’s not a million-dollar car.”
“It is now,” laughs the manager.
You respond, “No, I mean it’s not worth a

million dollars.”
He says, “It is to me. See? I wrote it down

right there.”
You explain, “No, I mean it’s not worth a

million dollars to the customer.”
There’s a pause.
You sigh and continue, “Look, I may not know

much about your business. But you can’t expect a
million-dollar sale if you don’t have a million-dollar
car on the lot. And you can’t just stick that silly price
tag on it. Even if you think it’s worth that much, that
doesn’t help. It’s got to be worth that much to the
customer.”
Back to fundraising
So, why hasn’t that small nonprofit received its
million-dollar gift? Consider the same questions. Is
123
there a million-dollar “car” on the lot? Have they

been showing that “car” to any potential buyers? For
many small charities, the answer is, “No.” Certainly, if
a donor walked in with a million dollars to spend, they
would figure something out. But that’s not the same
thing.
So, the answer is simple, right? Just slap on a

different price tag. Next time, instead of asking for a
thousand, just ask for a million instead. Now you are
a major gifts fundraiser! Actually, no. That’s not how
it works.
It’s fun to think, “One day that million-dollar

gift will come in!” It’s harder to think, “One day we’ll
deliver value to a donor worth a million-dollar gift.”
That’s not fun or magical. That’s hard work.
Delivering value as a goal

Charities often don’t get a million-dollar gift
because they aren’t trying. Maybe they’re trying to get
that much cash. But they aren’t trying to deliver that
much value. They aren’t trying to offer an experience
worth a million dollars to the donor.
In fact, delivering value to the donor may not

even make sense to them. It doesn’t fit into the
administrator-hero story. In that worldview, donors
are supposed to give because “we deserve it.” They’re
not supposed to give because “we deliver value to
them.”
124
In that worldview, here is the charity’s value

proposition:
Give us your money. We’ll use it to accomplish
our goals. Take it or leave it.
Donors, mostly, will leave it. Of course, small,

social compliance gifts can still happen. A “pat-on-
the-head” gift is possible. A small “isn’t-that-nice-for-
you?” gift still makes sense. But don’t expect the
transformational gift. That value proposition isn’t
going to compel any donor to make a major gift. It’s
not going to inspire sacrificial giving.
Let me be blunt. Is delivering a compelling

donor experience a core competency of your charity?
If not, then every other charity your donor gives to
had better answer the same way. Otherwise, your
organization will get left out.
Delivering value with heroism

The “one big thing” in fundraising is always the
same: Advance the donor’s hero story.
Fundamentally, this is about delivering value to the
donor. It is, in particular, about delivering the kind of
value that only philanthropy can. This is the kind of
value that consuming more stuff won’t give. So, what
does it mean to deliver value to a donor this way?
125
A hero story is a circular journey that results in

an enhanced identity. The simplified steps are these: 1
Or simply,
This pattern also matches the steps for a heroic

donation. A heroic donation is,
A sacrificial gift that protects the donor’s
people and values in a crisis
This matches the story cycle.
1 Joseph Campbell uses a three-step circular illustration with this description:

“victory.”
126
Delivering value: Enhanced identity

The ultimate result of a hero’s journey is an
enhanced identity. The ultimate result of a heroic gift
is the same. This enhanced identity is both
● Internal (within the donor), and
● External (within the donor’s community).
Let’s start with the practical side. What does it

mean to deliver external enhanced identity? We’ve
already seen it in the primal game. The first law of
sustainable giving in nature is this:
The greater the ability and willingness of the

audience to reciprocate, the more value making the
gift has. This value comes from enhancing the donor’s
external identity.
Call it reputation. Call it prestige. Whatever

you call it, an enhanced public identity can be
valuable. It’s valuable if the audience is right. A
heroic gift can deliver value by enhancing external
identity. But this requires a heroic gift audience.
127
Delivering value: Audience

Creating a compelling gift audience rarely
happens accidentally. Developing an audience of
“partners who are able and willing to reciprocate” isn’t
easy. It takes hard work.
And it’s hard work that happens only if the

charity wants to deliver value to the donor. If donors
are supposed to give “because we deserve it,” then
doing this work doesn’t make sense. But if the goal is
to deliver value to the donor, then it does.
How can the charity create this audience? It

can start by being a good audience. A charity can act
like a stable, reciprocal, reliable friend. It can deliver
gratitude for a gift. It can confirm the donor’s
enhanced identity.
Even more powerful, it can build a compelling

audience. This means building a community of
supporters.
The potential reciprocity from a single partner

can be significant. This is called direct reciprocity:
You gave to me (or not) → I’ll return the favor
(or not)
The potential for reciprocity becomes

exponentially larger when a whole community is
reciprocal. This is called indirect reciprocity: 2
2Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature,

437(7063), 1291-1298.
128
I’ve seen you give to others (or not) → I’ll

return the favor (or not)
An audience increases giving

Anonymous donations can’t improve the
donor’s public identity. In actual fundraising, they’re
also rare. Rare, as in 99% of gifts are not
anonymous. 3
In experiments, lowering visibility of the giving

decision decreases donations. 4 More visibility equals
more giving. 5 Oddly, this is true even if the feeling of
visibility comes only from a picture of watching eyes. 6
3 Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (1996). A signaling explanation for charity. The
American Economic Review, 86(4), 1019-1028. p. 1021. (“The data we
collected show that anonymous donations are rare. … The Pittsburgh
Philharmonic received 2,240 donations from individuals in 1991. Only 29 (1.29
percent) were anonymous … Of the 1,950 [donors to the Yale Law School
Fund], only four are anonymous … fewer than 1 percent of donations [to
Harvard Law School] were anonymous. Similarly, in 1989-1990 Carnegie
Mellon University received donations from 5,462 individuals. Only 14 (0.3
percent) were anonymous. Perusal of all reports by nonprofit organizations on
file at the Pittsburgh Business Library found no institution with rates of
anonymous donations higher than in these examples.”) Even these
“anonymous” gifts are often not anonymous to the recipient organization.
They are only anonymous (i.e., not published) for outside observers.
4 Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without
confidentiality: A glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-

8), 1605-1623.
5 See, e.g., Butera, L., Metcalfe, R., Morrison, W., & Taubinsky, D. (2019).
Measuring the welfare effects of shame and pride. National Bureau of

Economic Research Working Paper Series. No. 25637. (Public recognition
motivates charitable giving in experiments.); Lavertu, L., Marder, B., Erz, A., &
Angell, R. (2020). The extended warming effect of social media: Examining
whether the cognition of online audiences offline drives prosocial behavior in
‘real life’. Computers in Human Behavior, 110, 106389.
6 Bateson, M., Nettle, D. & Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance
cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters, 2, 412-414; Haley, K. J., &

Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in
an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245-256.
129
This can also happen with gifts in wills. In one

historical example, testators were actually put on
stage. Researchers compared different 17th-century
Dutch towns. They explained,
“In Zwolle people approached the Bench of
Aldermen, a civic institution, to make their last
will, whereas in Leiden and Utrecht citizens
went to private notaries.” 7 In Zwolle they
“were specifically asked to remember the
poor.” 8
Did this public stage make a difference? In

Leiden and Utrecht just over 10% of wills included
charitable gifts. At the same time in Zwolle, 76% of
wills did so. Making the decision visible had a huge
impact.
Audience matters. A supportive audience

matters even more. Experiments show that
encouragement from others, including other donors,
increases giving. 9 Encouragement to give is even
7 Meerkerk, E. V. N. (2012). The will to give: Charitable bequests, inter vivos

gifts and community building in the Dutch Republic, c. 1600–1800. Continuity
and Change, 27(2): 241-270. p. 253.
8 Teeuwen, D. (1985). Generating generosity: Financing poor relief through
charitable collections in Dutch towns, c. 1600-1800. [Ph.D. Thesis]. Utrecht

University. p. 61-62.
9 Caldwell, M. (1976). Communication and sex effects in a five‐person
prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33,

273- 280; Caporael, L. R., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., & Van De Kragt, A. J. C.
(1989). Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic
incentives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 683-739.; Chen, X. P. (1996). The
group‐based binding pledge as a solution to public goods problems.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 192-202; Dawes,
R. M., Mactavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication, and
assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.
130
more powerful if it comes from group leaders,

especially elected ones. 10 An approving audience – in
particular a high-status one – leads to more giving.
Making the audience optional lowers giving

Audience drives giving. But this doesn’t mean
people always want an audience. In fact, the opposite
may be true.
In one lab experiment, 11 people got a $10

bonus. They could share any of it with another player.
This choice to share or not would be public. They first
decided how much to share. Later, they got a chance
to “opt out.” This meant they would get only $9, not
$10. But this money could not be shared. The choice
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1-11; Issac, R. M., & Walker, J.
(1988). Communication and free riding behavior: The voluntary contribution
mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608; Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public
goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), The
handbook of experimental economics (pp. 111-194). Princeton University
Press; Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effects of social motives, communication,
and group size on behavior in an n‐person multi‐stage, mixed‐motive game.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239-264; Messick, D. M., & Brewer,
M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In L. Wheeler & P. Shaver
(Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 11-44). Sage;
Orbell, J. M., Van De Kragt, A. J. C., & Dawes, R. M. (1988). Explaining
discussion‐induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 811-819; Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust
reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 40, 134-151; Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in
social dilemmas: A meta‐analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992.
Rationality and Society, 7, 58-92.
10 Levy, D. M., Padgitt, K., Peart, S. J., Houser, D., & Xiao, E. (2011). Leadership,
cheap talk and really cheap talk. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
77(1), 40-52.
11 Dana, J., Cain, D. M., & Dawes, R. M. (2006). What you don’t know won’t
hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 100(2), 193-201.
131
to “opt out” was also private. Other players would

never know.
The result? 40% of those who initially chose to

give, later opted out. 12 These players initially gave,
but only because their choice was public. Why would
they take $9 instead of $10? Or why wouldn’t they
take $10, keep $9, and share $1? Because not giving,
or giving only $1, looks bad. It looks selfish.
This was a problem because the giving decision

would be public. If the initial decision was private,
things changed. Only 4%, not 40%, opted out of their
initial (private) decision. But because the initial
decision was private, giving also dropped by a third. 13
Once again, having an audience led to more giving.
Giving changes status with the audience

Having an audience encourages giving. It also
opens the possibility for indirect reciprocity. This can
have real economic consequences. It also shows up in
experiments.
One setup is this. Participants each get money.

They then decide how much to share with the group. 14
12 Id. p. 199.
13 Id. p. 198.
14 This is also called a public goods game. Anything a player shares with the
group is doubled. All group earnings are then divided equally among all
players. Thus, with three or more players, the gift is costly, but everyone
benefits if everyone gives. See, e.g., Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice
guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1402-1413, 1405.
132
Later, they pick a group member as a partner or a

leader.
Who do they pick? When they pick a partner,

people usually pick the most generous player. 15 When
they pick a leader, the results are the same. When
they predict who would earn the most money for the
group, the answer is also the same. People prefer the
most generous person.
In one experiment, people had to pick from two

group members for a profitable venture. The
researchers explained that people,
“Almost always chose to interact with the more
generous member.” 16
Giving affects others’ choices for partners and

leaders. In the lab, a charitable reputation has
economic benefits.
Status from giving can deliver cash value

Experiments in a lab are one thing. But what
about the real world? Is it economically valuable to be
seen as charitable? Of course.
Think about it. Why do corporations donate?

These are pure profit-making machines. And yet, they
15 Id.
16 Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism
in humans. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274(1610),
749-753. p. 752.
133
donate. Why? Because it works. Even for

corporations, public identity is valuable.
Research confirms this. Corporate charitable

giving predicts future revenue. For consumer firms, it
predicts customer satisfaction. 17 It boosts reputation
for features important to
● Customers (for example, quality of products or
services),
● Investors (for example, value as a long-term
investment), and
● Partners (for example, capacity to innovate). 18
Hollywood movies confirm this, too. Perhaps

the most transparently self-interested character in
modern film is the corporate raider, Gordon Gekko.
In the 1987 film Wall Street, Gekko delivers his
famous “Greed is good” speech. And yet, even this
extreme character, says, “I just got on the board of the
Bronx Zoo. It cost me a million.” 19
Why would this selfish corporate raider

character give a million dollars to a charity? Because
it provides access to powerful friends. Because it
17 Lev, B., Petrovits, C., & Radhakrishnan, S. (2010). Is doing good good for
you? How corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth.
Strategic Management Journal, 31(2), 182-200.
18 Brammer, S., & Millington, A. (2005). Corporate reputation and
philanthropy: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 61(1), 29-44.

19 Pressman, E. R. (Producer) & Stone, O. (Director). (1987). Wall Street.
[Motion Picture]. U.S.: 20th Century Fox, at 29:26. In the original screenplay,
this line was, “I just got on the Board of the Zoological Society, cost me a
million.” Stanley Weiser, S. & Stone, O. (1987, April 1). Wall Street.
[Screenplay]. http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/wall_street.html
134
displays his resources. Because it signals shared

values. Because membership is a greenhouse for
reciprocal alliances. These all have substantial
economic value.
The point isn’t that your donors are soul-less

corporations or greedy corporate raiders. The point is
that charities can deliver real value to donors.
Improving a donor’s external (public) identity
matters. It can have real-world, cash-money
consequences.
Primal math in partner selection

Consider this strategic calculation. Suppose I
have a mutually beneficial joint venture. It should
benefit both me and my potential partner. Whom
should I pick as a partner?
Philanthropy can help me decide. How?

Consider the following. What if, through
philanthropy, one potential partner displays financial
strength? This might be helpful. If we get into a
crisis, this partner apparently has the resources to get
us out. That’s a win for me.
What if his giving also supports our shared

group? If he benefits, he’ll probably help our shared
group. I care about our group, so that’s also a win for
me.
Because we share group membership, I also

have extra leverage. If my partner acts badly, I can
135
alert other group members to this. That’s also a win

for me. These are all reasons that make him the
preferred choice. These are also reasons why he
might prefer me as a partner. It’s a win-win.
Fundraiser as builder of a heroic donation

audience
A heroic donation is
a sacrificial gift that protects the donor’s
people or values in a crisis.
It shows both ability and willingness to protect in a
time of need. This demonstrates friendship insurance
reliability. 20 But to be valuable, this demonstration
requires the right audience. The right audience must
include desirable friendship insurance partners.
In the primal context, such powerful and

supportive friends were critical. They meant the
difference between life and death. 21 In the modern
world, the result is only slightly different. In a
political conflict, they might be the difference between
political life and death. In a liquidity crunch, they
might be the difference between economic life and
death. 22
20 See Chapter 7. Heroic donation displays in primal fundraising: I can be your

hero, baby!

22 Note that university endowments are themselves referred to as “shadow
banks” and actually acted as a source of liquidity for major donors during the
late-19th century financial panics. Wray, L. R. (2016). Hyman Philip Minsky
(1919–1996). In Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis (Volume I).
Edward Elgar Publishing.
136
This is where the charity can function as a

major gifts “greenhouse.” The charity can build the
right audience and opportunities for
transformational, heroic giving.
The first rule of fight club: Don’t talk about

fight club
Reputational benefits for donors are real. They
are motivational. But if these benefits are seen as the
reason for the gift, it destroys the identity
enhancement.
In experiments, giving a public financial

payment for a charitable act doesn’t work. It actually
reduces the charitable behavior. 23 One experiment
found that direct benefits for giving did, at least, make
one group feel better. They increased satisfaction and
reduced guilt – for those who didn’t support the
charity. 24 When giving appears motivated by benefits,
it loses its value as a signal.
Delivering value to donors is powerful. But it

must be done in the right way. This value can be real.
But it must preserve the reputational benefits from
making the gift. Giving can be advantageous. But it
must still advance the donor’s hero story.
23 Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image
motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American
Economic Review, 99(1), 544-555.
24 Giebelhausen, M., Chun, H. H., Cronin Jr, J. J., & Hult, G. T. M. (2016).
Adjusting the warm-glow thermostat: How incentivizing participation in

voluntary green programs moderates their impact on service satisfaction.
Journal of Marketing, 80(4), 56-71.
137
Conclusion
Delivering practical value to a donor starts by
building the right audience. It starts by building a
community. This begins the move from giving to
sharing. In the next chapter, we’ll explore this
difference in detail.
138
139
10
THE POWER OF COMMUNITY IN PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I’M NOT JUST GIVING, I’M SHARING!
Giving vs. sharing

Are we asking people to give? Or are we asking
them to share? This might feel like a trivial choice of
synonyms. It’s not.
Giving can be “arms-length,” anonymous, and

transactional. The giver and receiver are separated.
The giver is higher. The receiver is lower. Giving
helps “those people.”
Sharing is different. Sharing helps “us.” Each

person is both giver and receiver. It’s not equal. But
it is reciprocal. It is mutual.
Sharing is communal. It means being part of a

group, a partnership, a community. We can ask an
outsider to give. But we can’t ask an outsider to share.
140
Sharing is communal. This means several

things:
● Sharing requires membership.
● Sharing is visible to the community.
● Sharing supports community goals.
● Sharing follows community norms.
Examples of giving vs. sharing

Suppose a church member donates for their
new building. He’s part of a community, the
congregation. By donating, he joins with his fellow
donors from this community. They’re working
together to fund the new building. He’s also part of
the community of beneficiaries. The congregation will
use the new building. This gift is sharing.
Next, he gives to his local art museum. He

spends time with other donors and art lovers at
museum events. (He is part of a community of fellow
donors and other supporters.) He enjoys the
exhibitions. (He is part of a community of
beneficiaries.) This gift is sharing.
Now suppose he donates for another building.

He receives a request in the mail. The gift helps those
in another country rebuild after an earthquake. This
is giving, but it’s not sharing. It isn’t sharing because
it isn’t communal. He doesn’t know any other donors.
He doesn’t know any beneficiaries. He is an outsider.
This gift will likely be much smaller.
141
Without membership in the supported

community, things are different. The donor is an
outsider. A donation is no longer sharing. It’s just
giving. Remove the community and donations
become smaller.
Principles from primal origins

Sharing is different because it is communal.
This is also important in natural origins. Sustainable
giving to unrelated others can occur in nature.
Biologists model this with a game. 1 In the simple
game, two players both face these payoffs:
they get 3 points
point they get 0
Each must choose before knowing what the other will

do. Giving is costly. But if both players give, the
overall outcomes are better.
When players interact repeatedly, research

shows the winning strategy. Lead with a gift, then act
reciprocally. 2 But there’s a problem. This strategy is a
winning strategy. But it depends. It depends on the
community.
1 See, e.g., Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model
of reciprocal altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4), 211-222; Trivers, R.
L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of
Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1393.
142
Stable strategies
The game models nature. In nature, a winning
strategy must be “evolutionarily stable.” 3 In other
words, if everyone follows the strategy, anyone else
entering with a different strategy should fail. 4
Consider how this applies in the game.

Suppose everyone always gave no matter what.
Everyone wins! This seems great. But it can’t last.
It’s not “evolutionarily stable.”
If a “never give” player entered that world, he

would win every time. In natural selection, “never
give” players would then replicate. They would wipe
out the “always give” players. Giving without “tit for
tat” reciprocity is not stable.
In the game, an “always give” strategy is not

stable. In contrast, reciprocal altruism is stable. You
give first. This is altruism. Then, you do whatever
that player did to you last time. This is reciprocal
altruism. This world can become universally
altruistic. Everyone shares with everyone else, except
no one shares again with the non-sharers.
3 The “evolutionarily stable strategy” concept was first presented in Smith, J.

M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-
18. They note that it combines game theory and earlier work by W. D.
Hamilton.
4 “Roughly, an ESS [Evolutionarily Stable Strategy] is a strategy such that, if
most of the members of a population adopt it, there is no “mutant” strategy

that would give higher reproductive fitness.” Id. p. 15.
143
This world is stable. Suppose a “never give”

player enters. That player wins round one but loses
all repeated rounds. Meanwhile, the reciprocal
altruism players will be sharing with each other. They
will be getting further ahead of the “never give”
player. In natural selection, the “never give” player
disappears.
Reciprocal altruism is stable. An “always give”

strategy is not. Oddly, charities often expect this
unnatural “always give” behavior from donors. They
keep asking donors to give without any signals of
reciprocity. They never even try to deliver value to
donors.
In the game, and in nature, reciprocal sharing

can be stable and beneficial. Non-reciprocal giving
can be deadly. Community can support mutual
sharing. But this happens only if the community is
reciprocal.
The dark side

Now let’s consider the dark side. Suppose the
world is different. Now, it’s composed entirely of
“never give” players. What happens to a new
reciprocal altruism player? Every time he encounters
a new player, he loses. Then he stops giving to that
player. But he takes many losses the other players
don’t. He finishes last.
This “never give” world is also stable. No new

player can win against it.
144
Return of the altruists

Is this “never give” world permanently stuck?
Not necessarily. The “never give” world is stable. No
new player can win against it. But a new community
of players can. 5
Again, suppose everyone plays “never give.”

Next, a new cluster of reciprocal altruists enters.
Whenever possible, they interact with each other.
Their mutual sharing pushes them ahead of the
“never give” players.
Because they enter as a community, they will

dominate the “never give” players. Game theory
researchers explain,
“Altruists can survive in such a [‘never share’]
world if they are grouped together, so that the
benefits of altruism are enjoyed primarily by
other Altruists, who then earn relatively high
payoffs and are imitated.” 6
Reciprocal altruists can win, even in a dark

“never share” world. They can win, but only if they
enter as a community.
The reverse process doesn’t work.

(Researchers explain, “The gear wheels of social
5 Axelrod, R. (1981). The emergence of cooperation among egoists. American

Political Science Review, 75(2), 306-318.
6 Eshel, I., Samuelson, L., & Shaked, A. (1998). Altruists, egoists, and hooligans
in a local interaction model. American Economic Review, 88(1), 157-179.
145
evolution have a ratchet.”) 7 Once reciprocal altruism

becomes dominant, a cluster of “never give” players
can’t invade. Even if “never give” players entered as a
community, it wouldn’t matter. Their community
isn’t helpful. It’s non-cooperative. Community
without sharing is useless.
The power of community: Indirect reciprocity

In the game, sustainable giving requires
community. A single altruist, even a reciprocal one, is
vulnerable. But a community of reciprocal altruists is
strong and stable.
A sharing, reciprocal community does

something else. It increases the consequences of the
giving decision. So far, the game has been focused
only on direct interactions between two players. This
is called direct reciprocity. Simply put, this means
● You shared with me. Therefore, I share with
you.
● You didn’t share with me. Therefore, I don’t
share with you.
When giving is visible to a reciprocal

community, this changes things. It allows indirect
reciprocity. 8 This means,

211(4489), 1390-1396. p. 1394.
8 Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature,
437(7063), 1291-1298.
146
● You shared with him. Therefore, I share with

you.
● You didn’t share with him. Therefore, I don’t
share with you.
Before, the reaction to a giving decision was

limited. It was limited to one other player. That
player might not be encountered again frequently. He
might even leave or die.
But an enduring community can last forever.

The payback from one player is limited. The potential
payback from an entire community is exponentially
larger.
Fundraiser as builder of community

The charity can serve as a greenhouse for this
community building. Donors can build alliances with
the charity and its supporters. Sometimes they can do
this with the charity’s beneficiaries, too. As these
relationships arise, donors become part of a group.
They move from giving to sharing. This is valuable
because group members help each other.
The natural tendency to benefit group

members arises repeatedly in experiments. 9 It even
happens when the other group members are randomly
assigned and anonymous. Allowing future
9A review of 212 experimental studies found a consistent increase in
donations whenever the donor and recipient were placed in the same group.
This worked even when participants were randomly assigned and anonymous.
Balliet, D., Wu, J., & De Dreu, C. K. (2014). In-group favoritism in cooperation:
a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140(6), 1556-1581.
147
cooperation among group members makes the effect

even stronger. 10
It can start simple. Just using “group”

language helps. In one experiment, calling a potential
donor and recipient “a two-member group” increased
donations by 15%. 11 Describing the gift as “dividing”
funds among “a two-member group” increased
donations by 29%. 12 The language of community and
sharing is powerful.
Community support matters

One signal of indirect reciprocity is audience
encouragement. In experiments, encouragement
from others, such as other donors, increases giving.
People are more likely to give when other players
make approving statements or indicate that they also
plan to give. 13 This encouragement to give was even
10 See Id. (Allowing actual cooperation, e.g., future sharing, in experiment

made group-member favoritism even stronger); Ben-Ner, A., & Kramer, A.
(2011). Personality and altruism in the dictator game: Relationship to giving to
kin, collaborators, competitors, and neutrals. Personality and Individual
Differences, 51(3), 216-221. (This experiment measured willingness to donate
to 74 types of recipients. The researchers classified some recipients as
potential collaborators, potential competitors, or neutrals. Giving to neutrals
was 50% greater than giving to potential competitors. Giving to potential
collaborators was 37% higher than giving to neutrals.)
11 Banerjee, P., & Chakravarty, S. (2014). Psychological ownership, group
affiliation and other-regarding behaviour: Some evidence from dictator

games. Global Economics and Management Review, 19(1-2), 3-15. (Giving
changed from 137.3 Rupees to 157.6 Rupees.)
12 Id. (Giving changed from 137.3 Rupees to 177.0 Rupees.)
13 Caldwell, M. (1976). Communication and sex effects in a five‐person
prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33,

273-280; Caporael, L. R., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., & Van De Kragt, A. J. C.
(1989). Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic
incentives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 683-739; Chen, X. P. (1996). The
group‐based binding pledge as a solution to public goods problems.
148
more powerful when it came from group leaders. This

was especially true if the leaders were elected. 14
One meta-analysis looked at over 100

experiments using variations of the primal-giving
game. It found that giving increased whenever
conversations between prospective donors were
allowed. 15 Even in the lab, building donor community
through dialogue increases giving.
Encouragement from others works. But it is

only a signal of future indirect reciprocity. If future
behavior contradicts the signal, it becomes
meaningless. Thus, in experiments, the effect of
verbal encouragement fades or disappears when the
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 192-202; Dawes,

R. M., Mactavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication, and
assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1-11; Issac, R. M., & Walker, J.
(1988). Communication and free riding behavior: The voluntary contribution
mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608; Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public
goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), The
handbook of experimental economics (pp. 111-194). Princeton University
Press; Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effects of social motives, communication,
and group size on behavior in an n‐person multi‐stage, mixed‐motive game.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239-264; Messick, D. M., & Brewer,
M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In L. Wheeler & P. Shaver
(Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 11-44). Sage.
Orbell, J. M., Van De Kragt, A. J. C., & Dawes, R. M. (1988). Explaining
discussion‐induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 811-819; Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust
reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 40, 134-151; Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in
social dilemmas: A meta‐analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992.
Rationality and Society, 7, 58-92.
14 Levy, D. M., Padgitt, K., Peart, S. J., Houser, D., & Xiao, E. (2011). Leadership,
cheap talk and really cheap talk. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
77(1), 40-52.
15 Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-
analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7(1), 58-
92.
149
primal-giving game is repeated. Over time, giving

depends upon the actual experience resulting from
the gift. 16 In the same way, a charity’s words and
phrases can encourage an initial gift. But if the
donor’s resulting experience wasn’t worth the gift,
he’s unlikely to do it again.
Enhanced identity
“Sharing” delivers more value to the donor
than just “giving.” It delivers more indirect
reciprocity. It does this through shared membership
in a community. But sharing also delivers a higher
level of enhanced identity.
Identity comes, at least in part, from group

affiliations. It comes from communities. Effective
sharing enhances
● The donor’s community
● The donor’s connection with that community,
and
● The donor’s standing in that community.
Consider these benefits in terms of the

universal hero story. The story’s ending is this: The
hero returns to a place of beginning with a gift to
improve that world. This is not merely giving. This is
16 See, Bracht, J., & Feltovich, N. (2009). Whatever you say, your reputation
precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game. Journal of Public
Economics, 93(9-10), 1036-1044; Wilson, R. K., & Sell, J. (1997). “Liar, liar ...”
Cheap talk and reputation in repeated public goods settings. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 695-717.
150
sharing. The hero’s original world is a source of his

original identity. The concluding gift enhances
● The hero’s original world
● The hero’s re-connection with that original
world, and
● The hero’s standing in that original world.
The universal hero story (monomyth) is the

story of enhanced identity. It’s a story, ultimately, not
just of giving, but of sharing.
Billions
These story elements are powerful. Their
power goes beyond just games and experiments. It
goes beyond just small gift decisions.
One study analyzed the letters accompanying

187 billionaires’ “giving pledge” commitments. 17
These were pledges to give at least half of their wealth
to charity. Most letters included two elements.
First, they included an origin story. The letters

referenced family upbringing as the source motivating
generosity. The donors’ giving stories started with
17 Schmitz, H. P., Mitchell, G. E., & McCollim, E. M. (2021). How billionaires

explain their philanthropy: A mixed-method analysis of the giving pledge
letters. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 32, 512-523. p. 512. (“The majority of letters express a social–
normative rationale, consisting of two prevailing explanations: An expressed
gratitude and desire to ‘‘give back’’ (1) and references to family upbringing as
a socializing force (2)”)
151
their original identities. (In the monomyth, this is the

original world.)
Second, they referenced a desire not to give,

but to “give back.” Giving back is different than
giving. It is a circular process. It is a form of sharing.
Giving back requires a community. (In the
monomyth, the hero returns to the original world with
a gift.)
The idea of sharing is powerful. It’s powerful

in the lab. It’s powerful in gifts of small amounts.
And it’s powerful with gifts of billions.
Next step
Moving from giving to sharing requires
community. Building that community can be an
important part of fundraising. But community
doesn’t spontaneously produce donations.
Fundraising still requires asking. To harness

the power of community, that ask must be communal.
It must be visible to the community. It must benefit
the community or the community’s goals. It must
follow the community’s norms. The next chapter
looks at this.
152
153
11
SOCIAL NORMS IN PRIMAL FUNDRAISING:

PEOPLE LIKE ME MAKE GIFTS LIKE THIS!
Verba docent, exempla trahunt.
“Words teach people, examples compel them.”

- Latin proverb 1
It’s simple. We want the donor to say, “Yes.”

But how? How do we create the conditions that
encourage that “Yes.”? Let’s look at theory,
experiment, and practice.
1Latin proverb. It has been attributed to, among many, Right Reverend Alfred
A. Curtis, D. D., in 1886 as quoted in Nuns, V., & Wilmington, D. (1913). Life
and Characteristics of Right Reverend Alfred A. Curtis, DD: Second Bishop of
Wilmington. P.J. Kenedy & Sons. p. 104
154
Theory: The primal-giving game

The primal-giving game models the natural
origins of giving. 2 In the game, sustainable giving
depends on community norms. 3
● In a reciprocal, sharing community, giving
makes sense. Others become more likely to
share with givers in the future. Givers benefit
from their enhanced public reputation. Giving
is a winning move.
● In a non-sharing or non-reciprocal community,
giving does not make sense. Others do not
become more likely to share. Givers get no
benefit from their public reputation. Giving is
a losing move.
The right move depends on which world we are

in. How can we tell the difference? It’s complicated.
2This is known as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. For example, two
See the progression of this approach to modeling the natural origins of giving
in the following:
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review
of Biology, 46(1), 35-57;
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science,
211(4489), 1390-1396.;
Boyd, R. (1988). Is the repeated prisoner's dilemma a good model of reciprocal
altruism? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4), 211-222.
3 See Chapter 10. The power of community in primal fundraising: I’m not just
giving, I’m sharing!
155
In real life, there are many possible games and

communities. People may be reciprocal in some, but
not in others. Some gifts may help reputation, while
others won’t.
We could try to test every alternative. But

choosing wrong is costly. The smarter play is this:
Follow the examples of others in your community.
Examples are powerful. But examples of people like
me are even more powerful. The key question is,
“What do people like me do?” The answer shows the
community norm. The community norm dictates the
right move.
Theory: The monomyth

Showing that “people like me make gifts like
this” matches the primal-giving game. It also matches
the universal hero story (monomyth). 4 It does so by
linking the challenge with the full story cycle. That
cycle is,
4These parallel conclusions are not accidental. The monomyth originates in

the Jungian hero archetype. Jung explains that an archetype is “an inherited
mode of functioning, corresponding to the inborn way in which the chick
emerges from the egg, the bird builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the
motor ganglion of the caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas.”
Jung, C. (1953-1978). In H. Read, M. Fordham, & G. Adler (Eds.), The collected
works of C. G. Jung (20 vols). Routledge. Volume XVIII, para. 1228.
Another commentator explains, “ethology and Jungian psychology
can be viewed as two sides of the same coin: it is as if ethologists have been
engaged in an extraverted exploration of the archetype.” Stevens, A. (2001).
Jung: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. p. 52.
156
Showing that “people like me make gifts like this”

connects
• Original identity→ Challenge
Who is “like me?” The answer is personal. It’s
subjective. But whatever the answer is, it
reveals my identity. 5 If others like me accept a
challenge, it links the challenge to my identity.
It shows that I am the type of person who
accepts challenges like this. I am the type of
person who makes gifts like this.
• Challenge→ Victory
These other people also gave. They must have
thought it was a good idea. They must have
thought their gift would make a difference.
That makes it easier for me to believe the same
thing. It makes it easier to believe in the hope
of victory. This helps link the challenge to a
victory.
• Victory→ Enhanced Identity

These other people gave. They must have
thought that the promised victory was
important. This means two things. First, the
victory likely benefits our shared group. Our
group is a key source of my identity. Thus, the
victory enhances this source of my identity.
5 See Chapter 1. Primal fundraising and subjective similarity: I’m like them!
157
Second, other group members will likely

appreciate my efforts to achieve this victory.
(After all, it was important enough to compel
them to give, too.) This appreciation for my
gift solidifies my standing within the group.
The gift helps my group. And it helps my
standing within the group. Both of these help
link the victory to an enhanced identity.
We want the donor to say, “Yes.” That “yes”

comes in response to a challenge. The effective
challenge is part of the full story cycle. It must be
rooted in the donor’s original identity. It must
promise a victory that delivers an enhanced identity.
Showing that “people like me make gifts like

this” helps. It helps link the challenge with the full
story cycle. It helps make the challenge more
compelling. It helps the donor move to a “yes.” It
works. It works not only in games and myth. It also
works in experiments.
Experimental results: Other people

Others’ examples can influence any type of
helping. In experiments, they influence giving. 6 They
6Cason, T. N., & Mui, V. L. (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator
game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2-3), 248-265; Ebeling, F.,
Feldhaus, C., & Fendrich, J. (2017). A field experiment on the impact of a prior
donor’s social status on subsequent charitable giving. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 61, 124-133; Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004). Social comparisons
and pro-social behavior: Testing "conditional cooperation" in a field
experiment. American Economic Review, 94(5), 1717-1722; Herzog, P. S., &
Yang, S. (2018). Social networks and charitable giving: Trusting, doing, asking,
and alter primacy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 47(2), 376-394;
158
also influence volunteering. 7 They even influence

stopping to help a person with car troubles. 8
Others’ charitable examples can make donating

feel like the normal, expected, or default option. Such
defaults can influence behavior. For example,
describing a gift as an opt-out, rather than an opt-in,
increases giving. 9
Others’ examples can be powerful. But this

power increases when the examples are “like me.” If
other people “make gifts like this,” that’s informative.
If people like me “make gifts like this,” that’s
compelling.
One experiment in a law firm found a dramatic

result. Mentioning, “Many of our customers like to
Lieber, E. M., & Skimmyhorn, W. (2018). Peer effects in financial decision-

making. Journal of Public Economics, 163, 37-59; Sasaki, S. (2018). Group size
and conformity in charitable giving: Evidence from a donation-based
crowdfunding platform in Japan.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972403
7 Chen, Y., Harper, F. M., Konstan, J., & Li, S. X. (2010). Social comparisons and
contributions to online communities: A field experiment on movielens.

American Economic Review, 100(4), 1358-1398.
8 Bryan, J. H., & Test, M. A. (1967). Models and helping: Naturalistic studies in
aiding behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6(4), 400-407.

9 Nelson, K. M., Partelow, S., & Schlüter, A. (2019). Nudging tourists to donate
for conservation: Experimental evidence on soliciting voluntary contributions

for coastal management. Journal of Environmental Management, 237, 30-43.
(The opt-in condition was, “I agree to the $X recommended contribution to Lili
Eco trust to … offset my environmental impact.” Giving propensity was 55%
with the lower suggested amount or 48% with the higher suggested amount.
The opt-out condition was, “I do not agree to the $X recommended
contribution to Lili Eco trust to … offset my environmental impact.” Giving
propensity was 75% with the lower suggested amount or 61% with the higher
suggested amount.)
159
leave a gift to charity in their will,” more than tripled

the share of people who chose to do so themselves. 10
The story of Sara: People like me

In one experiment, I compared the effects of
two messages. 11 One described how “you” could use a
charitable gift annuity. The other was identical,
except it described how “Sara” had used a charitable
gift annuity. This message worked better. People
were more interested in making the gift after reading
about Sara.
And then things got more interesting. In

another test, I used identical language but also
showed a picture of Sara. And the results got worse.
The example became less persuasive. To learn more, I
next tested three more pictures:
● Younger Sara
● Middle-aged Sara, and
● Older Sara.
10 Cabinet Office. (2013). Applying behavioural insights to charitable giving.

Cabinet Office – Behavioral Insights Team,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/203286/BIT_Charitable_Giving_Paper.pdf ; For another test of this phrase
component, see also, James, R. N., III. (2016). Phrasing the charitable bequest
inquiry. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 27(2), 998-1011.
11 James, R. N., III. (2019). Using donor images in marketing complex charitable
financial planning instruments: An experimental test with charitable gift

annuities. Journal of Personal Finance, 18(1), 65-73.
160
The result? If the picture was close in age to

the subject, it made the example more persuasive. If
not, it made the example less persuasive.
But further analysis revealed that this result

actually wasn’t about age. It was about identity.
Statistically, age mattered only when it changed the
answer to this question:
“How much do you identify with Sara? She is
[a lot / somewhat / a little bit / not really / not
at all] like me.”
If Sara was “like me,” her example was

powerful. Otherwise, it wasn’t.
Experimental results: People like me

“People like me make gifts like this.” It’s a
powerful fundraising message. Other experiments
show this same result.
One experiment used a public radio station

pledge drive. 12 New members calling in were told,
● “We had another member; he [or she]
contributed $240.”
● This example gift was larger than the typical
gift.
● The use of “he” or “she” alternated randomly.
12Shang, J., Reed, A., & Croson, R. (2008). Identity congruency effects on
donations. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(3), 351-361.
161
What happened? When the “he” or “she”

matched the caller’s gender, average gifts were a third
larger than when it didn’t. A single letter “s” made a
big difference!
In another experiment, 13 students at a Swedish

university were asked for a donation. They were
randomly told the following:
• Group 1 was told nothing else.
• Group 2 was told that 73% of university
students in Sweden made the gift when asked.
• Group 3 was told that 73% of university
students at their university made the gift when
asked.
In the first group, 44% donated. In the second,

60% did. In the third, 79% did. As the example
became more like the donor, giving increased.
Another experiment used students at an Italian

university. 14 They were told, “On average, Italians [or
Germans] donate €70 to support this project.” 15
When the example was Italian, donations were nearly
13 Agerström, J., Carlsson, R., Nicklasson, L., & Guntell, L. (2016). Using
descriptive social norms to increase charitable giving: The power of local
norms. Journal of Economic Psychology, 52, 147-153.
14 Hysenbelli, D., Rubaltelli, E., & Rumiati, R. (2013). Others' opinions count,
but not all of them: Anchoring to ingroup versus outgroup members' behavior
in charitable giving. Judgment & Decision Making, 8(6), 678-690. (Participants
were entered into a drawing to win €100 less any amount they had chosen in
advance to donate to the charitable cause if they won the drawing.)
15 Id. p. 683
162
50% greater than when it was German. 16 Again,

giving by “people like me” was more influential.
This isn’t just about age, or gender, or

nationality. It’s about identity. Researchers call this
the “identity congruency effect.” 17 When “people like
me make gifts like this,” the examples are powerful.
More results: People like me

These same types of results show up in many
experiments with giving 18 or volunteering. 19 One lab
experiment reported,
“Peer effects are positive, with subjects’
donations increasing in those of labmates and
16 Id. p. 684. Figure 3, HA condition.

17 Shang, J., Reed, A., & Croson, R. (2008). Identity congruency effects on
donations. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(3), 351-361.
18 Bennett, C. M., Kim, H., & Loken, B. (2013). Corporate sponsorships may
hurt nonprofits: Understanding their effects on charitable giving. Journal of

Consumer Psychology, 23(3), 288-300. (Learning of corporate sponsorship can
reduce willingness to donate unless the donor has a high level of identification
with the company. The authors write, “Therefore, unless prospective donors
feel sufficiently attached to corporate donors (so as to create similarity or
identification with the donor, which can instill the belief that helping is the
norm), publicizing corporate sponsors can have a negative effect, resulting in
decreased willingness to support a nonprofit among prospective individual
donors.” p. 290.); Drouvelis, M., & Marx, B. M. (2021). Dimensions of donation
preferences: the structure of peer and income effects. Experimental
Economics, 24(1), 274-302. p. 276; Herzog, P. S., Harris, C. T., Morimoto, S. A.,
& Peifer, J. L. (2019). Understanding the social science effect: An intervention
in life course generosity. American Behavioral Scientist, 63(14), 1885-1909;
Tian, Y., & Konrath, S. (2021). The effects of similarity on charitable giving in
donor–donor dyads: A systematic literature review. Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 32, 316-339. p. 316; Zhang,
J., & Xie, H. (2019). Hierarchy leadership and social distance in charitable
giving. Southern Economic Journal, 86(2), 433-458.
19 Fishbach, A., Henderson, M. D., & Koo, M. (2011). Pursuing goals with
others: Group identification and motivation resulting from things done versus
things left undone. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140(3), 520-
534.
163
past subjects. However, subjects did not

respond to … gifts by an anonymous donor.” 20
This also arose in an experiment with

professors. 21 Results showed that professors’ giving
was influenced by another’s initial donation amount.
But not always. This happened only when the initial
donor was revealed to be a member of their own
department (peer) or their department chair (leader).
Without this information, there was no significant
response.
Another study found that showing people data

on how their giving compared with others of their
same age, education, and region increased their
subsequent charitable giving. 22
A meta-analysis found a similar result. It

reported,
“This systematic literature review (35 eligible
studies) investigates how individuals’
charitable giving is affected by the giving of
others. It [proposes] a new mechanism of
decision making in charitable giving through
20
Drouvelis, M., & Marx, B. M. (2021). Dimensions of donation preferences:
the structure of peer and income effects. Experimental Economics, 24(1), 274-
302. p. 276.
21
Zhang, J., & Xie, H. (2019). Hierarchy leadership and social distance in
charitable giving. Southern Economic Journal, 86(2), 433-458.
22
Herzog, P. S., Harris, C. T., Morimoto, S. A., & Peifer, J. L. (2019).
Understanding the social science effect: An intervention in life course
generosity. American Behavioral Scientist, 63(14), 1885-1909.
164
an important psychological construct:

similarity.” 23
If other people give, that’s interesting. If

people like me give, that’s powerful.
Experimental results: … make gifts like this

A socially relevant example creates a social
norm. 24 This tends to pull giving towards two points:
1. Giving at the norm.
2. Not giving at all.
23
Tian, Y., & Konrath, S. (2021). The effects of similarity on charitable giving in
donor–donor dyads: A systematic literature review. Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 32, 316-339. p. 316.
24 In general, as people’s expectations that others are giving grows, so does
their own giving. For example, one study used real donation data on a large
crowdfunding platform in Japan. The researchers report, “We find a donor
likely imitates the donation amount that many others have selected … The
likelihood increases when more of the others have given the similar amount …
This result supports the notion that a donor’s conformity behavior is more
likely to occur when a greater proportion of other donors give a similar
amount.” Sasaki, S. (2019). Majority size and conformity behavior in charitable
giving: Field evidence from a donation-based crowdfunding platform in Japan.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 70, 36-51.
Similarly, in another study, the answer to the question “How interested do
you think others are in giving to women’s and girls’ causes?” largely predicted
the person’s own intentions to give to these causes. Mesch, D., Dwyer, P.,
Sherrin, S., Osili, U., Bergdoll, J., Pactor, A., & Ackerman, J. (2018). Encouraging
giving to women's and girls' causes: The role of social norms. IUPUI Women’s
Philanthropy Institute. Figure 1.
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/17949
However, a social norm does not have to reflect majority behavior. A person
can identify with a smaller group, rather than the majority. For example, in the
previous study this phrase reduced giving to these causes: “Less than half of
donors give to women’s and girls’ charities.” But the negative impact
disappeared when adding, “but the number of donors is getting bigger and
bigger each year.” This addition made the non-majority behavior more
attractive.
165
Why does this happen? Giving costs. But

giving less than the norm still violates the norm.
Thus, giving too little doesn’t help reputation. But it
still costs something. So, it’s a costly failure. It’s a
bad decision.
Giving more than the norm could be

acceptable. But the extra cost might be pointless. So,
the best options likely narrow to just two: giving at the
norm or not giving at all.
These offsetting effects show up in

experiments. For example, seeding a transparent
donation box with large bills generates fewer, but
larger, gifts. Seeding it with coins generates more, but
smaller, gifts. 25 Mentioning a large gift by another in
an appeal letter raises average gift size. But it lowers
the likelihood of giving. 26
One UK study asked people to donate from a

£10 payment. Adding this phrase,
“Did you know that other participants gave £5
and they said that participants such as yourself
should give £5?” 27
25 Martin, R., & Randal, J. (2008). How is donation behaviour affected by the
donations of others? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(1), 228-
238.
26 Jackson, K. (2016). The effect of social information on giving from lapsed
donors: Evidence from a field experiment. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of

Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(2), 920-940.
27 van Teunenbroek, C., Bekkers, R., & Beersma, B. (2021). They ought to do it
too: Understanding effects of social information on donation behavior and

mood. International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, 18(2), 229-
253. p. 231.
166
had offsetting effects. It increased the share of people

giving £5. 28 But it also increased the share who gave
nothing. 29 The likelihood of giving amounts other
than £5 fell. Again, the social norm pushed giving
towards two points: Giving at the norm or not giving
at all.
For fundraising, the ideal example is a stretch

gift. In one experiment, a phone-a-thon for a public
radio station referenced another’s gift. If the example
was a bit larger than the donor’s last gift, it tended to
increase the donation. If smaller, it tended to
decrease the donation. 30
Examples from major gifts

These experiments show the power of others’
examples in small gift decisions. But major gifts are
rare. They’re harder to test. Yet, the same answer
emerges.
How can we persuade an ultra-high-net-worth

donor to give? By sharing examples of other “people
like me.” Josh Birkholz explains,
“You need to be branded as the type of place
that [other] ultra-high-net-worth donors give
to. How do we do that? One of the key ways is
to really go beyond just showing what your
28 Id. p. 240. Table 3. (The share of participants giving £5 was 26% in the
control group and 37% in the group exposed to the message.)

29 Id. (The share of participants giving nothing was 61% in the control group
and 68% in the group exposed to the message.)

30 Croson, R., & Shang, J. Y. (2008). The impact of downward social information
on contribution decisions. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 221-233.
167
organization’s impact on the world is, but to

actually demonstrate how specific donors have
made a big impact on the world. [emphasis
added]” 31
The key information isn’t just about the

charity. It’s about others who are like the donor. It’s
about showing that “people like me make gifts like
this.”
Similarly, a study of ultra-high-net-worth

donors found, “nearly 60% report collaborating with
other funders.” 32 In his interviews with mega gift
donors, Jerald Panas shares,
“‘People enjoy being part of ‘the club,’ being
associated with prominent men and women
who are giving to the same cause,’ he says. And
my interviewing bears this out. Very few
donors enjoy the independent route ...” 33
Examples from people like me work. But what

if we don’t already have mega donors to use as
examples? There are still ways to provide aspirational
examples.
31 Birkholz, J. (2019). BWF live fundraising show: 2019 – 12 things for

consideration. [Video]. 34:00,
https://m.facebook.com/BentzWhaleyFlessner/videos/bwf-live-fundraising-
show-2019-twelve-things-for-considerationjosh-birkholz-
prin/279456562721405/
32 Tripp, K. D. & Cardone, R. (2017). Going beyond giving: Perspectives on the
philanthropic practices of high and ultra-high net worth donors. The

Philanthropy Workshop. p. 12. https://www.ncfp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Going-Beyond-Giving.pdf
33 Panas, J. (2005). Mega gifts: Who gives them, who gets them (2nd ed.).
Emerson & Church Publishers. p. 34.
168
As president of Connecticut College, Claire

Gaudiani massively expanded fundraising success.
(The college’s endowment more than quadrupled.)
Her approach? Sharing donor stories from American
history. She recommends,
“Show how the vision of a major donor can
transform an institution (Mary Garrett at
Johns Hopkins) or an entire city (Ken Dayton
in Minneapolis).” 34
But she shares these stories in a special way.

She begins them with a phrase like, “You know, you
remind me of [insert historical name].” The donor
responds with, “Who is that?” She then shares the
story of a donor whose gifts made a major impact. 35
Because of this introduction, this isn’t just an
example. For the donor, it becomes an example of
someone “like me.” 36
34 Gaudiani, C. (2012). How to use the greater good. [Website].
http://www.clairegaudiani.com/Writings/Pages/HowToUseGreaterGood.aspx
now archive only at
https://web.archive.org/web/20170923063952/http://www.clairegaudiani.co
m/Writings/Pages/HowToUseGreaterGood.aspx
Her book, The Greater Good, is a collection of heroically-framed donor stories
from American history. She recommends that fundraisers’ use the book in this
way:
“Need a GREAT STORY to illustrate your message about the importance of
philanthropy? Tell a group of volunteers/smaller donors about the success of
the Mother's March of Dimes or the creation of Provident Hospital. Show how
the vision of a major donor can transform an institution (Mary Garrett at
Johns Hopkins) or an entire city (Ken Dayton in Minneapolis). Demonstrate
how risk-taking is essential for real social and economic progress (Guggenheim
support to the aviation industry). Connect your philanthropic effort with the
American entrepreneurial spirit (John Winthrop's Sermon on the "Arabella")”
35 Author’s notes from Guadiani, C. (2018, October 17). Luncheon keynote.
[Presentation]. Charitable Gift Planners Conference, Las Vegas, NV.

36 One study finds this identification with such “moral and civic virtue
exemplars,” to be a powerful predictor of pro-social action (giving and
169
Conclusion
“People like me make gifts like this.” It’s a
powerful message.
● It works in the primal-giving game. (It reveals
a reciprocal, sharing community norm.)
● It works in the universal hero story cycle. (It
connects the challenge to the donor’s original
identity. It validates the promise of a victory.
It shows that the victory will deliver an
enhanced identity.)
● It works in lab experiments.
● It works in field experiments.
● It works in simple gifts.
● It works in complex planned gifts.
● It works in bequest gifts.
● It works in small dollar gifts.
● It works in major gifts.
And most importantly, it works for people like you. :-)
volunteering) among adolescents as well. The researchers explain,

“adolescents who have made a habit of social action (having participated in
the previous 12 months and intending to participate again in future) are more
likely to … identify themselves more closely with moral and civic virtue
exemplars, and say that other people who know them also think they are
more like the moral and civic virtue exemplars”. Taylor-Collins, E., Harrison, T.,
Thoma, S. J., & Moller, F. (2019). A habit of social action: Understanding the
factors associated with adolescents who have made a habit of helping others.
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations,
30(1), 98-114. p. 109.
170
171
172
12
DELIVERING TRANSCENDENT VALUE IN PRIMAL

FUNDRAISING:
I BELIEVE IN THIS!
Effective fundraising can deliver real value to

donors. For example, it can enhance public
reputation. This external identity has tangible
economic value. 1
But fundraising can do more. It can also

deliver transcendent value. This comes from a
private, internal identity. It comes from a moral
identity. Moral identity reflects how well one’s life
matches one’s ideal values. 2
Primal origins: Morality as a gift

An internal moral identity may seem
intangible. It may feel far removed from the rational
1 See Chapter 9. Primal fundraising delivers practical value with external
identity: This is totally worth it!
2 For an economic model of this concept where people act as their own
audience in a social-signaling model, see Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006).

Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1652-
1678.
173
world of natural selection and game theory. But it

does connect. How? It connects in this way. Morality
is a code of conduct. More precisely, it’s a pro-social
code. 3 Pro-social actions benefit the group. Thus,
acting morally is like a gift to the group.
This gift may be simply an individual helpful

act.
But it can help the group in another way. It can
support a shared pro-social code. 4 The code dictates
that group members help each other. This mutual
concern makes the group stronger. Thus, supporting
a pro-social code makes the group stronger. It acts
like a gift to the group.
This support can even include punishing code

violators. The punisher incurs cost in order to enforce
a code. But the code benefits the group. Thus, costly
punishment can be a form of pro-social action. 5 (In
3 “Morality refers to a code of conduct that individuals and groups adopt as

normative to govern themselves.… Moral behaviors can be classified into two
broad categories: prosocial and antisocial. Prosocial behaviors are actions that
benefit others.… Antisocial behaviors are defined as actions that contradict
social norms, laws, and rules.” Carlo, G., Christ, C., Liable, D., & Gulseven, Z.
(2016). An evolving and developing field of study: Prosocial morality from a
biological, cultural, and developmental perspective. In T. Shackelford & R.
Hansen (Eds.), Evolutionary psychology series: The evolution of morality.
Springer. p. 55-56.
4 Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 206(2), 169-179.

5 See, e.g., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and
social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(2), 63-87; Fehr, E., & Gächter,
S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American
Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994; Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic
punishment in humans, Nature, 415(6868), 137-140.
As with other types of gifts, costly punishment also increases when the act
become more visible to others. See, Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & O'Brien, E.
(2007). Audience effects on moralistic punishment. Evolution and Human
Behavior, 28(2), 75-84.
174
the primal-giving game, this is called indirect

reciprocity. 6 A world of indirect reciprocity strongly
encourages sharing.)
The reinforcement may be positive or negative.

But the effect is similar: Supporting a pro-social code
acts like a gift to the group.
Primal origins of moral identity: Similarity

When are such gifts to the group a good idea?
It might depend on one’s similarity with the shared
group. In Hamilton’s simple math, 7 a gift is
genetically helpful when
The trade-off weighs the cost of support against

the benefit to the group. The value of this group
benefit depends on genetic similarity with the group
members. However, the natural origins of code
support go beyond this simple math.
Primal origins of moral identity: Alliances

If people aren’t related, Hamilton’s math
doesn’t work. Yet, sustainable giving is still possible.
It is possible through reciprocal altruism. Biologists
6 See the discussions of indirect reciprocity in chapters 9 “Primal fundraising

delivers practical value with external identity: This is totally worth it!” and 10
“The power of community in primal fundraising: I’m not just giving, I’m
sharing!”
7 Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.
175
model this using the primal-giving game. 8 In the

game, each player can give to the other. A gift helps
the other player more than it costs. But both players
must decide to give or not before knowing what the
other will do.
When behavior is hidden, reciprocity is not

possible. (We can’t respond to an action that we can’t
see.) Without reciprocity, not sharing is the only
logical move. That’s why visibility is so important. If
sharing is invisible, no one shares.
This choice is individually rational. But

everyone ends up worse off because no one shares. Is
there a way around this problem? Is there a way that
leads to reciprocal sharing even when it is invisible?
There is. Suppose a group of players adopted

an internal moral code:
When playing with fellow group members, they
would act as if they were being watched.
Each player would give up rational opportunities to
cheat fellow group members. They would share with
each other, even when their actions were hidden.
The result? This “moral code” group would

succeed. It would outperform other groups. 9 Being

9 Bazzan, A. L., Bordini, R. H., & Campbell, J. A. (2002). Evolution of agents with
moral sentiments in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma exercise. In S. D. Parsons,

P. Gymtrasiewicz & M. Wooldridge (Eds.), Game theory and decision theory in
agent-based systems (pp. 43-64). Springer; Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity
and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206(2), 169-179.
176
part of this group would be more valuable than being

part of a purely rational self-interested group. In
natural selection, being part of a strong, mutually
cooperative group is an ideal scenario.
Thus, playing the game as if one is being

watched – even when actions are hidden – can be a
superior strategy for the group. This gameplay
matches the desire for internal moral identity. It
means one’s private actions match one’s ideal public
values. It means acting the same whether the actions
are hidden or not.
Primal origins of moral identity: Alliance

problems
This “moral code” group would outperform
others. It works. But there’s a problem. It works only
if other group members actually follow the code. To
be stable, these groups must exclude cheaters. They
must exclude those who claim they will follow the pro-
social values, but then don’t. But how is this possible
if cheating is hidden?
One solution is to use a visible substitute for

the hidden action. Group members can express their
commitment to following the pro-social code using
costly signals. In religious groups, a costly signal
might be a special diet or dress. It can also be a gift or
sacrifice such as burning valuable goods. 10
10For a discussion of this game-theoretic model, see Iannaccone, L. R. (1998).

Introduction to the economics of religion. Journal of Economic Literature,
36(3), 1465-1495.
177
Increasing group member monitoring also

helps. Over time, an accumulation of costly signals –
including unknowingly observed behavior – means
something. It predicts the person will consistently
follow the moral code in the future. A group of such
similarly committed people is strong. It excludes
those who aren’t internally committed to the group’s
moral code. It excludes cheaters.
These game-theory concepts lead to practical

suggestions. For example, maintaining a long history
of commitment to a code is a particularly valuable
signal. Thus, reminders of one’s historical
commitment to such values encourage continued
support for the values.
Following the moral code is also strategic if

other group members support these values. Rejecting
such values risks being subjected to costly
punishment. It risks exclusion from the cooperative
group. Thus, reminders that other group members
support these values can also increase support for the
values.
Even when hidden, supporting the moral code

can still make sense. It makes sense because it helps
other group members. Moral values are pro-social.
But helping the group can also help the

individual. Being part of a strong, mutually
cooperative group is valuable. (In natural selection,
such alliances can be key to survival.) Thus,
178
reminders of how such moral values benefit one’s

group can encourage support for the values.
Story origins of moral identity

Primal game theory explains the power of
supporting a pro-social moral code. But what about
practical reality? What about fundraising?
Fundraising can match the game. Giving can

support a pro-social moral code. It can enhance the
donor’s internal moral identity. How? The steps are
already familiar.
The “one big thing” in fundraising is to advance

the donor’s hero story. The hero story (monomyth)
cycle is, 11
11Joseph Campbell uses a three-step circular illustration with this description:

“victory.”
179
Or, as a loop,
Previous chapters show how this cycle can

enhance external, public identity. 12 These same steps
can also enhance an internal, private, moral identity.
They can move the donor from his original moral
identity to an enhanced moral identity. In both cases,
the process starts with the donor’s original identity.
Original identity: Reminders

Most giving supports some moral value. It
might be faith or compassion. It might be freedom or
education. The options are endless. But when does
such giving enhance the donor’s internal moral
identity? It depends.
The first question is this: How much are these

values part of the donor’s ideal moral identity? If the
values don’t matter, the gift won’t help. If the values
do matter, then the gift can help. It can help the
donor’s life match his ideal values. Thus, the value of
the gift depends on the importance of the supported
values.
12 See Chapter 9. Primal fundraising delivers practical value with external

identity: This is totally worth it!; Chapter 10. The power of community in
primal fundraising: I’m not just giving, I’m sharing!; Chapter 11. Social norms
in primal fundraising: People like me make gifts like this!
180
But this importance can be fluid. Reminders

can influence it. This shows up in experiments using
religious reminders. In one, showing people the
words
● Spirit
● Divine
● God
● Sacred, and
● Prophet
more than doubled gifts to others. 13 In another, organ

donations increased if the solicitor wore a Christian
cross. 14 Another found a “Sunday effect”: Religious
people were more likely to support charity, but only if
they had visited their place of worship on that day. 15
In another, mindfulness meditation more than
doubled gifts to the United Way. 16 Thus, spiritual
reminders encourage donations.
But this is not just about religious values. The

right setting or reminder can strengthen a connection
13 Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming God
concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game.
Psychological Science, 18(9), 803-809. Experiment 1.
14 Guéguen, N., Bougeard-Delfosse, C., & Jacob, C. (2015). The positive effect
of the mere presence of a religious symbol on compliance with an organ

donation request. Social Marketing Quarterly, 21(2), 92-99.
15 Malhotra, D. (2010). “Sunday Effect” on pro-social behavior. Judgment and
Decision Making, 5(2), 138-143.

16 “Subjects who underwent the meditation treatment donated at a 2.61 times
higher rate than the control (p = 0.005), after controlling for socio-
demographics.” Iwamoto, S. K., Alexander, M., Torres, M., Irwin, M. R.,
Christakis, N. A., & Nishi, A. (2020). Mindfulness meditation activates altruism.
Scientific Reports, 10(1), 1-7. p. 1.
181
with any values. In experiments, reminders make

moral values more mentally accessible. 17 They bring
the values to the top of the mind. This, in turn,
increases actions that match those values. 18
Reminders strengthen the importance of the

moral value. A gift that supports that moral value
then becomes more attractive. 19 The reminder helps
link the gift with the donor’s ideal moral identity.
This connection makes the rest of the story more
compelling. It makes the gift more attractive.
Original identity: Socratic inquiry

Reminding people about desired values
underlying a gift works. But even more powerful is
getting them to talk about it.
17 Glasman, L. R., & Albarracin, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future
behavior: A meta-analysis of the attitude-behavior relation. Psychological
Bulletin, 132(5), 778-822.
18 Id. In another example, a reminder to “be grateful for what you have”
increased the tendency to make donations and increased the size of those
donations. Paramita, W., Septianto, F., & Tjiptono, F. (2020). The distinct
effects of gratitude and pride on donation choice and amount. Journal of
Retailing and Consumer Services, 53, 101972, 1-10. p. 4.
19 In one study, the reminder “Be proud of what you can do” (pride motive)
increased donations only if the donations would be publicly acknowledged

and recognized. Without this recognition, the highlighted value (pride) didn’t
match the gift. Paramita, W., Septianto, F., & Tjiptono, F. (2020). The distinct
effects of gratitude and pride on donation choice and amount. Journal of
Retailing and Consumer Services, 53, 101972, 1-10. p. 4.
Another study investigated charitable giving motivations for donors at 13 large
Dutch nonprofits that account for nearly a third of total donations in the
country. The researchers found that “donating to a specific nonprofit depends
on the congruency between the nonprofit values of the organization and the
individual donor's nonprofit values.” van Dijk, M., Van Herk, H., & Prins, R.
(2019). Choosing your charity: The importance of value congruence in two-
stage donation choices. Journal of Business Research, 105, 283-292.
182
In experiments, people who first describe their

connection with a value act differently. They become
more likely to act according to that value. 20
Expressing such an opinion once works.

Expressing it multiple times in different ways works
even better. This repetition increases commitment to
the belief. 21 It increases actions that match the
belief. 22
This also works in fundraising. Getting people

to express their opinion about the importance of the
underlying cause or values works. 23 In experiments,
this increases
● Current gifts
● Future gift intentions, and
● Charitable bequest intentions.
20 Glasman, L. R., & Albarracin, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future
behavior: A meta-analysis of the attitude-behavior relation. Psychological
Bulletin, 132(5), 778-822.
21 Descheemaeker, M., Spruy, A., Faxio, R. H., & Hermans, D. (2017). On the
generalization of attitude accessibility after repeated attitude expression.

European Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 97-104; Holland, R. W., Verplanken,
B., & van Knippenberg, A. (2003). From repetition to conviction: Attitude
accessibility as a determinant of attitude certainty. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 39(6), 594-601.
22 Downing, J. W., Judd, C. M., & Brauer, M. (1992). Effects of repeated
expressions on attitude extremity. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 63(1), 17-29.
23 Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & van de Pol, I. (2019). Increasing
altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges. Scientific

Reports, 9(1), 1-11; James, R. N., III. (2018). Increasing charitable donation
intentions with preliminary importance ratings. International Review on Public
and Nonprofit Marketing, 15(3), 393-411; Kessler, J. B., Milkman, K. L., &
Zhang, C. Y. (2019). Getting the rich and powerful to give. Management
Science, 65(9), 4049-4062.
183
It works in experiments for charities in

● Higher education
● Environmental conservation
● Cancer research
● Animal welfare
● International relief, and
● Youth programs.
Answering questions about the importance of

underlying values or causes works. It works by
highlighting the internal importance of those values.
And the more times people do it, the more impact it
has. 24
Original identity: Donor’s story

The right setting can provide values reminders.
Socratic inquiry can do the same. Either way,
focusing on values can increase giving. If.
Such reminders work only if the moral value is

part of the donor’s ideal moral identity. If it isn’t,
then this won’t work. The gift might advance some
moral value. But it doesn’t advance the donor’s moral
value. Thus, the gift won’t be compelling.
To be compelling, the challenge must be rooted

in the donor’s desired moral identity. Otherwise,
24James, R. N., III. (2018). Increasing charitable donation intentions with

preliminary importance ratings. International Review on Public and Nonprofit
Marketing, 15(3), 393-411.
184
neither meeting the challenge nor winning the victory

will enhance the donor’s identity. A compelling gift
requires each part of the story cycle. It requires
identity, challenge, and victory.
For example, suppose religious faith is not part

of a donor’s identity. Then a gift that supports that
value won’t help. It won’t enhance the donor’s
internal, moral identity. It won’t be compelling.
Different values work for different people. One

experiment tested a gender difference. 25 It pointed to
findings that women “consider relationships to be
more central to their sense of self.” 26 It tested
reminders of five relationship-centered moral traits:
compassionate, kind, caring, friendly, and helpful.
These reminders increased giving for women, but not
for men. 27 The researchers suggested that a different
set of moral traits might work better for men. 28
The “one big thing” in fundraising remains the

same: Advance the donor’s hero story. This means
25 Shang, J., Reed, A., Sargeant, A., & Carpenter, K. (2020). Marketplace
donations: the role of moral identity discrepancy and gender. Journal of
Marketing Research, 57(2), 375-393.
26 Id. p. 377.
27 Id. p. 379. (New or renewing members of a public radio station called in
during a pledge drive. Before being asked, “How much would you like to
pledge today?” some were told, “Thank you for becoming/being a [station
name] member.” Others were told “Thank you for becoming/being a [moral
trait 1] and [moral trait 2] [station name] member.” Using the five listed traits
increased average gift size by 21.3% for women. But it made no significant
impact for men.)
28 Id. p. 390. (“If women’s relationship concerns enabled us to shrink their
moral identity discrepancy through relationship building activities, is it

possible that we could shrink men’s moral identity discrepancy through
authority-building or fairness-restoration activities because of their need to be
the agent to uphold moral values?”)
185
advancing the donor’s story. A story about values that

aren’t part of the donor’s identity isn’t the donor’s
story. A gift that advances those values won’t help. It
won’t advance this donor’s story.
Challenge: External threat

A story about values central to the donor’s
identity is the donor’s story. But it’s not yet a hero
story. The hero story cycle starts with original
identity. It can start by connecting to values that are
part of this identity. It can start by highlighting the
importance of these identity connections. But to
advance the story, this identity must then connect to a
challenge.
A compelling challenge responds to a threat or

opportunity. A threat to one’s moral values can be
external or internal. An external threat arises when
an outside force attacks the moral value.
An external threat is common in political cause

fundraising. One experiment added an external
threat to a political appeal letter. Doing so nearly
doubled the share of people making gifts. 29 The
added phrases included,
• “Powerful members of Congress are working
hard to [take away rights from women].”
29Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (2004). Threat as a motivator of political

activism: A field experiment. Political Psychology, 25(4), 507-523. p. 513.
(Donation rate for direct mail appeals rose from .23% in the control letter to
.43% in the threat letter.)
186
• “These threats are real!” 30
Other experiments show similar results for

threats related to issues in
● Gun control
● The environment, and
● Abortion. 31
Showing that an opposing political candidate is

ahead in fundraising also provides a threat. And it
also increases donations. 32 In another example,
online donations to the ACLU were typically about $5
million per year. Then President Trump took office.
These donations shot up to over $120 million per
year. 33
Most hero stories involve responding to an

external threat. In fundraising, external threats can
make a huge impact. They can help create a more
heroic giving opportunity.
30 Id. at p. 520.
31 Miller, J. M., Krosnick, J. A., Holbrook A. L., Tahk, A., & Dionne, A. (2016).
The impact of policy change threat on financial contributions to interest
groups. In J. A. Krosnic, I. C. Chiang, & T. Stark (Eds.), Explorations in Political
Psychology. Psychology Press.
32 Schwam-Baird, M. (2016). Essays on the motivations and behavior of
individual political donors. [Doctoral dissertation]. Columbia University, New

York.
33 See Reints, R. (2018, July 5). The ACLU’s membership has surged and it’s
putting its new resources to use. Fortune.

http://fortune.com/2018/07/05/aclu-membership-growth/
187
Challenge: Internal threat

A challenge to moral values can be external.
But it can also be internal. An internal threat suggests
a gap between,
● Desired internal moral identity, and
● Actual internal moral identity.
This gap motivates action to fix the problem. It

motivates action to improve internal moral identity.
A gift can help do this. Thus, highlighting this gap can
motivate a related gift.
Some experiments create this kind of internal

threat. The threat highlights a gap between desired
and actual moral identity. This increases guilt. But it
also increases donations. In experiments, this
happens after
● Writing about one’s own greediness or
selfishness, 34
● Making an accidental unfair split of money, 35
● Using a counterfeit luxury product, 36 or
34 Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly
sinners the paradox of moral self-regulation. Psychological Science, 20(4), 523-
528.
35 Ohtsubo, Y. & Watanabe, E. (2013). Unintentional unfair behavior promotes
charitable donation. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 4(1), 1-4.

36 Chen, J., John, D., Wang, Y., & Carufel, C. (2017). Prosocial consequences of
counterfeits: using counterfeit luxury goods can lead to prosocial behavior.

In A. Gneezy, V. Griskevicius, and P. Williams (Eds.), NA - Advances in
Consumer Research (Vol. 45). Association for Consumer Research. p. 68-69.
https://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/v45/acr_vol45_1024798.pdf
188
● Failing at a task that could have helped

another. 37
These situations create a gap between desired

and actual internal moral identity. A gift helps close
that gap. Thus, creating the gap motivates the gift.
In another example, combining a charitable gift

with a product can sometimes increases sales. But not
always. It works if the product creates guilt. 38 For
example, it works for a hot fudge sundae. It works for
chocolate truffles. But it doesn’t work for laundry
detergent. It doesn’t work for a spiral notebook.
Again, the concept is the same. If consuming

the product creates a gap between desired and actual
identity, the gap can motivate a gift. If the product
doesn’t create a gap, it doesn’t motivate a gift.
Challenging one’s loyalty to an important value

can also create a threat. It implies that there is a gap
between desired and actual moral identity. For
example, mentioning a resented stereotype that a
group is un-generous does this. In experiments,
37 Darlington, R. B. & Macker, C. E. (1966). Displacement of guilt-produced

altruistic behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4(4), 442-443.
38 Strahilevitz, M., & Myers, J. G. (1998). Donations to charity as purchase
incentives: How well they work may depend on what you are trying to sell.
Journal of Consumer Research, 24(4), 434-446.
In another example of a potentially “guilt-inducing” sale, Kaylen Ward, the
“naked philanthropist,” offered to send nude pictures of herself to anyone
who donated $10 to fundraisers for Australian wildfires. She raised a reported
$700,000 in four days. See Rosen, M. (2020, January 7). What can you learn
from “The Naked Philanthropist”? [Blog].
https://michaelrosensays.wordpress.com/2020/01/07/what-can-you-learn-
from-the-naked-philanthropist/
189
doing this causes group members to give more. 39

Highlighting the alleged gap motivates the giving.
Promising victory
The effective challenge responds to a threat.
But it must also promise a victory. This victory can
address the threat to the donor’s values. For example,
the previous appeal letter threat that nearly doubled
giving also included the phrase,
“But we can stop them if we work together.” 40
That threat to the moral value was external. It

was from an outside force. Thus, victory comes from
defeating that outside force.
A victory over an internal threat is also

possible. The gift can reduce the gap between actual
and desired internal moral identity. 41 Giving can fix
the problem. It can prove commitment to the
supported values.
39 Hopkins, N., Reicher, S., Harrison, K., Cassidy, C., Bull, R., & Levine, M.
(2007). Helping to improve the group stereotype: On the strategic dimension
of prosocial behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(6), 776-
788.
40 Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (2004). Threat as a motivator of political
activism: A field experiment. Political Psychology, 25(4), 507-523. p. 520.

41 Shang, J., Reed, A., Sargeant, A., & Carpenter, K. (2020). Marketplace
donations: The role of moral identity discrepancy and gender. Journal of

Marketing Research, 57(2), 375-393.
190
Promising the donor’s victory

Not all victories are compelling. The
compelling victory must be tied to the donor’s
identity. It must also be the donor’s victory.
This is where charities often go wrong. Their

natural tendency is to claim the victory as theirs. The
victory enhances their own identity. (This matches
the administrator-hero story.)
But this is not as compelling for the donor.

This victory is not tied to the donor’s actions. It
doesn’t enhance the donor’s identity.
In an experiment, one e-mail focused on the

charity as the actor. For example, it stated,
“The fashion industry has let these women
down, but [the charity] won’t.” 42
Another version added the donor as an actor.

It instead stated,
“The fashion industry has let these women
down, but you and [the charity] won’t.”
The odds of people clicking on the link to learn

more were 27% higher for the second message. When
the donor delivers the victory, it enhances the donor’s
identity. This makes giving more attractive.
42 Id. p. 382.
191
The second message increased the odds of

responding even more, by 40%, among women. Why?
In that case, the challenge connected to both
● The donor’s original identity (female), and
● The donor’s enhanced identity (the hero who
delivers victory).
Connecting to more of the story cycle makes

the request more compelling.
Delivering victory: External threat

A challenge is more effective when it promises
victory leading to an enhanced identity. But how does
the charity actually deliver on this promise?
If the moral challenge is external, the goal is to

resist the external foe. Victory comes from the impact
of the gift. The charity can confirm this impact. It can
confirm this victory. How?
● It can report the gift’s impact.
● It can express gratitude for the gift’s impact.
● It can encourage others to express gratitude for
the gift’s impact.
● It can publicize the gift’s impact.
Confirming the victory makes the next

challenge more compelling. The hope of “Yes, you
can!” is compelling. But it fades unless followed by,
“Yes, you did!”
192
Delivering victory: Internal threat

If the moral challenge is internal, the goal is
different. The goal is to reduce the identity gap.
Victory moves actual internal moral identity towards
desired moral identity. 43
Confirming the gift’s impact can help here, too.

It can show that the donor is an effective, successful,
victorious, and valuable member of the community.
But internal victory can come even without

impact. The victory comes simply from the making of
the gift. It can verify that the donor is generous,
faithful, committed, and sacrificial.
The gift itself may even be destroyed. Such

offerings are described in the Iliad, 44 the Odyssey, 45
and the Pentateuch. 46 The act of giving shows
allegiance to the desired values regardless of impact.
This type of victory is internal. But it can still

be validated by others. The charity can confirm that
the act of giving supports the desired values. Gift
reporting, gratitude, and compatible publicity for the
gift as an expression of the moral value provides this
confirmation.
43 Id. p. 375. (Referencing “moral identity discrepancy (i.e., the gap between
actual and ideal moral identity)”).
44 Strittmatter, E. J. (1925). Prayer in the Iliad and the Odyssey. The Classical
Weekly, 18(11), 83-87.

45 Petropoulou, A. (1987). The sacrifice of eumaeus reconsidered. Greek,
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28(2), 135-149.

46 E.g., Genesis 35:14, Exodus 29:41, Leviticus 23:18.
193
Conclusion
Enhancing the donor’s internal moral identity
is powerful. It can tap into the deepest sources for
sacrificial motivation. But delivering this
transcendent value need not be mysterious.
Enhancing either private or public identity uses

the same process. Both internal moral identity and
external public reputation grow through the same
steps:
The process is familiar. The answer, once

again, is simply this: Advance the donor’s hero story.
Next up:
The Fundraising Myth & Science Series Book IV
THE SOCRATIC FUNDRAISER:

USING QUESTIONS TO ADVANCE THE DONOR’S STORY
194
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D., CFP® is a professor at

Texas Tech University where he holds the CH
Foundation chair in personal financial planning. He
directs the on-campus and online graduate program
in Charitable Financial Planning (planned giving). He
also teaches graduate courses in behavioral finance.
He holds a Ph.D. in consumer economics from the
University of Missouri, where his dissertation was on
charitable giving. He graduated, cum laude, from the
University of Missouri School of Law. He was a
member of the Missouri Law Review and received the
United Missouri Bank Award for Most Outstanding
Work in Gift and Estate Taxation and Planning.
Prior to his career as an academic researcher, Dr.

James worked as the Director of Planned Giving for
Central Christian College in Moberly, Missouri for 6
years and later served as president of the college for
more than 5 years, where he had direct and
supervisory responsibility for all fundraising. During
his presidency, the college successfully completed two
major capital campaigns, built several new debt-free
buildings, and more than tripled enrollment.
Dr. James has published research in over 75 peer-

reviewed scientific journal and law review articles. He
195
has been quoted on charitable and financial issues in a

variety of news sources including The Economist, The
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN,
MSNBC, CNBC, ABC News, U.S. News & World
Report, USA Today, the Associated Press, Bloomberg
News, and the Chronicle of Philanthropy. His
financial neuroimaging research was profiled in The
Wall Street Journal’s Smart Money Magazine.
His other books include
Visual Planned Giving: An Introduction to the Law &

Taxation of Charitable Gift Planning
Inside the Mind of the Bequest Donor: A Visual

Presentation of the Neuroscience and Psychology of
Effective Planned Giving Communication
For links to his videos, slide presentations, and

papers, please connect on LinkedIn.
196

The Primal Fundraiser

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Primal Fundraiser

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Primal Fundraiser

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Primal

The Fundraising Myth & Science Series: Book III

Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D.

All rights reserved.

Book I: The Storytelling Fundraiser: The Brain,

Book II: The Epic Fundraiser: Myth, Psychology,

Book III: The Primal Fundraiser: Game Theory

Book IV: The Socratic Fundraiser: Using

Introduction: The Matryoshka doll 1

1 Primal fundraising and subjective 9

2 Primal fundraising and reciprocal 19

3 Primal fundraising and capacity for 33

4 Relationship is the foundation of primal 49

5 Primal fundraising leads with a gift: I’m 61

6 Impact, gratitude, and reciprocity in 79

7 Heroic donation displays in primal 91

8 The heroic donation audience in primal 105

9 Primal fundraising delivers practical 119

10 The power of community in primal 137

11 Social norms in primal fundraising: 151

12 Primal fundraising delivers transcendent 169

About the author 191

This series started with The Storytelling

These three topics are like a Russian nesting

The first part was the surface doll. It focused

Inside that doll was another. It took a turn to

But inside that doll is yet another. (Don’t

Into the rabbit hole

Professor Jim Dillon writes,

The hero archetype, like other archetypes,

1Dillon, J. J. (2010). The primal vision: The psychological effects of creation

ganglion of the caterpillar, and eels find their

The reason that the archetype is universal is

Or, as Jung describes,

The following chapters explore these natural

2 Jung, C. (1953-1978). On the nature of the psyche. In H. Read, M. Fordham, &

University Press. p. 52.

Why jump in?

This book can help in two ways. First, it gives

Once you understand the rules of the game,

Second, it deepens understanding and

6 This relates to a fundamental reason why academic researchers and

experience-based findings. A deductive theory (ideally one supported by past

don’t lead to different conclusions. Instead, they

The “one big thing” in fundraising remains the

These same steps also create the ideal donor

8 Joseph Campbell uses a three-step circular illustration with this description:

following chapters match this sequence of steps. Each

Step 1: Connect with original identity

2. Primal fundraising and reciprocal alliances:

3. Primal fundraising and capacity for reciprocity:

4. Relationship is the foundation of primal

5. Primal fundraising leads with a gift:

Steps 2 & 3: Present a challenge that wins a

7. Heroic donation displays in primal fundraising:

I can be your hero, baby!

8. The heroic donation audience in primal

Step 4: Deliver an enhanced identity

10. The power of community in primal

11. Social norms in primal fundraising: