Title

Lucas vs. Lucas

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 190710 Jun 6, 2011

In Lucas v. Lucas, the Supreme Court rules that a prima facie showing is necessary
before a DNA testing order can be issued, affirming the jurisdiction of the trial court and
emphasizing the discretionary nature of such orders.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 190710)

Comprehensive

Facts:
In the case of "Lucas v. Lucas," petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation with a Motion for DNA Testing on July 26, 2007, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Jesse claimed that his mother, Elsie Uy, had
an intimate relationship with respondent Jesus S. Lucas in 1967, resulting in his birth on
March 11, 1969. Jesse's birth certificate did not name his father, but Elsie later informed him
that Jesus was his father. Jesse attached various documents to his petition, including his
birth certificate, baptismal certificate, college diploma, and newspaper clippings about him
as a musical prodigy. Despite not being served with a copy of the petition, Jesus learned of
it and his counsel obtained a copy. The RTC found the petition sufficient in form and
substance and set it for hearing, directing publication of the order and notifying the
Solicitor General. Jesus filed a Special Appearance and Comment, arguing that the petition
was adversarial and required summons. He also filed a motion for reconsideration,
claiming the petition was hearsay and lacked a prima facie case. The RTC initially
dismissed the case but later reconsidered, setting it for hearing. Jesus then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in his favor, dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction and failure to establish a prima facie case. Jesse then filed a petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in resolving the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent, which was not raised in the petition for certiorari?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that jurisdiction was not acquired over the
person of the respondent?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to recognize that the respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court?
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the title of a pleading, rather than its body, is
controlling?
 5. Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering the dismissal of the petition due to the motion
for DNA testing?
6. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that DNA testing can only be ordered after the
petitioner establishes prima facie proof of filiation?
7. Did the Court of Appeals err in its reliance on the case of Herrera vs. Alba regarding the
"four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action"?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the CA's Decision
dated September 25, 2009, and Resolution dated December 17, 2009. The Orders dated
October 20, 2008, and January 19, 2009, of the RTC of Valenzuela City were affirmed.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the RTC's orders denying the motion to dismiss were
interlocutory and not subject to certiorari unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. The petition to establish illegitimate
filiation was an action in rem, and jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was not
necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. The publication of the petition
and notice to the Solicitor General satisfied the due process requirements. The petition was
sufficient in form and substance, and the allegations of hearsay were matters of evidence to
be determined during the trial. The CA's reliance on the four procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action was misplaced, as these are matters of evidence to be addressed
during the trial. The Supreme Court also addressed the need for a prima facie showing
before issuing a DNA testing order to protect against harassment suits. The issuance of a
DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court, considering the necessity and
preponderance of evidence.
 Title
De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corp.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 194751 Nov 26, 2014

Aurora N. De Pedro's petition for annulment of a court decision nullifying her certificate
of title is denied by the Supreme Court, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her
person but her filing of a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari constituted
voluntary appearance, thus barring her from filing a petition for annulment of
judgment.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 194751)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case of "De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp." revolves around a land ownership
dispute in Antipolo City. The respondent, Romasan Development Corporation, initiated
separate complaints on July 7, 1998, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
seeking the nullification of free patents and original certificates of title against several
defendants, including the petitioner, Aurora N. De Pedro. Romasan claimed ownership of
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 236044 and alleged that De Pedro
and other defendants had obtained free patents and titles over portions of this property
through irregular means. Efforts to personally serve summons on De Pedro were
unsuccessful, prompting the RTC to authorize service by publication. De Pedro did not
respond, leading the RTC to declare her in default. Consequently, the RTC nullified her title
(OCT No. P-691) and ordered her to pay damages and attorney's fees. De Pedro filed a
motion for a new trial, citing improper service of summons and litis pendentia, but the RTC
denied her motion. She then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
was also denied. Subsequently, De Pedro filed a petition for annulment of judgment, which
the Court of Appeals denied on July 7, 2010. De Pedro then elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro.
2. Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a
petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Court ruled that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over De Pedro through her
voluntary appearance by filing a motion for a new trial and a petition for certiorari.
Consequently, she was barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that personal service of summons is the preferred mode
in any action. Substituted service or service by publication is only permissible when
personal service is impossible despite diligent efforts. In this case, the sheriff's return
lacked details of efforts to serve De Pedro personally, making the substituted service
defective. However, De Pedro's filing of a motion for a new trial and a petition for certiorari
constituted voluntary appearance, thereby curing the jurisdictional defect. The Court also
noted that an action for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy available only
when no other adequate remedy exists. Since De Pedro had already availed herself of other
remedies (motion for new trial and petition for certiorari), she was barred from filing a
petition for annulment of judgment. The Court further clarified that an action for
annulment of title is a direct attack on the title and does not violate Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibits collateral attacks on certificates of title.
Lastly, the Court found no merit in De Pedro's argument of litis pendentia, as the requisites
were not satisfied.
 Title
Heirs of Dragon vs. The Manila Banking Corp.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 205068 Mar 6, 2019

The Supreme Court dismisses the Complaint filed by Manila Banking against the Heirs
of Renato P. Dragon due to insufficient payment of filing fees, ruling that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and cannot rule on the issues of novation and
prescription as they are questions of fact not cognizable under a petition for review on
certiorari.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 205068)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case involves the Heirs of Renato P. Dragon, represented by Patricia Angeli D. Nubla, as
petitioners, and The Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Banking) as the respondent.
From 1976 to 1982, Renato P. Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking,
evidenced by four promissory notes totaling P6,945,642.00. Each note stipulated interest,
penalties, and attorney's fees. In 1987, Manila Banking was placed under receivership by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and several demand letters were sent to Dragon, the last dated
August 12, 1998, demanding P44,038,995.00. Dragon failed to pay, leading Manila Banking
to file a complaint for collection on January 7, 1999. Dragon claimed partial payment and
novation of the debt, arguing that Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation had assumed his
obligations. He also claimed that the action had prescribed. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ruled in favor of Manila Banking, ordering Dragon to pay the principal amount plus
interest, penalties, and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC's decision. The Heirs of Dragon then filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, arguing insufficient payment of docket fees by Manila Banking, which they
claimed deprived the RTC of jurisdiction.

Issue:
1. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the complaint despite the alleged
insufficient payment of docket fees by Manila Banking?
2. Was there novation of Dragon's obligations to Manila Banking?
3. Had Manila Banking's cause of action prescribed?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint due to the insufficient payment of docket fees by Manila Banking.
 2. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of novation as it is a question of fact not
cognizable under a petition for review on certiorari.
3. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of prescription as it is also a question of
fact not cognizable under a petition for review on certiorari.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the payment of the correct amount of filing fees is
essential for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a case. The Court found that Manila
Banking only paid P34,975.75 based on the principal amount of P6,945,642.00, while the
total amount claimed, including interests, penalties, and attorney's fees, was
P44,038,995.00. The Court held that the failure to pay the correct docket fees cannot be
remedied by making the payment contingent on the outcome of the case. The Court also
noted that the issues of novation and prescription are questions of fact, which are not
within the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court concluded that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint due to the
insufficient payment of docket fees, leading to the dismissal of the complaint.
 Title
Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 157479 Nov 24, 2010

Philip and Elnora Turner file a suit against Lorenzo Shipping Corp. to demand payment
for their shares, but the Court dismisses their case due to the lack of unrestricted
retained earnings in the respondent's books.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 157479)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case of "Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corp." involves petitioners Philip and Elnora
Turner, who held 1,010,000 shares in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in cargo shipping. In June 1999, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
amended its articles of incorporation to remove stockholders' pre-emptive rights to newly
issued shares. The Turners, dissenting from this corporate move, demanded payment for
their shares at P2.276 per share based on the book value, totaling P2,298,760.00. Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation, however, valued the shares at P0.41 per share based on the market
value, totaling P414,100.00, and stated that payment could only be made if there were
unrestricted retained earnings, which were absent at the time. An appraisal committee was
formed, which valued the shares at P2.54 per share, totaling P2,565,400.00. Despite this,
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation refused to pay, citing a deficit in its financial statements for
Fiscal Year 1999. The Turners then filed a suit for collection and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which was later transferred to the RTC in Manila. The RTC
granted the Turners' motion for partial summary judgment, but Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed
the Turners' suit due to the lack of unrestricted retained earnings. The Turners then
brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the RTC exceed its jurisdiction in granting the motion for partial summary
judgment and the motion for immediate execution?
2. Was the CA correct in dismissing the Turners' case due to the lack of unrestricted
retained earnings at the time of the demand?

Ruling:
1. Yes, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the motion for partial summary
judgment and the motion for immediate execution.
 2. Yes, the CA was correct in dismissing the Turners' case due to the lack of unrestricted
retained earnings at the time of the demand.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision, emphasizing that the RTC had exceeded its
jurisdiction by entertaining the Turners' complaint and rendering a summary judgment.
The Court explained that a stockholder's right of appraisal, as provided under Section 81 of
the Corporation Code, allows dissenting stockholders to demand payment for their shares
when certain corporate actions are taken. However, this right is subject to the condition
that the corporation must have unrestricted retained earnings to cover the payment, as
mandated by the trust fund doctrine. This doctrine ensures that corporate assets are
preserved for the payment of corporate creditors before any distribution to stockholders.

In this case, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation had no unrestricted retained earnings at the
time the Turners filed their complaint on January 22, 2001. Therefore, the Turners' cause of
action had not yet accrued, making their suit premature. The Court reiterated that a cause
of action arises only when all its essential elements are present, including a legal right, a
corresponding duty, and a violation of that right resulting in injury. Since the Turners'
demand for payment was made when there were no unrestricted retained earnings,
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation had no legal obligation to pay at that time. The subsequent
existence of unrestricted retained earnings did not cure the lack of a cause of action at the
commencement of the suit. Consequently, the CA's directive to dismiss the case was
appropriate, and the RTC's orders were nullified.

The Supreme Court also addressed the Turners' argument that the CA should not have
dismissed the case since the petition for certiorari only sought to annul specific RTC
orders. The Court found this argument baseless, stating that the CA's dismissal of the case
was not an abuse of discretion but a necessary action given the lack of a cause of action.
The Court concluded that the RTC's error was one of jurisdiction, not merely an error of
law, as it had taken cognizance of a complaint without an existing cause of action.
 Title
Zuniga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 197380 Oct 8, 2014

A complaint seeking the annulment of sale and revocation of title of three parcels of
land is dismissed by the Supreme Court due to failure to state a cause of action and
prescription.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 197380)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case of Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran involves a dispute over the ownership of three
parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The petitioner, Eliza Zuñiga-Santos,
represented by her attorney-in-fact Nympha Z. Sales, filed a complaint on January 9, 2006,
for the annulment of sale and revocation of title against Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran
and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. The complaint was later amended on March 10,
2006. Zuñiga-Santos claimed that she was the registered owner of the properties before
they were transferred to Gran through void and voidable documents, including a Deed of
Sale that could not be located. She alleged that Gran's birth certificate was forged to make it
appear that Gran was her daughter and that her second husband, Lamberto C. Santos,
facilitated the transfer of the properties to Gran. Gran filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the action had prescribed and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, dismissed the amended
complaint on July 6, 2006, for failure to state a cause of action and prescription. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision on January 10, 2011, but on the ground of
insufficiency of factual basis. The CA also denied Zuñiga-Santos's motion for
reconsideration on June 22, 2011, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner's Amended Complaint should be sustained.
2. Whether the action for annulment of sale and revocation of title had prescribed.
3. Whether the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision with modification.
The Amended Complaint was dismissed on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action
and prescription.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between failure to state a cause of action and
lack of cause of action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter pertains to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. The
CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of factual basis, as this
ground is only available after the presentation of evidence. However, the RTC correctly
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint did not
sufficiently allege the ultimate facts necessary to support the claim for annulment of sale
and recovery of the properties. The allegations were mere conclusions of law without
supporting facts. Additionally, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust had
prescribed, as the petitioner was not in possession of the properties, and the complaint was
filed beyond the ten-year prescriptive period from the issuance of the titles in Gran's name.
Therefore, the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was warranted on both grounds.
 Title
Guillermo vs. Philippine Information Agency

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 223751 Mar 15, 2017

A documentary film production company files a complaint against the government for
non-payment, but the Supreme Court denies their petition, ruling that the contract was
not binding and lacked evidence of public benefit.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 223751)

Comprehensive

Facts:
In the case of "Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency," petitioners Miguel "Lucky"
Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production Co. filed a complaint on December 10, 2010,
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 263, seeking a sum of money and
damages. The complaint arose from an alleged contract with the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) during the last
few months of the Arroyo Administration. Acting Secretary of DPWH, Victor Domingo, had
consulted with Guillermo and AV Manila for an advocacy campaign to counteract negative
public perception. Guillermo and AV Manila proposed a documentary film titled "Joyride,"
which was approved by Domingo. The project included various deliverables such as a
documentary film, infomercials, a coffee table book, and comics, with a total consideration
of PHP 25,000,000. Despite delivering the materials, the petitioners were not paid. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, stating that the contract was not binding on
the government due to the absence of legal requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, leading to the petitioners filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the petitioners sufficiently prove the existence of a binding contract with the
government?
2. Is the principle of quantum meruit applicable in this case to justify payment for the
services rendered?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. The
Court ruled that the petitioners failed to establish the existence of a binding contract with
the government and that the principle of quantum meruit was not applicable due to the
lack of evidence of public benefit from the "Joyride" project.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that for a complaint to state a cause of action, it must sufficiently
allege the existence of a right in favor of the plaintiff, an obligation on the part of the
defendant, and an act or omission by the defendant that violates the plaintiff's right. In this
case, the petitioners failed to meet these requirements. The Court emphasized that
contracts involving the expenditure of public funds must comply with specific legal
requisites, including an appropriation law and a certification of fund availability. The
absence of these requisites rendered the alleged contract void. Additionally, the principle of
quantum meruit was inapplicable as the complaint did not demonstrate any public benefit
derived from the "Joyride" project. The Court noted that the petitioners could seek recourse
by holding the officers who entered into the contract personally liable for damages.
 Title
NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 175799 Nov 28, 2011

NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited challenges the denial of their motion to
dismiss a complaint filed against them by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,
arguing that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that the issues
raised should be addressed during the trial.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 175799)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case involves NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited (petitioner) and Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company (respondent). On August 30, 2005, Lepanto filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, seeking to declare the loan
and hedging contracts between the parties void under Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and to claim damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-782 and
assigned to Branch 150. The trial court authorized the respondent's counsel to serve the
summons and complaint through the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. On
October 20, 2005, the petitioner filed a Special Appearance with a Motion to Dismiss,
arguing defective service of summons, lack of cause of action, estoppel, and unclean hands.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on December 9, 2005, and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration on March 6, 2006. The petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed on September 8, 2006. The
appellate court also denied the Motion for Reconsideration on December 12, 2006. The
petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
challenging the appellate court's decision and resolution.

Issue:
1. Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest.
2. Whether the denial of a Motion to Dismiss can be the subject of a Petition for Certiorari.
3. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to
Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and failure
to state a cause of action.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner, despite a change in corporate name, is
still the real party in interest.
 2. The Court ruled that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is generally an interlocutory
order and not subject to a Petition for Certiorari unless there is grave abuse of
discretion.
3. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Motion to Dismiss, as the issues raised by the petitioner were more
appropriately addressed during the trial.

Ratio:

1. Real Party in Interest: The Court found that the petitioner, now known as Investec
Australia Limited, provided sufficient evidence of its identity and continuity as the
same corporate entity. The change in corporate name did not affect its standing as the
real party in interest.

2. Petition for Certiorari: The Court reiterated that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss
is interlocutory and generally not subject to a Petition for Certiorari. However, if the
denial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari may be justified. Grave abuse
of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction and Cause of Action: The Court agreed with the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the issues of lack of cause of action, estoppel, and unclean hands are
matters of defense that should be resolved during the trial. The Court also found that
the trial court had properly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner through
extraterritorial service of summons. The petitioner’s active participation in the
proceedings, including seeking affirmative reliefs, constituted voluntary submission to
the court's jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thereby
denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
 Title
Umale vs. Canoga Park Development Corp.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 167246 Jul 20, 2011

A dispute over an unlawful detainer complaint arises when a lessee violates a lease
contract by constructing unauthorized buildings and subleasing the property without
consent, leading to two separate ejectment cases based on different causes of action,
ultimately resulting in the Supreme Court affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 167246)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case involves George Leonard S. Umale (petitioner) and Canoga Park Development
Corporation (respondent). On January 4, 2000, both parties entered into a Contract of
Lease for a period of two years starting January 16, 2000, for an 860-square-meter lot in
Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The respondent acquired the lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
Partnership with conditions that no shopping arcades, retail stores, or restaurants could be
established without prior written consent, and that the respondent must become a member
of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (Association) and abide by its rules. On October 10,
2000, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 8084) against the
petitioner for violating the lease contract by constructing unauthorized buildings and
subleasing the property. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68 ruled in favor of
the respondent, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 267 later dismissed the case for
being prematurely filed. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed another
unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 9210) on May 3, 2002, based on the expiration of the
lease contract. The MTC-Branch 71 ruled in favor of the respondent, but the RTC-Branch 68
dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
RTC's decision, leading to the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. Does litis pendentia exist between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210?
2. Did the respondent commit forum shopping by filing Civil Case No. 9210?

Ruling:
1. No, litis pendentia does not exist between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210.
2. No, the respondent did not commit forum shopping by filing Civil Case No. 9210.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that litis pendentia, which requires identity of parties, causes of
action, and reliefs sought, does not exist in this case. Civil Case No. 8084 was based on
violations of the lease contract, while Civil Case No. 9210 was based on the expiration of the
lease contract. The cause of action in the second case did not exist at the time of filing the
first case, as the lease contract was still in effect. The "same evidence" test and the test of
whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the first complaint
both indicate that the two cases have different causes of action. Additionally, the
respondent did not commit forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are not
present, and the respondent disclosed the existence of the first case in the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the second complaint. The CA's decision
to reinstate the MTC-Branch 71's ruling was affirmed.
 Title
Marilag vs. Martinez

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 201892 Jul 22, 2015

A petitioner seeks to collect the remaining balance of a loan secured by a real estate
mortgage, but is barred from filing a separate collection case due to the principle of litis
pendentia, while the respondent is entitled to the return of excess payments made.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 201892)

Comprehensive

Facts:
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez obtained a loan amounting to P160,000.00 from Norlinda
S. Marilag, with a stipulated monthly interest rate of 5%, payable within six months. To
secure the loan, a real estate mortgage was executed over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to
settle his obligation upon maturity, prompting Marilag to file a Complaint for Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite,
on November 10, 1995. Rafael was declared in default, and the RTC-Imus issued a Decision
on January 30, 1998, reducing the interest to 12% per annum and ordering Rafael to pay
P229,200.00. Before Rafael was notified of this decision, his son, Marcelino B. Martinez,
agreed to pay Rafael's obligation, which was pegged at P689,000.00. Marcelino paid
P400,000.00 and executed a promissory note for the remaining P289,000.00. After
learning of the RTC-Imus decision, Marcelino refused to pay the amount covered by the
promissory note, leading Marilag to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before
the RTC of Las Piñas City on July 2, 1998. The RTC initially denied recovery on the
promissory note, finding that Rafael's obligation had been settled, and ordered Marilag to
return the excess payment of P171,000.00. However, upon Marilag's motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed its decision, directing Marcelino to pay the amount due
under the promissory note. Marcelino's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting
him to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reinstated the RTC's initial
decision, leading Marilag to file a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
1. Whether the CA committed reversible error in upholding the dismissal of the collection
case.
2. Whether the principle of res judicata or litis pendentia applies to bar the collection
case.
3. Whether the stipulated 5% monthly interest is excessive and unconscionable.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA's decision to dismiss the
collection case.
2. The principle of litis pendentia, not res judicata, barred the collection case due to the
substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure
and collection cases.
3. The stipulated 5% monthly interest was found to be excessive and unconscionable, and
was reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court found that the principle of res judicata did not apply because there was
no indication that the RTC-Imus decision had attained finality. However, the principle of
litis pendentia barred the collection case due to the substantial identity of parties and
singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases. The Court
emphasized that in loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action to recover the debt, either through a personal action
for collection or a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The remedies are
alternative, not cumulative or successive. Since Marilag had already instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings, she was barred from filing a subsequent collection case. The
Court also found the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be excessive and unconscionable,
reducing it to 1% per month or 12% per annum. Consequently, Marilag was ordered to return
the excess payments made by Marcelino, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the filing of the Answer on August 6, 1998, until full satisfaction. The award of
attorney's fees was deleted due to the lack of factual or legal basis in the court a quo's
decision.
 Title
Chu vs. Spouses Cuan

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 156185 Sep 12, 2011

The court denies the petition for review and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals, holding that the compromise agreement between the parties settled all claims
and barred the Chus from filing multiple suits.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 156185)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case involves a dispute between the petitioners, Catalina B. Chu and her children, and
the respondents, Spouses Fernando C. Cunanan and Trinidad N. Cunanan, Benelda Estate
Development Corporation, and Spouses Amado E. Carlos and Gloria A. Carlos. On
September 30, 1986, the Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
involving five parcels of land in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga, in favor of Trinidad
N. Cunanan for P5,161,090.00. A side agreement clarified that only P1,000,000.00 was paid
upfront, with the balance to be paid within three months. Ownership was to remain with
the Chus until full payment. Cunanan, however, transferred the titles to her name and
mortgaged the lots without paying the balance. The Chus filed Civil Case No. G-1936 in 1988
to recover the unpaid balance and later amended it to seek annulment of the deed and
damages. The case was partially settled through a compromise agreement in 1999, which
the RTC approved. Subsequently, the Chus filed Civil Case No. 12251 in 2001 against the
Carloses and Benelda Estate, seeking cancellation of TCTs and damages. The RTC denied
motions to dismiss this case, but the CA later annulled the RTC's orders, citing res judicata.
The Chus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata despite the compromise agreement not
expressly including Benelda Estate and not referencing the lots registered in Benelda
Estate's name?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the CA's decision, holding
that Civil Case No. 12251 was barred by res judicata.

Ratio:
The Court explained that a compromise agreement is a contract that settles all claims
between the parties and has the effect of res judicata. The compromise agreement in this
case intended to settle all claims related to the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage,
which covered all five lots. The Court found that the Chus were guilty of splitting their
cause of action by filing multiple suits based on the same deed of sale. The doctrine of res
judicata, which aims to prevent multiple litigations over the same issue, applied because
the compromise agreement settled all claims arising from the deed of sale. The Court
emphasized that the identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between Civil
Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 was sufficient to bar the latter case. The Court
concluded that the Chus could not split their single cause of action and pursue multiple
suits, thus affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251.
 Title
Progressive Development Corp., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 123555 Jan 22, 1999

A lessee who failed to pay rentals filed a separate suit for damages against the lessor,
but the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the lessor, dismissing the separate suit and
emphasizing the prohibition of forum shopping.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 123555)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case involves Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (petitioner) and Westin
Seafood Market, Inc. (private respondent). On May 27, 1991, Progressive Development
leased a property located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, to Westin Seafood Market
for a period of nine years and three months, with a monthly rental of approximately
P600,000. Westin failed to pay its rentals amounting to P8,608,284.66, which constituted a
breach of their lease contract. Consequently, Progressive Development repossessed the
leased premises on October 31, 1992, as per the lease agreement's terms. Westin then filed a
complaint for forcible entry with damages against Progressive Development before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. While this case was still pending, Westin
filed another action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Progressive Development moved to dismiss the RTC case on the grounds of litis pendencia
and forum shopping, but the RTC denied the motion. The Court of Appeals also dismissed
Progressive Development's special civil action for certiorari and prohibition due to the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. Progressive Development then
petitioned the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. Can a lessee file a separate suit for damages in the RTC while a forcible entry case is
pending in the MeTC?
2. Did the petitioner commit forum shopping by filing multiple suits based on the same
cause of action?
3. Was the failure to file a motion for reconsideration before resorting to certiorari
justified?

Ruling:
1. No, the lessee cannot file a separate suit for damages in the RTC while a forcible entry
case is pending in the MeTC.
 2. Yes, the petitioner committed forum shopping by filing multiple suits based on the
same cause of action.
3. Yes, the failure to file a motion for reconsideration before resorting to certiorari was
justified under the circumstances.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the action for damages filed by Westin in the RTC should be
dismissed on the grounds of litis pendencia and forum shopping. The Court emphasized
that Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court mandates that all cases for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, including claims for damages and costs, must be filed in the Municipal
Trial Court. The Court noted that the pendency of another action between the same parties
for the same cause is a ground for dismissal under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
The elements of res judicata were present, as both the forcible entry case and the damages
suit arose from the same cause of action—the alleged illegal retaking of possession by
Progressive Development. The Court also found that the claims for moral and exemplary
damages in the RTC were an attempt to split a single cause of action, which is prohibited to
avoid multiplicity of suits.

The Court further explained that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting
to certiorari is not a strict requirement when the issue raised is purely of law, or where the
error is patent, or the disputed order is void. In this case, the issues raised on certiorari
were the same as those presented to and passed upon by the lower court, making a motion
for reconsideration unnecessary.

The Supreme Court directed the RTC of Quezon City to dismiss the complaint for damages
and ordered the MeTC of Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of the forcible
entry case. The Court also imposed treble costs against the private respondent.
 Title
Salvador vs. Patricia, Inc.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 195834 Nov 9, 2016

A group of occupants file a complaint to protect their improvements on a parcel of land

in Manila, claiming it belongs to the City of Manila, but the court dismisses the case for
lack of jurisdiction and failure to establish their legal or equitable title to the property.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 195834)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case of "Salvador v. Patricia, Inc." involves a group of petitioners, including Guillermo
Salvador, Remedios Castro, and others, who filed a complaint to protect their
improvements on a parcel of land situated along Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila. The petitioners claimed that the land belonged to the City of Manila and sought to
prevent Patricia, Inc. from evicting them. They applied for a preliminary injunction
pending the resolution of the quieting of title on the merits. The complaint was amended to
include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila, and the City of
Manila and Ciriano Mijares filed complaints-in-intervention. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 32, appointed three geodetic engineers to resolve the boundary
dispute between the properties of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. On May 30, 2005, the
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, permanently enjoining Patricia, Inc. from evicting
them and from collecting rentals. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's
decision on June 25, 2010, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
establish the petitioners' legal or equitable title to the property. The CA's decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 9, 2016.

Issue:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction?
2. Did the petitioners have the necessary legal or equitable title to maintain a suit for
quieting of title?
3. Was the joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title proper?
4. Did the petitioners have a cause of action for injunction?

Ruling:
1. The CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
2. The petitioners did not have the necessary legal or equitable title to maintain a suit for
quieting of title.
 3. The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was improper.
4. The petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction.

Ratio:

1. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over a real action depends on
the assessed value of the property involved as alleged in the complaint. The petitioners'
complaint did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property, leaving
the trial court without a basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance
of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not proceed with the
case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law
and cannot be vested by any act or omission of any party.

2. Legal or Equitable Title: The petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to
maintain the suit for quieting of title. They did not claim ownership of the land itself
and did not show their authority or other legal basis for their alleged lawful occupation
and superior possession of the property. The authenticity of the titles of the City of
Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but admitted by the petitioners. Therefore,
they could not expect to have any right in the property other than that of occupants
whose possession was only tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors.

3. Joinder of Actions: The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title
was disallowed by the Rules of Court. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits
the joinder of special civil actions or actions governed by special rules with ordinary
suits. The RTC should have severed the causes of action and tried them separately. The
refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the
case.

4. Cause of Action for Injunction: The petitioners did not establish a right to be protected,
which is a requisite for the issuance of an injunctive writ. They only established the
existence of a boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila, which did
not concern the petitioners. Therefore, they did not have a cause of action for
injunction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, dismissing the petitioners' complaint and
ordering them to pay the costs of the suit.
 Title
Espina vs. Zamora, Jr.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 143855 Sep 21, 2010

The case of Espina v. Zamora, Jr. involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act in the Philippines, with the Court ruling that the
petitioner lawmakers have legal standing to challenge the law, but ultimately upholding
its constitutionality due to its promotion of a balance between protecting local
businesses and allowing foreign investments.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 143855)

Comprehensive

Facts:
The case of "Espina v. Zamora, Jr." (G.R. No. 143855) was decided on September 21, 2010, by
the Philippine Supreme Court. The petitioners, Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, Orlando
Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Raul M. Gonzales, Prospero Pichay, Juan
Miguel Zubiri, and Franklin Bautista, challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.)
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. This law, signed by
President Joseph E. Estrada on March 7, 2000, repealed R.A. 1180, which had previously
prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business in the Philippines.
R.A. 8762 allowed foreign participation in retail trade under four categories based on
investment amounts. The petitioners argued that the law violated Sections 9, 19, and 20 of
Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which mandate the State to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos. They contended that the
law would lead to alien control of the retail trade, harm local retailers, and was improperly
imposed by the World Bank-International Monetary Fund. The respondents, including
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, and
others, countered that the petitioners lacked legal standing, the petition did not involve a
justiciable controversy, and the law did not violate the Constitution.

Issue:
1. Do the petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality
of R.A. 8762?
2. Is R.A. 8762 unconstitutional?

Ruling:
1. The Court ruled that the petitioner lawmakers have legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762.
 2. The Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 and dismissed the petition for lack
of merit.

Ratio:
The Court first addressed the issue of legal standing, noting that while the petitioners did
not show direct injury as taxpayers or legislators, the rule on standing can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires or the matter is of
transcendental importance. Given the overarching significance of the issue to society, the
Court decided to resolve the question raised by the petitioners.

On the constitutionality of R.A. 8762, the Court explained that the provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, which include the declarations of principles and state policies, are
not self-executing and do not give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The Court further
clarified that while the Constitution mandates the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, it does not impose a
policy of Filipino monopoly. The Constitution allows for the entry of foreign investments,
goods, and services on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and only limits protection
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

The Court emphasized that Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress
the discretion to reserve certain areas of investments to Filipinos upon the
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and when
the national interest requires. Congress, in this case, decided to open certain areas of the
retail trade business to foreign investments, and the NEDA did not oppose this policy. The
Court found that R.A. 8762 provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in retail
trade, such as limiting the types of retailing activities foreign entities could engage in and
ensuring reciprocity with foreign countries.

The Court concluded that the petitioners failed to show how the retail trade liberalization
had prejudiced local small and medium enterprises since its implementation. Therefore,
the Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.