Sanlakas Vs ES
Sanlakas Vs ES
Executive Secretary
Facts:
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the
corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of
President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief Hermogenes
Ebdane.
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation
No. 427 ("Declaring a State of Rebellion") and General Order No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and
the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long
negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
through Proclamation No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of Rebellion Has Ceased to Exist").
Subsequently, several petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the
President Arroyo's declaration of state of rebellion. One of which was:
G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Party-list organizations
Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation,
thereexists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President the
power to declare a state of rebellion.
2. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity.
3. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion has an effect on the rights of the
citizens.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the Court held that it is within her prerogative as Chief Executive for the
President to declare a state of rebellion. For the fact is, the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers.
Section 18, Art. VII reads in part: "The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." This provision
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. The only
criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces
‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’”
It is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from
her Commander-in-Chief powers. The Solicitor General points out the statutory authority for
such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office
of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order.
2. Yes, the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called
to prevent or suppress it. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
3. No. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests are unfounded. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a
state of rebellion. In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest
for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is
no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation
of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has
exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President
has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.