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Kanshi Ram and the Making of Dalit Political Agency

Surinder S Jodhka

K
Kanshi Ram worked out an additive strategy anshi Ram was born in 1934 in the family of Ramdasia
of visualising Indian society and argued for Sikhs in Khawaspur village of the Ropar district of
Punjab. Even though he did not support a turban, as
an identity-based representational space for
Sikhs mostly do, and his name did not carry the title “Singh,” a
communities in the Indian political system. An common feature of male Sikh names, Ramdasias are all Sikhs.1
important implication of such an imagination of the They were originally a part of the larger cluster of the Punjabi
political process was to turn the logic of caste from its Chamars. However, over the years, they have come to see
themselves as a separate group, with a sense of distinctive
existing vertical frame to a horizontal one. However,
identity of their own (Chandra 2000). Their identification with
considering that this vision of democratisation through Sikhism presumably goes back to the fourth Sikh guru, Guru
community-based hissedari in the political domain Ramdas, who they believe made them a part of the Sikh move-
having confronted a major block, a different language of ment. Ramdasias were also one of the four groups within the
Sikh community who were included in the state list of Sched-
politics needs to be invented towards an imagination of
uled Castes (SCs) on the insistence of the Sikh members of the
substantive citizenship or “absolute equality” in the Constituent Assembly, the only non-Hindus to be listed in the
words of Kanshi Ram. scheduled list for the benefit of reservations at that time.
Being Sikhs did not mean a complete escape from social
hierarchy for the Ramdasias. Their status in the local context
remained almost at par with the group they had seceded from.
However, Kanshi Ram’s immediate family had experienced
social and economic mobility over the previous two generations.
His grandfather had joined the British army as a jawan (soldier),
which helped him accumulate some surplus that was invested
in setting up a leather tanning unit after his retirement. The
family also owned some agricultural land and could be described
as “fairly well off” (Narayan 2014: 15).
Kanshi Ram’s early political socialisation happened far away
from his home, in the city of Pune in Maharashtra, where he
had gone to work after his studies in Punjab. By the late 1980s,
Kanshi Ram emerged as the face of Dalit political assertion in
all of North India, with significant electoral successes in the state
of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and elsewhere. He founded the Bahujan
Samaj Party (BSP) in 1984 and served as a member of the Indian
Parliament. He played a critical role in articulating Dalit political
agenda and in making Dalit political agency matter in the
national imagination. Kanshi Ram saw himself as taking forward
B R Ambedkar’s political work and was popularly seen as doing
so by those who joined his politics.2 Even those who think
that “a comparison between these seemingly incomparable
The author is grateful to Vivek Kumar for giving him access to some personalities could be misleading,” agree that he has been “the
valuable material on the subject and for the long ranging discussions biggest and most creative leader in the post-Ambedkar Dalit
he has had with him on the subject. Sneha Sudha Komath read the paper
movement” (Teltumbde 2006: 4531).
and provided useful comments.
Looking back in the third decade of the 21st century, Ambedkar
Surinder S Jodhka (ssjodhka@yahoo.com) teaches at the Centre for indeed remains the most revered leader and an ideologue of a
Study of the Social Systems, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
diverse range of Dalit identities and their political imaginations.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 35
SPECIAL ARTICLE

His influence on contemporary Dalit lives in India goes far engaging with his life trajectory as a national political elite
beyond the sphere of electoral mobilisations and continues representing a particular habitus of the Indian social life; and by
to shape and inspire a wide variety of social, religious and exploring the shifts that he initiated in the modes of thinking
political movements across the subcontinent. Given his pioneer- or imaginings of Dalit political agency and the modes of its
ing struggles and educational achievements, he has also come representations in the electoral politics.
to be very widely recognised as an important thinker of modern
India, far beyond the Dalit universe, who provided a powerful Researching India’s Political Leadership/Elite
and critical perspective on Indian society. Perhaps, the most important feature of India’s political elite is
Kanshi Ram’s life trajectory was quite different from that of their social diversity, which has been steadily growing over
Ambedkar’s. They were not only born in different regions of time, with diverse sections of the Indian population across
India, but also in different time periods. He did not go abroad regions producing leaders and representatives from within the
to study or write books like Ambedkar did. However, they ranks of their communities. India’s political elite has also been
also shared many things. Kanshi Ram, by his own admission, ideologically very diverse. Their growing diversity is a reflection
travelled on the path that had already been defined by Ambedkar. of the nature of change being experienced on the ground, in
And, quite like Ambedkar, he saw electoral politics as an the economy and society.
instrument of social change. He too founded Dalit organisa- However, the study of the political elite has not been a very
tions and a political party, and provided leadership to a variety popular concern with the social scientists in India. As Banerjee
of Dalit formations and social movements. While Ambedkar’s rightly points out, except for a few notable exceptions (Mines
party could not win electoral battles or form a government 1996; Raghavan and Manor 2009), most of the social science
headed by a Dalit, Kanshi Ram’s party did. writings on India’s democratic politic revolve around “the
The rise of the BSP in uP, the largest and politically the most ‘groups,’ defined variously by caste, class and status.” In com-
important state of India, marked a phenomenal shift in the parison, literature on leadership “has been remarkably lack-
politics of North India.3 Its rise changed the nature of the elec- ing” (Banerjee 2010: XV). Though there had been “a promising
toral arithmetic in several states of northern India and beyond. beginning, when a conference was organised in 1956 in the
Members of SCs were among the securest voters of the Con- University of California” that deliberated on the subject (Guha
gress party until Kanshi Ram arrived on the scene. Through 2010: 289; Park and Tinker 1959), it did not become a popular
his strategic political thinking and its clever execution, he also subject of empirical enquiry with the political sociologists
changed the nature of the caste–democracy relationship. working on Indian democracy. Most writings on the subject of
However, unlike Ambedkar, the persona of Kanshi Ram “did not leadership have been in the form of biographies and autobio-
receive the kind of attention and recognition he deserved” graphies, generally written in a celebratory mode. However,
(Kumar 2014: 73). Even when he is remembered and written they provide useful entry points for social scientific enquiry
about, it is mostly in relation to the Dalit politics of uP, where into the subject and could help us frame further questions.
the political party he founded managed to form a govern- Scholarship on the subject is gaining ground, though the pace
ment with his confidante, Mayawati, as the chief minister remains slow (Brass 2011; Oldenburg 2018; Price and Ruud
(Pai 2002, 2006; Narayan 2014; Bose 2008). He is rarely 2010). There has also been a growing volume of literature
talked about as someone who contributed to the making of on subjects like clientele politics and patronage democracy
the Indian democracy, or even in shaping Dalit identities. (Piliavsky 2014; Chandra 2004), including an edited volume
Mainstream political analysts began to forget him soon after on political dynasties (Chandra 2016). The question of caste is
he exited the scene. When he died in 2006, “the electronic also beginning to be discussed in relation to India’s political
and print media reported it but did not spend much time or elite; however, it is invariably done in relation to the domi-
space on it” (Pai 2006: 1). nant caste communities and their rise on the electoral scene
However, despite such cold-shouldering by the mainstream during the 1970s, or in the context of “backwards” who began
media, Kanshi Ram remains an important symbol of Dalit to be visible in the regional and national politics during the
assertion and political activism and an important member of 1990s. Rarely is the rise of Dalit politics and their leaders
India’s political elite who have shaped the nature of democratic seen from the perspective of the changing dynamics of India’s
and electoral politics of independent India. It is not only his political elites.
persona that continues to inspire the newer generation of lead-
ers coming from different Dalit communities in different state The making of Kanshi Ram: Dalit biographical narratives,
and regions of India, he is also remembered for the language including those presented in autobiographical accounts, invar-
and the idioms of politics that he injected into national political iably begin with stories of the protagonist’s childhood marked
life and Dalit activism. I propose to revisit the legacy of Kanshi by poverty and deprivations. They also carry narratives of
Ram in this paper by looking at his life trajectory and the making untouchability and humiliation, invariably experienced a little
of his politics. I look at the manners in which his legacy continues later in life, in schools or when they begin to move out of their
to shape contemporary Dalit political thinking and its influ- homes into the wider world. It is through these struggles and
ences on the larger ecosystem of the democratic political negotiations with prejudices and discriminations encountered
process of India. I do so by deploying a dual framework; by by them that they tend to develop the consciousness of being
36 january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Dalits, asserting their identity through the language of “politics,” a sense of dignity and confidence all his life. While he was
seeking dignity and citizenship.4 working in Pune, rarely did anyone think of him as being a
As we know from available sources, Kanshi Ram did not tell Dalit because “he was tall” and “fair skinned.” The BSP even
any such stories about his childhood or his later life. As his had to officially release a pamphlet denying rumours that he
biographer writes: was not a Dalit himself because he did not look like one.6
Recalling his childhood and student days, Kanshiram had once said
that while he saw many people around him who were affected by Becoming Dalit: Dalit is not a caste category, a synonymous
casteism and led pathetic lives, he himself was “never overtly” a of ex-untouchables. It is a political construct. It represents an
victim of this … articulation of a specific view on the subject of caste that rejects
… All my brothers were physically very strong and always ready for
its popular anthropological theorisations that approach it as a
a fight. Our family always rejected helplessness and we were so
arrogant that no one dared to touch us. (Narayan 2014: 17)
uniquely Indian cultural reality, a consensual framework of
living a Hindu life. The idea of Dalit rejects the ideology of
The caste question in Sikhism has been a rather tricky one. caste and karma and foregrounds the experience of violence
Ideologically, Sikhism decries notions of ritual hierarchy and that it implied for those classified as “untouchables.” The invo-
has put in place institutional processes that weaken caste, yet cation of Dalit-ness is to foreground the political and oppressive
its practice in everyday life survives and is widely accepted nature of the relational framework of caste. It, thus, frames
by scholars working on Sikhism or on the region of Punjab.5 the caste question in the language of modern citizenship.
However, there is no denying that the Sikh movement did The category, however, began to acquire prominence only in the
change the ground realities of caste and its practice in everyday post-1970s India when the Dalit Panthers movement emerged
life. As Puri (2003: 2693) observes: in Maharashtra (Murugkar 1991). As the name indicates, its
The teachings of the Sikh Gurus, the religious institutions of “sangat”
leaders were influenced by the Black Panthers of the United
and “langar,” the absence of a caste-based priesthood, and the respect States. Its popular support base was “the educated Dalit youth
for manual labour, all these were together aimed at creating a caste- wishing to give a political expression to their anger against
free Khalsa Brotherhood ... The untouchable castes in the region con- caste and class injustices” (Jaoul 2007: 199). The Panthers
verted to Sikh religion in large numbers with a view to improve their
expressed their disappointment with the existing leaders of
status. Their gain was not small.
the SCs, those in the Republican Party of India (RPI) and
The region also has its specificities for other historical reasons. those working with the national political parties, particularly
Perhaps the most important aspect of the regional profile of the the Indian National Congress, who were all able to get elected
caste system is a relatively “low” or marginal status of the Brahmins because of the quotas and the reservation system but did not
in the social and religious life. This was the case not only with have an independent voice. However, their influence did not
respect to the Sikhs but also amongst the Hindus of Punjab. last for very long.
Writing in the celebrated Punjabi Century, 1857–1947, Prakash Kanshi Ram shaped the next wave of the Dalit movement in
Tandon, an “upper-caste” Punjabi Hindu, had described the the post-Ambedkar period. Though his movement found its
Brahmins of his village as leading a “frugal life.” They were seen realisation in northern India, he too was “educated” about the
as being closer to the menial castes as they too mostly depend- dynamics of caste in Maharashtra. After completing his educa-
ed on the food that they collected from their jajmāns (patrons). tion in science from Punjab, he joined as a junior scientist in
With us brahmins were an underprivileged class and exercised little a public-sector unit, Explosives Research and Development
or no influence on the community … Our brahmins were rarely Laboratory (ERDL), located in Pune. It was here that he closely
erudite; in fact, many of them were barely literate, possessing only encountered caste as it was being experienced in the modern
a perfunctory knowledge of rituals and knowing just the necessary organisations during those times. As the story goes, Ambedkar’s
mantras by heart. (Tandon 1988: 76)
birthday used to be a holiday in his organisation. However, the
Interestingly, Kanshi Ram too had made a similar observation management suddenly decided to withdraw the holiday. Some
about the Brahmins of the region. As his biographer writes: of the Dalit employees protested against the move but the
In Punjab, Brahmins were not that prominent economically or cultur- administration did not concede. A Class IV employee, Dinabhana,
ally. It was the Jat Sikhs who constituted the dominant community. who had led the protest was charged with insubordination and
Sikhism never encouraged Brahminism … Kanshiram once recalled
was fired. Even though Kanshi Ram was in a senior cadre, he
in a lecture that as a small boy when he saw how some Brahman boys
he knew lived, he thought that Brahmans were a very poor, backward openly came out in support of Dinabhana and helped him during
community. Only much later did he come to realise that socially they his legal struggle. As his biographer writes, when his upper-caste
were way above the dalits. (Narayan 2014: 16–17; emphasis added) colleagues asked him to stay away from trade union activities
The only memory of “exploitation of the downtrodden” he of the Class IV staff, as he had nothing in common with them,
seemed to have recalled from his personal life was the story of Kanshiram retorted that the similarity indeed existed as Dinabhana
his father having been asked to do begaar (unpaid labour) by a was a Bhangi and he himself was a Chamar; they both had the same
bureaucrat, an official at the “canal guest house” close to his problems that this struggle was not for the Class IV workers alone.
(Narayan 2014: 20–21)
village (Narayan 2014: 17).
The nature of his childhood experience of caste perhaps had Thus, his most critical encounter with caste was not in the
an influence on his later life. Kanshi Ram carried himself with village where he was born or in the school where he went to
Economic & Political Weekly EPW january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 37
SPECIAL ARTICLE

study but in the office of a modern organisation, as a member hierarchy. He also stayed firmly committed to the idea of elec-
of the officially designated SCs. He also did not go back to his toral democracy as the only mode for bringing about change,
village to fight against the injustices of caste. Instead he decided through acquisition of political power. However, he did not
to build a platform for the protection of upwardly mobile Dalits deify Ambedkar and occasionally expressed his disagreement
like himself and set up the Backward and Minority Communities with him on the strategic modes of moving on the path he had
Employees Federation (BAMCEF) in 1978. shown. For example, he disagreed with the idea of foregrounding
This context also shaped his perspective on caste and politics. the agenda of annihilation of caste, which, for Ambedkar, was
To pursue his politic, he left his job and decided to focus to be the broader moral imperative of the Dalit movement.
completely on his political work. He stayed on in Maharashtra Kanshi Ram approached it as a resource, to be mobilised and
for some time, engaging and working with Dalit activists in the consolidated to fight against its oppression.
cities of Pune and Bombay. He was fascinated by Ambedkar’s Speaking at the first World Dalit Convention at Kuala Lumpur
writings and his vision but he grew dissatisfied with the local in Malaysia in 1998, he said:
activists. He found the RPI “divided into many factions,” which
When I read the Annihilation of Caste in 1962–63, I too felt that it was
made it incapable of any serious political action. The Panthers possible to annihilate caste. However, when I closely looked at the
too “were wasting their time on endlessly debating the relevance caste system and how deeply it is ingrained in the lives of common
Marxism and Buddhism to the Dalit cause.” The real need was people, I changed my opinion. It is hard to forget caste. Even when
“organizing a social movement” (Pai 2006: 2). From there on, poor Indians migrate from their villages to urban slums, the one thing
that they all carry with them is caste. If it matters so much to common
he was to travel on a different path. He shifted to Delhi, where
people, how could we destroy it?
he formally set up the office of the BAMCEF on 6 December While I continue to work for a society free of caste, I have no illusions
1978. This also marked the beginning of a different mode of that it cannot be destroyed simply because we wish to do so. If that is
dealing with caste, conceptually and politically. the case, how do we move forward? We must recognize that caste has
Though his larger social universe for political action were been put in place for a purpose, by those who gain from it. They are
also the rulers of India. How will they let us destroy it?
the Dalit masses of the country, he saw the Dalit employees as
Caste is a double-edged sword. We need to learn to handle it. The
his primary constituency. He not only organised them through
savarnas have so far used it against us, even though they are only 15
the BAMCEF but also criticised them for not being sufficiently percent of the population and we are 85 percent … If we have such
sensitive towards the communities of their origin, thereby large numbers, why can’t we use it for ourselves. However, the chal-
invoking a moral claim that he had over them. “They were lenge is to learn to use caste, politically. What appears to us as a source
educated and monetarily secure.” Their training in bureau- of all our problem could also be a source of opportunity for us. If we
use it intelligently, we can be in power … And power is the key to all
cratic set up enabled them to work “in a disciplined manner”
solutions. We need to be the rulers of this country. (Nath and Kureel
(Kumar 2013: 73). However, the task of acquiring political power 1999: 1–8, my summary)
required popular mobilisations, from across the length and
breadth of the country. It was with this objective in mind that Political power was the key. He underlined the need for a
he set up a new organisation with the name Dalit Shoshit Samaj new imagination and a political organisation that would bring
Sangharsh Samiti (DS-4) in 1981, followed by the formation of together 1,000 caste communities and organise them as a united
BSP in 1984. Along with a group of his comrades, he initiated a political force, the Bahujans. Dalits were to provide leadership
rally on bicycles, which took him across the country, cycling to this process. He was critical of the Dalits of Maharashtra
around 3,000 kilometres over a period of 40 days. who had been opportunistically aligning with parties of the
It was during this march that he coined the famous slogans upper caste and gaining some personal benefits. He continued:
that reflected his notion of bahujan, the majority, which was
We have people from Maharashtra in this Convention. I have learnt
to be visualised in caste terms and included a broad section a lot from them. I learnt half of my political lessons on how to run
of Indians. As he put it through a slogan, except for the three an Ambedkarite movement from Babasaheb Ambedkar. I have also
upper-caste Hindu groups, the Thakurs, the Brahmins and the learnt a lot from the Mahars of Maharashtra. While Ambedkar taught
Baniyas, everyone else was included in the DS-4 (Thakur, Brahmin, me how to run a movement; from the Mahars of Maharashtra I have
learnt how not to run a movement. (Nath and Kureel 1999: 10–11, my
Baniya chhod; baki sab hai DS -4). This “ruling minority” was
summary)
only around 15% of the total Indian population. Even though
India became a democracy in 1947, they, the minority, have been Towards the end of the lecture, he went on to pronounce his
ruling over the majority (Kumar 2013: 81–86). They were able views on Dalit-ness (dalitpan) and how that had become a
to do so because the majority was willing to be fooled and problem. While caste was a useful tool and a resource for moving
manipulated. This is what needed to be questioned and stopped: towards acquiring power, he was very critical of dalitpan which
Vote hamara, raj tumhara; nahin chale gaa, nahin chale gaa! (Our he saw as a reflection of a defeated mindset. He appealed to
votes, and your rule; no longer, no longer!) his audience to come out of it, if they wished to become rulers
of India. “Dalitpan has become the biggest weakness of Dalits.
Moving beyond Dalit-ness It makes them dependent like beggars. Beggars can never
Kanshi Ram stayed firmly committed to Ambedkar’s persona become rulers” (Nath and Kureel 1999: 16).
and his ideals of building a society grounded on the culture of The arguments presented in the Kuala Lumpur lecture were
equality and human dignity, free from the oppressions of caste an extension of the ideas that he had developed very early on
38 january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

during his political life, some of which were put together in the elected by them and accountable to them. They would have
only book he wrote, The Chamcha Age. The book was published taken the Dalits out of the “Dark Age” and into a “Bright Age.” In
in 1982, on the 50th anniversary of the Poona Pact. He dedicated the absence of genuine political leadership, even Dalit bureaucrats
it to the “pioneers of anti-caste thinkers and reformers, Jyoti- suffered. The SC employees were rarely given substantive posi-
rao Phule, B R Ambedkar, Periyar E V Ramasamy” and “many tions of authority in the system. They too were, therefore,
other rebellious spirits,” who had worked hard to prepare the turned into chamchas. Besides the persistent marginalisation
ground for Dalit struggles. The Poona Pact was signed in 1932 of large sections of the Dalit masses in the social and political
between Gandhi and Ambedkar after the former sat on fast unto life of the country, the opportunist mobilities of a section of
death against the British decision to grant separate electorates Dalits in the chamcha age thus produces, what he calls, an
to the “untouchable” communities of India, represented by “alienation of the elite.”
Ambedkar. Under the “Pact,” Ambedkar was to withdraw his Kanshi Ram’s objective was not simply to criticise every-
demand for separate electorates and in return the “untoucha- thing and everyone, but also to argue for or propose a new
ble” were to be given a quota of seats, from those allocated to the kind of sovereign politics of the Dalit, which, according to him,
Hindus. While other minorities could keep their separate, was the real vision of Ambedkar. The BAMCEF was to protect
community specific, electorates, the Dalits were to be elected the interests of employees belonging to the marginalised groups
by the common electorates. and to instil a sense of empathy among its members for the
As he argues, Ambedkar had worked hard for separate larger masses of the socially excluded communities that they
electorates, which he thought would give an autonomous or came from. For example, one of the core slogans of the new
sovereign voice to the Dalits. But he had to surrender them in organisation was to motivate its members to “payback to the
the face of Gandhi’s fast and the fear of the possible conse- oppressed and exploited society.” This was to help end the
quences his death could have had for the nascent Dalit move- alienation of the Dalit elite. The mobile Dalits who had been
ment. Kanshi Ram, in a sense, extended and articulated the able to move out of their depressed positions and had benefited
anxieties that Ambedkar himself had about the pact. The from the state policy of reservations, which had been put in
separate electorates would have undermined the power of the place because of the struggles of the Dalit masses, had an obli-
upper caste, who constituted only a small proportion of India’s gation to reciprocate. However, in the longer run, the way out
total population. Had the separate electorates been allowed of the chamcha age lay in claiming a share in the state power,
to prevail, they would have considerably shrunk the influence hissedari, which was substantive and real, and which would
of upper castes, perhaps equal to the size of their population take everyone towards a new culture of equality.
and thereby reducing them to a small minority. Ambedkar’s
success in winning the separate electorates for the Dalits was Assessing the Legacy
an indication of the things to come for the upper castes. They What is distinct about his legacy? How did he become one of
were quick to grasp their imminent marginalisation in a dem- the most powerful politicians of his times? How was he able
ocratic India. This was the reason for Gandhi’s hunger fast. to transcend his immediate identity of being a Ramdasia Dalit
While Gandhi managed to blackmail Ambedkar into signing Sikh from Punjab and emerge as the most powerful and influ-
the Poona Pact, it implied a defeat for the Dalits. Their hope ential of Dalit leaders of UP? What explains the decline of Dalit
and vision of a “Bright Age” was thus lost. politics after his departure? How do we assess his contribution
The Chamcha Age, he argued, was a consequence of the Poona to the making of Dalit political agency and leadership?
Pact. It made Dalit leaders stooges of the upper castes. Even As discussed above, Kanshi Ram did not see himself as a
when a good number of seats were reserved for them, Dalit “victim” of the system. He hardly ever encountered or
electorates had very little say in getting their representative experienced the violence of caste and untouchability during
elected. Given their demographic distribution across the country, his growing-up years. It was in Pune, and later in Mumbai,
no SC candidate could win without the support of upper caste that Kanshi Ram was exposed to Dalit organisations and read
voters. This is how the “upper-caste” national parties gained Ambedkar’s writings. However, unlike the local Dalits of
control over the Dalit representatives. The elected members of Maharashtra, who saw each other in terms of their jati identity,
the national parties did not represent their fellow Dalits. For Kanshi Ram could easily identify himself with the aggregated
the sake of getting elected and holding on to positions of official category of SCs. It is perhaps also for this reason that his
power, they became chamchas of their masters and worked for understanding of caste, and the political rhetoric around which
them, not for the welfare of their communities. he framed his politics in later years in North India, was through
Providing a broader context, Kanshi Ram argued that Dalits the governmental language. He saw caste as a national system,
had no possibility of gaining a voice of their own during which could be classified into three groupings: the Brahmin
the precolonial period. The British rule gave them access to and the other upper castes (the general category), the back-
education and a space for gaining a new consciousness and wards (the Other Backward Classes [OBCs]), and the Dalits
confidence. Reform movements initiated by Phule was the (the SCs). His notion of Bahujan Samaj too was additive, made of
beginning of this process. Following Phule, Ambedkar worked the officially classified OBCs and SCs, plus the religious minori-
hard to win freedom for his people. The separate electorates ties. This for him was a matter of alliance building. His own
would have enabled the Dalits to produce their own leaders, goal was to mobilise and empower the Dalits, giving them a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 39
SPECIAL ARTICLE

sense of confidence, which would enable them to become seeking their legitimate share in the power structure, that the
capable leaders, of their communities and of the larger alliance of Dalits could move forward, taking them closer to the represen-
Bahujans, eventually emerging as rulers. tational politics of the rural “dominant caste.” His language of
He also had a clear notion on how this was to be achieved. politics also gave a new lease of life to Dalit activism, a new
His initial activities remained focused on making common confidence and a new hope, of being rulers and sharers of power.
Dalits aware of their shared situation of marginality and how His success was quite evident. The decade of the 1990s saw a
they could convert their votes into a source of change. However, sudden decline of the Indian National Congress in UP and the
he reframed the narrative of caste-centric marginality. He, rise of the BSP.
in a sense, represented the “mobile Dalit,” socially as well as
metaphorically. He arrived on the political stage when a new Renewal of Kanshi Ram’s Imagination
(lower) middle class had already emerged among the Dalits, However, his vision of democratisation through community-
which was almost entirely made up of the beneficiaries of the based hissedari in the political domain soon confronted a
quota system. They were no longer poor but often felt slighted major block. While it was easy to visualise the additive idea of
in the office. In other words, their concerns were less to do bahujan, its realisation on the ground required a very different
with deprivation and more to do with humiliation. The politics kind of vision and language of politics. A bahujan imagination
of the Congress party for them was primarily framed in the needed to be produced through a politics that could transcend
narrative of deprivation. He shifted his narrative to the ques- the jati-specific boundaries and invoke a completely new
tion of dignity, which could be achieved only if Dalits extend- vocabulary. This was neither visualised in this framework, nor
ed their aspiration from economic mobility to political power. attempted. The ground realities of social and economic life
This is well illustrated in Kanchan Chandra’s paper on the BSP in a region like uP made it very difficult to bring the Dalits and
in Hoshiarpur (Punjab). Writing about those who were attract- “backwards” together for a common political action. If jati and
ed to Kanshi Ram’s politics, she observes: caste were to be the primary mode of mobilisation, why would
the backwards cede leadership space to the Dalits?
they were predominantly Scheduled Castes … all born after inde-
pendence; educated … in the lower echelons of government service ... Even the Dalits or the SCs do not see themselves as a singular
better off than their parents and the rest of the Scheduled Caste popu- ethnic formation. The growing self-awareness of deprivation
lation. They were … upwardly mobile … having hit the glass ceiling and marginalisation through the language of identity does not
that separated them from the rest of society, turned back to themselves necessarily bring them together as a political community. Identity
and their own community for respect. (Chandra 2000: 36)
politics-based purely on the principle of hissedari, representa-
Such a move from the narrative of deprivation to an tional power-sharing, could go either way, towards consolidation
aspiration for dignity thus broadened the idea of marginality or fragmentation. If demographics matter, it would also matter
and made the question of the growing internal differentiation across Dalit jatis and in the proportion of representation across
of class and the consequent social distancing within the them. Though it might appear contradictory, the rise or success
community redundant (Jodhka 2015: 169–209). Those who of the BSP and its constant reminder of caste identity would have
had benefited from quotas were yet not liberated and they also likely produced an aspirational elite, “Dalit movement entre-
had the obligation to pay back to their communities (Naudet preneurs,” as Amit Ahuja (2019) describes them, within the
2008). If they did not do so, they were being chamchas of the individual jatis, aware of their numbers and accounting for
upper-caste ruling establishment. In other words, his broader their possible hissa (share). The post-Mandal moment of poli-
framing of marginality could include all the SCs, irrespective tics that expanded space for caste-based political mobilisa-
of class and jati differences. tions would have only enabled such a process of sharpening
The next move was to work out an additive strategy of of jati-specific community identities. The idea of bahujan
visualising Indian society and arguing for an identity-based alliance in the absence of a new political language that could
representational space for communities in the Indian political go beyond the additive process of jatis/castes coming together
system. An important implication of such an imagination of could at best be short-lived. The rhetoric of “power-sharing”
the political process was to turn the logic of caste from its ex- could also encourage a jati-level fragmentation within the
isting vertical frame to a horizontal one: jis ki jitnee sankhya officialised clusters of SCs and OBCs.
bhari, us ki utnee hissedari (political representation to each The process of caste-based mobilisation and jati-based
community in proportion to their numbers). Such a framing fragmentation has also had implications for the relationship
enabled him to visualise an autonomous politics of the SCs and of caste with electoral politics at a broader level. It made
their coming to power through an alliance with the OBCs and everyone available for political manoeuvring, for viable elec-
religious minorities. toral alliances. Its translation is quite evident in post-2014
For this to happen, he needed the Dalit political elite to come electoral politics, when leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party
out of the patronage of upper-caste elite and the mainstream (BJP) with superior resources at their command were able to
political parties. Such an imagination would have required a successfully carry out such a manoeuvring. At the local level,
shift in focus, a postponement of the agenda of caste annihilation every jati has its own leaders and they negotiate for their
and working towards consolidation of caste communities. It share in the power that can be acquired through electoral
was only through numbers, and the consciousness of communities politics. Growing mobilisations for sub-classification of SCs
40 january 16, 2021 vol lVI no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

and OBCs across regions of India further sharpened the inter- could bring them back to interest-based political alliance
nal divisions within the officially classified categories. building. In other words, the BJP’s ability to secure Dalit
This is not to say that there has been a decline of Dalit votes does not necessarily imply the triumph of Hindutva
politics or a disappearance of the caste question from electoral over caste. If the realities of caste persist—exclusionary,
mobilisations, as some may see Palshikar (2020). Increasing discriminatory and humiliating—it would be very hard for
mobilisations and active organisational processes could also any political formation to take their support for granted.
produce a newer form of Dalit politics and leadership, more However, to move forward, the new generation of Dalit leader-
awakened and more accountable. The jati-based leadership is ship will need to invent a different language of politics,
certainly more organic and grounded in the social context of beyond the tokenism of hissedari, and towards an imagina-
their communities. A mere symbolic representation may not tion of substantive citizenship or “absolute equality,” in the
necessarily empower their communities at the local level and words of Kanshi Ram.

Notes Guha, R (2010): “Political Leadership,” The Oxford Best Heinrich and John Higley (eds), London:
1 His father, Hari Singh and his mother, Bishan Companion to Politics in India, Niraja Gopal Jayal Palgrave Macmillan, pp 203–23.
Kaur, have common Sikh names. However, it and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), Delhi: Oxford Pai, Sudha (2002): Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished
has been common among the Sikh Dalits to not University Press. Democratic Revolution: The Bahujan Samaj
be very particular about the title ‘‘Singh’’ being Guru, Gopal and Sundar Sarukkai (2012): The Party in Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi: Sage
attached to their names. Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience Publications.
2 A popular slogan among the BSP activists of and Theory, Delhi: Oxford University Press. — (2006): “Kanshi Ram: The Man and His Legacy,”
UP goes: Baba tera mission aadhura; Kanshi Jaoul, Nicolas (2007): “Political and ‘Non-political’ An Essay, EconPapers, viewed on 26 October
Ram Karega Poora (Kanshi Ram has come Means in the Dalit Movement,” Sudha Pai (ed), 2019, file:///C:/Users/ssjod/Downloads/Docu-
complete the mission that you Baba [Baba Political Process in Uttar Pradesh: Identity, Eco- ment113102006190.6993067%20(1).pdf.
Saheb Ambedkar] had left half accomplished, nomic Reforms and Governance, New Delhi: Palshikar, Suhas (2020): “The Hathras Case Is
quoted in Kumar 2014: 77). Pearson. Symptomatic of the Disappearance of Dalit
3 By the late 1990s, the BSP had emerged as the Jodhka, S S (2002): “Caste and Untouchability in Politics,” Indian Express, 16 October.
most favoured party among the SCs in the states Rural Punjab,” Economic & Political Weekly, Park, R L and Irene Tinker (1959): Leadership and
of Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, Vol 37, No 19, pp 1813–23. Political Institutions in India, Princeton:
where it polled more than 60% of SC votes. It — (2004): “Sikhism and the Caste Question: Princeton University Press, pp 288–98.
could muster middling level of support in the Dalits and Their Politics in Contemporary Piliavsky, Anastasia (ed) (2014): Patronage as Politics
states of Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana, Punjab,” Contributions to Indian Sociology, in South Asia, New Delhi: Cambridge University
where it could gain the support of more than Vol 23, Nos 1–2, pp 165–92. Press.
one-third of the total SC voters (Chandra 2000: — (2009): “The Ravi Dasis of Punjab: Global Price, Pamela and Arild Engelsen Ruud (eds)
27). Over the years, it has also extended its Contours of Caste and Religious Strife,” Economic (2010): Power and Influence in India: Bosses,
influence to the states of Rajasthan, Himachal & Political Weekly, Vol 44, No 24, pp 79–85. Lords and Captains, New Delhi: Routledge.
Pradesh and Bihar, even winning seats in state — (2015): Caste in Contemporary India, New Delhi: Puri, H K (2003): “Scheduled Castes in Sikh Com-
elections. Routledge. munity: A Historical Perspective,” Economic &
4 For a philosophical discussion on the subject — (2017): “Caste from a Contemporary Perspec- Political Weekly, Vol 38, No 26, pp 2693–2701.
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and Sarukkai (2012). Jacobsen, Gurinder Singh Mann, Kristina and Deepening Democracy: Political Innovation
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Jodhka (2002, 2004, 2017); Puri (2003); Judge Brill, Vol 1, pp 236–42. Ram, Kanshi (1982): The Chamcha Age: An Era of
and Bal (2009); Ram (2009). Judge, P S and Gurpreet Bal (2009): Mapping Dalits: Stooges, D S 4 Office, Delhi.
6 As Kumar (2013: 71) writes, ‘‘Some people call Contemporary Reality and Future Prospects in Ram, Ronki (2009): “Regional Specificities and
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… To do away these mysteries BSP’s central Juergensmeyer, M (1988): Religious Rebels in the Politics, June, Vol 43, No 2, pp 15–29.
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