5th Internal Moot court competition:2023

Compendium
of Respondent

CENTRE FOR RIGHTS OF CIVILIANS (PETITIONER)

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1) Sachidanand Pandey and Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal and Ors. (11.02.1987

- SC) : MANU/SC/0136/1987

Khalid, J:

My learned brother has considered the facts in detail and the questions of law relevant

for the purpose of this appeal. I fully agree with his conclusions. This short tail piece is

with a purpose. This case goes by the name "Public Interest Litigation." I wish to

delineate the parameters of public interest litigation concisely, against the background

of the facts of this case, so that this salutary type of litigation does not lose its

credibility. Today public spirited litigants rush to Course to file cases in profusion

under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the

public. They must be above suspicious. See the facts of this case and end result.

This public interest litigation takes its birth, perhaps from the righteous indignation of

the petitioners, against the State Government at their bartering away of four acres of

land belonging to the Zoo to the Taj Group of Hotels. The writ petition is mainly based

on the ground that the decision of the Government is arbitrary. The question to be

answered is whether this accusation can be justified. On a perusal of the records I find

that the State Government had made available to the Court all the relevant documents

so as to satisfy the Court about the propriety of its action.

Ultimately, by the dismissal of this appeal, the hotel will be completed and will be

commissioned. Six long years have passed by. I do not think that the appellants have

achieved anything. The first appellant who is a trade unionist has not espoused any

grievance of the mazdoors before us. It was faintly suggested by the Government's

counsel that the first petitioner does not represent all the mazdoors. This was refuted

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by the appellants. For the purpose of this case, we will accept the assertion of the first

appellant. Still, we did not have before us any of their grievances ventilated, which, if

there were any, we would have willingly considered.

2) Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. (28.08.1992 - SC) : MANU/SC/0532/1992

A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will

alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor

and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for

personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration.

Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for

vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.

AND

While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their

command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of

PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that courts

should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome

interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for

personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration.

In Gupta's case (supra) Bhagwati, J emphatically pointed out that the relaxation of the

rule of locus standi in the field of PIL does not give any right to a busybody or

meddlesome interloper to approach the court under the guise of a public interest

litigant.

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3) K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka (09.08.2011 - SC) :

MANU/SC/0914/2011

it was also noticed that the fundamental rights are not absolute but subject to law of

reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public to achieve the above

objectives specially to eliminate Zamindari system.

. While examining the scope of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 conflicting views

were expressed by the Judges with regard to the meaning and content of Article 19(1)

(f) and Article 31 as reflected in Sir Kameshwar Singh's case (supra). Suffice it to say

that the Parliament felt that the views expressed by the judges on the scope of Articles

19(1)(f) and 31 might come as a stumbling block in implementing the various welfare

legislations which led to the First Constitutional Amendment 1951 introducing Articles

31A and 31B in the Constitution

4) Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (25.01.1978 - SC) :

MANU/SC/0133/1978

Clause X(1) of Article 19 enshrines what may be described as the seven lamps of

freedom. It provides that all citizens shall have the right--(a) to freedom of speech and

expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or

unions;(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;- (e) to reside and settle in

any part of the territory of India; (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property and (g) to

practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. But these

freedoms are not and cannot be absolute, for absolute and unrestricted freedom of one

may be destructive of the freedom of another and in a well-ordered, civilised, society,

freedom can only be regulated freedom. Therefore, Clauses (2) to (6) of Art, 19 permit

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reasonable restrictions to be imposed on the exercise of the fundamental rights

guaranteed under Clause (1) of that article.

5) Amrit Singh v. State of Punjab

The accused had charges of rape and murder of an eight year old girl. When the body

of the deceased was discovered, some strands of hair were found in the closed fist of

the child. The Police wanted to analyse the hair of the accused, but the accused refused

to give the sample. The court found the accused to be protected against self-

incrimination, so he had the right to refuse to give hair sample. But if the right against

self-incrimination is considered in such a broad manner, then it might lead to misuse of

this right by the accused.

6) Deepti Kapur vs. Kunal Julka (30.06.2020 - DELHC) : MANU/DE/1314/2020

While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must yield to the right

of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant to court, to prove its case.

It is a critical part of the hallowed concept of fair trial that a litigating party gets a fair

chance to bring relevant evidence before court. It is important to appreciate that while

the right to privacy is essentially a personal right, the right to a fair trial has wider

ramifications and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public

justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out evidence

that a litigating party may wish to lead at the very threshold. Since no fundamental

right under our Constitution is absolute, in the event of conflict between two

fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest between the right to privacy and the right

to fair trial, both of which arise under the expansive Article 21, the right to privacy

may have to yield to the right to fair trial

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7) K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

These three requirements apply to all restraints on privacy (not just informational

privacy). They emanate from the procedural and content-based mandate of Article 21.

The first requirement that there must be a law in existence to justify an encroachment

on privacy is an express requirement of Article 21. For, no person can be deprived of

his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law.

The existence of law is an essential requirement. Second, the requirement of a need, in

terms of a legitimate State aim, ensures that the nature and content of the law which

imposes the restriction falls within the zone of reasonableness mandated by Article 14,

which is a guarantee against arbitrary State action. The pursuit of a legitimate State

aim ensures that the law does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a

postulate, involves a value judgment. Judicial review does not reappreciate or second

guess the value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is

sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness. The third

requirement ensures that the means which are adopted by the legislature are

proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law. Proportionality is

an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that

the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the

purpose of the law.