Resenha Cultural Objects, Material Culture, and Materiality
Resenha Cultural Objects, Material Culture, and Materiality
Resenha Cultural Objects, Material Culture, and Materiality
Review Article
ABSTRACT
The study of cultural objects and their materiality has moved to the center of cultural sociology. This
review synthesizes the work of this third wave of cultural sociology, demonstrating how insights from the
study of cultural objects and their mechanisms of meaning-making deepen our theories of culture in
action, culture and cognition, and the production and reception of culture. After placing this third wave
in the historical context of cultural sociology, this review clarifies three concepts: cultural objects,
material culture, and materiality. This review then makes a series of interventions around meaning-
making and action based on insights from scholarship on cultural objects and materiality. First, it
advocates attention to qualities in addition to symbols. Then it examines how object affordances
constrain and enable meaning and use and how objects have material agency. Then the role of cultural
objects in stabilizing and destabilizing meaning and social arrangements is discussed. Finally, cultural
power—whether and how cultural objects shape belief and behavior—is considered through the
orienting concepts of figure and ground.
Keywords
cultural objects, materiality, material culture, cultural power, culture in action, culture and
cognition, production of culture, reception theory, affordances, stabilization
INTRODUCTION
One cannot account for the effects of culture without understanding cultural objects. Griswold (1986, p.
5) defines cultural objects as “shared significance embodied in form,” meaningful expressions that are
materially perceptible by others. This includes what we usually think of as material objects (e.g., artifacts
in the world like books, tables, or cars) and people's bodily expressions (e.g., a whispered phrase, a hand
gesture, or a wink). As these are all perceptible, they are material. As externalized manifestations of
ideas, cultural objects make it possible to share meaning and therefore culture. I take cultural sociology's
task as explaining the creation and influence of shared meaning and how those meanings shape action.
Unless humans develop telepathic powers, people cannot share meaning without assigning meaning to
cultural objects, making new objects, and circulating them.
Despite this foundational importance of objects, there is a humility to things that leads us to miss their
influence (Miller 2005). Sociological accounts of culture and action are impoverished without accounting
for the role of objects in our explanations (Latour 1992). We off-load work onto objects to replace
human effort and then forget how those objects have come to shape behavior. We ignore cultural
objects’ centrality to action until they break down or misbehave. By taking objects for granted, we treat
them as static constants in our analysis. Instead, if we view objects as partners or collaborators in action,
we can see how objects bring dynamism to our explanations. People collaborate with objects; objects
are our imperfect but essential partners in action that require work from us so that objects can work
with us. I call objects imperfect partners because they require a great deal of stabilization to act
predictably. Just as no representation perfectly captures or communicates an idea (Becker 2007), cultural
objects can hold meaning for only so long, until they require repair and stabilization—else their meaning
changes (McDonnell 2010) or they cease being a cultural object altogether when they degrade beyond
recognition (Domínguez Rubio 2016).
Arguments for the importance of studying objects abound (see Benzecry & Domínguez Rubio
2018, Hodder 2012, McDonnell 2010, Mukerji 1994a, Preda 1999, Woodward 2007), and the case for
material agency is well established (Barad 2003, Cerulo 2009, Gell 1998, Latour 2005, Pickering 2010).
This review bridges this work on objects, materiality, and material culture with work in cultural sociology,
to develop a framework that accounts for the role of cultural objects in sociological explanations of
action. Scholars of materiality and cultural sociologists need each other. Cultural sociologists who rely on
people-side explanations can learn much of the contingencies of matter from scholars of materiality and
material culture. Attention to materiality moves us away from treating objects as static carriers of
symbols and inert sites of people's projections to viewing objects as contingent participants in meaning-
making and action (Jerolmack & Tavory 2014). Theorists of material agency and object-side explanations
for action often gloss over how meaning and interpretation operate as mechanisms of action. A more
complete theory of culture in action requires synthesizing the insights from cultural sociology and
scholarship on objects and materiality.
Tracing how objects and materiality shape meaning-making can offer more robust accounts of action. I
propose the following path, which structures this review: A focus on object qualities orients us to
potential meanings and lines of action afforded by those objects. Interactions among object qualities and
people's embodied cognitive capacities shape and change agentic possibility. Objects, then, have cultural
power both by stabilizing meaning-making and social arrangements and by the inverse—destabilizing
routines and opening up new lines of action. Objects have power through various direct and indirect
mechanisms, which I discuss through the lenses of figure and ground. By centering these insights from
the study of cultural objects and mechanisms of meaning-making, we deepen theories of culture in
action, culture and cognition, and the production and reception of culture. Throughout, I discuss
condoms and guns as cases to illuminate these insights. 1 Before boldly charging down this path, let me
briefly review where we have been.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBJECTS IN CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
Objects have been central to the development of cultural sociology. The study of culture in American
sociology coalesced when objects, especially art objects, became the central focus of study. Seeking to
distinguish between humanities and social scientific approaches, sociologists’ analyses of objects
emphasized social dimensions through the production and reception of culture: how institutional logics
and processes shaped the production and circulation of objects (Becker 1982, Peterson 1997) or how
belonging to particular groups constrains how people interpret objects (Griswold 1987, Halle
1993, Radway 1991). Despite this focusing effect of art as a case, sociologists of culture were inhibited in
their analysis of objects themselves (Wolff 1992). Much of this early work studied art objects because
they gave access to the human systems of production and audience interpretations. The objects
themselves were often an afterthought except in some exemplary cases where object qualities came to
the fore (Becker 1982, Berezin 1994, Cerulo 1995, Griswold 2000, Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1991).
This focus on the production and reception of objects dominated sociological research on culture for the
better part of two decades. Thus, this first wave of cultural sociology relied on objects, but object-
centered explanations were rarely foregrounded. Objects primarily served as access points to explain
institutionalized systems of cultural production or group interpretation and reception patterns.
Starting in the late 1980s, the second wave of cultural sociology increasingly directed attention to
internalized cognitive schemas, practices, and cultural structures (Alexander 2003, Bourdieu
1977, DiMaggio 1997, Lizardo & Strand 2010, Patterson 2014, Swidler 1986, Vaisey 2009) in an effort to
explain meaning and action. However, within sociology, the shift toward cognition and internalized
meaning systems relegated objects as subordinate to the study of ideas (Domínguez Rubio 2014). For
much of this second-wave sociology of culture work, cultural objects were carriers of cultural structures
or markers of cognitive outcomes, not actors in their own right. Cultural objects were treated as data—
evidence of cultural structures and cognitive processes—but not as things with causal power. The culture
in action tradition emphasized how internalized culture (in the head/body) shapes people's choice of
action, both in the sense of what interpretive schemas and actions a person has at their disposal and
how people select among these to act. Swidler's intervention into theories of action was to argue that
culture influences action not by articulating ends but by giving people capacities for action: “Culture
equips persons for action both by shaping their internal capacities and by helping them bring those
capacities to bear in particular situations” (Swidler 2001, p. 72). Cognitive approaches have improved
sociological accounts of action by emphasizing how schemas and embodied skills shape these capacities
(Boutyline & Soter 2021, DiMaggio 1997, Ignatow 2007, Wood et al. 2018). However, cultural sociology
has yet to sufficiently grapple with how objects make possible and shape people's capacities for action.
The time has come to bring objects into the explanation.
We need an approach that synthesizes the theoretical advances on objects outside of sociology with the
excellent work on cultural objects within the discipline. Rich accounts of objects and action have
flourished in adjacent fields, including anthropological and archeological studies of material culture
(Appadurai 1986, Gell 1998, Ingold 2007, Miller 2005), ecological psychology's theory of object
affordances (Gibson 1979), and debates about the agency of objects among scholars of science and
technology studies (Latour 2009, Pickering 2010, Pinch & Bijker 1984). While some pioneering cultural
sociologists incorporated these groundbreaking insights from other fields back into their sociological
work, breathing new life into the study of material objects as important sites of culture (Mukerji
1994a, DeNora 2000, Molotch 2003), only recently has the cultural sociology of objects, materiality, and
material culture flourished. This third wave of cultural sociology takes seriously the importance of
explaining how objects and their material qualities shape meaning and action, productively bridging
work on material agency with the study of meaning.
In this section, I clarify conceptual ambiguities in the study of cultural objects, materiality, and material
culture.
What Is a Cultural Object?
Let us begin with one of cultural sociology's touchstone concepts, the cultural object. Griswold's (1986,
p. 5) definition of a cultural object as “shared significance embodied in form” has stood the test of time
and anchored generations of sociologists’ work. Implicit in this definition is the idea that cultural objects
are dual and relational. By dual, I suggest that cultural objects are simultaneously cognitive (i.e.,
significance—ideas embodied schematically) and material (i.e., form—ideas embodied in a medium).
These cognitive and material instantiations of cultural objects are then relational in that they are deeply
intertwined and contingent upon each other, and meanings converge in the relations among people and
shared experience with objects in the world.
What Is Meant by Shared Significance?
What is shared significance? For Griswold, significance refers to symbols that denote or connote
meaning for people. More than just significance, a cultural object is significant if it enrolls people into an
“extended set of meanings” (Griswold 1986). To be cultural, such meanings must be shared—not just
personally significant. There are degrees of sharedness and significance. People may recognize or name
an object but not understand its meaning (McDonnell et al. 2017b). This line between personal and
cultural significance is complicated by Lizardo's (2017) recent distinction between personal and public
culture. Personal significance of an object may still be cultural in the sense that people's personal culture
is shaped by shared interactions with a world of objects and people. When are meanings that emerge
from personal culture individual versus shared? A child's toy rabbit may become personally meaningful
because of the unique personal experiences shared with that rabbit and the imaginative work done to
bring it to life. Another person would not have intuited just by looking at the rabbit that his name is
Snickerdoodle or that the child imagines that he is a farmer. Lizardo's argument makes room for
understanding idiosyncratic interpretations of objects as cultural because personal culture is a product of
enculturation. Even if someone cannot guess the name or imagined backstory by simply looking at the
toy rabbit, they can recognize the acts of naming and imaginative play as familiar cultural forms. The
source of meaning (i.e., content and/or form) and degree of sharedness (i.e., how much overlap is there
between people in the meanings and comprehensibility of the object) are important to consider.
Personal significance can be analyzed as cultural, but the analyst needs to be clear what is not cultural. In
this case, the form is cultural, but those meanings that are not intuitive givens to our cultural peers are
personal. If a child's interpretation of a toy rabbit is that it is great tinder for a fire, while technically
comprehensible, this is probably beyond what people might reasonably interpret or expect in most
situations.
Form: Cultural Objects as Materially Perceptible
For culture to be shared, it must be externalized in forms both perceivable and comprehensible to
others. Importantly, Griswold's idea of “embodied in form” extends beyond what material culture
scholars refer to as “artifacts” and the distinction between material and nonmaterial objects. Auslander
(2012), for instance, limits material culture to those objects one can touch or taste, emphasizing
tangibility over visuality or aurality. In so doing, Auslander distinguishes between violins and concertos,
viewing concertos as abstract and untouchable. While an emphasis on artifacts has been productive for
material culture scholars—especially approaches to material culture grounded in archeology—such
distinctions are too narrow for cultural sociologists. Griswold's definition treats speech as a cultural
object, allowing us to assess how the same idea communicates and circulates meaning differently
through speech versus printed text. Given that philosophy lectures, Netflix's algorithmic TV
recommendations, and a mime performance can all be sensed and communicate meaning, the question
then becomes how the qualities of similar objects shape meaning and action in patterned
ways. Griswold's (1987, p. 1079) emphasis on the “perceptual apparatus of those who experience the
object” suggests that spoken folktales or a performance of a play count as objects even as they are not
artifacts. The crucial point is that a cultural object must be materially perceptible to the senses
(McDonnell 2010)—cultural ideas made manifest in external form.
Types and Tokens: Cultural Objects as Cognitive and Material
Cultural objects are dual—both cognitively internalized shared significance and externalized in material
form. How should we make sense of this in practical terms? When we study cultural objects, we should
analyze them both as types and tokens (Peirce 1992) and be cognizant of the dynamic relation between
them (Taylor et al. 2019). Types are internalized cognitive, embodied, schematic categories based on
prior experience with a wide array of objects—the category of “gun.” Tokens are unique material
instantiations of objects in the world—my father's Secret Service–issued revolver. The type “gun” may
have many diverse tokens in the world: AR-19s, hunting rifles, nerf guns, clay pigeon shotguns, sniper
rifles, guns in a video game, toy guns with red tips, or 3D-printed guns. Each new token we confront in
the world requires us to reflect on and refine our fuzzy understanding of what counts as “gun” as type.
This suggests a couple of things. First, cultural objects as types are rarely perfectly stable—new tokens
with slight variations force us to restabilize or revise the type. Second, the sharedness of the cognitive
type imperfectly overlaps with cultural peers because people experience different sets of tokens.
Cultural objects are always, then, relations between types, tokens, and the interactions (among people,
objects, and groups) that hone, converge, or diverge our understandings of them. Cultural objects as
types presuppose conventions that are either adhered to or challenged in the production of tokens
(Becker 1982). Encountering new tokens in the world leads people to maintain or revise types, meaning
materiality serves as a mechanism for stability and cultural change (Taylor et al. 2019). Types and tokens
are mutually constitutive of cultural objects and inherently relational and dynamic. To have robust
theories of action, we need to take this seriously and synthesize research on cognition and material
objects.
Material Culture and Materiality
With all this talk of material, what is the distinction between material culture and materiality? As a
shorthand, material culture research examines what people do with objects, and studies of materiality
examine what objects do with or for people. Studies of material culture tend to examine the systems of
meaning that stabilize around specific categories of objects, usually artifacts such as vinyl records
(Bartmanski & Woodward 2015) or blue jeans (Miller & Woodward 2012). Resembling work on fan
cultures, subcultures, and consumption, material culture scholarship emphasizes audiences coming to
shared meanings and using objects as sites of expression (Douglas & Isherwood 1979, Hebdige 1988)
and contestation (DeSoucey 2016). This research interrogates how people engage in attachment and
valuation (Miller 2009), distinguish insiders and outsiders through boundary work (Wohl 2015), and
creatively “poach” and repurpose objects (Jenkins 1992), or the identity work made possible through
collecting or preserving objects' traditions (Hebdige 1983, Jordan 2015). A material culture approach to
guns might examine gun culture—how pockets of social life focally organize around guns, from militias to
gun clubs, to paintball and rifle hunting, to gun politics and the National Rifle Association (NRA).
Conversely, studies of materiality (Domínguez Rubio 2014, 2020; Greenland 2016; Griswold et al.
2013; Mangione 2016; McDonnell 2010; Miller 2005; Mukerji 1994a; Zubrzycki 2013) focus on the
material qualities of objects and the contingent ways those qualities shape the meaning and use of those
objects. In this sense, meanings are not overdetermined by the social constructions of group culture.
Instead, a focus on materiality attends to how objects are enrolled in lines of action, sometimes in
subversive ways. A focus on the materiality of guns would examine how the qualities of guns shape their
use: how gun size permits concealed carry, how the gun's bullet capacity and rate of fire permit mass
casualties, how its weight and recoil may make it difficult to fire accurately, how 3D-printed guns may
evade security systems, etc. I discuss the move to focus on object qualities at length below.
MATERIAL AGENCY
Cultural objects are not neutral social constructions, but their material and symbolic qualities influence
action. They constrain and enable the set of possible actions through affordances, but also through their
absences. Objects are agentic in that they permit people to do things they could not do otherwise (or at
the same scale). Objects distribute people's personhood over time and space. Objects can lead us to
reflect, reconsider, and redirect our action. They point us to previously unconsidered possibilities. They
call upon us to work with and around them in specific ways. Cultural objects are agentic.
What does this mean? Broadly, proponents of material agency advocate for treating objects and other
nonhumans as actors in our accounts of action. Such accounts decenter people in theories of agency. As
an idea, material agency covers a range of propositions, some more palatable to sociologists than others.
The easiest-to-swallow argument for sociologists is that objects have agency by standing in for humans,
acting on our behalf as secondary agents and enacting our will over time and space (Gell 1998). In such
accounts, people imbue objects with the intention to affect or influence others’ behavior. People fire
guns intending to harm people from greater distances than their bodies alone allow, or as Gell notes,
soldiers who place antipersonnel mines have their intentions manifested long after they were deployed.
We create technologies like speed bumps and door closers to work and act in the world replacing human
labor—instead of a police officer with a “slow” sign or a doorman, we have these objects doing that
work instead (Latour 1992).
A more provocative claim is that objects have agency independent of human intention, and it is difficult
to isolate human agency from the agency of objects (Latour 2005, 2009). To continue the gun example,
“You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another
subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship
with you” (Latour 2009, p. 179). Advocates for material agency argue agency does not reside exclusively
in humans, but in the relation between human and object—add or remove the gun and the set of
possibles are reconfigured. Holding a gun fundamentally changes your possible paths of action, the
extent of possible harm, how people interpret your intentions, and how people act around you.
Sociologists resist the idea of material agency because human intention is so central to sociological
accounts of agency—people pick up the gun, imbuing it with intention, otherwise it would be dormant.
Latour points to the NRA slogan “Guns don't kill people, people kill people” to caricature the distinction
between materialist and sociological accounts of agency. The NRA's explicitly sociological account that
people kill people treats a gun as “a neutral carrier of will that adds nothing to the action” (Latour 2009,
p. 177, emphasis in original)—all that matters is human intention. Certainly, human intention matters.
The point here is that objects matter too.
As a cultural sociologist, I am more interested in the pragmatist- and interactionist-inflected accounts of
material agency that are linked with human creativity and imagination where agency is temporally
emergent (Jerolmack & Tavory 2014). Humans and objects engage in a deeply entwined dance of agency
where paths of action emerge over time through interaction (Pickering 2010). Pickering shows how the
process of science is a dialectical interaction between material agency in the world and how we capture
that agency, interpret its meaning, and enroll it into the project of science. Accounts of material agency
from science studies are excellent but often sneak semiotics and meaning-making in the back door. I find
this collaborative vision persuasive, but what is missing from most accounts of material agency are
sophisticated accounts of the mechanisms of meaning-making that make actions possible.
When observers interpret a person with gun, assessing the possible affordances directly impacts how
they respond. Can that person with that gun shoot me if I hide here? How many people could they harm
before they would be subdued? Symbolic interactionist and cultural-cognitive accounts can help us tease
out whether a person with a gun is anticipated—like a uniformed officer patrolling Congress—or
schematically read as “matter out of place” and therefore threatening, as when someone appears with
an automatic weapon at a park or school (Douglas 1996). People read intention into the material
configurations of people, gun, location, dress, posture, and more. The chains of meaning and action that
proceed from these interpretations shape whether and how other actants are enrolled into action: What
objects in the environment have the affordances of shield or hiding place? Can this rock or tree limb
serve as a viable weapon? How quickly can authorities be called to the scene?
If affordances are potential meanings and uses of objects, agency is in how that potential gets enacted.
Agency emerges in interactions between objects and people, through the availability of objects, through
the recognition of affordances, and in imagining and selecting lines of action (both those intended by
object designers and those creatively enunciated). Below, I examine each of these aspects to show how
cultural sociology becomes essential to the work of bridging material and human agency. I advocate for a
synthesis of cultural sociology and theories of material agency that takes seriously objects’ influence on
action and that places meaning at the center of that approach. I illustrate this through an account of how
Ghanaian women turned female condoms into bangle bracelets.
Objects need to be available to enroll them into action—objects ready at hand are more likely to affect
action than objects that are far away (Schudson 1989). Production of culture and diffusion of innovations
research offer robust explanations for the distribution and institutional availability of cultural objects,
which prefigure objects’ influence and use (Becker 1982, Peterson 1997, Rogers 2003). Female condoms
became available because health nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) wanted to encourage a female-
controlled prophylactic that could prevent HIV. Condoms afford counting through sales—something that
NGOs wanted to track as evidence of successful intervention. Public health organizations subsidized their
cost to encourage their diffusion and accessibility. But distribution was limited, through clinics and peer
education (rather than advertising or retail markets), because female condoms require training so that
women can recognize the affordances of the object.
People cannot enroll objects into lines of action unless they can recognize their affordances
(Benediktsson 2022, McDonnell et al. 2017b). Recognition is fundamentally an act of meaning-making.
Understanding how cultural objects and their material affordances become recognizable requires the
tools of reception theory. Recent research seeking to understand how people converge on meanings has
revealed a variety of cultural mechanisms, from dispositions to qualities of objects to interaction
(Jerolmack & Tavory 2014, McDonnell 2010, Rawlings & Childress 2021). To make the agentic capacities
of female condoms legible, peer educators trained women how to interact with their material qualities
to use the condoms as intended (e.g., how to pinch the ring for insertion and fit it over the cervix, how
to twist the condom to safely remove it) and promoted female condoms as symbols of empowerment.
Ideally, women's dispositions, their material interactions with the condom, and the persuasiveness of
the peer education would motivate them to use the condoms with their sexual partner.
Affordances structure the set of possible meanings and actions but do not determine which lines of
action are ultimately selected. A fully elaborated vision of agency must attend to how people imagine
and weigh how they might enroll objects as they solve problems along with the possible consequences
of those choices (Jerolmack & Tavory 2014, Nagy & Neff 2015). Peer education is an act of embodied
simulation where participants imagine future actions this object affords. Material agency is thus
projective (Emirbayer & Mische 1998), grounded in imagining potential lines of action through an
object's material and symbolic affordances. Material agency is also emergent in interaction—it can be
difficult to predict how a material object will transform relations, destabilizing intended meanings and
uses, thereby making room for new ones. For example, how women imagine using female condoms in
the peer education setting may clash with their experience later using them with partners. The aesthetic
experience interacting with the object's qualities (e.g., how it feels, smells, sounds; whether it
encourages or diminishes pleasure; how clumsy it to work with) and with their partner's responses (e.g.,
his sensory experience, or how the condom signifies a lack of trust) may lead them to decide against
using female condoms in the future. Frustrated by the mismatch of their expectations and experience,
these women may imagine alternative affordances for the condom.
Creativity is a cultural-cognitive process through which people imagine how affordances can be taken up
into novel action (Brett 2022, Leschziner & Green 2013, Taylor et al. 2019). Left with a box of condoms
and coming from a material culture that prizes reusing objects, Ghanaian women creatively enunciated
new purposes for female condoms (McDonnell 2010). Thinking analogically, the size, shape, and
substance of the condoms’ rubber rings resemble jelly bracelets. The material of the female condoms
affords physical change, including resizing by making them malleable in boiling water and dyeing to look
more attractive. The agency of creatively enunciating new uses emerges interactively between the
person and the material qualities of the condoms, and the way the material qualities suggest alternative
uses. The failure of the condom's programmed purpose made it possible to enroll them in an alternative
project (Mische 2009), as I doubt jewelry entrepreneurs were looking for raw materials in condoms. The
material qualities of the female condom, women's creativity, and subsidized costs reconfigured the
condom from a prophylactic to a new jewelry business.
Having established objects as agentic, sociologists are increasingly interested in understanding how
objects both reproduce and transform social structure by stabilizing and destabilizing social
arrangements. By stabilize, I mean that consistent meanings and actions adhere to objects such that
objects make social relations appear patterned and predictable. Objects are essential to many habits,
routines, and rituals, stabilizing the definition of the situation while also reinscribing that object's typical
meaning and use. The more we use an object in specific, programmed ways, the harder it can become to
imagine other affordances. Stabilization, then, is a process of closure—the disappearance of problems
and the emergence of a settled, uncontroversial consensus of the object's meanings and uses (Pinch &
Bijker 1984). When stable, people's actions with such cultural objects are expected and predictable. We
internalize the meanings and uses of objects through a process of enculturation resulting from our
experiences engaging the world of cultural objects. So long as the material qualities of the object do not
give way, then repeated, routine interactions can hold in place the typical meanings and uses of an
object.
Certainly, human action helps to stabilize the meanings of objects, but so too do objects stabilize.
Cultural objects’ concrete material enables events to coalesce and take shape (Wagner-Pacifici 2017)
and provides an infrastructure for classification systems (Bowker & Star 2000). Systems of classification
powerfully structure action (Douglas 1996) but require objects to make such classifications manifest and
relevant (here again, material tokens are essential to cognitive types). Objects are essential to making
categorical distinctions by marking and exacerbating the distance between categories through their
qualities (Nippert-Eng 1995, Zerubavel 1991). We cannot keep everything in our head (D'Andrade 1995),
so objects help stabilize and structure our routines, cognition, and action.
People rely on the world of objects to scaffold cognition and action (Lizardo & Strand 2010). We off-load
memory and cognitive work into objects—pen and paper to-do lists are more reliable than
memorization, so long as the ink does not get wet and run. Regularities of objects in the environment
cue our behavior and facilitate action, such as condom dispensers at dance clubs. Cognition and
reasoning are distributed across people and objects (Hutchins 1996, Mukerji 2009), operating as an
“extended mind” (Clark & Chalmers 1998). Having condoms readily available allows people to make the
decision to have sex with strangers and scaffolds the practice of safe sex. When a condom breaks during
intercourse, it disrupts routine patterns of sex, leading people to enroll additional objects into decision
making. People feel increased anxiety, wondering “Am I pregnant?” or “Might I have contracted HIV?”
This invites opportunities for meaning-making, such as assessing the partner's risk of spreading an STD
or whether this is someone to partner with in raising a child. To process and make decisions, people
bring in other objects by, for example, buying a pregnancy or HIV test (or three!), or RU-486, or securing
a prescription for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) drugs. One's pregnancy or HIV status may then
reconfigure and reorient future sexual activity, lead to new family responsibilities, or affect health
routines.
The example of a broken condom makes clear the ways objects can destabilize social arrangements—
they create situations and problems that need to be worked over by enrolling new objects and people
into the situation. When objects stop behaving as intended or expected, they disrupt routines and act
back on us. If social orders require objects to operate smoothly, objects then require maintenance, which
calls people and objects into action to ensure the stability of social arrangements. Cultural objects vary in
their docility—their ability to hold in place the meanings we have come to attach to things without much
effort (Domínguez Rubio 2014). Unruly objects threaten categories (Domínguez Rubio 2014), often
requiring a great deal of maintenance and repair to stabilize meaning, action, and value (Domínguez
Rubio 2016). As cultural objects like a Van Gogh painting degrade, they threaten to destabilize social
arrangements, undermining the meanings and actions we conventionally attach to them. Are these the
same colors Van Gogh intended, or have they faded? When does a painting stop doing the work it was
venerated for? Is the goal to restore (which requires imagining artist intention) or just prevent further
degradation? Taking an ecological approach, Domínguez Rubio (2020) uncovers all the care work
institutions like art museums engage in to preserve the category of art, enrolling environmental control
technologies, art preservationists, complicated storage systems, and more to preserve a painting's social
function as a cultural object and not just a thing.
Guns are similarly unruly. The tragedy on the Rust film set—where actor Alec Baldwin accidentally killed
cinematographer Halyna Hutchins—makes clear all the work it takes to maintain the category of a “cold
gun.” Guns are made safe for use on set because they require constant maintenance to ensure they do
not have live ammunition, using dummy rounds or blanks instead. The gun must be under constant
surveillance in controlled settings and repeatedly checked, and protocols have been developed around
shouting “cold gun!” before it enters the scene. Such moments make visible all the human labor it takes
to tame a gun (e.g., training, protocols, storage systems, security) and how destabilizing an unruly object
can be. This event has destabilized taken-for-granted social arrangements and meaning-making—whose
responsibility is it to ensure a gun is safe? How does one know the round is safe, and how do the
qualities of rounds make it difficult to tell a dummy round from a live one (Romano 2023)? The film
industry is rethinking protocols for how to make guns safe, even moving away from having blanks or
dummy rounds on set by adding muzzle flashes in postproduction ( Guardian 2023). What Domínguez
Rubio's ecological approach reveals is how this work of (re)stabilization is distributed across a range of
objects and people and how one unruly object can unsettle well-established arrangements.
Recent scholarship has shown a variety of ways in which the material qualities of cultural objects are
involved in processes of stabilization and destabilization of categories and classification systems.
Standards that enable entire industries to operate smoothly often depend upon the tightly controlled
maintenance of the physical world. For instance, to ensure standard shoe sizes, footwear companies
must build an elaborate infrastructure to hold the shape of their benchmarking model's foot so that it
remains immutable over time (Benzecry 2022). At other times, a cultural object's interpretive flexibility is
essential to stabilization. By sitting at the borders between communities of practice, boundary objects
can facilitate coordination and collaboration across domains because their qualities are interpreted and
valued differently by different groups (Star & Griesemer 1989). Using the case of animal specimens, Star
& Griesemer (1989, p. 393) argue scientific work is made possible because specimens are “both plastic
enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust
enough to maintain a common identity across sites.” In this way, groups with distinct commitments, such
as amateur animal trappers, zoologists, and museum collectors, can coordinate their action while
maintaining commitments to their ways of seeing the world.
Another way objects destabilize is through diffusing into new situations, which can sometimes lead to
social change (Rogers 2003, Rossman 2012), as exposure to new objects, or old objects in new
situations, can reshape how people see the world. The introduction of condoms into new settings has
played a role in changing sexual practice and mores. Research on the global flow of objects through
cultural circuits suggests that this process is contingent and fraught (Appadurai 1996, Hannerz
1992, Kopytoff 1986). Local cultures mediate the meaning and use of objects (Jijon 2019, Kay
2022, Kuipers 2015, Wherry 2008). Given the circulation of cultural objects across situations, the
meanings of cultural objects are always at risk, and we should view cultural objects and the cognitive and
interactional structures they scaffold as an ongoing accomplishment (Taylor et al. 2019). In using objects
in typical ways, we reinforce their conventions, but when confronting new pairings of objects and
contexts, we are forced to extend and revise our cognitive types to make sense of them and how to put
them to use.
New and unfamiliar cultural objects or objects that are out of place trigger deliberative cognition and are
open to interpretation (DiMaggio 1997, Taylor et al. 2019). In such situations, conventions have not
settled, and meaning and action are not yet stable. When the stabilization of meaning occurs, it usually
results from a great deal of work. The interpretive flexibility of objects may lead to contestation in
meaning, reinterpretation, revision, or redesign of cultural objects, ultimately leading to closure,
consensus, and stability (Pinch & Bijker 1984). Treating objects as part of a complex of production makes
visible the collaborative work of stabilization (Griswold 2000). For instance, by tracing a single
novel, Childress (2017) models how to trace the stabilization and destabilization of an object's meaning
as it moves through drafting, literary agents, editors, rejection, revision, blurbing, cover design,
publication, reviewers, and audiences. The meanings brought to the novel Jarrettsville at every stage are
consequential, contested, and momentarily stabilized—directly shaping action and interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The concept of the cultural object made possible new avenues of sociological inquiry into meaning-
making. Cultural sociologists advocating for a material turn in the study of objects have revealed the
dynamism and independent effects of objects in meaning-making processes. This third wave points to
the complex and contingent ways that material qualities and symbols interact to stimulate, reinforce, or
upend meanings and uses of cultural objects. While cultural objects may appear consistent in their
meanings and use, their capacity to destabilize is always inherent in the objects themselves. When
people interpret and use objects in consistent ways, this as an accomplishment. Meaning is always at
risk, and people, objects, and environments coordinate to hold it together.
I have argued that cultural objects, materiality, and meaning are central to the sociological study of
action. Scholars have impoverished cultural accounts of action by emphasizing culture in people without
examining culture in objects in equal measure. Cultural explanations for action would benefit from
theorizing mechanisms through which objects shape meaning and agency and thereby exercise cultural
power. Objects’ qualities constrain and enable their meaning and use through what they afford for
people. People deploy cultural objects with the intention to channel behavior, but even objects imbued
with intentionality can also be creatively enunciated for resistance and play. Aesthetic experiences of
resonance, iconicity, and attachments trigger our emotions and propel us to see the world anew. Objects
constitute the grounds for action, often operating with their own politics and morality. Scholarship
should deepen our understanding of how meaning directs action through more rigorous empirical tests
of mechanisms of meaning-making (Rawlings & Childress 2019, 2021; Zhou 2022) and better
operationalize our cultural measurements of objects (Mohr et al. 2020).
This third wave of cultural sociology is primed to put cultural objects and cognition into productive
dialogue. The rise of cognitive sociology powerfully shaped understanding of culture in action but thus
far has typically sidelined objects. This is puzzling, given the role of objects in off-loading memory and
information, scaffolding meaning and action, stabilizing classification, and distributing cognition.
Research that synthesizes insights on objects with our knowledge of enculturation, embodied cognition,
and sense-perception offers an incredibly promising direction for future work—how do different somatic
and sensory experiences shape meaning-making processes and schema-formation? The question of
whether people's beliefs can change is fundamentally a matter of how cultural objects engage automatic
or deliberative cognitive processes. This space is primed for innovative scholarship.
Renewed attention to objects productively bridges production and reception work with explanatory
accounts of culture in action. Taking up this charge requires us to think ecologically (Domínguez Rubio
2016, 2020). Cultural objects exist in a “system of action,” operating through chains of “agency, intention,
causation, result, and transformation” (Gell 1998, p. 6). By tracing the “social life” of objects (Appadurai
1986, Kopytoff 1986), across their creation, production, circulation, and reception (Benzecry
2022; Childress 2017; Griswold 1986, 2000; McDonnell 2016), cultural sociologists can evince the
complex interactions of people, objects, and institutional settings that uphold or shake up social life.
disclosure statement
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be
perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
acknowledgments
Thanks to those who generously offered me feedback on this manuscript: David Gibson, Fiona
Greenland, Wendy Griswold, Erin Metz McDonnell, Ann Mische, Kelcie Vercel, and the Culture Workshop
at the University of Notre Dame. This article has been informed by numerous conversations. Many
thanks to my interlocutors: Dominik Bartmanski, Mike Owen Benediktsson, Fernando Domínguez Rubio,
Joe Klett, Omar Lizardo, Gemma Mangione, and Iddo Tavory. Finally, thanks to my research assistant,
Taylor Hartson, who helped build the bibliography. Any errors are entirely my own.
literature cited