G.R. No. 260374 - FR. CHRISTIA. B. BUENAFE, FIDES M.

LIM,
MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA,
ROLAND C. VIBAL, and JOSEP INE LASCANO, Petitioners, v~
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OFT E PHILIPPINES, represented by
the Senate President, THE HOU E OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by the Speaker of the Hou e of Representatives, Respondents;

G.R. No. 260426 - BONIFACIO PA BUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO

CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAR LINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO,
TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, J ANNA KINTANAR CARINO,
ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO
MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA
FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBA UB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA
NABLE SENTURIAS, SR., ARABEL A CAMMAGAY BALINGAO,
SR., CHERRY M . IBARDALOZA, CSSJB, SR., SUSAN SANTOS
ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE
ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CAR YN CANDILA, and JONAS
ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, Pe itioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMU LDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep esented by the Senate President,
and THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN ATIVES, represented by the
Speaker of the House of Representative , Respondents.

Promulgated:

SEPARATE CONCU ING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

These cases do not present difficult egal questions.

What makes these cases appare tly difficult are their political
repercussions and the threat of unthinking 'udgments by passionate partisans
from either side.

Put in another way: what are at is ue in this case are narrow legal /
questions, not political ones. /f
Separate Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

What is at issue in this case is ot whether the Justices of this court

politically support a candidate. The personal background, the leadership
potentials or even the platform, or la k thereof, of any candidate for the
highest political office are not at issue How we vote in this case does not
necessarily reveal how we voted dur ng the last elections nor reveal our
continuing positions regarding various latforms of government.

Thus, in the resolution of the narr w legal questions, any Justice should
be careful not to privilege our political hoices. Rather, we should adopt the
longer view: to examine the applic ble text of the provisions of the
Constitution and the law; to review the xisting construction of their meaning
as well as their genealogy; and to be conscious of our interpretative
methodology and ensure that our pre ises proceed not from the political
results that we want, but from the value and principles congealed in the legal
provisions and applicable not only for ~h parties involved in this case but also
durable enough for the future.

How we vote in this case will reve 1 our commitment to the rule oflaw,
regardless of its personal political conse uences for us.

In general, the qualifications for y person to vie for President of the

Republic of the Philippines is limited tot ose enumerated in Section 2, Article
VII of the Constitution. These qualifica ions are admittedly very sparse, but
intentionally so. Its intent is to be inclu ive, as well as to put as much of the
characteristics, background, and platfor of a candidate to the electorate. It
will, in the future, allow a socialist, a uni n leader, an activist that had already
been convicted of illegal possession of fi earms during martial law, or even a
former government employee who may have been wrongly convicted by a
final judgment of failure to file an incom tax return-even when taxes were
withheld from his or her monthly compe sation- to run for President.

In my view, these qualifications c ot be amended by statute. Neither

can additional qualifications be included hrough interpretation by the Court.
The Constitution can only be modified t ugh the process of amendment and
revision outlined in its own Article XVII.

In general, the Certificate of Can idacy is the document that would

allow the Commission on Elections to valuate: (a) the qualifications and
disqualifications of a candidate; and (b) etermine whether his or her name
should be included in the ballot. It is submitted to the Commission on
Elections and is not required to be publis ed. It is not the sole and exclusive
document that will be used by the ele torate to evaluate and judge the
candidate. /
Separate Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

In view of its limited purpose, the mnibus Election Code requires that
any cancellation be founded not only on aterial misrepresentations, but that
the representations be proven to be inten ·onally false.

Resolving the question does not m an that the candidate misrepresents

his or her credentials to the electorate this will be the subject of public
discussions and forums after the filing o the Certificate of Candidacy. The
question is whether a candidate has inte tionally misled the Commission on
Elections with a false representation hich is material enough to affect
whether or not his or her name should be included in the ballot.

Private respondent's final conv ction did not include perpetual

disqualification from any elected public office. That conviction is already
beyond the review of this Court. It beca e final upon the withdrawal of the
appeal to this Court. Neither is th accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification automatically and impli itly imposed in crimes that are not
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

The non-filing of an Income Tax R turn- an individual's self-report of

his or her taxable income-is not, in all cases, similar to tax evasion.
Certainly, the law now provides for a pro ess of compromising the failure to
file income tax retun1s on time. Definit ly, a failure to file an income tax
return by a government employee whose compensation is already subject to
withholding taxes is generally not tax eva ion.

Thus, there are certain instances w en the conviction for failing to file
income tax returns is not considered as crime involving moral turpitude
within the meaning of Section 12 of th Omnibus Election Code. Moral
turpitude in the context of that provision i plies an act that displays a level of
depravity that goes into the one's charac r to be able to discern right from
wrong. Not all acts that are punished b law involves a showing of moral
turpitude.

Our legal order does not require o e to be a saint before a person can
consider running for public office. Cand dates may have made mistakes in
the past. They may make mistakes in fili g Certificates of Candidacy. But
the intent of the relevant law is to have t e electorate, rather than for courts,
judge the strengths and faults of a candida e for themselves, through a narrow
reading of the law divorced from its spirit, to determine who will be included
in the ballot.

Certainly, in my view, we canriot dd to the minimum constitutional /

qualifications to run for President throu h the indirect route of assessing /
Certificates of Candidacies.
Separate Concurring Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

Consistent with this, I concur with the ponencia.

I explain further.

This Court has the duty and p wer of judicial review under the
Constitution. Article VIII, Section 1 of th Constitution provides:

Judicial Depa tment

Section 1. The judicial power shall be v sted in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established y law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether o not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or exces of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Governn ent. 1

The 1987 Constitution has expand d the scope of this judicial review
from its traditional purview. Comis are n longer only bound to "settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." They are also "empowere to determine if any government
branch or instrumentality has acted beyon the scope of its powers, such that
there is grave abuse of discretion. " 2 Jud·cial review gives authority to the
courts to invalidate acts of legislative, ex cutive, and constitutional bodies if
shown contrary to the Constitution·.3

Grave abuse of discretion refers to " apricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisd'ction[.]"4

In Mitra v. Commission on Election :5

[T]he abuse of discretion must be paten and gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refu al to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of la as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reas n of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must e grave. We have held, too, that

C ONST., Article Vll1 , sec. I.

2
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino !JI, .R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019,
<https://e library.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdo s/1/6 5208> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
3
Arau/lo v. Aquino Ill, 752 Phil. 716 (20 14) [Per J. Bers min, En Banc].
4
Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribu I, 394 Phil. 730, 775 (2000) [Per C.J. Davide,
Jr., En Banc].
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753 (20 IO [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

the use of wrong or irrelevant consi erations in deciding an issue is

sufficient to taint a decision-maker's acf n with grave abuse of discretion. 6

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cor ects acts made without or in excess
of jurisdiction by any tribunal, board, or officer in the exercise of its
governmental function:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.- en any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial junc ions has acted without or in excess
[ofJ its or his jurisdiction, or with grav abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there s no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary c urse of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in t e proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that jud ent be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such trib al, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice 1ay require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a c rtified true copy of the judgment,

order or resolution subject thereof, copi s of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and . a worn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragr h of Section 3, Rule 46. 7

A writ of certiorari may be issued:

(a) where the tribunal's approach to an is ue is tainted with grave abuse of

discretion, as where it uses wrong consi erations and grossly misreads the
evidence at arriving at its conclusion; (b where a tribunal's assessment is
"far from reasonable[,] [and] based solel on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is r plete with standards that can be
used[;]" "(c) where the tribunal's action n the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence oversteps the limits of its disc etion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable[;]" and (d) where the tri unal uses wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue. 8

There is grave abuse of discretion hen a "constitutional body makes

patently gross errors in making factual in erences[,] such that critical pieces
of evidence presented by a party not trave sed or even stipulated by the other
parties are ignored." 9

Under Rule 64 10 in relation to Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, a judgment

or final order of the Commission on Elecf ons may be reviewed by this Court

6
Id. at 777.
RULES OF COURT, Ru le 65, sec. I .
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares . Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 292, 657
(20 16) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
Id. at 656.
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Mode ofreview.- A judgment or final or er or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Aud it may be brought by the a grieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

{J
Separate Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

on the ground that the Commission cted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discr tion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

In its Comment, 11 public respond nt Commission on Elections posits

that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal as jurisdiction over the Petitions. It
claims that as the elections have been co eluded, this Court has already been
stripped of its power to resolve the i sues raised. 12 They add that the
overwhelming number of votes in favor o Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.)
has rendered the Petitions moot. 13

Commission on Elections is mista en.

Under the Constitution, this Court En Banc, sitting as the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal, is also the "sole ju ge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of th President or Vice-President[.]" 14

The Presidential Electoral Tribun 1 is an independent constitutional

body. However, it is not separate and istinct from this Court. When this
Court convenes as the tribunal, it exerci es judicial power albeit wearing a
different hat. 15

This Court En Banc sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has

the power to rule on election contests. "contest" refers to a postelection
16
scenario.

Moreover, this Court has held that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
only has jurisdiction over the declared resident and vice president of the
elections, and not candidates. Thus, it cm ot resolve cases filed before it that
question the qualifications of candidates r presidency or vice presidency. 17 -

Moreover, the nature of election is ues raised before the Commission

on Elections are different from those tha can be raised before the electoral
tribunals. The 2016 cases of Poe-Llaman ares v. Commission on Elections 18
and David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal 19 emonstrate this distinction.

11
12
13
14
Roilo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 654-732.
Id. at 669-672.
Id. at 665-666.
CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 .
I
15
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil 326 (20 I 0) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
16
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (20 ) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
17
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (20 ) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
18
782 Phil. 292 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
19
795 Phil. 529 (20 I6) [Per. J. Leonen, En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 7 G.R . Nos. 260374 & 260426

In Poe-Llamanzares, petitions un er Rule 64 were filed assailing the

decision of the Commission on Electi ns that cancelled the certificate of
candidacy for presidency filed by Sen tor Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Poe-
Llamanzares). The Commission on Elections found that the senator
committed false material representati n regarding her citizenship and
residency.

In its ruling, this Court clarified t t the Commission on Elections can

only rule whether the certificate of ca didacy should be cancelled on the
ground that there is false material rep esentation. It cannot rule on the
qualification or lack thereof of the candi ate.

Poe-Llamanzares stressed that th Constitution withholds from the

Commission on Elections the power to d cide inquiries into qualifications of
the candidates, such as age, residenc , and citizenship. Questions on
candidates' qualification are within the j risdiction of electoral tribunals.

This Court further created the di tinction between "disqualification

proceedings" and "declaration of ineligib lity."

Disqualification is based on Sec ions 12 and 68 of the Omnibus

Elections Code and Section 40 of the ocal Government Code. It bars a
person from "becoming a candidate or om continuing as a candidate from
public office." On the other hand, in ligibility pertains to the "lack of
qualifications prescribed in the Constituti n or the statutes for holding public
office[.]" It is the procedural vehicle to "r move the incumbent from office."20

Poe-Llamanzares elucidated that there is no legal proceeding to

determine the eligibility of a candidate b fore election. This is because the
determination of a candidate's eligibi ity, such as their citizenship or
residency, takes a long time and may ext nd beyond the start of the term of
office. Moreover, the rationale beh nd the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for presid nt, vice president, and members of
Congress is to preserve the prerogatives o the electoral tribunals.

Thus, in Poe-Llamanzares, this C urt held that the electoral tribunal

had no jurisdiction over the controversy. While the case touched upon the
requirements of citizenship and residenc , it mainly involved a petition for
cancellation of certificate of candidacy ba ed on false material representation.

This is in contrast with the subs quent case of David, where the
citizenship and residency of Poe-Lla anzares were likewise assailed: /
However, David is distinct from Poe-Liam nzares as it was filed after Senator

20
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782 Ph I. 292, 388 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc], c iting
Fermin v. Comm ission on Elections, 595 Phil. 449 (20 8) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

Poe-Llamanzares already took office as a senator. As a post-election case, the

petition was correctly filed before the Se ate Electoral Tribunal as it assailed
the actual eligibility of Poe-Llamanzares as a senator, not the validity of her
certificate of candidacy.

In this case, the two Petitions ar correctly filed under Rule 64 in

relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of ourt. They question the various
Resolutions2 1 of the Commission on Ele tions, which denied the petition for
cancellation of certificate of candidacy nd the petition for disqualification
against Marcos, Jr. The petitions assai ing the certificate of candidacy of
Marcos, Jr. were filed before the electio s were conducted, making them a
preelection contest.

The Petitions mainly assail the ce ificate of candidacy of Marcos, Jr.

on the ground that he committed false material representation. While it
involves his qualifications, the Petitions re anchored on the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy. It is a p eelection contest filed before the
Commission on Elections and reviewable by this Court. Thus, this Court may
review the Petitions notwithstanding th fact that the elections have been
concluded.

II

To be enabled to run for any.electiv public office, a person must satisfy

both substantive and procedural require ents under our electoral laws. A
candidate' s eligibility or ineligibility is defined by the Constitution and
statutes, such as the Omnibus Election C de. 22 These provide the minimum
qualifications for a person to present a ca didacy to run for a public office.

Substantive requirements pertain to he possession of qualifications and

none of the disqualifications for a publi office. 23 On the other hand, the

21
Rollo (G .R. No . 260374), pp. 94- 125 . The January 17, 2022 Resolution was signed by Presiding
Commissioner Socorro B. lnting and Commissioners ntonio T. Kho, Jr. (now a member of this Court)
and Rey E. Bulay of the Second Division of the Co mission on Elections, Manila; rol/o (G.R. No.
260374), pp. 72-82. The May I 0, 2022 Resolution was igned by Chairperson Saidamen B. Pa ngarungan
and Commissione rs M arlon S. Casquejo, SocorroB. In ng, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E. Bu lay, and Aimee
S. Torrefranca-Neri o f the Commission on Elections, En Banc, Manila; rollo (G .R. No. 260426), pp.
198-238. The February I0, 2022 Resolution was signe by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casq uej o
and Commissioner Aimee P. Ferolino of the Former First Div ision of the Comission on Elections,
Manila; rollo (G.R. No . 260426), pp. 285-299. The Ma 10, 2022 Resolution was signed by Chairperson
Saidamen B. Pangarungan and Commissioners Mar on S. Casquejo, Socorro B. lnting, Aimee P.
Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay, and Aimee S. Torrefranca- eri of the Commission on Elections, En Banc,
Manila .
22
J. Leonen, Concurring O pinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 292(20 16)
[Per J. Perez, En Banc].
23 Qualifications for public office are continuing req irements and must be possessed
at the time o f e lectio n or assumption of office and during the entire tenure. Once
any o f the required qualifications is lost, an e lective fficer's title may be seasonably challenged.
See Amores v. House ofRepresentatives Electoral Trib nal, 636 Phil. 600(20 10) [Per J. Carpio Morales,
En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

procedural requirements pertain to the, c mpliance with the electoral process

for a particular national or local election, s outlined by the Omnibus Election
Code and Commission on Elections. 24

The substantive qualifications for residency are found in Article VII,

Section 2 of the Constitution. 25 These q lifications are reiterated in Section
63 of the Omnibus Election Code.26 eanwhile, the disqualifications are
found in Sections 1227 and 6828 of the 0 ibus Election Code.

It is not enough that a person actu lly possesses the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for the po ition sought. They must likewise
dutifully and honestly declare details rel ting to these in their certificate of
candidacy. A person must file their certi 1cate of candidacy in the form and
within the period prescribed by the O ibus Election Code and by the
Commission on Elections. 29 It is throu h a certificate of candidacy that a
candidate certifies under oath their eligib lity, i.e., their qualifications to the
office sought. 30

24
See CONST., art. X I-C, sec. 2( I), in relation to Omni us Election Code, Section 52 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 1071 7, sec. 16.
25
See CONST., Artic le Vil, sec. 2, which provides:
SECTION 2 . No person may be elected President unle s he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least fort years o f age o n the day o f the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immed ate ly preceding such e lection.
26
See Batas Pambansa Big. 881 ( 1985), art. IX, sec. 63, hich provides:
SECTION 63. Qualifications for President and Vice-P1 esident of the Philippines. - No person may be
elected President or Vice-President unless he is a nat ral-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of a e on the day of election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately precedin such election.
27
See Batas Pambansa Big. 88 1 ( 1985), art. I, sec. 12, w ich prov ides:
SECTION 12 . Disqualifications . - Any person who as been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgm nt for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a pena ty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involv ing moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. ·
This [sic] disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authori ty that said insanity r incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of entence, unless w ithin the same period he aga in
becomes disqualified.
28
See Batas Pambansa Big. 881 ( 1985), art. IX, sec. 68, hich provides:
SECTION 68. Disqualifications . -Any candidate wh , in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent cou1t gui lty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
give n money or other m aterial consideration to intluenc , induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts oft rrorism to enha nce his candidacy; (c) spent in
his electi on campaign an amount in excess of that allo d by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 9 and I 04; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261 ,' paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragr ph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the of tee. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qual ifi d to run fo r any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
f
29
See Batas Pambansa Big. 88 I ( 1985), art. IX, secs. 73 a d 74.
30
See Ba tas Pambansa Big. 88 I ( 1985), art. IX, secs. 73 and 74. See also COMELEC Resolution No.
I 07 17, Section 16.
Separate Concurring Opinion 10 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

The lack of any qualification for a public office, or the commission of

any act constituting a ground for disq alification, including any material
misrepresentation in a certificate of cand' <lacy as regards their qualifications,
may prevent a person from running, or if lected, from serving a public office.
In other words, when an ineligible perso is elected as a public officer, their
right to hold office may be challenged in t least two ways: 31

(a) by filing a petition to deny due c urse or to cancel a certificate

of candidacy pursuant to Section 7 , in relation to Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code (Sectio 78 petition); or

(b) by filing a petition for disqualifi ation pursuant to Section 68

of the Omnibus Election Code (Sec ion 68 petition).

Pursuant to Section 78 of the Omn bus Election Code, a certificate of

candidacy may be denied or cancell d when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certi cate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate ofcandidacy.

- A verified petition seeking to deny du course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by the person e elusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therei as required under Section 74
hereof is false . The petition may be filed t any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, 1ot later than fifteen days before
the election.

In turn, Section 74 of the Omnib 1s Election Code enumerates the

contents of a certificate of candidacy: .

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of c ndidacy. - The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filin it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he s eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the p ovince, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district ors ctor which he seeks to represent;
the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all el ction purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and efend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith an allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees pr ulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a pennanent re ident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by is oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of vasion; and that the facts stated
in the certificate of candidacy are true to tl e best of his knowledge. 32
I
31
See Fennin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449 (2008) [,Per J. achura, En Banc]. In Fermin, this Court stated
that the eligibility or qualification of a candidate ma also be challenged through a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election ode.
32
The use of the pronoun "he" is retained to respect the Ian uage of the law. Nonetheless, the use of gender-
neutral language is observed in other parts of this separ e opinion.
Separate Concurring Opinion 11 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

Meanwhile, Section 68 of the Om ibus Election Code provides for the

grounds for which a candidate may be d" squalified:

SECTION 68. Disqualifications . - ny candidate who, in an action or

protest in which he is a party is declar by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or fow1d by the Co1m11i sion of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influen e, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral nctions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by t ·s Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under ections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be ct· qualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, fro n holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an i migrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective ffice under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permane1 resident or i1mnigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residen e requirement provided for in the
election laws.

In Fermin v. Commission on Elec ·ons,33 this Court pointed out that a

Section 78 petition and a Section 68 petit on are two distinct remedies:

Lest it be misunderstood, the enial of due course to or the

cancellation of the [certificate of caµdi acy] is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that he candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may r late to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. tis noted that the candidate states
in his/her [certificate of candidacy] tha he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the [Ornnib s Election Code], therefore, is to
be read in relation to the constitutio al and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public offi e. If the candidate subsequently
states a material representation in the [ce ificate of candidacy] that is false,
the [Commission on Elections], followin the law, is empowered to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the (Omnibus Election C de] since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, ith the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed be re proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamati n of the winning candidate.

At this point, we must stress that "Section 78" petition ought not
to be interchanged or confused with a ' Section 68" petition. They are
different remedies, based on different gr unds, and resulting in different
eventualities.

33
595 Phil. 449 (2008) (Per J. Nachura, En Banc].

(J
Separate Concurring Opinion 12 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

[Section 68 of the Omnibus Election C de] only refers to the commission

of prohibited acts and the possession f a pennanent resident status in a
foreign country as grounds for disquali cation . ..

To emphasize, a petition for disquali 1cation, on the one hand, can be

premised on Section 12 or 68 of the [O ·bus Election Code] ... On the
other hand, a petition to deny due co rse to or cancel a [certificate of
candidacy] can only be grounded on as tement of a material representation
in the said certificate that is false . The etitions also have different effects.
While a person who is disqualified unde Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person who e certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treat d as a candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a [ce1iificate of candidacy] Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this
Court made the distinction that a ca dictate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can validly be substituted nder Section 77 of the [Omnibus
Election Code] because he/she remains candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose [certificate of candidac ] has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be s bstituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate. 34

A grant of a Section 78 petition i volves a finding that: (a) a person

lacks a qualification; and (b) that they m de a false material representation.35

To deny due course or to cancel a c rtificate of candidacy under Section

78, there must be a showing that the repre entations of the candidates are both
false and material. 36

To be material, the representation ust pertain to the qualification for

the office sought by the candidate:

First, a misrepresentation in a certificat of candidacy is material when it

refers to a qualification for elective o fice and affects the candidate's
eligibility. Second, when a candidate co mits a material misrepresentation,
[they] may be proceeded against through petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, or through criminal
prosecution under Section 262 for vi lation of Section 74. Third, a
misrepresentation of a non-materi l fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to eny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Sectio9- 78 In other words, for a candidate's
certificate of candidacy to be denied ue course or [cancelled] by the
COMELEC, the fact misrepresented mu pertain to a qualification for the
office sought by the candidate. 37

34
Id. 465-469.
35
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 786 (20 2) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
36
See Batas Pambansa Big. 881 (1985), art. IX, sec. 78. Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753
(20 I 0) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
37
lluz v. Commission on Elections, 55 1 Phil. 428, 443 ( 007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

t
Separate Concurring Opinion 13 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

The representation must not only b material, but also be false. 38 To be

false, it must be established that the can ·date "intentionally tried to mislead
the electorate regarding [their] qualificati ns." 39 It must evince a "deliberate
intent to mislead, misinfo1m or hide a £ ct which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible[,]" and "made with a intention to deceive the electorate
as to one's qualifications to run for publi office. " 40

In Mitra v. Commission on Electio s, 41 this Court emphasized that the

attempt to mislead must be deliberate:

The false representation under Section 8 must likewise be a "deliberate

attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a act that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Given the purpo e of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive th electorate as to the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public offic . Thus, the misrepresentation that
Section 78 addresses cannot be the result fa mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the i'nte t to deceive is patently absent, or
where no deception on the electorate resul ·s. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the
consequences of any material falsity: a c ndidate who falsifies a material
fact cannot run; if [they run] and [are] el cted, (they] cannot serve; in both
cases, [they] can be prosecuted for violati n of the election laws. 42

The false material representation ommitted by a candidate cannot

merely be an innocuous mistake. It ust be both false and material
considering that the consequences impos d on a guilty candidate are grave.
The cancellation of the certificate of can ·<lacy prevents the candidate from
running, or if elected, from serving their te m of office.43 It deprives a person
of a basic and substantive political right to be voted for public office.44

Indeed, in David and Poe-Llamanz es, this Court had the occasion to
elaborate on whether a foundling is a natu al-born Filipino citizen in relation
to a declaration of citizenship in a candidat 's certificate of candidacy. These
two cases arose from Section 78 p titions involving Senator Poe-
Llamanzares' s certificate of candidacy to n for public office.

David held that the Senate Elector l Tribunal did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in finding that Senator oe-Llamanzares is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and qualified to hold a eat as senator under Article VI,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

38
39
Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
J . Leonen, Concurring Opin ion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 292, 787
/
(20 I 6) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
40
Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 575 Phil. 53, 265-266 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
41
636 Phil. 753 (2010) [Per J . Brion, En Banc].
42 Id. at 780.
43
Salcedo ff v. Commission on Elections, 37 1 Phil. 377 (l 99) [Per J. Gonzaga- Reyes, En Banc].
44 fd .
Separate Concurring Opinion 14 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

This Court clarified that a readi g of "the Constitution sustains a

presumption that all foundlings found i the Philippines are born to at least
either a Filipino father or a Filipino mot er and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise."45 y other conclusion would equate to
a permanent discrimination against fo ndlings, which violates the equal
protection clause and runs contrary to o r commitment to comply with our
inte1national treaty obligations.

In Poe-Llamanzares, I voted to et aside resolutions issued by the

Commission on Elections as Senator Poe Llamanzares made no false material
representation in her ce1iificate of candi acy for presidency. 46 I expressed
that a candidate should not be expected to be thoroughly familiar with the
precise interpretation of a legal concept elated to their eligibility to run for
public office, which in that case pertaine to the concept of foundlings vis-a.-
vis the citizenship requirement, and to co ·rectly apply such a concept.

Absent any doctrine on the matter, the assertion made by Senator Poe-
Llamanzares in her certificate of candida y did not constitute a false material
representation of fact, but a mere misint rpretation of law. Moreover, as I
have pointed out, the Commission on lections could not, based on new
doctrines not known to Senator Poe-Lla anzares, declare that her certificate
of candidacy is infected with false materi 1representation.

In this relation, I emphasized th need to establish that a material

representation is false to successfully c allenge a certificate of candidacy
through a Section 78 petition:

[T]o successfully challenge a certificate f candidacy under Section 78, a

petitioner must establish that:

First, that the assailed certifi ate of candidacy contains a

representation that is false;

Second, that the false representati n is material, i.e., it involves the

candidate's qualifications for elective ffice, such as citizenship and
residency; and

Third, that the false material r presentation was made with a

"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinfi , or hide a fact that would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible" o "with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications for pu lie office."

45
795 Phil. 529, 599 (20 16) [Per J. Leon, En Banc].
46
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-llamanzares . Commission on Elections, 782 Phil. 292, 657
(20 16) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 15 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

It is true that Section 78 makes o mention of "intent to deceive."

Instead, what Section 78 uses is the word 'representation." Reading Section
78 in this way creates an apparent absenc of textual basis for sustaining the
claim that intent to deceive should not be n element of Section 78 petitions.
It is an error to read a provision of law.

"Representation" is rooted in the ord "represent," a verb. Thus, by

a representation, a person actively doe something. There is operative
engagement in that the doer brings to fr ition what he or she is pondering
- something that is abstract and other ise known only to him or her, a
proverbial "castle in the air." The "r presentation" is but a concrete
product, a manifestation, or a perceptibl expression of what the doer has
already cognitively resolved to do. One ho makes a representation is one
who intends to articulate what, in his r her mind, he or she wishes to
represent. He or she actively and inten onally uses signs conventionally
understood in the form of speech, text, o other acts.

Thus, representations are assert ons. By asserting, the person

making a statement pushes for, affirms, r insists upon something. These
are hardly badges of something in whi h intent is immaterial. On the
contrary, no such assertion can exist unle s a person actually wishes to, that
is, intends, to firmly stand for something.

In Section 78, the requireme t is that there is "material

representation contained therein as requir d by Section 74 hereof is false."
A "misrepresentation" is merely the obv rse of "representation." They are
two opposite concepts. Thus, as with mak ng a representation, a person who
misrepresents cannot do so without iqten ing to do so.

That intent to deceive is an inhere t element of a Section 78 petition

is reflected by the grave consequences fac ng those who make false material
representations in their certificates of c didacy. They are deprived of a
fundamental political right to run for pu lie office. Worse, they may be
criminally charged with violating electi n laws, even with perjury. For
these reasons, the false material represe tation referred to in Section 78
cannot "just [be] any innocuous mistake."

Petitioner correctly argued that Se tion 78 should be read in relation

to Section 74's enumeration of what cer ·ficates of candidacy must state.
Under Section 74, a person filing a certific te of candidacy declares that the
facts stated in the certificate "are true to th best of his [or her] knowledge."
The law does not require "absolute certain y" but allows for mistakes in the
certificate of candidacy if made in good aith. This is consistent with the
"summary character of proceedings relati g to certificates of candidacy. " 47

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code requires a candidate to state

under oath that "[they are] eligible for' sai office." In the event a candidate
certifies under oath that they are eli ible to run for public office.
notwithstanding a final judgment express! disqualifying them from running, #
that is the time that the candidate is makin a false material representation. 48 A

47
Id. at 673-682.
48
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 60 I (20 12) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc).
 Separate Concurring Opinion 16 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

Here, there is no false material r presentation on private respondent

Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.'s pa when he did not indicate in his
certificate of candidacy that he was convi ted of a crime carrying a penalty of
perpetual disqualification and a crime in olving moral turpitude.

While the representation is materi as it refers to a qualification to run

for presidency, there is nothing false in h s certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners posit that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from

public service attaches to respondent Ma cos, Jr. 's conviction and is deemed
incorporated in the dispositive portion. They refer to Section 286 of
Presidential Decree No. 1994 that ame ded the National Internal Revenue
Code. The amendment included that a p blic officer or employee convicted
of a crime penalized under the Nationa Internal Revenue Code would be
disqualified from holding any public offi e:

Section 286. General provisions - (a) Any person convicted of a crime

penalized by this Code, shall, in addition to being liable for the payment of
tax, be subject to the penalties imposed l rein ...

(c) ... lfhe is a public officer or employe , the maximum penalty prescribed
for the offense shall be imposed and, in a dition, he shall be dismissed from
the public service and perpetually disq alified from holding any public
office, to vote and to participate in any el ction[.] 49 (Emphasis supplied)

As pointed out by Commission on Elections, Presidential Decree No.

1994 took effect only on January 1, 19 8 , which introduced the penalty of
perpetual disqualification for convictions nder the National Internal Revenue
Code. Thus, the 1977 National Internal evenue Code is the applicable law
for the taxable years of 1982, 1983, an 1984, which does not include the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualific tion.

While the provision is effective during the taxable year of 1985,

respondent Marcos, Jr. was no longer a p blic officer when he was required
to file his tax return. Thus, the accessor penalty under Presidential Decree
No. 1994 does not attach to his convictio .

Moreover, the dispositive portion f the Court of Appeals' Decision,

which became final and executory, is cruc al in this point. To recall, the Court
of Appeals' Decision modified the Regi nal Trial Court's ruling, acquitting
respondent Marcos, Jr. of his violation for onpayment of deficiency taxes but
affirming his conviction for failing to file ncome tax returns for taxable years
1982 to 1985. In so ruling, the Court f Appeals removed the penalty of ;1
imprisonment and retained the payment o fine. Thus: ~

49
Presidential Decree No. 1994 ( 1985), sec. 255.
Separate Concurring Opinion 17 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

WHEREFORE, the Decision oft e trial court is hereby MODIFIED

as follows:

1. ACQUITTING the accuse appellant of the charges for

violation of Section 50 of the NIRC for n -payment of deficiency taxes for
the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Crimin l Cases Nos. Q-02-29216, Q-92-
29215, Q-92-29214, and Q-91-24390; a d FINDING him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of the NIRC for failure to file
income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-91 -24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29 13, and Q-92-29217;

2. Ordering the appellant to pay o the BIR the deficiency income

taxes with interest at the legal rate until lly paid;

3. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge

in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-9 -2921 2, and Q-29217 for failure
to file income tax retmns for the years 1 82, 1983, and 1984; and fine of
P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-9"1-2 391 for failure to file income tax
return for 1985, with surcharges.

SO ORDERED. 50

Evidently, the dispositive po1iion f the final and binding judgment

does not impose a penalty of imprison.men or perpetual disqualification from
public service. This is the directive part f the Decision and the order that
should be followed in the execution. 51 Ulti ately, it is the dispositive portion
that binds respondent Marcos, Jr. 52

Thus, the order of execution can ever go beyond the terms and
consequences clearly expressed in the <lisp sitive portion. Otherwise, adding
other penalties not stated in the Decisio transgresses upon the Comi of
Appeals' judicial discretion to alties and incredibly prejudices
respondent Marcos, Jr.

The Court of Appeals has the judicia discretion to impose a penalty of

imprisonment, including perpetual disqu lification. Here, the Comi of
Appeals, within the discretion bound y law, decided to delete the
imprisonment and retain the imposition of ne.

Further, it bears emphasis that the Co rt of Appeals' Decision has been

rendered final. It is beyond appeal and alte1 tion. In Kumar v. People, 53 this
Court held:

50
Ponencia, p. 8
51
Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 479 (2 15) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc).
52 Id.
53
G.R. No. 24766 1, June 15, 2020, <https://elibrary.judic ary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1 /66335>
[Pe r J. Leonen, Third Division].
Separate Concurring Opinion 18 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

[A] decision that has acquired finality be omes immutable and unalterable.
As such, it may no longer be modi ed in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneo s conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that endered it or by the highest court
of the land.54 (Citation omitted)

Thus, the ruling can no longer be di turbed, even if the questions raised
are meant to correct e1Tors of fact or law.

Moreover, respondent Marcos, Jr.' conviction for the failure to file his
income tax return does not disqualify him to run as a candidate.

Apart from identifying the qualifica ions of candidates for public office,
the Omnibus Election Code likewise enu erates the circumstances that will
render a person disqualified. Section 12 o the Omnibus Election Code states:

SECTION 12. Disqualifications. -Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompete t, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, reb Ilion or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of m re than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be isqualified to be a candidate and
to hold any office, unless he has been iven plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate erein provided shall be deemed

removed upon the declaration by compet nt authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after he expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified. 55 ·

None of these disqualifications are resent in respondent Marcos, Jr.' s

case. He was not found to be insane or in ompetent by competent authority,
and he was not sentenced by final judgme t for subversion, insurrection, and
rebellion. Moreover, the affirmation of ·s conviction before the Court of
Appeals did not carry a penalty of impriso ment.

Petitioners, however, assert that the ailure to file an income tax return
in violation of Section 45 of the National Internal Revenue Code is a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude refers to "everyth ng. . . done contrary to justice,

honesty, or good morals." 56 In Villaber . Commission on Elections, 57 this
Court defined moral turpitude as "an act o baseness, vileness, or depravity in

54 Id.
/
55
Batas Pambansa Big. 881 (1985), art. I, sec. 12.
56
Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 930, 93 (200 I) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
51 Id.
Separate Concurring Opinion 19 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

the private duties which a [person] owes [t eir fellow], orto society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary r le of right and duty... , or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or ood morals." 58

The definition of moral turpitud and the identification of crimes

involving moral turpitude is loose. 59 · G nerally, the standard surrounding
moral turpitude depends on what the socie y accepts as rules of right and duty,
justice, honesty, or good morals. 60 D ermining what constitutes moral'
turpitude requires a social consensus of hat acts are deemed reprehensible
based on a society's standards.

However, not every criminal act ·nvolves moral turpitude. 61 It is

ultimately a question of fact, and it depend on the circumstances surrounding
the violation. 62 For this reason, this C urt must determine what crimes
involve moral turpitude. 63

The question of whether a failure to ile an income tax return is a crime

involving moral turpitude has been settled y this Court in Republic v. Marcos
II. 64 In that case, this Court ruled that the ailure to file an income tax return
is not a crime involving moral turpitude be ause "the mere omission is already
a violation regardless of the fraudule t intent or willfulness of the
individual." 65 Thus, the mere failure to fil an income tax return is a distinct
and separate violation from (1) filing a fal e return and (2) filing a fraudulent.
return with intent to evade tax. 66

A false return may or may not be ·ntentional. It simply involves a

deviation from the truth regardless of th person's intent. Meanwhile, a
fraudulent return "implies intentional or d ceitful entry with intent to evade
the taxes due."67

On the other hand, a mere omission r negligence in the filing of a tax

return does not signify malicious intent. ere is no apparent willfulness to
evade payment of tax. The failure to file a ax return is not viewed as entirely
irremissible. In fact, the penalty for failure o file an internal tax return can be
compromised under Section 255 of the Nat onal Internal Revenue Code:

5& Id.
59 Id.
60
Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral Trib ma!, 779 Phil. 268 (20 I 6) [Per J. Carpi o, En

61
62
63
Banc].
Id.
Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 420 Phii. 930 {200 ) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
Id.
/
64
Republic v. Marcos Jl, 61 2 Phil. 355 (2009) [Per J . Peral , Third Divis ion].
65
Id. at 375-376.
66
Id.
61
Commissioner of internal Revenue v. Fitness by Design, nc., 799 Phil. 39 1, 4 15 (20 I 6) [Per J. Leonen,
Second Divis ion] .
Separate Concurring Opinion 20 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

SECTION 255. Failure to ile Return, Supply Correct and

Accurate Information, Pay Tax Withh0l and Remit Tax and Refund Excess
Taxes Withheld on Compensation. - y person required under this Code
or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax make a
return, keep any record, or supply con- ct the accurate information, who
willfully fails to pay such tax, make such eturn, keep such record, or supply
correct and accurate information, or wi old or remit taxes withheld, or
refund excess taxes withheld on compen ation, at the time or times required
by law or rules and regulations shall, in a dition to other penalties provided
by law, upon conviction thereof, be puni hed by a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (P 10,000) and suffer im risonment of not less than one (1)
year but not more than ten (10) years.

Any person who attempts to ma e it appear for any reason that he

or another has in fact filed a return or sta ment, or actually files a return or
statement and subsequently withdraws t e same return or statement after
securing the official receiving seal or st mp of receipt of internal revenue
office wherein the same was actually file shall, upon conviction therefore,
be punished by a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P 10,000) but not
more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20, 00) and suffer imprisonment of
not less than one (1) year but not mor~ th three (3) years. 68

Here, as pointed out in the ponenci , our tax laws are being developed·
in a way that decriminalizes failing to fil an income tax return. This is fair
and reasonable considering that many Fili inos miss or fail to file their income
tax returns due to the complicated tax sy tern, the lack of incentives to file,
especially from individuals and businesses in the informal economy, or simply
due to negligence.69

While these acts should not be e abled, there should be a broader

understanding in characterizing this crime. The mere failure to file an income
tax return does not demonstrate. moral per ersity or intent to defraud or evade
payment of tax. Thus, under Section 1 of the Omnibus Election Code,
respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disquali 1ed from running as a presidential
candidate despite his failure to file his inc me tax return.

Nevertheless, Filipinos who mis·s or fail to file their tax returns should
face the consequences of the law. Our overnment relies heavily on the.
collection of taxes and compliance with ou tax laws is a duty of every citizen.
The president themselves must dutifully e sure that these laws are faithfully
executed. This includes the rightful filing f returns and payment of taxes.

The Constitution merely sets out t e minimum qualifications for the

president. In doing so, it allows the elect rate to decide for themselves the
standard they deem fit for the position. Thi may include a person's character,
integrity, educational background, politi al leaning, public service track /

68
National Internal Revenue Code, sec. 255.
69
See Senate of the Philippines, ANGARA TO BIR: SJMP /FY TAX SYSTEM TO ENCOURAGE PINOYS
TO PAY TAXES, September l4, 2014, available at
http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/20 14/09 I 4_an ara I.asp (last accessed on June 24, 2022).
Separate Concurring Opinion 21 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

record, expertise, work ethic, or even re ords of criminal conviction. These

standards can demonstrate and predict h w a candidate will carry out their
duties once elected to office. During the campaign period, the qualifications
of a candidate are threshed out by the p blic with the hope that it provides
guidance to the electorate in making an i formed decision.

Thus, the electorate heavily relies o the information it receives and the
kind of political discussions it participate 111.

III

As part of its duty, the Commissio on Elections is bound to "enforce

and administer all laws and regulations re ative to the election[.]" 70

The Omnibus Election Code states hat petitions to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such as the Buenafe Petition, "shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, no later than fifteen days before the
election." 71 On the other hand, final decisi ns of petitions for disqualification,
including the Ilagan Petition, "shall be r ndered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualifi ation is sought."72

Nevertheless, the Commission on E ections, in clear derogation of the

above provisions, released its Resolutions n both petitions on May 10, 2022,
a day after the 2022 elections.

The Commission on Elections c nnot claim that it was given

insufficient time to study the Petitions.

On January 20, 2022, petitione ·s filed a Motion for Partial

Reconsideration73 of the Commission on El ctions Second Division' s January
17, 2022 Resolution74 that denied the Bu nafe Petition for lack of merit. 75
Moreover, in its February 10, 2022 R solution,76 the Commission on
Elections Former First Division dismissed t e Ilagan Petition, and motions for
reconsideration were also filed soon after. 7 The Commission on Elections
spent almost four and tlu·ee months, respect vely, to decide on the motions for
reconsideration, releasing their Resolutio s only after the electorate cast
votes.
/
7
°
71
CONST., ait. IX(C), sec. 2(1 ).
Batas Pambansa Big. 881 (1985), a1t. IX, sec. 78.
72
Batas Pambansa Big. 881 (1 985), art. IX, sec. 72.
73
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374), pp. 191 -2 16.
74
Id. at 94-125.
15
Ponencia, p. 11 .
16
Rollo (G.R. No. 260426), pp. 198-238.
77
Ponencia, p. 15.
Separate Concurring Opinion 22 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

This unmitigated delay cannot e countenanced, especially as the

petitions involved no less than a candidat for the highest government position
in our country. Such delay in the reso ution of the qualifications and the
validity of the certificate of candida y of respondent Marcos, Jr. has
materially affected not just the results the elections but also the smooth
transition of the incoming administration It negatively impacted not just the
parties involved, but the electorate as we 1.

The pendency of the case was an e fective sword of Damocles hanging

over respondent Marcos, Jr. Petitione s were forced to cast their votes,
wondering if their efforts were for naught The looming issues on respondent
Marcos, Jr.' s qualifications and certificat of candidacy caused confusion and
uncertainty in the electorate's minds, o e that clearly weighed into their
choice of candidate.

The Commission on Elections sh uld have expended all efforts to

prioritize the resolution of these cases pri r to the conduct of elections. The
constitutional commission should be spe rheading the Philippine election's
organization and efficiency and should n t be the cause of any setback, as it
has been charged with the significant dut of enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the condu t of the elections. 78

IV

Already, even before the text of 11 the opinions in this case were
published and even before they have rea a single word in our unanimous
reading of the legal provisions, partisans were so ready to brand the sitting
Justices as traitors, motivated by greed an power, beholden to the President
who appointed them almost ten years a o, and everything else other than
being capable of legal judgment. All of w ich of course have no justification.
All of which of course are false.

All of which of course reveal th kind of uncritical thinking that

provides the fertile ground of disinforma ·on and violence that will subve1i
our democracy.

The potential for any totalitarian or authoritarian government to

succeed is directly proportional to the abi ity of the cultural environment of
its society to dehumanize its component individuals, identities, groups, or
communities.

78
CONST., art. IX(C), sec. 2( I).

I
Separate Concurring Opinion 23 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

It was Hannah Arendt who said, ·n her six-page letter to the scholar
Gerard Shoelem, clarifying again her co cept of the banality of evil, which
she first wrote in her book "Eichmann in erusalem": 79

You are quite right, I changed m mind and do no longer speak of

' radical evil.' ... It is indeed my opinio now that evil is never 'radical,'
that it is only extreme, and that it posses es neither depth nor any demonic
dimension. It can overgrow and lay aste the whole world precisely
because it spreads like a fungus on the s face. It is ' thought-defying,' as I
said, because thought tries to reach som depth, to go to the roots, and the
moment it concerns itself with evil, it is ustrated because there is nothing.
That is its ' banality.' Only the good has epth that can be radical.

All of us are a potential part of th t fungus, of that infection that can

spread evil.

We do so when we reduce our nemies to their worst, when we

caricaturize them as incapable of any hu anity. We do so when we reduce
the world into an "us-versus-they," with . thing in between. We do so when
we maintain ourselves only in the compa y of our epistemic bubbles.

As citizens deserving of a better der ocracy, we have the responsibility

to know that to speak and to express is a ri ht, but it is a responsibility to speak
well-to speak the truth, clearly, witho t drowning others, and with the
openness to engage in real conversations.

Elections foster partisanship and division. Democracy, however,

requires that we are open to listen; to be a le to judge; and to distinguish our
disagreement from our capacity to reduc those with whom we disagree as
persons incapable of any kind of humani

Otherwise, we enable that system hat oppresses. We facilitate that

society that is incapable of recognizing t e human rights of our opponents.
When we participate in demonizing an ther, we are as responsible for
atrocities to be committed against other h man beings.

The constitutional guarantee of a der ocratic society, with the sovereign

assurance that political leaders are chosen through elections, is certainly not
an inevitable guarantee of the quality of th t democracy.

An authentic and truly meaningful emocracy can only be assured by tf

the humanity and collective efforts of our eople. /

79
Marie Louise Knott ed., (translated by Anthony Davi ), The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and
Gershom Sholem, Letter no. 133 (University of Chicag Press: 2017).
Separate ConcmTing Opinion 24 G.R. Nos. 260374 & 260426

Any dysfunction in our democ acy, any belief in the power of

disinformation magnified by unmoderat d and unregulated social media, any
concerns about the weakening institutio s such as media and education that
traditionally informs a more critical cit zenry, are better addressed by the
strategic, collective, and sober action of ur people.

On the other hand, winners of elections should acknowledge that the

mandate they are given in an unequal so iety, with many who are poor, with
the growing fear of health, climate, and economic crises, are mainly
expressions of hope for a leadership tha inspires the best solutions from all
our people. That leadership should be tolerant, respectful of dissent, and
always protective of the intrinsic dignity s well as the rights of every human
being.

That leadership should lead throu h the power of their example: that
they follow the law and pay the right tl;lx s.

We have one life. Through electi ns, perhaps with reasons that only
the universe will know, some are given o e more chance to do what is right.

That opportunity should not be wa ted.

The electorate, our people, will en ure that they will deserve nothing
less.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DIS ISS the Petitions.

Associate Justice