Book 1 :

CEPHALUS: By Zeus, Socrates, I will tell you

exactly what I think. You see, a number of us
who are more or less the same age often get
together, so as to preserve the old saying.6
When they meet, the majority of our
members lament, longing for the lost
pleasures of their youth and reminiscing
about sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the
other things that go along with them
“How are you as far as sex goes, Sophocles?
Can you still make love to a woman?” “Quiet,
man,” he replied, “I am very glad to have
escaped from all that, like a slave who has
escaped from a deranged and savage
master.” I thought at the time what he said
was sensible, and I still do. You see, old age
brings peace and freedom from all such
things. When the appetites cease to stress
and importune us, everything Sophocles said
comes to pass, and we escape from many
insane masters. But in these matters, and in
those concerning one’s relatives, the real
cause isn’t old age, Socrates, but the way
people live. If they are orderly and
contented, old age, too, is only moderately
onerous; if they aren’t, both old age,
Socrates, and youth are hard to bear.
they think you bear old age more easily, not
because of the way you live, but because you
are wealthy. For the wealthy, they say, have
many consolations.
8 The same account applies to those who are
not rich and find old age hard to bear: a good
person would not easily bear old age if it
were coupled with poverty, but one who
wasn’t good would not be at peace with
himself even if he were wealthy.
SOCRATES: Did you inherit most of your
wealth, Cephalus, or did you make it
yourself? CEPHALUS: What did I make for
myself, Socrates, you ask. As a moneymaker I
am in between my grandfather and my
father
However, my father, Lysanias, diminished
that amount to even less than I have now. As
for me, I am satisfied to leave my sons here
no less, but a little more, than I inherited.
SOCRATES: The reason I asked is that you do
not seem particularly to love money. And
those who have not made it themselves are
usually like that. But those who have made it
themselves love it twice as much as anyone
else. For just as poets love their poems and
fathers their children, so those who have
made money take their money seriously both
as something they have made themselves
and—just as other people do—because it is
useful. This makes them difficult even to be
with, since they are unwilling to praise
anything except money
SOCRATES: Indeed, it is. But tell me
something else. What do you think is the
greatest good you have enjoyed as a result of
being very wealthy?
CEPHALUS: What I have to say probably
would not persuade the masses. But you are
well aware, Socrates, that when someone
thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened
and concerned about things he did not fear
before. It is then that the stories told about
Hades, that a person who has been unjust
here must pay the penalty there—stories he
used to make fun of— twist his soul this way
and that for fear they are true. And whether
because of the weakness of old age, or
because he is now closer to what happens in
Hades and has a clearer view of it, or
whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding
and fear, and begins to calculate and
consider whether he has been unjust to
anyone
Sweet hope is in his heart
Nurse and companion to his age
Hope, captain of the ever-twisting
Mind of mortal men.
How amazingly well he puts that. It is in this
connection I would say the possession of
wealth is most valuable, not for every man,
but for a good and orderly one. Not cheating
someone even unintentionally, not lying to
him, not owing a sacrifice to some god or
money to a person, and as a result departing
for that other place in fear—the possession
of wealth makes no small contribution to
this. It has many other uses, too, but putting
one thing against the other,
Socrates, I would say that for a man with any
sense, that is how wealth is most useful.
SOCRATES: A fine sentiment, Cephalus. But
speaking of that thing itself, justice,9 are we
to say it is simply speaking the truth and
paying whatever debts one has incurred?
SOCRATES: Then the following is not the
definition of justice: to speak the truth and
repay what one has borrowed.
POLEMARCHUS: Am I, Polemarchus, not heir
of all your possessions?
Cephalus replied with a laugh: Certainly. And
off he went to the sacrifice.
SOCRATES: Then tell us, heir to the
discussion, just what Simonides said about
justice that you think is correct.
POLEMARCHUS: He said it is just to give to
each what is owed to him
SOCRATES: Well, now, it is not easy to
disagree with Simonides, since he is a wise
and godlike man. But what exactly does he
mean? Perhaps you know, Polemarchus, but
I do not understand. Clearly, he does not
mean what we said a moment ago—namely,
giving back to someone whatever he has lent
to you, even if he is out of his mind when he
asks for it. And yet what he has lent to you is
surely something that is owed to him, isn’t
it?
POLEMARCHUS: Something else indeed, by
Zeus! He meant friends owe something good
to their friends, never something bad.
SOCRATES: I understand. You mean someone
does not give a lender what he is owed by
giving him gold, when the giving and taking
would be harmful, and both he and the
lender are friends. Isn’t that what you say
Simonides meant?
SOCRATES: Now what about this? Should one
also give to one’s enemies whatever is owed
to them?
SOCRATES: It seems, then, Simonides was
speaking in riddles—just like a poet!—when
he said what justice is. For what he meant, it
seems, is that it is just to give to each what is
appropriate to him, and this is what he called
giving him what he is owed.
SOCRATES: Then what, in the name of Zeus,
do you think he would answer if someone
asked him: “Simonides, what owed or
appropriate things does the craft10 we call
medicine give, and to which things?”
POLEMARCHUS: Clearly, he would say it gives
drugs, food, and drink to bodies.
SOCRATES: And what owed or appropriate
things does the craft we call cooking give,
and to which things?
POLEMARCHUS: It gives pleasant flavors to
food.
SOCRATES: Good. Now what does the craft
we would call justice give, and to whom or
what does it give it?
POLEMARCHUS: If we are to follow the
previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefit
to friends and harm to enemies.
SOCRATES: Does Simonides mean, then, that
treating friends well and enemies badly is
justice? POLEMARCHUS: I believe so.
SOCRATES: And who is most capable of
treating sick friends well and enemies badly
in matters of disease and health?
SOCRATES: So to people who are not at war,
a just man is useless? POLEMARCHUS: No, I
don’t think that at all.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what is justice
useful for using or acquiring in peacetime?
POLEMARCHUS: Contracts, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And by contracts you mean
partnerships, or what? POLEMARCHUS:
Partnerships, of course.
SOCRATES: So when money is not being
used, that is when justice is useful for it?
POLEMARCHUS: It looks that way.
SOCRATES: And when one needs to keep a
pruning knife safe, justice is useful both in
partnerships and for the individual. When
you need to use it, however, it is the craft of
vine pruning that is useful?
SOCRATES: And so in all other cases, too,
justice is useless when they are in use, but
useful when they are not?
SOCRATES: Then justice cannot be something
excellent, can it, my friend, if it is only useful
for useless things. But let’s consider the
following point. Isn’t the person who is
cleverest at landing a blow, whether in
boxing or any other kind of fight, also
cleverest at guarding against it?
SOCRATES: So if a just person is clever at
guarding money, he must also be clever at
stealing it
SOCRATES: It seems, then, that a just person
has turned out to be a kind of thief.
According to you, Homer, and Simonides,
then, justice seems to be some sort of craft
of stealing—one that benefits friends and
harms enemies. Isn’t that what you meant?
POLEMARCHUS: No, by Zeus, it isn’t. But I do
not know anymore what I meant. I still
believe this, however, that benefiting one’s
friends and harming one’s enemies is justice.
SOCRATES: Speaking of friends, do you mean
those a person believes to be good and
useful, or those who actually are good and
useful, even if he does not believe they are,
and similarly with enemies?
SOCRATES: But don’t people make mistakes
about this, so that lots of those who seem to
them to be good and useful aren’t, and vice
versa?
SOCRATES: Then it follows, Polemarchus,
that it is just for many people— the ones
who are mistaken in their judgment—to
harm their friends, since they are bad for
them, and benefit their enemies, since they
are good. And so we will find ourselves
claiming the very opposite of what we said
Simonides meant.
POLEMARCHUS: We said that a friend is
someone who is believed to be good.
SOCRATES: With respect to the virtue13 that
makes dogs good, or to the one that makes
horses good?
SOCRATES: And what about human beings,
comrade; shouldn’t we say that, when they
are harmed, they become worse with respect
to human virtue?
SOCRATES: Then, my dear Polemarchus,
people who have been harmed are bound to
become more unjust. POLEMARCHUS: So it
seems. SOCRATES: Now, can musicians use
music to make people unmusical?
SOCRATES: Well, then, can just people use
justice to make people unjust? In a word, can
good people use their virtue or goodness to
make people bad?
SOCRATES: For it isn’t the function of heat to
cool things down, I imagine, but that of its
opposite.
SOCRATES: So the function of a good person
isn’t to harm, but that of his opposite.
SOCRATES: So it isn’t the function of a just
person to harm a friend or anyone else,
Polemarchus, but that of his opposite, an
unjust person
. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has
become clear to us that it is never just to
harm anyone. POLEMARCHUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: You and I will fight as partners,
then, against anyone who tells us that
Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other
wise and blessedly happy men said this.
POLEMARCHUS: I, for my part, am willing to
be your partner in the battle
SOCRATES: All right. Since it has become
apparent, then, that neither justice nor the
just consists in benefiting friends and
harming enemies, what else should one say
it is? Now, while we were speaking,
Thrasymachus had tried many times to take
over the discussion but was restrained by
those sitting near him, who wanted to hear
our argument to the end. When we paused
after what I had just said, however, he could
not keep quiet any longer: crouched up like a
wild beast about to spring, he hurled himself
at us as if to tear us to pieces.
Polemarchus and I were frightened and
flustered as he roared into our midst:
. If Polemarchus and I made an error in our
investigation of the accounts, you may be
sure we did so involuntarily. If we were
searching for gold, we would never
voluntarily give way to each other, if by
doing so we would destroy our chance of
finding it. So do not think that in searching
for justice, a thing more honorable than a
large quantity of gold, we would foolishly
give way to one another or be less than
completely serious about finding it
THRASYMACHUS: What if I show you another
answer about justice, one that is different
from all these and better than any of them?
What penalty would you deserve then?
THRASYMACHUS: What a pleasant fellow
you are! But in addition to learning, you
must pay money. SOCRATES: I will if I ever
have any.
No, it is much more appropriate for you to
answer, since you say you do know and can
tell us. Don’t be obstinate. Give your answer
as a favor to me and do not begrudge your
teaching to Glaucon and the others. While I
was saying this, Glaucon and the others
begged him to do as I asked. Thrasymachus
clearly wanted to speak in order to win a
good reputation, since he thought he had a
very good answer. But he pretended to want
to win a victory at my expense by having me
do the answering. However, he agreed in the
end, and then said:
SOCRATES: When you say I learn from
others, you are right, Thrasymachus; but
when you say I do not give thanks, you are
wrong.
THRASYMACHUS: Listen, then. I say justice is
nothing other than what is advantageous for
the stronger
SOCRATES: First, I must understand what you
mean. For, as things stand, I do not. What is
advantageous for the stronger, you say, is
just. What on earth do you mean,
Thrasymachus?
THRASYMACHUS: Don’t you know, then, that
some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a
democracy, and some by an aristocracy?
SOCRATES: Of course I do. THRASYMACHUS:
And that what is stronger in each city is the
ruling element?
SOCRATES: Certainly. THRASYMACHUS: And
each type of rule makes laws that are
advantageous for itself: democracy makes
democratic ones, tyranny tyrannical ones,
and so on with the others. And by so
legislating, each declares that what is just for
its subjects is what is advantageous for itself
—the ruler—and it punishes anyone who
deviates from this as lawless and unjust.
That, Socrates, is what I say justice is, the
same in all cities: what is advantageous for
the established rule. Since the established
rule is surely stronger, anyone who does the
rational calculation correctly will conclude
that the just is the same everywhere—what
is advantageous for the stronger.
something advantageous. But you add for
the stronger. I do not know about that. We
will have to look into it.
SOCRATES: That is just what I am going to do.
Tell me, then, you also claim, don’t you, that
it is just to obey the rulers?
SOCRATES: And are the rulers in each city
infallible, or are they liable to error?
SOCRATES: And a law is correct if it
prescribes what is advantageous for the
rulers themselves, and incorrect if it
prescribes what is disadvantageous for
them? Is that what you mean?
SOCRATES: According to your account, then,
it isn’t only just to do what is advantageous
for the stronger, but also the opposite: what
is not advantageous.
SOCRATES: The same as you, I think. But let’s
examine it more closely. Haven’t we agreed
that the rulers are sometimes in error as to
what is best for themselves when they give
orders to their subjects, and yet that it is just
for their subjects to do whatever their rulers
order? Wasn’t that agreed?
POLEMARCHUS: Who needs a witness?
Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers
sometimes issue orders that are bad for
them, and that it is just for the others to
obey them
SOCRATES: It makes no difference,
Polemarchus. If Thrasymachus wants to put
it that way now, let’s accept it. But tell me,
Thrasymachus, is that what you intended to
say, that what is just is what the stronger
believes to be advantageous for him,
whether it is in fact advantageous for him or
not? Is that what we are to say you mean?
to the extent that he is a ruler, never makes
errors and unerringly decrees what is best for
himself, and that is what his subject must do.
Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do
what is advantageous for the stronger
SOCRATES: Bless you, Thrasymachus; I would
not so much as try! But to prevent this sort
of confusion from happening to us again,
would you define whether you mean the
ruler and stronger in the ordinary sense or in
what you were just now calling the precise
sense, when you say that it is just for the
weaker to do what is advantageous for him,
since he is the stronger?
SOCRATES: That’s enough of that! Tell me: is
a doctor—in the precise sense, the one you
mentioned before—a moneymaker or
someone who treats the sick? Tell me about
the one who is really a doctor.
SOCRATES: In other words, we should not
take any account of the fact that he sails in a
ship, and he should not be called a sailor for
that reason. For it is not because he is sailing
that he is called a ship’s captain, but because
of the craft he practices and his rule over
sailors?
SOCRATES: It is like this: suppose you asked
me whether it is satisfactory for a body to be
a body, or whether it needs something else. I
would answer, “Of course it needs
something. In fact, that is why the craft of
medicine has been discovered—because a
body is deficient and it is not satisfactory for
it to be like that.19 To provide what is
advantageous, that is what the craft was
developed for.” Do you think I am speaking
correctly in saying this, or not?
SOCRATES: What about medicine itself? Is it
deficient? Does a craft need some further
virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight and
the ears of hearing, so that another craft is
needed to consider and provide what is
advantageous for them?
SOCRATES: Doesn’t it follow that medicine
does not consider what is advantageous for
medicine, but for the body?
advantageous for itself—since it has no
further needs—but what is advantageous for
that with which it deals? THRASYMACHUS:
Apparently so. SOCRATES: Now surely,
Thrasymachus, the various crafts rule over
and are stronger than that with which they
deal?
SOCRATES: So no kind of knowledge
considers or enjoins what is advantageous
for itself, but what is advantageous for the
weaker, which is subject to it. He finally
agreed to this too, although he tried to fight
it. When he had agreed, however, I said:
Surely then, no doctor, to the extent that he
is a doctor, considers or enjoins what is
advantageous for himself, but what is
advantageous for his patient? For we agreed
that a doctor, in the precise sense, is a ruler
of bodies, not a moneymaker. Isn’t that what
we agreed?
SOCRATES: So then, Thrasymachus, no one in
any position of rule, to the extent that he is a
ruler, considers or enjoins what is
advantageous for himself, but what is
advantageous for his subject—that on which
he practices his craft. It is to his subject and
what is advantageous and proper for it that
he looks, and everything he says and does,
he says and does for it.
THRASYMACHUS: Because she is letting you
run around sniveling and doesn’t wipe your
nose when you need it, since it is her fault
that you do not know the difference
between sheep and shepherds. SOCRATES:
What exactly is it I do not know?
THRASYMACHUS: You think that shepherds
and cowherds consider what is good for their
sheep and cattle, and fatten them and take
care of them with some aim in mind other
than what is good for their master and
themselves. Moreover, you believe that
rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think
about their subjects in a different way than
one does about sheep, and that what they
consider night and day is something other
than what is advantageous for themselves.
You are so far from understanding justice
and what is just, and injustice and what is
unjust, that you do not realize that justice is
really the good of another, what is
advantageous for the stronger and the ruler,
and harmful to the one who obeys and
serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules those
simpleminded—for that is what they really
are—just people, and the ones it rules do
what is advantageous for the other who is
stronger; and they make the one they serve
happy, but they do not make themselves the
least bit happy.
You must consider it as follows, Socrates, or
you will be the most naïve of all: a just man
must always get less than does an unjust
one. First, in their contracts with one
another, when a just man is partner to an
unjust, you will never find, when the
partnership ends, that the just one gets more
than the unjust, but less. Second, in matters
relating to the city, when taxes are to be
paid, a just man pays more on an equal
amount of property, an unjust one less; but
when the city is giving out refunds, a just
man gets nothing while an unjust one makes
a large profit. Finally, when each of them
holds political office, a just person—even if
he is not penalized in other ways—finds that
his private affairs deteriorate more because
he has to neglect them, that he gains no
advantage from the public purse because of
his justice, and that he is hated by his
relatives and acquaintances because he is
unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The
opposite is true of an unjust man in every
respect. I mean, of course, the person I
described before: the man of great power
who does better21 than everyone else. He is
the one you should consider if you want to
figure out how much more advantageous it is
for the individual to be unjust than just. You
will understand this most easily if you turn
your thoughts to injustice of the most
complete sort, the sort that makes those
who do injustice happiest, and those who
suffer it—those who are unwilling to do
injustice— most wretched. The sort I mean is
tyranny, because it uses both covert means
and force to appropriate the property of
others—whether it is sacred or secular,
public or private—not little by little, but all at
once. If
So you see, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a
large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and
more masterful than justice. And, as I said
from the beginning, justice is what is
advantageous for the stronger, while
injustice is profitable and advantageous for
oneself.
t. Or do you think it is a trivial matter you are
trying to determine, and not rather a way of
life—the one that would make living life that
way most profitable for each of us?
SOCRATES: Either that, or you care nothing
for us and so are not worried about whether
we will live better or worse lives because of
our ignorance of what you claim to know
I do not believe that injustice is more
profitable than justice, not even if you should
give it full scope to do what it wants.
Suppose, my good fellow, that there is an
unjust person, and suppose he does have the
power to do injustice, whether by covert
means or open warfare;
you did not consider it necessary to maintain
the same level of exactness when you later
turned to the true shepherd
SOCRATES: Then, it is clear now,
Thrasymachus, that no type of craft or rule
provides what is beneficial for itself; but, as
we have been saying for some time, it
provides and enjoins what is beneficial for its
subject, and aims at what is advantageous
for it—the weaker, not the stronger. That is
why I said just now, my dear Thrasymachus,
that no one chooses to rule voluntarily and
take other people’s troubles in hand and
straighten them out, but each asks for
wages. You see, anyone who is going to
practice his type of craft well never does or
enjoins what is best for himself—at least not
when he is acting as his craft prescribes—but
what is best for his subject. It
is because of this, it seems, that wages must
be provided to a person if he is going to be
willing to rule, whether they are in the form
of money or honor or a penalty if he refuses.
GLAUCON: What do you mean, Socrates? I
am familiar with the first two kinds of wages,
but I do not understand what penalty you
mean, or how you can call it a wage.
SOCRATES: Then you do not understand the
sort of wages for which the best people rule,
when they are willing to rule. Don’t you
know that those who love honor and those
who love money are despised, and rightly
so?
So, if they are going to be willing to rule,
some compulsion or punishment must be
brought to bear on them—that is probably
why wanting to rule when one does not have
to is thought to be shameful. Now, the
greatest punishment for being unwilling to
rule is being ruled by someone worse than
oneself. And I think it is fear of that that
makes good people rule when they do rule.
They approach ruling, not as though they
were going to do something good or as
though they were going to enjoy themselves
in it, but as something necessary, since it
cannot be entrusted to anyone better than—
or eveThere it would be quite clear that
anyone who is really and truly a ruler does
not naturally seek what is advantageous for
himself, but what is so for his subject n as
good as—themselves
There it would be quite clear that anyone
who is really and truly a ruler does not
naturally seek what is advantageous for
himself, but what is so for his subject
SOCRATES: Come on then, Thrasymachus,
answer us from the beginning. You say, don’t
you, that complete injustice is more
profitable than complete justice?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, if they do complete
injustice and can bring cities and whole
nations under their power. Perhaps, you
thought I meant pickpockets?
SOCRATES: Yes, I am not unaware of what
you mean. But this did surprise me: that you
include injustice with virtue and wisdom, and
justice with their opposites.
But now, obviously, you will say that
injustice is fine and strong and apply to it all
the attributes we used to apply to justice,
since you dare to include it with virtue and
wisdom
SOCRATES: It makes no difference. But here
is a further question I would like you to try to
answer: do you think that a just person
wants to do better25 than another just
person?
SOCRATES: In any branch of knowledge or
ignorance, do you think that a
knowledgeable person would intentionally
try to take more for himself than another
knowledgeable person, or to do or say more,
and not rather exactly what the one like
himself would do in the same situation?
e. For it was claimed, I believe, that injustice
is stronger and more powerful than justice.
But now, if justice is indeed wisdom and
virtue, it will be easy to show, I suppose, that
it is stronger than injustice, since injustice is
ignorance—no one could now be ignorant of
that. However, I, at any rate, do not want to
consider the matter in such simple terms,
Thrasymachus, but to look into it in some
such way as this: would you say that a city
may be unjust and try to enslave other cities
unjustly, and succeed at enslaving them,27
and hold them in subjection which it
enslaved in the past?
SOCRATES: You are doing well at it, too. So
please me some more by answering this
question: do you think that a city, an army, a
band of robbers or thieves, or any other
group with a common unjust purpose would
be able to achieve it if its members were
unjust to each other?
SOCRATES: Because, Thrasymachus, injustice
causes factions, hatreds, and quarrels among
them, while justice brings friendship and a
sense of common purpose. Isn’t that so?
THRASYMACHUS: I will say it is, in order not
to disagree with you. SOCRATES: You are still
doing well on that front, which is very good
of you. So tell me this: if the function of
injustice is to produce hatred wherever it
occurs, then whenever it arises, whether
among free men or slaves, won’t it make
them hate one another, form factions, and
be unable to achieve any common purpose?
SOCRATES: Well, then, my amazing fellow, if
injustice arises within a single individual, will
it lose its power or will it retain it
undiminished? THRASYMACHUS: Let’s say
that it retains it undiminished. SOCRATES:
Apparently, then, its power is such that
whenever it comes to exist in something—
whether in a city, a family, an army, or
anything else whatsoever—it makes that
thing, first of all, incapable of acting in
concert with itself, because of the faction
and difference it creates; and, second of all,
an enemy to itself, and to what is in every
way its opposite: namely, justice. Isn’t that
so?
SOCRATES: And in a single individual, too, I
presume, it will produce the very same
effects that it is in its nature to produce.
First, it will make him incapable of acting
because of inner faction and not being of one
mind with himself; second, it will make him
his own enemy as well as the enemy of just
people. Isn’t that right?
SOCRATES: Then an unjust person will also
be an enemy of the gods, Thrasymachus,
while a just person will be their friend?
SOCRATES: Come on, then, complete the
banquet for me by continuing to answer as
you have been doing now. We have shown
that just people are wiser and better and
more capable of acting, while unjust ones are
not even able to act together.
However, we must now examine the
question, as we proposed to do before,28 of
whether just people also live better and are
happier than unjust ones
SOCRATES: All right. Does there seem to you
also to be a virtue29 for each thing to which
some function is assigned? Let’s go over the
same ground again. We say that eyes have
some function?
SOCRATES: Well, then. Could eyes perform
their function well if they lacked their proper
virtue but had the vice instead?
SOCRATES: So, if ears are deprived of their
own virtue, they too perform their function
badly?
THRASYMACHUS: No, there is nothing else.
SOCRATES: Then what about living? Don’t we
say that it is a function of a soul?
THRASYMACHUS: Absolutely. SOCRATES:
And don’t we also say that a soul has a
virtue?
SOCRATES: It is necessary, then, that a bad
soul rules and takes care of things badly, and
that a good soul does all these things well?
SOCRATES: So a just soul and a just man will
live well and an unjust one badly.
SOCRATES: Therefore, a just person is happy
and an unjust one wretched.
THRASYMACHUS: Let’s say so. SOCRATES:
But surely it is profitable, not to be
wretched, but to be happy. THRASYMACHUS:
Of course. SOCRATES: So then, blessed
Thrasymachus, injustice is never more
profitable than justice