INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

TEAM 1 ASSIGNMENT
GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897

NAME : SOUNDARYA D N
SRN: 03FL22BCL033
CLASS : III B.Com LL.B
SUBMITTED TO: KEERTHY RAJ
DATE : 22.02.2025
CANDIDATE’S SIGNATURE :
TEACHER’S SIGNATURE
Overview of the 1897 General Clauses Act In India
the General Clauses Act of 1897 is a crucial legislative framework that facilitates the
interpretation and implementation of laws. It ensures uniformity and clarity across various
laws by establishing general principles for interpreting statutes and standardizing definitions
for frequently used legal terms. Each statute had to define its own terms prior to the
enactment of this Act, which frequently resulted in inconsistencies and misunderstandings in
legal interpretation.
The Act removes the necessity for repeated explanations in various laws by establishing a
consistent set of definitions and interpretive guidelines. Except in cases where a particular
statute specifies otherwise, it applies to all Central Acts and Regulations.

REASON FOR CHOOSING THIS ACT

The General Clauses Act, 1897, was selected for analysis due to its broad applicability and
foundational role in statutory interpretation. As a general statute, it applies to all central acts
and regulations unless expressly excluded, making it an essential tool for understanding how
laws are interpreted and applied across different legal contexts. Given its fundamental role in
statutory construction, this Act is highly relevant for an assignment on legal interpretation.
The Act provides key definitions, interpretative principles, and procedural rules that are
critical in understanding statutory provisions. It clarifies how singular and plural terms should
be read, how gender-specific words should be understood, and how statutory powers should
be exercised. Mastering these interpretative tools is vital for any law student aspiring to
develop expertise in statutory construction. Courts frequently rely on this Act to resolve legal
ambiguities, determine the effect of repealing clauses, and interpret amendments, ensuring
uniformity in judicial decisions.
Additionally, the Act lays down essential principles on matters such as the treatment of
repealed laws, the scope of delegated legislative powers, and the computation of time limits
in legal proceedings. Studying these provisions helps in understanding how courts use
general principles to resolve statutory ambiguities. Its relevance extends beyond a single area
of law, impacting constitutional, administrative, and criminal law by aiding in the
interpretation of legislative authority, delegation of power, and penal provisions. Given its
interdisciplinary significance, a deep understanding of the General Clauses Act equips a law
student with the ability to interpret statutes accurately, construct persuasive legal arguments,
and draft precise legal documents—all essential skills for a successful legal career.

HISTORY
The General Clauses Act, 1897, traces its origins to British rule in India, where the need for
uniformity in statutory interpretation led to its enactment. The first version of such a law
appeared as the General Clauses Act, 1868, which was later replaced by the General Clauses
Act, 1887, before being consolidated into the present 1897 Act. Inspired by similar legislation
in England, it was introduced to simplify legal drafting, remove redundancy, and provide
standardized definitions for commonly used terms in Central Acts. By establishing general
principles of interpretation, the Act ensured consistency across various laws and continues to
serve as a fundamental tool for statutory construction in India.
The General Clauses Act, 1897, repealed the General Clauses Act, 1868, and the General
Clauses Act, 1887, through an express repeal under Section 2 of the 1897 Act 1. This provision
explicitly stated that the enactments listed in its Schedule (which included the 1868 and 1887
Acts) were hereby repealed. However, the Act ensured that any rights, obligations, or legal
effects arising under the repealed laws remained valid, in line with the principle now codified
in Section 6 (Effect of Repeal2). The 1897 Act did not introduce major substantive changes
but consolidated and refined the provisions of the earlier laws to establish a more
comprehensive framework for statutory interpretation, making it the primary legislation
governing definitions and interpretation rules in Indian law.

PURPOSE OF THE ACT

This Act serves as a fundamental statute that standardizes the interpretation of Indian laws,
integrating definitions, legal principles, and interpretative rules applicable to all Central Acts
and Regulations, unless expressly excluded. Enacted to promote uniformity and clarity, it
eliminates the necessity for repetitive explanations across different statutes, ensuring
consistency in legal language and facilitating a coherent and streamlined legislative
framework.
S.C recognized the General Clauses Act, 1897, as essential for maintaining legislative
coherence. The Court emphasized its role as a key instrument in statutory interpretation,
particularly in computing timeframes, interpreting the effect of repeals, defining the scope of
statutory authority, and resolving procedural ambiguities. By providing standardized
interpretative principles, the Act ensures consistency in legal application and prevents
uncertainty in judicial decision-making.3.
The General Clauses Act, 1897, plays a crucial role in ensuring consistency in judicial
decisions by simplifying legal language and eliminating redundancy in legislative drafting.
By assigning standardized meanings to frequently used terms, it facilitates uniform statutory
interpretation across various laws. However, courts have cautioned against rigid application,
emphasizing the importance of context and legislative intent in interpretation. Additionally,
the Act enhances judicial efficiency by minimizing unnecessary semantic disputes, allowing
judges to focus on substantive legal issues. By eliminating the need for repeated definitions, it
enables laws to prioritize essential provisions, ultimately making statutory texts clearer, more
concise, and easier to interpret.4

1
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 2.
2
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 6.
3
Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar AIR 1961 SC 838
4
Subramania Iyer v. Official Reciever AIR 1958 SC 1
 OBJECT
The General Clauses Act, 1897, was enacted to streamline statutory language, eliminate
redundancy, and enhance clarity in legislative drafting. Its primary purpose is to prevent the
repetitive use of identical terms and expressions within a statute, making legal provisions
more precise and efficient. By eliminating superfluous language, the Act ensures uniform
statutory interpretation across various laws. Through standardized definitions and
interpretative principles, it simplifies legislative processes and minimizes the need for
extensive explanations in every new enactment, thereby promoting consistency and efficiency
in legal drafting.

NATURE OF THE STATUTE

The General Clauses Act, 1897, serves as both a consolidating and amending statute, aimed at
governing the interpretation and application of laws in India. A consolidating statute
integrates provisions from multiple enactments into a single, cohesive framework, ensuring
uniformity in statutory construction. An amending statute, on the other hand, modifies,
updates, or repeals existing legal provisions to maintain consistency and clarity. This Act
plays a pivotal role in statutory interpretation by establishing standardized definitions, rules
for repeals, and procedural safeguards. The following section-wise legal analysis delves into
the legal meaning, illustrations, justification, and judicial interpretation of its key provisions.
CONSOLIDATING
Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides standardized definitions for commonly
used statutory terms, ensuring uniformity and consistency across all Central Acts and
Regulations. These definitions apply unless a specific statute or context requires a different
interpretation, thereby eliminating ambiguity, reducing redundancy, and promoting clarity in
legal language.
Illustration
Consider the term "person" appearing in multiple laws. If one statute defines it narrowly as
referring only to natural persons, while another includes corporate entities, it could result in
contradictory legal interpretations. Section 3(42) addresses this issue by defining "person"
broadly to include both natural persons and legal entities (such as corporations and
associations). This ensures consistency in judicial reasoning and statutory application,
preventing interpretative conflicts between different laws.
Judicial Interpretation (Case Laws)
1. The word “person” has been defines in widersense . However, in a specific statute, the
context may control the word's meaning.5

5
Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Nagpur (1956 AIR 354, 1956 SCR 154)
2. S.C ruled that the term "person" under Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, refers
only to entities recognized by law and does not include a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF)
unless explicitly stated in the relevant statute. This decision reinforced that definitions
provided under Section 3 are not absolute and must be interpreted in accordance with the
context of the specific statute in which they are used.
3. The Court reaffirmed that the term "person" under Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act,
1897, encompasses firms, companies, and associations but does not apply to groups that lack
legal recognition.6
4 The Court clarified that the definition of "person" under Section 3(42) of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, applies only when the specific statute does not provide its own definition. It was
emphasized that courts must first refer to the definition given in the particular Act before
relying on the General Clauses Act for interpretation.7.
HOWEVER , Modern legal developments (such as recognizing gender identities and artificial
intelligence entities) raise questions about whether Section 3 definitions need expansion to
reflect contemporary realities. S.C ruled that if a statute provides its own definition, it
prevails over Section .

AMMENDING STATUTE
An amending statute is a law that modifies, clarifies, or updates existing legal provisions to
address inconsistencies and maintain continuity in the legal framework. The General Clauses
Act, 1897, qualifies as an amending statute as it introduced new interpretative principles that
reshaped the approach to repeals, substitutions, and statutory definitions. Additionally, it
superseded the earlier General Clauses Acts of 1868 and 1887, incorporating expanded
definitions and refined legal principles. By continuously adapting to the evolving needs of
statutory interpretation, the Act functions as a self-evolving legislative tool that enhances
clarity and consistency in legal interpretation.
Justification with Case Laws
1. . Section 6 – Preventing the Automatic Extinction of Rights and Liabilities After
Repeal
 Case M.S. Shivananda v. K.S.R.T.C8
o S.C ruled that repealing a statute does not automatically revive earlier laws or extinguish
past obligations unless explicitly stated.
o This amended the common law doctrine, which previously presumed that rights and
liabilities ceased upon repeal.
 Case Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India9

6
Rashiklal & Co. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Orissa (1995 AIR 1471, 1995 SCC (2) 607)
7
State Of Rajasthan v. Aanjaney Organic Herbal Pvt. Ltd. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 21)
8
M.S. Shivananda v. K.S.R.T.C (1980 AIR 77, 1980 SCR (2) 684)
9
Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India (1974 AIR 960, 1974 SCR (3) 825)
o The Court clarified that procedural changes in a repealed Act do not survive unless
specifically retained, reinforcing that Section 6 is not absolute and must be applied
contextually.
2. Section 6A – Clarifying the Effect of Repealing an Amending Act10
 Case State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose11
o S.C held that if an amending Act is repealed, the amendments it introduced
remain valid.
o This settled uncertainty over whether repealing an amending Act invalidates
the changes it introduced, thereby refining statutory interpretation principles.
3. Section 7 – Prohibiting Automatic Revival of Repealed Laws12
 Case Rayala Corporation v. Director of Enforcement13
o The Court ruled that once a law is repealed, it does not revive automatically
unless expressly reinstated by the legislature.
o Previously, common law did not clarify whether repealed laws could revive by
implication, leading to judicial ambiguity. Section 7 resolved this by requiring
explicit legislative intent for revival.
4. Section 8 – Ensuring Legislative References Stay Updated When Laws Are Repealed
and Re-Enacted
 Case State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh 14
o The Court held that when a new law repeals and re-enacts an old law, all
references to the repealed law must be read as references to the new
enactment.
o This eliminated confusion where courts previously had to determine whether
references to repealed laws remained valid.
o Section 8 refined statutory interpretation by making references to repealed
laws automatically shift to the re-enacted provisions.
Justification The Act as an Amending Statute
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, modified common law principles, such as the
automatic extinguishment of rights upon repeal and the uncertainty in legal references
after re-enactment.
 Sections 6A and 8 were not present in the earlier General Clauses Acts of 1868 and
1887, proving that the 1897 Act introduced substantive amendments to statutory
interpretation rules.
10
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 6 A
11
: State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (1962 AIR 945, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 123)
12
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 7
13
Rayala Corporation v. Director of Enforcement (1969 AIR 667, 1969 SCR (2) 412)
14
State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955 AIR 84, 1955 SCR (1) 893)
  Courts have continuously refined the application of the Act, demonstrating that its
amendments remain crucial in modern statutory interpretation

1. Classification Based on Duration Permanent Statute

 A temporary statute automatically ceases to exist after a specified period unless it is
extended or re-enacted.
 A permanent statute remains in force indefinitely unless it is expressly repealed or
amended by the legislature.
Justification with Case Law
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, is a permanent statute as it contains no provision for
expiry or time limitation.
In State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari 15S.C held that if a statute lacks a sunset clause, it is
presumed to be permanent unless repealed.
2. Classification Based on Effect Prospective with Limited Retrospective Application
 Immediate statutes take effect as soon as they are enacted.
 Prospective statutes apply only to future transactions, without affecting past actions.
 Retrospective statutes apply backward in time, altering previously accrued rights,
liabilities, or obligations.
 Retroactive statutes apply to past events but regulate their future consequences.
Justification with Case Law
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, is primarily prospective, as it governs the
interpretation of laws from its enactment onward.
 However, Sections 6 and 6A provide for limited retrospective application by
preserving rights and obligations under repealed or amended laws.
 In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh 16, S.C ruled that the General Clauses Act does
not apply retrospectively unless expressly stated.

3. Classification Based on Operation or Extent General Statute

Legal Meaning
 A general statute applies universally across different laws and subjects.
 A special statute applies to a specific legal field, class of persons, or transactions.
 A local statute applies only to a particular geographical region.
Justification with Case Law
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, is a general statute as it applies to all Central Acts
and Regulations, without being confined to any particular area of law.

15
State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari (1961 AIR 221, 1961 SCR (1) 728),
16
State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955 AIR 84, 1955 SCR (1) 893)
  In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. 17S.C held that
when a general and special statute conflict, the special statute prevails.

4. Classification Based on Nature Mandatory Statute

 Mandatory statutes must be strictly followed, and non-compliance renders actions
invalid.
 Directory statutes serve as guidelines, and non-compliance does not invalidate
actions.
Justification with Case Law
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, is a mandatory statute, as its rules of interpretation
are binding unless a specific statute expressly excludes its application.
 In State of W.B. v. Union of India 18S.C ruled that courts must apply the General
Clauses Act unless a statute explicitly excludes it.

5. Classification Based on Content Adjective (Procedural) Statute

 Substantive statutes define rights, duties, liabilities, and legal relationships.
 Adjective (procedural) statutes prescribe the methods and processes for enforcing
substantive rights.
Justification with Case Law
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, is an adjective statute as it does not create
substantive rights or liabilities but instead lays down interpretative rules.
 In Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. 19, S.C held that the General Clauses Act
applies to procedural aspects of law and does not confer substantive rights.

MODE OF COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACT

Section 3(13) defines "commencement" as the exact date when an Act becomes legally
effective, establishing rights, liabilities, and obligations under that statute. If an Act specifies
its commencement date, that date applies. However, if no commencement date is
mentioned, Section 5 provides that the Act shall take effect on the day it receives the
President’s assent.

Types of Commencement of an Act

(A) Commencement on a Specified Date

17
J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1961 AIR 1170, 1961 SCR (3) 185),
18
State of W.B. v. Union of India (1964 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371),
19
Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999 AIR 1090, 1999 SCC (3) 1)
  Some statutes explicitly state the exact date they take effect.
 Example The General Clauses Act, 1897, under Section 1(3), came into force on 11th
March 1897.
 Judicial Precedent In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh 20, S.C held that if an Act
specifies its commencement date, no further interpretation is required.
(B) Commencement by Government Notification
 Certain Acts provide that they shall come into force on a date notified by the
government.
 Until the government issues a formal notification, the Act remains dormant.
(C) Commencement on the Date of Enactment (Assent-based Commencement)
 If an Act does not mention a commencement date or does not require notification, it
takes effect on the date it receives the President’s assent.
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, commenced on 11th March 1897, as provided
under Section 1(3), meaning no separate notification was required.
 Section 5 clarifies that an Act comes into force either on its specified date or, if silent,
upon receiving presidential assent.
 Section 6 ensures that repealing a law does not affect pre-existing rights, liabilities, or
legal proceedings, unless the new law expressly states otherwise.
 The General Clauses Act, 1897, was enacted during British rule and originally
published with a clear commencement date 11th March 1897. However, modern legal
publications often omit preambles and enacting clauses, focusing only on substantive
provisions, which is why the commencement date may not always be visible in recent
versions of the Act.

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT,

1897
The provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, particularly its definitions, apply not only to
the interpretation of the Act itself but also to all Central Acts and Regulations enacted after its
commencement. This ensures uniformity and consistency in statutory interpretation,
preventing ambiguity and redundancy in legal language. 21 These definitions are intended to
maintain consistency and clarity in statutory interpretation, ensuring that legal provisions are
uniformly applied across various statutes. When a statute delegates powers or functions to the
State Government, any statutory provisions, including notifications issued by the President of
India, must be interpreted in accordance with the principles established under the General
Clauses Act, unless the specific statute indicates otherwise.22

20
In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955 AIR 84, 1955 SCR (1) 893)
21
State of Orissa v Gangadhar Subudhi (1966) 32 Cut LT 383, 387
22
Shinghara Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1971 P&H 246, 1971 Cr LJ 966.
As a general rule, terms defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, carry the same meaning in
all subsequent legislations that use those terms, unless the context of a specific statute
requires a different interpretation or the enactment expressly provides an alternative
definition. This ensures consistency in statutory language while allowing flexibility when a
particular law necessitates a distinct meaning.23. However, the General Clauses Act, 1897,
does not apply to provincial or state legislation. For example, it is inapplicable to the Bombay
Abkari Act, as that law was enacted by the Governor of Bombay in Council as a provincial
statute. Similarly, its definitions do not extend to the Government of India Act, 1935, since it
was passed by the British Parliament and does not fall within the scope of a Central Act or
Regulation under the General Clauses Act.24
Furthermore, the definitions in the General Clauses Act, 1897, are solely meant for
interpreting statutory provisions and do not apply to private contracts or personal
communications. Courts have also clarified that Section 3 of the Act does not extend to the
Government of India Act, 1935, as it does not qualify as a Central Act or Central
Regulation under the scope of this legislation.25.

Analysis of the Definitions Under the General Clauses Act, 1897

1. "Abet" – Section 3(1)26
Type of Definition Interpretative Definition
ANALYSIS
This definition ensures that when an act criminalizes certain conduct, it also extends liability
to those who aid, instigate, or encourage the offense. This is particularly important in
conspiracy laws and offenses that require participation from multiple parties.
The definition does not differentiate between direct and indirect abetment, leaving ambiguity
regarding passive encouragement (such as remaining silent when an offense is being
planned). It does not clarify whether mere presence at the scene of a crime constitutes
abetment .
Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab27– S.C clarified that abetment includes both active
encouragement and passive facilitation.
2. "Act" – Section 3(2)28
Type of Definition Formal Definition
ANALYSIS

23
amanathan Chettiar v Somasundaram Chettiar AIR 1964 Mad 527. 11
24
Province of Bengal v SL Puri 51 CWN 753.
25
Province of Bengal v SL. Puri 51 CWN 753-54.
26
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(1)
27
Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996 AIR 946, 1996 SCC (2) 648)
28
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(2)
 This definition ensures that whenever a statute refers to an "Act," it is understood to mean a
Central Act unless specified otherwise. This removes ambiguities regarding whether the term
includes state legislations.
State laws and ordinances are excluded, leading to interpretation issues in cases where State
laws are similar to Central Acts. The definition does not specify whether constitutional
amendments qualify as "Acts ."
State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari 29– Held that State laws cannot be interpreted using the
General Clauses Act unless explicitly mentioned
3. "Affidavit" – Section 3(3)30
Type of Definition Formal Definition
Justification
The definition ensures legal reliability in court proceedings by requiring affidavits to be
officially sworn and verified.
K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy31– S.C ruled that affidavits must comply with procedural
laws and cannot be treated as conclusive evidence unless examined properly.
Does not recognize electronic affidavits, despite the increasing use of digital notarization
under the Information Technology Act, 2000. Oral affirmations are excluded, even though
they are sometimes accepted in legal proceedings .
4. "Barrister" – Section 3(4)32
Type of Definition Technical Definition
Justification
The definition was necessary in colonial India, where British-trained legal practitioners were
distinguished from local lawyers.
In R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma , 33S.C ruled that the term "barrister" is obsolete
in Indian legal practice under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Legally irrelevant in modern Indian law, as the Advocates Act, 1961, replaced the
classification of legal practitioners. The term does not apply to Indian lawyers, making it
redundant in contemporary statutes .
5. "British India" – Section 3(5)34
Type of Definition Declarative Definition
Justification

29
State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari (1961 AIR 221, 1961 SCR (1) 728)
30
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(3)
31
K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011 11 SCC 275)
32
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(4)
33
R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma (2000 7 SCC 264),
34
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(5)
 The definition was included to distinguish between areas governed by British law and
territories under princely rule before India’s independence.
In State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, 35S.C ruled that post-independence, the
term "British India" has no legal relevance.
Legally obsolete after India’s independence, as the Constitution of India replaced colonial
classifications. Any reference to "British India" today is interpreted as referring to the
Republic of India.
6. "Central Act" – Section 3(7)36
Type of Definition Formal Definition
Justification
This prevents confusion between State and Central legislations and ensures that when a law
refers to a Central Act, it means a law passed by Parliament.
Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon 37– The Court clarified that Central Acts derive
their authority from the Constitution and cannot be questioned based on legislative
competence.
Definition does not specify whether constitutional amendments fall under "Central Acts.
Does not clarify the status of pre-independence laws still in force.

7. "Central Government" – Section 3(8)38

Type of Definition Declarative Definition
Justification
The definition ensures uniform interpretation of executive power in statutory provisions,
preventing confusion about whether a particular department, ministry, or official action
represents the Central Government.
Judicial Interpretation
Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty 39– S.C ruled that for statutory
interpretation, the Central Government includes its authorized officers acting in an official
capacity.
Ambiguity in delegation of power – The definition does not clarify whether an autonomous
body or a PSU is part of the "Central Government. “Judicial challenges in taxation and
regulatory cases, where companies question whether a regulatory authority’s decision
represents government policy.

35
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957 AIR 699, 1957 SCR 874),
36
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(7)
37
Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon (1972 AIR 1061, 1972 SCR (2) 33)
38
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(8)
39
Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty (1962 AIR 316, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 371)
8. "Colony" – Section 3(10)40
Type of Definition Historical Definition (Now Obsolete)
Justification
The definition was originally included to distinguish colonial possessions from the British-
ruled territories in India. Post-independence, courts have consistently ruled that this definition
is obsolete and does not apply to Indian territories. Has no legal relevance after India's
independence in 1947. Any reference to "colony" in modern statutes is ignored or replaced
with "Union Territory" or "Indian territory. "
9. "Commencement" – Section 3(13)41
Type of Definition Declarative Definition
Justification
This definition ensures clarity regarding when a law begins to apply, preventing disputes
over retroactive application of statutes. Does not clarify the effect of partial commencement
(i.e., when different sections of an Act come into force on different dates).No reference to
digital publication – The Act assumes publication in the Gazette but does not account for
online notifications or digital law enforcement.
10. "Debt" – Section 3(14)42
Type of Definition Interpretative Definition
justification
This ensures that all financial liabilities are covered under a single definition, whether due
immediately or payable later.  Fails to distinguish between secured and unsecured debts,
which has led to disputes in bankruptcy and insolvency cases. Ambiguous about penalties and
fines – Courts have debated whether statutory fines can be treated as debts under this
provision.

11. "District Judge" – Section 3(17)43

Type of Definition Formal Definition
Justification
The definition ensures clarity in judicial hierarchy, particularly when laws assign specific
powers or responsibilities to District Judges. Does not clarify whether an Additional District
Judge (ADJ) is included – Some laws grant separate powers to ADJs, creating ambiguity.
Lack of flexibility in evolving judicial roles – With the introduction of fast-track courts and
special courts, the rigid definition of "District Judge" has created interpretative challenges.

40
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(10)
41
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(13)
42
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(14)
43
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(17)
12. "Document" – Section 3(18)44
Type of Definition Inclusive Definition
Justification
The definition adapts to technological advancements, ensuring that electronic documents are
treated on par with physical documents. Does not explicitly mention blockchain records,
artificial intelligence-generated documents, or smart contracts, which are now relevant in
digital law. Ambiguity regarding private vs. public documents – Courts have debated whether
self-created digital records can be considered reliable evidence
13. "Enactment" – Section 3(19)45
Type of Definition Formal Definition
Justification
This ensures uniform interpretation of legislative provisions, distinguishing between
legislations that are merely passed vs. those that are actively in force. Does not differentiate
between permanent and temporary enactments, leading to confusion in ordinances and
emergency law
14. "Father" – Section 3(20)46
Type of Definition Declarative Definition
Justification
The inclusion of adoptive fathers ensures that rights and obligations under family law,
succession law, and guardianship statutes extend to legally adopted children, maintaining
consistency in statutory interpretation. Does not include stepfathers, leading to ambiguity in
inheritance and guardianship cases. No distinction between different personal laws, which
may have varying interpretations of adoption.
15. "Financial Year" – Section 3(21)47
Type of Definition Declarative Definition
This standardized financial calendar ensures uniform accounting periods across government
and corporate sectors, preventing inconsistencies in taxation, financial reporting, and
budgeting. Fails to accommodate businesses that follow international financial years (e.g.,
January–December for multinational corporations). No provision for altering financial years
for special economic zones (SEZs) or industries with different fiscal cycles.
17. "Government" – Section 3(23)48
Type of Definition Inclusive Definition

44
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(18)
45
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(19)
46
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(20)
47
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(21)
48
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(23)
 This ensures uniformity in laws governing executive power, administration, and statutory
functions, preventing confusion regarding which authority is being referenced in legal
provisions. Does not specify whether autonomous bodies, commissions, and regulatory
authorities are part of the "Government. “Judicial ambiguity in taxation and labour law cases
regarding whether government-owned companies qualify as part of the State
18. "Heresy" – Section 3(24)
Type of Definition Exclusive Definition
The term was included in earlier British-era legislations to differentiate permitted religious
beliefs from legally punishable heretical practices. However, it no longer holds relevance
in the modern secular legal system. Legally obsolete – No Indian law currently penalizes
heresy as a criminal offense. Contradicts the secular nature of the Indian Constitution,
which allows freedom of religion and belief under Article 25.
19. "Immovable Property" – Section 3(26)
Type of Definition Exclusive Definition
The exclusion is meant to differentiate agricultural produce and temporary plantations
from permanent land ownership, ensuring better legal clarity in property and revenue
laws.  Exclusion of timber and crops has led to disputes over plantation estates, tea
gardens, and forestry rights. Fails to account for modern land-use changes, such as
vertical farming, hydroponics, and urban agricultural development.
20. "Judge" – Section 3(27)
Type of Definition Formal Definition
The definition establishes who qualifies as a Judge under Indian law, preventing confusion
between judicial officers and executive authorities performing quasi-judicial functions.
 Fails to cover judges in quasi-judicial roles, such as Tribunal Judges and
Adjudicating Officers in regulatory bodies. No clarity on whether acting and ad-hoc
judges fall within this definition, leading to ambiguities in service and retirement
benefits.
21. "Local Authority" – Section 3(31)
Type of Definition Inclusive Definition
The definition ensures that when statutes refer to "local authority," it is understood to include
municipalities, panchayats, improvement trusts, and other local governing bodies, preventing
ambiguity in taxation, governance, and administrative laws. Does not explicitly include
newly created statutory authorities, such as development corporations or smart city projects.
Ambiguity over whether cooperative societies with statutory backing qualify as local
authorities.

22. "Magistrate" – Section 3(32)49

49
 Type of Definition Formal Definition
 This definition ensures that references to "Magistrate" in criminal statutes are interpreted
consistently, distinguishing them from civil judges and administrative officers. No distinction
between different classes of magistrates (Executive, Judicial, Metropolitan Magistrates),
leading to confusion in overlapping jurisdictions. Fails to clarify whether Special Magistrates
appointed under special laws (e.g., environmental courts) fall within this definition.
23. "Master" – Section 3(33)50
Type of Definition Interpretative Definition
This definition clarifies maritime and admiralty laws, ensuring that only the individual with
command authority over a ship is recognized as the "Master." Excludes harbour pilots and
senior officers on board, even though they may make critical navigation decisions. Fails to
address modern maritime structures where authority is shared among multiple officers.
24. "Month" – Section 3(35)51
Type of Definition Declarative Definition
This ensures uniformity in interpreting time periods in contracts, statutes, and legal
documents, preventing disputes about whether "month" refers to a lunar or business month.
Fails to account for financial and fiscal months that operate differently in banking and
corporate sectors. No clarity on whether digital agreements using alternative calendar systems
(e.g., fiscal quarters) are affected by this definition.
25. "Moveable Property" – Section 3(36)52
Type of Definition Inclusive Definition
This definition ensures clarity in contract law, sale of goods, and taxation laws, distinguishing
landed property from other forms of assets. Fails to address whether digital assets,
cryptocurrencies, or intellectual property qualify as "moveable property." Ambiguity
regarding whether certain machinery permanently attached to the land is moveable or
immovable.
26. "Oath" – Section 3(37)53
Type of Definition Formal Definition
 This definition ensures that oaths administered in courts and official capacities have a
uniform standard, reinforcing the legal consequences of false statements under perjury laws.
Fails to include digital oaths or affirmations used in online courts and video conferencing
proceedings.
 Does not clarify whether oaths administered in non-religious ceremonies (e.g., corporate
affidavits) hold the same legal weight.

50
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(33)
51
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(35)
52
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(36)
53
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(37)
27. "Offense" – Section 3(38)54

Type of Definition Formal Definition

This provides a clear legal standard for distinguishing criminal acts from mere regulatory
violations, ensuring consistency in penal laws and procedural codes. Fails to account for new
categories of digital crimes, such as cyber fraud and AI-generated criminal activity. Does not
clarify whether administrative violations (e.g., tax defaults) qualify as "offenses" under penal
laws.

28. "Official Gazette" – Section 3(39)55

Type of Definition Formal Definition

The importance of this definition lies in the fact that many laws, notifications, and rules only
take effect upon publication in the Official Gazette. It serves as an authenticated record of
government decisions, ensuring that citizens, businesses, and courts have access to official
government actions.

One major limitation of this definition is that it does not explicitly account for modern digital
publications. In today's era, many government notifications are first published on government
websites before appearing in the Official Gazette, raising questions about their legal validity
if there is a delay in Gazette publication. Moreover, the Act does not clarify whether
notifications published solely in electronic form (without print publication) carry the same
legal force. This has led to legal disputes where individuals challenge government actions on
the ground that they were not officially notified in the prescribed format.

29. "Ordinance" – Section 3(40)56

Type of Definition Formal Definition

The definition ensures clarity regarding the temporary nature of ordinances and their legal
status. Since ordinances allow the executive to legislate in emergency situations, this
definition provides statutory legitimacy to such actions while ensuring they are subject to
legislative approval.

A significant issue with this definition is that it does not specify the impact of actions taken
under an ordinance once it lapses. There have been legal debates on whether rights, liabilities,
and administrative actions undertaken during the ordinance's validity period remain
enforceable once the ordinance ceases to exist. This has created uncertainty, particularly in
cases where government decisions based on an ordinance were challenged after its expiration.
Additionally, the definition does not explicitly mention whether ordinances can be issued for
purely administrative matters or whether they must always relate to legislative functions.

Although the definition is clear, it does not clarify whether an Act must be mandatorily
divided into Parts or whether it is optional. Some statutes use Sections and Chapters but do
not have Parts, which creates inconsistency in legal drafting. Moreover, the definition does
54
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(38)
55
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(39)
56
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(40)
 not specify whether amendments to one Part affect other Parts, leading to legal confusion in
cases where statutory amendments alter the meaning of an Act's division .

1. "Person" – Section 3(42)57

Type of Definition Inclusive Definition

This broad definition ensures that laws apply not just to individuals but also to corporate
bodies and other legal entities. It is essential in contract law, taxation, and criminal liability,
where entities other than human beings are subject to legal obligations.

One major drawback of this definition is that it does not explicitly include modern legal
entities like Artificial Intelligence systems, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
(DAOs), or crypto-based legal entities. With advancements in technology, courts may have to
determine whether AI-based decision-making systems or blockchain-powered organizations
qualify as "persons" for taxation and liability purposes. Additionally, the exclusion of Hindu
Undivided Families (HUFs) from this definition has led to legal disputes in income tax and
property succession cases.

Provision Type of Definition

Section 3(43) -Interpretative Definition
Section 3(44)- Formal Definition
Section 3(45) -Declarative Definition
Section 3(46) -Formal Definition
Section 3(47)- Formal Definition
Section 3(48) -Formal Definition
Section 3(49) -Formal Definition
Section 3(50) -Inclusive Definition
Section 3(51) -Interpretative Definition
Section 3(52) -Declarative Definition
Section 3(53) -Formal Definition
Section 3(54) -Interpretative Definition
Section 3(55) -Inclusive Definition
Section 3(56) -Formal Definition
Section 3(57) -Inclusive Definition

METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

Application of the Literal Rule in the General Clauses Act, 1897

The Literal Rule of Interpretation mandates that statutory words be given their
plain, ordinary, and grammatical meaning, even if the outcome appears unjust or
57
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 3(42)
unreasonable. Courts do not go beyond the text unless ambiguity exists, ensuring
certainty and uniformity in statutory application. Several provisions of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, have been interpreted strictly using this rule.

1. Section 3 – Definitions

Case State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar58

 This case revolved around the interpretation of "offense" under penal

laws. The accused argued for a broader interpretation, while the state
insisted on a strict application of the term.
 S.C held that statutory definitions in the General Clauses Act must be
read literally unless the specific statute states otherwise.
 The Court refused to expand the meaning of "offense" beyond its explicit
wording.

Justification

 Section 3 provides standardized definitions, which must be applied as

written rather than being interpreted flexibly.
 The Literal Rule ensures that the same term carries a uniform meaning
across all statutes, preventing inconsistencies.

Purpose of Section 3 Using the Literal Rule

 Prevents judicial overreach by prohibiting courts from expanding or

modifying statutory definitions.
 Ensures uniformity in legal interpretation across different Central Acts.
 Automatically applies definitions to new statutes unless explicitly
excluded, maintaining consistency in legal terminology.

2. Section 5 – Commencement of Acts

Case State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh59

 The Punjab government sought to enforce a law retrospectively, claiming

it was implied by legislative intent.
 The affected party challenged this, citing Section 5, which specifies that
an Act comes into force on the date mentioned, or, if no date is specified,
from the date of Presidential assent.
 S.C applied the Literal Rule, holding that an Act must be treated as
prospective unless it explicitly states otherwise.

Justification

58
State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha (1982 AIR 949, 1982 SCR (3) 121)
59
State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955 AIR 84, 1955 SCR (1) 893)
  Section 5 clearly states that an Act takes effect only from the mentioned
date or the date of assent.
 The Court ruled that no assumptions about retrospective application can
be made unless explicitly stated in the statute.

Purpose of Section 5 Using the Literal Rule

 Prevents confusion regarding the effective date of laws.

 Ensures that citizens and businesses are not subjected to retroactive laws
unless the legislature expressly provides for it.
 Reduces disputes over whether an Act applies before its official
enactment.

3. Section 6 – Effect of Repeal

Case State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co.)60

 The Maharashtra government repealed a law that had granted tax

exemptions to transport operators.
 The state argued that the benefits ceased immediately upon repeal, while
the transport company claimed protection under Section 6.
 S.C applied the Literal Rule and ruled that since the repeal did not
expressly extinguish accrued rights, the tax exemptions remained valid.

Justification

 Section 6 explicitly preserves rights, liabilities, and obligations accrued

before repeal, and courts must apply this as written.
 The Court refused to add exceptions or conditions that were not present in
the statute.

Purpose of Section 6 Using the Literal Rule

 Protects individuals and businesses from losing accrued rights due to

repeal.
 Prevents pending cases from being dismissed without resolution.
 Provides clarity to legal entities regarding the consequences of
statutory repeal.

II. Application of the Harmonious Construction Rule in the General Clauses

Act, 1897
The Harmonious Construction Rule is applied when there is an apparent conflict
between statutory provisions, ensuring that both operate together without
60
State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co. (1964 AIR 1957, 1964 SCR (7) 305)
invalidating each other. The General Clauses Act, 1897, incorporates this
principle in various sections to resolve inconsistencies in statutory language,
particularly regarding gender references, governmental authority, and procedural
rules.

1. Section 13 – Gender and Number

Case State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj)61
 A statute used the term "person" in the singular while discussing land
acquisition.
 The government argued that the law applied only to individual
landowners, while the affected party claimed it should include joint
ownership.
 S.C applied Harmonious Construction and ruled that singular includes
plural unless expressly stated otherwise, ensuring that the law applied
fairly to both individual and joint owners.
Justification
 The Harmonious Construction Rule ensured that statutory provisions did
not create unintended restrictions.
 It prevented arbitrary exclusions and ensured equal applicability to all
similarly placed individuals.
Purpose of Section 13 Using Harmonious Construction
 Prevents technical disputes in statutory interpretation concerning gender
and number.
 Ensures gender neutrality in statutes where explicit language is absent.
 Allows flexible interpretation without deviating from legislative intent.

2. Section 26 – Successive References to Government

Case R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay62
 An Anti-Corruption law was enacted when Bombay was a Part A State.
After the reorganization of states, Maharashtra was created.
 The accused argued that since Bombay no longer existed, the law was
unenforceable.
 S.C applied Harmonious Construction and held that references to
"Government of Bombay" must now be read as "Government of
61
State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj (1962 AIR 922, 1963 SCR (1) 1)
62
R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay (1984 AIR 684, 1984 SCR (2) 495)
 Maharashtra", ensuring that the law remained applicable despite political
restructuring.
Justification
 The Harmonious Construction Rule prevented laws from becoming
obsolete due to administrative or territorial changes.
 It ensured legislative continuity despite government reorganization.
Purpose of Section 26 Using Harmonious Construction
 Maintains legal continuity even when government structures change.
 Prevents administrative confusion where laws reference now-defunct
entities.
 Preserves legislative intent, ensuring that laws remain applicable without
requiring constant amendments.

3. Section 27 – Meaning of Service by Post

Case K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan63
 Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, legal notice is
required before filing a cheque bounce complaint.
 The accused claimed that since he had not personally received the notice,
the case should be dismissed.
 S.C applied Harmonious Construction and ruled that if the sender follows
legal requirements (proper addressing and postage), service is presumed
unless proven otherwise.
Justification
 Ensured that procedural formalities were not misused to evade legal
obligations.
 Clarified that deliberately avoiding notice does not exempt liability.
Purpose of Section 27 Using Harmonious Construction
 Ensures statutory notices are presumed validly delivered, reducing
unnecessary litigation.
 Prevents misuse of procedural loopholes by defendants to escape liability.
 Balances the rights of both sender and recipient, ensuring fairness in legal
proceedings.

63
: K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999 AIR 3762, 1999 SCC (7) 510)
Application of the Mischief Rule in the General Clauses Act, 1897
The Mischief Rule (Heydon’s Rule) is applied to remedy defects in the law by
identifying the mischief or problem that the statute intends to correct. Courts
analyze
1. The state of the common law before the Act.
2. The defect or mischief the statute aimed to rectify.
3. The remedy introduced by the legislature.
4. The reason for implementing that remedy.
Several provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, have been interpreted using
this rule to prevent legal loopholes and ensure legislative intent is preserved.

1. Section 8 – Construction of References to Repealed Enactments

Case Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar64
 A tax statute referenced a repealed law to impose tax liability.
 The taxpayer argued that since the old law was repealed, the reference in
the new law was meaningless, making the tax unenforceable.
 S.C applied the Mischief Rule, holding that references to repealed laws
should be interpreted as references to their successor laws.
 This interpretation prevented taxpayers from escaping liability due to
outdated statutory references.
Justification
 The mischief the legislature sought to prevent was legal uncertainty
caused by outdated statutory references.
 If Section 8 were interpreted strictly, every law would have to be amended
every time a referenced statute was repealed, leading to legislative
inefficiency.
Purpose of Section 8 Using the Mischief Rule
 Prevents statutory references from becoming obsolete when laws are
repealed.
 Ensures continuity in legal enforcement by allowing references to apply to
successor laws.
 Avoids unnecessary litigation and confusion over technical repeal issues.

64
Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (1955 AIR 661, 1955 SCR (2) 603)
2. Section 24 – Continuity of Orders Issued Under Repealed Enactments
Case Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar65
 A safety regulation issued under a repealed mining law was challenged by
an employer, arguing that since the parent law was repealed, the safety
rule also ceased to exist.
 S.C applied the Mischief Rule, ruling that rules and regulations issued
under a repealed law remain valid under the new law unless expressly
revoked.
 The Court reasoned that allowing all subordinate rules to lapse upon
repeal would create administrative chaos, which was not the legislative
intent.
Justification
 The mischief the legislature intended to prevent was the legal vacuum
caused by repealing statutes that contained essential administrative rules.
 If Section 24 were not applied, all government orders and rules under
repealed laws would immediately become ineffective, leading to
regulatory instability.
Purpose of Section 24 Using the Mischief Rule
 Ensures that executive and administrative actions taken under old laws do
not automatically become invalid upon repeal.
 Prevents disruption in governance by keeping rules, notifications, and
orders in effect until formally repealed.
 Avoids delays and inefficiencies in reissuing necessary government orders
after statutory changes.
IV. Application of Purposive Interpretation and Ejusdem Generis in the
General Clauses Act, 1897
I. Purposive Interpretation
Principle
 Courts interpret statutes based on their intended purpose, rather than
adhering strictly to their literal meaning.
 This approach is widely used in constitutional and human rights cases to
ensure fairness and legislative intent are upheld.

65
Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar (1961 AIR 838, 1961 SCR (2) 459)
Provision Section 3(42) – Definition of "Person"
Case Rashiklal & Co. v. CIT, Orissa)66
 A partnership firm argued that it should not be classified as a "person"
under tax laws, citing uncertainty in statutory definitions.
 S.C applied a purposive approach, holding that “person” must include
firms to ensure taxation laws fairly apply to business entities.
 The Court ruled that excluding non-human entities would allow
businesses to evade tax liabilities, which was contrary to legislative intent.
Justification
 A purposive interpretation was necessary to ensure businesses could not
exploit statutory gaps.
 If "person" were interpreted narrowly, corporate entities could evade legal
and financial obligations.
Purpose of Section 3(42) Using Purposive Interpretation
 Ensures that laws apply fairly to both individuals and organizations.
 Prevents businesses from exploiting statutory loopholes to evade taxation.
 Aligns statutory interpretation with legislative intent, ensuring
comprehensive tax enforcement.

II. Ejusdem Generis – Applied in Section 3(55) (Definition of "Vessel")

Principle
 When general words follow specific words in a statutory list, the general
words must be interpreted in line with the specific terms.
 This rule prevents overly broad interpretations that could extend beyond
legislative intent.

Provision Section 3(55) – Definition of "Vessel"

Case M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. 67
The dispute concerned whether a floating oil rig qualified as a "vessel" under
admiralty laws.
 S.C applied the Ejusdem Generis Rule, ruling that since the statute lists
"ships" and "boats," the definition of "vessel" should be limited to floating

66
Rashiklal & Co. v. CIT, Orissa (1995 AIR 1471, 1995 SCC (2) 607)

67
M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. (1993 AIR 1014, 1993 SCC (4) 543)
 structures used for transportation.
 The Court excluded stationary floating structures, ensuring admiralty laws
applied only to transport-related vessels.
Justification
 Prevented an excessively broad interpretation that could include floating
structures unrelated to transportation.
 Ensured that only similar types of vessels, as listed in the statute, fell
within the Act’s scope.
Purpose of Section 3(55) Using Ejusdem Generis
 Restricts the definition of "vessel" to floating objects used for transport,
preventing inclusion of unrelated structures.
 Preserves legislative intent, ensuring admiralty laws apply only to
transport-related vessels.
 Prevents ambiguity by keeping the statutory scope clear and predictable.

REPEALING CLAUSE
1. Section 268 provides for the express repeal of certain enactments listed in its
Schedule, meaning the legislature has explicitly declared that specific laws are no
longer in force. The Act itself was later repealed by the Repealing and Amending
Act, 1903, demonstrating how the legislature periodically clears outdated laws
while ensuring continuity through savings provisions.

2. Section 6 is crucial for maintaining legal stability and continuity. Applying the
Mischief Rule, courts ensure that repeals do not create unintended legal vacuums
by preserving
 Rights and obligations accrued under repealed laws.
 Legal proceedings initiated under repealed statutes.
This provision prevents governance disruptions and upholds statutory intent,
ensuring that legislative changes do not result in uncertainty or loss of vested
rights.69

3. Section 29 70
Judicial Interpretation

68
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 2
69
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 6
70
The General Clauses Act 1897, Sec 29
  S.C has upheld that when a statute grants rule-making power, it
inherently includes the power to amend or repeal rules.
 The Court also ruled that rule-making authorities can introduce changes in
response to administrative needs, provided they comply with procedural
safeguards.
However, Section 29 is not absolute—rules
 Cannot exceed the scope of the parent Act.
 Must follow the same procedural requirements as the original rule-making
process.
This provision reduces the legislative burden, ensures adaptability, and maintains
the balance between legislative and executive powers, preventing excessive
reliance on Parliament for minor regulatory modifications.

Power to Remove Difficulty Clauses – Implicit Flexibility in the Act

 The General Clauses Act does not explicitly provide for a "Power to
Remove Difficulty" clause, which is commonly found in modern
legislation.
 However, Section 29 implicitly allows flexibility, as it states that the
power to make rules includes the power to amend, vary, or repeal them.
 Additionally, Section 21 allows modifications of orders, notifications, and
rules, indirectly addressing implementation challenges.

Presumption of Constitutionality in Indian Law

The presumption of constitutionality is a well-established legal principle under
which courts assume that every statute enacted by the legislature is valid and
constitutional unless proven otherwise. The burden of proof lies on the person
challenging the law, who must demonstrate that the statute violates constitutional
provisions.
Indian courts have consistently upheld this principle, relying on constitutional law
and judicial precedent rather than any specific provision of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. This presumption ensures judicial restraint, respects legislative
authority, and prevents unnecessary invalidation of statutes. However, this
presumption is not absolute, and courts may strike down laws if they violate
fundamental rights, exceed legislative competence, or are manifestly arbitrary.