[6TH GAVELLED, MOOT COURT COMPETITION]

TEAM CODE: TC-15A

LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY, PHAGWARA, PUNJAB

6TH GAVELLED, MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

Before,

THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF UTTAM PRADESH

APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARYAVARTA

ARARARYAARYAVARTA

STATE OF UTTAM PRADESH .................................................................APPELLANT

VERSUS

KESHAV SINGH & OTHERS ................................................................... RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARYAVRATA

STATE OF UTTAM PRADESH ................................................................APPELLANT

VERSUS

ARVIND DHODIA & OTHERS ................................................................ RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HIGH COURT OF UTTAM PRADESH

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... 2

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. 4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................... 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... 10

ISSUES RAISED.................................................................................................................... 13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... 14

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................ 16

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF

EVIDENCE IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED KESHAV SINGH, RAGHAV
CHAUHAN, AND OTHERS OF THE CHARGES UNDER SECTIONS 70(1) AND 103
OF THE BNS (BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA) ACT, RELATING TO THE GANG
RAPE OF RUKMINI DEVI AND THE MURDERS OF THE FIVE MISSING
WOMEN? _____________________________________________________________ 16
[1.1] ERRONEOUS REJECTION OF FORENSIC AND DNA EVIDENCE ________________ 16
[1.2] FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ACCORDING TO SECTION 111 OF
BNS ACT, 2023 _______________________________________________________ 19
[1.3] MISAPPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASES ________________________________ 21
ISSUE 2 – WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF KESHAV, RAGHAV AND OTHERS
CONSTITUTE OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES)
ACT? _________________________________________________________________ 24
[2.1] THE ACCUSED WERE FULLY AWARE THAT RUKMINI DEVI BELONGED TO THE

SCHEDULED CASTE COMMUNITY. _________________________________________ 24

[2.2] NOTWITHSTANDING THIS KNOWLEDGE, THE ACCUSED VIOLATED MULTIPLE

PROVISIONS OF THE SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT,1989. ____________ 25

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ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE WHATSAPP MESSAGES MEET THE LEGAL

STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE REQUIRED TO
BE TREATED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT PROCEEDINGS? _________________ 29
[3.1] ADMISSIBILITY UNDER SECTION 63 OF BSA, 2023. _______________________ 29
[3.2] CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE AND CONTEXT ____________________________ 30
3.3 RELEVANCY AND CONNECTION TO THE CRIME: WHATSAPP MESSAGES AS EVIDENCE
OF CONSPIRACY AND COMMON INTENTION. _________________________________ 31

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF ARVIND DHODIA, MANU, RAJNI,

SHYAM, AND THE FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DISAPPEARED WOMEN IS
LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
PRESENTED IN THE CASE? ____________________________________________ 33
[4.1] ERRONEOUS REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE LIABILITY AND UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY

PRINCIPLES ___________________________________________________________ 34

[4.2] IMPROPER DISREGARD OF DIGITAL AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE LINKING THE

ACQUITTED INDIVIDUALS TO THE CRIME ____________________________________ 36

[4.3] MISAPPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO PROTEST, TRANSFORMATION FROM PEACEFUL

DEMONSTRATION TO VIOLENT MOB ________________________________________ 38

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 40

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION CORRESPONDING EXPANSION

¶ Paragraph

& And

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Art. Article

Govt. Government

Hon’ble Honourable

i.e., That is

Ors. Others

§ Section

v. Versus

BNS Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

BSA Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

SC/ST Act Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Amerika Rai & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2011) 4 SCC 677 ................................................. 35, 38
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 473 .................................................... 30, 33
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 ...................................................................... 39
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC .................................... 25
Asharfi v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 SCC 742 ............................................................................. 24
Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 4 SCC 127. ......................................................... 21
Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 ..................................................... 32
Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 ........................................................................... 22
Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 .............................................................................. 23
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415. ........................................................... 18
Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of UP, (2014) 5 SCC 509 ............................................................ 16
Gajraj v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2011) 10 SCC 675 .............................................................. 37
Hanumant v. State of MP, AIR 1952 SC 343. .......................................................................... 21
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1963) 2 SCR 678. ......................................... 35
Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437 .................................................................................. 35
Masalti v. State of UP, AIR 1965 SC 202 .......................................................................... 34, 38
Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 557 ....................... 24
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad v. State of J&K, (2010) 9 SCC 417 ..................................................... 20
Mohibur Rahman v. State of Assam, (2002) 6 SCC 715 ......................................................... 23
Mohibur Rahman v. State of Assam, (2002) 6 SCC 715. ........................................................ 17
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of AP, (1989) Supp (2) SCC 706. ............................................... 19
Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P., (2021) 16 SCC 225 ............................................................ 24
Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613. ................................... 19
R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471 ...................................................... 31
Rajiv Kumar v. State of UP, (2017) 11 SCC 83 ....................................................................... 19
Rajkumar v. State of MP, (2014) 5 SCC 353. .......................................................................... 17
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555 ........................................................... 34
Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar, (2006) 10 SCC 386. .................................................................. 18
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, (2012) 5 SCC 1 ................................................ 38
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of AP, (2006) 10 SCC 172 .................................... 22

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Sama Alana v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 517 ............................................................... 23

Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 66 ................................ 36
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311 .................................... 37
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 .................................... 28
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 .................................. 22
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. ................................. 18
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 .................................................................. 36
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 ............................................ 30, 31
State of Delhi v. Mohd. Afzal and others, 2003 (3) JCC 1669 ................................................ 30
State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, (2014) 5 SCC 108. ................................................................. 17
State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pradhan, (1987) 2 SCC 705 ........................................................ 21
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, (1999) 4 SCC 370 .................................................. 20
State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, (2004) 4 SCC 75 ............................................................... 28
State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213 ............................................ 38
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 ................................................................. 36
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ............................................................... 27
State of Rajasthan v. Kalu Ram, (2000) 10 SCC 324 .............................................................. 22
State of UP v. Dan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 546 .................................................................... 37, 39
State Through CBI v. Santosh Kumar Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 747. ........................................... 18
Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607 ....................................................... 38
Suresh v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 2 RLW 1039 (Raj). ........................................................ 27
Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435. .............................................................................. 26
Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 .................................. 22
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 388 ............................................... 35
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501 ........................................... 36, 39
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178. ................................................................... 18
Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178 ............................................. 30, 36
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1. ................................ 20
Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 ........................................................... 21

Statutes

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, § 175 .................................................................. 17

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 189(1). ......................................................................................... 34
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 190............................................................................................... 34
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Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 191............................................................................................... 34

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 108..................................................................................... 20
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 111 ..................................................................................... 19
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 111. .................................................................................... 20
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 120A .................................................................................. 31
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 70(1). ........................................................................... 16, 27
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 103. ........................................................................... 17
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 27 .............................................................................. 23
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 3. ............................................................................... 20
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 45 .............................................................................. 37
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 58. ............................................................................. 18
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63 .................................................................. 16, 30, 36
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63. ............................................................................. 35
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 8 ................................................................................ 31
India Const. art. 19, cl. 1(b). .................................................................................................... 38
India Const. art. 19, cl. 3 .......................................................................................................... 38
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(d). ...... 25
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(e). ...... 26
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(r). ....... 26
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(w)(ii). 28
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(zb) ..... 28
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(2)(v). ...... 24

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for the Appellants humbly submits before this Honourable High Court of Uttam
Pradesh that it has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the present matter under Article 226
of the Constitution of Aryavarta stated as below:

(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor
and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and
for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation
to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in
any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1),
without –

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for
such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court
for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose
favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of
the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the
date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the
High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards
on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order
shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand
vacated.

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(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

The present memorandum sets forth the present case’s facts, contentions, and arguments.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case unfolds in the Deshrath district of Uttam Pradesh, Aryavarta, a region plagued by
superstition and caste divisions. Village headman Keshav Singh and his friend Raghav
Chauhan, both upper-caste figures, wielded significant control over village affairs.

Between August 2023 and September 2024, five young women from SC/ST families who had
challenged the village leadership disappeared mysteriously. While police dismissed these as
elopements, the village panchayat spread rumors that Rukmini Devi, a widowed SC/ST woman
known for herbal medicine but viewed with suspicion, was practicing witchcraft and sacrificing
these women.

When clothing from a missing woman was found near Rukmini’s home, a mob led by Keshav
and Raghav dragged her out on September 20, 2024, stripped her naked, and paraded her
through the village. Medical reports later confirmed she had been brutally assaulted and gang-
raped.

Following public outrage from viral videos of the incident, police arrested Keshav, Raghav,
and others. During their trial, on November 20, the decomposed bodies of all five missing
women were discovered near Keshav’s property, revealing that the witchcraft accusations were
a cover-up.

Enraged villagers, including Arvind Dhodia (Keshav’s political rival), Rukmini, and families
of the victims, organized a protest that turned violent on November 27. They stormed the jail
and lynched the accused, except Keshav who escaped. Based on digital evidence and forensics,
60 individuals were charged with the lynching.

Surprisingly, the trial court acquitted both Keshav and Raghav (citing insufficient evidence for
the original crimes) and all 60 mob participants. The prosecution has now appealed to the High
Court of Uttam Pradesh. Here is a brief timeline of the case:

Date Event Key Details

Aug 2023 - Five women All victims aged 15-20 from SC/ST families;
Sep 2024 disappear Victims’ families had challenged Keshav and
Raghav’s authority. Police dismiss cases as
elopements. Village panchayat spreads rumors about

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Rukmini performing dark rituals; Torn clothing of

missing woman found near Rukmini’s house.

Sep 20, 2024 Attack on Rukmini Heated panchayat meeting led by Keshav and
Raghav; Mob includes both upper caste and SC/ST
groups armed with sticks, sickles, and stones.
Rukmini stripped and paraded through village.

Sep 21, 2024 Rukmini found Discovered by Rajni and Shyam near village square
and taken to the hospital. Medical reports show
brutal injuries and DNA evidence shows
involvement of 4-5 individuals. Blurred videos of
parade surface on social media.

Oct 26, 2024 Police Action FIR filed against multiple individuals including
Keshav and Raghav

Oct 27, 2024 Arrests Made Police arrest Keshav and Raghav while the villagers
attempt to prevent arrests.

Nov 20, 2024 Bodies Discovered Three decomposed bodies found in farmland near
Keshav’s house; Two more bodies recovered from
nearby pond. All bodies found without clothes;
DNA tests confirm victims’ identities.

Post- Public Response WhatsApp groups formed (“Justice for victims”,

Discovery “Justice for Rukmini”); Approximately 500
villagers, mostly women, begin peaceful protest led
by Arvind Dhodia, Rukmini, Rajni, Shyam, victims’
families.

Nov 27, 2024 Jail Break and Peaceful protest turns violent; Mob storms district
Lynching jail. Guards overwhelmed; Keshav escapes, other
accused lynched. Incident filmed and shared online;
Poor visibility in footage makes identification
difficult.

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Post- Investigation 300 suspects arrested. Evidence includes: Video

Incident clips, Cell tower data, WhatsApp messages, DNA
evidence on weapons.

Final Trial Court Proceedings Cases clubbed together. 60 individuals charged

including Arvind, Manu, Rajni, Shyam. Court
acquits Keshav and Raghav citing insufficient
evidence. Court acquits all 60 accused of lynching

This case will profoundly impact the legal landscape by testing the judiciary’s ability to balance
formal justice with social realities. It challenges the nation to confront deep-rooted issues of
caste violence, gender-based crimes, and mob justice while determining where accountability
truly lies when institutional systems fail marginalized communities. The verdict may establish
crucial precedents for addressing systemic discrimination and vigilante responses to perceived
injustice.

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ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE IN ACQUITTING THE

ACCUSED KESHAV SINGH, RAGHAV CHAUHAN, AND OTHERS OF THE CHARGES UNDER SECTIONS
70(1) AND 103 OF THE BNS (BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA) ACT, RELATING TO THE GANG RAPE OF
RUKMINI DEVI AND THE MURDERS OF THE FIVE MISSING WOMEN?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF KESHAV, RAGAV AND OTHERS CONSTITUTE OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST
(PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE WHATSAPP MESSAGES MEET THE LEGAL STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND

EVIDENTIARY VALUE REQUIRED TO BE TREATED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT PROCEEDINGS?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF ARVIND DHODIA, MANU, RAJNI, SHYAM, AND THE FAMILY

MEMBERS OF THE DISAPPEARED WOMEN IS LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND

CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED IN THE CASE?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

[ISSUE 1]: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE IN

ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED KESHAV SINGH, RAGHAV CHAUHAN, AND OTHERS OF THE

CHARGES UNDER SECTIONS 70(1) AND 103 OF THE BNS (BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA) ACT,
RELATING TO THE GANG RAPE OF RUKMINI DEVI AND THE MURDERS OF THE FIVE MISSING
WOMEN?

It is humbly submitted that the trial court’s acquittal of the accused was based on erroneous
rejection of forensic and DNA evidence, failure to recognize a criminal conspiracy, and
misapplication of the standard of proof in circumstantial evidence cases. The trial court
improperly dismissed DNA evidence conclusively linking the accused to the crimes despite
statutory provisions emphasizing its primacy. The presence of multiple DNA samples from the
accused on the victim, Rukmini Devi, was overlooked, contradicting established legal
precedents favoring scientific evidence. Furthermore, the systematic targeting of women from
dissenting SC/ST families over a specific period demonstrated a pattern of coordinated criminal
behavior. False allegations of witchcraft were used strategically to divert suspicion from the
true perpetrators, indicating a conspiracy. Additionally, the trial court set an unjustifiably high
standard for circumstantial evidence, disregarding the comprehensive chain of events
connecting the accused to the crime. DNA evidence, forensic findings, and the discovery of
bodies near the accused’s residence collectively established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[ISSUE 2]: WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF KESHAV, RAGAV AND OTHERS CONSTITUTE OFFENCES
UNDER SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT?

It is humbly submitted that the accused knowingly targeted Rukmini Devi, an SC community
member, committing multiple offenses under the SC/ST Act. These included parading her
naked in violation of Section 3(1)(d), forcing her into humiliating acts violating Section 3(1)(e),
and publicly insulting her under Section 3(1)(r). The accused further committed acts of sexual
nature and made derogatory gestures towards her, falling under Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and (ii).
The false witchcraft allegations, intended to cause mental agony and physical harm, violated
Section 3(1)(zb) of the Act.

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[ISSUE 3]: WHETHER THE WHATSAPP MESSAGES MEET THE LEGAL STANDARDS OF

ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE REQUIRED TO BE TREATED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT

PROCEEDINGS?

It is humbly submitted that the WhatsApp messages in this case were admissible and
demonstrated the accused’s conspiracy and shared intent. Certified under Section 63 of the
BSA, 2023, the messages were collected following proper chain of custody protocols. Digital
forensic analysis confirmed the authenticity and relevance of the messages, which revealed
planning and coordination by the accused.

[ISSUE 4]: WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF ARVIND DHODIA, MANU, RAJNI, SHYAM, AND THE
FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DISAPPEARED WOMEN IS LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE BASED ON THE

EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED IN THE CASE?

It is humbly submitted that the acquittal of several individuals involved in the violence was
unjustified due to the rejection of collective liability principles. The trial court wrongly
demanded direct evidence against each individual, ignoring well-established principles holding
all members of an unlawful assembly jointly liable. Additionally, DNA traces on weapons,
digital records of WhatsApp discussions, and video footage collectively demonstrated their
participation. Respondents also failed to dissociate from the assembly once violence began,
aligning them with the common object of the mob.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF

EVIDENCE IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED KESHAV SINGH, RAGHAV
CHAUHAN, AND OTHERS OF THE CHARGES UNDER SECTIONS 70(1) AND 103
OF THE BNS (BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA) ACT, RELATING TO THE GANG
RAPE OF RUKMINI DEVI AND THE MURDERS OF THE FIVE MISSING WOMEN?

¶ 1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the trial court gravely erred in its
appreciation of crucial scientific evidence, specifically the forensic and DNA evidence that
established direct links between the accused persons and the crimes committed. The rejection
of such objective, scientific evidence in Favor of unreliable oral testimony and politically
motivated defenses constitutes a significant miscarriage of justice.

¶ 2. Thus, it is submitted that [1.1] Erroneous rejection of forensic and DNA evidence; [1.2]
Failure to recognize criminal conspiracy according to section 111 of BNS Act, 2023; [1.3]
Misapplication of the standard of proof in circumstantial evidence cases.

[1.1] ERRONEOUS REJECTION OF FORENSIC AND DNA EVIDENCE

¶ 3. It is humbly submitted [1.1.1] The trial court incorrectly dismissed conclusive DNA
evidence linking the accused to the rape of Rukmini Devi; [1.1.2] The trial court failed to give
due weight to forensic evidence connecting the accused to the murder of the five women;
[1.1.3] The legal precedents mandate primacy of scientific evidence over oral testimony in
cases involving serious offenses.

[1.1.1] The trial court incorrectly dismissed conclusive DNA

evidence linking the accused to the rape of Rukmini Devi.

¶ 4. It is argued that the BNS, 2023, under Section 70(1)1, defines and prescribes punishment
for gang rape, while Section 632 of the BSA, 2023, specifically addresses the admissibility of
digital and forensic evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically affirmed the
scientific accuracy and conclusive nature of DNA evidence in establishing the guilt of the
accused3.

1
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 70(1).
2
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63.
3
Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of UP, (2014) 5 SCC 509.
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¶ 5. Additionally, the Hon’ble Court established that DNA findings cannot be rebutted through
oral evidence, emphasizing that the DNA report must be accepted unless it is significantly
challenged4.

¶ 6. In the present case, the medical examination of Rukmini Devi confirmed the presence of
semen samples containing DNA from multiple individuals, establishing the commission of
gang rape5. As confirmed in the medical examination, it was conducted as per the procedure
prescribed by law and showed that the brutal marks of injuries and presence of semen samples
confirming the presence of DNA from at least four to five individuals6.

¶ 7. Therefore, the trial court’s rejection of this evidence stands in direct contradiction to both
statutory provisions and well-established legal principles. The medical examination has
directly linked the accused to the victim, and the trial court’s dismissal of this evidence,
represents a flawed interpretation of the facts that warrants appellate review.

[1.1.2] The trial court failed to give due weight to forensic evidence
connecting the accused to the murder of the five women.

¶ 8. Section 1037 of the BNS, 2023, prescribes punishment for the offense of murder. It is
argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court established that the location of body disposal is a
crucial factor in connecting the accused to the crime, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence,
especially the disposal of victims’ bodies in locations tied to the accused, forms a vital and
irrefutable link in the chain of evidence8.

¶ 9. Additionally, the Hon’ble Court emphasized that scientific evidence should be afforded
primacy over oral testimony, stating that the investigating officer and the court must carefully
evaluate scientific evidence, such as DNA samples, fingerprints, and other forensic findings,
and accord them due weight in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused9. Furthermore,
Section 17510 of the BNSS, 2023 mandates the adherence to proper investigative procedures,
ensuring that the chain of custody is preserved and forensic evidence is properly validated.

4
Rajkumar v. State of MP, (2014) 5 SCC 353.
5
Moot Proposition, ¶ 6.
6
Moot Clarifications, ¶ 1.
7
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 103.
8
Mohibur Rahman v. State of Assam, (2002) 6 SCC 715.
9
State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, (2014) 5 SCC 108.
10
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, § 175.
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¶ 10. In the present case, the discovery of decomposed bodies near Keshav Singh’s residence,
with subsequent DNA analysis confirming their identities as the missing women, directly links
the accused to the crime11. This creates a powerful presumption of their culpability, which the
accused has failed to counter with any plausible explanation. Therefore, this compelling
evidence, which strongly substantiates the guilt of the accused, was wrongly dismissed by the
trial court despite its conclusive nature.

[1.1.3] Legal precedents mandate the primacy of scientific evidence

over oral testimony in cases involving serious offenses

¶ 11. Section 5812 of the BSA, 2023 accords special weight to expert testimony, including
forensic reports. The Hon’ble Court has highlighted the critical role of scientific evidence in
contemporary criminal jurisprudence13. The court has emphasized that when scientific
evidence is available, courts should not hesitate to rely on it, preferring it over testimonial
evidence, which may be tutored or prone to human fallibility14.

¶ 12. It is argued that if the circumstantial evidence is conclusive and forms a complete chain
of custody, it is considered sufficient for conviction as laid out by the court in the five-step test
(Panchsheel Test) for evaluating such evidence15. Furthermore, this Hon’ble Court has the
power to overturn an acquittal if the trial court had wrongly discarded the scientific evidence
which conclusively established the involvement of the accused16. The appellate court has the
power to reappreciate evidence when trial courts misinterpret it17.

¶ 13. In the present case, forensic reports18 were duly certified under Section 63 of the BSA,
2023, affirming their admissibility and evidential value. The trial court’s dismissal of such
appropriately certified evidence constitutes a significant error in judicial assessment.
According to the Panchsheel Test, Keshav and Raghav orchestrated crimes to silence dissent,
evidenced by the victims’ bodies found near Keshav’s property and DNA linking them to the
murders19. The events form a conclusive chain with no plausible alternative hypothesis,
establishing their guilt.

11
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
12
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 58.
13
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178.
14
Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar, (2006) 10 SCC 386.
15
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116.
16
State Through CBI v. Santosh Kumar Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 747.
17
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415.
18
Moot Clarifications, ¶ 6.
19
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8; Moot Proposition, ¶ 9.
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¶ 14. Therefore, it is submitted that the trial court committed a grave error in disregarding
conclusive scientific evidence that establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.

[1.2] FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ACCORDING TO SECTION 111 OF BNS

ACT, 2023

¶ 15. It is humbly submitted [1.2.1] The systematic pattern of crimes establishes the existence
of a criminal conspiracy; [1.2.2] The false witchcraft allegations against Rukmini Devi were
strategically orchestrated to deflect suspicion; [1.2.3] The trial court failed to apply established
legal principles for inferring conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.

[1.2.1] The systematic pattern of crimes establishes the existence of

a criminal conspiracy

¶ 16. Section 11120 of the BNS, 2023, defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement between
two or more persons to commit an illegal act. The provision explicitly recognizes that
conspiracy need not be proven through direct evidence, but can be inferred from the conduct
of the parties involved and the surrounding circumstances. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, especially when the acts of
the different accused persons are so connected with each other by timing and sequence as to
rule out any reasonable possibility except the existence of a preconceived plan21.

¶ 17. It is argued that the court has observed that the meeting of minds, the consensus to effect
an unlawful design may be reached by simultaneity of thoughts; criminal sharing, schematizing
by persons with common intention in carrying out the illegal act22. Furthermore, the Court held
that a pattern of conduct can establish systematic criminal behaviour23.

¶ 18. In the present case, the disappearance of five women over a specific period (August 2023
to September 2024), all of whom belonged to SC/ST families that had recently challenged the
authority of Keshav Singh and Raghav Chauhan in panchayat meetings, strongly indicates a
systematic pattern of targeted victimization24. This pattern cannot be dismissed as coincidental,
but rather points to a premeditated conspiracy aimed at silencing dissent.

20
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 111.
21
Rajiv Kumar v. State of UP, (2017) 11 SCC 83.
22
Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613.
23
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of AP, (1989) Supp (2) SCC 706.
24
Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
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¶ 19. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the above pointers accurately describe the conduct
of Keshav Singh and Raghav Chauhan, who shared a common intention to silence opposition
to their authority by systematically targeting women from dissenting families.

[1.2.2] The false witchcraft allegations against Rukmini Devi were

strategically orchestrated to deflect suspicion

¶ 20. Section 10825 of the BNS, 2023, addresses the liability of an abettor when the act abetted
is committed in a different manner than intended. Furthermore, Section 11126 of the BNS, 2023
recognizes that conspiracy may involve not only the commission of the main offense but also
acts done to further the conspiracy, including the creation of diversionary narratives.

¶ 21. It is argued that the Hon’ble Court recognized that acts of diversion or deflection of
suspicion can constitute strong circumstantial evidence of guilt27. The Supreme Court has held
that the fabrication of false evidence and attempts to mislead the court are serious factors that
can be considered as evidence of guilt28. Additionally, the essence of conspiracy is the
agreement to commit an illegal act, and parties may join the conspiracy at any time; the
agreement need not be expressed but can be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of
the accused29.

¶ 22. In the present case, the false accusations of witchcraft against Rukmini Devi, orchestrated
by the village panchayat led by Keshav Singh30, were a calculated strategy to divert attention
from the real perpetrators of the disappearances. The accused, by falsely implicating Rukmini
Devi and deliberately spreading witchcraft rumours, abetted the subsequent atrocities
committed against her. The subsequent discovery of the bodies near Keshav Singh’s property31
confirms that these allegations were deliberately fabricated to shield the actual culprits.

[1.2.3] The trial court failed to apply established legal principles for
inferring conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.

¶ 23. Section 332 of the BSA, 2023, recognizes that facts, which may not directly prove the
main fact but establish a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the main fact can

25
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 108.
26
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 111.
27
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad v. State of J&K, (2010) 9 SCC 417.
28
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, (1999) 4 SCC 370.
29
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1.
30
Moot Proposition, ¶ 4.
31
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8; Moot Proposition, ¶ 9.
32
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 3.
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be reasonably inferred, constitute admissible and relevant evidence. It is argued that the
Supreme Court observed that it is difficult to get direct evidence in a case of conspiracy as the
conspiracy generally takes place in secrecy33.

¶ 24. The circumstantial evidence in the form of various acts of the accused persons
complimenting each other to reach the intended object of the conspiracy is admissible to
establish both the criminal acts and criminal responsibility34. Additionally, the court has held
that where the accused persons are alleged to have committed several criminal acts in
furtherance of a conspiracy, the court must consider the cumulative effect of the proved
circumstances to determine whether they unerringly point to the guilt of the accused35.
Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain leading to the accused’s guilt, according
to the five-pronged test36.

¶ 25. In the present case, that the trial court erred in requiring direct evidence of conspiracy,
disregarding well-established legal principles that allow conspiracy to be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. The circumstances form an unbroken chain: (i) the victims were from
families that opposed Keshav Singh and Raghav Chauhan; (ii) false allegations were spread
against Rukmini Devi; (iii) bodies were discovered near Keshav Singh’s property; (iv) DNA
evidence confirmed the identities of the victims. This chain clearly establishes the conspiracy.
The trial court failed to consider the cumulative effect of all circumstances, focusing instead
on isolated aspects of the evidence. Therefore, it is submitted that the trial court’s failure to
recognize the criminal conspiracy despite overwhelming circumstantial evidence constitutes a
serious miscarriage of justice.

[1.3] MISAPPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE CASES

¶ 26. It is humbly submitted [1.3.1] The trial court erroneously set an excessively high standard
for circumstantial evidence; [1.3.2] The circumstantial evidence in this case forms a complete
chain sufficient for conviction; [1.3.3] The trial court failed to properly appreciate the
evidentiary value of the discovery of bodies near the accused’s property.

33
Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195.
34
State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pradhan, (1987) 2 SCC 705.
35
Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 4 SCC 127.
36
Hanumant v. State of MP, AIR 1952 SC 343.
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[1.3.1] The trial court erroneously set an excessively high standard

for circumstantial evidence

¶ 27. It is argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that circumstantial evidence, when
forming a complete and unbroken chain, can serve as the sole basis for conviction37. It is
explicitly recognized that in cases where direct evidence is not available, a conviction can be
based solely on circumstantial evidence, particularly in cases involving criminal conspiracy38.
It is well settled that where direct evidence is not available to prove the factum of conspiracy,
it may be proved by circumstantial evidence39.

¶ 28. In the present case, the trial court erred in requiring direct evidence in a case where
eyewitness testimony is naturally precluded by the nature of the crime, reflecting a fundamental
misunderstanding of this well-established legal principle. The trial court’s disregard for these
settled principles regarding circumstantial evidence constitutes a grave legal error, warranting
reversal.

[1.3.2] The circumstantial evidence in this case forms a complete

chain sufficient for conviction

¶ 29. It is argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where a case rests squarely on
circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused40. It is
a well-recognized principle that the courts should not expect rigid consistency and exactitude
in matters of evidence when the crimes are committed in secrecy41.

¶ 30. In this case, the following circumstances form an unbroken chain pointing to the guilt of
the accused: (i) Five women from SC/ST families who had challenged the authority of Keshav
and Raghav mysteriously disappeared; (ii) The disappearances occurred systematically
between August 2023 and September 2024; (iii) The missing women’s decomposed bodies
were found near Keshav Singh’s property, DNA evidence confirmed the identities of the
victims as the missing women (iv) The accused fabricated witchcraft allegations against
Rukmini Devi to divert attention from their crimes (v) Medical reports confirmed brutal injuries
on Rukmini Devi and the presence of semen samples from multiple individuals. Therefore, the

37
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116.
38
Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45.
39
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of AP, (2006) 10 SCC 172.
40
Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156.
41
State of Rajasthan v. Kalu Ram, (2000) 10 SCC 324.
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circumstances listed above, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused are guilty of the offenses charged.

[1.3.3] The trial court failed to properly appreciate the evidentiary

value of the discovery of bodies near the accused’s property

¶ 31. It has been recognized that the location of body disposal can be crucial in linking the
accused to the crime42. Additionally, the Court held that the recovery of the dead body at the
instance of the accused is a relevant fact43 under Section 2744 of the BSA, 2023.

¶ 32. It is argued that when the accused fails to explain how the deceased’s body came to be at
a particular location associated with them, it constitutes a significant incriminating
circumstance45. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in circumstantial evidence, motive plays
a vital link in completing the chain46. Furthermore, as per Section 106 of the BSA, 2023, when
facts are especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden of proving those facts lies
upon him.

¶ 33. In the present case, it is submitted that the discovery of five decomposed bodies on or
near property connected to Keshav Singh constitutes highly incriminating evidence. The
discovery was not coincidental but resulted from dogs acting strangely and digging in farmland
near Keshav Singh’s house, followed by farmers noticing a strong foul odour47. The subsequent
discovery of two more bodies from a nearby pond further strengthens the connection between
the accused and the crime48.

¶ 34. Furthermore, the accused have failed to provide any plausible explanation for the presence
of the victims’ bodies near Keshav Singh’s property, thereby strengthening the appellants’ case.
The accused had a clear motive to silence the victims, as all of them came from families that
had recently challenged the authority of Keshav Singh and Raghav Chauhan in panchayat
meetings49. Therefore, the trial court grossly undervalued the significant evidentiary weight of
the discovery of the victims’ bodies near Keshav Singh’s property.

42
Mohibur Rahman v. State of Assam, (2002) 6 SCC 715.
43
Sama Alana v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 517.
44
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 27.
45
Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45.
46
Vikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 306.
47
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
48
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8; Moot Proposition, ¶ 9.
49
Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
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¶ 35. [CONCLUSION TO ISSUE 1]: The trial court’s dismissal of crucial forensic and DNA
evidence, failure to recognize the clear pattern of criminal conspiracy, and misapplication of
the standard of proof in circumstantial evidence cases collectively resulted in a grave
miscarriage of justice. The DNA evidence conclusively linked the accused to the crimes, and
the systematic targeting of SC/ST families established a clear conspiracy. The discovery of
victims’ bodies near the accused’s property further strengthened the case. Given these facts, the
trial court’s decision must be overturned in accordance with established legal principles and
evidentiary standards.

ISSUE 2 – WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF KESHAV, RAGHAV AND OTHERS

CONSTITUTE OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT?

¶ 36. It respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the actions of the accused
constitute offenses under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, based on two primary
arguments that [2.1.1] The accused were fully aware that Rukmini Devi belonged to the
Scheduled Caste community; [2.1.2] Notwithstanding this knowledge, the accused violated
multiple provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

[2.1] THE ACCUSED WERE FULLY AWARE THAT RUKMINI DEVI BELONGED TO THE SCHEDULED
CASTE COMMUNITY.

¶ 37. It has been argued that Section 3(2)(v)50 of the SC/ST Act, 1989 was amended by the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015,
which came into effect on 26-1-201651. The words “on the ground of” under Section 3(2)(v)
have been substituted with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe52.” Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the accused that the person
upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the
charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act53.

¶ 38. Furthermore, The Supreme Court has held that with reference to Section 3(2)(v) of the
Act that to attract the provisions of the said section the sine qua non is that the victim should
be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under

50
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(2)(v).
51
Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P., (2021) 16 SCC 225.
52
Asharfi v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 SCC 742.
53
Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 557.
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the Penal Code, 1860 (now, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) is committed against him on the
basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Schedule Tribe54.

¶ 39. In the present case, it is established that the accused were well aware that Rukmini Devi
belonged to the SC community for several reasons: they resided in the same village, which is
a close-knit unit where individuals are commonly aware of each other’s caste55; she was known
in the village as a member of the SC/ST community, a widow living at the outskirts of the
village, and practicing herbal medicine and natural remedies56.

¶ 40. Therefore, Keshav, Raghav, and the other villagers were fully aware that the woman
belonged to the SC/ST community, yet they deliberately proceeded to commit heinous offenses
against her, thereby contravening the provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989.

[2.2] NOTWITHSTANDING THIS KNOWLEDGE, THE ACCUSED VIOLATED MULTIPLE PROVISIONS

OF THE SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT,1989.

¶ 41. It is submitted that the argument is substantiated by [2.2.1] That the accused is liable
under Section 3(1)(d) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; [2.2.2] That the accused is liable
under Section 3(1)(e) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; [2.2.3]That the accused is liable
under Section 3(1)(r) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; [2.2.4] That the accused is liable
under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; [2.2.5] That the accused is
liable under Section 3(1)(w)(ii) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; [2.2.6] That the
accused is liable under Section 3(1)(zb) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

[2.2.1] That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(d) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 42. Section 3(1)(d)57 of the Act reads (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe; (d) garlands with footwear or parades naked or semi-naked a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

¶ 43. In this present case, Keshav, Raghav, and the other villagers, fully aware that the woman
belonged to the Scheduled Caste community, callously proceeded to commit heinous offenses

54
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC .
55
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2.
56
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2.
57
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(d).
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against her, demonstrating a blatant disregard for her dignity and violating the core provisions
of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act58. They gathered local political leaders and a mob
of villagers and manipulated them to believe that Rukmini Devi caused the disappearances of
the 5 women59. Even the village panchayat fuelled the villagers’ fears by spreading stories that
Rukmini was performing dark rituals and sacrificing young women to increase her powers,
then dragged her out of her home and despite her cries of innocence, stripped her naked and
paraded through the village streets60. The accused exploited their power by inciting violence
against the victim and falsely accusing Rukmini Devi to protect themselves. Therefore, they
must be convicted under Section 3(1)(d) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

[2.2.2] That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(e) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 44. Section 3(1)(e)61 of the Act reads (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe; (e) forcibly commits on a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe any act, such as removing clothes from the person, forcible tonsuring of head, removing
moustaches, painting face or body or any other similar act, which is derogatory to human
dignity.

¶ 45. Keshav, Raghav, and the other villagers not only falsely accused her of being the murderer,
thereby severely harming her human dignity, but also forced her to dance and parade naked
through the village streets, which constitutes an offense under Section 3(1)(e) of the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

2.2.3 That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(r) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 46. Section 3(1)(r)62 of the Act states (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe; (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. The court has held
that an offence committed in a location visible to the public, such as a lawn outside a house
that can be seen from the road or lane, constitutes an offence committed in public view63.

58
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2.
59
Moot Proposition, ¶ 5.
60
Moot Proposition, ¶ 6.
61
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(e).
62
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(r).
63
Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435.
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¶ 47. In the present case, Keshav, Raghav, and the other villagers committed a serious act of
violence and intimidation against Rukmini Devi. They not only insulted her, but also used their
power to rape her and parade her naked through the village streets. This was a deliberate
attempt to humiliate and degrade her64. Rukmini Devi was unable to defend herself against the
large group of villagers. Their actions were intended to strip her of her dignity and assert their
power over her. Rukmini Devi was paraded naked in the village streets, which unequivocally
falls within the purview of public view. Thereby, the counsel respectfully submits before the
Hon’ble Court that these actions constitute an offense under the aforementioned section.

2.2.4 That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 48. Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the Act states (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; (w)(i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the recipient’s consent.
Section 70(1)65 of BNS, 2023 which states where a woman is raped by one or more persons
constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention. Rape is a crime that
adversely affects the prestige of the victim66.

¶ 48. In the present case, Keshav, Raghav, and other villagers were apprised of the fact that
Rukmini Devi belonged to the Scheduled Caste community. They then gathered outside her
house, dragged her out of her home, committed rape on her and finally stripped her naked and
paraded through the village streets67. They committed the offense under Section 3(w)(i) of the
Act by: (i) Intentionally touching a woman (Rukmini Devi) of a Scheduled Caste; (ii) Knowing
the fact that she belonged to a Schedule Caste; (iii) Act of touching was of sexual nature (Raped
her); (iv) There was no consent of Rukmini Devi.

¶ 49. It is humbly submitted that Keshav, Raghav, and villagers are guilty of gang rape as the
bare reading of the proposition makes it clear that the acts committed on her satisfy the above
conditions. A rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female68. Being the most hated
crime, rape is tantamount to a serious blow to the supreme honor of a woman and offends both

64
Moot Proposition, ¶ 6.
65
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 70(1).
66
Suresh v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 2 RLW 1039 (Raj).
67
Moot Proposition, ¶ 6.
68
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384.
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her esteem and dignity69. It causes psychological and physical harm to the victim, leaving upon
her indelible marks70. Thereby, the counsel most respectfully submits before the Hon’ble Court
that the actions of Keshav, Raghav, and other villagers constituted an offense under Section
3(1)(w)(i) of the Act.

2.2.5 That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(w)(ii) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 50. Section 3(1)(w)(ii)71 of the Act states (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; (ii) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature towards a woman
belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

¶ 51. In the present case, Keshav, Raghav and other villagers knew that Rukmini Devi belonged
to a Scheduled Caste and commited acts of sexual nature (rape and naked parade) on her
thereby inviting offences under the section.

2.2.6 That the accused is liable under Section 3(1)(zb) of SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 52. Section 3(1)(zb)72 of the Act states (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe; (zb) causes physical harm or mental agony of a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe on the allegation of practicing witchcraft or being a witch.

¶ 53. In the present case, Rukmini Devi was subjected to malicious rumors and accusations by
the villagers, who alleged that she was involved in occult practices, including witchcraft and
black magic73. The village panchayat perpetuated these falsehoods, fueling the villagers’ fears
by spreading unfounded stories that Rukmini Devi was performing dark rituals and sacrificing
young women to enhance her powers74.

¶ 54. Furthermore, Keshav, Raghav, and other political leaders, accompanied by a mob of
villagers, falsely accused Rukmini Devi of being responsible for the disappearance of five
women75. The allegations of practicing witchcraft were particularly distressing to her mental

69
State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, (2004) 4 SCC 75.
70
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546.
71
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(w)(ii).
72
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3(1)(zb).
73
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2.
74
Moot Proposition, ¶ 4.
75
Moot Proposition, ¶ 5.
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health, as they were entirely unfounded and misrepresented her actual practice of herbal
medicine and natural remedies. Ultimately, the mob’s actions escalated into violent brutality,
as they dragged Rukmini Devi out of her home, raped her, and paraded her naked, causing her
grievous physical and mental harm. The severity of the ordeal was evident the next day, when
she was found in an impaired condition. The counsel, supported by the aforementioned facts,
hereby submits that the actions of Keshav, Raghav, and the other villagers constitute offences
under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

¶ 54. [CONCLUSION TO ISSUE 2]: Therefore, the actions of Keshav, Raghav, and others clearly
violate multiple provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Their
exploitation of Rukmini Devi’s caste, along with the brutal physical and mental harm inflicted,
including rape, public humiliation, and false witchcraft accusations, constitutes offenses under
the Act. These acts violate her dignity and perpetuate harmful stereotypes against the SC/ST
community. Therefore, the counsel submits that the accused should be convicted under the
relevant sections of the SC/ST Act.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE WHATSAPP MESSAGES MEET THE LEGAL

STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE REQUIRED TO BE
TREATED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT PROCEEDINGS?

¶ 55. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the WhatsApp messages meet the
legal standards of admissibility and evidentiary value required to be treated as evidence in court
proceedings as they meet the requirements under Section 63 of BSA, corroborate other
evidence, and demonstrate the meeting of minds and common intention of the accused.

¶ 56. The argument is further supported by [3.1] Relevancy and Admissibility under Section
63 of BSA, 2023; [3.2] Corroborative Evidence; [3.3] Meeting of Minds and Common
Intention.

[3.1] ADMISSIBILITY UNDER SECTION 63 OF BSA, 2023.

¶ 57. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court [3.1.1] Compliance with Section 63
ensures reliability; [3.1.2] Establishes Evidentiary Foundation.

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[3.1.1] Compliance with Section 63 ensures reliability.

¶ 58. Section 6376 of BSA 2023 provides that WhatsApp messages fall under electronic records
and are admissible as evidence under this section. The Court held that electronic records are
only admissible if accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B(4) 77. The requirement of a
certificate under Section 65B is a condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic
records78. It has been established that WhatsApp texts, SMS/MMS, and other electronic
evidence are all fully admissible in Indian courts79.

¶ 59. In the present case, certification has been granted under section 63 of BSA and hence it
is admissible in the court as evidence80. Therefore, since certification has been granted in this
case, the electronic records are valid evidence in court.

[3.1.2] Chain of Custody and Authentication.

¶ 60. The Supreme Court has upheld the admissibility of electronic evidence when the chain of
custody was properly maintained81. The Court has emphasized that expert testimony can
authenticate electronic evidence, including social media messages82.

¶ 61. In the present case, the chain of custody of the WhatsApp messages has been established,
showing that they were collected, stored, and analyzed without tampering. Digital forensic
experts have testified to the authenticity of the WhatsApp messages, confirming that they were
not altered or manipulated.

[3.2] CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE AND CONTEXT

¶ 62. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that WhatsApp messages do not stand
alone. These messages can be used as corroborative evidence alongside other evidence, such
as cell tower data placing individuals at the scene, eyewitness testimonies, and DNA evidence
found on weapons. The messages can help establish the intent and planning behind the mob
lynching, especially if they contain incriminating statements or calls to action. Furthermore, it
supported by [3.2.1] Establishes Evidentiary Foundation; [3.2.2] Conduct and Motive of the
Accused.

76
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63.
77
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 473.
78
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors., 2020 7 SCC 1.
79
State of Delhi v. Mohd. Afzal and others, 2003 (3) JCC 1669.
80
Moot Clarifications, ¶6.
81
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600.
82
Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178.
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[3.2.1] Establishes Evidentiary Foundation.

¶ 63. The Court held that electronic evidence, including call records, can be used to support
other evidence in the case83. Additionally, WhatsApp messages can be used to corroborate the
prosecution’s case.

¶ 64. In the present case, even if the footage is of low quality, the Whatsapp messages can help
identify individuals involved. This can be done by matching phone numbers in the Whatsapp
group with the arrested suspects and witnesses. It would establish the presence and
participation of individuals in the planning and execution of the violence.

[3.2.2] Conduct and Motive of the Accused.

¶ 65. Section 884 of BSA, 2023 deals with the admissibility of electronic records in legal
proceedings, including messages, documents, or other forms of data that can be admissible as
evidence in courts. The Supreme Court held that evidence showing the state of mind of the
accused is admissible in the court85.

¶ 66. In the present case, the WhatsApp messages clearly show the conduct and motive of the
accused. The messages demonstrate the ill-will of the villagers towards Keshav and Raghav,
their intention to take the law into their own hands, and their knowledge of the planned
violence. Thereby, this establishes the accused’s intent to commit the crime.

3.3 RELEVANCY AND CONNECTION TO THE CRIME: WHATSAPP MESSAGES AS EVIDENCE OF

CONSPIRACY AND COMMON INTENTION.

¶ 67. It is humbly submitted that [3.3.1] Meeting of Minds within WhatsApp Groups
Demonstrates Conspiracy; [3.3.2] Presence and Participation Indicate Shared Common
Intention; [3.3.3] “Justice Served, Our Way” Demonstrates Shared Purpose and Culpability.

[3.3.1] Meeting of Minds within WhatsApp Groups Demonstrates

Conspiracy.

¶ 68. Section 120A86 of BNS, 2023 deals with criminal conspiracy – it is an agreement between
two or more persons to do something illegal or to do something legally that may cause harm or

83
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600.
84
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 8.
85
R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471.
86
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 120A.
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be unlawful. The agreement does not need to result in the commission of a crime but must be
intended to commit a crime or harm in the future.

¶ 69. In the present case, The WhatsApp groups “Justice for Victims” and “Justice for
Rukmini”87 were actively discussing frustration against the legal system and calling for direct
action, including vague plans to gather near the district jail and establish a clear link between
the online discussions and the subsequent events. This indicates a clear meeting of minds, a
critical element of criminal conspiracy.

¶ 70. The sustained dialogue, calls for action, and shared sentiments of frustration reveal a
concerted effort to subvert the legal system and exact their form of justice. This collective
intention and agreement to act unlawfully fulfils the essential requirements of criminal
conspiracy.

[3.3.2] Presence and Participation Indicate Shared Common

Intention

¶ 71. Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor88 (1925) is a landmark case which describes the
essence and applicability of section 34 IPC, it held that when two or more persons act in concert
with a common intention, they are jointly liable for the offense committed. The case clarified
the applicability of “common intention” in criminal liability.

¶ 72. In the present case, it was observed that if many persons join and act in pursuance of a
common intention, each of them would be responsible for the act as if it was done by him alone.
Messages explicitly mentioning plans to gather near the district jail show that the accused were
aware of the possibility of violence and still participated.89 Even if not all accused directly
participated in the physical act of lynching, their presence with sticks at the district jail during
the violent incident, coupled with their earlier participation in WhatsApp discussions planning
the gathering, proves their common intention.

¶ 73. The fact that the accused willingly joined a gathering where the atmosphere was charged
and the potential for violence was evident. By choosing to remain present and not disassociate
themselves from the unlawful assembly, they implicitly endorsed the actions of the mob and
shared the common intention to achieve its goal.

87
Moot problem, ¶10.
88
Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1.
89
Moot problem, ¶10.
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[3.3.3] “Justice Served, Our Way” Demonstrates Shared Purpose

and Culpability.

¶ 74. The Supreme Court has held that virtual verbal communications like WhatsApp messages
can be used as evidence to prove the meaning and content of the messages during trial through
chief witness and cross-examination90.

¶ 75. The circulation of videos with the caption “Justice Served, Our Way”91 unequivocally
demonstrates the mob’s shared purpose and collective culpability in the lynching. This
statement, disseminated widely after the incident, reveals that the perpetrators believed they
were enacting a form of justice outside the purview of the legal system. It reinforces the
existence of a pre-existing agreement and a common intention to take the law into their own
hands, thus strengthening the charges of criminal conspiracy and shared liability.

¶ 76. This phrase is not merely a spontaneous outburst but a reflection of a pre-meditated plan
to circumvent the legal process. The fact that this message was circulated demonstrates a sense
of collective accomplishment and a belief that their actions were justified.

¶ 76. [CONCLUSION TO ISSUE 3]: Therefore, the WhatsApp messages in this case meet the legal
standards of admissibility under Section 63 of BSA, 2023, and provide crucial corroborative
evidence. They establish the conspiracy, shared intention, and conduct of the accused, linking
them to the crime and supporting the charges of criminal conspiracy and mob violence.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF ARVIND DHODIA, MANU, RAJNI,

SHYAM, AND THE FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DISAPPEARED WOMEN IS
LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
PRESENTED IN THE CASE?

¶ 77. It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the trial court erred in acquitting
Arvind Dhodia, Manu, Rajni, Shyam, and the family members of the disappeared women, as
it failed to appreciate the well-established principles of collective liability and unlawful
assembly under Indian criminal law. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the accused
were part of an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing mob violence.

¶ 78. Thus, it is submitted that [4.1] Erroneous rejection of collective liability and unlawful
assembly principles; [4.2] Improper disregard of digital and forensic evidence linking the

90
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 473.
91
Moot problem, ¶11.
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acquitted individuals to the crime; [4.3] Misapplication of the right to protest, transformation
from peaceful demonstration to violent mob.

[4.1] ERRONEOUS REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE LIABILITY AND UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY

PRINCIPLES

¶ 79. It is submitted that [4.1.1] The trial court erred in demanding direct individual acts despite
the collective liability principle; [4.1.2] The presence of the accused in the violent mob
establishes their criminal liability; [4.1.3] Digital and forensic evidence corroborate their
participation.

[4.1.1] The trial court erred in demanding direct individual acts

despite the collective liability principle

¶ 80. It is argued that Section 189(1)92 of the BNS, 2023 read with Section 19093, BNS 2023
establishes that if an unlawful assembly acts with a common object, each member is vicariously
liable for the group’s acts. Section 19194 of the BNS can be interpreted in the particular to
criminalize mob lynching, making all participants liable regardless of their specific individual
acts. The Supreme Court has held that in mob violence cases, proving individual acts is
unnecessary if the common object is established95. The Court has emphasized that each member
of an unlawful assembly shares the criminal liability for acts committed in pursuit of the
common objective96.

¶ 81. In the present case, the mob had the common object of attacking persons detained in the
district jail97. The prosecution argues that all respondents were present at the protest location
and remained on-site as the mob forcibly entered the jail. Evidence, including eyewitness
accounts and digital tracking, demonstrates that they failed to distance themselves from the
mob’s violent activities98. The trial court’s insistence on direct evidence against each accused
contradicts these principles and undermines the objective of mob violence laws.

92
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 189(1).
93
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 190.
94
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 191.
95
Masalti v. State of UP, AIR 1965 SC 202.
96
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555.
97
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
98
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12; Moot Proposition ¶ 13.
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[4.1.2] The presence of the accused in the violent mob establishes

their criminal liability.

¶ 82. It is argued that the Court held that individuals who remain part of an unlawful assembly
after it turns violent are presumed to share its common object99. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that it would be virtually impossible to prosecute mob violence cases, thereby
encouraging impunity100. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has established the 5
essentials of the unlawful assembly as followed: (i) a group of five or more people, (ii) a
common object, (iii) knowledge of unlawful intent, (iv) use of force or violence, and (v) active
participation101.

¶ 83. In the present case, it is contended that all respondents were present at the protest site and
remained there as the mob stormed the jail as evidenced through eyewitness testimonies and
digital footprints proving they did not disassociate from the mob’s violent actions102. Therefore,
the accused attracts criminal liability under Section 189(1) of the BNS, 2023.

[4.1.3] Digital and forensic evidence corroborate their participation.

¶ 84. The trial court failed to appreciate the digital and forensic evidence linking the accused
to the crime. Section 63103 of the BSA, 2023, permits the admissibility of digital evidence such
as WhatsApp messages, video footage, and cell tower data. It is argued that the Court held that
forensic evidence must be given due weight in linking accused to violent acts104.

¶ 85. In the present case, (i) WhatsApp Messages: Messages from groups “Justice for Rukmini”
and “Justice for Victims” contained inflammatory rhetoric urging action105. These messages
were properly certified under Section 63 of the BSA106; (ii) Video Evidence: Videos showed
mob members breaking into the jail and dragging the accused outside; despite poor quality,
forensic analysis linked some respondents to the scene107; (iii) Forensic Analysis of Weapons:
Bloodstains on weapons matched the DNA of lynched victims108. Therefore, the digital and
forensic evidence corroborate their participation in the mob lynching.

99
Amerika Rai & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2011) 4 SCC 677.
100
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1963) 2 SCR 678.
101
Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437.
102
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11; Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
103
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63.
104
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 388.
105
Moot Proposition, ¶ 10.
106
Moot Clarifications, ¶ 6.
107
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
108
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
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[4.2] IMPROPER DISREGARD OF DIGITAL AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE LINKING THE ACQUITTED
INDIVIDUALS TO THE CRIME

¶ 86. It is submitted that [4.2.1] WhatsApp messages and digital footprints demonstrate
premeditation and intentional participation; [4.2.2] Video and photographic evidence place the
accused at the crime scene and establish their active involvement; [4.2.3] Forensic examination
of weapons confirms the accused’s participation and directly links them to the violent acts.

[4.2.1] WhatsApp messages and digital footprints demonstrate

premeditation and intentional participation.

¶ 87. Section 63109 of the BSA, 2023 recognizes the admissibility of electronic records when
properly certified. It has been emphasized the role of social media in inciting mob violence and
established that online calls to action constitute evidence of criminal intent 110. Furthermore, it
has been distinguished between mere discussion and active incitement, with the latter being
punishable under law when it leads to imminent violence111. The Supreme Court affirmed that
digital footprints constitute valuable evidence in criminal proceedings112 and mobile location
tracking can establish an accused’s presence at a crime scene113.

¶ 88. In the present case, messages calling for direct action circulated like WhatsApp messages
exchanged in groups such as “Justice for Rukmini” and “Justice for Victims” contained
incitement to violence against the jail inmates, including plans to gather near the district jail114.
The frequency and content of these messages indicate a clear evolution from frustration to
organized action. Given the severity of the threats and the subsequent violence, the trial court
erred in not recognizing the direct correlation between digital communications and the physical
acts of violence that followed.

[4.2.2] Video and photographic evidence place the accused at the

crime scene and establish their active involvement.

¶ 89. The Court has established that digital evidence must be given due weight in criminal
proceedings, particularly when it places an accused at the crime scene115. The Supreme Court

109
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 63.
110
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501.
111
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
112
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 66.
113
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471.
114
Moot Proposition, ¶ 10; Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
115
Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178.
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has further clarified that digital evidence, even when not of optimal quality, can serve as
valuable corroborating evidence when subjected to proper forensic analysis116.

¶ 90. In the present case, multiple villagers filmed parts of the attack with captions such as
“Justice served, our way” and “The system failed, we won’t”117. These recordings, though
blurry, provide visual evidence of the unlawful assembly and subsequent violence. The
circulation of these videos with celebratory captions demonstrates not only the presence of the
accused but also their endorsement of the violent actions.

[4.2.3] Forensic examination of weapons confirms the accused’s

participation and directly links them to the violent acts.

¶ 91. It is argued that the forensic analysis of weapons recovered from the crime scene provides
scientific proof of the accused’s involvement in the lynching. Section 45118 of the BSA, 2023
recognizes the admissibility of expert opinions on scientific matters including forensic
findings. The Court has held that forensic evidence must be given strong probative value when
linking an accused to a crime119. Similarly, forensic evidence can outweigh contradictory
testimonial evidence due to its scientific objectivity120.

¶ 92. In the present case, sticks and sickles with bloodstains matching the DNA of the lynched
victims were recovered from the scene and these weapons, when subjected to forensic analysis,
revealed fingerprints and DNA traces that directly link the respondents to the violence 121. The
presence of multiple weapons with distinct DNA profiles indicates a coordinated attack
involving numerous individuals, refuting the claims of passive presence or mere observation.
Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of this forensic evidence without proper scrutiny
constitutes a miscarriage of justice and warrants appellate intervention.

116
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311.
117
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
118
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 45.
119
State of UP v. Dan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 546.
120
Gajraj v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2011) 10 SCC 675.
121
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
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[4.3] MISAPPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO PROTEST , TRANSFORMATION FROM PEACEFUL

DEMONSTRATION TO VIOLENT MOB

¶ 93. It is submitted that [4.3.1] The right to peaceful protest does not include violent actions;
[4.3.2] The respondents failed to dissociate themselves from the violent mob; [4.3.3] The
prosecution has established clear evidence of their participation in the mob lynching.

[4.3.1] The right to peaceful protest does not include violent actions.

¶ 94. It is argued that while Article 19(1)(b)122 of the Constitution guarantees the right to
assemble peacefully, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(3) 123 to
protect public order. The Court has held that the right to protest does not extend to unlawful
activities and that the State is empowered to act against violent demonstrations124. It is well
established that protestors who engage in violence and destruction of public order are liable for
their actions125.

¶ 95. In the present case, the trial court erroneously overlooked this distinction, treating the
respondents as mere protestors when the assembly had clearly escalated into an unlawful mob
that stormed the district jail, overwhelmed the guards, and lynched the inmates.

[4.3.2] The respondents failed to dissociate themselves from the

violent mob.

¶ 96. It is argued that an individual who remains part of an unlawful assembly despite having
the opportunity to leave is liable for the consequences of collective violence 126. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has established that individuals who remain part of an unlawful assembly
after it turns violent are presumed to share its common object127. The failure to disassociate
from a violent assembly constitutes tacit approval of its actions and attracts criminal liability128.

¶ 97. In the present case, the respondents continued to remain present at the jail premises while
the mob stormed inside and lynched the accused individual129. Despite claiming they had

122
India Const. art. 19, cl. 1(b).
123
India Const. art. 19, cl. 3.
124
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
125
In Re: Destruction of Public & Private Properties, (2009) 5 SCC 212.
126
State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213.
127
Amerika Rai & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2011) 4 SCC 677.
128
Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607.
129
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
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gathered for a peaceful protest, they failed to disassociate themselves when the assembly turned
violent. The trial court failed to appreciate this principle while acquitting the respondents.

[4.3.3] The appellant has established clear evidence of their

participation in the mob lynching.

¶ 98. It is argued that general witness testimonies are sufficient to convict individuals in mob
violence cases when they establish the presence of the accused at the scene130. The digitally
certified video evidence is admissible and carries significant probative value131. The Court held
that messages inciting mob action constitute strong evidence of premeditated intent132. Forensic
reports were given decisive weight in confirming an accused’s involvement in mob violence133.

¶ 99. In the present case, all the principles in the stated case laws are satisfied as follows: (i)
Multiple witnesses identified the respondents as part of the crowd that stormed the jail 134; (ii)
Despite poor visibility conditions, forensic analysis of video footage from the scene confirms
the presence of the respondents. The videos circulated with captions such as “Justice served,
our way” and “The system failed, we won’t” demonstrate not only the presence but also the
intent of the participants135; (iii) The respondents exchanged inflammatory messages before the
attack, urging people to take direct action136; (iv) Sticks and sickles recovered from the crime
scene contained bloodstains matching the lynched victims, further linking the respondents to
the violent act137. Therefore, the trial court’s disregard of this compelling evidence constitutes
a misapplication of established evidentiary principles.

¶ 100. [CONCLUSION TO ISSUE 4]: The acquittal of Arvind Dhodia, Manu, Rajni, Shyam, and
the family members of the disappeared women is not legally justifiable. The trial court’s failure
to properly apply the principles of collective liability and unlawful assembly. Digital
communications, forensic evidence, and eyewitness testimonies all clearly link the accused to
the mob violence. Therefore, the acquittal should be reviewed and overturned in light of the
compelling and irrefutable evidence against the accused.

130
Masalti v. State of UP, AIR 1965 SC 202.
131
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473.
132
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501.
133
State of UP v. Dan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 546.
134
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
135
Moot Proposition, ¶ 10.
136
Moot Clarifications, ¶ 6.
137
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
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PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
APPELLANTS respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Court to ADJUDGE and DECLARE that:

I. SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S ACQUITTAL AND CONVICT KESHAV SINGH, RAGHAV CHAUHAN
AND OTHERS UNDER SECTIONS 70(1) AND 103 OF BNS, 2023 FOR GANG RAPE AND MURDERS.

II. DECLARE RESPONDENTS’ ACTIONS AS OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST (PREVENTION OF

ATROCITIES) ACT.

III. ACKNOWLEDGE THE ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE CERTIFIED WHATSAPP
MESSAGES UNDER SECTION 63 OF THE BSA, 2023, AS PROOF OF CONSPIRACY.

IV. REVERSE THE ACQUITTAL OF ARVIND DHODIA, MANU, RAJNI, SHYAM AND OTHERS BASED
ON DNA EVIDENCE, CELL TOWER DATA AND VIDEO FOOTAGE.

AND/OR

pass any order/declaration that the Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of justice,
equity, and good conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED

PLACE: HIGH COURT OF UTTAM PRADESH

DATE: 21 March 2025

SD/-_______

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

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