COMUN XXXI

RESOLUTION 01/02

TOPIC: Trade-off between sustainable outcomes and financial performance in the

context of climate crisis

SPONSOR NATIONS: Brazil, South Africa, China

SIGNATORIES: Brazil, South Africa, Fiji, Tesla, Turkey, Sierra Leone, India, Russia, New
Zealand, China, Mexico, Indonesia, Poland, NVIDIA, Iran

CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE FORUM

Pre-Ambulatory Clauses:
Highlights the efforts of international organizations such as the UNFCCC, UNEP, and
in supporting climate finance initiatives,

Noting the increasing role of financial markets in sustainability, with ESG

investments growing to over 35 trillion dollars globally as of 2023,

Concerned that many developing economies face difficulties in financing

sustainable projects,

Operative Clauses:

1. Encourages all willing and able nations to promote the use of Public Private
Partnerships for sustainable initiatives such as forest monitoring in order to;
a. Encourage corporations to integrate sustainable PPPs into their Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR goals) goals
b. Streamline permitting for such PPP initiatives in order to remove any barriers
and ease the process for corporations
 2. Affirms the creation of a data sharing platform within BRICs supporting
nations in order to;
a. Implement comprehensive monitoring platform within these data
sharing hubs following for research and development, to support
nations who advocate for the use of real time tracking such as early
warning systems,

3. Calls to solve the issue within the trust fund under the GEF (Global
Environment Facility) in order to;
a. Finance the implementation of infrastructure building projects ,including
activities aimed at avoiding forest degradation and combating land
degradation and desertification
b. Only targeted to under-developed countries- non annex countries under the
list in the UNFCCC
c. Funded by A share of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects,
specifically two percent of certified emissions reduction revenues and
marrakech accords where;
I. Marrakech accords do not have financial mechanisms on its own and therefore
affect its accountability, as it relies on conventional sources like devment
cooperation;

4. Recognize the freedom to utilize Carbon Markets to attract Foreign Direct

Investment in to green industries, promoting economic growth whilst supporting
sustainable projects.

POIS
On Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for Sustainability
1. How does the resolution ensure that corporations engaging in PPPs for
sustainability do not merely use them as a form of corporate greenwashing
without making substantive environmental contributions?
 2. What safeguards does the resolution propose to prevent corporations from
influencing sustainability policies in their favor while engaging in PPPs under
the guise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)?
3. Since streamlining permitting for PPP initiatives may weaken environmental
review processes, how does the resolution propose to balance efficiency with
regulatory oversight?
4. Many developing nations lack the institutional capacity to effectively oversee
PPP projects. How does the resolution address the risk of corruption or
mismanagement in these partnerships?

On the BRICS Data Sharing Platform

5. Why does the resolution limit the data-sharing platform to BRICS and
supporting nations? Would this exclusivity not hinder global collaboration and
create a geopolitical divide in climate finance initiatives?
6. How does the resolution propose to ensure data privacy and security,
particularly if real-time tracking technologies such as early warning systems
involve sensitive national infrastructure data?
7. Since BRICS countries have varying environmental policies and commitments,
how does the resolution propose to standardize the implementation of this
data-sharing initiative to prevent discrepancies in environmental monitoring?
8. Real-time tracking and early warning systems require significant investment
in digital infrastructure. How does the resolution address the technological
and financial barriers that some BRICS nations may face in implementing
these systems?

On Reforming the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund

9. The resolution funds GEF infrastructure projects through a 2% levy on
Certified Emission Reductions (CER) under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). Given the decline of CDM markets post-Kyoto
Protocol, how does the resolution ensure a reliable long-term funding
source?
10.The Marrakech Accords rely on conventional sources like development
cooperation, which often involves political and financial constraints. How does
the resolution ensure a stable financing mechanism that does not leave
projects vulnerable to fluctuations in donor commitments?
11.The resolution limits GEF funding to non-Annex countries under the
UNFCCC, excluding certain developing nations that might still struggle with
climate finance. How does the resolution justify this exclusion, and does it risk
alienating middle-income developing countries?
 12.Many GEF-funded projects have been criticized for inefficiencies and
bureaucratic delays. How does the resolution propose to improve the fund’s
governance and accountability to ensure timely project execution?

On Carbon Markets and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

13.How does the resolution ensure that carbon markets do not become vehicles
for speculative trading, where financial institutions profit while actual
emissions reductions remain minimal?
14.Many carbon offset projects fail to deliver genuine emissions
reductions due to faulty verification and accounting methods. How does the
resolution address concerns about carbon market integrity and transparency?
15.Since foreign direct investment (FDI) in green industries often
prioritizes higher-return markets, how does the resolution ensure that
investment actually benefits developing nations rather than just wealthier
emerging economies?
16.Given that carbon markets can be volatile and prone to price crashes,
how does the resolution ensure long-term stability for nations that rely on
these markets for climate finance?

IMPROVEMENTS

1. Pre-Ambulatory Clauses
Flaws:
 Vague Attribution:
The clause “Highlights the efforts of international organizations such as the
UNFCCC, UNEP…” is too general and does not specify which initiatives or how
these organizations have supported climate finance.
 Broad Financial Market Reference:
Mentioning ESG investments growing to over 35 trillion dollars is impressive
but is not clearly connected to how this growth impacts sustainable
development efforts in developing economies.
Improvements:
 Specificity in Acknowledgment:
Clearly outline the particular initiatives, programs, or successes of
organizations like the UNFCCC and UNEP that have positively impacted
climate finance.
  Contextual Linkage:
Explain how the growth of ESG investments directly supports or can be
leveraged to overcome financing challenges in developing economies.

2. Operative Clause 1: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

Flaws:
 Ambiguous Eligibility:
“Willing and able nations” is not defined, leaving unclear which countries are
targeted or how capacity is measured.
 Regulatory Oversight Concerns:
The notion of “streamlining permitting” may risk lowering environmental or
community safeguards if not properly managed.
 Potential for Greenwashing:
Encouraging corporations to integrate sustainable PPPs into their CSR might
allow firms to prioritize reputation over genuine sustainability efforts.
Improvements:
 Clarify Eligibility:
Define criteria for “willing and able” nations, perhaps based on institutional
capacity, commitment to sustainability, or regulatory frameworks.
 Balance Efficiency and Oversight:
Detail measures to streamline permitting without diluting environmental
reviews—such as establishing clear, transparent procedures or independent
oversight committees.
 Mitigate Greenwashing:
Require that PPPs include measurable sustainability targets and third-party
audits to ensure genuine environmental benefits rather than superficial CSR
adjustments.

3. Operative Clause 2: BRICS Data Sharing Platform

Flaws:
 Ambiguity in Scope:
The phrase “within BRICS supporting nations” is unclear. Does it refer
exclusively to BRICS countries, or also to nations that align with BRICS on
certain policies?
 Unclear Technical and Operational Details:
There is little information on how the comprehensive monitoring platform will
function, how data will be shared, and what standards will be applied.
  Data Security and Privacy Risks:
The clause does not address how sensitive data will be protected, especially
given the involvement of real-time tracking systems.
Improvements:
 Define Participating Nations:
Specify whether the platform is limited to BRICS or includes additional
partnering nations and outline the criteria for participation.
 Operational Framework:
Include details about the technological infrastructure, data standards, and
protocols for integrating real-time tracking and early warning systems.
 Ensure Data Protection:
Incorporate robust cybersecurity measures, data privacy guidelines, and clear
protocols on how sensitive information is managed and shared.

4. Operative Clause 3: GEF Trust Fund Reforms

Flaws:
 Lack of Clarity on “The Issue”:
The phrase “Calls to solve the issue within the trust fund” does not clearly
define the specific problems (e.g., funding gaps, administrative inefficiencies,
accountability concerns).
 Eligibility Constraints:
Limiting the target to “under-developed countries – non annex countries
under the UNFCCC” might exclude nations that, while not classified as under-
developed, still struggle with climate finance.
 Uncertain Funding Mechanism:
Relying on a 2% share of Certified Emissions Reduction revenues from the
CDM is risky, particularly as the CDM mechanism has seen declining
relevance and market fluctuations.
 Ambiguous Reference to Marrakech Accords:
The reference to Marrakech accords as a funding basis is unclear and may
lack the necessary financial structure for accountability.
Improvements:
 Define the Issues:
Clearly state what problems within the GEF trust fund are being addressed—
whether they are funding shortfalls, administrative bottlenecks, or
accountability challenges.
  Widen Eligibility or Justify Exclusion:
Either broaden the eligibility criteria or provide a detailed rationale for
focusing solely on under-developed, non-annex countries.
 Diversify Funding Sources:
Consider integrating additional or alternative funding streams (e.g., green
bonds, international climate funds) to reduce dependence on a single,
potentially volatile revenue source.
 Clarify Marrakech Accord Mechanisms:
Elaborate on how the Marrakech accords can be operationalized to provide a
stable and accountable financing mechanism, possibly by linking them with
existing international development frameworks.

5. Operative Clause 4: Carbon Markets and FDI

Flaws:
 Overly Broad Language:
The clause “Recognize the freedom to utilize Carbon Markets” is too general
and does not provide a framework for regulation, oversight, or ensuring
environmental integrity.
 Risk of Market Manipulation:
Without proper safeguards, carbon markets might be exploited for
speculative gains rather than driving genuine emissions reductions.
 Unclear Link to FDI:
The mechanism by which carbon markets attract Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) into green industries is not clearly outlined.
Improvements:
 Develop a Regulatory Framework:
Specify guidelines or standards for carbon market operations, including
measures to ensure transparency, prevent fraud, and maintain market
integrity.
 Link to Sustainable Outcomes:
Clearly articulate how revenue from carbon markets will be reinvested into
sustainable projects and how it will be monitored to ensure environmental
benefits.
 Detail the FDI Attraction Mechanism:
Provide a clear rationale and mechanism for how enhanced carbon market
operations will create a favorable investment climate for green industries,
potentially through fiscal incentives or targeted investment programs.
Overall Recommendations
 Enhance Clarity and Specificity:
Across all clauses, replace ambiguous language with precise definitions,
criteria, and measurable targets. This will help in both implementation and
accountability.
 Integrate Robust Oversight Mechanisms:
Whether it is PPPs, data-sharing platforms, or carbon markets, include clear
oversight and verification processes to mitigate risks such as corruption,
greenwashing, or market manipulation.
 Ensure Inclusive Participation:
Revisit eligibility criteria—especially in financial mechanisms like the GEF
trust fund—to ensure that all nations facing climate finance challenges are
adequately supported.
 Adopt a Phased and Pilot Approach:
Given the innovative nature of several proposals (e.g., AI-driven data sharing,
reliance on CDM revenues), consider implementing pilot projects or phased
rollouts with periodic reviews to refine and scale up successful measures.

Statement 1: On Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

"While PPPs can accelerate sustainable development, this resolution lacks clear
safeguards against corporate greenwashing. Streamlining permitting without
regulatory oversight risks allowing corporations to exploit environmental loopholes
rather than contribute to real climate action. Instead of merely encouraging PPPs,
we should mandate transparent accountability measures, third-party audits, and
enforceable sustainability benchmarks to ensure that these partnerships drive
genuine progress rather than just boosting corporate reputations."

Statement 2: On the BRICS Data-Sharing Platform

"The resolution proposes a BRICS data-sharing platform, yet it excludes global
cooperation by limiting participation. Climate change is a global crisis that requires
international collaboration, not regional exclusivity. Moreover, there are no data
security provisions—how do we prevent misuse of sensitive environmental
intelligence? A more effective approach would be an open-access platform with
clear cybersecurity frameworks, ensuring both transparency and equitable
participation from all nations."

Statement 3: On Carbon Markets and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

"The resolution assumes that carbon markets will attract foreign direct investment
into green industries, but without strict regulations, these markets can be exploited
for speculative trading rather than real emissions reductions. We need enforceable
verification mechanisms, such as AI-driven carbon tracking and blockchain
authentication, to prevent greenwashing. Additionally, rather than hoping for FDI
inflows, why not include direct fiscal incentives like tax breaks or de-risking
strategies to actively encourage sustainable investments?"