CASE REPORT ON THE

Selected opinions of Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council and major

judgments of the Supreme Court on Professional Misconduct

PAPER- PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, BENCH-BAR RELATIONS AND ACCOUNTANCY

FOR LAWYERS.
PAPER CODE- 8.4

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED

TO:
Name-Sk Mizanur Rahman
Roll- Assistant Professor (Law)
8th Semester
Section B
 CERTIFICATE

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Committee of Bar Council and major judgments of the Supreme Court on
Professional Misconduct” has been prepared by ALAKESH DAS, ROLL NO:
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NERIM LAW COLLEGE NERIM LAW COLLEGE
Dr. Md Sultan Haidar Alam Jafreen Haque
Principal, NERIM LAW COLLEGE Assistant Professor
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to our Principal Dr. Md.
Sultan Haidar Alam and our teacher Daisy Roy as well as Dibrugarh University
who gave us the opportunity to do this project.

I have taken effort on this project on the topic Supreme Court Cases on
Professional Misconduct. Through this project I have gained valuable information
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 Table of contents:

INTRODUCTION
1.SMT. URMILA DEVI VS. SITA RAM SINGH
2. UPENDRA D. BHATT VS. VIJAY SINGH M. KAPADIA
3. KV Umere vs Smt Venubai D, E Venkataramiah.R Mishra
4.RAJENDRA V. PAI vs. ALEX FERNANDES & OTHERS
5. ASHOK KUMAR KAPUR vs. BAR COUNCIL OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
6. Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar vs Bar Council of Maharashtra
7. SMT. SUDESH RANI & OTHERS vs. MUNISH CHANDRA GOEL
8.SMT. FARIDA CHOUDHARY vs. DR. ACHYUT KUMAR THAKURIA
9. PRAHLAD ARAN GUPTA vs. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
10.VIJAYA SINGH vs. MURALILAR & OTHERS
11. S.K NAGAR vs. V.P. JAIN
12 J.N. GUPTA vs. D.C. SINGHANIA AND J.K. GUPTA
13.Parvin C Shah vs K.A Mohd.Ali & Anr
14.AJMER SINGH vs. JAGIR SINGH
15.HIKMAT ALI KHAN vs. ISHWAR PRASAD ARYA AND OTHERS
16.. KAMLA PRASAD MISHRA vs. MEHILAL
17.SUO MOTTO ENQUIRY vs. NAND LAL BALWANI
18.K.V. UMRE vs. SMT. VENUBAI D. GAGE AND ANRs
19.JOHN D'SOUZA vs. EDWARD ANI
20.PRAHLAD SHRAN GUPTA vs. BAR COUCIL OF INDIA & Anr
21.Smt Siya Bai vs Sitaram Singh
22. Secretary, Karnataka Khadi Gram Udyog Samyukta Sangha vs J.S Kulkarni
23.M.Veerabhadra Rao vs Tes Chand
24.. Babulal vs Subhash Jain
25.Shambhu Ram Yadav vs Hanum Das Khatry
26.Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs Union Of India & Ors
27.. District Bar Association vs Ishwar Shandilya
28.An Advocate Vs BB Haradara &Ors
29. Baldev Raj Sharma vs Bar Council of India
30. Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate vs State of Uttar Pradesh
31.In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Ors
32.Jagadish Singh & Ors vs T.C Sharma
33.Harish Chandra Tiwari Vs Baiju
34.In Re: An Advocate vs Unknown
35. Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs Dabholkar & Anr
36. Hikmat Ali Khan vs Ishwar Prasad & Ord
37.Joginder Singh Vs Bar Council Of India
38.Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India
39. Dr Haniraj L Chulani vs Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa
40. Baswarooponi vs Babulsoni
41.Indure Ltd vs Deo Raj Guptha
42.Commissioner of Civil Supplies &Consumer Protection Dept vs Balakrishnan
43.Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs Bar Association Pathankot
44.Satish Kumar Sharma vs The Bar Council of Himachal
45.D.P Chandra vs Triyugi Narayan Mishra
46.P.D Khandekar vs Bar Council of Maharashtra , Bombay & Ors
47.Ravinchandra Iyer Vs Justice A M Bhattacharjee & Ors
48.V C Rangadurai vs D. Gopalan & Ors
49. Suresh Shiva Rao Vs N.D Upadhyay Secretary, Bar Council of Maharashtra
50. Allahabad Banks Vs Girish Prasad Verm
51. R.D Saxena Vs Balram Prasad
52.Salil Dutta Vs T.M and MC (P) Ltd
 INTRODUCTION

Professional ethics are those set code or moral principles that govern a person’s conduct in a
professional workplace or work life. In the legal profession, a lawyer must obey to professional
codes for fair dealing with the client and uphold the self-possession. The Indian government has
established a statutory body known as The Bar council of India under the Advocate Act,1961.

Advocate Act, 1961

It was introduced to implement the recommendations of the All-India Bar Committee and taking
into account the Law Commission’s recommendations relating to the legal profession. The
Parliament has established The Bar Council of India under section 4 of The Advocate Act,1961.
As per section 7(1)(b) the council has to lay down standards of professional conduct and
etiquette for advocates. And section 49(1)(c) allows the bar council of India to make rules as to
suggest the standard of professional conduct to be observed by advocates.

The term misconduct has been defined in Blacks dictionary as a transgression of some establish and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior.

The expression professional or other misconduct are mentioned in section 10 of the Indian Bar Council
Act, 1926. Section 35 provides for professional misconduct or other misconduct, section 37 lays down
that an appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Committee may prefer to the Bar Council of India and
thereafter to the Supreme Court of India against the order of the Bar Council of India under section 38.

The expression professional misconduct in the simple sense means improper conduct. In law profession
misconduct means an act done willfully with a wrong intention by the people engaged in the profession. It
means any activity or behaviour of an advocate in violation of professional ethics for his selfish ends.
 THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE

BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

B.C.I TR. CASE NO. 21/1987

URMILLA DEVI ……….. COMPLAINANT

Vs.

SITA RAM SINGH ………. RESPONDENT -

In this case the complainant was the money lender duly registered under the Money Lenders Act.
She engaged the respondent advocate named Shri Sita Ram Singh as her counsel for filing many
money suits against her borrower and several suits were decreed. She paid the Advocate Court
fees, Counsel’s Fees and other expenses. The complainant alleged that the said advocate used
Withdraw decretal amounts from the court from time to time without the consent and knowledge
of the complainant. Initially in his written statement, the advocate admitted that he had
withdrawn the amount but thereafter in amended statement he denied it. In the view of the
admission, it was for the Advocate to prove that he had not withdrawn the amount. The
Disciplinary Committee of the BCI came to the conclusion that, though the exact amount of
withdrawal by the respondent advocate and he failed to account the same to the complainant in
spite of the notice. This conduct of the respondent was Professional misconduct. The Committee
expressed the view that whatever Money was withdrawn was not paid to the complainant in spite
demand made by her.

The Committee found that notice was given by the complainant to the Advocate to furnish
accounts for the amounts withdrawn from the C.C.D but This notice was not replied by the
advocate. In the opinion of the Committee Failure of the part of the advocate in replying the
notice or furnishing the Accounts for the amount withdrawn was professional misconduct.

The Committee examined several documents submitted by the complainant and came to the
conclusion that several amounts were withdrawn by the advocate. Since there was an allegation
that these amounts were in the Handwriting of the respondent, it was necessary for him to
explain them. The Committee held that the advocate had withdrawn the amount and it was
Buttressed by own admission made by him in original unamended reply. The Committee further
held that the advocate had wrongly denied the withdrawal. The argument of the advocate that he
had not withdrawn any amount and Therefore he did not make any payment to the complainant
was not accepted by the committee.

The Committee held that the Respondent Advocate withdrew Rs. 40,000/- in All and therefore he
should pay this amount to the complainant within the Period of two months. The Committee held
that since he was inflicted sentence of suspension in another case for both the cases would run
concurrently.

The Committee held that the cost of the case (that was Rs. 5000/-) would be Paid by the
Respondent Advocate within one month, failing which he had to Undergo suspension for one
year.
 THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
D.C. APPEAL NO. 23/1993
UPENDRA D. BHATT
Vs.
VIJAY SINGH M. KAPADIA
In this case the advocate was given heavy amounts for doing several works but He did not do the
work for which the money was paid to him. He collected Some money even for imaginary work.
The advocate admitted that he had Received Rs. 5000 in the appeal to be filed in the Small
Causes Court and suit to be filed against M.G.Pujjari. He also admitted to have received Rs.
22,000
In review application judgement by way of intervener. Certain sum of money Was received by
him for cost deposit for Advocate General of Maharashtra and Delhi and main Party. The
Committee expressed surprise as to how the Advocate could realize the amount as he did not file
an appeal in the Small Causes Court against dismissal of the suit before the Bombay Appellate
Branch of Small Causes nor did he file any suit against M.G.Pujari. The Committee expressed
surprise as to how he could seek the review in the case Before the Supreme Court as to law point
of suit and realize the amount for Filing the review of the Supreme Court judgment by way of
intervener in a ** Different matter to which complainant was not a party for the matter arose out
Of Maharashtra State. No particular case and law point involved of such Imaginary matter are
coming forth and it was nothing but a mate device called Out to willfully usurp the money of the
complainant’s mother. The Committee Expressed surprise as to how a Small Cause matter was
pending before the Supreme Court in review without filing an appeal before the Appellant Bench
of Small Causes Court.

The Committee held that no benefit from such imaginary review petition was Possible without
filing an appeal. By no stretch of imagination, a Small Cause Court judgment could be reviewed
by the Supreme Court without exhausting the remedies of appeal in the lower courts. With
reference to Rs. 15000 Received by the advocate for deposit to the Advocate General of
Maharashtra and Delhi the Committee has held that in no proceedings in the Supreme Court,
deposit of Rs. 15000is required to be made to the Advocate General of Maharashtra and Delhi as
is apparent from Ex. C-3 in review petition or Intervening application. The appellant had not
filed appeal and suit in the Lower courts. He simply misused the money and defrauded the
Complainant/complainant’s mother and it was an offence which could not be Pardoned. The
advocate should have been tried on criminal side for such a Serious offence. The Committee has
opined that it really unfortunate that such Black sheep are still in profession which is regarded as
one of the noblest Professions of the world. Advocates are not only protectors of democracy but
also of individual freedom rights of clients. They are supposed to protect Clients from
exploitation and fraud. They are not meant to defraud them. A few Such unscrupulous persons
bring disrepute to the system.

The advocate had been punished earlier twice and suspended from practice by The State Bar
Council of Maharashtra and Goa for two years and six months but he did not improve and had
played fraud of serious nature, totally Misconceived legally untenable defense he had taken. He
was held to be guilty of defrauding the complainant’s mother and the complainant. The
Committee Held that allegations found to be proved were of serious misconduct of Criminal
nature and therefore no less punishment could be imposed except Striking off his name from the
roll of advocates maintained by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. The Committee further
directed that an amount of Rs. 38,000 along with interest at the rate of 10% per annum be paid by
the Advocate to the complainant from the date of demand to refund the money
Taken by him till the date of payment.
 THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEAL NO 2385 DECREED ON 20/071983

K.V UMERE ….............

Appellant
Vs
Smt. Venubai D,Gage And Anr …...............
Respondent

Bench : A Sen, E Venkataramiah, R Misra

Brief Fact- appellant advocate: respondent husband died in a motor accident, advocate withheld
payment of compensation which was to be awarded, he withdrew the amount and did not pay the
same amount, matter of misappropriation of money, case filed before SBC, held that advocate
guilty for misappropriation, suspended from roll for 1 year, also to pay the amount of 2
instalment along with date fixed each instalment, in case he fails to do so, he will be permanently
debarred from practice

He made the payment, but he made a delayed payment, matters go on appeal to

SC. He brings stay from SC not to suspend him and then went to Bar Council of India for appeal,
held that idea to punish the advocate was deterrent, BCI said that it was indeed serious but still
disciplinary committee took lenient approach to punish him. Advocate did indeed pay the
amount sent back the case to SBC for review in case they want to supply stringent punishment

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) This appeal under S. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is directed against an order of the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated July 13, 1977, rejecting an application
for review.
(2.) By an order dated May 9, 1977, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
directed the appellant, who had misappropriated the decretal amount of Rs. 11,760.70 payable to
the respondent, to pay the same to her in two instalments, one of Rs. 6,000/- by May 25, 1977,
and another of Rs. 4,000/- within three months from May 9, 1977. The appellant was held guilty
of grave professional misconduct and the Disciplinary Committee took a serious view of the
matter but gave the appellant another chance. It accordingly directed that if the appellant paid the
amount of Rs. 10,000/- as directed, he shall remain suspended from practice for a period of one
year from August 10, 1977. On his failure to deposit Rs. 6,000/- by May 25, 1977, as stipulated,
his name shall stand removed from the rolls of advocates permanently with effect from May 25,
1977. Although the appellant made payment of Rs. 10,000/- in two instalments but he made a
default in not making the deposits on due dates as stipulated and consequently the eligibility
clause was attracted resulting in his permanent disbarment. The appellant made an application for
review to the Disciplinary Committee praying that the delay in making the payment be condoned
and the period of suspension be limited to one year. The Disciplinary Committee however
rejected the application observing that if the appellant had not volunteered to pay Rs. 10,000/- in
two instalments on due dates, the punishment would have been much more severe. It observed
that he had deprived the respondent who was a helpless widow of money legitimately due to her
without any reasonable excuse and that there was no ground for showing any leniency as it
would be against the spirit of R. 20 of the Disciplinary Rules of the Bar Council of India. It took
a strict view having regard to the fact that there were a large number of claims for death or bodily
injury resulting in motor accident in the country, and if lawyers were allowed to withhold
payment of compensation awarded and pay the same in instalments, it would amount to sharing
of profits of litigation.
(3.) It is needless to stress that in a case like this the punishment has to be deterrent. There
was in this case complete lack of candor on the part of the appellant as earlier alleged and
thereafter when the State Bar Council initiated disciplinary proceedings, he took a false plea that
Rs. 6,600/- were due to him towards fee and other miscellaneous expenses. The respondent was
prevailed upon by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India to accept a lesser sum
of Rs. 10,000/-. Looking to the seriousness of the charge, we feel that the disciplinary Committee
took a rather lenient view in limiting the period of suspension to one year, but the fact remains
that the appellant ultimately paid Rs. 10,000/- although there was delay in making payment of
the instalments. If the Disciplinary Committee had initially struck off the name of the appellant
from the rolls for all times, then the rejection of the application for review would be justified but
the Disciplinary Committee limited the period of suspension to one year. The appellant having
paid the amount of Rupees 10,000/- the Disciplinary Committee had to consider whether it could
condone the delay in making payment of the instalments. While condoning the delay, it could
have enhanced the period of suspension, but this could not result in permanent disbarment. We
therefore feel that the Disciplinary Committee should consider the application for review afresh
in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. This direction of ours should not be
construed to mean that the period of suspension should be limited to one year. In fixing the
period of suspension, it must keep in view that the appellant had completely betrayed the trust
reposed in him by the respondent.;

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF

THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
D.C. APPEAL NO. 11/2000
RAJENDRA V. PAI …......... APPELLANT
VS.
ALEX FERNANDES …........... RESPONDENT
DC APPEAL NO 12/2000
RAJENDRA V PAI ….......... APPELLANT
VS
BAPTISH FARNENDEZ ….......... RESPONDENT
DC APPEAL NO 13/2000
RAJENDRA V PAI ….......... APPELLANT
VS
 FRANCISCO FERNENDEZ …......... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI RAM CHANDRA JHA, CHAIRMAN
SHRI BABU RAM TIWARI, MEMBER SHRI MOHAN PRASAD JHA, MEMBER

FACTS:
There were about 150 villagers whose lands were acquired by the Government for the public
purposes. The appellant was an advocate and he was also personally interested in defending
against the proposed of acquisition of the land belonging to his family and members. The villages
on their own confined in appellant to contest the land acquisition proceedings for reasonable and
fair quantum of compensation for the land acquisition.

Three complainants out of 150 complaints filed complaint against appellant for professional
misconduct that appellant solicited professional work from the villages and appellant settled
contingent fee depending on the quantum of the composition awarded to the claimants. It is also
alleged that the appellant identified some claimants in opening a bank account wherein the
cheque for awarded amount of compensation was lodged. It is also alleged that the amount of
compensation was withdrawn on false identification.

DEFENCE OF THE APPELLANT:

The appellant contended that the villagers had voluntarily confined in him because he was an
advocate and was also looking after litigation relating to his family land. The appellant also
contented that that villager had voluntarily agreed to contribute the expenses of litigation. The
charges of false identification were denied by the appellant.

JUDGMENT:

The Appellant, an advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, has been
found guilty of professional misconduct and by order dated 22.1.2000, passed under Section 35
of the Advocates Act, 1961, his name has been directed to be removed from the State roll of
advocates. The appeal to the Bar Council of India preferred by the appellant has been dismissed
on 22.12.2000. Feeling aggrieved by the said two orders these appeals have been preferred under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act.
In all the three appeals the appellant is Rajendra V. Pai, whereas the respondent in D.C. Appeal
No. 11/2000 is Alex Fernandes, in D.C. Appeal No. 12/2000 is Baptist Fernandes, and in D.C.
Appeal No. 13/2000 is Francisco Fernandes.

It was submitted that the appellant did not solicit professional work as such and in fact the
villagers confided in him because of his being an advocate, also looking after litigation relating
to his family land, and the villagers had voluntarily agreed to contribute to a collective fund
raised for covering the expenses of litigation as they were likely to make an overall saving in
litigation expenses by fighting collectively as a group and it is out of this fund that the appellant
incurred expenses including those by himself. So far as false identification in opening the bank
account is concerned the appellant acted irresponsibly when he relied on other villagers who
persuaded him to make an identification which only was acceptable to the authorities on account
of his being an advocate. This fact finds support from the circumstance that out of little less than
150, only 3 of the litigating landowners have filed these complaints to Bar Council. It was urged
most passionately by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was the first fault, if at all, of
the appellant and if debarred from practice for his life at his age yet in early forties, the appellant
and his family would be completely ruined.

Ordinarily, the Court does not interfere with the quantum of punishment in such like matters
where an elected statutory body of professionals has found their own kinsman guilty of
professional misconduct and hence not worthy of being retained in profession. The Court held
that debarring a person from pursuing his career for his life is an extreme punishment and calls
for caution and circumspection before being passed. No doubt probity and high standards of
ethics and morality in professional career particularly of an advocate must be maintained and
cases of proved professional misconduct severely dealt with, yet, it was strongly felt that the
punishment given to the appellant in the totality of facts and circumstances of the case is so
disproportionate as to prick the conscience of the Court. Undoubtedly, the appellant should not
have indulged into prosecuting or defending a litigation in which he had a personal interest in
view of his family property being involved.

The appeals are partly allowed. Though the finding of the appellant having been guilty of
committing professional misconduct as arrived at by the State Bar Council and the Bar Council
of India is maintained, the punishment awarded to the appellant is modified. Instead of the name
of the appellant being removed from the State rolls of Bar Council of the State it is directed that
his license to practice shall remain suspended for a period of seven years. Order awarding the
costs is maintained. The appeals stand disposed of in these terms. No order as to the costs in this
Court.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

D.C. APPEAL NO. 18/1999 DATED 15-09-2000

ASHOK KUMAR KAPUR … ….... Appellant

VS.

BAR COUNCIL OF PUNJAB & ... HARYANA …...... Respondent

PRESENT:
SHRI R.C. JHA, CHAIRMAN

APPELLANT RESPONDENTS

SHRI INDRAJIT MAHANTY, MEMBER SHRI MANOJ KUMAR MISHRA, MEMBER

Advocates Act (Act No. 25 of 1961) Section 35(D) and Bar Council of India Rules, Chapter-II,
Section 1, Rule 1 and 4 – Professional Misconduct. Appellant was removed from membership of
District Bar Association on the allegation of fraud, cheating and blackmailing and initiated suo
moto disciplinary action. Appellant had filed 56 cases before District Consumer Forum against
Honorable High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Registrar, High Court, District Judge, Sub-Judges
and other judicial officers, institutions and persons, alleging illegalities committed by the
presiding officers and improper behaviour shown by the Registrar, High Court and the Sub-
judge. On being questioned that the Consumer Forum had no power to adjudicate such complain,
the appellant replied that he filed those cases in the capacity of his rights as an Advocate and he
is not concerned about its maintainability or non-maintainability.

Held that the appellant with oblique motive had filed those cases being well aware of the fact that
it was not maintainable and was frivolous. An advocate taking advantage of his position should
not be allowed to mis-utilise his position as an advocate to victimise and harass general people
including judicial officers.

Therefore, the conduct of an advocate should be such that it should not damage reputation of
advocates as a class in the society.

Held guilty of professional misconduct and ordered for removal of name from the roll of State
Bar Council under Section 35(3)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961.

This appeal arises out of the judgment passed by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana in
disciplinary committee enquiry no. 96 of 1998, imposing punishment of removal of the name of
the appellant from the roll of the Bar Council and against imposition of cost of Rs. 5000/-.

The appellant was removed from membership of District Bar Association, Ludhiana on the
allegation of playing fraud, cheating and blackmailing under the gran of an advocate. The
resolution was passed by the State Bar Association which was intimated to the State Bar Council
and the same was treated as a complaint by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. Prima facie
case having found against the appellant, the State Bar Council initiated a suo moto disciplinary
proceeding against the appellant. The appellant defended his action on the ground that he had
done the same in exercise of his right as an advocate.
The Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana after hearing parties and considering evidences on
record found the appellant guilty of committing professional misconduct and imposed
punishment of removal of the name of the appellant from the roll of Bar Council and awarded
cost of Rs. 5000/-. The appellant has preferred this appeal challenging the said punishment.

The appellant submitted a written note of argument wherein it was contended that Shri. C.M.
Munjal, a member of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, without having any authority
recorded evidence and exhibited the documents filed by the appellant. It was also contended that
the Bar Association, Ludhiana, having about 700 members held a meeting which was attended by
not more than 400 members showing illegal conduct at the instance of one, Ashok Kumar Juneja
who was habitual in decamping legal rights of consumers in sale of cement, brick and iron, etc.
Therefore, the Bar Association had no right or authority to pass such resolution against the
appellant. It was further urged by the appellant that the said Bar Council before referring the
matter for adjudication to the disciplinary committee should have given an opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. The appellant in his written note of argument did not spare the members
of the disciplinary committee who passed the judgment against him by making serious
allegations that they are instigators and the judgment is highly defamatory which tend to cast
serious aspersions on the appellant. He has also referred to written argument note filed by him
before the said Bar Council.

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

AIR 1984 SC 110 a, 1983 (2) SCALE 495, (1984) 2 SCC 556, 1984 1 SCR 414

Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar

vs.

Maharashtra Bar Council

Bench: A Sen, E Venkataramiah, R Mishra

JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J.
1. The disciplinary proceedings out of which this appeal Under Section 38 of the Advocates Act,
1961 ('Act' for short) has arisen were initiated on a complaint made by a group of 12 advocates
practising in the two courts of Sub-Divisional Magistrates in the Collectorate of Poona alleging
various acts of professional misconduct against the appellant P.D. Khandekar and one A.N.
Agavane. The proceedings stood transferred to the Bar Council of India Under Section 36B of
the Act. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India by its order dated April 23,
1976 held both the appellant and A.N. Agavane guilty of professional misconduct and directed
that the appellant be suspended for a period of four months from June 1, 1976 and Agavane for a
period of two months therefrom. This Court by its order dated September 24, 1976 admitted the
appeal and stayed the operation of the suspension of order.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

SMT. SUDESH RANI & OTHERS …......... COMPLAINANT

. VS.

MUNISH CHANDRA GOEL …........ RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI. B.S. RATHORE, CHAIRMAN

SHRI. ARUN MISHRA, MEMBER SHRI. AMAN DHAIYA, MEMBER

COMPLAINANT RESPONDENT
Respondent advocate signed as a witness in agreement of sale of plots of land sold by his father-
in-law and receive consideration money by way of compromise decrees in 11 suits filed by 11
complainants who constructed houses on their plots. Thereafter respondent filed eviction suits
showing all complainants as tenants, suppressing all the material facts.

Held that by filing false suits respondents advocate has failed in performing his duty towards the
court by suppressing fact of decrees which are known to the respondent advocate before as he
was an advocate in the earlier cases and he received decretal amount.

He has filed to carry out his duty and has committed breach of Rule 38. It is the duty of
advocates to uphold to the dignity of the profession and not to do and act which may bring
disrepute to the profession.

Ordered for suspension of license for a period of two years which cost Rs. 11,000/- i.e., Rs.
1,000/- to each complainant to be paid within the period of two months, failing which his license
shall further be suspended for additional period of one year.

JUDGMENT:

The Respondent-advocate in as much as 1 person have filed this complaint against the
Respondent-Advocate on the allegations that they were the residents of Goyal Nagar Moradabad.
It was alleged that one Shri Rama Kant Agarwal, who happens to be the father- in-law of the
Respondents-Advocate was the owner of certain plots. These plots were sold by the respondent-
advocate to the complainants, Smt. Kusum Lata, wife of respondentadvocate was the power of
Attorney holder of her late father Shri Rama Kant Agarwal, who was father-in-law of the
Respondent-advocate. An agreement for sale of land was entered into by the father of the
Respondent-advocate was acting power of attorney holder of late Shri Rama Kant Agarwal, her
father.

The complainant has been residing after passing the decrees in their house constructed by them.
The respondent-advocate again turn round and started threatening the complainants in various
ways demanding Rs 2 Lakhs in each case as otherwise he will harass the applicants by filing
different suits against them in the court of law. Notice was also served treating them as tenants in
spite of compromise decrease passed and suits were also filed falsely and frivolously in different
courts of Mordabad, photostat copies of complaints of which are placed on record as annexures-
III and IV. It was alleged that the respondent advocate misusing his position as an advocate was
harassing the complainants and trying to extract money from them, hence suitable action should
be taken against them. Smt. Kusum Lata, who happens to be the wife of the respondent was the
Power of Attorney holder of Shri Rama Kant Aggarwal. Shri Munish Chandra Goel, respondent
has also signed the said compromise petition in the capacity of his being advocate of Shri Rama
Kant Aggarwal and the compromise petition has also been certified before the court by the
respondent-advocate. As is apparent from the compromise petition filed in suits in No.136/79, a
sum of Rs 1000/- was received by the respondent-advocate, Shri. Munish Chandra Goel vide
Receipt Date 26/10/1979 from the plain tiff in civil suit No.136/79 which was the course to be
paid to Shri. Rama Kant. Agreements were entered into by the wife of respondent-advocate in
the capacity of her being the Power of Attorney Holder of Shri. Rama Kant. Another suit bearing
No.126/78 was filed by Smt. Saraswati Devi against Shri Rama Kant. In this case the
compromise petition was also filed by Shri Munish Chandra Goel, respondent-advocate and it is
apparent from the compromise petition and the order of the court that Shri Munish Chandra
respondent-advocate was present on behalf of the Shri Rama Kant in that case.

After signing the compromise petition the respondent-advocate filed suit for ejectment of
complainants as advocate of Shri Rama Kant Agarwal to suppress and black mail the
complainants. Thus, he has committed professional misconduct. All these negotiations were not
made by Smt. Kusum Lata but by the respondent-advocate. It was also contended that the
complainants have suffered great loss on accounts of the suit filed by the respondent advocate.
The joint rejoinder was signed by all the complainants and notarized copies of the document
have been placed on record in support of the aforesaid allegation.ass left behind his sister Smt.
Vidya Wati who succeeded to the estate on death of Lala Shrikishan Dass and took over the
entire movable and immovable estate. Thereafter the complainant and two other persons
propounded will of Lala Shrikishan Dass". This statement of P.D. Gupta has been verified by
him as true and correct to his knowledge. It does appear to us to be rather odd for a lawyer to
verify such facts to his knowledge. It is claimed that when Shrikishan Dass died, subject
immovable property was plot bearing No.4858-A, 24 Daryaganj measuring 1500 sq. feet and the
same was got mutated in the name of Vidya Wati in the records of the Municipal corporation of
Delhi and then she got plan sanctioned from the Municipal corporation of Delhi for construction
of the house on this plot and which she did construct and got completion certificate on August
28, 1981. It is peculiar, rather astounding, how could Vidya Wati get the property of Shrikishan
Dass mutated in her name when she is yet to be granted letters of administration or declaration to
her title. The two sale-deeds transferring this property was examined, one executed in favour of
P.D. Gupta and other in favour of his son-in-law Suresh Kumar Gupta and we complainant and
the concerned parties.

Bar Council of India observed that:" It is acknowledged fact that a lawyer conducting the case of
his client has commanding status and can exert influence of his client. As a member of the Bar it
is our common knowledge that lawyers have lawyers have started contracting with the clients
and enter into bargains that in case of success he will shore the result. Number of instances of
Motor Accident Claims. No doubt there is no bar for instances to purchase property but on
account of common prudence specially law knowing person will never prefer to purchase the
property, the title of which is under doubt.”

Finally, it said for the purpose of the present complaint, having regard to all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the committee is of the opinion that the conduct of the respondent is
patently unbecoming of a lawyer and against professional ethics. Consequently, as an exemplary
punishment, Shri P.D. Gupta was suspended from practice for a period of one year so that other
erring lawyers should learn a lesson and refrain themselves form indulging in such practice.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

B.C.I.TR CASE NO.1/1993, DATED 1.10.1999

SMT. FARIDA CHOUDHARY

. VS.

DR. ACHYUT KUMAR THAKURIA

PRESENTS:
 SHRI ASHOK DEB, CHAIRMAN

SHRI ARUN MISHRA, MEMBER SHRI M.P BHARDWAJ, MEMBER

Advocates Act (Act No. 25 of 1961) Sec 35 and Bar Council of India Rules 1975, Chapter – II
preamble and Section I, Rule 4-Professional Misconduct, Respondent advocate not having good
friendly relation with complainants-neighbor, filed false cases against her, wrote letter to her
employees to harm her reputation in her department and letters to her containing vulgar and
obscene language with remarks, sketches and pictures in his own handwriting.

Held that respondent in the author of the obscene letters. He is clearly guilty of writing the letters
which contain obscene materials, obscene figures and this act, we hold, is unbecoming of the
respondent as an advocate and he has rendered himself liable to the disciplinary action of
punitive nature. He has failed to discharge his duties as an officer of the Court as well as a
responsible person of the society, his conduct entails him to punishment.

Held guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from practice for a period of four months
with cost of Rs. 10,000/- payable within 2 months. In case of failure to pay cost within time, to
undergo suspension from practice for an additional period of one year.

JUDGMENT:

This is a case received on transfer from the Bar Council of Assam etc. In this case complainant
has alleged that she is ana employees of M/s. Steel Authority of India, Guwahati residing at
Guwahati. The Respondent happened to be the neighbor of the complaint and the respondent
filed a case against the complainant and her husband u/s 504, 506 and 511 IPC on 20.08.90 in the
court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup ,
Guwahati. In that case, final report has been submitted. On 09.10.90 the complainant was
discharged from the charges. On 08.10.90 the Respondent has written a letter to the Branch
Manager of M/s, Steel Authority of India, Pan Bazar, Guwahati informing the pendency of the
case before the Learned Court in which the complainants were discharged on the next day. The
respondent has written the letter with malicious intention to harm the reputation of the
complainants in the department. He violated the professional ethics rules and thus his conduct is
unbecoming of an advocate. On 04.05.1990 a stone was thrown aiming at the son of the
complainant. But somehow, he has escaped. This was done by the respondent.

There was an order passed by the Bar Council of Assam that a reply has to be filled because the
original documents have already been filed in the case. But still no reply was filed. On 25.08.92
order sheet indicates that notice sent to the respondent was refused by the Respondent on
13.08.92 and the envelope was received back by the office on 22.08.92. Thus, the disciplinary
committee treated the respondent exparte. Thereafter the was taken up on 12.09.92. On 29.09.92
order sheet indicates that the complainant has filed certain copies of the documents. Photocopies
are already on record. Hence, there was no necessity to call for the originals. The evidence of the
complainant was recorded on 29.09.92.
Thereafter the case was sent to the Bar Council of India as one year period has elapsed.

The respondent is also guilty of writing dated 8.10.1990 which is on record and was written to
the Branch Manager of Steel Authority of India by Mr. A K Thakuria on his letterhead and bears
his signatures. He has written to the Branch Manager that he has to inform that Smt. Farida
Choudary was an accused in Police Station case No. 291/90 u/s 504 and 506 I.P.C and she
surrendered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati on 22.9.90. She was even than in P.R
Bond in case No.GR.3044/90 in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati. Next date
was fixed on 8.10.90 for appearance in Court. This was for information and for necessary action.

From the report and as to the conduct of the respondent of non-traversing the allegation it is
evident that the respondent is the author of the obscene letters. He has not replied to the
complainant filed before the Disciplinary Committee and the Respondent evaded to answer
pertinent questions during deposition also. He is clearly guilty of writing the letters which
contain obscene material, obscene figures and this act we hold is unbecoming of the Respondent
and he has rendered himself liable to the disciplinary action of punitive nature. He was held
guilty of other misconduct. He has failed to discharge his duties as an officer of the court as well
as a responsible person of the society, his conduct entails him to punishment.

On the afore stated grounds the respondent is held guilty of professional misconduct and he is
suspended from practice for a period of four months and we impose a cost of Rs.10,000/- over
him to be paid to the complainant. If he fails to pay the same within two months, he shall have to
undergo suspension from practice for an additional period of one year. Cost should be deposited
with the Bar Council of India so that the amount could be collected by the complainant at
Guwahati.
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEAL, NO. 3588 OF 1984, DATED 6-2-1997

PRAHLAD ARAN GUPTA

VS.

BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA ...

JUSTICE S. C. AGRAVAL JUSTICE G.B. PATTARNAIK

JUDGMENT:
This appeal, files under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, is directed against the judgment
of Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, dated March 25, 1984 in B.C.I. Tr. Case
No. 12 of 1982 whereby the Disciplinary committee has found the appellant guilty of serious
professional misconduct and has imposed the punishment of suspension from practice for a
period of one year.

The State Bar Council referred the case to one of its Disciplinary Committee but the said
Committee could not complete the proceedings in the prescribed time of one year and, therefore
the proceedings were transferred to the Bar Council of India under section 36b of the Act and
thereafter the Disciplinary Committee dealt with the proceedings.

In support of the complaint, the complainant examined himself as a witness and produced the
judgment debtor, Shri Ram, as well as Sunderial and Bairaj Gupta. The complainant also
produced a number of documents. The appellant examined himself in defense.

Shri R.B. Mehrotra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the
Disciplinary Committee has erred in holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct on
the basis of the charge relating to notice under section 80 C.P.C. having been drafted by the
appellant. The submission is that the said charge was not contain in the complaint filed by the
complainant and was put forward for the first time before the Disciplinary Committee of the
State Bar Council by the complainant in his application and furthermore the request of the
appellant for examination of the handwriting in the draft of the notice filed as document No. 16
by an expert to show that the said draft of the notice was not in the handwriting of the appellant
having been rejected by the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Committee was in error in
holding, on the basis of a comparison of the admitted handwriting of the appellant with the
handwriting in document 16, that the same was written by the appellant.

It was in agreement with Shri Mehrotra that the Disciplinary Committee was in error in holding
the appellant guilty of professional misconduct for drafting the notice under section 80 CPC
which was served upon the union of India through the General Manager, Western Railways on
behalf of M/s. Agarwal Traders. Ghaziabad on the view that document No. 16, the draft of the
said notice, was in the handwriting of the appellant. The Disciplinary Committee has arrived at
this conclusion by a comparison of the handwriting of the appellant in Document No. 16. We
find that during the course of arguments a request by the learned Counsel appearing for the
appellant before the Disciplinary Committee to send document No. 16 to a handwriting expert
for examination, but the said request made on behalf of the appellant was rejected by the
Disciplinary Committee on November. 27, 1983 on the view that no useful purpose would be
served because the allegation relating to the said document was not contained originally in the
complaint. The Disciplinary Committee was in error in going into the merits to the said
allegation and furthermore in comparing the handwriting in the said document with the
handwriting of the appellant without the assistance of the opinion of a handwriting expert and
incoming to the conclusion that the said was in the handwriting of the appellant.

It was of the opinion that it was not advisable for the Disciplinary Committee to base its
conclusion purely on the basis of its own comparison of the handwriting, especially when the
matter related to a charge of professional misconduct which is quasi criminal in nature requiring
prove beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it was unable to uphold the finding recorded by the
Disciplinary Committee holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct for having
prepared the draft of the notice under Section 80 CPC that was served on the Union of India Oil
on behalf of M/s Agarwal Traders

Thus, the appeal was partly allowed and, while holding the appellant guilty of professional
misconduct in wrongfully retaining the amount of Rs. 1500 which was kept with him in
connection with the settlement in the execution proceedings till he deposited the said amount in
the court on May, 2, 1978 and in not paying the said amount to the decree holder in spite of
demand, the penalty was imposed of reprimand on the appellant for the said misconduct. No
order as to cost.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(From Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India)

CIVIL APPEAL CASE NO. 1992 OF 1979, DATED 3/8/1979

VIJAYA SINGH

VS.

MURALILAR AND OTHERS

PRESENT:
 HON’BLE JUSTICE A. KOSHAL
HON’BLE JUSTICE V. K IVE

ORDER:
The Appellant, a fledging in the legal profession, has been punished by the Tribunal of the Bar
Council for eating the forbidden fruit of dubious professional conduct by improperly certifying,
the solvency of a surety for an accused person, his client. Suspension from practice for one
month is the punishment awarded by the trial tribunal and in appeal. Counsel for the appellant
Shri Khanduja, has pleaded for an admonitory sentence by the Court ex-misericordium. Of
course, the punitive pharmacopoeia of the Advocates Act, in Section 35, does permit reprimand
provided the ends of public justice are met by this leniency, Afterall, public professions which
enjoy a monopoly of public audience have a statutorily enforced social accountability for purity,
probity and people conscious service. In our Republic, Article 19(1)(g) vests a fundamental right
to practice any profession only subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general
public (vide Article 19(6). The law forbids the members of the legal or other like professions
from converting themselves into a conspiracy against the laity and all regulations necessary for
ensuring a people- oriented bar without exploitation potential are permissible, nay necessary.
Rule 10, chapter 2 part six of the Rules of Bar Council of India for Professional Misconduct
framed for disciplinary purposes is stated to have been violated by the appellant for which
dispensatory punishment has been meted out.

The factual setting gives an insight into the degree of deviance of the delinquent appellant.
Punishment must be geared to a social goal, at once deterrent and reformatory. In the present
case, the appellant is charged with certifying the solvency of a surety in a bailable offence.
Obviously, the accused, who was the client of the appellant, was entitled to be enlarged on bail
because the offence for which he was in custody was admittedly bailable. Even so, it is a
common phenomenon in our country that bail has too often become, a bogey and an instrument
of unjust incarceration. There are some magistrates who are never satisfied about the solvency of
sureties except when the property of the surety is within their jurisdiction and Revenue Officers
have attested their worth. This harasses the poor and leads to corruption as pointed out by this
Court in Moti Ram's case Moti Ram and Ors.
v. State of M.P. [1969] 1 SCR 335. It may, therefore, be quite on the cards that some sympathetic
lawyer who appears for an indigent accused may commiserate and enquire whether the surety is
solvent. If he is satisfied, on sure basis, that the surety is sufficiently solvent, then he may
salvage the freedom of the accused by certifying the solvency of which he has satisfied himself.
It is also possible that the detainee is a close relation or close friend or a poor servant of his. In
that capacity, not as a lawyer, he may know the surety and his solvency or may offer himself as a
surety. If a lawyer's father or mother is arrested and the Court orders release on bail, it is quite
conceivable and perhaps legitimate, if the son appears for his parent and also stands surety. He
violates the rule all the same. The degree of "Culpability in a lawyer violating Rule 10, chapter 2,
part six depends on the total circumstances and the social milieu.

This Court has held, taking cognizance of the harassment flowing from sureties being insisted
upon before a person is enlarged or bailed out, that the Court has the jurisdiction to release on his
own bond without the necessity of a surety. The question, therefore, is whether the circumstances
of the offence and offender are venal or venial.

The Rule with which we are concerned is a wholesome one in the sense that lawyers should not
misuse their role for making extra perquisites by standing surety for their clients or certifying the
solvency of such sureties. That is a bolt on the bar, an exploitative stain on the profession. At the
same time, the punishment is flexible in the sense that where the situation cries for the help of the
lawyer in favour of a client who is languishing in jail because his surety is being unreasonably
rejected, we may not frown upon a lawyer who helps out the person, not by false pretenses, but
on the strength of factual certitude and proven inability to substantiate solvency. In the present
case, the circumstances are amelioratory and hardly warrant condign punishment.

The lawyer is young, the offence is not tainted with turpitude and the surety whose solvency be
certified was found to be good. The most that may be justified is perhaps a public reprimand
since censure has a better deterrent value on the errant brethren in the profession in some
situations than a suspension for a month from professional practice which may pass unnoticed in
the crowd of lawyers and the delinquent himself may be plying his business except for
appearance in Court. In suitable cases, of course, even severity of suspension or disbarment may
be, justified.

This Court should not interfere ordinarily with a punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Tribunal except where strong circumstances involving principle are present. In our vast country
of illiterate litigants and sophisticated litigation, the legal position must be so explained as to
harmonize the interests of the indigents who are marched into Court and the professional probity
of the Bar which is an extended instrument of justice.

It was held that public admonition is an appropriate sentence in the present case and proceed to
administer it in open court to the appellant. Thereby he was reprimanded, and directed that he
shall not violate the norms of professional conduct and shall uphold the purity and probity of the
profession generally, and, in particular, as spelt out in the rules framed by the Bar Council of
India. We condone his deviance this time and warn him that he shall not violate again.

The appeal is, to this extent, allowed and the sentence of reprimand substituted for the sentence
of suspension.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

S.K. NAGAR …. COMPLAINANT

VS.
 V.P. JAIN …... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI B.S RATHORE, CHAIRMAN

SHRI ARUN MISHRA, CHAIRMAN, BCI SHRI M LOKESH, MEMBER

JUDGMENT:
Allegations giving rise to this complaint are that the complainant was a patient of Civil Hospital,
Ghaziabad for about a month and was treated by Dr. Rastogi of the said hospital. He approached
the said doctor in the month of January 1997 and was advised for operation of cataract in the
right eye. Then he approached the OP-Dr. S.K. Jain for expert advice on 03-02-1997 who after
examining the eyes told him that he has cataract in both the eyes and the right eye required
immediate operation and prescribed certain medicines and called him again on 05-02-1997 for
examination of retina.

After using medicines, he again contacted the OP on 5-2-97 who after examining the right eye
told that the retina is in perfect condition and there is no ill- effect whatsoever of blood sugar on
any part of the right eye. He again approached the OP on 26-02-1997 and the OP checked and
decided the lens number to be fitted inside the eye during operation and suggested date and time
of operation as 01-03-1997 at 10.30 A.M.

On 01-03-1996 complainant again called upon the OP for operation but the operation could not
be conducted because of high blood pressure. He was again called on 06-03-1997 and the
operation was conducted and O.P. charged Rs. 3,500/- as professional fee and Rs. 3,000/- as the
price of the lens. During the course of operation, the lens slipped and fell into the right eye and
could not be taken out and the surgery was abandoned. The OP after completion of the operation
told the complainant that the operation was successful and he will have a very good vision within
10-15 days. But with passage of time the vision deteriorated and finally the vision was
completely lost. When he approached the OP, he was told to get X-ray and ultra sound done
which were done on 11-04-1997. From the X-ray it transpired that there is a total retinal
detachment which was beyond repair.

In support of his allegations of medical negligence of the OP, the complainant has relied upon
letter dated 11-04-1997 written by the OP to the following effect: -

On the date everything was going on smoothly but all of a sudden, the IOC upper lens broke and
came out and slipped in the postural chamber which could not be taken out in spite of efforts as
such the whole surgery was abandoned. In his defense the OP has come out with the following
version: -

The lens was purchased by the complainant and not by the OP. Lens was in sealed package and it
could not be examined before the operation. The lens was defective which came to knowledge of
the respondent only when the lens was partly inserted into the right eye which cracked from the
upper side but he safely set the same into the eye of the complainant. Due to the defective upper
heptic of the lens, the lens could not be taken out from the eye and he was not at all responsible
for the same. The lens was left in the eye itself as the medical literature provided that the lenses
that have dislocated into the vitreous body should be left alone, provided they do not fall
anteriorly into the anterior chamber. The tendency for such dislocation can be tested with the
pupil widely dilated.

On the contrary the Counsel for the complainant contends that in para 6 of the reply the OP had
admitted that he was having high blood pressure on 01-03-1997 and as such surgery was not
done and postponed to 06-03-1997 and therefore OP was well aware that the complainant was
suffering from high blood sugar and until it became normal the operation could not be conducted.
It is further contended that even if due to inadvertence the lens fell in the eye it was the duty of
the OP to inform the complainant thereabout so that he could avail the remedy immediately.
Complainant has also relied upon the certificate dated 0205-2001 issued by R.P. Centre for
Ophthalmic Science (AIIMS) which is to the following effect: -

This is to certify that Mr. R.L. Jain, 56 years male was seen in the Centre vide OP No.
908303 has dislocated OIL with retinal detachment (R). His vision is PR inaccurate RE & 6/6: E/
He suffers from 30% visual handicap.

The court first dealt with the concept of medical negligence in context of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 as case of negligence arises from the definition of deficiency in service
provided by Section 2(1)(g) of the Act.

The OP was negligent on two aspects. Firstly, he should have ensured about the quality of lens
before undertaking the operation. Even if it was assumed that it was not possible to see the
quality of lens because of it being in sealed condition but the OP was negligent in handling it
properly as the lens could have been broken due to its quality or otherwise.

Giving due weight to every aspect of the matter, nature of negligence and competence of the OP
doctor as the negligence was because of mishandling of the lens, it was deemed that lumpsum
compensation of Rs. 50,000/- including the cost of litigation would meet the ends of justice as
complainant lost his vision.

Hence the complaint is disposed of.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

BCI TR CASE NO.38/1994

J.N. GUPTA . ….. COMPLAINANT

VS.
D.C. SINGHANIA AND J.K. GUPTA …... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI O.P. SHARMA, CHAIRMAN
 SHRI T.P. SINGH, MEMBER SHRI S.K. PADHI, MEMBER

Advocate Act, (Act No.25 of 1961) Section 35&36 professional misconduct. Respondent
advocate had issued two advertisements in the newspaper for the first time indicating their
change of address to another place on account of fire in the building and for the second time for
shifting back to the building which was their old office. Therefore, the respondent made a
publication in the International Bar Directory giving the names and addresses of the officers
under the heading “Singhania & Company” “Firms major case”, and representative client.

JUDGMENT:

Shri. J.N. Gupta, Complainant, present in person. Shri Vibhu Singhania, Advocate for Shri D.C.
Singhania and Shri. J.K. Gupta are present in person. In view of the facts made in the complaint
are admitted by the charged Advocate, no further ID required. However, Shri J.K. Gupta has
submitted that he is not a partner in Singhania & Company, which is a sole proprietorship firm.
Otherwise also he cannot be tagged with the act of the company the complainant stated that his
name finds place as a partner in the International Directory filed along with complaint.
Judgement Reserved.

The facts are admitted in this case. In view of the contention of the parties that no issues are
required to frame as facts are admitted and none of the parties propose to adduce any evidence,
we proceeded to hear the matter on the basis of facts on record.

The short question for consideration is that whether the complainant petition accepted as a whole
make out any allegation of professional misconduct against the respondents is that they had
issued an advertisement in the Indian Express on 3rd May, 1991 and 14th December 1991 in
which they indicated their change of address. According to the complainant under the guise of
change of address, the respondents were advertising themselves. The paperpublications have
been annexed as annexure “A” an Annexure “C” to the complaint petition.

The second part of the complaint petition which is proposed to deal now is the name of Singhania
& Company which was published in the International Bar 1991 giving detail of their addresses,
type of practice etc., which has been annexed to the complaint petition as Annexure “B”.

It would be relevant to extract Rule 36 framed by the Bar Council of India with regard to
advertisement under the healing “Duty to Colleagues” which forms a part of Chapter II i.e.,
“Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette”.
In the present case the respondents have made a publication in the International Bar Directory
giving the name of their partners and the addresses of their officer. In the said publication
addresses of advocates/solicitors' firm and the company has been given. According to this, by
itself would not constitute any professional misconduct.

The Court held that there was no violation of the rule against advertisement concerning
publication in the newspaper as the same was made on account of the fire, which required urgent
notice of change in address to be given to existing clients. About the publication in the
International Bar Directory, it was held that publication in any manner, either in National or
International Bar Directory would not constitute a violation of Rule 36 if it is done to give
information of address or telephone numbers of advocates. However, in the instant case, it was
found that the publication was made to give publicity to the fact that the law firm had dealt with
important cases and had eminent clients; hence, was being used to advertise the firm itself.

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (civil) 3050 of 2000

PRAVIN C. SHAH …... PETITIONER

VS

K.A. MOHD. ALI & ANR. …..... RESPONDENT

 BENCH:

K.T.Thomas,
S.N.Variava
JUDGMENT: THOMAS,
J.
We thought that the question involved in this appeal would generate much interest to the legal
profession and hence we issued notices to the Bar Council of India as well as the State Bar
Council concerned. But the Bar Council of India did not respond to the notice. We therefore
requested Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, Senior Advocate, to help us as amicus curiae. The learned
senior counsel did a commendable job to help us by projecting a wide screen focussing on the
full profiles of the subject with his usual felicity. We are beholden to him.

When an advocate was punished for contempt of court can he appear thereafter as a counsel in
the courts, unless he purges himself of such contempt? If he cannot, then what is the way he can
purge himself of such contempt. That question has now come to be determined by the Supreme
Court.

This matter concerns an advocate practising mostly in the courts situated within Ernakulam
District of Kerala State. He was hauled up for contempt of court on two successive occasions.
We wish to skip the facts in both the said cases which resulted in his being hauled up for such
contempt as those facts have no direct bearing on the question sought to be decided now. (The
detailed facts leading to the said proceedings have been narrated in the two decisions of the High
Court of Kerala reported in C.N. Presannan vs. K.A. Mohammed Ali 1991 Criminal Law Journal
2194 and 1991 Criminal Law Journal 2205). Nonetheless it is necessary to state that the High
Court of Kerala found the respondent-advocate guilty of criminal contempt in both cases and
convicted him under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and sentenced him in one
case to a fine of Rs.10,000/- (to be credited, if realised, to the funds of Kerala Legal Aid Board).
In the second case he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. Though he challenged the
conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court, he did not succeed in the Supreme
Court except getting the fine of Rs.2,000/- in one case deleted. The apology tendered by him in
this Court was not accepted, for which a two Judge Bench made the following observation: We
regretfully will not be able to accept his apology at this belated juncture, but would rather
admonish the appellant for his conduct under our plenary powers under the constitution, which
we do hereby.
The above conviction and sentence and refusal to accept the apology tendered on his behalf did
not create any ripple in him, so far as his resolve to continue to appear and conduct cases in the
courts was concerned. The present appellant (who represents an association Lalan Road
Residents Association, Cochin) brought to the notice of the Bar Council of Kerala that the
delinquent advocate continued to conduct cases before the courts in Ernakulam District in spite
of the conviction and sentence.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

D.C. APPEAL NO. 11/1994 DATED 20.6.1998

AJMER SINGH …... APPELLANT

VS.

JAGIR SINGH …... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI D.V SUBHA RAO, CHAIRMAN
 SHRI P. KUMARAN KUTTY, MEMBER SHRI N.A. ALI, MEMBER
JUDGMENT:
The present appeal arises from the order of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana dated
6.6.1993. By the said order the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the complaint filed
by Shri. Ajmer Singh against the respondent advocate, Jagir Singh. The gist of the complaint is
that one Amar Singh filed a civil suit No.268/1986 in the court of Sub- Judge 1st class, Karnal
claiming half share in the land situated in village Karsa Dod, Tehsil and District Karnal
(Haryana) on the ground that they are the descendent of predecessors in interest of the
complainant. The said suit was dismissed by the learned Sub-Judge 1st class on 9.9.1988. After
the suit was disposed of the legal representative of Amer Singh deceased and other filed an
appeal before the District Judge, Karnal and the same was accepted by the Additional District
Judge, Karnal vide Judgement dated 24.5.1990 and there by the suit was decreed. In the
complaint it is alleged that the respondent-advocate, Shri Jagir Singh appeared for the appellants
and after the suit was disposed of, he purchased the property partly in his named and partly in the
name of other relation. The case of the complainant is that he learnt in the month of February,
1992 that the respondent-Advocate entered into an agreement even prior to the disposal of the
matter and that he agreed to appear in the matter on condition that the property will be
transferred in case it is decreed in the appellant’s favour. The complainant had also alleged that
he and the other co-owner had also learnt that in fact Shri. Amar Singh (Deceased) figured as
plaintiff at instance of said Sri Jagir Singh and filed the suit with ulterior motive to grab the land
dispute. The respondent Sri Jagir Singh, Advocate had probably some knowledge about the pre
degree table of the plaintiff’s family and decided to proof that the plaintiff-respondent were
descendant of one of the branches of the predecessors in interest of the complainant and other co-
owner.

Respondent-Advocate has denied the allegation and stated that he only appeared in appeal,
before the sale deeds were obtained, agreement of sale were executed and the balanced of the
sale consideration was paid. He also denied any conspiracy in getting the property in his favour
and in favour of his relations. Before the D.C. of the State Bar Council all the sale deeds were
filed under which the properties were purchased an agreement of were also marked. Affidavits
were also filed on behalf of the sellers. In the affidavit the deponents have stated that the
deponent and the other co-sharer enter into agreement to sell their 1⁄2 share in land measuring
284-17M ON 15.6.1990 for total consideration of Rs. 10,628.58. It was further stated that there
was no litigation pending at the time of agreement of sale or sale deed.

From the facts and circumstances of the case it is cleared that a second appeal is pending in the
High Court and that respondent-advocate and his family members are impleaded as parties. Sec
52 pf the Transfer of Property Act 1882 clearly says that were property is the subject matter of
legal proceedings the property cannot be purchased or otherwise dealt with so as to affect the
rights of the parties except under the authority of the Court. Neither of the party has stated
anything about the disposal of the matter RAC 1760-90 in the High Court. It is presumed that the
same is pending. Even if the client says, as in the present case, that the property was voluntary
sold for full consideration, the purchase of property by his council certainly raises the issue of the
property. There appear to be very thin line of the distinction between Rule 22 and what had
transpired in this case Sec 136 of the Transfer of Property Act which says that an advocate or an
Officer of High Court shall not receive any interest in any actionable claim. The fact that the
respondent has purchased the property before the litigation is completed, itself raises the issue of
property. Now the issue before us is not what would be the consequences of purchases of
property but the very act of purchased itself. In 47(2) Law weekly 42 the Madras High Court
held that a lawyer purchasing a decree is guilty of professional misconduct.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEAL NO.4240/1986 DATED 28-01-1997

HIKMAT ALI KHAN

.. VS.

ISHWAR PRASAD ARYA ... AND OTHERS

PRESENT:
 JUSTICE S.C AGARWAL

JUSTICE SUJATA V MANOHAR

Ishwar Prasad Arya was an advocate practicing at Badaun in Uttar Pradesh. He assaulted his
opponent, Radhey Shyam in the courtroom of munsif at Badaun with knife. After investigation
he was prosecuted for offences under section 307 of the IPC and section 25 of the Arms Act and
he was sentenced for 3 years imprisonment. But he remained free on fraudulent letter said to
have come from governor suspending the conviction. The III additional District and session
judge, Badaun send a complaint containing these facts to the chairman, Bar Council of UP. The
disciplinary committee of UP Bar Council debarred him from practice for the period of 2 years.
The Advocate appeal to the bar council of India which set aside the orders of the Bar Council of
UP.

Subsequently by taking into account of the bad conduct of the Advocate i.e., Conviction for the
offence under S.307 of I.P.C and his name being entered by the police in a register which
contains the list of persons with bad character he was debarred for the practice for a period of 3
years by the State Bar Council. On appeal this order was also set aside by the Bar Council of
India because it is interconnected with the earlier matter. Hikmat Ali Khan preferred an appeal
before Supreme Court against this order.

The Supreme court held that the second order of the State Bar Council was based on totally a
different ground not connected with the grounds of the first order and the Bar Council of India
was erroneous in setting aside the second order of the U.P. Bar Council. Further Supreme court
held that the gravity of the misconduct committed by him is so serious and the punishment of
suspending him from practice for 3 years is not sufficient and ordered the removal of his name
from the roll of Advocates.

JUDGMENT:

The 1st Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated July 3, 1972, convicted him
of the said offense and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the
offence under Section 307 I.P.C. and for a period of nine months for offence under Section 25 of
the Arms Act.

The conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. were maintained by the
High Court by its judgment dated September 10, 1975 in Criminal Appeal No. 1873 of 1972 but
he was given the benefit of doubt regarding offence under Section 25 of Arms Act and the
conviction and sentence for the said offence were set aside.

April 28, 1976, purporting to have been sent by Shri L.R. Singh, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
Home, U.P., Lucknow, addressed to the District Magistrate, Badaun bearing endorsement No.
1513(II)-75-76 was received in the Court of the rd Additional District and Session Judge,
Badaun, who was responsible for executing the order of the court of the 1st Temporary Civil &
Sessions Judge on its abolition. In the said letter it was stated that the Governor has been pleased
to suspend the conviction of Ishwar Prasad Arya under Article 161 of the Constitution with
immediate effect and until further orders, he should remain free.

After receiving the copy of the said letter dated April 28, 1979, stayed the proceedings in the case
and despite repeated inquiries by the court from the State Government about the suspension of
the sentences the execution of the sentence awarded to respondent remained suspended till
September 27, 1977, when on receipt of a crash radiogram message from the Home Ministry,
Lucknow, it was found that the letter dated April 28,1976 was fraudulent and thereupon a
warrant for the arrest of respondent no.1 was issued by the court on September 28, 1977 and he
was arrested the same day and was sent to Badaun Jail to undergo the imprisonment.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTED OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

D.C. APPEAL NO.45/2000

KAMLA PRASAD MISHRA …..... APPELLANT

VS
 MEHILAL …...RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI B.S. RRATHORE, CHAIRMAN

SHRI R.S. CHAUHAN, MEMBER

SHRI RAJENDRA SING VERMA, MEMBER
ORDER:
This application arises out of a proceeding under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling
Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 1961 in which a proceeding was started against the
petitioner in the year 1973 and 50.21 acres of land have been found surplus. The petitioner has so
far failed before all the authorities in saving the properties but before the Board of Revenue there
has been a partial remand.

The impugned order has been assailed primarily on two grounds i.e., (i) that 9.55 acres of land
transferred by the petitioner in the name of his wife Ram Jyoti who was living separately from
the petitioner could not be included under the holding of the petitioner; and (ii) that the revenue
authorities have committed an apparent error of law in adding another area of 5.98 acres of land
which was dedicated to the deities namely Sri Ram Jankijee, as far back as in the year 1913.

The Board of revenue in para 5 of its resolution has said that "This point was not pressed during
the hearing before this Court. The learned lower court had rightly held that the lands possessed
by the first wife as well as by the second wife would be clubbed along with the lands held by the
petitioner".

Although the first point as appears from the resolution of the Board was not pressed there,
learned counsel, however, pressed the point in this Court and also placed reliance on the case of
Arti Devi v. State of Bihar 1980 B. B. C J. (HC) 23. In the case relied upon by the learned
counsel, apart from taking a view contrary to the other cases of this Court, the fact of that case
was that the partition has taken place between the wife and the husband who thereafter had taken
a second wife in which the properties allotted were separately mutated in her name much before
the 'appointed day'. According to the very definition of the expression

"Landholder", the person and his or her spouse and their minor children have to be taken together
as a unit of a family. Therefore, the principle laid down in the case of Arti Devi would have no
application in the present case, as it was observed in that case that on that account the first wife
ceased to be a member of the family of the male landholder and made her an independent entity
in law.

Reference in this connection may be made to another Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Mahabir Prasad v. The State AIR 1976 Pat 256 (Para 22) where it was observed that "Section 5
creates family as a unit for the purpose of the ceiling law. Observations in the former decision of
this Court in Arti Devi's case (1980 B. B. C. J. (HC) 23) (supra) can be viewed as somewhat
conflicting with the above observations extracted from Mahabir Prasad's case (AIR 1976 Pat
256). Earlier case was not noticed in the latter case and I find myself in complete agreement with
the view expressed by the learned Judges in Mahabir Prasad's case. First point has, therefore, no
substance and must fail.

The second point indicated above is that the power of the Collector to enquire into the validity of
transaction was only with reference to the date mentioned in Section 5(l)(ii). The power can be
exercised from the appointed day and not before that, and inasmuch as the Samarpannama was of
the year 1913 much before the ceiling law was even conceived, the revenue authorities had
committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in examining the correctness of the Samarpannama.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is entirely erroneous and
must be rejected. Reasoning of the authorities is that in spite of the execution of the deed of
Samarpannama in the revisional survey the lands dedicated to the deities were recorded in the
name of the petitioner's family and therefore, in order to chase the lands of the landholder to find
out the surplus area held by the petitioner, they could still examine as to whether the
Samarpannama had become operative or remained simply a paper transaction. For this purpose, a
limited enquiry could be permissible. On local enquiry and the materials on the records and
appreciation of the evidence that was put on the record by the parties the finding of fact has been
recorded that the land was dedicated to the deities under the Samarpannama but it was never
acted upon.

The learned counsel, however, emphasised on a Ladabi deed which was executed in the year
1973 by the petitioner in favour of the deities and it was contended that his right, title and interest
could not be deemed to be subsisting. This argument is also fallacious in as much as in view of
the earlier finding that the dedications to the deities remained simply a paper transaction thereby
the property still remained with the family of the petitioner, there was no effective transfer of
ownership from the petitioner unto the deities. In that event the execution of the Ladabi was
entirely misconceived in law and could not improve the position. The contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The application, therefore fails and is hereby
dismissed.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

B.C.I. TR. CASE NO.68/1999

SUO MOTTO ENQUIRY … COMPLAINANT

VS.
 NAND LAL BALWANI ... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
SHRI B.S. BATORE, CHAIRMAN

SHRI ARUN MISHRA, MEMBER SHRI M.P. BHARDWAZ, MEMBER

JUDGMENT:
Respondent Advocate committed a most highly unprecedented action on 26.2.1999 by which the
entire country was shocked to know that he hurled the shoes and shouted slogans in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa initiated Suo Motto proceeding on
27.3.99, but the Bar Council of India considered the issue of great importance and ordered the
case to be made over the Bar Council of India Disciplinary Committee for its trial.

He states that he has files this affidavit in which he has admitted his intemperate behavior in the
Court. The contemnor was asked if he have anything further to say in his defense and he stated
that he did not have anything further to say in his defense but he had files and interim affidavit
and would like to file a detailed affidavit giving details of how he has been persecuted by the
police agencies so far. It was not considered necessary to examine him any further on that aspect
since in so far as the charge of contempt of Court is concerned, he has nothing further to say.

The apology was disallowed and the contemnor was punished with the sentence to suffer for
simple imprisonment for four months and pay a fine a Rs.2,000/- and in default in payment of
fine further to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court’s
order in view of seriousness of the offence committed by the contemnor, it is necessary to
impose punishment on him so that it serves an example to others and no one indulges in
repetition of such acts.

The apology was rejected, firstly, since respondent has passed the law in the year 1993 and was
enrolled as an advocate in 1995. He is supposed to know the method redressal of grievance. The
action of the respondent is most condemnable and unparallel in the history of judiciary of India.
It cannot be imagined by any sane person that such an incident can even take place that too in the
court of Hon’ble of Chief Justice of India were the respondent hadadmittedly no matter at all
listed for arguments on 26.2.99. His own personal matter was in some different Court and was
dismissal of the petition the respondent ought to know being a lawyer that only remedy was to
file Review Petition. No complaint of nature of summary dismissal of the matter could be
entertained or files by the respondent. His action was wholly uncalled for. It was motivated,
deliberate and highly undesirable

The act done by him cannot be allowed to resort to by any person much less a lawyer. If such act
has been done by a lawyer that becomes more serious, harmful to the institution, the Bar and the
Bench.

The findings in the instant case are final of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The jurisdiction is not to
go beyond them. The respondent has also admitted his act. His submission that he was harasses
by the Police or suffered injustice in the Court case can never be taken as an excuse justifying his
most irresponsible uncalled for act which happen in Hon’ble Supreme Court on 26th February,
1999. Charge, issues no 1 & 2 are fully proved against respondent by the judgment and the
admission made before us and in view of findings recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme court and
misconduct admitted before us.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2385 OF 1977

WITH CONTEMPT PETITION NO.147 OF 2000 DATED 20-7-1983

 K.V. UMRE … APPELLANT

VS.
SMT. VENUBAI D. GAGE ... RESPONDENTS

AND ANR.

PRESENT:
JUSTICE A.P. SEN

JUSTICE E.S. VENKATARAIAH JUSTICE R.B. MISHRA

JUDGMENT:
This appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is directed against an order of the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated July 13, 1977 rejecting an application
for review.

By an order dated May 9, 1977 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India directed
the appellant, who had misappropriated the decretal amount of Rs. 11,760.70 payable to the
respondent, to pay the same to her in two instalments, one of Rs. 6,000/- by May 25, 1977 and
another of Rs. 4,000/-within three months from May 9, 1977. The appellant was held guilty of
grave professional misconduct and the Disciplinary Committee took a serious view of the matter
but gave the appellant another chance. It accordingly directed that if the appellant paid the
amount of Rs. 10,000/-as directed, he shall remain suspended from practice for a period of one
year from August 10, 1977. On his failure to deposit Rs. 6,000/- by May 25, 1977 as stipulated,
his name shall stand removed from the rolls of advocates permanently with effect from May 25,
1977. Although the appellant made payment of Rs. 10,000/- in two installments but he made a
default in not making the deposits on due dates as stipulated and consequently the eligibility
clause was attracted resulting in his permanent disbarment. The appellant made an application for
review to the Disciplinary Committee praying that the delay in making the payment be condoned
and the period of suspension be limited to one year. The Disciplinary Committee however
rejected the application observing that if the appellant had not volunteered to pay Rs. 10,000/- in
two installments on due dates, the punishment would have been much more severe. It observed
that he had deprived the respondent, who was a helpless widow, of money legitimately due to her
without any reasonable excuse and that there was no ground for showing any leniency as it
would be against the spirit of r. 20 of the Disciplinary Rules of the Bar Council of India. It took a
strict view having regard to the fact that there were a large number of claims for death or bodily
injury resulting in motor accident in the country, and if lawyers were allowed to withhold
payment of compensation awarded and pay the same in installments, it would amount to sharing
of profits of litigation.

It is needless to stress that in a case like this the punishment has to be deterrent. There was in this
case complete lack of condor on the part of the appellant as earlier alleged and thereafter when
the State Bar Council initiated disciplinary proceedings, he took a false plea that Rs. 6,600/- were
due to him towards fee and other miscellaneous expenses. The respondent was prevailed upon by
the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India to accept a lesser sum of Rs. 10,000/-.
Looking to the seriousness of the charge, we feel that the Disciplinary Committee took a rather
lenient view in limiting the period of suspension to one year, but the fact remains that the
appellant ultimately paid Rs. 10,000/- although there was delay in making payment of the
installments. If the Disciplinary Committee had initially struck off the name of the appellant
from the rolls for all times, then the rejection of the application for review would be justified but
the Disciplinary Committee limited the period of suspension to one year. The appellant having
paid the amount of Rs. 10,000/-, the Disciplinary Committee had to consider whether it could
condone the delay in making payment of the installments. While condoning the delay, it could
have enhanced the period of suspension but this could not result in permanent disbarment. We
therefore feel that the Disciplinary Committee should consider the application for review afresh
in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. This direction should not be construed to
mean that the period of suspension should be limited to one year. In fixing the period of
suspension, it must keep in view that the appellant had completely betrayed the trust reposed in
him by the respondent. Subject to this direction, the appeal shall be no order as to costs.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3206 OF 1993, DT 17.12.1993

JOHN D’SOUZA ... APPELLANT

VS.
 EDWARD ANI ... RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
JUSTICE S. RATNAVEL,
PANDIAN JUSTICE P.B,
SAWANT JUDGMENT:
The judgment of the court was delivered by S.RATNAVEL, PANDIAN, J – the appellant who is
an advocate in Bangalore practicing since 1942 was proceeded against for professional
misconduct on the basis of a complaint dated November 7, 1986 lodged by the respondent, Mr.
Edward ANI with the Karnataka State Bar Council (Bangalore) under Section 35 of the Advocate
Act alleging that the appellant with whom a will dated July 1, 1968 executed by his mother-in-
law, Mrs. Mary Raymond was entrusted for safe custody against receipt dated July 5, 1968
bearing Serial No. 576 in his register of Wills (marked as Ex. P-1) refused to return that will in
spite of two letter dated January 4, 1982 and April 15, 1986 demanding the appellant to hand
over the will kept in his custody and that the appellant thereby has committed professional
misconduct.

It is the case of the respondent that he wrote two letters to tile appellant of which one dated
January 4, 1982 was sent on behalf of Mrs. Mary Raymond under Certificate of Posting from
Manchester (U.K.) marked as Ex. P-6 and another letter dated April 15, 1986 by himself under
Registered Post with A/D marked as Ex. P-8. Both the letters were addressed to the appellant
requesting him to return the will dated July 1, 1968. But the appellant did not reply to both the
letters and kept conspicuous silence.

The second will be executed in 1978 was probated on February 21, 1984 after the death of Mrs.
Mary Raymond on October 29, 1983.

On being aggrieved at the conduct of the appellant in not replying to his letters and returning the
will kept in his custody, the respondent filed a complaint dated November 7, 1986 before the
Karnataka Bar Council. By a Resolution No. 110 of 1987 on July 12, 1987, the State Council
rejected that complaint holding that there was no prima facie case made out. The respondent
preferred a revision before the Bar Council of India which by its order dated November 20, 1988
set aside the order of the State Bar Council and allowed the revision holding that there existed
prima facie case of misconduct against the respondent (advocate) and remitted the matter to the
Disciplinary Committee of the State Council.
The Disciplinary Committee further suspended the appellant herein from practice for a period of
one year.

The appellant filed a Stay Petition No. 24 of 1993 under Section 14(2) of the Advocates Act
before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India praying to stay the operation of its
order dated June 4, 1993 suspending him from practice, so as to enable him to prefer an appeal
before this Court. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India vide its order dated
June 23, 1993 suspended the impugned order for one month from the date of communication of
the order.

The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant along with an application for stay. When
the matter was mentioned on July 20, 1993, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned
order.

According to Mr. Jethmalani, the will in question had been revoked and returned on January 13,
1982 presumably to Mrs. Mary Raymond who was then alive. That fact is supported by an
endorsement made by the appellant's wife in the register of Wills and that even assuming that the
will had not been returned, the appellant cannot be said to have committed any breach of trust by
retaining the revoked will which after its revocation had become a mere scrap-paper; that the
appellant cannot even by imagination be said to have entertained any dishonest or oblique motive
or Carried any pecuniary profit by keeping the revoked will which had become res nullius and
indisputably was a worthless paper having no value.

The respondent appearing in person took much pains to sustain the findings of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India submitting inter alia, that the appellant who kept the will
in his custody was in the nature of a Trustee and as such he was entitled to return the will on
demand and that the question of oblique motive or private gain has no relevance. As neither the
testatrix, Mrs. Mary Raymond nor the respondent, being the legal representative of the estate of
the testatrix, had abandoned the will which was their property, it cannot be said that the will had
become res nullius. He asserts that the appellant should have received the first letter or at least
deemed to have received that letter (Ex. P6) which had been posted from Manchester (U.K.)
under Certificate of Posting (Ex. P-6A).

The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India after examining the matter in detail
disapproved the findings of the State Bar Council holding.
On the basis of the above findings, the impugned order was passed. The fact that Mr. George
DaCosta requested the appellant to hand over the will cannot be said to be an afterthought and
invented only at the time of filing the complaint.

Raymond and on her death had become his property and that the said document was not
abandoned by either of them.

On an overall evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case it is held that the respondent
has proved that the appellant had not returned the will. It has to be remembered, in this
connection, that his earlier stand was that he did not have the will. He changed the position later
and came out with the case that he had returned it in 1982 and for this purpose he relied upon an
endorsement made by his wife in his register of documents. We are left with the irresistible
conclusion, in the circumstances, that he had not returned the will though demands were made
first by the testatrix, then by her new lawyer and by the respondent who was also holding the
power of attorney from the testatrix when he wrote the first letter and was the executor appointed
under the second will. The conduct of the appellant in not returning the will even on demand is
unworthy of an advocate belonging to a noble profession. The appellant has no right to withhold
the will. On the other hand, he was bound in duty to return the said will when demanded because
the instrument was entrusted to his custody by the testatrix, Mrs. Mary Raymond only on trust.

Under these circumstances, we do not find any reason much less compelling reason to interfere
with the impugned order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India. The Appeal
is accordingly dismissed and the stay granted by this Court shall stand vacated. No costs.
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEAL, NO. 3588 OF 1984, DATED 6-2-1997

PRAHLAD ARAN GUPTA ... APPEALANT

VS.
BAR COUCIL OF INDIA … RESPONDENT

PRESENT:
JUSTICE S. C. AGRAVAL
JUSTICE G.B. PATTARNAIK
JUDGMENT:
This appeal, files under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Act’), is directed against the judgment of Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Disciplinary Committee’) dated March 25, 1984 in B.C.I. Tr. Case
No. 12 of 1982 whereby the Disciplinary committee has found the appellant guilty of serious
professional misconduct and has imposed the punishment of suspension from practice for a
period of one year.

The State Bar Council referred the case to one of its Disciplinary Committee but the said
Committee could not complete the proceedings in the prescribed time of one year and, therefore
the proceedings were transferred to the Bar Council of India under section 36b of the Act and
thereafter the Disciplinary Committee dealt with the proceedings.

In support of the complaint, the complainant examined himself as a witness and produced the
judgment debtor, Shri Ram, as well as Sunderial and Bairaj Gupta. The complainant also
produced a number of documents. The appellant examined himself in defense.

Shri R.B. Mehrotra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the
Disciplinary Committee has erred in holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct on
the basis of the charge relating to notice under section 80 C.P.C. having been drafted by the
appellant. The submission is that the said charge was not contain in the complaint filed by the
complainant and was put forward for the first time before the Disciplinary Committee of the
State Bar Council by the complainant in his application and furthermore the request of the
appellant for examination of the handwriting in the draft of the notice filed as document No. 16
by an expert to show that the said draft of the notice was not in the handwriting of the appellant
having been rejected by the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Committee was in error in
holding, on the basis of a comparison of the admitted handwriting of the appellant with the
handwriting in document 16, that the same was written by the appellant.

It was in agreement with Shri Mehrotra that the Disciplinary Committee was in error in holding
the appellant guilty of professional misconduct for drafting the notice under section 80 CPC
which was served upon the union of India through the General Manager, Western Railways on
behalf of M/s. Agarwal Traders. Ghaziabad on the view that document No. 16, the draft of the
said notice, was in the handwriting of the appellant. The Disciplinary Committee has arrived at
this conclusion by a comparison of the handwriting of the appellant in Document No. 16. We
find that during the course of arguments a request by the learned Counsel appearing for the
appellant before the Disciplinary Committee to send document No. 16 to a handwriting expert
for examination, but the said request made on behalf of the appellant was rejected by the
Disciplinary Committee on November. 27, 1983 on the view that no useful purpose would be
served because the allegation relating to the said document was not contained originally in the
complaint. The Disciplinary Committee was in error in going into the merits to the said
allegation and furthermore in comparing the handwriting in the said document with the
handwriting of the appellant without the assistance of the opinion of a handwriting expert and
incoming to the conclusion that the said was in the handwriting of the appellant.

It was of the opinion, it was not advisable for the Disciplinary Committee to based its conclusion
purely on the basis of its own comparison of the handwriting, especially when the matter related
to a charge of professional misconduct which is quasi criminal in nature requiring prove beyond
reasonable doubt. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the finding recorded by the Disciplinary
Committee holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct for having prepared the draft
of the notice under Section 80 CPC that was served on the Union of India Oil on behalf of M/s
Agarwal Traders.

Therefore, the appeal was partly allowed and, while holding the appellant guilty of professional
misconduct in wrongfully retaining the amount of Rs. 1500 which was kept with him in
connection with the settlement in the execution proceedings till he deposited the said amount in
the court on May, 2, 1978 and in not paying the said amount to the decree holder in spite of
demand, we imposed the penalty of reprimand on the appellant for the said misconduct. No order
as to cost.
 THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
BCI Tr Case No. 8/1997

Smt. Siya Ram …............. Complainant

V.s

Sitaram Singh .................. Respondent

FACTS: -

In this instant case the complaint was filed before the disciplinary committee often
M.P. State Bar Council by Smt.Siya Ram Bai against the respondent advocate, Sita Ramsingh.
the complaint was that the advocate was engaged by the complainant for filing the money suit
against the 13 persons and passing the decree in execution proceeding, the decrial amount was
deposited which was withdrawn by the C.C.D by the respondent advocate but it was not paid to
the complainant and he did not furnish the account therefor. It was also alleged that the advocate
had concealed the real facts and avoided to give any information to the complainant on some
pretext or the other. The respondent advocate said that he had not withdrawn the amount from
the C.C.D. In addition, the complainant alleged that the advocate had not paid the full court fee
in civil suit against the Dhani ram. In his reply the advocate contended that whenever the amount
was withdrawn from the CC.D, it was in the presence of the applicant and had been adjusted
asper record the amount recoverable by the non-applicant from the applicant. He further said that
the amount desired by the applicant had been taken away in the presence of her husband and
from his office. He said that after taking away the amount the applicant, she was required to pay
six hundred rupees to him but she did not pay. The contention of the advocate, that the amount
withdrawn by him from the C.C.D payable to the complaint had been adjusted towards the court
fee and the other expenses with the consent of the complainant was not find correct. In the
opinion of the disciplinary committee the advocate was to show as to how much amount was
withdrawn by him and adjusted towards his fees. he failed to discharged his burden.

Held: -

The advocate withdrew the decretal amounts paid and did not make the payment to the client, in
violation of Rule 27 of the BCI Rules on Professional Ethics. The Disciplinary Committee of the
Bar Council of India ordered the advocate to refund the money to the complainant along with the
10% interest per annum and also ordered suspension of advocate for a period of one year.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF

THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA BCI Tr. Case No 63/1990

Secretary, Karnataka Khadi Gram Udyog Samyukta Sangha …............

Complainant

Vs.

J.S.Kulkarni, ................
Respondent

FACTS: -

in this case complainant engaged the respondent advocate, J.S.Kulkarni for filing the execution
proceeding in the court for the execution of the certain decrees obtained in the civil suit. It was
alleged that the advocate file the execution proceeding in the competent court and he had
received the different amounts towards the decretals amounts in different execution proceeding
but he did not pay the whole amount to the compliant. The complainant was successful in
proving that the after having engaged the respondent to represent him in the execution
proceeding arising out of decree against the judgement debtor, he recovered but the whole
amount was not paid to the complainant.

HELD: -
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the India held that Rules 23 to 30stated in the
section II of the Chapter II of the Part 5 of the BCI rules specially provide that an advocate shall
keep an account of the client money entrusted to him and the account so prepared should know
the amount received from the client or on his behalf the expenses incurred for him and debits
made on account of fees with respective dates and all other necessities particulars. Whenever the
moneys are received from or an account of a client the entries should contain a reference as to
whether the amount have been received for the fees or expenses and during the course of the
proceeding, an advocate shall, except with the consenting writing of the client concerned, be
liberty to divert any portion of the expenses towards fees. Where any amount is received or given
to him on behalf of his client the fact of such receipt must be intimated to the client, as early as
possible.in view of the above duties of the client the committee held that the advocate had failed
to discharged his duties towards the client as he neither furnished the accounts of the recovery of
the amount from different judgment debtor nor refunded the said amounts to the client nor
proved the claim of settled or unsettled fees payable by the client to him. The committee held
that the advocate guilty of having committed professional misconduct and ordered that he be
suspended from the practice for a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order. The
committee debarred him from practicing in any court or before any authority or person during the
period of suspension
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 28, 1985 SCR (1)1003

M. VEERABHADRA RAO ……… PETITIONER

Vs.

TEK CHAND ……… RESPONDENT

Bench: Desai, D.A.

The appellant M.Veerbhadra Rao attested an affidavit which appears to be a forged one and
which was used to obtain an unfair advantage by income tax clearance certificate on the strength
of Ex.A-1 which did not appear to be genuine one.

The complainant alleged that he was caused wrongful loss. The State Bar Council referred this
complaint to the disciplinary committee. Having found the Appellant guilty of serious
misconduct namely, attesting an affidavit which appears to be a forged one, the committee
imposed reprimand by developing cold feet.

The appellant appealed to Bar Council of India and it affirmed the order made by the state
committee. Then the appellant filed an appeal to the court Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that appellant violated his statutory duty and he was also acted in the
manner unbecoming of a member of the noble profession. He has knowingly become a party to
the forgery of a very valuable document and he has by his conduct facilitated the commission of
a fraud which would to some extent benefit his senior M. Ram Mohan Rao While awarding
the punishment, the Supreme Court deferred with the Bar Council and directed the appellant
shall be suspended from practice for a period of 5 years by considering the gravity of the
misconduct and the appeal was dismissed.

THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

B.C.I. Tr. CASE NO.115/1996

BABULAL ……………… COMPLAINANT
VS
SUBHASH JAIN ……………… RESPONDENT

Facts: The complainant was an advocate. He alleged that the respondent advocate was a
practicing lawyer as well as was working as an editor, printer, and publisher of a weekly called
“Aaj Ki Janata”.

The complainant and the Respondent are Advocates. The complainant filed a petition before the
Madhya Pradesh Bar Council stating that the respondent to guilty of professional misconduct
under.35. The allegation of the complainant is that the respondent a practicing lawyer, is working
as an Editor, Printer and Publisher of a weekly called``Aaj Ki Janta’’ He is the owner of the press

s which prints the weekly. It is also alleged that the respondent did not disclose these facts while
applying for enrolment to the State Bar Council. The respondent denied all the allegations. He
contended that before enrolment, the job of printing and publishing was transferred tohis wife
and thereafter he was working only as an editor of the said weekly. Since the enquiry was not
completed within one year, the case was transferred to the Bar Council of India.

In the enquiry it was found that he enrolled in 1973 and continued as the printer, publisher and
editor of the weekly till 1983.Only in 1983 printing and publishing was transferred in the name
of his wife. But, by a general power of attorney from his wife the respondent was looking after
the entire work of the weekly. Based on this findings the Bar Council of India held that the
respondent is guilty of professional misconduct punishable under S.35 of the Advocates Act and
passed the following orders.

1. He was suspended from practice for a period of one year.

2. Suppression of the fact that he is the owner of the weekly inthe enrolment application cannot
be treated as professional misconduct punishable under S.35.

Held: Rule 47 of BCI rules prohibits an advocate to be engaged personally in any business. The
respondent advocate was found to have been actively engaged in carrying on the business and his
conduct was take by the disciplinary committee as profession misconduct.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal(civil)6768 of 2000
Bench: K.T.Thomas,Y.K.Sabharwal

SHAMBHU RAM YADAV ....... Petitioner

Vs.

HANUM DAS KHATRY ........ Respondent

Facts of the case

This case under Advocate Act, 1961 is concerned with professional misconduct of an advocate.
In this case, a complaint was filed by the appellant against the respondents-Advocate before the
Bar council of Rajasthan, which was referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the State Bar
Council. The complaint against advocate was that he had written a letter to his client Mahant
Rajagiri stating that another client had informed him that the concerned judge accepts bribe to
give favorable orders, and so he should send an amount of Rs. 10,000 /- to get decision in his
fever, and in case he can influence the judge himself, there is no need to send Rs. 10,000 /- to be
given to the judge. The content of the letter was admitted by the respondent Advocate. However,
in reply to the complaint letter, he pleaded that the services of the presiding judge were
terminated due to taking illegal gratification, and that he had followed by norms of professional
ethics and brought this fact to the knowledge of the client to protect the interest of his client, and
that the money was not sent by the client to him. Under such circumstances, he had not
committed in professional misconduct. The State Bar Council came to the conclusion that the
respondent Advocate was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for
a period of 2 years. The respondent advocate challenged this decision before the Bar Council of
India. The disciplinary committee of Bar Council of India enhanced the punishment and directed
that the name of respondent be struck off from the roll of Advocate and thus he be debarred
permanently from the practice of advocacy. The respondent Advocate filed a review petition
before it against this decision under Section 44 of the Advocate Act, 1961. The Bar Council of
India accepted the review petition and held that the Advocate is a man of 80 years old and is
continuing practice since 1951. During such a long period of practice, he has never committed
any professional ethics with any ill motive. This is his first mistake. So, the review-petition was
allowed and the earlier order was modified by substituting the punishment of permanently
debarring him from practice with that of remanding him.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the earlier order of Bar Council of India had taken into
consideration all the relevant factors for arriving at the conclusion that the Advocate was totally
unfit to be a lawyer having the written such a letter and so the punishment lesser then
permanently debarring him cannot be imposed on guilty respondent. The Court further the held
that the power of review does not have empower the Disciplinary Committee for taking a
different view on the same facts of the case. The penalty of permanent debarment of practice was
imposed on the respondent in view of the nature of misconduct committed by the Advocate
respondent, which has been modified in exercise of review power. It is the duty of Bar Council to
adhere to the required standards and on its failure to take appropriate action against the erring
Advocates.

Finally the Court set aside the review order of the Bar Council of India and restored its original
order.
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) 132 OF 1988

EX-CAPT. HARISH UPPAL ………………

PETITIONER

Vs

UNION OF INDIA & ANR …...............

RESPONDENT

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 17/12/2002

BENCH:

DORAISWAMY RAJU,

S.N. VARIAVA,

D.M. DHARMADHIKARI.

JUDGEMENT
All these Petitions raise the question whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for
boycotts of Court/s. In all these Petitions a declaration is sought that such strikes and/or calls for
boycott are illegal. As the questions vitally concerned the legal profession, public notices were
issued to Bar Associations and Bar Councils all over the country.

In conclusion it is held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not
even on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements, TV
interviews, carrying out of Court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or
any color arm bands, peaceful protest marches outside and away from Court premises, going on
dharma’s or relay fasts etc. It is held that lawyers holding Vacillates on behalf of their clients
cannot not attend Courts in pursuance to a call for strike or boycott. All lawyers must boldly
refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visited with any adverse
consequences by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including
that of expulsion can be held out. It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association can permit
calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a call for strike or boycott and requisition, if
any, for such meeting must be ignored. It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where the
dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts may ignore
(turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention from work for not more than one day. It is being
clarified that it will be for the Court to decide whether or not the issue involves dignity or
integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the Bench. Therefore, in such cases the President of
the Bar must first consult the Chief Justice or the District Judge before Advocate decide to absent
themselves from Court. The decision of the Chief Justice or the District Judge would be final and
have to be abided by the Bar. It is held that Courts are under no obligation to adjourn matters
because lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, it is the duty of all Courts to go on with matters
on their boards even in the absence of lawyers. In other words, Courts must not be privy to
strikes or calls for boycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holding a Vacillate of a client, abstains
from attending Court due to a strike call, he shall be personally liable to pay costs which shall be
addition to damages which he might have to pay his client for loss suffered by him.

It is now hoped that with the above clarifications, there will be no strikes and/or calls for boycott.
It is hoped that better sense will prevail and self-restraint will be exercised. The Petitions stand
disposed of accordingly.
 Supreme Court of India

(AIR 2020 SC 1412)

DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION …........ APPELANT

Vs

ISHWAR SHANDILYA …....... RESPONDENT

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

• Advocates in the entire District of Dehradun, in several districts of Haridwar and

Udham Singh Nagar district in the State of Uttarakhand have been boycotting the Courts on all
Saturdays for the past more than 35 years. The strikes are seriously obstructing the access to
justice to the needy litigants.

• According to the statistics shown by the High Court of Uttarakhand, Dehradun to the Law
Commission in the State of Uttarakhand, The Advocates were on strike for about 455 days in
Dehradun district and 515 days in Haridwar district averaging about 90 to 103 days per year.
Taking cognizance of the matter, High Court of Uttarakhand passed an order taking action
against the Advocates who abstained from representing their client in the court.

• High Court delivered an order that whoever abstains from representing the client in the court
for any reason and consideration in lieu of the strike calls will be punished by the court.
Feeling impugned by the order of High Court, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition
under Article 136 to seek redressal from the civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court referring to various judgements and idiosyncrasies of the Advocates Act,
 1961, called upon the district bar association to withdraw their call of strike in case they do not
start attending Courts, as directed hereinabove, the District Judges concerned shall submit their
respective reports to the High Court for it to consider whether action should be initiated against
the errant Advocates under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. The court also issued direction to
Uttarakhand State Bar Council to take disciplinary proceedings against the office bearers of the
Dehradun District Bar Association, within the time period of four weeks under the offence of
illegally having issued a call for illegal strikes/boycott of the Courts on Saturday in the
jurisdiction of Dehradun, Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar. The Court also took the initiative
to direct the Bar Council of India to also take an appropriate action against the rebellious Bar
Association in lieu of its notice published on July 12, 2019, within three weeks and also make
sure that such an action does not repeat itself again in future by such Bar Associations.

• Finally, The Supreme Court also requested The High Court and ordered the District Court to
make sure the proper functioning of courts and such actions do not come in the way of
providing speedy justice to the civilians.

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

• The Supreme Court taking in consideration the right to protest under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Indian Constitution and also the right to ensure smooth functioning of the courts, held that
advocates cannot abstain from representing the client under the garb of a call for strike.

• It held that any call for a strike by Bar Associations is fraudulent and illegal and
Advocates should seldom follow them. Being a professional ecosystem, resistance cannot be
excused under the lieu of right to protest which cannot be exercised in contrary of the Indian
Judicial System. They cannot thus disrupt court proceedings and put interest of their clients in
jeopardy4.

• The Supreme Court therefore, upheld the decision of the High Court to punish the
misdemeanor of the defaulting advocates and disrupt the working of the court. Therefore, the
Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
 Supreme Court of India

1989 AIR 245

AN ADVOCATE

V.S

B. B. HARADARA AND ORS.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

The case was filed in 1989 and in this case the appellant was an advocate. The suit dealt with the
matter of recovery of Rs. 30,098/-. The complainant left the responsibility of the case to the
advocate (appellant) who had given the responsibility for the matter at hand to his Junior
colleague. There are two versions to the story. As per the version of the complainant, the
Respondents has failed to inform him and without taking his due consent pulled back the case.
They did also inform him that his presence would be needed in court and without giving him the
following information they got the suit dismissed through court. The complainant believed his
legal needs were infringed.

The version of the appellant advocate and his junior colleague (respondent 2) where quite
different. The appellant contended that he came to know the complainant through an old
acquaintance Gautam Chand. On Gautam Chands request the case of the complainant was taken
up by the advocate and passed on to his colleague. That time the colleague worked with the
appellant advocate but during the dismissal of the suit the junior advocate had his own office.
Gautam Chand was in business with Haradara (the plaintiff) and the defendant in the suit
initiated by them through the appellant was Anantaraju. Anantaraju was a common adversary for
both Gautam Chand and Haradara. Gautam Chand had paid earnest money to Antaraju for the
execution of a sale deed of property in his name. However, the sale deed was not executed during
the required time. Gautam Chand sent instructions to the advocate (appellant) and his colleague
(respondent no 2 Ashok) to get the suit dismissed as the sale deed was achieved. Initially the
court denied the request, post which Gautam Chand published a notice stating that he has dealt
with the property matter and the object of the suit is achieved and no one should interfere as its
the personal matter of Anantaraju and Gautam Chand. RW 3 (Gautam Chand) and the
complainant acted in complete concert and had common interests. The court dismissed the suit in
1981 on December 10. The complainant Haradara gained knowledge the suit in which he was the
plaintiff which was against Anantaraju had been dismissed by the court he made no attempts to
restore the suit or to meet the appellant. The appellant contended that Haradara the complainant
has knowledge of the dismissal and yet failed to immediately act upon it. Also, that he only acted
on the claims made by Gautam Chand who was a close friend of Haradara and they filed the suits
together towards the common adversary Anantaraju.

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

It was held that the advocate wasn’t afforded a proper and reasonable opportunity to express his
side of the story. There were no specific charges devised against him and he wasn’t informed of
the charges against him.

The doctrine of benefit of doubt had not been reasonably established the intentions of the
advocate was not considered. The motives of the advocate weren’t considered while judging the
case and its outcome by the disciplinary committee.The court also felt that such a judgement
before being given by the BCI had to have been discussed properly and the judgement should
leave no place for any reasonable doubt. The court held the opinion that a detailed inquiry ought
to be held as the discipline committee is giving a very heavy sentence of removing the advocate
from the bar. The conclusion, cannot only be taken in terms of evidence and has to be supported
by a proper enquiry till the doctrine of benefit of doubt has been reasonably established.
 Supreme Court of India

1989 AIR 1541

BALDEV RAJ SHARMA

V.S

BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

Facts

• Baldev Raj Sharma passed his B.A. exam in March,1972 from Punjabi University. In
1978 he joined the Bachelor of Laws of 2 years duration in a private manner.

• In the year 1981 he was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Laws from Kurukshetra
University. In 1981, petitioner joined Kanpur University in third year professional course for
LL.B. The course had to be attended as a regular student. The most important fact in the case is
that the two years from Kurukshetra University were without regular attendance.

• The petitioner contended that the rules of Kanpur University made no distinction on
whether the General course of LL.B. has to be pursued by regular attendance or as a non-
collegiate student.

• The petitioner also states that Kanpur University degree of LL.B. was a recognized
degree and he attended all the requisite classes of LL.B. at the third year of Kanpur University.
• He gave the final examinations and was awarded the degree on July 22, 1982. Upon the
successful completion he applied to be an Advocate at Punjab and Haryana High Court and even
paid the required fee.

The Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana denied the petitioner enrolment as an Advocate on April
26, 1983 on the basis of rules and provisions under Advocates Act, 1961.

• The reason under these rules was that the petitioner has obtained his degree of two years
study from Kurukshetra University as a private student.

• On the receiving of the application the Bar Council had asked for the opinion of Bar
Council of India. The Bar Council of India has similar opinions as the State Bar Council in this
matter.

• BCI used the rules stating that the rules mentioned regular attendance in the three years
course of studies. Considering that the petitioner has not fulfilled the following condition the
State Bar Council is right in denying admission. The BCI believed that there was a clear
difference between private candidate course and a course taught with compulsory and regular
attendance.

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

The writ petition filed by Baldev Raj Sharma under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
against the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana order rejecting his enrolment as an Advocate.
The application was rejected under the legal rules as the petitioner had not fulfilled the
conditions laid down in Rule 14

1(1)(c) of the Rules of the Bar Council of India framed under S. 7(h) and (i), S. 24(1)(c)(iii) and
(iiia) and S. 49(1)(d). The rules required regular attendance which was missing as the petitioner
had completed bachelors in law in a two years private course then followed by one year of
regular attendance. This was different from the mandatory three years of regular attendance
course.
The policy underlying the relevant provisions of the Bar Council Rules indicates the great
emphasis laid on regular attendance at the law classes. The conditions are specifically spelt out
when the Act is read along with the Rules. When so read, it is plain that a candidate desiring
enrolment as an Advocate under the Advocates Act must fulfil the conditions mentioned in S.
24(1)(c)(iii) or S. 24(1)(c)(iiia) read with Rule 1(1)(c) of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975. In
the present case the petitioner failed to do so. It was held that his application was rightly rejected
by the Bar Council.

THE Supreme Court of India

(MANU/SC/0730/2016)

MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE

V.S

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

• In the present case, a reference under Section 15(2) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was
made by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah through District Judge, Etah regarding two separate
incidents in his courtroom by one Mahipal Singh Rana, a practicing Advocate. The incidents
related to the usage of foul/indecent language and inappropriate comments/ behavior in the
courtroom.

• The matter was placed before the Administrative Judge who forwarded the matter to the
Registrar General. Subsequently, the matter was placed before the Hon’ble
Chief Justice who referred the matter to the appropriate bench. The Hon’ble Allahabad High
Court took into account the then prevalent conditions where advocates tried to persuade and
threaten the judges and the prior antecedents of the contemnor. The court sentenced the appellant
to simple imprisonment of two months and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and to go for further
imprisonment of two weeks in case of failure of payment of the fine. Further, the Hon’ble High
Court had directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to consider the complaint of Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Etah to initiate proceedings for professional misconduct and director the
contemnor not to enter the judgeship at Etah until he purges the contempt.

• The contemnor preferred an appeal against the judgment of Hon’ble Allahabad High
Court whereby the appellant was found guilty of threatening the Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Etah.

JUDGMENT IN BRIEF

The Court held that the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court had committed no error while convicting
the accused and further held that the accused had appeared before the court. The court looked
into the aspect of complaints of the present appellant against the said judge and opined that it is
not a valid defense and the act of the accused and the language used were contemptuous.

It was held that the contention of the appellant regarding limitation had no merit as it is upon the
concerned judge to take requisite action as per the law which s/he finds appropriate. The
appellant was held liable for contempt and it was further held that the incidents as alleged
regarding malafides of the complainant judge were made with a motive to protect himself from
contempt proceedings and no apology was ever rendered. The court set aside the imprisonment
keeping in view the old age of appellant however, it held that Hon’ble Allahabad High Court was
correct in convicting the appellant under Criminal Contempt. The court discussed the settled
principle of law regarding merit imprisonment i.e. culpability of offender and likelihood of
interference with administration of justice.

The enrollment of the appellant in State Bar Roll was suspended for two years from the date of
order in light of Section 24A of the Act. Also, in light of jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act,
the court directed the license of the petition to remain suspended for another five years and
further, the appellant was debarred from appearing before the court even after the said period,
unless he purges out of contempt.
It was held that in case of failure of Bar Council to take appropriate actions in case of
misconduct, the Supreme Court can take actions Under Section 38 of the Act whereas, the same
power can be availed by High Court under Article 226. Hon’ble Court expressed the need of
review/amendment in regulatory provisions of the Act and requested the law commission to do
the needful in this regard at the earliest

THE Supreme Court of India

(MANU/SC/0587/2020

IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN & ORS.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

In the present case, Prashant Bhushan a well-renowned Advocate with over 30 years of Standing
at Hon’ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court, famously known for his public interest
lawyering made tweets against Hon’ble Chief Justice and The Supreme Court of India. They are
reproduced as follows:

“CJI rides a 50 Lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader at Raj Bhavan Nagpur, without a
mask or helmet, at a time when he keeps the SC in Lockdown mode denying citizens their
fundamental right to access justice!”

And
“When historians in future look back at the last 6 years to see how democracy has been destroyed
in India even without a formal Emergency, they will particularly mark the role of the Supreme
Court in this destruction, & more particularly the role of the last 4 CJIs.”

Pursuant to the tweets, one advocate named Mahek Maheshwari, filed a petition without
obtaining the consent of the Learned Attorney General of India against the above-mentioned
tweets and the matter was taken on the administrative side.

Subsequently, after being listed on the administrative side the court directed the matter to be
listed on the judicial side for the passing of the appropriate order. The matter was listed on July
22, 2020, and after prima facie observing the tweets the Hon’ble Court found that the tweets
were of the nature of disreputing the administration of justice and were capable of bringing down
the dignity of Hon’ble Chief Justice and the Supreme Court in the eyes of the public at large. As
such, the court took suo moto cognizance in this matter and directed the Contemnors to file their
reply

JUDGMENT IN BRIEF

• Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court held Prashant Bhushan
liable for criminal contempt whereas, the notice issued to Contemnor No. 2 (Twitter) was
discharged.

• The contention regarding the maintainability of the petition had already been considered
by the Supreme Court in several cases. It was observed that the manner to initiate contempt is not
limited by provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but the source of such power is the
Constitution (Article 129 to be specific) itself. In case of suo moto contempt petitions, there is no
need of taking consent from anybody and the Court can initiate proceedings based on the
information received.

• It was observed that if a person while exercising his right under 19(1)(a), bonafidely
exceeds right in the public interest, the court would show its magnanimity and will be slow in
exercising contempt jurisdiction. However, if such a statement is made against a judge having an
adverse effect on the administration of justice or maligning the image of the judiciary, court
cannot be supposed to be a silent spectator and would be entitled to invoke contempt jurisdiction.
• It was observed that the statement “CJI Rides..........time when he keeps the SC in
Lockdown mode denying citizens their fundamental right to access justice” is completely false,
malicious and scandalous undermining dignity and authority of administration of justice for the
reason being that the alleged Contemnor No. 1 himself appeared in various matters through
video conferencing.

• It was observed that the second tweet is a clear criticism about the institution of the
Supreme Court and institution of Chief Justice of India and the tweets clearly gave an impression
that the judges presiding the Supreme Court in the last six years played a role in the destruction
of democracy and the last four CJI’s in particular. The tweets tend to shake public confidence in
the institution of the judiciary and it cannot be considered as a fair criticism made in bonafide
public interest.

The Disciplinary Committee of The Bar Council of India

BCI TR Case No.47/1990

Jagadish Singh & other …... PETITIONER

VS

T.C. Sharma ….... RESPONDENT

Jagadish Singh and others were employees of the Central Board of Education, New Delhi. They
were arbitrarily dismissed from service by the Board. They approached T.C. Sharma an
Advocate to file a case against the arbitrary dismissal. They paid Rs.1400 as fees for the case.

Sharma gave a fake case number starting that he has field the case before the central
Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi. On verification it was found that no such case has been
field. Later they engaged another Advocate Mr. Bhati to file the case and got a favourable order
of reinstatement.
Therefore, they asked the return of Rs.1400 from T.C. Sharma. He refused to pay the same. So,
the complainant filed a petition against him before the Delhi Bar Council alleging professional
misconduct. Since Sharma failed to appear during the enquiry, the state Bar Council could not
able to dispose off the case within one year. Hence, the case was transferred to the Bar Council
of India.

The Bar Council of India examined the petitioners, but the respondent was absent. Finally the
Bar council of India passed an order holding the respondent guilty of professional misconduct
and awarded the following punishments.

1. Suspended him from practice for a period of 5 years.

2. Directed him to return the Rs.1400/-with 12%interest per annum.

3. Directed to give Rs.500 as cost to the complainant.

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(AIR 2002 SC 548)

HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI …...... APPEALANT

V.S

BAIJU ….......
RESPONDENT
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

Appellant was selected as an Advocate with the Bar Council of U. P. in May 1982, and has
been practicing from that point forward. Appellant was locked in by Baiju the respondent, in a
land obtaining case in which the respondent was an inquirer for remuneration. The appellant
applied for delivering the sum and according to the Courts request pulled out the sum on
September 2, 1987 yet he didn't restore it to the customer to whom it was expected nor did he
educate the customer about the receipt regarding the sum. When the customer got the
information on it and subsequent to get the sum composed by the Advocate, a complainant was
lodged by him with the bar committee of state for reasonable disciplinary action against
Appellant. On June 12, 1988, appellant documented an answer to the said accepting the
representation of the respondent by him for pulling out cash, however he used the defense that he
had restored the add up to the customer subsequent to deducting his charges and costs.
Notwithstanding this Appellant on 3 August 1988 recorded an affidavit before State Bar
gathering bar board in which a trade-off between the appellant and respondent had been shown
up was expressed. State Bar Disciplinary Advisory Group was checking the affidavit with the
respondent. The respondent denied the substance as well as denied having gotten any sum from
the appellant Advocate. Under area 36-B the Act of procedures stood moved to the Bar Council
of India. The disciplinary board of trustees led enquiry and reached the resolution that the
affidavit dated August 3, 1988 was fabricated one and that application was created. On this
conclusion the advisory group forced a discipline of suspending the Advocate from practice for a
duration of 3 years.

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

In the current scenario, the misappropriation stayed unabated even after the disciplinary
procedures initiated and it proceeded even till now as the deficient advocate didn't want to return
even a solitary pie to the customer. The wrongdoing of the appellant-advocate turned out to be
more disturbed when he resolved to fabricated an affirmation for the sake of his customer, which
he created before the 41disciplinary committee to swindle his customer and to delude the
disciplinary committee to accept that he and his customer had settled the contest by making a late
instalment to his customer. The court thinks holding such advocate on the move of the legal
profession, it is risky to the calling. The circumstance for this situation along these lines,
warrants the discipline of expulsion of his name from the move of advocates.
 The Supreme Court Of India (AIR 1961 KER 209)

IN RE: AN ADVOCATE V UNKNOWN

Facts

In Re An Advocate v Unknown the client, the decree-holder [Petitioner] in the Changanacherry

Munsiff's Court against the Advocate [Counter-petitioner] who was involved with the client’s
case. The petitioner raised an allegation that the Advocate had withdrawn Rs. 270/- deposited by
the judgment-debtor for payment to the client as per the Debt Relief Act, but has not paid the
same to the complainant despite repeated demands and a registered notice through counsel. In the
later investigation, it was found that the date when the counter-petitioner withdrew the amount
from the court was not disclosed by the petitioner. However, the counter petitioner admitted that
he was issued a receipt of a notice demanding the money by the complainant on February 26,
1959 and that he paid the amount on December 12, 1959 even after the complaint before the Bar
Council was filed by the decree-holder on June 24, 1959. The retention of the client's money by
the counter- petitioner even after demand by the client for a period of more than 9 months had no
excuse whatever and was quite becoming of the advocate .it was noted that there was no due fee
to the advocate by the client

JUDGEMENT

• The Kerala High Court suspended the counter-petitioner for a period of six months, for non-
fulfilment of this duty under Rule 27 of the BCI Rules- Chapter II.• While deciding the case, the
court viewed that the cases of professional misconduct cannot be viewed as cases for recovery of
money or breach of contract. The court is bound to uphold the high and rigid standard of
professional conduct expected of a legal practitioner who, because of their privileged status, are
bound to conduct themselves in a manner befitting the high and honorable profession to whose
privileges they have been admitted; and if they depart from the high standards which the
profession has set for itself and demands of them in professional matters, they are liable to
disciplinary action.The court held that it is the imperative duty of the counsel, on receipt of the
client's money, to inform the client thereof and pay him without any delay the amount under
receipt.

The Supreme Court of India

Bar Council of Maharashtra ….... PETITIONER

Vs

Dabholkar And Others …...... RESPONDENT

Facts

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

This case involves the Bar Council of Maharashtra as the Petitioner v M.V. Dabholkar and others
as the respondent. The respondents, who were lawyers practicing in criminal courts, were
charged with professional misconduct under section 35(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Bar
Council of Maharashtra considered the complaint received from the High Court of Maharashtra
against the lawyers and referred the matter to its Disciplinary Committee for further probe.
According to the testimony; recorded by the State Disciplinary Committee, these lawyers were
sited at the entrance to the Magistrates’ Courts, waiting for the arrival of potential litigants. They
raced towards the clients in an unpleasant tussle to snatch the briefs, to lay claim to the
engagements even by physical fight, to undercut fees, and to obtain work for themselves through
such unedifying behavior.

The State Disciplinary Committee held the respondents guilty of professional misconduct and
suspended them from practicing as advocates for three years. Aggrieved by the order the
respondents preferred an appeal to the Bar Council of India under Section 37 of the Advocates
Act, 1961.

JUDGEMENT

It held that the Appellate Tribunal has erred in the application of Rule 36 of the Bar Council
Rules, as it was only promulgated in 1965, post the Amendment and the said act took place way
before that.

When the question arose for consideration of the Bar Council of India as an
“aggrieved person”, the Court referred to the findings in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v.
H. M. Seervai, 1970, where an appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra to the Bar
Council of India was questioned, the Court held that the right of appeal is a statutory right and is
invariably confined to an aggrieved person or a person that claims to be aggrieved. And that the
interestsof the Bar Council are to uphold professional conduct and etiquette of the advocates
enrolledunder it.

The Court also held that “the Bar Council functions in a dual capacity, one as the prosecutor
through its Executive Committee and the other quasi-judicial performed through its Disciplinary
Committee. Hence, being the prosecutor, the State Bar Council would be an ‘aggrieved person’
and therefore, the appeal under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 would be maintained

Supreme Court of India (1997) 3 SCC 131

HIKMAT ALI KHAN

V.S

ISHWAR PRASAD ARYA AND ORS.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal under Section 38 of Advocates Act, 1961 before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India against the order of the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India dated
September 8, 1985 setting aside the U. P. State Bar Council Disciplinary Committee’s sentence
to the respondent of being disbarred for 3 years. In this case, the advocate for the appellant was
Mr. Subodh Markandeya, Miss Chitra Markandeya, Mr. Ajay Singh and Miss Meenakshi
Agarwal. The respondent was represented by Advocate H. K. Puri and Pramod Swarup.

In this case, the respondent, namely Advocate Ishwar Prasad Arya practised in Badaun. On May
18 1971, he assaulted his opponent Radhey Shyaam Tiwari with a knife and a bullet is also said
to have been fired by him in the course of this. He was convicted for this under Indian Penal
Code, Section 307 and Arms Act, Section 25 by the 1st Temporary Civil and Sessions judge on
July 3, 1972. The High Court upheld his conviction under Section 307 IPC on appeal. He was
sentenced to 3 years of rigorous imprisonment by the High court. However, the IIIrd Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Badaun who was responsible for the execution of the order of the
High Court received a letter from Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home, U. P. stating that the
Governor has suspended the conviction of Ishwar Prasad Arya under Article 161 of the
Constitution of India.

On further enquiry it was found that letter so received was fraudulent and he was arrested and
sent to Badaun Jail to undergo imprisonment. The IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge
sent a complaint to the Bar Council of U. P. against the respondent alleging professional
misconduct as envisaged under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The disciplinary
committee of the U.P. state Bar Council initiated proceedings against him and found him guilty
of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the act. He was debarred from practicing as an
advocate for a period of 2 years through an order dated 30th January 1982.

Judgement

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India gave the following verdict in this case. The court set aside
the order of the Bar Council of India dated September 8, 1985 which seaside the U. P State Bar
Council’s order of disbarment of the respondent. The court upheld the order of disbarment of the
respondent owing to gross professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act,
1961.The court furthermore, stated that the act of the Advocate not only amounts to
professionalmisconduct but also has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude
which is aground for Disqualification for enrolment from State rolls as per Section 24-A(1(a) of
the Act.

The court order the removal of respondent-advocate from state rolls.

 Supreme Court of India AIR 1975 DELHI 192)

JOGINDER SINGH …......... APPELLANT

V.S

THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA …........ RESPONDENT

Facts of the case

Appellant Joginder Singh, an Advocate, was grieved because his name had been struck off from
the rolls. On January 12, 1965, the Bar Council of India notified the appellant that when he had
applied for enrolment under the Advocates Act of 1961 to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, he
concealed the fact that he was previously convicted of offences related to moral turpitude. This
concealment of fact is considered misrepresentation and fraud within the ambit of Section 26(1)
of the said Act, and thus his name was removed. The appellant was to file his written statement
within three weeks of the date on which he received this notice, and was informed that his
defense would be considered by them, on a date to be notified to him when he could appear in
person or by an Advocate.The appellant and his counsel appeared before the Bar Council of
India on the date fixed, he pleaded for the postponement of the hearing but they interrogated him
and convicted him under Section 473 and 411 Indian Penal Code. The appellant then filed a suit
in the court seeking declarations that the orders made by the Bar Council of India on April 11,
1965 were null void, unconstitutional, ultra vires, without jurisdiction and nonbinding. The main
contention was whether the appellant had secured his enrolment by misrepresentation/fraud or
whether he was under no duty to volunteer that information, thus not amounting to
misrepresentation or fraud. The court gave the verdict that there was nothing to suggest that the
ultimate decision of the Bar Council was based on the finding that the certificate of character
produced by the appellant was false, thus the contentions raised by the appellant was unsound
and dismissed the appeal.

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

So, the main contention is that, given the exclusive expectations expected of those in the legal
profession, it would be a fraud/misrepresentation if the concerned advocate doesn't unveil the
reality of his past conviction, particularly those including moral turpitude as they help find out
the personality of a man. (Infringement of Rule 43 of the BCI Rules-Chapter II). It was
encouraged that by the guidelines of natural justice, the appellant was qualified for notice of
what was charged against him so he could make his answer, it was additionally said that in the
notification requiring the appellant to show cause against their proposed activity, the Bar Council
had not affirmed that he had got the testament of character by fraud or misrepresentation; yet
they considered this matter while making their request notwithstanding the complaint of the
appellant that it was not pertinent. the request for the Bar Council fits this development. The
misrepresentation of the endorsement of character is alluded to in that of the request which
records the appropriate responses given by the appellant and the entries made by his counsel.
There isn't anything to recommend that a definitive choice of the Bar Council depended on the
finding that the declaration of character delivered by the appellant was false. It holds that the
appellant had acquired admittance as an advocate by fraud or misrepresentation in that he had
abstained from unveiling that he had recently been indicted for offenses. In this way the appeal
falls flat and is excused with costs.

Supreme Court of India

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 95 OF 2018, SC

ASHWINI KUMAR UPADHYAY …...... PETITIONER

V.S

UNION OF INDIA …...... RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 95 OF 2018, SC

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

Ashwini Kumar had filed a petition through which she wants to say that who are MLAs./MPs
and if they are Advocates, then according to the tenure when they are the members of the
parliament, till that particular period of time will be debarred from practising in the field of
advocacy as an Advocate.Reliance has been placed on
Rule 49 of the Rules in particular to contend that there is an express restriction on Advocates to
take up other employment. It is also urged that being an elected people‘s representative, by the
very nature of his/her duty as a law maker and legislator, it is a full-time engagement, coupled
with the fact that the emoluments paid to them is under The Salary, Allowances and Pension of
Members of Parliament Act, 1954. Similarly, allowances are paid as per the rules framed for
different heads under the 1954 Act. It is urged that there can be no relationship of an employee
and employer between the MP/MLA/MLC and the Government as such, merely because they
receive salary, allowances and pension in terms of the provisions of the 1954 Act as applicable to
the Members of Parliament or similar enactment applicable to the Members of Legislative
Assembly/Council

JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF

The Supreme Court of India held that in the absence of any rule which clearly and expressively
prohibit the legislators from practicing as advocates Rule 49 of the rules framed by Bar Council
of India does not apply. It was held that; rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules provides that
an Advocate should not be the full-time employee of anybody. It includes any person, firm,
organization or Government if any advocate takes any such employment, he has to inform the
Bar Council about the emplacement and he ceases to be an Advocate and from practicing law till
the course of employment.

Supreme Court of India 1996 SCC (3) 3

DR.) HANIRAJ L. CHULANI ….... APPELLANT

V.S
 BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA & GOA ….... RESPONDENT

Facts

The appellant is a permanent resident of Bombay. He has been a medical practitioner (colorectal
surgeon) since 1970. During the continuance of his said profession as a medical practitioner, the
appellant joined LL.B. Degree Course and obtained Degree of Bachelor of Laws on March 4,
1991. Thereafter the appellant applied to the respondent State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa
for being enrolled as an Advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act'). This application was moved by the appellant on July 26, 1991. The appellant insisted that
even though he is a medical practitioner he is entitled to simultaneously carry on the profession
as an advocate. The Enrolment Committee of the respondent-State Bar Council rejected his
request for being enrolled as an advocate simultaneously with his carrying on his medical
practice as a surgeon. The appellant was ultimately informed on November 16, 1992 that his
application for enrolment as an advocate was rejected. He was also supplied a copy of the
reasons for 'refusal for grant of a Sanad'. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the said refusal filed
Writ Petition No. 2584 of 1992 in the High Court of Bombay.After hearing the petitioner, a
Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed his writ petition on December 14, 1992.
It is thereafter that the appellant moved the present proceedings by way of special leave petition.
By an order dated November 30, 1993 delay in filing the special leave petition was condoned and
notice was ordered to be issued to the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa with a direction that
the notice will state that the matter will be disposed of at the notice stage itself

Judgement

• In the light of the aforesaid statutory settings it, therefore, becomes clear that it is for the
concerned State Bar Councils by promulgating appropriate rules to regulate the entry of persons
seeking to join the legal profession. The respondentState Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa in
exercise of its powers under Section 28(2)(d) read with Section 24(1)(e) of the Act has framed
rules in this connection. Rule (1) with which we are concerned reads as under: “A person who is
otherwise qualified to be admitted as an Advocate but is either in full or part time service or
employment or is engaged in any trade, business or profession shall not be admitted as an
Advocate”.
 The Disciplinary Committee Of The Bar Council of India BCI DC Appeal No.25/1992

Baswarooponi

v.S

Babulalsoni

Babulalsoni is the father of Balswaroopsoni. He filed a complaint against his son alleging
professional misconduct before the Madhya Pradesh Bar Council. The allegations are as follows:

1. A criminal case under S.307 I.P.C. is pending against him.

2. while appearing as a defence counsel for one munna in a criminal case

No.125/89 he has introduced his own brother as Dwarha Pradesh and arranged him to stand as
surety for munna.

3. He has withdrawn a sum of Rs.1500 deposited in the court in the name of Babulalsoni in a
civil case without his consent.

Before the State Bar Council, Babulalsoni personally appeared and produced certain
documentary evidence in support of his case but the present appellant did not appear though
many chances are given to him. Finally, the Bar Council held that Balswaroopsoni is guilty of
professional misconduct and passed an order removing his name from the Advocates Roll.

Against this order Balswaroopsoni filed an appeal the Bar Council of India. In the appeal he
denied all the allegations against him but, failed to produce any documentary evidence in his
support.

Regarding the second allegation he took a defence that munna brought one person and introduced
him as Dwarakha Prasad. Believing Munna’swords only he also introduced him to the court as
Dwarakha Prasad. This defence was not accepted by the Bar Council of India because
Balswaroopsoni knows that the person brought by Munna Dwarakha Prasad.

Regarding the third allegation he took the defence that he is also one of the plaintiff in the said
case and his father has given power to withdraw that amount of Rs .1500/. But no documentary
evidence in support of this difference was produced by him. After hearing the parties, the Bar
Council of India reduced the punishment and suspended him from practice for a period of 5
years.

The Disciplinary Committee of The Bar Council of India

BCI TR Case No.58/1993

Indure Ltd. …..... COMPLAINANT

VS

Deo Raj Guptha …........ RESPONDENT

The complainant company is one of the highest producers of ash handling system in the world,
having large manufacturing and engineering factories. The respondent was the Advocate of the
company and various causes related to the company was entrusted with him.

In April 1986 NELCO precisions, a company located at Faridabad gave a false advertisement in
the papers that Indure Ltd. Is using the parts manufactured by NELCO precisions.

To stop this false advertisement Indure Ltd. instructed the respondent to serve a legal notice to
NELCO. Notice was sent, but the notice has not given the desired result. Therefore, the
respondent was instructed to file a case against NELCO. A plaint was prepared and it was
approved by the petitioner company and necessary court fees was also paid to him.

The respondent informed the complainant that he has filed the suit in the Delhi High Court and
got a stay order. In fact no suit had been filed.

The complainant filed a complaint in the Bar Council of U.P. alleging professional misconduct
against the respondent. They alleged that the respondent had made a similar type of
misrepresentation earlier also when he was instructed to file a case against Anoel Industries Ltd.
A criminal complaint was also filed against Gupta in this regard.

The respondent filed a very brief counter and failed to give any explanation about the serious
allegation of professional misconduct. He simply prayed that for the same matter there is already
a criminal case pending against him, so the Bar Councilshould not proceed with the complaint.
When the petition was pending before the Bar Council, the criminal case was disposed off and he
was convicted.

Since the U.P Bar Council could not able to complete the enquiry within one year the petition
was transferred to the Bar Council of India.

The Bar Council of India examined the complainant and the respondent and finally came to the
conclusion that the allegations against the respondent the complainant has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and directed the removal of his name from the roll of Advocates and prohibited
him from practicing as an Advocate
 Madras High Court of India DC Appeal No.15/1995

Commissioner of Civil Supplies & Consumer Protection Dept.

VS

Balakrishnan

Mr. Chandrakanth of Villupuram has filed a writ petition No.10589/90 in the Madras
High Court praying for the release of a Van TAH 4777 which was ceased by the Special
Tahsildar, Dindi Vanam on 5- 7-1990. The writ petition was dismissed on 11- 7-1990.The
respondent Mr. V. Balakrishnan was the Advocate for Mr.
Chandrakanth in the writ petition. After the dismissal of the Writ petition. After the dismissal of
the writ petition the respondent sent the following telegram to the District Revenue Officer,
South Arcot.High Court of Madras in writ petition No.10589/1990 filed by Chandrakanth
directed the District Revenue Officer to release the van TAH 4777 with 100 bags of paddy
within one week. Do not sell the paddy. Detailed order follows’’.

In another writ petition No.6184/1990 the respondent sent the following telegram to the
Collector, South Arcot.

In writ petition No.6184/1990 filed by cube ran of Villupuram for release of 117 bags of paddy
the High Court has ordered notice of motion returnable on 11-6-90. Not to dispose the paddy till
the final order in the writ petition’.

A petition was filed against Mr. Balakrishnan before the State Bar Council alleging professional
misconduct. It is alleged that the contents of both these telegrams were false and is not in
consonance with the High Court order.
The State Bar Council gave benefit of doubt to the respondent by observing that he acted with all
enthusiasm to protect the interest of his client. The State Bar Council observed that though his
conduct is not praise worthy, it did not amount to professional misconduct and thereby no
punishment is awarded to him.

Against this order an appeal was filed before the Bar Council of India. After hearing both the
parties, the Bar Council of India passed the followings orders.

1.The order of the State Bar Council was set aside.

2.He was found guilty of professional misconduct under S.35 of the Act.

3.The act sending wrong telegram misquoting the content of the court order is not an act fit for an
Advocate and he was reprimanded with strong words.

The Supreme Court of India

Sc 480, AIR 2002

Bhupinder Kumar Sharma

Vs

. Bar Association Pathankot

Facts

• In this case, the appellant was enrolled with the State Bar Council as an advocate on
16/09/1994 vide enrollment number P/771/94

• The respondent association made a written complaint to the State Bar Council making
allegations that the appellant was carrying on and continued his business and business
activities even after his enrollment as an advocate.

• The State Bar Council took recognition of the complaint and referred the complaint to its
disciplinary committee.

• That he was running a photocopies documentation centre in the court compound Pathankot and
the space for the same was allotted to the appellant in his personal capacity on account of being
handicapped. He was also running a PCO/STD Booth.

• That he was the proprietor/ General Manager of the Punjab Coal Briquettes Pathankot, a
private concern and he was pursuing the business / his interest in the said business even on the
date when his statement was recorded by the Disciplinary Committee on 12/05/1996.

• The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council witnessing Senior

Telecommunication Office Assistant who deposed that STD/PCO has been allotted to appellant
in the handicapped quota and the same is continuing in the name of the appellant even after his
enrollment as an advocate and a clerk in the office of SDO also stated in his evidence that space
for installment of photocopy machine was allotted on lease basis to the appellant in the
handicapped quota. Thus, the Disciplinary Committee passed an order to remove the name of the
Appellant from the State`s Roll of Advocates under Section 35(3)(d) of Advocates Act 1961 and
debarred him from practicing as an advocate.

• The appellant filed an appeal to the Bar Council of India on re-appreciation of the material on
record. The Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India confirmed the decision of the
State Bar Council held the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and dismissed the
appeal.
• The appellant filed an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocate Act, 1961 before the Supreme
Court against the judgment an order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council
of India, confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council
removing the name of the appellant from the State Roll`s of Advocates under Section 35(3)(d)
of the Act.

Judgement

• The Supreme Court held that having persuaded both orders and evidence place on record
the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct supported by and based on cogent and
convincing evidence and the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• The Supreme Court further held that having regard to the nature of misconduct and taking
note of the handicap of the appellant debarring him from practicing for all time is too harsh. So
they debar the appellant from practicing up to the end of December 2006. His licensed was
cancelled for 5 years.

Supreme Court of India

Appeal (civil) 5395 of 1997

Satish Kumar Sharma

vs

The Bar Council Of Himachal

BENCH:

S.V.Patil, R.C.Lahoti

FACTS:

After securing LL.B. in 1975-76 the appellant was appointed as Assistant (Legal) by the
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (for short the Board). The said post was re-designated
as Law Officer Grade-II in 1978. The Board, by its order dated 6.9.1983 allowed the appellant to
act as an advocate of the Board and also ordered that the expenditure of his getting licence from
the Bar Council shall be met by the Board. His application seeking enrolment was sent by the
Secretary of the Board to the respondent on 13.10.1983. The Secretary of the respondent by letter
dated 28.3.1984 informed the Board that the Office Order dated 6.9.1983 of the Board did not
meet the requirements of the Rules and that the appellant should first be designated as a Law
Officer. The respondent also requested the Board to send the order of appointment and the terms
of such appointment of the appellant. The Board by order dated 11.6.1984 modified the earlier
order dated 6.9.1983 and declared the appellant as a Law Officer of the Board. On 5.7.1984
another order was passed by the Board by changing the designation of the post of Law Officer
Grade-II as Law Officer. It is, thereafter, the respondent issued a certificate of enrolment dated
9.7.1984 to the appellant. By Office Order dated 8.5.1991 the appellant was given ad hoc
promotion to the post of Under Secretary (Legal)- cumLaw Officer, which order also stated that
he would continue to work in the Legal Cell of the Secretariat of the Board. Further on 14.1.1993
he was promoted as Under Secretary (Legal)- cum-Law Officer on officiating basis.

JUDGEMENT:

Under these circumstances there is no justification to retain Shri Satish Sharma on the Roll of the
Bar Council as an Advocate.

It is, thus, resolved that the Enrolment No. HIM/45/1984 be and is hereby withdrawn with
immediate effect and he is ordered to surrender his Enrolment Certificate within a period of 15
daysIt is this resolution, validity and correctness of which was challenged by the appellant before
the High Court in the writ petition contending that the enrolment was validly granted to him as
he fulfilled the requirements of relevant provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961; he also pointed
out that advocates, who obtained enrolment and later on joined State Government service in the
Prosecution Department, have continued to retain their enrolment and defend the State
Government in the courts; no rules have been framed by the respondent preventing persons like
the appellant from getting enrolled, it was not open to the respondent to withdraw the certificate
of enrolment; according to him Rule 49 of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India has been
misconstrued and misunderstood by the respondent. In short it was contended that the respondent
had no jurisdiction to withdraw the enrolment certificate granted to the appellant. The Division
Bench of the High Court by an elaborate and well- considered order dealing with all aspects
dismissed the writ petition. Hence the appellant has filed this appeal assailing the order of the
respondent as well as the order of the High Court affirming it.

Per contra, the learned counsel representing the respondent made submissions supporting the
orders impugned in this appeal. According to him the appellant was not at all entitled for
enrolment as an advocate having regard to Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules in the
absence of any enabling provision to a full time salaried employee for enrolment as an advocate.
The learned counsel submitted when the appellant was not at all entitled to be enrolled as an
advocate the action taken by the respondent after lapse of some time is of no consequence and
the delay in taking action in a case like this itself does not give protection so as to sustain the
enrolment. He further submitted that there was no discrimination as alleged by the appellant
looking to the nature of duties of the prosecutors in the State Departments and the appellant.

Section 24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll. (1) subject to the
provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted
as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfills the following conditions, namel.Section 49. General
power of the Bar Council of India to make rules

Law Officer for the purpose of this Rule means a person who is so designated by the terms of his
appointment and who, by the said terms, is required to act and/or plead in Courts on behalf of his
employer.
 The Supreme Court of India

2001 SC457
D.P.Chadha

Vs

Triyugi Narayan Mishra AIR

Fact:

This case under Advocate Act, 1961 is concerned with professional misconduct of an advocate.
In this case, a complaint was filed by the appellant against the respondents-Advocate before the
Bar council of Rajasthan, which was referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the State Bar
Council. The complaint against advocate was that he had written a letter to his client Mahant
Rajagiri stating that another client had informed him that the concerned judge accepts bribe to
give favorable orders, and so he should send an amount of Rs. 10,000 /- to get decision in his
fever, and in case he can influence the judge himself, there is no need to send Rs. 10,000 /- to be
given to the judge. The content of the letter was admitted by the respondent Advocate. However,
in reply to the complaint letter, he pleaded that the services of the presiding judge were
terminated due to taking illegal gratification, and that he had followed by norms of professional
ethics and brought this fact to the knowledge of the client to protect the interest of his client, and
that the money was not sent by the client to him. Under such circumstances, he had not
committed in professional misconduct. The State Bar Council came to the conclusion that the
respondent Advocate was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for
a period of 2 years.

Judgement:

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the earlier order of Bar Council of India had taken into
consideration all the relevant factors for arriving at the conclusion that the Advocate was totally
unfit to be a lawyer having the written such a letter and so the punishment lesser then
permanently debarring him cannot be imposed on guilty respondent. The Court further the held
that the power of review does not have empower the Disciplinary Committee for taking a
different view on the same facts of the case. The penalty of permanent debarment of practice was
imposed on the respondent in view of the nature of misconduct committed by the Advocate
respondent, which has been modified in exercise of review power. It is the duty of Bar Council to
adhere to the required standards and on its failure to take appropriate action against the erring
Advocates.

Finally, the Court set aside the review order of the Bar Council of India and restored its
original order
 The Supreme Court of India

(1984) 2 SCC 556

P.D Khandekar

V.S

BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA, BOMBAY

AND OTHERS

Facts

This case is of an appeal against the suspension order passed by the disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India. The appeal has been brought under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Advocate V. J. Francis has represented the appellant in this case. V. N. Ganpule and V. D.
Khanna were Advocates for respondents in this case.

In this case, a complaint was brought before the disciplinary committee constituted under Section
9 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The complaint was brought by 12 Advocates practising at 2 courts
of the Sub-Divisional Magistrates in Collectorate of Poona under Part VII, Chapter-1 of the Bar
Council of India Rules. The complaint is against appellant P. D. Khandekar and A. N Agavane.
The complaint was
transferred to the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India by the virtue of Section
36B(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 as the State Bar Council failed to dispose of the complaint
within one year from the receipt of the complaint under Section 35 of the act.

Judgement:

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India gave the following verdict in the present case.

• Advocates act as loco parentis for their clients and they must follow norms of the profession
aswell as protect the clients.
• The legal advice rendered by an advocate must not be improper in nature. There is a difference
between ‘Wrong-legal advice’ and ‘Improper legal advice’. The rendering of ‘Improper legal
advice’ with ulterior motive can be classified as professional misconduct.

• Mere negligence in preparing the legal documents with no moral delinquencies must not
amount to professional misconduct.

• The test to affirm ‘professional misconduct’ has been outlined in various cases.
The court relied on the case In re A Solicitor Ex parte the law Society (1912) 1 KB 302 in which
the court laid down that when a person in pursuit of his profession does something which brings
disgrace or dishonour to the profession, they are working in then it to be held as ‘Professional
Misconduct’.

• The court held that it is not misconduct or unprofessional on part of the appellant and Agavane
to draft an affidavit on instructions of the client. Furthermore, the clients of the appellant in
question here are of reasonable prudence owing to their power of understanding of what they
were doing. The evidence submitted by the complainant was not found to be substantial.

• The court held the second charge on the appellant and Agavane to be of no basis due to lack of
substantial evidence connecting the appellant to the affidavit in question.

The Supreme Court of India citations: 1995 SCC (5)

457, JT 1995 (6) 339

Ravichandran Iyer …. Petitioner

vs

Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors …. Respondent

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.

The petitioner, a practicing advocate, has initiated the public interest litigation under Article 32
of the Constitution seeking to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction restraining
permanently the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa [BCMG], Bombay Bar Association [BBA]
and the Advocates' Association of Western India
[AAWI], respondents 2 to 4 respectively, coercing Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee [the 1st
respondent]. Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, to resign from the office as Judge. He also
sought an investigation by the Central Bureau of investigation etc. [respondents 8 to 10] into the
allegations made against the 1st respondent and if the same are found true, to direct the 5th
respondent, Speaker Lok Sabha to initiate action for his removal under Article 124 (4) and (5)
read with Article 218 of the Constitution of India and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [for short, `the
Act']. This Court on March 24, 1995 issued notice to respondents 2 to 4 only and rejected the
prayer for interim direction to the President of India and the Union of India [respondents 6 and 7
respectively] not to give effect to the resignation by the 1st respondent. We have also issued
notice to the Attorney General for India and the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association
[SCBA]. The BBA filed a counter- affidavit through its President, Sri Iqbal Mahomedali Chagla.
Though respondents 2 and 4 are represented through counsel, they did not file any counter-
affidavit. The SCBA informed the Court that its newly elected office bearers required time to
take a decision on the stand to be taken and we directed them to file their written submissions.
Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appeared for the BBA and Shri Harish N. Salve,
learned senior counsel, appeared for AAWI, the 4th respondent. The learned Attorney General
also assisted the Court. We place on record our deep appreciation for their valuable assistance.

The SCBA, instead of filing written submissions sent a note with proposals to reopen the case; to
issue notice to all the Bar Associations in the country and refer the matter to a Bench of not less
than five, preferably seven, Judges for decision after hearing them all. We do not think that it is
necessary to accede to this suggestion.
 The Supreme Court of India

1979 AIR 281, 1979 SCR (1)1054

Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.

V. C. Rangadurai ….. Petitioner

VS

D. Gopalan And ORS ….. Respondent

FACTS:

In this case V. C. Rangadurai was an advocate and Devasenapathy was an old deaf man, aged 70
years and Smt. D. Kamalammal was also aged. They had given two promissory notes to
rangadurai and also paid the fees as was asked to the advocate. Nevertheless, the advocate did
not file the case in time. The limitation was over.

After a long time of wandering around the office of the advocate, the old man came to know that
the advocate deceived him by not filing the cases within the time even after receiving the fees.
He filed a complaint before disciplinary committee of the Tamil Nadu.

JUDGEMENT:

The state bar council which after enquiry punished the advocate suspending him for
6 years. On appeal, it was confirmed by the Bar council of India and also by Supreme Court.
Rule 6 of Chapter II of Part- VI of the Bar Council Rules states that an advocate shall not appear,
act, plead or practice before the court if any member is related to the advocate as father, son, wife
etc. the main object is to avoid personal bias between an advocate and presiding officer related to
such advocate. Due to natural love and affection, the judge may incline towards the advocate,
thus to favour the client of the advocate related to him or her.

The Disciplinary Committee of

The Bar Council of India

Suresh Shiva Rao

N.D. Upadhyaya secretary, Bar council of Maharashtra

Brief fact

In this case, the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India passed an order against
Suresh Shiva Rao for misconduct on 27th June 1998. After the proceedings began, the
disciplinary committee began with its examination and investigation on the matter through
documents and witnesses. After the examination ended, all the evidence were against Suresh and
the committee held him guilty and as a part of punishment for misconduct, his license was
withdrawn for a period of 2 years. However, Suresh was unsatisfied by the order of the court and
by exercising the rights given to him under the Indian statutes, preferred an appeal against the
same. Thereafter, an order of stay was issued on this order of the committee.

On the other hand, while the case was still going on and according to the previous order on which
the stay had been put, Suresh's license was withdrawn, he continued to practice legal profession
by working with a company named m/s Vulcan level ltd. The type of employment he was under
was full time. Besides being employed with the company, he was also practicing in the court of
Maharashtra and Goa. As per the norms, the accused for misconduct should have told about the
company and the employment offered to the court of law but he failed to do so.

Consequently, Shri N.D. Upadhyaya made a complained to the Bar council of the state that he
was practicing in i.e., Bar council of Maharashtra but interpreting the text of section 36-B, the
bar council of India was unable to take any step because the proceedings has exceeded the period
prescribed which is 1 year. After the expiration period is over, the matter was transferred to the
Bar council of India

The Bar Council of India

BCI Trial Case no 49/1993

Allahabad Banks ….. Complainant

VS

Girish Prasad Verm …... Respondent

Facts:
In this case complainant Allahabad Bank filed complaint against the advocate Girish Chandra
Verma alleging that out of the 52 suits which were given to the advocate for filing in the court 50
suits were filed with nominal court fees and 2 suits were not filed at all and the advocate
misappropriated the sum the sum paid to him by the complainant for the purpose of court fees.

Held :

U.P Bar Council disciplinary committee held that the advocate has misappropriated the amount
of the court fees and further ordered for the striking of the name of the advocate from the roll of
the U.P Bar Council. The committee made it clear that legal profession is a noble profession and
its members must set an example of conduct worthy of emulation

The Supreme Court of India

AIR 2000 SC 2912

R.D. Saxena …. Appellant

Vs

Balram Prasad …. Respondent

Judge : K.T. Thomas

Facts of the Case

The appellant was appointed as a legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Bank
Ltd. (herein referred to as ‘Bank’) in 1990. He used to conduct cases on behalf of the said bank.
Subsequently, on 17.7.1993 the bank terminated the retainers of the appellant; and requested him
to return his files related to the bank. Instead of returning the files, he informed the bank that
only after dues amounting to rupees 97,100/- were paid will he return the files.

Hence, the Bank filed a complaint before the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh on 3.2.1994;
wherein the appellant contended that he has a right of lien on those files; whereas the respondent
contended that the appellant is guilty of professional misconduct by not returning the files to his
client.

Subsequently, the matter got transferred to the disciplinary committee of Bar Council of India;
wherein the appellant was held guilty of professional misconduct and was imposed a fine of
rupees 1000/-; and also debarred him from practicing for 18 months; and was directed to return
all the case bundles of the client without any delay. Therefore, the advocate/appellant filled for
the appeal before the Supreme Court

Judgement

Rule of Law-

Section 148 of the Contract Act defines the bailment which states that; if the goods are
transferred from one person to another for some purpose; and after completion of the purpose the
goods have to be returned to; or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person
delivering them then such transfer can be termed as a bailment.

But in this case, the goods are not bailed to the appellant/advocate as there was no delivery of the
goods; because the advocate owned paper on his account.
The term ‘goods’ has to be understood in the sense of the Goods and Sales Act, 1930 wherein
section 2(7) states “every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; and
includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to or forming part of the
land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale.”

Thus the goods which fall in the purview of section 171 should have marketability i.e. they
should be saleable.

The case files in the present case are neither saleable nor can be converted into money; hence
section 171 is of no meriting punishment will be altered to reprimanding the appellant. However,
if any person commits this type of professional misconduct in the future; then Bar Council will
determine respective punishment; and the lesser punishment imposed in this case should not be
taken under the ambit of precedent

The Supreme Court of India

(1993)2 SCC187

Salil Dutta …. Appellant

VS

T.M. and MC (P) Ltd … Respondent

Facts of the case:

The appeal is preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and order of a division bench of the
Calcutta High court allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent/defendant. And the appeal
before the High court was directed against an order of the city civil court, Calcutta dismissing an
application filed by the defendant to set aside the ex parte decree passed against him, under
Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC
• The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for ejecting the defendant-tenant on the ground of
default in paying rent and on the ground that the such premises are required for his own use and
occupation. The suit was posted for final hearing on 9/06/1988 seven years after its institution.

• According to the defendanthis advocate advised him that he need not be present at the
hearing of the suit on 9/06/1988, and thereafter till the applications filed by him under Order 14
Rule 5 and Order 6 Rule 16 Civil Procedure Code are disposed of. On 9/06/1988, the advocate
for the defendant prayed for an adjournment till the next day. It was adjourned accordingly. On
June 10, neither the advocate for the defendant nor the defendant appeared, with the result the
defendant was set ex parte

Held

• “This was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution.
The defendant not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company ...managed by
educated businessmen who know where their interest lies......they chose to non-cooperate with
the court. Having adopted such a stand

towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame
upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or
significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have
been accepted.” • “For the above reasons, the appeals allowed“
 CONCLUSION

In the above discussion it is evident that the person belonging to the learned profession are
under duty to exercise reasonable degree of care and skill in performance of these
Professional activities . It is the fundamental principle of the profession to protect the judicial
interpretation of the term “service” and “deficiency of service” with respect to the legal
service keeping in to the account.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ETHICS PROFESSIONAL ON JUDGEMENTS SELECTED-VOLUME 1 BAR

COUNCIL OF INDIA TRUST. VOLUME 1, 1ST EDITION@2002, BAR COUNCIL OF
INDIA TRUST.

2. SIROHI. S-P-J RELATIONS BAR BENCH & LAWYERS FOR ACCOUNTANCY

ETHICS PROFESSIONAL