Journal Infa - Harsono Yoewono
Journal Infa - Harsono Yoewono
Accounting (INFA)
ISSN: 2986-5239 (Electronic)
Open Access: https://journal.gpcpublisher.com/index.php/infa
Article history: The aim of this research is to examine the impacts of managerial ownership,
Received 22/08/2023 institutional ownership, board of commissioners, independent board of
Revised 23/08/2023 commissioner, and board of director on firm value. The population of this research
are companies that included in LQ 45 companies for the period of 2012-2018. By
Accepted 25/08/2023
using purposive sampling method, 133 companies were selected as samples. The
type of data used in this research is secondary data. Meanwhile, data analysis
Keyword: method that used in this research is descriptive statistics and multiple regression
Managerial Ownership, analysis. The T test result of this research indicates that only institutional ownership
Institutional Ownership, and independent board of commissioner out of five other variables affects
Board of Commissioners, significant positive on firm value. Meanwhile, the F test result of this research
indicates that five variables (managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board of
Independent Board of
commissioners, independent board of commissioner, and board of director)
Commissioners, Board of
together affect the firm value.
Directors, Company Value
©2023 Authors. Published by PT. Great Performance Consulting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)
INTRODUCTION
The company always strives to obtain as well maintain public trust, one of the efforts taken by
the company to gain public trust is the implementation of integrated governance company (Triyuwono
et al., 2020). Integrated corporate governance will ensure that each company stakeholders get their
respective rights, based on applicable regulations (Triyuwono et al., 2020). The corporate governance
mechanism encourages organizations to implement excellent accounting rules and carry out the
company's managerial supervision function to issue quality financial reports and reduce the frequency
of financial report restatements (Marjono, 2021).
The difference in interests between managers and shareholders results in a conflict which is
commonly called agency conflict. Agency conflict occurs because managers prioritize personal
interests, whereas shareholders do not like the personal interests of managers because what managers
do will increase company costs, causing a decrease in company profits and affecting stock prices,
thereby reducing company value. One mechanism that is expected to control agency costs is by
implementing good corporate governance. The collapse of these public companies was due to strategy
failures and fraudulent practices from top management which went undetected for quite a long time
due to weak independent oversight by corporate boards (Nasution, 2022).
The awareness of companies in Indonesia to implement corporate governance is still
relatively low. There are still companies that have not been managed properly, making Indonesia have
the lowest corporate governance index when compared to other Asian countries such as Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand. The weak implementation of corporate governance is shown through the
following empirical data. Based on the results of research conducted by Credit Lyonnais Securities
INFA International Journal of The Newest Finance and Accounting
Vol 1 No 2 August 2023
Asia (CLSA) in collaboration with the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA). Credit
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) is a leading independent brokerage and investment group in Asia
(www.clsa.com). While the definition of ACGA is a non-profit organization whose members are
highly dedicated organizations to work collaborating with investors, companies, and regulators in the
implementation of effective corporate governance across Asia (www.acga-asia.org). After conducting
a survey on the implementation of corporate governance, it can be seen from the score in 2012-2018,
Indonesia always gets the last position out of 11 countries (2012-2016) and 12 countries (2018)
survey participants. Indonesia experienced a decline in corporate governance scores from 2014-2018.
This is due to the constraints faced by companies in Indonesia, namely internal constraints
(commitment of the leadership and members of the company, the level of understanding of the
leadership and members of the company about the principles of corporate governance) and external
constraints (legal instruments and enforcement rules).
Corporate governance is included in the components that affect the basis of the company's
economic stability, if corporate governance is applied effectively, then the decisions determined in
corporate governance are expected to reduce problems triggered by the separation of ownership (Edi
and Felicia, 2022). If the company can implement good governance, it will have implications for
increasing investor confidence which in turn maximizes company value (Azaria and Muslichah 2021).
The application of governance mechanisms in carrying out the company's operational activities will
receive a positive response from investors and the public, indicating that the company and its
management have carried out their duties properly and correctly so that the value of the company can
increase (Azaria and Muslichah 2021). Efforts to add value, entities that have a weak governance
structure can lead to inaccuracies in investments, therefore it will have an impact on company value
and profits (Cahyani and Faisal, 2019). Firm value is the selling value of a company as an operating
business (Kolamban et al., 2020). Company value as a reflection of financial performance according
to (Faisal, Samben, and Pattisahusiwa 2018) is a picture of the merits of a company's financial
condition as measured by financial measuring instruments that reflect work performance in a certain
period.
The KNKG was formed by the government based on the Decree of the Coordinating Minister
for the Economy Number: KEP/49/M.EKON/11/2004 states that strong good corporate governance is
focused on the board of directors and the board of commissioners. The National Governance Policy
Committee (KNKG) (2006) defines the board of commissioners as follows: "The board of
commissioners is part of the company's organs that are collectively in charge and responsible for
supervising and providing advice to the directors and ensuring that the company implements GCG."
The board of directors in a company will determine the policies to be taken or the company's strategy
in the short and long term. Meanwhile, the role of the board of commissioners in a company is more
emphasized on the monitoring function of the implementation of directors' policies. The role of the
commissioner is expected to minimize agency problems that arise between the board of directors and
shareholders. In contrast to the research by Valencia and Khairani (2019) concludes that the board of
independent commissioners has a significant positive effect on company value. Meanwhile, Amaliyah
and Herwiyanti (2019) found that Independent Commisioners has no significant effect on company
value.
In this study, the sample that the author will use is companies listed in the LQ 45 index. LQ
45 is an index that measures the price performance of 45 stocks that have high liquidity and large
market capitalization and are supported by good company fundamentals. LQ 45, uses 45 selected
stocks based on stock trading liquidity and is adjusted every six months (every beginning of February
and August). The company has shares that make it easy to buy and sell back in a short time. Thus,
companies belonging to the LQ 45 group are considered to have good corporate value.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The relationship between the agent (management of a business) and the principal
(shareholders). The relationship between agents (management) and principals (stakeholders) is very
possible for agency conflicts to occur. Agency problems are characterized by differences in interests
and incomplete information (information asymmetry) between the principal and the agent
(Septianingrum, 2020). The principal is the owner of the company and what is meant by the agent is
the manager of the company. while what is meant as an agent is management who is obliged to
manage the owner's property. The principal as the owner of the company obliged to provide facilities
and funds for operational needs company, while the agent as manager of the company is obliged
managing the company entrusted by the shareholders to him prosperity and shareholder profits
through value creation company (Puspitasari, 2021).
Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership is the number of company shares held by non-bank financial
institutions where these institutions manage funds on behalf of other people. Institutional ownership
has an important meaning in monitoring management, where an optimal increase in supervision is due
to institutional ownership, where the greater the institutional ownership, the more efficient the use of
company activation which is expected to also act as a prevention of waste by management (Naomi
2022). This monitoring will certainly guarantee prosperity for shareholders. This monitoring will
certainly guarantee prosperity for shareholders.
Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership is share ownership as well as management of the company (Purba and
Effendi, 2019). Managerial share ownership can be used to align the interests of shareholders with
managers (Purba and Effendi, 2019). The existence of managerial ownership in a company will raise
an interesting allegation that the value of the company increases as a result of increased managerial
ownership. The large proportion of ownership by managers will be effective in monitoring every
activity carried out by the company.
Board of Directors
The board of directors or board of directors is a person appointed to lead a Limited Liability
Company (PT) which acts as an aspect of the control system within a company, has a dual role as
monitoring and decision making (Purnama & Handayani 2021). The board of directors is an important
resource within the company which will contribute to reducing environmental damage by the
company (Euginia & Triwacaningrum, 2022). The board of directors is a board tasked with
overseeing the company and has a very vital role in a company. The Board of Directors is an organ of
the company that is authorized and fully responsible for managing the company for the benefit of the
company, by the aims and objectives of the company, and for representing the company, both inside
and outside the court. According to (Kalim, Yan Chen, Khalil, & Niaz, 2018) the board of directors is
very helpful in effective monitoring and decision-making processes.
Independent Commissioner
According to Fahmi and Nabila (2020), In the GCG general guidelines, the definition of an
independent commissioner is a member of the board of commissioners who is not affiliated with the
directors, other members of the board of commissioners and controlling shareholders, and is free from
business relationships or other relationships that may affect his or her ability to act independently or
act solely for the benefit of the company. The board of commissioners as an organ of the company has
collective duties and responsibilities for supervising and providing advice to the directors and
ensuring that the company practices good corporate governance (Wahyuningsih, 2020).
Company Value
Increasing the value of the company is an important step that must be taken by a company
because increasing the company, also means maximizing the company's main goals. By increasing the
value of the company, the welfare of the owner of the company will also increase. The high value of
the company will increase investor confidence regarding the company's performance, not only at this
time but also in the prospects for the company in the future (Asna & Rita, 2018).
From the description above, it can be described that the framework used in this study is as
follows:
RESEARCH METHODS
This approach uses a quantitative approach with a deductive process that studies something
by looking at general or specific patterns. In quantitative research, the researcher is a value-free
individual, does not bring the values he already has, and is based on universal law. The population in
this study are all companies listed on LQ 45 from 2012-2018. The LQ 45 index is the market
capitalization value of the 45 most liquid stocks and has a large capitalization value, which is an
indicator of liquidation. The LQ 45 index uses 45 stocks selected based on the liquidity of stock
trading and is adjusted every six months (every beginning of February and August). The sampling
method in this study used a purposive sampling method, which is a sampling technique using certain
considerations and limitations so that the selected sample is relevant to the research objective.
This study uses two studies in data collection through library research and field studies. The
data analysis method used in this study is descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis.
Analysis of the data obtained in this study used the Eviews Version 11.0 application program..
Firm value is proxied by the TOBINS variable which is the result of calculating the market
value of all outstanding shares, debt, and total assets of firms. The mean value, maximum value,
minimum value, and standard deviation for the TOBINS variable in the data above are 1.431803,
1.191693, 3.544047, 0.039433, and 0.714767 respectively. Managerial ownership (INSIDER) The
average value (mean) is 0.001090, The maximum value is 0.006729, The minimum value is
0.0000003, The standard deviation value of managerial ownership is 0.001621. Institutional
ownership (INSOWN) has an average value (mean) of 0.486434, The maximum value in this study
has a value of 0.967993, The minimum value in this study has a value of 0.055414, The standard
deviation value indicates some 0.195059. The size of the board of commissioners (UDK) has an
average value (mean) of 3.631579, a maximum value of 6.000000, a minimum value of 1.000000, a
standard deviation value of 0.925020. Independent commissioners have an average value of 0.429732,
the maximum value of the independent commissioner's board variable is 0.666667, the minimum
value is 0.285714, while the standard deviation value of the independent commissioner's variable is
0.105317. The size of the board of directors has an average of 7.669173, a maximum value of
12.000000, a minimum value of 4.000000, and a standard deviation value of 1.933445.
Based on Table 2 it can be seen that the chi-square probability value is 0.0000. This shows
that the prob. is smaller than the significance level (0.05) so a decision can be taken to reject H0,
which means that the selected model is a fixed effect so that the test continues with the Hausman test.
Based on the results of the Hausman test shown in Table 3 where the Chi-square probability
value is smaller than the significance level, namely 0.0250 <0.05. This shows that the decision is to
accept H0, which means that it is better to use the Fixed Effect Model (FEM). Thus it can be
concluded that the testing model used in this study is the Fixed Effect Model (FEM). Because the
results of the Chow Test and Hausman Test show that the correct regression model to use is the Fixed
Effect regression model, there is no need to perform the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test.
Based on the results of the normality test conducted using the Eviews 11.0 program, the
probability of a jarque-bera is greater than the significance level, which is 0.132478 > 0.05. These
results indicate that the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted, which means that the residuals have a
normal distribution. So it can be concluded that the data in the research model either the dependent
variable, the independent variable, or both are normally distributed.
Based on the results of the normality test carried out using the Eviews 11.0 program, which is
listed in Table 4, it is known that the correlation value between the independent variables is less than
0.85 (r < 0.85). This shows that the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted, which means that there is no
multicollinearity problem.
Based on Table 5, the Chi-Square probability value is 0.9647. This shows that the Chi-Square
probability value is greater than the significance level (0.05), meaning that in the heteroscedasticity
test, the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted so that it can be concluded that in the research data, there is
no heteroscedasticity.
Table 6 shows the Durbin Watson (DW) value of 1.863800. To see whether there is an
autocorrelation symptom, it is necessary to compare it with the table's Durbin Watson (DW) value.
Table DW values can be seen by identifying the number of cross-sections (n) and the number of
independent variables (k). In this study, the number of cross-sections (n) was 133 and the number of
independent variables (k) was 5. Based on the alpha significance value of 0.05, the dL (lower limit)
value was 1.6397, and the dU (upper limit) was 1.7954, while 4-dU is 2.2046 and 4-dL is 2.3603.
Durbin Watson test results show 1.7954 ≤ 1.863800≤ 2.2046. This result means that H0 is accepted,
in other words, there is no autocorrelation.
The probability value of the managerial ownership variable is 0.7293. This value indicates a
probability value greater than the significance level (0.05). Based on these results, it means that the
INSIDER variable has no significant positive effect on the Firm Value action. The probability value
of the institutional ownership variable is 0.0317. This value indicates a probability value that is
smaller than the significance level (0.05). INSOWN has a significant positive effect on the Company
Value action. The probability value of the variable Size of the Board of Commissioners is 0.5965.
This value indicates a probability value greater than the significance level (0.05). UDK has no
significant positive effect on Firm Value measures. The probability value of the Independent
Commissioner's Board of Commissioners variable is 0.0418. This value indicates a probability value
that is smaller than the significance level (0.05). DKI has a significant positive effect on the Company
Value action. The probability value of the variable Size of the Board of Directors is 0.6264. This
value indicates a probability value greater than the significance level (0.05) UUD does not have a
significant negative effect on firm value actions.
Table 9. Simultaneous Test Results (Test F)
R-squared 0.683356 Mean dependent var 1.431803
Adjusted R-squared 0.616541 S.D dependent var 0.714767
S.E. of regression 0.442613 Akaike info criterion 1.369658
Sum squared resid 21.353760 Schwarz criterion 1.891225
Log likekihood -67.082250 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.581603
F-statistic 10.227620 Durbin-Watson stat 0.877018
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Based on Table 9 it can be explained that the value of the F-statistic is 10.22762 with a
probability value of 0. This indicates that the value is at the 99% confidence level or can be
categorized as highly significant because it has a significance value of 0 <0.05 so it can be concluded
that the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted.
From Table 10 it can be seen that the coefficient of determination or R-squared is 0.683356,
which means that 68.3% of the dependent variable in this research model is explained by independent
variables such as managerial ownership, institutional ownership, the board size, independent board of
commissioners, and board size. While the rest is explained by other variables outside of the variables
used
Discussion
The managerial ownership coefficient is 2.241184 and the probability value of managerial
ownership is 0.7293 which is greater than the significance level (0.05). These results indicate that H1
is rejected, meaning that managerial ownership has no significant effect on firm value.
The coefficient value of institutional ownership is 0.243659 and the probability value of
institutional ownership is 0.0317 which is smaller than the significance level (0.05). These results
indicate that H2 is accepted, meaning that there is a significant positive effect between institutional
ownership on firm value.
The coefficient value of the size of the board of commissioners is 0.062061 and the
probability value of the size of the board of commissioners is 0.5965 which is greater than the
significance level (0.05). These results indicate that H3 is rejected, meaning that the size of the board
of commissioners has no significant effect on firm value.
The coefficient value of the independent board of commissioners is 1.949885 and the
probability value of the board of independent commissioners is 0.0418 which is less than the
significance level (0.05). These results indicate that H4 is accepted, meaning that there is a significant
positive effect between the independent board of commissioners on firm value.
The coefficient value of the size of the board of directors is -0.037170 and the probability
value of the size of the board of directors is 0.6264 which is greater than the significance level (0.05).
These results indicate that H1 is rejected, meaning that the size of the board of directors has no
significant effect on firm value.
CONCLUSION
From the results of the descriptive statistical analysis, it was obtained that the variable value
of the firm value proxied by Tobin's Q has an average value of 1.431803. This value illustrates that
the stock is in overvalued condition, which means management is successful in managing company
assets and the potential for high investment growth because Tobin's Q value is more than 1. The
results of the simultaneous test (F test) conclude that there is a significant effect simultaneously
between the variables of managerial ownership, ownership institutional size, the size of the board of
commissioners, the independent board of commissioners, and the size of the board of directors on
company value. The results of the partial test (T-test) show that of the five independent variables, only
two variables affect firm value. This study only examines companies listed in the LQ 45 index as a
research sample, so the number of samples obtained is not large, and also cannot represent all
companies in Indonesia. There are only two of the five independent variables that have a significant
influence on firm value, meaning that firm value is influenced by factors other than the four variables.
This research is limited to a period of seven years. As for suggestions in this study, namely, the next
researcher is expected to be able to add to the sample not only companies listed in the LQ 45 index
but all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) so that they can represent all
companies in Indonesia. Further researchers are expected to be able to add variables and other factors
that are not used in this study and need to be investigated further regarding other factors that influence
firm value to support future research. For further research, it is expected to add to or extend the
research period.
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