CIVIL PROCEDURE – Case digests

Table of contents
1. Serafin Tijam, et al v. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, Lucia Bagiuo and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. G.R. No.
L-21450, 1968 April 15
2. Foronda-Crystal v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, 29 November 2017
3. Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. v. Pineda, G.R. No. 227147, 30 July 2018
4. Spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, 20 February 2017
5. Paloma v. Magno, G.R. No. 237767, 10 November 2021
6. Tumagan v. Kairuz, G.R. No. 198124, 12 September 2018
7. Heirs of Sanches v. Abrantes, G.R. No. 234999 (2021)
8. Delgado v. GQ Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 242774, 25 September 2019
9. Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, 11/8/17
10. Momarco Import Co., Inc. v. Villamena, G.R. No. 192477, 7/27/16
11. Maranan v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 164398 (2007)
12. Fernandez v. Villegas, G.R. No. 200191, 8/20/14
13. Philippine Savings Bank v. Papa, G.R. No. 200469, 15 January 2018
14. Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, G.R. No. 138500, 16 September 2005
15. Solis v. Solis-Laynes, G.R. No. 235099, 29 March 2023
16. Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, 17 January 2005
17. Philippine National Bank v. Romeo B. Daradar, G.R. No. 180203, June 28, 2021
18. Patricio G. Gemina V. Espejo, Jr., G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021
19. Silvestre Tiu v. Daniel Middleton and Remedios P. Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, July 19, 1999
20. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Alfonso O. Pineda, Jr., and Josephine C. Pineda, G.R. No. 227147, July
30, 2018
21. G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. Vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation
22. Alex Raul B. Blay Vs. Cynthia B. Bana
23. Virra Mall Tenants Association, Inc. Vs. Virra Mall Greenhills Association, Inc.
24. Santamaria v. Cleary, G.R. No. 197123 (2016)
25. Afulugencia v. MBTC, G.R. No. 185145 (2014)
26. Limos v. Odones, G.R. No. 186979 (2011)
27. Duque v. Spouses Yu, G.R. No. 226130 (2018)
28. Olivarez Realty Corp. vs Castillo G.R. No. 196251
29. Asis vs Ilao G.R. No. L-17451
30. Lara's Gift vs PNB General Insurers G.R. No. 230429
31. TIDCORP vs Philippine Veterans Bank G.R. No. 233850 04-25-25
32. Villalongha, et al. v. CA G.R. No. 227222
33. Jonathan Land Oil International vs Magundadatu G.R. No. 155010
34. Velasco vs Ortiz G.R. No. L-51973
35. Santos vs Santos G.R. No. 214593
36. Far east Bank and Trust Co. v. Toh, G.R. No. 144018, 23 June 2003
37. xxx v. CA, G.R. No. 261459, 20 May 2024
38. Zabarte v. Puyat, G.R. No. 234636, Feb 13 2023
39. PSALM v. Maunlad Homes Inc., G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017
40. So Tiat King v. Vicente Lim, et.al, G.R. No. 186407, June 22, 2015
41. Ordaneza v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254484, November 24, 2021
42. Rivera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings B.V, G.R. No. 173783, June 17, 2015
 Case digests

1.Serafin Tijam, et al v. Facts: After the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in
Lucia Bagiuo and Manila the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and
Surety and Fidelity Co., Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from
Inc. G.R. No. L-21450, the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As
1968 April 15 prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond
by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
Having received a summon, the defendants interposed a counterclaim.
- The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants.
- The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against
which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds,
namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for
the payment of the amount due under the judgment.
- Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its
counter-bond but also "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if
any, under the bond in question", the same has been denied.
- Upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second
motion for execution against the counterbond.
- Surety’s counsel filed for a motion for extension and was granted 5 days to
answer.
- They filed a motion to quash, the same was denied, on the ground that the same
was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
The surety appealed raising that; 1) the court erred in issuing writ of execution without
summary hearing, 2) the court erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-appellant. 3) the court erred in denying the motion to quash the
writ of execution.
CA affirmed.
Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the
Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that
appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No.
296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section
88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
- Appellees were required to answer but failed to do so, CA resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to SC.
Issue: WON the appellant may invoke lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling: No, the appellant cannot invoke lack of jurisdiction.
The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the
Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in
a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
 to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action
by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

2.Foronda-Crystal v. Son, Facts: Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land
G.R. No. 221815, 29 located in Barrio Magay, Municipality of Compostela, Province of Cebu. The latter
November 2017 derived his title over the property from a successful grant of a Free Patent (Free Patent
No. VII-519533), which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-37324.
On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance
and damages against Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a
half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that
she purchased the same from a certain Eleno T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum
of P200,000.00. According to her, since her acquisition, she has been religiously paying
real property taxes thereon as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was
issued under her name.
According to the respondent, the issuance of the Free Patent in favor of the petitioner's
father was "due to gross error or any other cause. The respondent alleged that "there is no
tax declaration in the name of patentee Eddie Foronda", meaning the latter is not the
owner of lot 1280 and neither has payment of real estate taxes been made by him when he
was still alive or by his heirs.
Herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and since the "market value of the subject
property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B, Complaint) is P2,830.00" jurisdiction
over the case lies with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu. But
RTC following herein respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and
set aside its earlier ruling based on "tax declaration, sometimes being undervalued, is not
controlling then ordered the cancellation of the title, in favor of the defendant.
Petitioner appealed to CA, the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
According to this law, in Ruling: No, the RTC does not validly acquires jurisdiction over the case.
all civil actions which
involve title to, or Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.
[16]
possession of, real In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case
property, or any interest on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. What is
therein, the RTC shall relevant in this case, therefore, is the delineation provided for by law which separates the
exercise exclusive original jurisdictions of the second level courts—the Regional Trial Courts—and the first level
jurisdiction where the courts. The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment
assessed value of the introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction
property exceeds
of the first level courts. x x x. Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases
P20,000.00 or, for civil
the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest
actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level
P50,000.00.[20] For those courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This
below the foregoing amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would
threshold amounts, result in the speedier administration of justice."[24] (Emphasis, underscoring and formatting
exclusive jurisdiction lies supplied, citations omitted).
with the MeTC, MTC,
MCTC, or MTCC.[2 To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with
appropriate jurisdiction, an examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It
is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the
complaint to determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. That a failure to allege the
assessed value of a real property in the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case.
 This is because absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
Based on the foregoing, the rule on determining the assessed value of a real property,
insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is
concerned, would be two-tiered; (a) the fair market value of the real property in litigation
stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged by
the claimant. Having laid out the essential rules in determining the jurisdiction of the first
and second level courts for civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, the Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances
that surround the current case.
In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject
property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market value
amounting to P200,000.00.[47] In the course of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the
assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and
therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.The question thus posed before this Court was
whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and in the
affirmative, whether or not the RTC decision should be rendered void for being issued
without jurisdiction.
As discussed above, settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the
complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of the
property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because the court
which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified. However, a liberal
interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag,[48] would necessitate an
examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the complaint
referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex "B," which naturally
would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal that the
property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the
case. The RTC should have upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed
the same. Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null and void. Thus, considering
the foregoing, it would be proper for the Court to immediately dismiss this case without
prejudice to the parties' filing of a new one before the MTC that has jurisdiction over the
subject property.

3.Radiowealth Finance Facts: In its Complaint[3] dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23,
Co., Inc. v. Pineda, G.R. 2014, it extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note,[4] in the
No. 227147, 30 July 2018 amount of P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly installments of P23,242.00, which
was secured by a Chattel Mortgage[5] constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents.
Notably, the Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums
due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National
Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a
branch/office, a[t] its sole option."[6] Due to respondents' default, petitioner demanded
payment of the whole remaining balance of the loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of
June 8, 2015, excluding penalty charges. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed
the instant suit for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin
before the RTC, further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal. [7]
In an Order[8] dated March 28, 2016, the RTC issued a Writ of Replevin, due to
respondents' continued failure to pay their monetary obligations to petitioner and/or
surrender their vehicle subject of the Chattel Mortgage.

However, in an Amended Order[9] dated July 21, 2016, the RTC recalled the Writ of
Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Ruling: "Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right
to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is
settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant
allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of
 the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted."[13] This is markedly different from the concept of venue, which only pertains to
the place or geographical location where a case is filed. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,[14] the Court exhaustively differentiated these
concepts, to wit: Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City of
Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority:
On the one hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the court or tribunal where the Constitution or
a statute says it can be brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be
brought at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court
which has no jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.

On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action
or proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A
party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived. When the
venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment.
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law. [15]
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note – which reads
"[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be
brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place
where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option" [20] – is
indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any
place where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing allegation that
it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has been properly laid, unless
such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on.

4.Spouses Romeo and Ida Facts: Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) entered into a Remarkable
Pajares v. Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with Spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares (petitioners) on September 8,
Laundry and Dry 2011. Under the contract, the petitioners were to act as a dealer outlet, accepting items for
Cleaning, G.R. No. laundry to be picked and processed by the respondent. The contract included a provision
212690, 20 February 2017 requiring the petitioners to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week; failure
to do so would incur penalties. On April 30, 2012, the petitioners unilaterally ceased their
dealer outlet operations due to lack of personnel, leading to a breach of the contract’s
terms, specifically Article IV concerning required quotas and penalties. Respondent made
several written demand attempts for the due penalties, which were ignored by the
petitioners. Consequently, on September 3, 2012, the respondent filed a complaint for
“Breach of Contract and Damages” at the RTC in Cebu City, claiming P200,000 in
damages plus additional costs.

Initially, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-39025 on
February 19, 2013, on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the claim amounted
only to P280,000, which was below the RTC jurisdictional threshold of P300,000. The
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration emphasizing that the nature of the
complaint (breach of contract) rendered it a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus
falling under RTC jurisdiction, but the RTC rejected the motion on April 29, 2013.
Subsequently, the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing the RTC exercised grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled in favor of the
respondent, declaring that the case was indeed within the RTC’s jurisdiction, as it
pertained to a breach of contract involving issues beyond mere monetary recovery.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners sought reversal of the CA ruling through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari to the Supreme Court, maintaining that the complaint was predominantly for
damages, which should be assessed according to the totality of claims amounting below
RTC jurisdiction.
 Issue: 1. Whether the RTC correctly dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of
jurisdiction since the total damages claimed were below P300,000.
2. Whether the nature of the complaint, for breach of contract seeking damages, qualifies
as being for an amount capable of pecuniary estimation or not.
3. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the breach of contract claim was a matter incapable
of pecuniary estimation, thereby falling under RTC jurisdiction.

Ruling: The Supreme Court reinstated the RTC’s dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction. It concurred with the RTC, finding that the complaint was primarily for the
recovery of a specified sum of money (damages), making it an action capable of
pecuniary estimation. The Court refuted the CA’s interpretation that the complaint was
inherently non-pecuniary due to its foundation in a breach of contract. Instead, it clarified
the cause of action was strictly rooted in the recovery of liquidated damages specified in
the penal clause of the contract, qualifying it as a claim well within the purview of
monetary estimation. The Supreme Court underscored the requirement for determining
jurisdiction by considering the aggregate sum of all claimed damages and reiterating that
the total amount did not exceed the jurisdictional prerequisite for RTC mandates as
defined by law.

5.Paloma v. Magno, Facts: Ester Delmolin-Magno and Justina Delmolin-Paloma are siblings, and Cristobal R.
G.R. No. 237767, 10 Delmolin was their late brother, with all being legitimate children of Santiago and Eulalia
November 2021 Delmolin. Cristobal was survived by his wife Abigail Delmolin and their children. Santiago
Delmolin was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Pablo City, evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1539 issued in 1977. He allegedly sold 300 square
meters of this to Justina on August 28, 1967, for P10,000. In 1980, Ester constructed a house
on this land with apparent consent from Santiago. The Deed of Sale was only registered in
2000, over three decades after purported execution. Justina claimed the entire property in a
1999 confirmation affecting the whole 684 square meters. In 1999 and later years, the land
dispute was brought to the barangay’s attention. An initial agreement partitioned the land,
which Justina refused to sign. In 2010, Ester and Abigail filed for annulment of the title (TCT
No. T-52423) and sought judicial partition of Santiago’s estate, asserting that the sale and later
titling deprived them and Cristobal’s heirs of rightful inheritance. The RTC declared the sale
partially null for heirs of Ester and Cristobal, asserted the land should be equally partitioned,
and ordered cancellation of Justina’s title in 2014. In February 2017, the CA upheld the RTC,
dismissing the appeal by sustaining the equal partition ruling and confirming mismaintenance
of misjoined causes of action was not ground for dismissal.

Issue: 1. Whether the purported sale of a portion of Santiago’s land in 1967 to Justina was
valid and equitable, given irregularities in registration and lack of any actual partition
beforehand.
2. Whether the trial and appellate courts rightly ordered partitioning the property equally
among Santiago’s children and Cristobal’s heirs.
3. Whether the presence of two combined actions, annulment of title and partition, was
permissible.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed that the purported sale contained irregularities—
registration was delayed, and involved dubious acknowledgment beyond the initial 300 square
meters. Santiago’s later actions, such as applying for a patent, further undermined the sale
validity. Both lower courts appropriately directed an equal partition among the heirs’ children,
referencing Civil Code provisions entitling legitimate heirs to equal inheritance unless
disposed otherwise by valid acts. Citing procedural rules, the Court maintained that the errors
in joining causes were not grounds for case dismissal, as both causes could be adjudicated
where jurisdiction was evident.
6.Tumagan v. Kairuz, Facts: Mariam Kairuz (respondent) filed an ejectment complaint against John Cary Tumagan,
G.R. No. 198124, 12 Alam Halil, and Bot Padilla (petitioners) at the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
September 2018 Tuba-Sablan, Benguet. Mariam claimed she was forcibly ousted from a 5.2-hectare property
in Tadiangan, Tuba, Benguet, owned by her late husband Laurence Ramzy Kairuz, his sisters,
and later allegedly transferred to Bali Irisan Resources, Inc. (BIRI). Petitioners argued that
Mariam was never the sole possessor of the property, asserting it was owned by BIRI by
virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for its sale. They also raised that Mariam is a
co-owner of 30% of BIRI and the matter constitutes an intra-corporate dispute, not an
ejectment issue. MCTC dismissed the complaint for failure to implead BIRI as an
indispensable party. RTC upheld the MCTC dismissal, agreeing that BIRI was necessary for
jurisdiction. Mariam appealed, and the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed previous judgments,
recognizing Mariam’s prior possession and allowed ejectment without BIRI’s involvement.
Petitioners filed for a review of the CA decision with the Supreme Court, arguing CA’s error
in overlooking indispensable party rules and mischaracterizing the dispute.
 Issue: 1. Whether BIRI was an indispensable party in the ejectment action.
2. Whether the matter is an intra-corporate dispute, hence falling outside the jurisdiction of
MCTC.
3. Validity of the CA ruling granting possession to Mariam.

Ruling: The Supreme Court found that BIRI, as the registered property owner, was an
indispensable party, as petitioners acted on its behalf. Therefore, without BIRI’s inclusion, no
full determination of the case could occur. The Court held that the failure to implead an
indispensable party is significant, contradicting the CA’s decision, as actions without all
indispensable parties present are null and void. The Court agreed the case was an intra-
corporate matter, given Mariam’s shareholder status and involvement with the corporation.
The essence of the dispute was about management decisions taken by BIRI affecting Mariam
as a shareholder. The Court concluded that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction as the underlying
issue pertained to corporate governance, not simple possession. Consequently, the Supreme
Court reversed the CA’s decision and dismissed the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction.
7.Heirs of Sanches v. Facts: The case involves two complaints related to a dispute over a parcel of land in
Abrantes, G.R. No. Poblacion, Municipality of Butuan, Province of Agusan del Norte. The first complaint for
234999 (2021) Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Liquidation,
Damages, and Attorney’s Fees was filed by Horacio C. Abrantes against the heirs of
Bartolome J. Sanchez, Jr. in 2002. However, after Horacio’s death in 2003, his heirs expressed
disinterest in pursuing the case, leading to its dismissal in 2004. More than four years later,
Horacio’s heirs filed a second complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Reconveyance,
and Damages related to the same property against the heirs of Bartolome J. Sanchez, Jr., but
this was dismissed by the RTC and CA on the grounds of res judicata and litis pendentia,
respectively.

Issue: 1. Whether the CA erred in declaring the first dismissal order a nullity.
2. Whether dismissing the second complaint on the basis of litis pendentia was correct.

Ruling: The SC held that the CA erred in declaring the first dismissal order a nullity. The
initial dismissal, due to the plaintiffs’ (Horacio’s heirs) lack of interest, was seen as final and
executory, which means there was no pending case that could cause litis pendentia for the
second complaint. The first dismissal order, being final, was not an adjudication on the merits
since it did not proceed from any of the conditions that characterize a “failure to prosecute”
due to fault of the plaintiff. Therefore, the second complaint is not barred by res judicata.

The decision and resolution of the CA were set aside, and the second complaint was reinstated
and remanded to the RTC for continuation of proceedings. This case clarifies the application
of the concepts of litis pendentia and res judicata, specifically in the context of the finality and
effects of dismissal orders. It reiterates that a dismissal due to the plaintiff’s lack of interest to
pursue the case does not equate to a failure to prosecute and that such dismissal, unless stated
otherwise, is without prejudice and does not act as an adjudication on the merits.
8.Delgado v. GQ Facts:
Realty Development
Corporation, G.R. No. Issue:
242774, 25 September
2019 Ruling:
9. Gaffney v. Butler, Petitioner: Donald Francis Gaffney (Donald)
G.R. No. 219408, Respondent: Gina V. Butler (Gina)
11/8/17 Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Gina and her husband Anthony Butler invited Donald Gaffney to invest in ActiveFun
Corporation wherein Gina was the president and her husband the Chief Executive Officer.
Donald advanced the amount of Php 12,500,000 as his initial investment. Unfortunately,
Anthony died therefore the proposed investment agreement was not realized. Donald
demanded the return of his investment to which Gina undertook to pay with the accrued
interest. Gina paid Donald the amount of Php 1,000,000 as initial payment, receipt of which
was duly acknowledged in writing by Donald, but after that, no payment was given to Donald
at all after several demands through phone calls and emails.

A letter was sent to Gina demanding her to pay the aggregate amount of Php 25,000,000 plus
accrued interest, to be paid to Donald and Richard McDonell who also invested. The letter
stated that it is to be paid within 10 days. The given period lapsed and Gina was not able to
satisfy the payment, she then stated in a letter denying knowledge of the investments and
having offered to buy Donald’s share in ActiveFun. Donald was thus constrained to institute a
legal action for the enforcement of his claim against petitioner.

She stated that she does not have any knowledge of Donald’s investment in ActiveFun and the
Php 1,000,000 given to Donald was for the partial payment owed by her husband, and that she
was misled and intimidated to believe that she has an obligation to return investment when no
such obligation existed. She also claimed that her signature in the Acknowledgment Receipt
acknowledged by Donald was forged.
 The pre-trial was then scheduled have the acknowledgment receipt pre-marked. No full relief
can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the original Complaint,
he then filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading
the estate or the heirs6of the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional party-defendant],
represented by surviving heirs, which is his spouse, Gina. Gina opposed the motion primarily
on the ground that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action.
Donald’s motion was granted, Gina did not file a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
An Alias Summons was served upon petitioner purportedly as the representative of her late
husband.

Gina then filed a motion to dismiss Ad cautelam, purporting that she is not an ipso facto
representative of her husband’s estate and that claims against estate cannot be consolidated
with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical persons may be parties pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, lastly, she contends that the service of summons
intended for the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler was improperly served.
Donald, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for failure to file an
answer within the reglementary period.

Both motions were denied by the RTC.

Gina sought relief through CA on the RTC ruling for allowing the estate of Anthony to be
named a defendant in the present case and for considering Gina as legal representative. CA
granted the petition, dismissed the case pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
which states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action."18 The CA likewise ruled that the genuineness and authenticity of the
handwritten receipt stating that the advanced amount of P1,000,000.00 is part payment of
money owed by Anthony is undisputed.19 This suggests that Anthony is the one owing the
money and is an indispensable party to the case.20 Finally, the CA ruled that there is no legal
basis to consider Gina as representative of Anthony's estate since the estate has no legal
personality.

Donald filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA to which was consequently dismissed,
hence this petition.

Issue: 1) WON the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving spouse Gina, could
be named as additional defendant in the present case.
2) WON the entire complaint be dismissed even if the same was not raised as an issue nor
prayed for in the petition before it.

Ruling: 1) The deceased or his estate may not be named a defendant in the present case. A
deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a
case.25 Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased
person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion
to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's
estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity;
such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there
being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative
of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action.

Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded
as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection.28 As such, the complaint against
him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be
a party to a civil action.

2) The CA cannot validly dismiss the complaint against Gina in the instant action. It is settled
that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party.38 Due process considerations justify this requirement.39 It is improper to
enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief.

In the present case, clearly, no issue on, or prayer for, the dismissal of the entire case was
made in the Motion to Dismiss before the RTC and the corresponding CA Petition. The sole
issue presented was, and is, confined to the propriety of the complaint being maintained as
against Anthony (or his estate) who was impleaded as an additional defendant by virtue of
the Amended Complaint.
10. Momarco Import Petitioner: Momarco Import Company, Inc.
Co., Inc. v. Villamena, Respondent: Felicidad Villamena
G.R. No. 192477,
7/27/16 Facts: Felicidad filed a complaint against Mamarco for the nullification of Deed of Sale and of
title issued alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of land with improvements situated in
Caloocan City covered by TCT 204755. Mamarco informed the plaintiff the TCT 204755 was
already cancelled and TCT C-319464 has been issued in favor of Mamarco pursuant to the
SPA executed by her late husband, Dominador Villamena, and a deed of sale. Felicidad
contended that what they entered with Mamarco is only a deed of REM for a loan of Php
100,000 and not a deed of conveyance. She further alleged, that the SPA is a forgery and the
deed of sale was falsified.

Mamarco, on the other hand, argues that the property was made a collateral to the loan the
Villamena’s availed to which they were not able to pay, interest accumulated and were added
to the principal, so the villamena’s offered to execute a deed of absolute sale to settle the loan.

Under the order dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner was declared in default, and its answer
was ordered stricken from the records. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the respondent to present
her evidence ex parte.

The RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the assailed deed of absolute sale and the
transfer certificate of title issued, it ruled in favor of Felicidad Villamena purporting that
preponderance of evidence was duly established and that the act of the petitioner's counsel of
formally entering an appearance in the case had mooted the issue of defective service of
summons.

CA affirmed the decision, hence, the petition.

Issue: WON CA gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in ordering its
answer stricken off the records; in allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence exparte;
and in rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.

Ruling: No, the CA is correct in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in ordering its
answer stricken off the records; in allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence exparte;
and in rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.

The claim of the petitioner is unfounded. The filing of the formal entry of appearance on May
5, 1998 indicated that it already became aware of the complaint filed against it on September
23, 1997. Such act of counsel, because it was not for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, constituted the petitioner's voluntary appearance in the action,
which was the equivalent of the service of summons.10 Jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner as the defendant became thereby vested in the RTC, and cured any defect in the
service of summons.11chanrobleslaw

Under Section 3,12 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be complied with by
the claiming party before the defending party can be declared in default are: (1) that the
claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming
party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period
provided by the rule.13 It is plain, therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be
declared motu proprio.

Although the respondent filed her motion to declare the petitioner in default with notice to the
petitioner only on August 19, 1998, all the requisites for properly declaring the latter in
default then existed. On October 15, 1998, therefore, the RTC appropriately directed the
answer filed to be stricken from the records and declared the petitioner in default. It also
received ex parte the respondent's evidence, pursuant to the relevant rule.15chanrobleslaw

11. Maranan v. Manila Petitioner: Alicia Maranan

Banking Corporation, Respondent: Manila Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 164398 Action: Petition for review on Certiorari
(2007)
Facts: Mandarin Development Corporation (Mandarin) obtained from respondent Manila
Banking Corporation a Ten million peso loan as additional working capital. Petitioner Alicia
C. Maranan, with Yu Kim Chuy, Sofio Mo Gianan, Nestor Ignacio, and Roberto Posadas,
signed a surety agreement binding themselves solidarily liable with Mandarin for the said
loan.

Mandarin’s outstanding loan reach up to Php 30,500,000 thus Manila Banking Corp was
constrained to file a complaint for a sum of money against Mandarin, as well as Pacific
Enamel and Glass Manufacturing Corporation (Pacific Enamel), S. Antonio Roxas Chua, Jr.,
the guarantors. Pacific Enamel and Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is
no cause of action against them. The motion was granted, they were dropped from the case

Alicia filed an Answer alleging that the surety agreement did not express the true intent of the
 parties. She claimed that Chua was the real borrower and actual recipient of the loan and that
Mandarin was merely used as a conduit of Pacific Enamel. Mandarin and Pacific Enamel were
allegedly owned and controlled by Chua.8 She stated in the Answer that as a mere employee
of Chua, she was made to sign the surety agreement in compliance with the formalities
required by the Central Bank.

Manila Banking Corp subsequently filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It was
dismissed.

About two years later, petitioner filed an Amended Answer10 impleading Chua and Pacific
Enamel as defendants in her counterclaim.

In its first assailed Order, the trial court denied the admission of petitioner’s Amended Answer
and deemed the same expunged from the records. The trial court explained that it had already
dismissed the complaint against Chua and Pacific Enamel for lack of cause of action. It had
also denied the motion for reconsideration of said dismissal. The trial court further pointed out
that the Amended Answer was filed without prior leave of court.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: a) WON The filing of petitioner’s Amended Answer was a matter of right and,
therefore, did not require prior leave of court.
b) WON petitioner correctly resorted to filing a counterclaim, and not a third-party complaint,
in impleading the intended defendants-on-counterclaim.

Ruling: a) Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court14 state:

SEC. 2. When amendments allowed as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within ten (10) days after it is
served. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 3. Amendments by leave of court. – After the case is set for hearing, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause
of action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and
an opportunity to be heard. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, it is clear from Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 that once a case has already
been set for hearing, regardless of whether a responsive pleading has been served, substantial
amendments such as those contained in petitioner’s Amended Answer may only be made
upon leave of court. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to secure such prior leave, thus, the lower
court cannot be faulted for denying the admission of the said Amended Answer. Nonetheless,
even if such prior leave of court was duly filed, the court a quo could still deny it on the
ground that the Amended Answer substantially altered the theory of the defense.

b) Sections 6 and 14 of Rule 6 provide:

SEC. 6. Counterclaim. – A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A counterclaim need not diminish or
defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or
different in kind from that sought by the opposing party’s claim. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 14. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the original
action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or
cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them
can be obtained.

Records show that at the time of the filing of the Amended Answer in which Chua and Pacific
Enamel were impleaded in the counterclaim, the two were no longer parties to the action.
Note that the trial court had already dropped Chua and Pacific Enamel from the case for lack
of cause of action against them. Under the Rules, a counterclaim may be filed only against an
opposing party. The filing of a counterclaim against a third party is not allowed, but the court
may order such party to be brought in as defendant.

In this case, petitioner’s allegations in the Amended Answer point to the existence of a
substantive right against Chua and Pacific Enamel, and impute liability to both for the sum of
money respondent claims against petitioner. Clearly, under Section 12 of Rule 6, the
petitioner’s appropriate recourse is the filing, with proper leave of court, of a third-party
complaint against Chua and Pacific Enamel.

12. Fernandez v. Petitioner: Lourdes C. Fernandez

Villegas, G.R. No. Respondent: Norma Villegas and any person acting in her behalf including her family
200191, 8/20/14 Action: Petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court4 (CA petition) due to
defective verification and certification against forum shopping.

Facts: Lourdes C. Fernandez (Lourdes) and her sister, Cecilia Siapno (Cecilia), represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Imelda S. Slater (Imelda), filed a Complaint for Ejectment 5 before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Dagupan City(MTCC), against respondent Norma
Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her behalf including her family (respondents),
seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land situated in Guilig Street, Dagupan City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 19170.

Lourdes and Cecilia(plaintiffs) averred that they are the registered owners of the property on
which both Lourdes and respondents previously lived under one roof. However, when their
house was destroyed by typhoon "Cosme," Lourdes transferred to a nipa hut on the same lot,
while Norma, Cecilia’s daughter-in-law, and her family were advised to relocate but, in the
meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof.7 Instead, Norma erected a house over plaintiffs’
objections and, despite demands, refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property.8 The dispute was referred to the Barangay Office of Pugo9 Chico and the Public
Attorney’s Office, both of Dagupan City, but no settlement was reached.

Norma filed an Answer averring that the complaint has no cause of action because Lourdes
have already donated her portion to Cecilia and that she is bound by her declaration that “The
house and lot belongs to Eddie”, who is the late husband of Norma. She further asserted that
there was no compliance with the required conciliation and mediation under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law14 as no Certificate to File Action was attached to the complaint, 15 thereby
rendering the complaint dismissible.

MTCC ruled that the respondents failed to impugn the validity of the ownership of Lourdes,
and was ordered to (a) vacate the subject property and pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱1,000.00
per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the portion of the lot
occupied by them, reckoned from the filing of the complaint; (b) pay plaintiffs ₱10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and (c) pay the cost of suit. She then appealed to RTC.

RTC dismissed Lourdes complaint on the ground that there was no substantial compliance
with the mandatory conciliation and respondents are builders in good faith and cannot be
summarily ejected from the subject property without compliance with the provisions of
Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code. She was then ordered to pay Php 50,000 as
attorney’s fee. Aggrieved, Plaintiffs filed a petition with the CA.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the grounds that: (a) Cecilia failed to
personally verify the petition; and (b) the appeal is dilatory. The CA granted respondents’
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, holding that the verification and certification 30 against forum
shopping attached to the CA petition was defective since it was signed only by Lourdes, one
of the plaintiffs in the case, in violation of Section 5,31 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which
requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same. The CA further noted that plaintiffs failed to
comply with its prior Resolution dated October 11, 2010 requiring the submission of an
amended verification/certification against forum shopping within five (5) days from notice,
warranting the dismissal of the CA petition on this score.34
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective
verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective
verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition.

The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the
requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum
shopping; A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." The certification against forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
 however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. Finally, the certification against
forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

In the case at bar, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners
may bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both
Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of
interest and cause of action as against respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed
before the CA indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that the same was filed on
their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA
petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules.

Following paragraph 5 of the guide lines as aforestated, there was also substantial compliance
with the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only
Lourdes signed the same. It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances -
as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense - the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign
the certification against forum shopping may be relaxed.43 Consequently, the CA erred in
dismissing the petition on this score.

13. Philippine Savings Facts: On 30 March 2006, petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) filed before the Me TC a
Bank v. Papa, G.R. complaint5 for collection of sum of money against respondent Josephine L. Papa (Papa). In its
No. 200469, 15 complaint, PSB alleged that Papa obtained a flexi-loan with a face amount of ₱207,600.00,
January 2018 payable in twenty-four (24) monthly installments of ₱8,650.00 with interest at 38.40% per
annum. For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note dated 26 July 2005. PSB further
alleged that the promissory note provides additional charges in case of default, to wit: Three
percent (3%) late payment charge per month of the total amount until the amount is fully paid;
Twenty-Five percent (25%) Attorney's Fees, but not less than ₱5,000.00; Ten percent (10%)
liquidated damages, but not less than ₱1,000.00; and costs of suit. When the obligation fell
due, Papa defaulted in her payment. PSB averred that as of 27 March 2006, Papa's total
obligation amounted to ₱173,000.00; and that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to meet
her obligation.

On 26 October 2006, Papa filed her Answer.6 She alleged that PSB had no cause of action
against her as her liability had already been extinguished by the several staggered payments
she made to PSB, which payments she undertook to prove. She likewise claimed that there
was no basis for the interest and damages as the principal obligation had already been paid.
During the trial on the merits, PSB introduced in evidence a photocopy of the promissory
note,7 which the MeTC admitted despite the vehement objection by Papa. Meanwhile, Papa
chose to forego with the presentation of her evidence and manifested she would instead file a
memorandum. After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for decision.

the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of PSB and against Papa. The MeTC was convinced
that PSB was able to establish its cause of action against Papa by preponderance of evidence.
the RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC decision. The trial court ruled that PSB failed to
prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the existence and due execution of the
promissory note. In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa posited, among
others, that the RTC decision had already attained finality. Papa explained that although PSB
filed the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears that service of the said
motion was made one (1) day late as PSB availed of a private courier service instead of the
modes of service prescribed under the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed, it ruled that the R TC
decision had already attained finality due to PSB's failure to serve on Papa a copy of its
motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period.

Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that the RTC decision attained finality based on technical
The kind of proof of grounds regarding service.
service required would
depend on the mode of Ruling: PSB is correct that filing and service are distinct from each other. Indeed, filing is the
service used by the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court; whereas, service is the act of
litigant. Rule 13, providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. Nevertheless, although they
Section 13 of the pertain to different acts, filing and service go hand-in-hand and must be considered together
Rules of Court when determining whether the pleading, motion, or any other paper was filed within the
provides: applicable reglementary period. Precisely, the Rules require every motion set for hearing to be
SECTION 13. Proof accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties concerned; otherwise, the court
of Service. - Proof of shall not be allowed to act on it,15 effectively making such motion as not filed.
personal service shall
consist of a written In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as equivalent to filing by
admission of the party ordinary mail.16 The Court opines that this pronouncement equally applies to service of
served, or the official pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party
return of the server, or must attach an affidavit of the person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such
the affidavit of the affidavit must show compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which
party serving, provides:
containing a full
statement of the date, Section 7. Service by mail. - Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy
place and manner of in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his
service. If the service office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with
is by ordinary mail, instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
proof thereof shall undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or the
consist of an affidavit addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
of the person mailing
of facts showing In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration to Papa's
compliance with counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of the
section 7 of this Rule. person who sent it through the said private messengerial service. Moreover, PSB's explanation
If service is made by why it resorted to private courier failed to show its compliance with Rule 13, Section 7. PSB's
registered mail, proof explanation merely states: Greetings: Kindly set the instant motion on 20 November 2009 at
shall be made by such 8:30 o'clock in the morning or soon thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard. Copy of
affidavit and the this pleading was served upon defendant's counsel by private registered mail for lack of
registry receipt issued material time and personnel to effect personal delivery.18
by the mailing office. Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an
The registry return effective service by ordinary mail.
card shall be filed
immediately upon its
receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter
together with the
certified or sworn
copy of the notice
given by the
postmaster to the
addressee.

14. Quelnan v. VHF Facts: This case revolves around an ejectment suit filed by VHF Philippines, Inc. (respondent)
Philippines, G.R. No. against Andy Quelnan (petitioner), pertaining to a condominium unit in Manila. The
138500, 16 September Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila issued a decision on November 23, 1992, in favor
2005 of the respondent due to the petitioner’s failure to file an answer, deeming service through
petitioner’s wife as valid. As the decision went unclaimed despite multiple notices, it became
final and executory. Subsequently, writs of execution were served to the petitioner’s wife on
May 18, 1993. Upon learning about the ejectment suit and the judgment against him, Quelnan
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on May 24,
1993, claiming he was unaware of the suit due to his wife’s actions during a marital squabble,
leading to the RTC setting aside the MeTC’s decision. The respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, prompting a direct petition to the Supreme Court which was
remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the RTC’s decision, reinstating the
MeTC’s original judgment based on the procedural lapse regarding the timelines for filing a
petition for relief.

Issue: WON the presumption of completeness of service under Rule 13, Section 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply concerning the 60-day filing period for a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3?

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied Quelnan’s petition, upholding the CA’s decision. It held
that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief should be reckoned from when the party is
presumed to have knowledge of the judgment, which, in this case, was five days after the first
notice given by the postmaster. The Court emphasized strict compliance with the specified
periods for filing a petition for relief due to its equitable nature. Since Quelnan filed his
petition well beyond the allowed period, his appeal was invalid. The Court also rejected the
argument that excusable negligence was present due to the petitioner’s wife’s actions, stating
that a failure to claim registered mail does not constitute excusable neglect.

The Supreme Court reiterates the doctrine of finality of judgments, emphasizing that
judgments must become final at some definite date by law. Moreover, it underscored the
presumption of completeness of service by registered mail, which becomes effective upon
actual receipt by the addressee or five days after the first notice from the postmaster,
whichever is earlier.
15. Solis v. Solis- Facts: The Spouses Solis were the owners of a five-hectare untitled fishpond situated in
Laynes, G.R. No. Romblon. Said fishpond was covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 82,7 and later by TD No.
235099, 29 March A08-005-002798 in the name of Ramon. During the lifetime of the Spouses Solis, they
2023 donated their properties to their children, except for a small lot in Quezon City and the subject
fishpond. After the death of the Spouses Solis, Salvador, one of their children and heirs,
discovered from the Provincial Assessor that the TD over the subject fishpond was changed
 allegedly to correct a "typographical error" that resulted in the change of the owner's name
from Ramon M. Solis, Sr. to Ramon M. Solis, Jr. (Ramon, Jr.; Salvador's brother).

When Ramon, Jr. died, the fishpond was included in his estate, which was settled by his heirs
by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Consequently, a new TD (No.
0035711) over the fishpond was issued in the names of Ramon Jr.'s heirs, namely: Juana, Eric,
Albert, and Marivic Solis-Laynes (Marivic). Thereafter, the subject fishpond was registered in
the name of Marivic through Free Patent No. IV-045907-117191 issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. Alleging fraud and unlawful intent on the part of
Marivic — petitioners, filed the complaint before the RTC. It was also averred in the
complaint that Marivic and her husband are now American citizens, but she may be served
with summons at her address in Poblacion, San Agustin, Romblon. On March 14, 2014, the
Postmaster of San Agustin, Romblon issued a certification stating summons was sent three
times by registered mail to Marivic's stated address but was returned undelivered in all those
instances because the recipient is "out of town/abroad" and the relatives refused to accept the
summons. Consequently, Salvador moved that Marivic be served with summons by
publication, which the RTC granted through the Order18 dated September 18, 2013.

In compliance with the RTC Order, Salvador submitted an Affidavit of Publication issued by
Esperanza D. Castro of the People's Balita, stating that Salvador had caused the publication of
the summons in said newspaper once a week for three consecutive weeks. Salvador, however,
failed to send a copy of the summons to Marivic's United States of America (USA) address as
indicated in the September 18, 2013 RTC Order. Apparently, Salvador sent a copy of the
summons to Marivic's last known address in the Philippines. Expectedly, Marivic failed to file
her answer within the 60-day period given by the RTC, prompting Salvador to move that
Marivic be declared in default.

Issue: WON the service of summons on Marivic was valid as per Section 15, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ruling: The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due
process as it is of jurisdiction. Indeed, proper service of summons is important because it
serves to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent, or to notify said
person of the action filed against them and to afford an opportunity to be heard on the claims
made against them. Corollarily, regardless of the type of action – whether it is in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem – the preferred mode of service of summons is personal
service. Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that
actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the
other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status
of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against such him/her because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his/her person unless such defendant voluntarily appears in court. But when
the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such actions,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential, although summons must still be served upon the defendant
in order to satisfy the due process requirements. In such instance, extraterritorial service of
summons can be made upon the defendant.

In this case, extraterritorial service of summons on Marivic was proper as she is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines, and petitioners' complaint is in the nature of an
action quasi in rem, which relates to Marivic's interest in the subject fishpond. Nonetheless,
the CA found that the extraterritorial service of summons on Marivic was invalid because
Salvador merely complied with the publication requirement but failed to send copies of the
complaint and the summons to Marivic's last known address in the USA. In this regard, the
CA opined that the RTC intended that extraterritorial service of summons on Marivic be
made via the second mode under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Even so, the fact that Salvador – apart from complying with the publication requirement – also
sent a copy of the summons and the complaint to Marivic's last known address (albeit in the
Philippines, and not in the U.SA.) is telling that extraterritorial service of summons in this
case was indeed to be effected under the second mode stated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This conclusion is bolstered by no less than Salvador's own
Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication.
16. Domagas v. Facts: Filomena Domagas, the petitioner, initiated a forcible entry complaint against Vivian
Jensen, G.R. No. Jensen, the respondent, with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan, on
158407, 17 January February 19, 1999. Domagas claimed she was the registered owner of a parcel of land from
2005 which Jensen had forcibly taken possession by building a fence. The complaint sought
restitution, damages, and fees. The summons and complaint were not personally served to
Jensen, as she was out of the country, so they were received by her brother, Oscar Layno.
Without Jensen responding, the MTC ruled in favor of Domagas. Jensen, upon learning of the
 case, filed for annulment of the MTC decision with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, arguing improper service of summons due to her absence in Norway and
questioning the MTC’s jurisdiction over her person. The RTC decided in Jensen’s favor, a
decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), which led Domagas to elevate the case to the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: The central legal issue was whether there was valid service of summons on Jensen,
which hinges on whether the forcible entry action was in personam or quasi in rem.

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied Domagas’s petition, holding that the MTC’s decision in
the forcible entry case was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction over Jensen’s person. The
The case underscores Court clarified that a forcible entry case is considered an action in personam, which aims to
the judiciary’s strict enforce personal obligations against a specific individual. Since Jensen was out of the country,
interpretation of proper service required either personal service outside the country with the court’s permission
procedural rules, or any mode deemed sufficient by the court, neither of which was done. Substituted service on
especially regarding Jensen’s brother was deemed invalid as there was no evidence he resided at Jensen’s property
service of summons or was a suitable representative. The Court emphasized strict adherence to rules on the service
essential for of summons to establish jurisdiction over a defendant.
establishing
jurisdiction. It reflects An action for forcible entry is considered in personam, focusing on personal obligations and
the legal system’s requiring proper service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
balancing act between the defendant. Strict compliance with the modes of service established by the Rules of Court
efficiently resolving is essential for the validity of substituted service.
disputes and ensuring
due process by - An action in personam aims to enforce rights or obligations against a specific individual,
safeguarding the requiring jurisdiction over that person.
defendants’ right to be – Substituted service of summons is valid only when strict requirements are met, including
properly informed of that the recipient is of suitable age and discretion and resides at the defendant’s dwelling.
legal actions against – Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is fundamental for the court to validly try and
them. decide a case.
17. Philippine Facts: Petitioner PNB and Romeo B. Daradar (Daradar) entered into a Deed of Promise to
National Bank v. Sell (Deed) covering two parcels of land and improvements therein that were owned by PNB.
Romeo B. Daradar, Due to Daradar's failure to pay the yearly amortizations and interest due under the Deed, PNB
G.R. No. 180203, June rescinded the Deed through a Notarial Notice of Rescission dated November 27, 1989.
28, 2021 Daradar then filed an action for Annulment of Rescission, Accounting and Damages against
PNB in the RTC of Iloilo City (RTC) to annul the notarial rescission of the Deed.

Due to respondent's failure to appear at the scheduled hearing, the RTC ordered (First Order -
April 5, 1995) to provisionally dismiss the case without prejudice. No motion for
reconsideration was filed against the said Order. After the lapse of four years, the RTC motu
proprio ordered (Second Order - June 17, 1999) finally dismissing the case on the ground of
respondent's failure to prosecute the case under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, in
view of respondent's failure to reinstate or revive the case despite the lapse of more than four
years from the first dismissal.

On October 18, 1999, Daradar filed another complaint for declaration of nullity of notarial
rescission of the Deed with the RTC. Summons was properly served upon PNB, who moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the second order of dismissal which dismissed
Civil No. 21375 for failure of respondent to prosecute was an adjudication on the merits,
thereby barring the subsequent filing on the ground of res judicata.

RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata.

CA granted petitioners appeal, the court opined that the First Order dismissing Civil Case No.
21375 operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the case; thus, the Second Order
issued by the trial court four years later dismissing the case is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the court a quo erred in reinstating the complaint in Civil Case No. 25981, as the
First Order provisionally dismissing Civil Case No. 21375 without prejudice was merely
interlocutory and not a final order that terminated the proceedings.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred when it reinstated the complaint in Civil Case No.
25981 on the basis of the First Order, which provisionally dismissed Civil Case No. 21375
without prejudice and which purportedly operated to divest the trial court over its jurisdiction
on the case.

In the first place, the concept of a provisional dismissal in our jurisdiction contemplates the
temporary dismissal of a criminal action that may be revived within the period set by the
Rules of Court upon compliance with certain requisites. There is nothing in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides for a provisional dismissal of a civil case. Moreover, a
judgment must be definitive; the decision itself must purport to decide finally the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted by specifically denying or granting the remedy sought by the
action.
 Guided by the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the First Order which provisionally
dismissed Civil Case No. 21375 is void and without legal effect for lack of basis. A void
judgment or order has no legal and binding effect for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it
is non-existent and may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is
not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may
simply be ignored. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. In this sense, a void order can never attain finality. Being void, the issuance of the
First Order never became final nor operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the
complaint.

Nevertheless, while the present Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for provisional
dismissals, this Court in a 1940 case equated a provisional order with an interlocutory order
that was subject to vacation or amendment at any time before final judgment is rendered or
has become executory. It is settled that an order is considered interlocutory when it does not
completely dispose of the case because it leaves something to be done by the trial court with
respect to the merits, and "refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy."
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court until the final decision of the
suit, and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment. Here, the First Order which provisionally dismissed the case is interlocutory
because it did not completely dispose of the case and did not decide with finality the rights
and obligations of the parties.
18. Patricio G. Facts: The present controversy involved a property in Quezon City. According to Gemina, he
Gemina V. Espejo, Jr., purchased, owned, occupied with his family, and possessed the subject property openly,
G.R. No. 232682, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of an owner since 1978. On the other hand, the
September 13, 2021 heirs of Espejo averred that they are co-owners of the subject property. When Gerardo died in
1975, he was survived by his wife Ma. Teresa Espejo and children Jaime Gerardo Francisco
and Rhodora Patrice, collectively referred to as the heirs of Espejo. The Espejos filed an
action for recovery of possession and prayed for the trial court to order Gemina and all
persons claiming in his behalf to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property, and
to pay reasonable compensation from the time that their possession have become unlawful,
among others. Gemina’s counsel failed to attend the pre-trial schedule multiple times.

The trial court granted the withdrawal of Gemina's counsel and directed Gemina to secure the
services of a new counsel. However, the trial court regarded the motion for reconsideration as
a mere scrap of paper since it lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Meantime, the heirs of
Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence proceeded as scheduled. The trial court ruled in
favor of the heirs of Espejo based on preponderance of evidence. It held that the latter have
the better right to possess the subject property.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court and held that held that Gemina could no longer
question the propriety of the trial court's Order allowing the Espejos to present evidence ex
parte since he already filed a motion for reconsideration albeit it was denied by the court a quo
for lack of notice of hearing. Since the Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached Motion for
Reconsideration failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under the rules, Gemina is
bound by the Order of the trial court allowing ex parte presentation of evidence.

Issue: (1) Whether CA erred in affirming the court a quo’s Order allowing the respondents to
present their evidence ex parte due to the absence of the petitioner’s counsel during the pre-
trial. Thereby denying petitioner the right to present evidence in violation of his right to due
process; and (2) whether CA erred in affirming the ruling against the petitioner despite
respondents’ failure to prove the identity of the land.

Ruling: Yes. When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial
shall not ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence. Pre-trial serves a
significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and expedites the trial, if
not the entire process of administering and dispensing justice. For this reason, the parties and
their counsels cannot take this stage for granted as it is more than just a part of procedural law
or its technicality.

The then Section 5, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court gives the impression that only the
failure of the plaintiff or the defendant to appear in pre-trial would bring about the dismissal
of the action or the eventual ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, respectively.
Taking the cue from such plain reading, Gemina's counsel argued that his non-appearance
during the pre-trial should not have worked to his client's prejudice as the latter had been
prudent in attending hearings in the proceedings.

Simply, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-appearance of
his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously appearing in the
course of the proceedings, including dμring the pre-trial. 2. Yes. The identity of the property
and the title of the claimant must be ascertained in an action to recover; possession of real
property pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code. In view of the procedural infirmities of this
 case to the prejudice of Gemina, We deem it appropriate to remand the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings, to hear and receive evidence. If only to shed light on a few
questions of law to serve as guide, Article 434 of the Civil Code is controlling in this case. It
provides that "[i]n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. The Petition
is granted.
19. Silvestre Tiu v. Facts: The present case arose from the Complaint for a recovery of ownership and possession
Daniel Middleton and of real property between the disputing parties. In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he
Remedios P. would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference,
Middleton, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses
G.R. No. 134998, July and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. In the trial, the plaintiff presented their
19, 1999 witnesses in due course and when it turn came to present Antonia Tiu as the first witness, the
respondents argue that the witness cannot be allowed to testify because they have failed to
named her in the Pre-Trial Brief. The Trial Court decided that the witness must be barred
because her name was not included in the pre-trial brief as cited in Sec. 6 of Rule 18, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an unnamed witness can testify.

Ruling: The court rendered a decision in affirmative. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call
for the speedy disposition of cases. Pre-trial seeks to achieve The limitation of the number of
witnesses; In light of this objectives, the parties are also required to submit a pre-trial brief,
which must contain The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their
respective testimonies.” The Court emphasizes that pre-trial and its governing rules are not
technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with. “What needs stressing is that the
parties as well as the trial court must realize that the parties are obliged not only to make
formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described [--]
indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down
in the separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss,
refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single document at or shortly after the pre-
trial -- but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and
candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20,
i.e., the „possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration,‟ the
„advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner,‟ and „such other matters
as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action,‟ inclusive of a resort to the modes of
discovery.”

In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that
judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the
pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. In his Pre-trial Order,
however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed
witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that “[t]he defendant will present six witnesses.” It made
no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named.
Significantly, it also stated that “plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses,” without however naming
them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present
witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.
20. Radiowealth Facts: In its Complaint dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2014, it
Finance Company, extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the amount of
Inc. v. Alfonso O. P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly installments of P23,242.00, which was secured by a
Pineda, Jr., and Chattel Mortgage constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents. Notably, the Promissory
Josephine C. Pineda, Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall
G.R. No. 227147, July exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in
30, 2018 any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option."
Due to respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the whole remaining balance of
the loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of June 8, 2015, excluding penalty charges. As the
demand went unheeded, petitioner filed a suit for sum of money and damages with application
for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo,
Rizal. The RTC issued a Writ of Replevin. However, in an Amended Order, the RTC recalled
the Writ of Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a) petitioner's principal place of business is in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac, Pampanga, it
has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Ruling: NO. In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving
the amount of P510,132.00. Pursuant to Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as
amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction
over petitioner's complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of
its purported lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and
venue which are not synonymous with each other. o In this case, the venue stipulation found
 in the subject Promissory Note – which reads " [a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums
due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National
Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a
branch/office, a[t] its sole option" – is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National
Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of
petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue
has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later
on. o Finally, even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the
courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
21. G.V. Florida Facts: The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages[4] against GV
Transport, Inc. Vs. Florida and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose out
Tiara Commercial of a vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon,
Corporation Isabela on May 1, 2007. In its complaint, VLI claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in
supervising its employee.

In its Answer,[6] GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and
mechanical defects which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause of
the vehicle collision.

On April 8, 2008, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint[8] against TCC. According to

GV Florida, on March 23, 2007, it purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires,
four (4) of which were installed into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that
though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the accident, the bus
nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus. GV Florida
maintains that the "proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought
about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV
Florida absolutely and totally had no control over."

The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC, which was served to Cherry Gino-gino
(Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager authorized by TCC to receive
summons on its behalf.

TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time to
File Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss. The RTC granted TCC's prayer for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss.

TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss[12] GV Florida's third-party complaint. First, it

argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons.
As the summons in this case was not served on any of the persons listed in Section 11of Rule
14, there was no proper service of summons on TCC that would vest the RTC with
TCC harped on the jurisdiction over it. Second, TCC stated that the purported cause of action in the third-party
fact that GV Florida complaint is a claim for an implied warranty which has already prescribed, having been made
did not mention in the beyond the six-month period allowed in the Civil Code. Third, the third-party complaint failed
third-party complaint to state a cause of action against TCC. Fourth, TCC argues that there is a condition precedent
that the tires that blew which the law requires before a claim for implied warranty may be made. Fifth, GV Florida
out were purchased has the burden of first establishing that the cause of the accident was not its own negligence
from it. Moreover, a before it can be allowed to file a third-party complaint against TCC. Sixth, venue was
tire blow-out does not improperly laid since TCC's principal place of business is in Makati. And finally, TCC states
relieve a common that the third-party complaint should be dismissed due to GV Florida's failure to implead
carrier of its liability. Michelin as an indispensable party.

The party claiming The RTC denied TCC's motion to dismiss.

must submit a
warranty claim and
demand. GV Florida TCC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
failed to do so in this Court challenging the RTC's denial of its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
case.
the CA rendered its Decision granting TCC's petition and reversing the Orders of the RTC.
Emphasizing that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is exclusive,
the CA found that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC because of the improper
service of summons upon a person not named in the enumeration.[19] It then proceeded to
rule that GV Florida's third-party complaint against TCC is a claim for implied warranty
which, under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, must be filed within six months from delivery.
While the CA noted that the delivery receipt for the tires is not in the records of the case, it
may be assumed that the tires were delivered a few days after the purchase date of March 23,
2007. Since GV Florida only filed the third party complaint on April 8, 2008, the action has
prescribed.

GV Florida thus filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the CA's Decision.

GV Florida argues that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over TCC. While it agrees that the
enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is exclusive, GV Florida argues
that service of summons is not the only means through which a court acquires jurisdiction
over a party. Under Section 20 of Rule 14, voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent
to service of summons, which then gives a court jurisdiction over such defendant.

GV Florida also challenges the CA's ruling that its third-party complaint against TCC should
be dismissed on the ground of prescription. It claims that prescription cannot be the basis of a
dismissal when the issue involves evidentiary matters that can only be threshed out during
trial. In this case, GV Florida asserts that the issue of whether its action has prescribed
requires a determination of when the Michelin tires were delivered. Thus, there is a need to
examine the delivery receipts which, as GV Florida highlights, are not in the records of the
CA as stated in the Decision itself.

Issue: WON the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquired jurisdiction over Tiara Commercial
Corporation (TCC) due to the alleged improper service of summons.

Ruling: Yes, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquired jurisdiction over Tiara Commercial
Corporation (TCC) due to the alleged improper service of summons.

This is not an error in jurisdiction but merely an error in judgment. Instead of granting the
petition and reversing the RTC, what the CA should have done was to dismiss the petition
for certiorari for failing to allege grave abuse of discretion. TCC's recourse is to proceed to
trial and raise this error in its appeal in the event of an adverse judgment.

We agree that there was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply
jurisprudence and rule that in cases of improper service of summons, courts should not
automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of summons
to a domestic private juridical entity. It states:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old rules pertaining to the
service of summons on corporations. While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a
corporation, the current rule has provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of
summons must be made.
In Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation,[48] we
explained that the purpose of this rule is "to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
 the legal papers served on him."[49] This rule requires strict compliance; the old doctrine that
substantial compliance is sufficient no longer applies.
Service of summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a defendant, however, appears
before the court for the specific purpose of questioning the court's jurisdiction over him or
her, this is a special appearance and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.[57] Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as a
defendant raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other grounds
of objection. In such case, there is no voluntary appearance.
In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC.
While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC
has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial
brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it. At no point in its pre-trial
brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC
that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional evidence through documents and
witnesses. While it is true that TCC initially filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, we rule that TCC
waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when it subsequently
filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be allowed to present
additional evidence. This, to this Court's mind, is an unequivocal submission to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to conduct the trial.
We also disagree with the CA that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be dismissed on
the ground of prescription.
Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going to trial on the merits.
Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is raised in a motion to dismiss which is filed before
the answer. It may also be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. At the discretion of
the court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense may be conducted as if a motion to
dismiss was filed.[65] Nevertheless, this is only a general rule. When the issue of prescription
requires the determination of evidentiary matters, it cannot be the basis of an outright
dismissal without hearing.
The Court has consistently held that the affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the
issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the
merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss.
We find that the reckoning date from which the prescriptive period may be ascertained is not
apparent from the pleadings themselves. We agree with GV Florida's observation that the CA
itself admitted in its Decision that the delivery receipts do not appear in the records. A finding
of fact as to the date of delivery can only be made after hearing and reception of evidence.
Thus, the CA erred in ruling that GV Florida's third-party complaint should be dismissed on
the ground of prescription. We further note that the CA based its finding on the delivery date
on mere presumptions.
Therefore, The Order dated March 2, 2009 of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City is REINSTATED.

22. Alex Raul B. Blay Facts: On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Vs. Cynthia B. Bana Nullity of Marriage,[6] seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
[7] Subsequently, respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim[8] dated
December 5, 2014.

However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to
Withdraw[9] his petition. In her comment/opposition[10] thereto, respondent invoked Section
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 17), and prayed that her
counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent adjudication.[11] In turn,
petitioner filed his reply,[12] averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from being
prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was
required under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that
respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However, respondent's
counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence,
respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her desire to
prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.[13]

In an Order[14] dated May 29, 2015, the RTC granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw
petition.[15] Further, it declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent
adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[17] which was denied in an

Order[18] dated March 3, 2016. Thus, he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari,[19] praying that the RTC Orders be set aside to the extent that they allowed the
counterclaim to remain for independent adjudication before the same trial court.

In a Decision[21] dated February 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit
holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed
by the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner's motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.

Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim
for independent adjudication before the same trial court.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim
for independent adjudication before the same trial court.

Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims
in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs instance, viz.:
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding section,
a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal,
the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this
case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the
subject elucidate that "[i]nstead of an 'action' shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the
term 'complaint'. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint.
For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite
of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.[26]

However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within
fifteen (15) days from notice o[the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in
a separate action. As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:
Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to
 which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such
dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he
opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and
reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have
his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he
must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. x x x[27]

In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second
sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA
ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to
the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s
motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to
prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim
may be prosecuted only in a separate action.

By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated the
foregoing principle and in so doing, erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring
respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" despite the latter's
failure to file the required manifestation within the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period. As
petitioner aptly points out:
If the intention of the framers of the Rules of Court is a blanket dismissal of the complaint
ALONE if a counterclaim has been pleaded prior to the service of the notice of dismissal then
The rationale behind this there is NO EVIDENT PURPOSE for the third (3rd) sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17.
rule is not difficult to
discern: the passing of the
fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the It is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will direct the defendant to manifest
court's dismissal of the within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to prosecute his
complaint and hence, bars
counterclaim in the SAME ACTION when the same AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the
the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the automatic survival of the counterclaim and the death of the complaint as being ruled by the
prosecution of respondent's Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed true, then the third sentence should have
counterclaim, in the same required defendant to manifest that he will prosecute his counterclaim in a SEPARATE [and
action. Thus, in order to not as the provision reads - in the same] ACTION.[30]
obviate this finality, the
defendant is required to file
the required manifestation
within the aforesaid period; Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which affirmed
otherwise, the counterclaim
the patently erroneous RTC Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should have
may be prosecuted only in
a separate action. only granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the prosecution of
respondent's counterclaim in a separate action.

23. Virra Mall Tenants Facts: Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is the owner of the Greenhills
Association, Inc. Vs. Shopping Center (GSC). On 5 November 1975, Ortigas and Virra Realty Development
Virra Mall Greenhills Corporation (Virra Realty) entered into a Contract of Lease (First Contract of Lease) over a
Association, Inc. portion of the GSC. The 25-year lease was to expire on 15 November 2000. Pursuant thereto,
Virra Realty constructed a commercial building, the Virra Mall Shopping Center (Virra Mall),
which was divided into either units for lease or units whose leasehold rights were sold.3
Thereafter, Virra Realty organized respondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association (VMGA), an
association of all the tenants and leasehold right holders, who managed and operated Virra
Mall. In the First Contract of Lease, VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the rights,
obligations and liabilities of Virra Realty.4
On 22 November 2000, VMGA, through its president, William Uy (Uy), requested from
Ortigas the renewal of the First Contract of Lease.5 VGMA secured two insurance policies to
protect Virra Mall against damage by fire and other causes. However, these insurance
coverages expired simultaneously with the First Contract of Lease on 15 November
2000.6 Subsequently, on 13 March 2001, VGMA acquired new sets of insurance policies
effective 10 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.7
On 5 May 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire, requiring substantial repair and restoration.
VMGA thus filed an insurance claim through the insurance broker, respondent Winternitz
Associates Insurance Company, Inc. (Winternitz). Thereafter, the proceeds of the insurance
were released to VMGA.8
On 3 September 2001, Ortigas entered into a Contract of Lease (Second Contract of Lease)
with Uy effective 2 November 2001 to 31 December 2004. On 11 September 2001, the latter
assigned and transferred to petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association (VMTA) all his rights
and interests over the property.9
On 7 February 2003, Ortigas filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and
Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against several defendants, including
herein respondents. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion of substantial
portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the repair and
restoration of Virra Mall. To secure the subject insurance proceeds, Ortigas also sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against herein respondents. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 69312, and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC Br. 67), which issued a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment on 12 February 2003.10
On 17 February 2003, VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention.11 It claimed that as the
assignee or transferee of the rights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of Lease, and
upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the services of various contractors. These
contractors undertook the restoration of the damaged area of Virra Mall amounting to
₱18,902,497.75. Thus, VMTA sought the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred in
relation thereto.12 RTC Br. 67 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention in its Order dated 8
January 2004.13
On 5 March 2004, herein respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint-in-
Intervention on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 In its Omnibus Order dated 2
August 2005, RTC Br. 67 denied this Motion to Dismiss.15 The trial court based its Decision
on the grounds that (a) by filing the said motion, herein respondents hypothetically admitted
the truth of the facts alleged in the Complaint-in-Intervention, and (b) the test of sufficiency of
the facts alleged was whether or not the court could render a valid judgment as prayed for,
accepting as true the exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint.16 Thus, RTC Br. 67 held that
if there are doubts as to the truth of the facts averred, then the court must not dismiss the
Complaint, but instead require an answer and proceed to trial on the merits.17
On a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion, the CA reversed the
ruling of RTC Br. 67 and dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention on the following grounds:
(a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in
litigation; and (c) the Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial of the action,
make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties,
stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and relief.
Issue: WON VMTA had a legal interest in the matter being litigated and whether its
complaint-in-intervention stated a valid cause of action.
Ruling: Yes, VMTA had a legal interest in the matter being litigated and its complaint-in-
intervention stated a valid cause of action.

The determination of whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint-
in-Intervention filed by VMTA boils down to the sole issue of the propriety of this remedy in
enforcing the latter’s rights.
According to VMTA, it has a legal interest in Civil Case No. 69312, which is rooted in the
alleged failure of VMGA to turn over the insurance proceeds for the restoration and
rehabilitation of Virra Mall, in breach of the latter’s contractual obligation to Ortigas.
However, the CA ruled against this position taken by VMTA not only because, in the CA’s
view, VMTA’s Complaint-in-Intervention failed to state a cause of action, but also because it
has no legal interest in the matter in litigation. We rule in favor of VMTA.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.
 In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,21 this Court explained intervention in this wise:
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention.
Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal
interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect
and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence
of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the
exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene, and the
ruling of RTC Br. 67 allowing intervention was wrongly reversed by the CA because such a
ruling does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Pursuant to and by virtue of such claim, defendant VMGA and defendant VMGA Board
Members, impleaded as party defendants herein, received, at various times, from their
insurance broker, and it is in their custody, the insurance proceeds arising out of such claim
which, as of January 8, 2003, aggregated P48.6-Million. Having failed to deliver the said
proceeds to the real beneficiary inspite of due notice and demand, plaintiff Ortigas herein
instituted the present action against all the defendants to compel delivery of the said insurance
proceeds which are being unlawfully and illegally withheld by all the defendant VMGA and
defendant VMGA Board Members inspite of written demands made therefor. Worse, a
portion of said insurance proceeds, aggregating P8.6-Million had already been disbursed and
misappropriated in breach of trust and fiduciary duty.
It is clear from the foregoing allegations that VMTA’s purported right is rooted in its claim
that it is the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a)
facilitated the repair and restoration of the insured infrastructure upon the orders of Ortigas,
and (b) advanced the costs thereof. Corollarily, respondents have a duty to reimburse it for its
expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in favor of respondent VMGA,
even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally, the imputed act or omission on
the part of respondents that supposedly violated the right of VMTA was respondent VMGA’s
refusal, despite demand, to release the insurance proceeds it received to reimburse the former
for the expenses it had incurred in relation to the restoration and repair of Virra Mall. Clearly,
then, VMTA was able to establish its cause of action.
VMTA was also able to show its legal interest in the matter in litigation — VMGA’s
insurance proceeds — considering that it had already advanced the substantial amount of
₱18,902,497.75 for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. That VMTA seeks reimbursement
from Ortigas is precisely the reason why intervention is proper. The main issue in Civil Case
No. 69312 is whether Ortigas has a contractual right to the insurance proceeds received by
VMGA. Thus, the recoupment by VMTA of the expenses it incurred in the repair of Virra
Mall depends on the success of either party in the main case. VMTA therefore has an
undeniable stake in Civil Case No. 69312 that would warrant its intervention therein.
Further, the issuance to Ortigas of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts
VMTA in a situation in which it will be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of the property in the custody of the court, pursuant to the said writ.lawphil The
prospect of any distribution or disposition of the attached property will likewise affect
VMTA’s claim for reimbursement.

24. Santamaria v. Facts: On January 10, 2002, Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California,
Cleary, G.R. No. filed a Complaint[6] for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land
197123 (2016) Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria (Santamaria), Astrid Sala
Boza (Boza), and Kathyrn Go-Perez (Go-Perez) before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation, for
which Cleary paid US$191,250.00.[7] Cleary sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and
Put Agreement he entered into with Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go,
Santamaria, Boza, and Go-Perez. Paragraph 9.02 of the Agreement provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the courts
of the State of California, (b) the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, or (c) the courts of the country of Corporation's incorporation, as Cleary may elect
in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action proceeding or
judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile.[8]
Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu.
Santamaria, Boza, and Go-Perez filed their respective Answers with Compulsory
Counterclaims.[9] The trial court then issued a notice of pre-trial conference dated July 4,
2007. In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify either on the witness stand
or by oral deposition. On January 22, 2009, Cleary moved for court authorization to have
deposition taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles. Santamaria
and Boza opposed averring that Cleary is depriving the court and the parties the opportunity
to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on him. Go-Perez filed a separate
Opposition, since he elected to file suit in the Philippines, he should submit himself to the
procedures and testify before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
The trial court denied Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition in the
Order. It held that depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual testimony in open
court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral examination at trial as required under
Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On August 10, 2010, the Court of Appeals
granted Cleary's Petition for Certiorari and reversed the trial court's ruling.[25] It held that
Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions, and that it is
immaterial that Cleary is the plaintiff himself. Hence the petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred in granting Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take
Deposition.
Ruling: No, the CA did not err in granting Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take
Deposition.
1.) SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person,
whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with
these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of
court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any
person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the
instance of any party.
On the use of depositions taken, we refer to Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This
Court has held that "depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes."[71] These exceptional cases are enumerated in Rule 23, Section 4(c) as follows:
SEC 4. Use of depositions. - At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition
or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions: (2)
that the witness resides at distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by
the party offering the deposition.
The difference between the taking of depositions and the use of depositions taken is apparent
in Rule 23. The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept
entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are
imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for
knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be
appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial;
the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties
before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.
[U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a
method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of
presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have
been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
 circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.
2.) The bone of contention now is on whether Cleary can have his deposition taken in the
United States. Respondent did avail himself of the processes and procedures under the Rules
of Court when he filed his Motion. He invoked Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court
and requested to have his deposition taken in Los Angeles as he was "out of the Philippines."

Moreover, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court no longer requires leave of court for the
taking of deposition after an answer has been served. According to respondent, he only sought
a court order when the Department of Foreign Affairs required one so that the deposition may
be taken before the Philippine Embassy or Consulate.[81]

That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to personally examine and observe
the conduct of a deponent does not justify denial of the right to take deposition. This objection
is common to all depositions.[82] Allowing this reason will render nugatory the provisions in
the Rules of Court that allow the taking of depositions.

As suggested by the Court of Appeals, the parties may also well agree to take deposition by
written interrogatories to afford petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine without the need
to fly to the United States.[84]

The second premise is also erroneous. That respondent is "not suffering from any impairment,
physical or otherwise" does not address the ground raised by respondent in his Motion.
Respondent referred to Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, in that he was "out of
the Philippines."[85] This Section does not qualify as to the condition of the deponent who is
outside the Philippines.

25. Afulugencia v. Facts: The core of this case involves the Spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia
MBTC, G.R. No. (petitioners) embarking on a judicial quest to invalidate several documents concerning a
185145 (2014) mortgage, its subsequent foreclosure, auction sale, and the certificate of sale involving their
property in Meycauayan, Bulacan, against the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank)
and Emmanuel L. Ortega. The civil case was initiated at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos City, Bulacan, and was designated as Civil Case No. 336-M-2004.
In the course of the proceedings, after the completion of pre-trial activities, the petitioners
requested the court to issue a Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum directed at
Metrobank’s officers, aiming to have these officers appear as their initial witnesses and
produce pertinent documents related to the loan and the foreclosure process. Metrobank
opposed this motion on the grounds of improper notice of hearing and the petitioners’ failure
to serve written interrogatories as mandated by Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC sided with Metrobank, highlighting the procedural misstep pertaining to the notice
of hearing and the necessity of serving written interrogatories before compelling adverse
parties to testify. The petitioners’ subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
preserving the initial ruling.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the
procedural requirements cited by the RTC were not applicable to their request for a subpoena.
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC’s decision, emphasizing the litigated nature of the
motion for subpoena and the procedural necessity of serving written interrogatories to adverse
parties beforehand.
Issue: WON the court of appeals committed (reversible) error in holding that the petitioners
must first serve written interrogatories to respondent bank’s officers before they can be
subpoenaed.
Ruling: No, the court of appeals did not commit an (reversible) error in holding that the
petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to respondent bank’s officers before they
can be subpoenaed.
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition
thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the
Opposition.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –
 Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it
is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. The process could be treated as a
fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result
that a prior written interrogatories might bring.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may
limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or
harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only
protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the
calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their
initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of
their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the
incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s
officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations
act only through their officers and duly authorized agents34 – as their main witnesses; nor
may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their
opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if
petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party
Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served
written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice
and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to
prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by
petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they
were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan agreement with Metrobank
at the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to
willingly provide petitioners with these documents even before petitioners can present
evidence to show that indeed they were never furnished the same, any inferences generated
from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing
petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not
furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while
the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.

26. Limos v. Odones, Facts: On June 17, 2005, Spouses Francisco and Arwenia Odones filed a complaint against
G.R. No. 186979 Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes, and the Spouses Rolando and Eugene Delos Reyes in the
(2011) Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac. The Odoneses sought the annulment of a
deed, title, and sought damages, claiming ownership of a 940-square meter parcel of land in
Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Their claim was based on an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale dated January 29, 2004, executed by the supposed heirs of Donata Lardizabal.
When they attempted to register this deed, they discovered that the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) had been canceled on April 27, 2005, and replaced by a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 329427 under the name of the petitioners. The petitioners claimed their title
was valid, having stemmed from a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata
Lardizabal and her husband in 1972. However, the Odoneses asserted that this deed was
forged since Donata and Francisco Razalan both died prior to its execution (1926 and 1971
respectively).
The petitioners responded by questioning the legitimacy of the Odoneses’ vendors as the only
heirs of Donata, arguing defects in the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale, and raised
defenses including failure to state a cause of action, non-joinder of indispensable parties, and
laches. The trial court denied a Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by the petitioners, leading
them to submit their Answer with affirmative defenses.
Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission. Respondents failed
to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses,14 arguing that respondents’
 failure to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative
defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present
evidence on the admitted facts.
The trial court denied this motion, concluding the facts were already traversed in earlier
pleadings, reasoning reiterated by the Court of Appeals (CA) upon review. The CA upheld the
trial court’s denial, prompting the petitioners to bring the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the rule on implied admissions under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
was rightfully applied.
Ruling: No, the rule on implied admissions under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
was not rightfully applied.
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file
and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been
furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less
than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow
on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting
the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters for which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to
have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however,
that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the
court.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners’ Request for
Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents
already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in
the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny
once again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will
serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on
admission as a mode of discovery which is "to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of
proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry."25
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described
in the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it
serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.26 Verily then, if the trial
court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in
previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request
and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in
Section 2, Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners’ Request for
Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the
implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied
admission attributable to respondents’ failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary
hearing is imperative loses its point.

27. Duque v. Spouses Facts: Petitioner Lilia S. Duque and her late husband, Mateo Duque, owned a 7,000-square
Yu, G.R. No. 226130 meter lot in Lambug, Badian, Cebu. On August 28, 1995, they allegedly executed a Deed of
(2018) Donation transferring this property to their daughter, respondent Delia Duque Capacio.
Capacio then sold a 2,745-square meter portion to the respondents, Spouses Bartolome D. Yu,
Jr. and Juliet O. Yu.
Spouses Duque filed a complaint at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu, alleging
forgery of the signature on the Deed of Donation, seeking to nullify both the Deed of
Donation and the Deed of Sale, to cancel the new tax declarations, and to reinstate their
original tax declaration.
Capacio admitted the forgery of the signature. Spouses Yu denied Duque’s ability to question
the Deed of Sale and claimed the matter was barred by prescription. A Motion for Admission
was filed by Spouses Yu requesting admission of various documents, including the Deed of
Donation and Deed of Sale. Spouses Duque failed to comment, which the trial court construed
as admission. Respondents moved for a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court granted,
dismissing the complaint. Spouses Duque’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the trial court’s decision, citing the failure to
reply to the request for admission as an implied admission of authenticity. The CA also
dismissed the motion for reconsideration by the petitioners. Posthumously, Mateo Duque’s
heirs were substituted as petitioners, continuing the legal battle to the Supreme Court (SC).
Issue: WON in holding that petitioners' failure to reply to the request for admission is
tantamount to an implied admission of the authenticity and genuineness of the documents
subject thereof.
Ruling: Yes, in holding that petitioners' failure to reply to the request for admission is
tantamount to an implied admission of the authenticity and genuineness of the documents
subject thereof.
The scope of a request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court and a party's failure
to comply thereto are respectively detailed in Sections 1 and 2 thereof, which read:
SEC. 1. Request for admission. - At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file
and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been
furnished.
SEC. 2. Implied admission. - Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less
than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow
on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting
the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the
preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are
resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
Clearly, once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to file a
sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule, however, admits of an exception,
that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted
the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a
request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the
requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the
requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and, thereafter, assume or
even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.13 The
rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates of
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been
alleged in the pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a useless,
pointless process which petitioner should not be subjected to."

In the case at bar, the respondents served the request for admission on the petitioners to admit
the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation, among other documents. But as
pointed out by petitioners, the matters and documents being requested to be admitted have
already been denied and controverted in the previous pleading, that is, Verified Complaint for
Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale
and Cancellation of TD. In fact, the forgery committed in the Deed of Donation was the very
essence of that Complaint, where it was alleged that being a forged document, the same is
 invalid and without force and legal effect. Petitioners, therefore, need not reply to the request
for admission. Consequently, they cannot be deemed to have admitted the Deed of Donation's
genuineness and authenticity for their failure to respond thereto.

Moreover, in respondents Spouses Yu's criminal case for estafa15 against respondent
Capacio, which they filed immediately upon receipt of a summon in relation to the Complaint
of Spouses Duque, one of the allegations therein was the forgery committed in the very same
Deed of Donation, which authenticity and genuineness they want petitioners to admit in their
request for admission. In support thereof, respondents Spouses Yu even utilized the
questioned document report of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime
Laboratory Office certifying that the signature in the Deed of Donation is a forgery. Thus, it is
then safe to conclude that their request for admission is a sham.
Having said that there was no implied admission of the genuineness and authenticity of the
Deed of Donation, this Court, thus, holds that it was also an error for the trial court to grant
the demurrer to evidence.

To recapitulate, the demurrer to evidence was anchored on the alleged implied admission of
the Deed of Donation's genuineness and authenticity. The trial court granted the demurrer
holding that with the said implied admission, respondents Spouses Yu's claim became
undisputed and Spouses Duque have nothing more to prove or disprove. This is despite its
own findings that the opinion of the handwriting expert and the Answer of respondent
Capacio, both confirmed the fact of forgery. The trial court easily disregarded this on account
of the said implied admission. The CA, on appeal, affirmed the trial court.

But in view of this Court's findings that there was no implied admission to speak of, the
demurrer to evidence must, therefore, be denied and the Orders granting it shall be considered
void. Here, it would appear from the trial court's January 5, 2011 Order that the evidence for
the petitioners consists mainly of the testimony of the handwriting expert witness and the
Answer of respondent Capacio, which both confirmed that the signature in the Deed of
Donation was, indeed, falsified. With these pieces of evidence and nothing more, this Court is
inclined to grant the petitioners' Complaint. Being a falsified document, the Deed of Donation
is void and inexistent. As such, it cannot be the source of respondent Capacio's transferable
right over a portion of the subject property. Being a patent nullity, respondent Capacio could
not validly transfer a portion of the subject property in favor of respondents Spouses Yu under
the principle of "Nemo dat quod non habet," which means "one cannot give what one does not
have."19 As a consequence, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent
Capacio in favor of respondents Spouses Yu has no force and effect as the former is not the
owner of the property subject of the sale contract. In effect, the tax declarations in the
respective names of respondents Capacio and Juliet O. Yu are hereby ordered cancelled and
the tax declaration in the name of Mateo Duque, et al. is ordered restored.

28.Olivarez Realty
Corp. vs Castillo G.R.
No. 196251

29.Asis vs Ilao G.R.

No. L-17451

30. Lara's Gift vs PNB

General Insurers G.R.
No. 230429

31. TIDCORP vs
Philippine Veterans
Bank G.R. No.
233850 04-25-25

32. Villalongha, et al. Facts: The instant case stemmed from a complaint5 for annulment of sale and transfer
v. CA, G.R. NO. certificates of title (TCT), damages, and attorney's fees filed by siblings Virgilio, Luzviminda,
227222, 2019 August Virgincita, Deogracias6 Villalongha (Deogracias), and Alejandro Villalongha against their
20 mother, Felipa, and their siblings Aurora, Josefina, and Ramonito, together with Bolton
Bridge Homeowners' Association, Incorporated (BBHAI), and the Register of Deeds for the
City of Davao (RD-Davao) before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Plaintiffs Villalongha claimed that: (a) they are co-owners of the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-130982, 7 T-141817, 8 and T-1418329 that used to be conjugal properties of Felipa
and her late husband, Mauricio Villalongha (Mauricio), who passed away in 1978; 10 (b) in a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Donation 11 dated May 7, 1996
(extra judicial settlement), Felipa waived her rights over her shares in the said lands, which
were allotted and awarded as follows: (i) TCT No. T141817 to Virgilio, Deogracias, and
Alejandro, (ii) TCT No. T-141832 to Ramonito and Josefina, and (iii) TCT No. T-130982 to
Virgincita, Luzviminda, and Aurora; 12 (c) despite having lost all rights and interests on the
said lands, Felipa subsequently sold13 to BBHAI the lands covered by TCT Nos. T-141817
and T-141832 (subject lands) upon the malicious instigation of respondent Aurora, resulting
in the issuance of TCT Nos. T31320614 and T-31320715 in the name of BBHAI, which is
now threatening or procuring to eject the plaintiffs from the subject lands.
For their part, respondents Villalongha denied17 the conjugal nature of the subject lands and
their participation in the execution of the extrajudicial settlement. They averred that: (a)
Felipa is the sole owner of the subject lands which she purchased from the Board of
Liquidators on October 20, 1988, long after Mauricio's demise in 1978; (b) Felipa signed the
extrajudicial settlement on the representation of Luzviminda that the said document will only
show the boundaries and monuments of the properties involved, without any intention to
donate her properties to her children; and (c) the signatures of Aurora and Josefina appearing
thereon were forged, and they did not sign any acceptance of the alleged donation to them. 18
On the other hand, BBHAI claimed to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
The RTC Ruling
the RTC (a) dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs Villalongha failed to
establish their claim by a preponderance of evidence; (b) declared the extra judicial settlement
null and void; and (c) adjudged Felipa as the sole owner of the subject lands.21 Aggrieved,
plaintiffs Villalongha appealed22 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, thereby (a) adjudging Felipa as the
exclusive and sole owner of the subject lands; (b) declaring her sale to BBHAI as valid and
binding; (c) ordering Felipa to deliver possession of the subject lands to BBHAI; and (d)
ordering plaintiffs Villalongha to pay litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
A copy of the March 22, 2013 Decision was sent to plaintiffs Villalongha's counsel, Atty.
Advincula, Jr. and was received by a certain Ariel Hernandez on May 8, 2013. However, in a
manifestation26 dated March 11, 2014 (request manifestation), Atty. Advincula, Jr. informed
the CA that (a) he did not receive said notice; and (b) Ariel Hernandez is not his staff or
employee, and not personally known to him or to his associate, Atty. Victorio S. Advincula,
Sr.
Atty. Advincula, Jr. also filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel27 dated March 11, 2014, the
CA granted the motion to withdraw and submitted the request manifestation for resolution.
the CA noted without action the request manifestation, pointing out that (a) Atty. Advincula,
Jr. has no more personality and/or authority to file pleadings in behalf of plaintiffs
Villalongha; and (b) the request manifestation did not specify the action requested from the
CA.
Virgilio received a copy of the said resolution on July 15, 2015, and filed a notice of receipt,
requesting for time to engage the services of a new counsel. 31 On August 17, 2015, he also
received notice 32 of BBHAI's Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment33 in the case.
Thereafter, Atty. Arnold C. Abejaron (Atty. Abejaron) filed a formal entry of appearance as
counsel34 for herein petitioners only, and opposed35 BBHAI' s motion on the ground
of prematurity, averring that there was no proper notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision on
their former counsel, Atty. Advincula, Jr.
Respondents Villalongha countered36 that petitioners already had knowledge of the said
Decision, and that Virgilio even attached a copy of the same in his Judicial Affidavit in
Criminal Case (a criminal case for theft filed by Alejandro38 against petitioners) before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Davao City, yet petitioners failed to do anything to verify if
Atty. Advincula, Jr. received notice of said Decision and/or protect their remedial rights, if
any.
In a Resolution40 dated July 7, 2016, the CA held that the March 22, 2013 Decision had
become final and executory on May 24, 2013 in the absence of any motion for reconsideration
or further appeal and, accordingly, directed the Division Clerk of Court to make an entry of
judgment. Petitioners filed a Manifestation/Compliance with Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment,43 which was noted without action in a Resolution44 dated September 20, 2016.
In the meantime, respondents Villalongha and BBHAI moved45 for the issuance of a writ of
execution before the RTC; hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining, among others, the Presiding Judge of the RTC from
hearing and/or giving due course to the said motions; and respondents from ejecting
petitioners from the subject lands. In order not to render moot the issue in this case, the Court
issued a TRO.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in directing an entry of judgment in
the case, and denying petitioners' motion to recall the same, despite their claim of lack of
proper service.
Ruling: Yes, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in directing an entry of judgment in
the case, and denying petitioners' motion to recall the same, despite their claim of lack of
proper service.
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "if any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party represented by counsel has been
actually notified, said notice is not considered notice in law.47 "The reason is simple - the
parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure,
specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be
unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More
importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly
procedure - either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if [he/she] does not
intend to hire a lawyer.
In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s copy of the
notice was not returned to the CA. 49 However, the CA concluded that the notice was
received by Atty. Advincula, Jr. on the basis of the reply to tracer of William H. Olmoguez,
Postmaster of Davao City, that a certain Ariel Hernandez received the notice on May 8,
2013. 50 But in his request manifestation, Atty. Advincula, Jr. denied having received such
notice and knowing Ariel Hernandez, which was not refuted by respondents.
It must be stressed that the mail matter must be received by the addressee or his duly
authorized representative since service on a person who was not a clerk, employee or one in
charge of the attorney's office, is invalid. 51 "[S]ervice of the court's order upon any person
other than the counsel of record is not legally effective and binding upon the party, nor may it
start the corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent procedural steps that may be
taken by the attorney."52 Since Ariel Hernandez was not an employee and, thus, not
authorized to receive court notices in behalf of Atty. Advincula, Jr., his alleged receipt of the
notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision on May 8, 2013 is without any effect in law, and
cannot start the running of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal.
Notably, Atty. Advincula, Jr. likewise withdrew as counsel for petitioners with the conformity
of Virgilio, which was approved by the CA.
Having been informed that the withdrawing counsel has not been duly served with notice of
the March 22, 2013 Decision, and considering further that no new counsel has entered any
appearance in behalf of plaintiffs Villalongha, the CA should have ensured that the latter were
duly served notice thereof, but it did not. While it originally sent a copy of the said Decision
to them under registered letter No. 03562 on April 12, 2013, the same was unserved, and thus,
returned to sender.53 Nonetheless, it bears to reiterate that such earlier notice is not
considered notice in law since plaintiffs Villalongha were then represented by counsel.
While Virgilio received a copy of the June 3, 2015 Resolution (noting without action Atty.
Advincula, Jr.'s request manifestation), and manifested that plaintiffs Villalongha will engage
a new counsel "to whom a copy of the x x x [March 22, 2013 Decision may] be
served,"54 neither plaintiffs Villalongha nor Atty. Abejaron who subsequently entered his
appearance for petitioners was served a copy of the March 22, 2013 Decision.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that plaintiffs Villalongha have not been duly served
with notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision; hence, the period within which they may file a
motion for reconsideration has not commenced to run. Thus, the Entry of Judgment made in
 the case on the ground that the said Decision had become final and executory on May 24,
2013 or after the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period from the invalid receipt by Ariel
Hernandez was therefore premature and inefficacious, and should be recalled and lifted. An
entry of judgment merely records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution has become
final and executory; but it is not the operative act that makes such judgment, order or
resolution final and executory. 55
In the case at bar, the Entry of Judgment did not make the March 22, 2013 Decision final and
executory considering that as of the date of entry, notice of said Decision has not yet been
served on plaintiffs Villalongha/petitioners. Consequently, the Court finds that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its July 7, 2016 Resolution directing entry of
judgment in the case, and the September 20, 2016 Resolution noting without action
petitioners' motion to recall such entry.

33. Jonathan Landoil Facts: Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the (RTC), a
International Co., Inc. Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI").
v. Spouses Initially, petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed
Mangudadato, G.R. its Answer dated November 23, 1999.6 Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective
No. 155010, 2004 Pretrial Briefs.7 Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, whose absence during
August 16 the pretrial on August 8, 2000, had led the trial court to declare it in default.
The petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision. 9 On July 18, 2001, it filed an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue.10 This Motion was deemed submitted for
resolution on August 7, 2001,11 but was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order. The
petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution dated December 4, 2001. Alleging that it
had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.
On January 7, 2002, its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro --
submitted separate withdrawals of appearance.14 On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad
Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution.15 To its Supplement, petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario
and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial.16 On the same day, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice dated
December 26, 2001, regarding the public auction sale of its properties.17 By reason of the
immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA on January 14,
2002, a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the
resolution of the Motion to Quash.
On January 9, 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their written
comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing thereon for February 1, 2002.
On January 23, 2002, petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re:
Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement) dated January 16, 2001.
Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly issued by the
postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had
been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record.21 The Certification pertaining
to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a
copy of the Order intended for him.22 The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he
had personally received his copy on December 21, 2001.23
On January 24, 2002, petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro.24 The Deposition was
intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial. 25
At 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled -- at the
Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before
Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary public acting as deposition officer.26 At 12:00 noon of
the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express, advising it that they
had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take Deposition; and asking it
not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion,27 a copy of which it eventually
received later in the day, at 3:10 p.m.
On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario and
Peligro, as witnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies.28 On the same
date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the RTC attaching (1) a
Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her; (2) a transcript
bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy of
the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by
respondents’ counsel.29
During the February 1, 2002 hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1)
Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked during the
deposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents’ Vigorous Opposition to the Motion to Quash;
and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the Notice to Take
Deposition.30
Meanwhile, on February 26, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition for
Prohibition in CA-GR SP No. 68483.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Resolution dated February 21,
2002, denying the Motion to Quash.31 On March 8, 2002, it received a copy of respondents’
Motion to Set Auction Sale of Defendant’s Levied Properties.
On March 11, 2002, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,32 seeking to hold in abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution and the
December 4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the
Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed.33 It thus
concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 6, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLI’s Petition. It ruled that
petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since
trial had already been terminated.34 The appellate court also opined that the alleged error
committed by the trial court -- when the latter disregarded two witnesses’ oral depositions --
was an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari or prohibition.35 Finally, it ruled that
between the denial of a lawyer and the certification of a postmaster, the latter would prevail.
Issue: WON (1) the petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New
Trial; and (2) whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances.
Ruling: 1) A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and
by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have
discovered and produced at the trial; and that, if presented, would probably alter the
result.40 In its Omnibus Motion for New Trial,41 petitioner argued that its counsel Atty.
Mario was sick, a fact that allegedly constituted excusable negligence for his failure to appear
at the August 8, 2000 pretrial.42 With regard to Atty. Rogelio Fernandez, the collaborating
counsel, it alleged that the Board of Directors had terminated his legal services on August 4,
2000.43
These grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial. Counsels are not
the only ones required to attend the pretrial. The appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant
is also mandatory. The pertinent rule states:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. -- It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to
appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to
enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to
enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.44
The rationale for this requirement of compelling the parties to appear personally before the
court is to exhaust the possibility of reaching a compromise.45 While notice of the pretrial is
served on counsels, it is their duty to notify the party they represent.46
The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is
therefore unacceptable. It should have also justified its own absence therefrom. Having failed
to do so, it had no valid ground to request a new trial.
Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal
is granted, lawyers are deemed to be the representatives of their clients.47
Atty. Fernandez may have been notified of the termination of his services on August 7,
2004.48 But as far as the trial court was concerned, he continued to be petitioner’s counsel of
record, since no withdrawal of appearance had yet been granted. Hence, his absence from the
pretrial was still not excusable. While he could no longer represent petitioner, his presence
would have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of appearance. An
improvident termination of legal services is not an excuse to justify non-appearance at a
pretrial. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be rendered meaningless, as they would be
subject to the counsel’s will.
Under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not
for the petitioner to be considered "as in default,"49 but "to allow the plaintiff to present
evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof."50 This
procedure was followed in the instant case.
To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the
defendant’s remedy is a motion for reconsideration.51 An affidavit of merit is not required to
be attached to such motion, because the defense has already been laid down in the answer.52
Liberality is the rule in considering a motion for reconsideration.53 It is best for the trial court
to give both the plaintiff and the defendant a chance to litigate their causes fairly and openly,
without resort to technicality.54 Unless the reopening of the case is clearly intended for delay,
courts should be liberal in setting aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence.
Judgments based on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon.
In the present case, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had
allowed respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit
the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability of a motion for reconsideration.
But the failure to file the latter motion -- without due cause -- is a factor in determining
whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex parte presentation of
evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts, petitioner did
not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration.
The lapse of time -- from the August 8, 2000 pretrial to the September 5, 2000 ex parte
presentation of evidence, and until the June 19, 2001 promulgation of the Decision56 -- shows
the negligence of petitioner and its counsels. Prior to the trial court’s resolution of the case, it
had ample opportunity to challenge the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence.
Too late was the challenge that it made after the Decision had already been rendered.
2) The appellate court supposedly erred, too, in declaring that the taking of the depositions of
petitioner’s witnesses was improper. We agree with this contention.
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an
answer has been served.60 Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of
which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial.61 The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is
"well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged,
and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law."62
Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a
manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or
when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege.63
As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:
"1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. x
xx
"2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and
defenses.
"3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which
otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
"4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses,
thereby encouraging settlements out of court.
"5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of
many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
"6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the
issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial.
"7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases."64
The Rules of Court65 and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole
function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the
 deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes,66 we
allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual
presence at the trial.
Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of
pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial."67 There
can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed. This was the
primary concern in Northwest Airlines v. Cruz.73 In that case, the ends of justice would be
better served if the witness was to be brought to the trial court to testify. The locus of the oral
deposition therein was not within the reach of ordinary citizens, as there were time
constraints; and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare.74 In
People v. Webb,75 the taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already
admitted the Exhibits on which the witnesses would have testified.76
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, under the circumstances specified hereunder:
Section 4. Use of Depositions. -- At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used; and
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require
him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce
any other parts.80
The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of
Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from
Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its
Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s
Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been
terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.
We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its
February 21, 2001 Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other
evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been
received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove
convincingly its denial of receipt.

34. Velasco v. Ortiz, Facts: Private respondent Tan Sim Te was the ward of petitioner Ely Chan Sa Velasco and her
G.R. No. L-51973, husband Lorenzo Velasco. Tan Sim Te was not the daughter of Lorenzo Velasco; neither had
1990 April 16 she been formally or legally adopted by petitioner and her husband. Sometime in 1974,
Lorenzo suffered paralysis of his right hand and consequently lost the use of that hand. In
view thereof, he converted his then existing bank accounts standing in his own name into joint
accounts under his name and that of Tan Sim Te, amounts therein being withdrawable by
either or both Lorenzo Velasco and Tan Sim Te.
On 28 January 1975, Lorenzo was examined by Dr. Raul V. Idea, a neurologist, who found
him suffering from "asphasia" and a "tumor on the left cerebral hemisphere, probably
metastatic".1 His condition was described in the following terms by Dr. Idea:
Asphasia is the inability of a person to understand comprehend what is being spoken and the
inability to express oneself; that the condition of the patient was already moderately advanced
and that the patient could not even then understand and comprehend but that he also could no
longer obey simple instructions. Lorenzo Velasco was also found to have malignant cancer of
the prostate glands which caused the brain tumor which had metastacised. Lorenzo Velasco's
illness was incurable so that the doctor's advice was for him to be brought home in order that
money may not be further expended uselessly on his hospitalization.
On 5 February 1975, or about a week after the medical examination, private respondent Tan
Sim Te withdrew the entire balance standing in China Banking Corporation Savings Account
No. 30-0882-7 in the amount of P99,504.83 and closed the account. Then on 14 February
1975, Tan Sim Te withdrew P37,000.00 from Lorenzo's current account with the Citizens
Bank and Trust Company.
As anticipated, Lorenzo Velasco died on 28 February 1975.
On 24 May 1975, petitioner in her personal capacity and in her capacity as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Lorenzo Velasco, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a
complaint for the recovery of property and annulment of certain documents alleging, among
other things, that private respondent Tan Sim Te had misappropriated and converted to her
own use the bank deposits of the deceased Lorenzo Velasco. In her Answer, Tan Sim Te
countered that the withdrawals had been made by her upon the instructions of Lorenzo
Velasco to whom the monies were allegedly given and who allegedly used the same to pay his
creditors and to defray his hospitalization and medical expenses.
After trial, on 17 March 1979, the trial court then presided over by Judge Augusto L. Valencia
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
A copy of the decision was received by private respondent through her former counsel Atty.
Jose J. Acejas on 6 April 1979.
On 10 May 1979, or four (14) days after the 30-day reglementary period to appeal had lapsed,
private respondent through her new counsel Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 4 The alleged newly discovered
evidence proferred by this Motion consisted of a certification dated 17 December 1975, issued
by Dr. Hinigio Tan of the Chinese General Hospital, relating to the physical and medical
examination undergone by the deceased Lorenzo Velasco during his confinement at that
hospital and thereafter as of 24 January 1975. The certification read as follows:
This is to certify that I was one of the attending physicians of a certain Lorenzo Velasco who
was confined at the Chinese General Hospital from November 20 to December, 22, 1974. I
was called to see the patient in connection with his hip fracture accident which occurred on
November 22, 1974. After his discharge, he came to my clinic for regular follow-up treatment
of his hip fracture. His last visit to my clinic was on January 24, 1975. During this period I
asked him questions about his illness and disability and other things and he was able to
answer them intelligently although his speech was such that he could only answer in slow
stuttering or faltering manner 5
In the Motion for New Trial, private respondent's new counsel sought to impugn the diagnosis
of Dr. Raul V. Idea, contending that diagnosis was "indirect and speculative" and that "Dr.
Idea [had] not categorically ruled out the possibility of Lorenzo Velasco's ability on February
5 and 14, 1975 to comprehend questions and to indicate his assent or dissent to said questions
which may have been addressed to him regarding [the withdrawals from Lorenzo's bank
accounts]." 6 Private respondent's new counsel sought to excuse the tardiness of the filing of
the Motion for New Trial by pleading "excusable negligence". Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez
stated that his professional services had been engaged only on 18 April 1979 and that:
. . . Believing in good faith that the undersigned counsel still have thirty (30) days from April
18, 1979 within which to file the appropriate pleadings and/or motions to vacate and/or appeal
the judgment and due to daily court appearances and other professional engagements, he
deferred action on the matter. It was only yesterday (i.e. 9 May 1979) that the undersigned
counsel was informed that the former counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Acejas, has not filed
any petition or motion insofar as the decision is concerned despite the fact that he realized that
the period within which the defendant can have the judgment set aside or vacated has already
lapsed. . . . 7
The trial court, by that time presided over by respondent Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, granted the
Motion for New Trial in an order dated 26 July 1979. In this order, Judge Ortiz held that the
excuse offered by private respondent's new counsel constituted excusable negligence and that
the "newly discovered evidence" would probably alter the result of the case. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of this order; the trial court refused reconsideration in an order dated 18
October 1979.
Accordingly, on 26 November 1979, petitioner commenced the instant Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction. In a resolution dated 5
December 1979, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge
from proceeding with the case (Civil Case No. 23208).
Issue: WON the grant by the respondent judge of private respondent's Motion for New Trial is
proper.
Ruling: No, the grant by the respondent judge of private respondent's Motion for New Trial is
improper.
Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial. — Within the period for
perfecting appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in
his rights;
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result;
(c) Award of excessive damages, or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, or
that the decision is against the law." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that at the time the Motion for New Trial was filed, the reglementary
period to appeal had already lapsed and that Judge Valencia's decision dated 17 March 1979
had already become final and executory. It is firmly established that a judgment which has
become final and executory can no longer be altered and modified, and much less set aside by
the court which rendered it since such court has already lost jurisdiction over the
case. 8 Thereafter, the power and prerogative to order suspension of the rules of procedure is
reposed, not in the court which had rendered such decision, but rather in an appellate court
and ultimately this Court, and then only upon a showing that otherwise the imperious
demands of substantial justice will be thwarted. 9
Respondent judge in his order granting the Motion for New Trial invoked Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 10 as authority for the proposition that the respondent judge could, "in the interest of
justice extend the period within which a motion for new trial may be filed by the defendant
provided there was excusable negligence on her part, which prevented her from filing the said
motion within the reglementary period."
It also seems useful to point out that where the reglementary period to appeal has not yet
expired, a Motion for New Trial under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
appropriate remedy. Where, upon the other hand, the judgment involved has already become
final, the appropriate recourse is either to a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the Revised Rules of Court, or in an appropriate case, a petition for annulment of judgment. It
is not mere coincidence that the principal grounds which justify grant of the Motion for New
Trial under Rule 37, are the same grounds which must be shown in a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38: fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
In the case at bar, as already noted, new counsel for private respondent pleaded his own
negligence in filing the Motion for New Trial four (4) days after the judgment had become
final as "excusable negligence," such negligence consisting of his failure to determine and
inform himself of the exact date of receipt by his client of Judge Valencia's decision, due to
his erroneous belief that he still had thirty (30) days (i.e., the full reglementary period) from
the time he accepted the case from his client. The newly retained counsel in addition pleaded
that he "has had court appearances and other professional engagements in equally important
cases" such that "he forgot all about the decision rendered in this case [Civil Case No. 23208,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 31 in Quezon City]." 13
We are unable to adopt the view taken by respondent judge on this matter. Even a novice
litigator would have instinctively ascertained the date of finality of the judgment he is retained
to reverse. We find it difficult to understand how a lawyer as distinguished and experienced as
private respondent's new counsel could have supposed, without asking his client, that he had
 the full reglementary period to file a Motion for New Trial or to appeal, from the day his
services were retained.
Private respondent Tan Sim Te claimed that she had discovered Dr. Tan's certification only
after trial, i.e., on 13 February 1979. This was vehemently controverted by petitioner's counsel
who indeed described such statement as a "blatant perjury". Petitioner, both in her opposition
to the Motion for New Trial before the trial court 16 and in her memorandum submitted to
this Court 17 pointed out that the same piece of evidence had been submitted by private
respondent Tan Sim Te as part of her evidence as respondent in a preliminary investigation
for "falsification of public document" in IS No. 75-16615 before the Fiscal of Quezon City in
late 1975 or early 1976, which preliminary investigation resulted in the filing in court of an
information against Tan Sim Te and others for falsification of public documents. Obviously,
then, Dr. Tan's certification was known and available to private respondent during the trial of
Civil Case No. Q-23208. While the records of IS No. 75-16615, Office of the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, are not before this Court, private respondent's failure to deny petitioner's
allegations lead us to believe that such allegations are true and that consequently Dr. Hinigio
Tan's certification could not have properly been regarded as "newly discovered evidence."
Moreover, Dr. Tan's certification is clearly in the nature of impeaching evidence, for it seeks
merely to weaken or controvert the written findings of Dr. Raul V. Idea that as of 28 January
1975 (that is, four (4) days after the last visit of the deceased Lorenzo Velasco to the clinic of
Dr. Hinigio Tan) Lorenzo's mental condition was already in the process of deterioration.
Being merely impeaching evidence in character, Dr. Tan's certification certainly by itself
would not have resulted in a different decision. The trial court had found private respondent
Tan Sim Te's testimony to be full of inconsistencies and outright prevarication. When
presented as an adverse witness, she testified that she had deposited P99,504.83 into her
personal individual account and had spent the same, thereby contradicting her own allegations
in her Answer that the said amount had been turned over to Lorenzo Velasco. Evidence was
also adduced before the trial court that the P37,000.00 was withdrawn upon instructions of
Tan Sim Te to purchase a cashier's check payable to Supercars Inc. obviously in payment of a
new car bought by or for her. One of respondent's own witnesses Lydia Alolon, testified that
one of her duties then had been to clean up Lorenzo of his feces, and urine thereby indicating
that Lorenzo no longer had the capacity to communicate even his basic physiological needs.
Finally, no accounting of the amounts withdrawn by Tan Sim Te was ever presented by her,
and her allegations that those sums had been used to defray Lorenzo's hospital bills and to pay
Lorenzo's creditors remained unsubstantiated. In view of all these circumstances, we find it
very difficult to understand how private respondent judge could have supposed that Dr. Tan's
certification would have sustained a different result.

35. Santos v. Santos, Facts: – 1982: Dana S. Santos and Leodegario R. Santos met at a wake, which led to a
G.R. No. 214593, romance and later cohabitation. They had two children together before officially marrying in
2019 July 17 1987.
– December 3, 1987: Dana and Leodegario marry in a Catholic ceremony.
ge
– 2001: Their relationship deteriorates due to infidelity suspicions, leading to a joint
dissolution of conjugal partnership.
– September 11, 2003: Leodegario files for the declaration of nullity of marriage citing
Dana’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The case, Civil Case
No. 03-6954, is lodged at the RTC Branch 72 in Antipolo City.
– April 2, 2004: Dana files an answer, contesting the petition.
– February 26, 2009: Despite receiving notices, Dana’s counsel fails to appear at trial, leading
to a waiver for Dana to present evidence.
– June 24, 2009: RTC declares the marriage null and void due to Dana’s psychological
incapacity, with a diagnosis of Histrionic Personality Disorder.
– August 26, 2009: Dana receives the decision and initially files a notice of appeal but later
withdraws and files a Petition for Relief from Judgment citing extrinsic fraud.
– February 17, 2010: RTC denies the petition for relief due to insufficient allegations of fraud,
prompting Dana’s motion for reconsideration, which is also denied on April 22, 2010.
– Petition for Certiorari: Dana files a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), accusing the
RTC of grave abuse of discretion.
– February 7, 2011: CA refers the case to mediation resulting in a compromise agreement
transferring their conjugal properties to their four children.
– July 3, 2012 – August 14, 2012: Dana accuses Leodegario of non-compliance with the
compromise agreement, filing a motion to reopen the case and reinstate her petition.
– April 15, 2014: CA denies Dana’s motion for lack of merit, noting Leodegario’s
compliance.
– September 26, 2014: CA reiterates denial of Dana’s motion for reconsideration,
emphasizing that the compromise only pertains to property and not to the validity of the
marriage.
– November 24, 2014: Dana files for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court,
challenging the CA’s decisions which upheld the RTC’s ruling and denied her relief petition.
Issue: 1. Whether the CA’s resolutions upholding the trial court’s judgment and closing the
case based on the property compromise agreement violated the State’s duty to protect the
sanctity of marriage.
2. Whether Dana’s rights to due process were violated due to her inability to present evidence
at the trial.
3. Whether the finality of the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage void was affected
by the pending petition for relief from judgment.
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied Dana’s petition, affirming the CA’s decisions. The Court
recognized the finality of the trial court’s decision on the nullity of marriage due to Dana’s
failure to file an appeal according to procedural rules. On the issue of the compromise
agreement, the Court held that the agreement was limited to property relations and did not
compromise the validity of the marriage due to explicit prohibitions under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the CA did not err in treating the case as closed and terminated. The Court also
ruled that Dana failed to substantiate claims of extrinsic fraud sufficient to set aside the trial
court judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The petition has no merit.
The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment upon compromise
rendered by the court a quo. It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are, therefore, the Family
Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
with the Rules of Court applying suppletorily.27
In the case at bar, the CA28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court decision had
attained finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom. The two resolutions of the
appellate court presuppose that the judgment on the validity of Dana and Leodegario's
marriage had attained finality. Dana, on the other hand, asserts that it had not.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality
of the RTC decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the
decision on the subsequent proceedings a quo.
There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration or new trial
from the RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal. However, probably cognizant of
the proscription in Section 2030 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a
motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she
withdrew her appeal and filed a petition for relief from judgment.
There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from
judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule sanctions the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court31 to cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that
Dana availed of an inappropriate remedy to question the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the
trial court admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the issues thereon, and
rendered an order denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order
of denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No.
03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of
the 15-day period for appealing the decision.
Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is to set aside
a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion that the decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 03-6954 had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been
annotated in their marriage contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact
that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had
rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for relief from that judgment.
From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate court. The appellate court,
in dismissing the case upon the parties' compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the
finality of the RTC decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's
petition. This conclusion is untenable.
The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the existence of
any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may
be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of decisive
importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will reverse the denial
or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the main case and remand the case to the lower court
for a new trial in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.37
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for
relief from judgment, making it unappealable38 and, hence, assailable only via a petition
for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of
petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still
obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the
grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also
and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may
be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from
determining the issues raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a Rule
38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment,41 the grant thereof reopens the case
for a new trial;42 and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial
court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.
The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of the finality of
the trial court decision.
The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside the judgment on
compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon compromise is well-
settled. In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract
binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination
of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and
not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and
conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes
a ministerial duty of the court.44
However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a
void judgment; and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not
divest rights, and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void
judgment are equally worthless."45
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition which gave rise to
these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's
petition for certiorari with the CA, which is nothing but a consequence of the proceedings
before the RTC, alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert
Leodegario's allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in her
petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her marriage to
Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the compromise agreement, therefore,
necessarily implies the settlement by compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and
Leodegario's marriage.
In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and even judges, who
have drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction adulterous relations. The rule
applies a fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore, erroneous for the appellate court to terminate
Dana's suit - which puts in issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the
Decision 11 Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property
relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue
should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil
Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the
appellate court held, it was Dana's intention49 to have the case terminated upon the execution
of the compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it
ruled that the scope of the compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's
property relations vis-�-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that
"[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by
necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same."
As held by the appellate court.
The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is
limited only to their property relations vis-a-vis their children.50
However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of consent or other
defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding upon Dana and Leodegario, as
they have freely and willingly agreed to, and have already complied with, the covenants
therein. The agreement operates as a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the
properties of the marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the
trial court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the Court deems it
necessary to write finis to this case at this level in order to avoid remanding the case to the
appellate court. It has been held that "remand is not necessary if the Court is in a position to
resolve a dispute on the basis of the records before it; and if such remand would not serve the
ends of justice."51 A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court, the
appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to support a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers to extrinsic or
collateral fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that prevented the unsuccessful
party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial
of the issue, as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.
Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented
from presenting his case to the court.53

Because extrinsic fraud must emanate from the opposing party, extrinsic fraud concerning a
party's lawyer often involves the latter's collusion with the prevailing party, such that his
lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.
In this light, we have ruled in several cases that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does
not amount to the extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.
We so ruled not only because extrinsic fraud has to involve the opposing party, but also
because the negligence of counsel, as a rule, binds his client.55 (Citations omitted)
Given this definition, the Court found the following circumstances sufficient to make out a
case for extrinsic fraud.
The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely
on its legal officers to vigilantly protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its
counsel, they were its employees tasked to advance the agency's legal interests.
Further, the NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it appears
deliberate on their part.
First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by
negligently and repeatedly failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's
evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its chance to recover from Lasala the employee
benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer.
Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on his
part. Parenthetically, this was not the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the
same when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in a prior 1993 case
where Lasala secured a judgment of P34,500,229.67 against the NFA.
For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse
decision was lost and was only found after the lapse of the period for appeal. Under these
circumstances, the NFA was forced to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Mendoza
for his string of negligent acts.
Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-
examine Lasala's witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove and
counter Lasala's counterclaim. Atty. Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise
failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the trial court's September 2, 2002
decision, where Lasala was awarded the huge amount of P52,788,970.50, without any
convincing evidence to support it.
When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned that
the NFA's copy of the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for
appeal had already lapsed.
The trial court's adverse decision, of course, could have been avoided or the award minimized,
if Atty. Cahucom did not waive the NFA's right to present its controverting evidence against
Lasala's counterclaim evidence. Strangely, when asked during hearing, Atty. Cahucom
refused to refute Lasala's testimony and instead simply moved for the filing of a
memorandum.
The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with unreasonable
disregard for the case they were handling and with obvious indifference towards the NFA's
plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys. Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions amounted to a
concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial court's huge and baseless
counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from making a fair
submission in the controversy.56
Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her petition for relief fall
way short of the jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic fraud. The Court quotes the allegations
Dana made in her petition for relief with the trial court:cralawred
In all candor, [Dana] wanted to present her side of the controversy and all she intended was to
take the witness stand. Without her knowing it, however, her time to present her evidence
passed without her being able to do so. Her previous counsel did not remind, much less advice
[sic], her of the hearing dates to present her case. Particularly, she was not simply aware of the
hearings held by this [h]onorable [c]ourt on February 26 and March 26, 2009. She can only
surmise that somebody must have maneuvered to impress, if not mislead, the [h]onorable
[c]ourt that she was not interested to present her side.

This must be so since after [Dana] confronted her counsel about the promulgation of the
Decision without her being able to present evidence, her counsel nonchalantly told her that it
was their mutual decision not to present any evidence. This was not what [Dana] thought and
knew. In the first place, she filed her Answer to the petition and assailed all the material
allegations therein. She found no reason to abandon her case.
[Dana], by these assertions does not accuse her previous counsel any wrongdoing or neglect,
or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel. But it certainly had caused
some harm to and, in fact, defrauded this [h]onorable [c]ourt which was led into believing that
[Dana] was not interested in presenting her evidence. Hence, this [h]onorable [c]ourt found
that [Dana] failed to appear despite notice as already mentioned above. Had it known that she
was interested on [sic] presenting her side, this [h]onorable [c]ourt certainly would not have
denied her that right. Otherwise put, by the deception, this Honorable Court was not aware
that [Dana] was deprived of her day in court.60 (Emphasis and underlining Ours)
Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel failed to notify her
of the hearings dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and second, that her counsel
nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual decision to not present any evidence. However,
she categorically admits that she "does not accuse her previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing
or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel."61 Furthermore, the
petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances attributable to her counsel
that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity to fully ventilate her claims and defenses
with the trial court. The acts complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and
palpable negligence" nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The general
rule, which binds the client to the negligence of her counsel, remains applicable to this case.
All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
 of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for relief.

36. Far east Bank and Facts: On March 17, 1999, Tomas Toh, Sr., private respondent herein, filed Civil Case No.
Trust Co. v. Toh, G.R. MC-99-643 against petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTCO now merged in Bank of
No. 144018, 23 June the Philippine Islands), seeking recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the amount of
2003 ₱2,560,644.68 plus damages. In his complaint, Toh claimed that petitioner had debited,
without Toh’s knowledge and consent, said amount from his savings and current accounts
with petitioner bank and then applied the money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed
of by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner. Thus, when Toh
issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored by FEBTCO
allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient funds, although Toh alleged as of
February 4, 1999, he had an outstanding withdrawable balance of ₱2,560,644.68.
It appears that earlier, private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan
Toh, Jr., and Antonio Tan Toh executed Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of
petitioner, binding themselves solidarily as sureties for the ₱22 million credit facilities,
denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, earlier granted by petitioner to
CASICO. Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for
another year, subject to the following amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line from ₱22
million to ₱7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of the sureties of CASICO.
Petitioner bank averred that the debiting of Toh’s bank accounts was justified due to his
surety undertaking in the event of the default of CASICO in its payments. Petitioner further
claimed that the reduction of credit line does not relieve Toh, Sr. from his continuing surety
obligation, citing the absence of a new surety undertaking.
Private respondent filed a affirmativement on the Pleadings, the lower court granted the
aforesaid motion ordering the defendant to restore immediately to plaintiff’s savings/current
accounts the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus the stipulated interest and moral damages and
Citing De Leon v.
attorney’s fees.
Soriano,8 where we
held that the approach Toh Sr., filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2,5 Rule 39 of the
of the end of one’s life Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on the ground of
span is a compelling old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy his money deposited in
cause for discretionary petitioner’s bank. While private respondent’s motion was pending before the RTC, petitioner
execution pending filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order.
appeal,9 the trial court
used the circumstance The RTC issued its order granting private respondent’s Motion for Discretionary Execution.
of Toh’s advanced age In granting Toh’s motion, the trial court held that discretionary execution may be issued upon
as a "good reason" to good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),7 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
allow execution Petitioner’s appeal was given due course. Later on, the appellate court decided that the instant
pending appeal. petition for certiorari be DISMISSED. Motion for reconsideration denied as well.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court’s Order granting
execution pending appeal on the ground of advanced age of private respondent Tomas Toh,
Sr.
Ruling: No, the CA did not err in affirming the lower court’s order.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the
time to appeal. "Good reasons" are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate
In the present case,
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time,
private respondent
become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently
Toh is already 79
have no case except to delay.15
years old. It cannot, by
any stretch of The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of "good reasons" to justify
imagination, be denied execution. The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the
that he is already of sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must
advanced age. Not a necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience
few might be fortunate and by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of another’s judgment or
to live beyond 79 conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule.16
years. But no one
could claim with In this case, the trial court granted private respondent’s motion for discretionary execution due
certainty that his tribe to his advanced age, citing our ruling in De Leon v. Soriano.17 It concluded that old age is a
would be always "good reason" to allow execution pending appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the
blessed with long life. present case may deny private respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has with
defendant bank.18 The Court of Appeals found said ruling in conformity with sound logical
precepts, inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time would render the ultimate
judgment ineffective. It further stressed that the trial court was in the vantage position to
 determine whether private respondent’s advanced age and state of health would merit the
execution private respondent prayed for.

37. xxx v. CA, G.R. Facts: Petitioner was charged with the violation of Section 5(e)(2)5 of Republic Act No. (RA)
No. 261459, 20 May 9262,6 or the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," by then and
2024 there deliberately depriving [AAA], his legal wife, and their child, [BBB], a minor of
financial support for the purpose of controlling his wife's conduct, that is to compel his wife to
allow him to regularly visit their child as a condition for the grant of support, thereby
depriving them of their basic needs, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties.
RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
Petitioner thereafter applied for probation and moved for the partial reconsideration of the
RTC Decision as to his civil liability on the ground that the trial court failed to consider that
he was unemployed at a certain period during the pendency of the case; hence, he was not
capable of giving support. He thus prayed, among others, that the RTC Decision dated
October 28, 2019, be reconsidered by deleting therefrom the portion ordering him to give
monthly support to private respondent and BBB.
RTC denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration stating that the issues raised therein
were already resolved in the RTC Decision. Petitioner thus elevated the case to the CA via a
Notice of Appeal on the civil aspect of the RTC Decision.
Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal (motion for execution pending appeal) before the CA praying for the issuance of a
writ of execution as to petitioner's civil liability for monthly support of PHP 15,000.00 and the
unpaid accumulated monthly support.
The CA partially granted private respondent's motion. The CA clarified that there are two
types of support in the RTC Decision – future support amounting to PHP 15,000.00 per month
and support in arrears or the unpaid accumulated monthly support of PHP 15,000.00 "to be
reckoned from March 2013 up to the present." Citing Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, the CA held that the immediate execution of the judgment on future support was with a
good reason. However, as to the support in arrears, the CA found that private respondent's
justification, i.e., dire financial need, was not a good reason to execute the judgment pending
appeal. CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal insofar
as it ordered petitioner to pay future monthly support.
Ruling: No, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal.
In partially granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, the CA cited Rule 39,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court in that an execution pending appeal requires three
conditions; first, the prevailing party must file a motion therefor; second, there must be a good
reason for the issuance of a writ of execution; and third, the good reason must be stated in a
special order.
In this regard, Section 5 of RA 9262 enumerates the acts of violence against women and their
children and gives protective measures for the victims thereof. In connection thereto, the
Court issued A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,38 or the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children," which applies to petitions for protection orders under RA 9262. Section 33(b)
thereof reiterates that a petition for protection order is deemed instituted with the criminal
action for violations of RA 9262 unless the offended party reserves the right to file it
separately; In turn, Sections 30 and 31 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC specifically provide that a
judgment granting permanent protection against acts of violence and other reliefs shall
be immediately executory, and that appeals from judgments on cases filed under RA 9262
shall not stay the enforcement of the final order or judgment.
In the case, the RTC Decision, insofar as the award of support is concerned, may be deemed
as a protection order as it granted a relief to private complainant and BBB under Section 11(h)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. Being akin to a protection order, the judgment falls under Section
4 of Rule 39 because A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly provides that it shall be immediately
executory. For this reason, the CA's reliance on Rule 39, Section 2 pertaining to the
discretionary execution of judgments is misplaced.
This is not to say, however, that the immediate execution of judgments under Rule 39, Section
4 is without exception. On the contrary, the provision also states that "the appellate court in
 its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction,
receivership, accounting, or award of support." Consequently, while a writ of execution may
be issued directing petitioner to pay support to private respondent and BBB on the basis of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the CA may nonetheless suspend or modify the award of support,
upon such terms as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of
petitioner.
Moreover, apart from the foregoing exception, Rule 39, Section 4 further provides that "[t]he
stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered
proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party." This is precisely why
the CA, in the exercise of its discretion under the exception stated in Rule 39, Section 4
only partially granted private respondent's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal as it deemed proper under the circumstances.
All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting private respondent's motion for execution pending
appeal as to the award of future support, the grant being duly supported by factual and legal
justifications. Consequently, the Court denies petitioner's prayer for the issuance of injunctive
relief for patent lack of merit.

38. Zabarte v. Puyat, Facts: In January 1994, petitioner Ron Zabarte (petitioner) filed a Complaint before the RTC
G.R. No. 234636, Feb against respondent Gil Miguel T. Puyat (respondent) for the enforcement of a money
13 2023 judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa,
United States of America. After respondent filed his Answer, petitioner moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the answer failed to tender a genuine issue.
The above ruling was affirmed by the CA which then became final and executory. Two days
later, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) which was partially executed, as per Sheriff's
Partial Returns. As the Writ remained not fully satisfied despite the lapse of three years,
petitioner moved for the amendment of the Writ, which the RTC granted. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a Motion for Examination of Judgment Obligor, which respondent opposed on
the basis of Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The respondent argued that he, being a
resident of Mandaluyong City, cannot be compelled to appear before the RTC in Pasig City.

Without resolving the motion, the RTC conducted a clarificatory hearing and required the
parties to submit their respective proposal and counter-proposals as basis for a possible
compromise agreement. The following month, however, petitioner manifested that he did not
receive any proposal from respondent. Furthermore, the next clarificatory hearing scheduled
on 26 May 2006 was moved twice upon respondent's motions for the resetting of the hearing.
Meanwhile, the hearing on 19 July 2006 was also reset due to the absence of petitioner and his
counsel, while the 04 October 2006 hearing was reset due to the absence of both
parties. Apparently, the parties were having settlement talks, leading to more hearing
cancellations upon their mutual agreement. Petitioner filed via registered mail a motion to
revive with motion to resolve the pending motion to compel respondent to appear.
Subsequently, petitioner also filed on 11 August 2009, an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance
of Alias Writ of Execution, followed by an ex-parte motion for the replacement of the
assigned sheriff. The RTC purportedly denied the motions to revive and issue
an alias writ, but later assigned Sheriff Marco A. Boco (Sheriff Boco) to fully implement the
amended Writ. Sheriff Boco garnished the amount of P280,160.27 from China Bank and
turned it over to petitioner. He also levied two condominium parking lots under the name of
respondent and his wife, Ma. Mercedes Puyat.
Allegedly, however, respondent sold the same to VGS Properties, Inc. two days after the
notice of levy was annotated on the certificates of title of said properties.28 Furthermore,
Mercedes submitted an Amended Affidavit of Third Party Claim,29 claiming half of the
properties as co-owner thereof. Despite these incidents, respondent's share in the parking lots
were sold at public auction for P1,000,000.00.
As the total amount of P73,943,620 from the monetary award remained unsatisfied, petitioner
filed a Motion [for the Examination of the Judgment Obligor and Corporations where
Defendant has Interest]. Later, the RTC issued an Order dated 27 June 2014, partially granting
the same, as it ordered respondent to appear before the court, but denied the prayer for the
examination of the president and/or duly authorized representatives of the corporations listed
in the motion.
Both parties sought reconsideration of the said ruling. Acting thereon, the RTC issued an
 Order33 dated 18 February 2015 reversing its earlier Order. This time, the RTC agreed with
respondent's argument that the latter cannot be compelled to appear before the RTC as it was
beyond his place of residence.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the execution proceedings were properly terminated due to the expiration of the
five-year period for execution by motion.
Ruling: No, the execution proceedings were properly terminated due to the expiration of the
five-year period for execution by motion.
The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can
have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry
of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the
lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced
by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment
becomes final.
For this reason, the jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by motion is only
effective within the five-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year period,
any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the judgment creditor, is null and
void. If no writ of execution was issued by the court within the five-year period, even a
motion filed within such prescriptive period would not suffice. A writ issued by the court after
the lapse of the five-year period is already null and void. The judgment creditor's only
recourse then is to file an independent action, which must also be within the prescriptive
period set by law for the enforcement of judgments.
In the instant case, the CA decision, affirming the RTC judgment in petitioner's favor, became
final and executory on 16 July 2001. Hence, petitioner had until 16 July 2006 to have it
executed by mere motion; otherwise, he must file the appropriate action within the required
period to have it enforced. Petitioner moved for execution on 02 September 2002, and the
RTC issued the Writ two days after. There is no question, therefore, that the timing of the
motion, and the consequent issuance of the Writ, were well-within the five-year prescriptive
period for execution by motion.

39. PSALM v. Facts: Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the (MTCC), Malolos City, Bulacan, an
Maunlad Homes Inc., unlawful detainer case with damages against (NPC). After trial, the MTCC issued its
G.R. No. 215933, Decision, ordering NPC to vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession
February 8, 2017 thereof to respondent; to pay reasonable compensation reckoned from the date of demand
until complete vacation and surrender of the subject premises; and to pay for attorney's fees
and cost of suit.
The NPC appealed the decision to the (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan. It affirmed in toto the
MTCC decision.
Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which was opposed by the NPC. The NPC also filed
a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. RTC denied the NPC's motion for
reconsideration and granted respondent's motion for execution. A Writ of Execution pending
appeal was issued and the sheriff served a Notice of Demand6 of payment to the NPC.
Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break Open Order since the sheriff
who tried to implement the writ of execution, by serving the notice of levy on the NPC
Warehouse at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by the security guards
assigned therein. The NPC argued that the warehouse is being used both by it and the
PSALM, an entity created and existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law); that the said law provides that the
ownership and all generation assets, IPP contracts and other NPC disposable assets are
transferred to PSALM; and that as of the moment, the ownership of the said items stored in
the said warehouse cannot be established with certainty as they are in the process of
determining what properties may be retained by the latter.
The RTC issued a Break Open Order7 authorizing the sheriff and his deputies from both
parties to enter/break open into the NPC's warehouse facilities. the sheriff issued a Notice of
Levy8 on execution pending appeal of personal properties/sale of seven (7) units transformer
radiator fins, one (1) unit power transformer and four (4) pieces angle bars.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit10 of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties
pursuant to the EPIRA Law.
 Petitioner filed a Manifestation11 with Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Status
Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner of the subject properties pulled out by
the sheriff by operation of law; that it is not a party to the instant case and therefore cannot be
bound by the judgment therein; that the obligation to pay respondent had not been transferred
to it. Petitioner also prayed for the nullification of the levy of its properties and restoring their
immediate possession to it. The Motion and prayer to annul are both denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed for being an
incorrect remedy. The CA found, among others, that contrary to the allegation of petitioner
that there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy obtaining under the circumstances,
Section 16, Rule 3 9 of the Rules of Court provides a more expeditious and encompassing
recourse in case a property belonging to a third person is placed under the coverage of the writ
of execution and, thereafter, sold at public auction.
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the denial
of the latter's third-party claim for being a wrong remedy.
Ruling: No, the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the
denial of the latter's third-party claim for being a wrong remedy.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone.17 An execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court.18 The duty of the sheriff is to levy the
property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's
goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.19 Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a
writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party
claimant. (refer to Sec. 16, Rule 39)
Petitioner claims that the CA erred
in overlooking the fact that it filed
a third party claim as provided
Under the above-quoted provision, the third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of his
under Section 16 of Rule 39 of the title or right to the possession of the property levied, and serve the same to the officer making
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner contends that the CA the levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria.20 The
should have taken consideration of officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless the judgment creditor files a bond
the substantive issues raised in its
petition reiterating its ownership of approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of
the levied properties. It claims that
upon the effectivity of the EPIRA
the property levied on. An action for damages may be brought against the officer within one
law on June 26, 2001, the hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The same section also
ownership of all existing generation
assets, IPP contracts, real estate and
provides that a third-party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his claim to the
all other disposable assets of NPC levied property. The proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have for its object the
were transferred to it; and that all
existing liabilities and outstanding recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
financial obligations of NPC as of resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party
June 26, 200 I arising from loans,
issuance of bonds, securities and claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to
other instrument of indebtedness
were then and there likewise
have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the
legally transferred and assumed by judgment creditor himself. If instituted by a stranger to the suit in which execution has issued,
it. However, since respondent's
claim is not among those existing such proper action should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former suit.
obligations that were transferred to
it upon the effectivity of the EPIRA In this case, petitioner had filed an affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff and a motion
law, it cannot be held liable for the
claim even if it were made a party for issuance of status quo order with the RTC to prevent the sale of the levied properties at
in the case. It contends that there is public auction, nullification of the levy and restoration of the subject properties to it, which
sufficient ground to annul the levy
and sale made by the sheriff since it were denied by the RTC and, consequently, the sheriff was directed to proceed with the
is not a party in the case, and
therefore, not bound by the
implementation of the issued writ of execution. Since the RTC denied the third-party claim
judgment rendered. for failure of petitioner to satisfactorily establish its claim of ownership over the subject
properties, the latter filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing such denial and
claimed that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA for being a wrong remedy.
We affirm the dismissal.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. An adequate remedy has been defined as a remedy which is equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a
revival of the judgment of the lower court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a
remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal.25
Notably, petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party claim since it is not one of
the parties in the action where the writ of execution was issued,26 as the unlawful detainer
case was between respondent and the NPC. Also, the denial of the third-party claim is not
appealable as provided under the above-quoted Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
 since the remedy of a third party claimant is to file a separate and independent action to
vindicate his claim of ownership or right of possession of the levied properties against the
judgment creditor or the purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. It is in this
separate and independent action that the issue of the third-party claimant's title to the levied
properties can be resolved with finality.

40. So Tiat King v. Facts: In Civil Case No. 94-71083, the Spouses Victoriano and Evelyn Calidguid (Spouses
Vicente Lim, et.al, Calidguid) executed a Compromise Agreement1 binding themselves to pay the amount of
G.R. No. 186407, ₱2,520,000.00 to the Spouses Jaime Lee (Jaime) and Lim Dechu (collectively, Spouses Lee),
June 22, 2015 which was approved by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. However, the Spouses
Calidguid failed to comply with the terms of the said decision, leading the Spouses Lee to
avail of the remedy of execution. A Writ of Execution3 was issued to satisfy the compromise
judgment and a property belonging to the Spouses Calidguid covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 85561 was levied on execution. During its sale at a public auction, the
judgment creditor, Jaime emerged as the highest bidder and a corresponding Certificate of
Sale4 was issued in his favor.
As an assignee of the Spouses Calidguid, Sio Tiat King (King) redeemed the subject property
before the expiration of the one-year period of right of redemption. Hence, the sheriff
executed a Certificate of Redemption.5 More than 11 years after the redemption of the subject
property, King filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was granted by
the RTC, a Writ of Possession7 was thereafter issued. Pursuant to this, Sheriff Cesar Javier
served a Notice to Vacate8 addressed to the Spouses Calidguid, their agents and all other
persons claiming rights under them at 109 P. Florentino Street comer Araneta Avenue, Sto.
Domingo, Quezon City, which is the location of the subject property.
Michael George O. Lim, Mathew Vincent O. Lim, Mel Patrick O. Lim, Moises Francis W.
Lim and Marvin John W. Lim (Lims) filed a Joint Affidavit of Third Party Claim,9 alleging
that they are the registered owners of the property situated at 109 P. Florentino Street comer
Araneta Avenue, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City under TCT No. 122207. The Lims filed an
Entry of Appearance with Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. The RTC issued an Order
setting the case for preliminary conference, the actual and physical possession of a part of the
subject property was turned over to King, prompting the Lims to file an Extremely Urgent
Motion to Issue Status Quo Ante Order. the actual and physical possession of a part of the
subject property was turned over to King, prompting the Lims to file an Extremely Urgent
Motion to Issue Status Quo Ante Order.
The Lims filed a Petition for Certiorari13 before the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging among
others, that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion when they were ousted from
their property by virtue of the writ of possession, without a separate and independent action to
resolve the issue of ownership.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order15 commanding the sheriff to defer completion of the
implementation of the writ of possession while the resolution of the motion to quash the writ
of execution is pending. The RTC issued an Orde, denying the motion to quash of the Lims.
The RTC also resolved that the TCT of the Spouses Calidguid was issued at an earlier date;
therefore it shall prevail over the TCT of the Lims. This led the Lims to file a Motion to
Admit the Attached Supplemental Petition,17 which the CA granted. The CA also issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the rights of both parties while awaiting resolution of
the petition.The RTC issued an Order20 suspending the execution of its Order dated April 28,
2008 and all allied processes pertinent to the case.
The CA decision granted the petition filed by the Lims.
Issue: WON the Lims may be evicted from the property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued in favor of King.
Ruling: King deplored that the CA erred in ruling that he is a successor-in-interest of the
judgment debtor and not a redemptioner under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, who is entitled to a writ of possession. He averred that the word "redemptioner" found
in the same section should be loosely applied to include the judgment debtor's successor-in-
interest.27 But King's line of reasoning is flawed. His understanding of the word
"redemptioner" notwithstanding, the fact is that the writ of possession can only be rightfully
enforced against the Spouses Calidguid and their successors-in-interest - which ironically
includes King himself. Even assuming for the sake of argument that King is treated as a
redemptioner, he seemed to have forgone that the same provision he invoked provides for an
exception, which is hereunder quoted:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
 executed or given.
The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the
same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor.
King acquired his right over the property with TCT No. 85561 from the Spouses Calidguid
when their right to redeem the property was assigned to him and subsequently, when
redemption was made; whereas the Lims' claim of ownership is based on TCT No. 122207
registered in their names. This goes to show that the Lims hold the property adversely to the
judgment obligor, Spouses Calidguid.
The Lims are considered as a third party, whose possession over the subject property may not
be defeated summarily. "The third party's possession of the property is legally presumed to be
based on a just title, a presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial
proceeding for recovery of the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the
adverse possession by the third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded
due process and the opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property
only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored
principle of due process."28
The foregoing elucidations find legal basis under Article 433 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
While King and the Lims are contending for the possession and ownership of the same
property, which has been the subject of levy and execution in Civil Case No. 94-71083, an
ejectment suit should have been filed by King before the Lims could be evicted from the
property. This is due to the existence of their ostensibly conflicting titles coupled with the
Lims' actual possession over the property. "One who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The
'judicial process' could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated."29
King took a procedural shortcut when he applied for the issuance of a writ of possession
instead of filing a suit to recover possession of the property against the Lims. Besides, as the
CA had espoused, the issuance of the writ of possession produced a peculiar situation in
which the writ sought by King was directed against himself as the assignee of the judgment
debtors.
The CA is also correct when it held that King cannot enforce his claim of possession and
ownership in a case terminated long ago,30 more so that the possession is with the Lims, who
are considered as strangers in Civil Case No. 94-71083. As can be readily gleaned from the
records, the judgment in the aforecited case has already been executed and satisfied. In their
Comment31 to the petition before the CA, the Spouses Lee manifested that the issuance of the
Certificate of Redemption confirmed that their claims as judgment creditors had been fully
satisfied.32
As regards King's submission that the TCT of the Lims was fictitiously issued, the Court
holds that this is not the proper forum to resolve issues concerning ownership of the disputed
property. Matters regarding its ownership should be ventilated in a separate proceeding, as
this case is limited to the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession following
redemption.33

1. Ordaneza v. Facts: Janevic, a Filipino citizen, and Masayoshi Imura (Masayoshi), a Japanese national,
Republic of the were married on April 7, 2006 in Pasay City.3 On May 13, 2009, Janevic and Masayoshi
Philippines, G.R. No. obtained a divorce decree by agreement/amicable divorce pursuant to the Civil Code of
254484, November Japan.4 The divorce notification5 was received and duly registered by the Mayor of Karuya-
24, 2021 shi, Aichi on May 15, 2009. Janevic, through her brother Ricky, filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and that her civil status be changed from "married" to "single"
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kidapawan City.

During the trial, Ricky testified for Janevic and presented the following documents: (1)
Special Power of Attorney;7 (2) Certificate of Marriage between Janevic and Masayoshi;8 (3)
Japan Certification of All Information in Family Register with translation n in English
language and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan;9 (4)
Divorce Notification with translation in English language and authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan;10 (5) Certificate of Publication dated February 17, 2017;
and (6) copy of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of Japan with its translation in
English and authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

The RTC found that Janevic has proven her petition and compliance with the requirements
under Rule 108 of the Rules, as shown by the documents she submitted, it held that there was
sufficient compliance since the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified and the
petition was duly published. Citing the case of Fujiki v. Marinay, the RTC added that
notwithstanding Article 26, the courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effects of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG for lack of merit. The OSG
appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) Janevic's petition did not comply with Rule 108; and (2)
the divorce decree failed to comply with the requirements under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

The CA ruled that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 108. The CA
explained that since the end sought to be achieved in the petition was the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the Civil Registry (i.e., change of civil status from "married" to
"single"), Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 108 should strictly be observed.

The CA also held that there was no compliance with the requirements under Article 26 of the
Family Code. The CA pointed out that while the Japanese law on divorce provides that a
husband and wife may divorce by agreement, the Japanese husband's capacity to remarry was
not sufficiently established. There was nothing in the copy of the provisions of the Civil Code
of Japan that Janevic submitted that states that the Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry
once the divorce decree is obtained. For the CA, the party seeking recognition of the divorce
bears the burden of proving that the Japanese law allows her former spouse to remarry.

Issue: WON the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce should be treated as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.

Ruling: No, the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce should be treated as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,38 the Court categorically acknowledged that a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment in relation to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not the same as a petition for cancellation of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules.

The Court explained that:

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to
the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the
civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and
 place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry - one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

In Fujiki v. Marinay,40 the Court explicitly stated that:

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may
be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Here, it is clear from the prayer that Janevic intended to cancel or correct her civil status entry
in the civil registry aside from the judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The cancellation
or correction of her civil status cannot be done through a petition for recognition under Article
26 (2) without complying with the requirements of Rule 108.

An individual seeking the change of his or her civil status must adhere to the requirements
governing a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108. There are underlying objectives and interests that the State seeks to protect in imposing
the requirements in Rule 108, including inter alia the requirements on venue (Section 1 of
Rule 108) and parties to implead (Section 3 of Rule 108), that the Court cannot simply
disregard in favor of expediency.

Here, the interested parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108 include inter alia the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City and Masayoshi. The RTC of Kidapawan City does not possess
any authority to instruct the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City to reflect the change in civil
status of Janevic considering that it was not impleaded in her petition.

While the change in Janevic's civil status is an expected consequence of the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce, it does not automatically follow that the Petition she filed
is the petition contemplated under Rule 108. Janevic herself acknowledged in her Petition that
"[t]he court does not altogether preclude the filing of the separate proceedings to effect the
same."46 Since Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, its particular provisions on venue
and the parties to implead must be observed to vest the Court with jurisdiction.47 Therefore,
the Court cannot take cognizance of Janevic's prayer for the cancellation or correction of her
civil status from "married" to "single" as this may only be pursued and granted in the proper
petition filed in compliance with the specific requirements of Rule 108.

2. Rivera Golf Club, Facts: Riviera Golf, a domestic corporation, is the owner of Riviera Golf Club (Club), a 36-
Inc. v. CCA Holdings hole golf course and recreational facility in Silang, Cavite. On October 11, 1996, Riviera Golf
B.V, G.R. No. entered into a Management Agreement with CCA Holdings, B.V. (CCA Holdings), a foreign
173783, June 17, 2015 corporation, for the management and operation of the Club.

The Management Agreement was for a period of five (5) years. Under this agreement, Riviera
Golf would pay CCA Holdings a monthly Base Management Fee of 5.5% of the Adjusted
Gross Revenue equivalent to US$16,500.00 per month, adjusted to4.5% per month from the
opening date, plus an incentive Management Fee of 10% of the Gross Operating Profit.
The parties also entered into a co-terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera
Golf and the Club’s developer, Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), to use CCA Holdings’ name and facilities to market the Club’s
shares. In consideration of the license to use CCA Holdings’ name, Riviera Golf and AFP-
RSBS will pay CCA Holdings a gross licensing fee of 1% on all membership fees paid in the
sale of shares, an additional gross licensing fee of 4% on all club shares, and 7% on non-golf
memberships sold. Riviera Golf initially paid the agreed fees, but defaulted in its payment of
the licensing fees and the reimbursement claims in September 1997. Riviera Golf likewise
failed to pay the monthly management and incentive fees in June 1999, prompting CCA
Holdings to demand the amounts due under both agreements.

Riviera Golf sent CCA Holdings a letter informing the latter that it was pre-terminating the
Management Agreement purportedly to alleviate the financial crisis that the AFP-RSBS was
experiencing. The Royalty Agreement was also deemed pre-terminated.

CCA Holdings protested the termination of the agreement and demanded that Riviera Golf
settle its unpaid management and royalty fees. Riviera Golf however refused on the ground
that CCA Holdings violated the terms of the agreement.

In April 2001, CCA Holdings filed before the (RTC) Makati City, a complaint for sum of
money with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 01-611 (first complaint) against Riviera
Golf. During the pendency of the case, the parties tried to extrajudicially settle their
differences and executed a Compromise Agreement.

The RTC rendered a decision approving the parties’ Compromise Agreement which states: 4)
It is understood that the execution of this compromise agreement or the payment of the
aforementioned sum of money shall not be construed as a waiver of or with prejudice to
plaintiff’s rights/cause of action, if any, arising from or relative to the pre-termination of the
parties’ Management and Royalty Agreements by the defendant subject to whatever claims
and defenses may have relative thereto;

Subsequently, or on November 22, 2002, CCA Holdings again sent a letter to Riviera Golf,
this time, demanding the sum of US$390,768.00 representing the projected net income or
expected business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-year term of the
Management Agreement. As its demands went unheeded, CCA Holdings filed another
complaint for sum of money and damages.

Noting that the first and second complaints involve the same parties, the same subject matter,
and the same causes of action, Riviera Golf filed on August 6, 2003, a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of res judicata and violation of the rule against splitting of causes of action. CCA
Holdings opposed the motion contending that there is no splitting of causes of action since the
two cases are entirely independent of each other. CCA Holdings also justified its belated
filing of the second complaint, arguing that the needed financial records were in Riviera
Golf’s possession.

The RTC, Branch 57, Makati City granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the first and
second complaints have identical causes of action and subject matter.

The CA set aside the order granting the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the RTC
for adjudication on the merits. The CA held that res judicata and splitting of a single cause of
action were not committed based on the following reasons: First, there is no identity of causes
of action in the two civil cases. The test to determine the identity of causes of action is to
ascertain whether the same evidence is necessary to sustain the two suits. In this case, the sets
of evidence in the two complaints were different.
Second, there is no splitting of a single cause of action because Riviera Golf violated separate
primary rights of CCA Holdings under the management contract.

Third, Riviera Golf recognized CCA Holdings’ right to seek damages arising from or relative
to the premature termination of the Management Agreement. This view isevident from the
literal interpretation of Paragraph 4 (or the "non waiver clause") of the parties’ compromise
agreement. Riviera Golf moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied its
motion in its resolution of July 5, 2006; hence, the present recourse to us pursuant to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

Issue: WON the appellate court committed a grave error in not holding that the filing of the
second complaint amounted to res judicata and splitting of a single cause of action.

Ruling: No, the appellate court did not commit a grave error in not holding that the filing of
the second complaint amounted to res judicata and splitting of a single cause of action.

Res judicatais defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; or a
thing or matter settled by judgment. Under this rule, a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit.5
The concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47(b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c)
identity of causes of action.6

All the Elements of Res Judicata are Present

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three elements in the present case. The
decision in Civil Case No. 01-611 is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. Since a judicial compromise
operates as an adjudication on the merits, it has the force of law and the effect of res judicata.7
With respect to the fourth element, a careful examination of the allegations in the two
complaints shows that the cases involve the same parties and the same subject matter. While
Civil Case No. 01-611 is for the collection of unpaid management and royalty fees, and Civil
Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, is for recovery of damages for the premature termination
of the parties’ agreements, both cases were nevertheless filed on the basis of the same
Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we agree that these two cases refer to the same
subject matter.

The Court is also convinced that there is identity of causes of action between the first and the
second complaints.

A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed.8 A single
cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more
different actions. The rule on prohibiting the splitting of a single cause of action is clear.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

In both Civil Case No. 01-611 and Civil Case No. 03-399, CCA Holdings imputed the same
wrongful act – the alleged violations of the terms and conditions of the Management and
Royalty Agreements. In Civil Case No. 01-611, CCA Holdings’ cause of action rests on
Riviera Golf’s failure to pay the licensing fees, reimbursement claims, and monthly
management and incentive fees. In Civil Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, CCA Holdings’
cause of action hinges on the damages it allegedly incurred as a result of Riviera Golf’s
premature termination of the Management and Royalty Agreements (i.e., the expected
business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-year term of the Management
Agreement). Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on Riviera
Golf’s breach of the Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we conclude that they have
identical causes of action.