Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Islamic house nancing:current models

and a proposal from social perspective
Hasan, Zubair
INCEIF the Global University of Islamic Finance, Kuala
Lumpur
04. January 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27919/
MPRA Paper No. 27919, posted 06. January 2011 / 06:26
1
Islamic house financing: current models and a proposal
from social perspective

Prof. Dr. Zubair Hasan
INCEIF: The Global University of Islamic Finance, Malaysia.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract
Shelter is one of the basic needs for human beings. Its availability for the people is an Islamic imperative. In view of the
appalling living conditions for a substantial proportion of population in most countries around the world, especially Muslim,
Islamic banks have entered the field with varying schemes for house financing. In this infant industry, the effort is
understandably guided by profit motive but a social dimension has to surface in course of time. Unfortunately, the models banks
currently use for house financing remains under the juridical gaze, more so as the practice is not always found transparent. This
paper looks at Islamic house financing models in a broader societal context. It evaluates the efficacy of the in practice financing
structures and suggests a new approach. The proposed model is shown as superior to the existing ones. It meets the norms of
equity, fair play and openness and does not presumably violate any other Islamic norm. Finally, the paper makes some policy
suggestions to integrate Islamic house financing with broader social goals of an Islamic economy.

Key words: Housing problem; basic needs, Resource allocation, rural-urban migration; Conventional model, BBA in housing, the
MMP model, Diminishing balances; planning
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Introduction
Among the basic necessities of civilized living shelter ranks only next to food and clothing. Yet a
multitude of world population has over their heads no roof worth the name. The problem of
housing insufficiency has assumed alarming proportions across the world. It is not so acute in the
developed countries as in the developing ones but persists everywhere. The shortage is especially
scary in the metropolitan centers; their expansion rarely knows any limits.
1
Population growth
unceasingly tends to frustrate solutions. According to figures, available latest for the year 1996,
approximately 52% of the total housing in Caracas of Venezuela consisted of squatter
settlements. For Dar es Salam in Tanzania the figure was 49% and for Karachi in Pakistan 40%.
The Indian movie Slum dog millionaire partly won the Oscars for highlighting the seamy side of
Mumbai, the commercial capital of the country.
Housing affects health, culture and civility of people. Poor and inadequate housing breeds
crime, creates unrest, lowers productivity and slows down growth. The UN House Settlement
Program (UN-HABITAT) estimated that 600 million urban and 1 billion rural residents in the
developing countries live in overcrowded homes with poor water quality, lack of sanitation and
safe food preparation or storage (Brown, 2003).

1
Cities in developing countries are growing at extraordinary rates, often compressing into decades the
urbanizations process that has taken centuries in developed countries. Malpezzi and Mayo (July 1987, p.3)
2
The liberalization wave now sweeping the globe for decades has seemingly been
restrictive of the public action to straighten the oblique market-oriented approaches to housing.
Ironic it is that the housing market collapse in the US should have been the initiator of the worst
ever economic crisis that afflicts the world today.
In Islam, the fulfillment of their basic needs including housing is the individuals own
responsibility but to make up deficiencies is a state obligation (Hasan, 1997). The governments
in Muslim countries are, therefore, under faith compulsion to promote the construction of
affordable residential houses for the people in need. The house financing schemes of banks
Islamic or conventional - have to be somehow made commensurate with societal requirements.
The effort may include the promotion of cooperatives, group housing schemes and even private
contributions. Tax concessions, subsidized land allocation and its long term leasing can be a few
strategic elements for consideration. The effort of Islamic financial institutions in redeeming
societal deficiency can possibly be seen as a sort of fard kifaya. House financing schemes in
Muslim countries lack the linkages to reflect the awareness. It would be fatal to view banks as
just for-profit businesses.
2
Islamic business can in no way be de-linked from social business.
In evaluating the current modes of finance Islamic banks are generally using to provide
credit for housing, one can hardly ignore the overall scenario. But we resist the digressive
temptation for the moment and proceed to evaluate the existing models for house financing in the
following Section 2. Here, the discussion focuses essentially on operational aspects as explained
in the literature on the subject. Since the present financing practices are steeped in confusion and
controversy, we shall present for readers consideration a new model in Section 3 and show its
efficacy for Islamic home financing relative to other models. In Section 4 we revert to the bigger
picture alluded to above. We make a few policy suggestions in that context.
Finally, let us refer to a difficulty one comes across in juristic discussions on various
types of financial contracts. Conventionally, each construct is generally named in the literature
after a single Shariah norm. For example, one hears of murabahah, BBA or mudarabah contracts
implying the exclusion of others. The exclusionist flavor limits the range of possible
multiplication of contractual forms. At times, it may also feed the perceptions that one form of

2
Iqbal and Salman (2007, p.14) say that Islamic banks as any other private business in an Islamic system are for
profit organizations. The authors are not alone. Many scholars, especially with Western orientation tend to promote
the gospel in their writings on Islamic finance.
3
contract conflicts with the other. The fact is that often more than one norm is employed in a
single contract. For a clearer understanding of various legal provisions, it may possibly help to
state the basics of a general principle and bring in departures from it, if needed, as variants or
exceptions. This may help in constructing broad-based hybrid models, reduce controversies and
enhance the permissibility range for instrumental innovations. We shall have occasion to
illustrate the point in the following Section.
2. Current models
2.1 The BBA variants
Currently the BBA - sale with price deferment model has found much favor with the banks for
safety reasons, (Rosly 2010, p. 536.) The contract in practice has two variants. In Malaysia, it has
an embedded buy-back (inah) provision. The customer books the house with a developer with
some earnest money committing to pay the balance within an agreed period and the ownership is
transferred to him. During this period, he sells the house to a financing bank at cost price with a
simultaneous contract to buy it back from the bank at the cost plus a mark-up he agrees to. The
house is pledged with the bank as collateral. ng The amount becomes a debt payable to the bank
as per an agreed installment payments scheme.

In Bahrain murabahah replaces inah.
In either case the banks face little risk in this structure. In case of default, they are amply
covered by the pledge and the down payment may be forfeited. In contrast, the customers are all
the way on the receiving end. In the case of installment delays, there is a penalty clause that can
be invoked even though under the regulations the amount must go to a charity fund each bank
has to establish for the purpose. The main source of trouble is the treatment of the whole buy
back amount as debt.
3
Banks insist that whatever be the time point of default the remaining debt
has to be cleared in full.
4
. More disquieting than default is the situation when debt is all cleared
before maturity but the banks still do not waive the profit component for the remaining period.

3
A court judgment in 2007 took note that the sale element in the BBA was not a bona fide sale and brings into
question the profit portion of the facility. Later, a Bank Negara circular advised banks to review the use of BBA.
4
Due to arbitraging activities, the BBA has converged to the conventional mode where the computational formulas
are similar to the conventional and where the profit rate tracks the market interest rate. Instead of charging the
customer interest, financiers charge a profit rate that is dependent on the market interest rate. (Meera & Razak
2009, p.4. See also p.6). In this context the authors also reject the plea of Usmani & Yaqubi (1998) for bench
marking the profit rate on LIBOR P.8). To me, their reasoning is tenable. Factors determining rates of interest and
their varistions are certainly different from those that should influence profit margins in Islamic finance.
4
The waiver, they argue, would deprive them of the profit they would have otherwise booked
from the transaction. Such situations turn out worse than may arise under interest financing
where the banks do not charge interest on the balance for the remaining period
5
. Rules on rebates
in such cases are on the way in Malaysia
6
and the banks already seem moving away to a new
structure taking the form of a joint venture. It is the now the much lauded musharakah
mutanaqisah partnership (MMP) or the diminishing partnership model.

2.2 Conventional vs. Diminishing Partnership Model
It may be helpful to use illustrations for making the features and working of the conventional and
the new Islamic model (MMP) clearer for comparison. Suppose a person wants to purchase a
house worth RM 100,000. He pays RM 20000 as earnest money to the seller to grant three
months time to pay the remaining amount. During the intervening period he evaluates the terms
for borrowing the amount from a conventional bank the CB - compared to an Islamic bank IB
- operating on a musharakah mutanaqisah partnership (MMP) principle. He plans to clear the
debt in 10 years paying 20 six-monthly installments. The conventional bank charges 8% interest
per annum plus a loan redemption factor of 6.71%. The loan redemption factor can be found for
a given interest rate and payment period from the readily available table of present value (PV)
annuity factors.
7
The yearly installment is calculated as loan amount (interest rate + redemption
factor). In our case it would be RM 100000 (.08 + 0.0671) = RM 14710 a year. The amount will
be half i.e. RM 7355 for a six-monthly payment. Table 1 provides the operational details.

5
If the interest rate charged was lower on the loan for the entire period that on loans for the shorter period when full
payment is made, conventional banks sometimes claim the amount lost due to that difference.
6
The juristic basis of granting such discounts is the Islamic concept of ibra. In the context of finance it refers to
granting waiver by the creditor of his debt to some person partially or in full to provide relief in case of default. For
details see the research note of Marjan (2010).
7
The redemption factor (R) can also be calculated using the following formula R =
( )
(

n
i 1
1
1
i
1
where i is the
rate of interest and t the time units involved. In our example r being 8% and time 10, the formula gives the same
value as mentioned (6.71%).

5
It comes about that in the total payment made to the bank (RM 147194) the interest
component is (147194 100000) = RM 47194 in 10 years. Thus, the effective rate charged is
4.72% per annum. This is experience, not fiction. Members of the various cooperative group-
housing societies in Delhi obtained loans under such a plan (author joining in 1980) from the
Housing Development Corporation (HDFC) of India, now a leading private sector bank of the
country. Interest rates varied according to amount borrowed and the time dimension involved.
The customer later approaches an Islamic bank the IB - to finance the house purchase,
other details remaining unchanged. The bank offers to provide the remaining RM 80,000 to the
seller. Thus, the bank would acquire an 80% share in the ownership of the house. The remaining
20% will be the share of the client. The rental for the house is proposed to be fixed at 8% a year.
The bank must get (RM 80,000 + its share of rent) in six-monthly installments over the next 10
years.
Table 1: Details of loan repayment to the conventional bank
S. No. Installment Interest Principal Balance
1 7355 4000.0 3355.0 96645.0
2 7355 3865.8 3489.2 93155.8
3 7355 3726.2 3628.8 89527.0
4 7355 3581.1 3773.9 85753.1
5 7355 3430.1 3924.9 81828.2
6 7355 3223.1 4081.8 77746.4
7 7355 3109.6 4245.1 73501.2
8 7355 2940.0 4415.0 69086.2.
9 7355 2763.4 4591.6 64494.4
10 7355 2579.6 4775.2 59719.2
11 7355 2388.8 4966.2 54753.0
12 7355 2190.1 5164.9 49588.1
13 7355 1983.5 5371.4 44216.6
14 7355 1768.7 5586.3 38630.3
15 7355 1545.2 5809.8 32820.5
16 7355 1312.8 6042.2 26778.3
17 7355 1071.1 6263.9 20494.4
18 7355 819.8 6535.2 13959.2
19 7355 558.4 6796.6 7162.6
20 7355 286.5 7068.5 94.1
Total 147100 47142.8 99905.9

The client would surrender his share in the rental to the bank until the banks share in the house
is completely liquidated. As this part of the rental will not be enough to redeem the amount, a
redemption factor of 6.71% would be added to the 8% rental rate giving an overall six-monthly
6
charge of 14.71 / 2 = 7. 355%. Note that the annual rate rent plus redemption is to be halved
for half yearly payments. This would fix the installment at 80000 x 0.07355 = RM 5884. The
client is satisfied and opts for the contract. Since the entire rental goes to the bank the redemption
component in the installment will be 5884 4000 = RM 1884. The entry in column C of Table 2
can be viewed as the price of one unit of banks ownership, the customer is obliged to buy, so to
say, each six months. Note that the installment has two components: a rental and a redemption
element so determined that the ownership of the house will completely pass on to the customer
by the stipulated date.
8


Table 2: Working of a Musharkah-Mutankashah Partnership (MMP) Model
Components of a six-monthly installment Rental Division Customer's Bank's
Installment Rent Redemption Total Customer's Customer Bank Equity Equity
Number RM RM Payment Ratio RM RM

A B C = A + B D E F G H

0 0.2000 20000.0 80000.0
1 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.20000 800.0 3200.0 22684.0 77316.0
2 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.22684 907.4 3092.6 25475.4 74524.6
3 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.25475 1019.0 2981.0 28370.4 71629.6
4 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.28370 1134.8 2865.2 31389.2 68610.8
5 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.31389 1255.6 2744.4 34528.8 65471.2
6 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.34528 1381.1 2618.9 37793.9 62206.1
7 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.37794 1511.8 2488.2 41189.7 58810.3
8 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.41190 1647.6 2352.4 44721.3 55278.7
9 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.44721 1780.8 2211.2 48386.1 51613.9
10 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.48386 1935.4 2064.6 52205.5 47794.5
11 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.52205 2086.2 1911.8 56175.7 43624.3
12 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.56176 2247.0 1753.0 60306.7 39693.3
13 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.60301 2412.0 1588.0 64602.7 35397.3
14 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.64602 2584.1 1415.9 69070.8 30929.2
15 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.69071 2762.8 1237.2 73717.6 26282.4
16 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.73718 2948.7 1051.3 78565..3 21449.7
17 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.78565 3142.6 857.4 83591.9 16408.1
18 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.83592 3343.7 656.3 88819.6 11180.4
19 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.88820 3552.8 447.2 94256.4 5743.6
20 4000 1884.0 5884.0 0.94256 3770.2 229.8 99910.6 89.4

It is clear from the above illustration that there is little difference in the operational
mechanism of the conventional model and the much lauded Islamic MMP in the literature. In

8
The procedure of its calculation is derived from the same formula as indicated in n.5 above. A modified formula
for calculating the redemption factor for MMP is provided in Kameel and Razak (2009, 10) also. We have shown
that the same formula and annuity tables as in conventional finance can be used with advantage.

7
both cases, the payable amount diminishes as identical installments are paid and both have the
advantage of regular cash inflows for the bank which enhances the turnover of resources,
improves liquidity and mitigates risk in a measure. But we shall see that there is more in the
MMP despite the apparent departure from the conventional interest rate that goes against the
client. He may discover that the conventional banks terms were more specific and straight
forward. In the MMP model the rental will always be a bone of contention between the customer
and the bank due to conflict of interests.
9
Evidentially, an upward revision of the rental would
not always or easily be acceptable to the bank in a volatile property market as it would only be
notional. Notice that here the bank gets the return on its investment via the rent accruals to the
client. Full financing is not possible. There are other difficulties too with the model.
In one of his recent articles on musharakah and mudarabah as modes of financing, Taqi
Usmani (2010) a leading jurist devotes a section to a broad discussion on MMP (pp.70-76). He
discusses the different shapes the contract has taken in various sort of transactions, housing
mentioned as the dominant one. Here, he recounts (p.73) the three main steps involved: (i)
creation of a joint ownership in property which all schools of fiqh expressly allows (ii) the
financier leases his share in the house to the client on rent. On this too there is no difference of
opinion among the classical jurists unless it is leased out to a third party, and finally (iii) the
client purchases different units of the undivided share of the financier; again there are no
differences among the jurists on the validity of ijarah if the lease is granted to the co-owner.
Even as individually each one of the three steps listed above is permissible, it can be a
moot point if they can be combined in a single arrangement. Usmani states his position as under.
1. The three transactions cannot be the linked conditions for an enforceable contract. The
Islamic legal system does not allow one transaction to be a precondition for the other.
2. The promise of the client to buy the share units of the financier is one-sided without any
quid-pro-quo.
3. A promise to do something creates in general only a moral obligation which cannot be
enforced through courts of law albeit there are juridical differences on the point. For example,

9
The data on area wise rental published by town halls is too general and time intervals are usually substantial. It is
not at all suitable for application in individual cases. Market rates seldom match them. Each house in a locality or
building is a separate case for negotiations. Things like level, location, open sides and parking cause rental
differences even in the same building complex.
8
the Hanafi position is that promises can be enforced in cases of need on the principle of bai-
bilwafa.
Presumably, these are valid reservations. This brings us to our model.
3. Diminishing balance model A proposal
The inspiration rather urge to develop this model came from two sources: First the proliferating
econometric studies on Islamic finance have often claimed that Islamic banks are more efficient
on cost-profit criteria than their conventional cousins. Second, there is a judicial opinion on
record in Malaysia that Islamic banks fleece their clients at times more than the interest charging
institutions. The two views are contradictory and prompt investigation. Hence, the introduction
of a new approach which I think is tenable in the first instance on the principle of what we
cannot prove as un-Islamic is Islamic, though I shall indicate the juridical basis for the model.
Let us continue with our example to explain the new model. The bank proposes to the
client as follows. You have already paid RM 20000 to the seller as earnest money. The
remaining RM 80000 the bank shall pay for acquiring a constructive ownership in the house.
Table 3: Working of the Diminishing Balance Model

Installments
Return of
capital
Diminishing
balance
4%
Mark-up
on C
Installment
Payments
A B C D
E = B + D

0 0 80000

1 4000 76000 3200
7200
2 4000 72000 3040
7040
3 4000 68000 2880
6880
4 4000 64000 2720
6720
5 4000 60000 2560
6560
6 4000 56000 2400
6400
7 4000 52000 2240
6240
8 4000 48000 2080
6080
9 4000 44000 1920
5920
10 4000 40000 1760
5760
11 4000 36000 1600
5600
12 4000 32000 1440
5440
13 4000 28000 1280
5280
14 4000 24000 1120
5120
15 4000 20000 960
4960
16 4000 16000 800
4700
17 4000 12000 640
4640
18 4000 8000 480
4480
19 4000 4000 320
4320
20
4000 0 160
4160
Total 80000 33600
113600
9
For getting back the amount in six-monthly installments over a period of ten year, we shall put a
mark-up of 8% for our contribution to the cost of the house. However, the mark-up amount will
be reduced proportionate to the return of our money. That would reduce your liability to the bank
considerably. The registration of the house in the court will be in your name but you will be
signing simultaneously a mortgage deed pledging the house with the bank as security until
installments as per Table 3 have all been cleared in full. The Table provides the calculation for
your six-monthly installments. The model is simple. In case the payments were spread over a
long period of say 25-30 years, it may tend to align with the life cycle hypothesis of personal
incomes.
The following linear function is derived to facilitate the calculation of installments for the Table
and highlight the features of the Diminishing balance model for house financing.

I
n
= A [1 (n-1)] M
Where,
I
n
= nth Installment amount
A = Financiers investment
= the ratio of investment component in installments to A
n = the time points relevant to the study
M = Mark-up ratio used
In our illustration we have used for calculating I, A = 80,000; = 0.05; n = 0, 1, 2, 3 ......20 and
M = .04 for the six-monthly payments. If we want to know, for example the 7
th
installment we
may find it out using n = 6 as under:
I
n =7
= 800,000 (1 6 x 0.05) 0.04 = RM 2240, the same as in Table 3.
Even as the model does not seem to attract any adverse comment from the juristic point
of view, one may presumably ask for spelling out positive support from the Shariah to be on
firmer grounds. The model uses the concept of what is known as constructive ownership in the
legal parlance and combines on that basis the features of murabahah and rahn provisions in the
Islamic law.
10


10
Constructive ownership refers to implied or virtual ownership of something tangible for the benefit of another
person. For example in many countries a broker may have an effective ownership of company shares owned by an
ordinary investor because the broker alone can buy and sell shares on the stock market the investor directly cannot.
Likewise civil laws allow spouses to be in constructive ownership of each others property or of their children.
10
In the three models explained above we have used the same explanatory example so that
we could compare at some stage their features on certain criteria. Table 4 now helps us make
Table 4: Comparison of competitive house financing models
Name of Model % of finance
provided
Nature of
installments
Residuals
RM
Profit of the
financier
Conventional 100% Uniform 94.1 4.71%
Diminishing partnership 80% Uniform 89.4 4.71%
Diminishing balances 80% Diminishing 00.0 4.20%

such comparison: we kept the rate of return on the money the financier offered to provide the
client for purchasing the house at 8% in each case. The final result on the basis of effective profit
rate the client has to pay is in favor of the Diminishing balance Model.
11
The Conventional
interest based model and the MMP interestingly give identical results. Why should then the latter
attract public attention?
A comparison of what happens in each case if the contract is breached after, say, the tenth
installment has been paid may be no less interesting. This we can check from Tables 1, 2, and 3
from row number 11 of each. In the case of interest-based conventional finance, the liability of
the client will be the unpaid loan amount of RM 54, 753 plus interest until the amount is cleared.
In the MMP model, the client has to pay RM 43624 plus the rental share of the bank at the rate of
RM 1911.8 every six months as long as the default continues. He has to pay the remaining RM
36000 only in the Diminishing Balance Model, the mark-up no longer having any relevance.
Here too the Diminishing balance Model scores over the other models from the viewpoint of the
customer. Being cheaper, it will have a competitive edge over the conventional interest finance
and will bring in more business diverting customers, especially the non-Muslims, to its fold.
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the seeking of finance from an IB operating
on DBM is more advantageous for the client both from the viewpoint of cost and in the case of
default or premature clearance of liability compared to both CB and the MMP. The latter is

Islamic jurisprudence too allows such ownerships. Orphans, the persons weak of understanding and children are
specifically mentioned. The principle is much in use in the management of awqaf.
11
The effective rates have been calculated as under: 1 The conventional bank gets RM 47142.8 as interest for 10
years on an advance of RM 100000/-. Thus, 47142.8 / 10 = 4714.28 is the yearly interest. Divided by 1oo,ooo it
gives 4.71% as the effective rate. In the MMP model the bank gets from installments RM 5880 x 20 = 117600 plus
RM 89.4 the residual i.e. RM 117689.4 This amount minus RM 80000 = 37689.4 is the net revenue of the bank for
10 years i.e. RM 37689 a year. This divided by 80,000 equals 4.71% return a year. Finally, the mark-up totals as RM
33600 over 10 years. Thus, the rate for the year will be 3360 / 80000 = 4.2% a year.
11
complicated for the client to understand and also raises juristic issues as explained earlier. Under
the circumstance, the Diminishing Balances Model based on a murabahah-rahn mix looks
preferable.
12
It is simple to understand, involves no buy backs or seeks to tie transaction. The
case we presented here is just illustrative of the principle and its modus operandi. Refinements
are possible and welcome. The non-delivery of Islamic finance in housing, as elsewhere, takes us
back to the bigger picture.

4. Concluding remarks
Frankly speaking, Islamic finance is at present not playing any mentionable role in house
financing albeit one comes across much noise in the literature. Even a cursory glance through the
GIFF 2010 compilation of country-wise information on Islamic finance in its report would tell
one of the validity of this observation. Malaysia and Bahrain are currently the two leading hubs
of Islamic finance. However, in the direction of finance Chart for Malaysia (p. 165) shows that
the share of construction in total finance is just 5.7%. Even of this paltry sum, not even half is
spent on real estate. The situation in Bahrain apparently looks better. Of the total funds the share
of construction is 29% of which 5.7% goes to real estate. But expenditure on real estate in either
case is certainly not all on common housing. Figure 1 shows the comparative distribution of
resources over some broad heads in the two counties. The data has been consolidated in the case
of Malaysia to match categories.
The situation is no different in Indonesia, Pakistan Bangladesh or Egypt most populous of
countries in the Muslim world. Everywhere the effort is found casual, patchy, uneven and
inadequate. Thus, any reference to Islamic banks for this sorry state of affairs would only be
misplaced; it is the failure of public policy to address the problem and channel finance including
from the banks into the area. And, to this wider issue we now briefly turn.
The difficulty with Muslims is that they have not yet been able to free themselves fully of
the Western thought process, value system and culture ethos they perforce acquired during the
long colonial occupation of their lands. After independence too, they could not loosen much of

12
However, the claims of superior profitability for Islamic banks vis--vis their conventional counterparts based on
sophisticated econometric models have to be taken with a grain of salt. Our comparative analysis seems to contradict
that claim.
12
Islamic Banks: Malaysia
12.1
5.7
11
8.8
60.2
2.2
that strangulation. They do talk of Islamic and want to act but could not move far on the straight
path for reasons not always of their own making. Islamic economics and finance took off well
















USD 25.4 billion
Public sector
Construction & real estate
Industries
Commercial & non-financial
Personal loans
Others


Figure 1: Comparison of resource use on various activities in Bahrain and Malaysia
Source: GIFF Malaysia 2010, IMF country Report: No. 06 / 91 and IFSL: Research: Islamic Finance 2010

but now perforce charter the un-chosen course. Islamic institutions cannot find roots and deliver
in a set-up dominated with alien ways and interests. For example, Islamic finance is not showing
concern for housing because the Islamic insistence on the fulfillment of basic needs does not
Islamic Banks
1%
29%
10%
28%
31%
1%
Islamic Banks: Bahrain

Bahrain
USD 79.7 billion


13
form the core of planning in Muslim countries. The rivers of finance flow down to fertile lands;
they do not climb up into the barren ivory towers. Some suggestions for improving the
contribution of Islamic finance in the housing sector I offered in the introduction; a few more
may be added here.
1. Assign a high priority to poverty reduction in national plans, a good part of the allocation
going to the promotion of low cost housing (Amott, 2008).
2. Establish a National Housing Foundation with regional offices; provide seed money and
encourage people to register and make deposits to own a home in the future. Let media play
a role in creating consciousness. People should know that something is really being done
for providing a roof over their heads.
3. Issue housing sukuk to mobilize funds, open even to international subscriptions.
4. Persuade and if need be instruct banks to support the National program. They may find it
beneficial to combine in bigger units to meet the challenges (Nannana, 2010).
5. Prof. A. K. Sen had made sometime back a worth while suggestion that give property rights
to slum dwellers and squatters over the structures where they have been living in for long.
That would provide them confidence, political clout and means to raise funds through say
mortgaging.
6. Muslim countries can establish an apex body for integrating various country programs and
support research in designing and construction of cheap yet comfortable homes.
Finally, while it is good to promote house financing via Islamic banks, the effort at the
national and regional levels will create the environment in which banks could perform and
deliver.
Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to his students Mughees Shaukat and Nurhafiza Abdul Kader Malim for
the assistance they rendered in the preparation of this paper


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