CH 15
CH 15
CH 15
Reserve Demand
Federal Funds Rate
iff,2
iff,1
RD
R2
R1
Reserves
The cost of borrowing from the Fed is the discount rate (id). As long as the federal funds rate (iff) is less than the discount rate, BR = 0
Its cheaper to borrow reserves from other banks than from the Fed.
We assume that the Fed is willing to lend as much as banks are willing to borrow at the discount window.
Reserve Supply
RS
id iff,2 iff,1
NBR
Reserves
RS2
id iff,2 iff,1
RS2
RS1 RD
NBR2 NBR1
Reserves
Easily reversed
Mistakes can be quickly corrected in a way that would not have been possible with reserve requirements or discount lending.
Quickly implemented
There is no administrative delay to conducting open market operations. Orders go to the trading desk in New York and they are executed immediately.
RS1
RS2
RD NBR1 Reserves
RS1
RS2
RD NBR1 R2 Reserves
While this role has helped avert some bank panics (since FDIC could not by itself cover all losses from a bank panic), it may have created moral hazard costs
Banks know they will be bailed out by the Fed if they fail Encourages them to take on high-return/high-risk loans If the loan comes in, they keep all the profits If the loan fails, the Fed subsidizes the losses.
An increase in reserve demand pushes up the federal funds rate and lowers the money supply (lower multiplier) In practice, the reserve requirement is not the most effective policy tool
Many banks hold excess reserves due to classification rules An increase or decrease in the reserve requirement may not alter their behavior. Changing the reserve requirement will only affect the federal funds rate and money supply if the requirement is binding. For banks in which the requirement is binding, raising it can cause severe liquidity problems. In fact, many countries have abandoned reserve requirements as a policy tool (Australia, Canada, New Zealand)
Id,1 iff,2
RS1
iff,1