The Political Economy of International Trade
The Political Economy of International Trade
The Political Economy of International Trade
Trade
Chapter 6
? these factors?
Instruments of Trade Policy
Tariffs
Subsidies
Quotas and VER’s
Local content requirements
Anti-dumping actions
Administrative policies/procedures
5-4
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Hypothetical Tariff Rate Quota
CS Local production
=
pe Local consumption
PS
Local demand
qe
Importing at World Price
World price becomes both a demand
and supply curve.......why?
pe
pw SW
DL
pe
pw SW
Imports
DL
qe q
Local Local
production consumption
An Importing Country
pe
pw
SW
DL
qe q
Impact of a Tariff
Imports after
S
pe Tariff
Tariff p
pw SW
Imports before
DL
qe q
Impact of a Tariff – Welfare Loss
Total consumer surplus
(benefit) lost through tariff
pe
pw
SW
DL
Tariff revenue to
government
pe
pw
SW
DL
Redistribution
• Consumer to producer
• Consumer to government
7
6
5
4
3
Percent
2
1
0 Sweden
Ireland
Japan
US
IDC
W. Ger.
UK
5-6
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Subsidies to EC Manufacturers
(Percent of Value Added)
% 16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Belgium
Holland
Spain
Ireland
GB
Germany
Luxembourg
Italy
France
Greece
Portugal
5-7
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Instruments of Trade Policy
Import Quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints
Both quantity instruments
Import Quota:
Restriction on the quantity of some good imported
into a country.
5-8
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Results of Japanese VERs
Benefits producers by limiting import
competition
5-9
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
So who were the ‘winners’
from VERs?
20
Consumer Losses
15 Producer Gains
10
Automobiles Dairy
5
Meat Sugar
0
5-13
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
So why accept the costs?
Peanuts: (US, 1982 – 87) shifted
?
National Security
World Semiconductor Production
60
50
40
Japan
30
USA
20
10
0
1974 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
5-15
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Retaliation
US Trade Sanctions
Partial List
Afghanistan Italy
25
Burma Libya
20
Canada Nigeria
15
China N. Korea
New
10 Sanctions Cuba Pakistan
5 India Saudi Arabia
0
Iran Sudan
98
1993
95
97
Iraq Syria
Yugoslavia
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009 5-16
Retaliation - Helms-Burton Act
5-17
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Economic Arguments for
Intervention
Infant industry.
Oldest argument - Alexander Hamilton, 1792.
Protected under the WTO.
Only good if it makes the industry efficient.
• Brazil auto-makers - 10th largest - wilted when
protection eliminated.
Requires government financial assistance.
• Could argue that if a good investment, global
capital markets would invest.
5-18
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Economic Arguments for Intervention
Strategic trade policy.
Government helps raise national income if first-
mover advantage successful.
Government intervention may help domestic
firms overcome first-mover advantage of
foreign firms.
The role of Porter’s ‘diamond’ in
forming views?
© McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 2007 2008 2009
Revised Case for Free Trade
Paul Krugman, MIT economist, argues that strategic
trade policies can lead to trade wars. The best way to
handle disputes is to work to establish rules that minimize
trade-distorting subsidies - a function of the World
Trade Organization.