E-Mail Security: CS 470 Introduction To Applied Cryptography Instructor: Ali Aydin Selcuk

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E-mail Security

CS 470
Introduction to Applied Cryptography
Instructor: Ali Aydin Selcuk

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Security Services for E-mail

privacy
authentication
integrity
non-repudiation
anonymity
proof of submission
proof of delivery
message flow confidentiality, etc.
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Key Management
A per-message symmetric key is used for
message encryption,
which is conveyed in the mail, encrypted under a
long-term key (typically a public key)
Long-term keys can be established,
offline
online, with help from a trusted third party
online, through a webpage (for public keys)

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Multiple Recipients
Message key will be encrypted under each recipients
long term key in the message header.
Bobs ID, KBob{S}
Carols ID, KCarol{S}
Teds ID, KTed{S}
S{m}
E.g.:
To: Bob, Carol, Ted
From: Alice
Key-info: Bob-4276724736874376
Key-info: Carol-78657438676783457
Key-info: Ted-12873486743009
Msg-info: UHGuiy77t65fhj87oi.....
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Text Format Issues


Mail gateways/forwarders may modify the format
of the message (wrapping long lines, end-of-line
character, high order bits, etc.), causing the
integrity check to fail
Encode messages in a format supported by all
mailers. 6-bit representation, no long lines, etc.
(similar to uuencode)

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Text Format Issues (contd)


Problem: Non-supportive clients should be able
to read authenticated (but not encrypted)
messages, which they no longer can.
Two options:
MAC without encoding
(subject to corruption by mail routers)
Encode & MAC/encrypt
(may not be readable at the other end)
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

Providing Different Services

confidentiality: by encryption
auth./integrity: by signature or MAC
non-repudiation: by signature
some eccentric services,
anonymity
message flow confidentiality
non-repudiation with secret keys

can be provided by TTP support.

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

PEM & S/MIME


Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
Developed by IETF, to add encryption, source
authentication & integrity protection to e-mail
Allows both public & secret long-term keys
Message key is always symmetric
Specifies a detailed certification hierarchy

Secure/MIME (S/MIME)
PEM never took off; CA hierarchy difficult to realize
S/MIME: PEM design incorporated into MIME

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

PEM Key Exchange & Encryption


Interchange keys: Users long-term PEM keys
public (a detailed PKI is defined)
secret (pre-shared symmetric keys)

Encryption
A symmetric per-message key is sent encrypted under
the interchange key.
The message is encrypted under the per-message key
(typically with DES in CBC mode)

Authentication
Message is authenticated by a MIC
(Q: Any authentication for the per-message key?)
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

PEM Certificate Hierarchy


The root CA: Internet Policy Registration Authority
(IPRA)
Policy Certification Authorities: Second-level, CAcertifying CAs, each with a different policy:
High Assurance (HA): super-secure
implemented on secure platforms
regulates that the child CAs (also HACAs) enforce the same rules

Discretionary Assurance (DA): secure


requires that the child CAs own their names

No Assurance (NA): no constraints


can be used to certify Internet personas (pseudonyms)

Lower-level CAs, certifying individuals or other CAs


CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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S/MIME vs. PEM


Incorporated into MIME; no other encoding
Any sequence of sign & encrypt is supported
(each as a recursive MIME encapsulation)
Has more options than PEM
ASN.1 header encoding
No prescribed certification hierarchy
Has a good prospect of deployment for
commercial & organizational usage

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)


Popular mail & file encryption tool
Developed by Phil Zimmermann, 1991
Based on RSA, IDEA, MD5 (later DSS, ElGamal
(DH), 3DES, SHA1)
Many different versions have emerged (from
PGP, from GNU (GPG), from IETF (Open PGP))
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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PGP Operation
All long-term user keys are public
Signature:
Message & timestamp are hashed (MD5 or SHA1) and
signed (RSA or DSS)

Compression (ZIP)
Encryption:
Message is encrypted with a per-message symmetric
key (typically with IDEA in CFB mode)
which is encrypted with the recipients public key
(RSA or DH (ElGamal))

Radix-64 (6-bit) encoding


CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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Trust Model & Key Management


Any user can certify any other (anarchy model)
Each user decides whom to trust and how much
Key Ring: Data structure to store public keys
held by a user, with their levels of trust
Public keys can be obtained,

offline (in person, over the phone, etc.)


through personal webpages
through a trusted friend (web of trust)
through a trusted CA

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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DKIM Domain Keys Identified Mail


An effort to stop spam with forged domain
addresses (e.g. phishing attacks).
Standardized by RFC 4871; supported by Yahoo,
Gmail, FastMail etc.
Each domain has an email signature key.
Public keys will be retrieved over DNS.
If signature verification fails, mail will be dropped.
CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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DKIM
Once deployed, it will significantly limit phishing
attacks with forged domain addresses.
Deployment is increasing rapidly.
Example: Gmails collaboration with PayPal &
eBay

CS470, A.Selcuk

E-mail Security

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