Rule 130

Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. The

rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
RES INTER ALIOS RULE

res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet-

this principle literally means things done
between strangers ought not to injure those
who are not parties to it

Kinds of res inter alios acta:

1. Admission by third party (Sec 28, Rule 130);
2. Similar Acts as Evidence (Sec. 34, Rule 130)
-this prohibits the admission of the so-
called propensity evidence
Exceptions to the res inter alios
acta rule (first kind/branch)
1. Admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29, Rule 30)
The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his
authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given
in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Illustration:
Twin brothers put up their partnership to engage in buying and selling of real
properties. One of the brothers executed a Special Power of Attorney duly
notarized authorizing his twin brother to sell a certain real property owned by the
Partnership. In this situation, a partner who executed special power of attorney
can be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of his twin brother.

2. Admission by a conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule 130)

The rule is that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Illustration:
A killed B. A conspired with X to kill B. X knows
Bs identity/ profile but not A. In this case, although A
was the only one who killed B and he admitted that X
supplied him only with the identity/profile of X, the latter
will also be liable as a conspirator. Hence the admission of A
that X gave him the information will be admissible in
evidence and X can be prejudiced by an act or declaration
of A.

3. Admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130)

-Where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former.
Illustration:
Doctor P purchased a certain house and lot in Filinvest I,
Quezon City. He bought the said property from Spouses
Bautista. The said lot however, is subjected to an
encumbrance by virtue of a law enacted because Quezon City
Hall was gutted by by fire destroying the records of the
Register of Deeds. In this situation, Dr. P derives title to the
property from another-Spouses Bautista. The act, declaration,
or omission of the latter-Spouses Bautista, while they were
holding the title in relation to the property can be an
evidence against the former- Dr. P.

Because Spouses Bautista did nothing to cancel/erase the

encumbrance in their title, and despite that encumbrance, Dr.
P still bought the house and lot, then that encumbrance
appearing at the back of the title can still be used as
evidence against Dr. P.
HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYDANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR.,
G.R. No. 177727

Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter,
Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at on August 15, 2003.
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime
until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an
affidavit stating that a certain Lucio Columna told him that
Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who
killed Atty. Tamargo.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the
strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor
issued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna
and three John Does and an Informations for murder were
filed against them.
 Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit
wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the
shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias
Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged
as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son,
respondent Lloyd Antiporda. he former was the ex-mayor and the
took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping
case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented

Columna unsolicited handwritten which disowned the contents of
his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured
until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those
he implicated had no participation in in the killings.
The investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor. Meanwhile, in
another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced
to withdraw all his statements against because of the threats to his
life inside the jail.
 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner
filed an appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
which reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of
the Informations for murder
The RTC, ruled that, based on Columnas affidavitthat
there was probable cause to hold the accused for
trial.
Respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition in the CA
In a decision, the CA ruled that Columnas
extrajudicial confession was not admissible against
the respondents because, aside from the recanted
confession, there was no other piece of evidence
presented to establish the existence of the
conspiracy.
 Issue:
Whether or not Columnas extrajudicial
confessions was admissible against the
respondents.
Held:
No. The SC court held that Columnas
extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004
affidavit was not admissible as evidence
against respondents in view of the rule on
res inter alios acta.
 Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered
as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a

mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are

evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man
should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be
used as evidence against him.
Gerry A. Salapudin vs CA, Gov. Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama J. Indanan
GR NO. 184681

Facts
On Nov. 13, 2007, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the

House of Representatives which led to the death of

Congressman Wahab Akbar, Marcial Taldo, Jul-Asiri Hayudini,
Maan Gale Bustalino and Dennis Manila and the inflicting
serious injuries to Rep. Henry Teves and five others. Ona a
follow-up operations Aunal, Ikram and Kusain were arrested. A
day after the arrest, Kuasain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
stating that whenhe firs arrived in Manila he stayed in the house
of Salapudin, his fathers friend. Salapudin also paid for his one
year college education and helped him be employed. He also
explained that Redwan bought his motorcycle which was used on
the bombing incident. Ikram also executed his several affidavits
but notably on his first three affidavits he never mentioned
Salapudins involvement in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar.
 But on his fourth affidavit he claimed that he was
beside Redwan when Salapudin ordered to kill Cong.
Akbar. The DOJ Investigating Panel recommended the
amendment to include respondent Salapudin for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder.
Salapudin filed a petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice which issued a Resolution excluding
Salapudin from the Information on the following
premises: the only material evidence against
Salapudin is the statements of Ikram. However,
Ikrams statements are laden with irreconcilable
inconcistencies and contradictions that they cannot be
considered worthy of belief. The Secretary also added,
there is nothing on record that will indicate that
Salapudin performed overt acts of the offense charges.
A Petition for Certiorari before the CA was filed by
Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan. CA set aside
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice as held;
the totality of the evidence sufficiently indicated
the probability that Salapudin lent moral and
material support or assistance to the perpetrators
in the commission of the crime. Salapudin moved
for, but was denied, reconsideration hence he filed
a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
 Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of Ikram are admissible
implicating Salapudin even if it was ridded serious contradictions and
inconsistencies.
Held:
The court ruled that the only material evidence against Salapudin is
the confession made by Ikram but this cannot be considered against
Salapudin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta allteri nocere
non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
an axtrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot
be admitted against his or her co accused and is considered as hearsay
against them citing the case of Tamargo vs Awingan:
[o]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.-
The act or declaration of a partner or agent of
the party within the scope of his authority and
during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act
or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or
other person jointly interested with the party.
 Agency

An agent performs some service in representation or on

behalf of his principal (Art. 1868, Civil Code of the
Philippines). The agent therefore, is in legal
contemplation, a mere extension of the personality of the
principal and unless the agent acts in his own name, the
principal must comply with all the obligations which the
agent may have contracted within the scope of his
authority (Art. 1883; Art. 1910, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Hence, whatever is said by an agent to a
third person, during the course of the agency and within
the scope of his actual or apparent authority, relative to
the business contemplated by the agency, is for legal
purposes also the statement of the principal and is
therefore, admissible against said principal
 Partnership

The relationship among partners is on the same

footing with the relationship of an agent to his
principal. Both the contracts of agency and
partnership involve fiduciary relationships. Under the
law (Art. 1818, Civil Code of the Philippines), every
partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business and the act of the partner in
carrying out the usual course of business binds the
partnership as a rule. Hence, under the same
principle governing an agency, the declarations of a
partner may be admissible against the other
partners or the partnership.

Common Interest
It is recognized that the statements of one
person may be rendered admissible against
another by virtue of the existence between
them of a common interest, and this
common interest exist as a rule, between
persons who act jointly or have joint rights
or interests, but not necessarily merely
because there is co-ownership of property,
such as exists ordinarily between co-heirs
and co- legatees or co-devisees.
Exception:
Does not include the relation of co-heirs and

co- legatees or co-devisees because while

they succeed to one deceased, their
hereditary rights are distinct and separate.
 Requisites for admissibility
Not every declaration or act made or done by a partner or agent
is admissible against the other partners or the principal. For the
admission of a co-partners or agent to be admissible, the
following requisites must concur:

(a) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have
been made or done within the scope of his authority;

(b) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have
been made or done during the existence of the partnership or
agency, and the person making the declaration is still a partner
or an agent; and

(c) The existence of the partnership or agency is proven by

evidence other than the declaration or act of the partner and
agent.
G.R. No. 118375 October 3, 2003
CELESTINA T. NAGUIAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA QUEAO, respondents.

Facts
Queao applied with Naguiat for a loan which Naguiat

granted. Naguiat indorsed to Queao Associated Bank

Check No. 090990 (dated 11 August 1980) for the amount of
Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P95,000.00), and her own
Filmanbank Check No. 065314, to the order of Queao, also
dated 11 August 1980 and for the amount of Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (P95,000.00). The proceeds of these checks
were to constitute the loan granted by Naguiat to Queao.
Queao received a letter from Naguiats lawyer, demanding

settlement of the loan. Shortly thereafter, Queao and one

Ruby Ruebenfeldt (Ruebenfeldt) met with Naguiat. At the
meeting, Queao told Naguiat that she did not receive the
proceeds of the loan, adding that the checks were retained
by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiats agent.
Issue:
Whether or not admission by an agent is admissible as evidence.
Held
YES. The existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat
and Ruebenfeldt is supported by ample evidence. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Ruebenfeldt was not a
stranger or an unauthorized person. Naguiat instructed
Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queao the checks she issued or
indorsed to Queao, pending delivery by the latter of additional
collateral. Ruebenfeldt served as agent of Naguiat on the loan
application of Queaos friend, Marilou Farralese, and it was in
connection with that transaction that Queao came to know
Naguiat. It was also Ruebenfeldt who accompanied Queao in
her meeting with Naguiat and on that occasion, on her own and
without Queao asking for it, Reubenfeldt actually drew a check
for the sum of P220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover for
Queaos alleged liability to Naguiat under the loan agreement.
 The interaction between Naguiat and
Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the impression that
Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but
Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaos
impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One
who clothes another with apparent authority as
his agent, and holds him out to the public as
such, cannot be permitted to deny the authority
of such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with
such person in good faith, and in the honest
belief that he is what he appears to be.