Computer networks

Name: K.SUDHA
Designation: Lecturer
Department: Electrical and Electronics Engineering

Subject code: CS2361

Year: III
Unit: IV
Title: Data Compression
 Data Compression
• Represents an information source (e.g. a data file, a
speech signal, an image, or a video signal)
• as accurately as possible using the fewest number of bits.
• process of encoding information using fewer bits(or
other information-bearing units) than an unencoded
• it helps reduce the consumption of expensive resources,
such as hard disk space or transmission bandwidth
 Data Compression
• allows the exact original data to be reconstructed from the
compressed data.
• The term lossless is in contrast to lossy data compression, which
only allows an approximation of the original data to be
reconstructed
• is required for text and data files, such as bank records, text articles,
etc.

• Example: executable programs and source code

 Lossy compression

• The compressed and decompressing data may well be different

from the original
• used to compress multimedia data (audio, video, stil images),
especially in applications such as streaming media and internet
telephony. By contrast, lossless compression is required for text and
data files, such as bank records, text articles, etc.
• repeatedly compressing and decompressing the file will cause it to
progressively lose quality
 Two basic lossy compression schemes:

• lossy transform codecs

– samples of picture or sound are taken, chopped into small segments,
transformed into a new basis space, and quantized.
– The resulting quantized values are then entropy coded.
• lossy predictive codecs
– previous and/or subsequent decoded data is used to predict the
current sound sample or image frame.
– The error between the predicted data and the real data, together with
any extra information needed to reproduce the prediction
– is then quantized and coded.
 Cryptography
• Is the science of writing in secret code to provide security
• The word is derived from the Greek kryptos, meaning hidden.
• Cryptography is closely related to the disciplines of cryptology and
cryptanalysis.
• Includes techniques such as microdots, merging words with
images, and other ways to hide information in storage or transit.
 Cryptography
• is associated with scrambling plaintext (ordinary text, sometimes
referred to as cleartext) into ciphertext (a process called
encryption), then back again (known as decryption).
• Individuals who practice this field are known as cryptographers.

• Objective:
– Confidentiality
– Integrity
– Non-repudiation Authentication
Cryptography
Cryptography
 RSA Algorithm
• Generate two large random primes
• p and q, of approximately equal size such that their product n = pq is of the
required bit length
• e.g. 1024 bits.
• Compute n = pq and (φ) phi = (p-1)(q-1).
• Choose an integer e, 1 < e < phi, such that gcd(e, phi) = 1.
• Compute the secret exponent d, 1 < d < phi, such that ed ≡ 1 (mod phi)
• The public key is (n, e) and the private key is (n, d).
• n is known as the modulus.
• e is known as the public exponent
• d is known as the secret exponent
 Summary of RSA

• n = pq, where p and q are distinct primes.

• phi, φ = (p-1)(q-1)
• e < n such that gcd(e, phi)=1
• d = e-1 mod phi.
• c = me mod n, 1<m<n.
• m = cd mod n.
 DES(Data Encryption Standard)

• DES is the archetypal block cipher

• operates on 64-bit blocks of data, using a 56-bit key.
• It is a 'private key' system.

– 1 Process the key.

– 2 Process a 64-bit data block.

 Process the key.

– Get a 64-bit key from the user

– Calculate the key schedule.
• Perform the following permutation on the 64-bit key.
• Split the permuted key into two halves.
• Calculate the 16 subkeys. Start with i = 1.
• Perform one or two circular left shifts on both
• Permute the concatenation C[i]D[i] as indicated below
• Loop back to 1.2.3.1 until K[16] has been calculated
 Process a 64-bit data block.
• Get a 64-bit data block. If the block is shorter than 64 bits
• Perform the following permutation on the data block
• Split the block into two halves
• Apply the 16 subkeys to the data block. Start with i = 1.
– Expand the 32-bit R[i-1] into 48 bits according to the bit-selection function
below.
– Exclusive-or E(R[i-1]) with K[i].
– Break E(R[i-1]) xor K[i] into eight 6-bit blocks.
– Substitute the values found in the S-boxes for all B[j ]
• Take the 1st and 6th bits of B[j] together as a 2-bit value
• Take the 2nd through 5th bits of B[j] together as a 4-bit value
• Replace B[j] with S[j][m][n]. Substitution Box 1 (S[1])
• Permute the concatenation of B[1] through B[8]
• Exclusive-or the resulting value with L[i-1].
• L[i] = R[i-1].
• Loop back to 2.4.1 until K[16] has been applied.
 Summaries
Key schedule:
C[0]D[0] = PC1(key)
for 1 <= i <= 16
C[i] = LS[i](C[i-1])
D[i] = LS[i](D[i-1])
K[i] = PC2(C[i]D[i])

Encipherment:
L[0]R[0] = IP(plain block)
for 1 <= i <= 16 L[i] = R[i-1]
R[i] = L[i-1]xor f(R[i-1], K[i])
cipher block = FP(R[16]L[16])
 Decipherment:
• R[16]L[16] = IP(cipher block)
• for 1 <= i <= 16
• R[i-1] = L[i]
• L[i-1] = R[i] xor f(L[i], K[i])
• plain block = FP(L[0]R[0])
 Generating keys
• Key generation requires a good source of random
bits
– Bad key material makes system vulnerable to attacks.
Has been done in practice.
– Hardware generators provide the best source.
– For end-user applications - some user interaction can
be used (mouse movement, key strokes, etc.)
– Using system time for high security requirements is a
bad idea!
• For high-security applications, key generation
should take place in a closed environment.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 19

 Distributing symmetric keys
• Symmetric keys are very sensitive and must be
distributed with great care.
• Depending on how valueable the key is,
different approaches are possible.
– Send the key to recipient by physically secure
means, e.g., by courier, by registered mail etc.
– If a common key exists, send the new key
encrypted under the common key.
– Split the key into components and send the key
components with different security officers.
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 Key splitting
• One option for distributing keys with lower
risk is to split the key into components and
send the parts separately.
• After generation, the key is split into n parts.
To recreate the key, all n parts must be
available.
• Knowledge of less than n parts should give as
little help as possible for recreating of keys.
• How do we do this?
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 Splitting into parts of equal length
• When splitting into parts of equal length, the
key of length l is split into n components, each
of length l / n.
• First part consists of bits 1 through (l / n) – 1,
second part of bits l / n though 2(l / n) – 1, etc.
• A disadvantage of this method is that
knowledge of several parts reveals parts of the
key, and leaves fewer bits for guessing.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 22

 Exclusive-or with random bit strings
• If we want to distribute an l-bit key k as n components,
we first generate (n – 1) l-bit strings u1, u2, …, un – 1.
• The n’th component is computed as un = k  u1  u2 
…  un – 1, where  denotes bitwise XOR.
• The basic properties of XOR gives that u1  u2  … 
un = k.
• This method gives higher security, since knowledge of
either n – 1 components reveals nothing about the key.
– Recall that with the previous method, this knowledge
revealed several key bits, making a brute-force attack on
the rest easier.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 23

 Distributing keys for asymmetric keys
• Distributing the public part of asymmetric keys
is simple – no special security measures are
needed.
• Distributing keys in certificates makes it easier
to prove the owner of the key.
• If the private part is to be distributed, the
same techniques as for symmetric keys can be
used.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 24

 Key Derivation
• Key derivation is a technique to User
assign individual keys without information
having to store a key per user.
• The key information is
concentrated into a single master
key.
• Every key is derived from this Encryption Master key
master key.
• The individual keys are computed
on-the-fly from the master key
and user information.

Individual
key

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 Session Keys
• For security reasons it is often Session
a good idea to use different information
keys for each transaction.
• Keys used only for one
transaction are called session
keys. Individual
Encryption
key

Session key

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 26

 Key Management – Setup
• If two systems need to share a
common symmetric key, there are Master Key
several possiblities.
– Can be created by system A and System A System B
transferred to system B. Master Key
– Can be created by system A and
transferred to system B.
– Can be created by a third party
and transferred both to system A
and system B.

Key
generation

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 27

 Zone Master Key – ZMK
• If the two systems have one common symmetric key, this key can be used
to encrypt other keys that are sent between the systems.
• This key is often called Zone Master Key, ZMK.
• Once this common key has been established, exchanging further keys is
simple.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 28

 Symmetric Key Management –
Zone Master Key

ZMK Component 1

ZMK Component 2

ZMK Component 3
Configuration
system Host system

Components
Generation of Zone Master Key
reassembled as the
Zone Master Key sent as components host to give the
to host by security officers same key

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 Transfer of Zone Master Key
• When transferring the Zone Master Key, no
single person will see the key.
• Key components are given out only one at the
time, so that no one person sees all
components.
• When combining the components, each
component is first encrypted. Only when all
components are encrypted do the security
officers meet and give all components.

Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 30

 Symmetric Key Management –
Key Export

Key ZMK ZMK Key

System A System B

System A and system Symmetric key encrypted

B shares ZMK under ZMK and sent
Symmetric key Symmetric key
generated decrypted at system B

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 Key length
• Apart from selecting a good algorithm, the key
length to be used must be chosen.
• When selecting the key length, you need to take
into account security requirements and hardware
costs.
– Longer keys are more secure, but encryption and
decryption takes longer time.
– How sensitive is the data? Do we need to protect it for
twenty seconds, twenty days or twenty years?
– Who do we want to protect ourselves against? The
causal eaves-dropper, a competing company or a
foreign government?
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 Symmetric key lengths
• If the symmetric cipher is good, the only way to
break the key is to do exhaustive search. For an n-
bit key, this requires 2n iterations.
• As of today, 64-bit keys take a few years to crack
for someone with enough resources. 128-bit keys
are virtually impossible to break, and are likely to
stay that way for the foreseeable future.
• Since encryption and decryption is fast, there is
usually no reason to use less than 128 bits.
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 Symmetric key lengths

• The graph below demonstrates how the

time necessary to break a key depends on
the key length.
Time to break

Key length

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 Asymmetric key lengths
• For asymmetric systems, there are much more
efficient ways than exhaustive search to retrieve
the key.
– For RSA, factoring the modulus gives the private key.
• The longest RSA key that is publicly known to
have been broken is 512 bits.
– Two years ago, this required 30 CPU-years.
• 1024 bit keys probably remain secure for the next
years.
• Be very careful with comparisons between
strength of symmetric and asymmetric keys!
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 Asymmetric keys
• Asymmetric keys often have a longer life-span
than symmetric keys.
– Symmetric keys are used for session encryption,
which often has to be kept secret only for a
limited period.
– Asymmetric keys are used for signatures that may
have to remain secure for several decades.
• Analyze the situation and choose the most
appropriate solution!
Apr 30, 2002 Mårten Trolin 36
 What is a Firewall?
• A choke point of control and monitoring
• Interconnects networks with differing trust
• Imposes restrictions on network services
– only authorized traffic is allowed
• Auditing and controlling access
– can implement alarms for abnormal behavior
• Itself immune to penetration
• Provides perimeter defence
 Classification of Firewall
Characterized by protocol level it controls in
• Packet filtering
• Circuit gateways
• Application gateways

• Combination of above is dynamic packet filter

Firewalls – Packet Filters
 Firewalls – Packet Filters
• Simplest of components
• Uses transport-layer information only
– IP Source Address, Destination Address
– Protocol/Next Header (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc)
– TCP or UDP source & destination ports
– TCP Flags (SYN, ACK, FIN, RST, PSH, etc)
– ICMP message type
• Examples
– DNS uses port 53
• No incoming port 53 packets except known trusted servers
 Usage of Packet Filters
• Filtering with incoming or outgoing
interfaces
– E.g., Ingress filtering of spoofed IP addresses
– Egress filtering
• Permits or denies certain services
– Requires intimate knowledge of TCP and UDP port
utilization on a number of operating systems
 How to Configure a Packet Filter
• Start with a security policy
• Specify allowable packets in terms of logical
expressions on packet fields
• Rewrite expressions in syntax supported by
your vendor
• General rules - least privilege
– All that is not expressly permitted is prohibited
– If you do not need it, eliminate it
Every ruleset is followed by an implicit rule
reading like this.

Example 1:
Suppose we want to allow inbound mail
(SMTP, port 25) but only to our gateway
machine. Also suppose that mail from some
particular site SPIGOT is to be blocked.
 Solution 1:

Example 2:
Now suppose that we want to implement the
policy “any inside host can send mail to the
outside”.
 Solution 2:

This solution allows calls to come from any

port on an inside machine, and will direct
them to port 25 on the outside. Simple
enough…

So why is it wrong?
• Our defined restriction is based solely on the
outside host’s port number, which we have no
way of controlling.
• Now an enemy can access any internal
machines and port by originating his call from
port 25 on the outside machine.

What can be a better solution ?

 The ACK signifies that the packet is part of an
ongoing conversation
 Packets without the ACK are connection
establishment messages, which we are only
permitting from internal hosts
 Security & Performance of Packet Filters
• IP address spoofing
– Fake source address to be trusted
– Add filters on router to block
• Tiny fragment attacks
– Split TCP header info over several tiny packets
– Either discard or reassemble before check
• Degradation depends on number of rules applied at
any point
• Order rules so that most common traffic is dealt
with first
• Correctness is more important than speed
 Port Numbering
• TCP connection
– Server port is number less than 1024
– Client port is number between 1024 and 16383
• Permanent assignment
– Ports <1024 assigned permanently
• 20,21 for FTP 23 for Telnet
• 25 for server SMTP 80 for HTTP
• Variable use
– Ports >1024 must be available for client to make any
connection
– This presents a limitation for stateless packet filtering
• If client wants to use port 2048, firewall must allow incoming
traffic on this port
– Better: stateful filtering knows outgoing requests
 Firewalls – Stateful Packet Filters
• Traditional packet filters do not examine
higher layer context
– ie matching return packets with outgoing flow
• Stateful packet filters address this need
• They examine each IP packet in context
– Keep track of client-server sessions
– Check each packet validly belongs to one
• Hence are better able to detect bogus packets
out of context
Stateful Filtering
 Firewall Outlines
• Packet filtering
• Application gateways
• Circuit gateways

• Combination of above is dynamic packet filter

 Firewall Gateways
• Firewall runs set of proxy programs
– Proxies filter incoming, outgoing packets
– All incoming traffic directed to firewall
– All outgoing traffic appears to come from firewall
• Policy embedded in proxy programs
• Two kinds of proxies
– Application-level gateways/proxies
• Tailored to http, ftp, smtp, etc.
– Circuit-level gateways/proxies
• Working on TCP level
Firewalls - Application Level Gateway (or
Proxy)
 Application-Level Filtering
• Has full access to protocol
– user requests service from proxy
– proxy validates request as legal
– then actions request and returns result to user
• Need separate proxies for each service
– E.g., SMTP (E-Mail)
– NNTP (Net news)
– DNS (Domain Name System)
– NTP (Network Time Protocol)
– custom services generally not supported
 App-level Firewall Architecture

FTP
Telnet proxy SMTP
proxy proxy

Telnet FTP SMTP

daemon daemon daemon
Network Connection

Daemon spawns proxy when communication detected …

Enforce policy for specific protocols
• E.g., Virus scanning for SMTP
– Need to understand MIME, encoding, Zip archives
 Firewall Outlines
• Packet filtering
• Application gateways
• Circuit gateways

• Combination of above is dynamic packet filter

Firewalls - Circuit Level Gateway
Figure 9.7: A typical SOCKS connection through interface A,
and rogue connection through the external interface, B.
 Bastion Host
• Highly secure host system
• Potentially exposed to "hostile" elements
• Hence is secured to withstand this
– Disable all non-required services; keep it simple
• Trusted to enforce trusted separation between
network connections
• Runs circuit / application level gateways
– Install/modify services you want
• Or provides externally accessible services
Screened Host Architecture
Screened Subnet Using Two Routers
 Firewalls Aren’t Perfect?
• Useless against attacks from the inside
– Evildoer exists on inside
– Malicious code is executed on an internal machine
• Organizations with greater insider threat
– Banks and Military
• Protection must exist at each layer
– Assess risks of threats at every layer
• Cannot protect against transfer of all virus
infected programs or files
– because of huge range of O/S & file types
 Quiz
• In this question, we explore some applications and
limitations of a stateless packet filtering firewall.
For each of the question, briefly explain how the
firewall should be configured to defend against
the attack, or why the firewall cannot defend
against the attack.
– Can the firewall prevent a SYN flood denial-of-service
attack from the external network?
– Can the firewall prevent a Smurf attack from the
external network? Recall that as we discussed in the
class before, the Smurf attack uses the broadcast IP
address of the subnet.
– Can the firewall prevent external users from exploiting a
security bug in a CGI script on an internal web server
(the web server is serving requests from the Internet)?
– Can the firewall prevent an online password dictionary
attack from the external network on the telnet port of
an internal machine?
– Can the firewall prevent a user on the external network
from opening a window on an X server in the internal
network? Recall that by default an X server listens for
connections on port 6000
– Can the firewall block a virus embedded in an incoming
email?
– Can the firewall be used to block users on the internal
network from browsing a specific external IP address?
Thank u