PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY

OF MATHEMATICS
• The Philosophy of
Arithmetic
• Aristotle’s Analysis of
Plato’s Philosophy of
Arithmetic
• Number in Dialogues
Presented by:
PEDE I. CASING, PhD MS – Math Ed Student
1
 What is Philosophy of Mathematics?

According to Plato, knowledge is a subset of that which is

both true and believed
 LEARNING
GOALS

PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY OF
ARITHMETIC

3
 Let’s begin…

!
What is Arithmetic?
Arithmetic is derived from the Greek word “arithmos”
which means “number”.
It is a branch of mathematics in which numbers,
relations among numbers and observations on numbers are
studied and used to solve problems.
 Propositions I -VII
 I. Two kinds of arithmetic
 II. Two kinds of Ideal Arithmetical entities
 III. The Mathematical Numbers are “Intermediates”
 IV. Plato’s reasons for believing in the intermediate
Mathematical Numbers
 V. Philosophical Arithmetic
 VI. Philosophical Arithmetic is a deductive science
 VII Dialectic
I. Two kinds of arithmetic

Popular Arithmetic – makes assertions about

sensible objects: it speaks of such thing

Philosophical Arithmetic- compels the soul

to reason about abstract number and
refuses to consider number of visible or
tangible bodies.
II. Two kinds of Ideal Arithmetical
entities
A.The Mathematical Numbers
B.The Ideal Numbers
A. The Mathematical Numbers

are characterized by the following properties;

1. They are made up of certain ideal “Units” or “1’s”. The
Mathematical Number N is set of N such units: 2 is a set
of two, 3 a set of three, and soon.
2. Of such ideal unit, or 1’s there exist an infinite supply.
3. There is no difference between the ideal units
A. The Mathematical Numbers (Cont.)

are characterized by the following properties;

4. An ideal unit does not contain any plurality of parts, or
constituent, or characteristics; from whatever point of view
we consider such a unit, it is One and One only.
5. Of each Mathematical Number there are infinitely may
copies from the infinite supply if ideal units we may choose
N units infinitely many ways, and every choice gives us a
representation of the Mathematical Number N.
A. The Mathematical Numbers (Cont.)

6. The elementary arithmetical notions are simple set

theoretical notions.
7. Mathematical Numbers are the numbers studied by
arithmetic. It is for them, and for them, that the concepts
of arithmetic are defined.
B. The Ideal Numbers

 are characterized by the following properties;

1. They are Ideas, viz, the Ideas of (Oneness,) Twoness,
Threeness and so on.
2. As Ideas the ideal Numbers are simple entities.
3. In particular, they are not sets of units like the
Mathematical Number
B. The Ideal Numbers (Cont.)

4. The notions of arithmetic, are not defined for the Ideal

numbers
 The statements of arithmetic are not concerned with them
 the equation, 2+3=5, e.g., says only that the addition of the
Mathematical Number 2 and 3 gives rise to the
Mathematical Number 5. It says nothing of the Ideal Numbers,
for which arithmetical addition is not defined.
 Similarly , the arithmetical statement , 2<5, hold only for the
Mathematical Numbers 2 and 5. For Ideal Numbers the
relation < is not defined.
B. The Ideal Numbers (Cont.)

5. There is a relation of “priority” among the Ideal Numbers,

by which they are ordered in a series that runs parallel to
the series of Mathematical Numbers, ordered according to
size: (1),2,3,…
6. The study of Ideal Numbers belong to the general theory
of Ideas, Dialectic.
III. The Mathematical Numbers are
“Intermediates”
 The Mathematical Numbers are “Intermediates”
between the Ideal Numbers and sensible things, or
collection of sensible things
 Aristotle’s representation in Ideal Numbers(@Next Slide)
Aristotle’s representation in Ideal Numbers

Ideal Numbers

Perfect Imperfect
exemplification exemplification

Mathematical Imperfect Collection of

Numbers Resemblance sensible things
IV. Plato’s reasons for believing in the
intermediate Mathematical Numbers
 Plato’s reasons for believing in the intermediate Mathematical
Numbers were, at least in part, analogous to his reasons for
adopting doctrine of intermediate geometrical objects.
 Plato’s was convinced that the statements of arithmetic are
true
 But, Aristotle’s words – They are not of sensible things
 Hence, they must be true of something else, and that of
which they are true are mathematical number
 The logic of this argument can, (@Next Slide)
The logic of argument

1. Arithmetic is true
2. The truth of arithmetic presupposes the existence of
object which truly participate in the Ideas of Oneness,
twoness, and so on , i.e., in the Ideal Numbers.
3. In the world of the senses, there are no perfect instances
of the Ideal Numbers.
4. Hence, Perfect instances of the Ideal Numbers exist
somewhere outside the world of the senses.
V. Philosophical Arithmetic

 In arithmetic we do not, properly speaking, “add” two

numbers and thereby create their sum
 The sum of two numbers has an eternal existence, and we
can merely direct the eye of the mind toward that sum.
 Thus, Aristotle’s critique in the physics of the assumption of an
actual arithmetic infinite is probably meant as a critique of a
Platonic doctrine.
 For Aristotle the number series is infinite on in the sense that
whatever number given to us, we can always create larger
number
VI. Philosophical Arithmetic is a
deductive science
 Proceeds from certain hypotheses which it takes for
granted without proving them

VII. These are hypotheses are justified by

Dialectic on the basis of the first principle the
Idea of the Good
Queries
These proposition above raise a number of problems
which have to be solved before we can consider
ourselves to have understood Plato’s thought.
 i. The assumption of two parallel kinds of number
appears gratuitous
 ii. What kind of entities are ideal units out which the
Mathematical number are made?
 iii. How exactly, did Plato conceive such arithmetical
concepts as addition, multiplication and equality?
 iv. Why was Plato inclined to think that only
mathematical Numbers truly participated in the Ideal
numbers
i. The assumption of two parallel kinds of
number appears gratuitous

 The Ideal Number are the Ideas of (Oneness), Twoness,

Threeness and so on.
 If one accepts a logical realism of the sort of theory
which the theory of Ideas represent, he can also agree
with the postulation of these Ideal Numbers.
 But why does Plato in addition assume Mathematical
Numbers?
 Under II.B.4 in Plato’s opinion, the notions of arithmetic
are not defined for Ideal numbers. But again, why does
Plato hold that opinion?
ii. What kind of entities are ideal units out
which the Mathematical number are
made?
 They are vague one from other, and that each one of
them is absolutely one, without any intrinsic multiplicity
parts.
 This description is obscure, to say the least. Why, and
what sense, did Plato attribute such characteristics to his
unit?
iii. How exactly, did Plato conceive such
arithmetical concepts as addition,
multiplication and equality?
 How did he accordingly interpret an arithmetical
statement such as, say, “2+3=5”?
iv. Why was Plato inclined to think that only
mathematical Numbers truly participated in
the Ideal numbers
 Why, e.g., does the Mathematical Number 2 have a
better claim to exhibiting the Idea of Twoness than, say,
the couple consisting of Socrates and Protagoras?
Response
 Let us begin with question (ii) and (iii). Plato probably
conceived the basic arithmetic concepts in a vague
intuitive manner, without defining them.
 In the fashion of Greek mathematics, we represent the
units by points, we may think of the number 2 and 3 as
the two sets of points delimited by continuous lines:
Response
Their sum may then be thought of as the set contained
within the dotted line.
The following figure illustrates in a similar manner the
multiplication of these numbers:
 This is how Euclid understands addition and
multiplication (cf. Elements, book VII, def. 15)
 And there is no reason to believe that Plato thought
otherwise
 Response
 Since there are infinitely many Mathematical 2’s, 3’s etc., we
have to think of the numerals “2”, “3”,… as ambiguously
denoting anyone of the 2’s, 3’s,…
 A statement such as “2+3=5” we shall accordingly have to
interpret as saying:
The sum of any 2 and any 3 is numerically equal to any 5
Given the relation of numerically equality (same number of
units), we could defined the sum m+n as any set formed by
joining a set equal to m with a set equal to n, provided these
sets have no unit in common.
 The product mxn could similarly be explained as any set equal
to n and then joining these n-adic sets, provided that no two of
them have a unit in common.
Reply
If this explanation corresponds to Plato’s view, he could
reasonably say that the units are vague in the following
sense.
 The truth-value of a statement such as “2+3=5” remains
the same whatever dyad triad and pentad of units we
let the numerals “2”, “3” and “5” denote.
 If such a statement is true at all, it remains true even if
we let distinct occurrences of the same numerical “n”,
within the statement, denote distinct n-adic sets of units.
 Thus, from the point of view of arithmetic, there is
nothing to distinguish one unit to another, or one set of
units from a numerically equal set
Reply

 The definition of number as “plurality of units”, hence,

must have another and a less sophisticated meaning for
Pre-Platonic philosophers that it had for Plato.
Aristotle’s two senses of number

 1. number in the sense of a collection of things which are

counted, and
 2. number in the sense of that by means of which
collections are counted
Aristotle’s two senses of number(Cont.)

 But for Aristotle the definition does not in itself imply

acceptance of Plato’s theory of Mathematical Number.
 According to Aristotle, counting is a kind of
measurement, in fact the prototype of all other
measurement

“The measure must always be some identical thing

predicable of all the things it measures, e.g. if the things
are horses, the measure is ‘horse’
Aristotle’s by saying
 That counting presupposes agreement upon some unit
concept.
 An important consequence of this fact is that the
number counted depends essentially upon our choice
of unit concept.
e.g. Suppose that we are faced with three married
couples.
 If we asked to count, the demand remains indefinite
as long as the unit concept is not stipulated.
 if we are given the unit concept Human Being, the
result of the count will be 6.
Aristotle’s by saying (cont.)

 A particular case of it is that a shift in unit concept may

change the result of a count from “one” to “more than
one”, or “many”, although the count remains
concerned with the same thing or things.
 Is probably of importance for the understanding of
Plato’s arithmetical philosophy
is asserted by Aristotle, when he explains that no
paradox is involved in the fact that what is one can
also be many is-as-much as it combines several
properties or is a whole containing several parts.
Response

 We have one significance of the word “unit”, as used in

Greek mathematical parlance, which is free from the
Platonic implications.
 To count the object within an area or a domain
somehow designated or delimited is to count them with
respect to some chosen unit concept.
Reply

 With this significance of the term “one” or “unit” another

significance is connected.
Each one of the objects counted is also called a unit
or a 1 (relative to the unit concept).
E.g. if I count, say Socrates, Protagoras and
Gorgias with respect to unit concept Man, each
one of the three is a unit
Reply

 What is this sense, is a unit (relative to a given unit

concept), is usually also “indivisible” (relative to that
concept) in the following sense:
what is one man, is not simultaneously “divisible into”
many men
What is one horse, is not simultaneously “divisible into”
many horses.
Aristotle Says
 Witticism
 The Pythagoreans could also say that number is plurality of
units.
 But in their mouth this statement had a more esoteric
meaning.
 For them the units were a kind of physical points or
indivisible material particles, and they thought of numbers
as collocations of such points.
Witticism

 Pythagorean view reduces numbers to materials

instances of them:
It identifies the number 1 with one point, the number 2
with two points, and so on.
 Although Plato was probably strongly influenced by the
Pythagorean doctrine, obviously he could not accept it
as it stands.
Witticism

 The common Greek definition of number as “plurality of

units” tells us merely of what numbers are predicated,
not what numbers are themselves.
Plato cannot have been satisfied with it.
Rejoinder

 Although Plato was looking for an explanation of

numbers in the abstract, obviously he could not entirely
free himself from the belief that the number 2 is a dyadic
set, the number 3 is a triadic set, so on.
 The abstract nature of 2, it is natural to answer that is the
set consisting of two abstract 1’s, or of two ideal units.
Rejoinder
 It is important to notice the difference in significance
between the word “unit as defined by Aristotle and, probably
also, understood by the Pre-Platonic philosophers, and the
same word as used by Plato and his followers.

 Plato’s assumption of ideal units probably derived a certain

vague intuitive content from association to the Pythagorean
doctrine

 The only difference between an ideal unit and a point us,

according to Aristotle, that a unit has no position, whereas a
point does
Rejoinder

 Theory of mathematical Numbers conceives numbers as

ideal entities, it is true, but not yet as Ideas.
 Hence, Plato could not be satisfied with theory of
Mathematical Numbers as constituting the ultimate truth
about number
 Above the Mathematical Numbers he had to postulate
a unique Oneness, a unique twoness, a unique to
Threeness, and so on, i.e. the ideal numbers.
Zeno’s Paradoxes Argument
a)If any number were truly applicable to a set of sensible
object, then each in the set would have be truly one.
b)But any sensible object contains a multitude of
characteristics, or constituents, or parts.
c) Hence, no sensible object is truly one
d)Hence, no number is truly applicable to any set of
sensible object

Plato himself rejects the argument

Socrates adds that such a person is saying not a paradox
but a truism
Conclusion

 The only difference between Ideal and Mathematical

Numbers which he acknowledges in his critique is that in
Mathematical Numbers all units are;
Mathematical Numbers all units are “associable”
(“comparable”) and “undifferentiated”
Whereas, Ideal Numbers the units are “in-associable”
(“incomparable”) and “differentiated”
 In modern research on the foundation of mathematics
both types of definitions have been successfully
employed
Appendix C
ARISTOTLE’S ANALYSIS OF PLATO’S
PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC

In this appendix the author indicated and, in part,

quoted the passages from Aristotle upon which he has
mainly relied when making the reconstruction of Plato’s
philosophy of arithmetic found on pp. 64-68.
Appendix C
ARISTOTLE’S ANALYSIS OF PLATO’S
PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC

In this appendix the author indicated and, in part,

quoted the passages from Aristotle upon which he has
mainly relied when making the reconstruction of Plato’s
philosophy of arithmetic found on pp. 64-68.
Although Aristotle’s exposition is rambling, repetitious,
often exceedingly obscure and at times obviously
inconsistent, certain items stand out clearly.

In appendix A we have already established the

following points (which are generally acknowledged by
Aristotelian scholars):
According to Aristotle, also arithmetic as conceived by Plato
fits into the scheme: there are
certain arithmetical Ideas or Forms, the so-called “Ideal
Numbers” or “Numbers Ideas”,
(ii) the so-called “Mathematical Numbers” which belong to
the class of intermediate mathematical objects, and
(iii) the sensible things, or collections of sensible things, that
we count.
That Plato believed both in Ideal and in Mathematical Numbers
and that the former are Ideas, is stated in the following passage,
where
“some” undoubtedly refers to Plato and the description,
“that which has a before and after”, designates the
Ideal Numbers:
Let us now consider the synopsis on pp. 00-00, item for item,
and see to what extent it is borne out by Aristotle’s words.

II, (A). The Mathematical Numbers.

They are made up of certain ideal ‘units’, or ‘1’s’.
(i) A Mathematical Number is an aggregate of units.

“Mathematical Number is counted thus—after 1,

2 (which consists of another 1 besides the former 1),
and 3 (which consists of another 1 besides these two), and the
other numbers similarly.”
 ii) The units are ideal (eternal) entities.
This is not directly stated by Aristotle. It is, however, a self-
evident consequence of Aristotle’s assertions that the
Mathematical Numbers themselves belong to the class of
ideal entities and that these numbers are composed out of
the units.
(2) There exists an infinite supply of such units.
No direct statement to this effect is found in Aristotle. But it is
implied by (5) below, which is explicitly asserted by Aristotle.
(3) There is no difference between the ideal units: two such units
are completely indistinguishable.
“In Mathematical Number no one unit is in any way different from
another.” “Mathematical Number consists of undifferentiated
units, and the truths proved of it suit this character.”
 (4) An ideal unit does not contain any plurality of parts, or
constituents, or characteristics: from whatever point of view we
consider such a unit, it is One, and One only.
Part of this statement is corroborated by Aristotle when he
contrasts the Platonic and Pythagorean views on number. The
Pythagoreans, too, believed in a kind of mathematical numbers,
but with one important difference:
“only not numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the
units to have spatial magnitude.”
With this may be compared a statement such as this:
“that which is no way divisible in quantity is a point or a
unit— that which has not position a unit, that which has
position a point.”
 (5) Of each Mathematical Number there are infinitely many copies.
Aristotle says:
“The similar and undifferentiated numbers are infinitely many, so
that any particular 3 is no more Man-himself [= the Idea of Man]
than any other 3.
The reason for (5) is indicated in another passage, where
Aristotle says that if one speaks “mathematically” of “the objects of
mathematics”, he is bound to hold that “any two units taken at
random make 2”
(6) The elementary arithmetical operations are simple set-
theoretical notions.
This assumption underlies Aristotle’s entire discussion of
Mathematical Numbers, but it is difficult to quote anyone
statement, in which it is compactly expressed. That a smaller
number is a subset of a larger number, is implicitly asserted in the
statement quoted under II, (A), (1), (i).
(7) Mathematical Numbers are the numbers studied by
arithmetic. Aristotle says:
This is implied by the very designation “Mathematical
Numbers” . It is Also implied by the train of thought which,
according to Aristotle, led Plato to his belief in intermediate
mathematical objects.
II, (B). The Ideal Numbers.
The analysis of Plato’s notion of Ideal Numbers given on p. 00
can only in part invoke Aristotle’s authority.

(1) They are Ideas, viz. the Ideas of Oneness, Twoness, Three-
ness, and so on.
We have already quoted a passage, where Aristotle states
that Plato (referred to as “some”) considers “that which has
before and after”, i.e., the Ideal Numbers, as identical with the
Ideas.
That the Ideas, which the Ideal Numbers are, are just the
Ideas of Oneness, Twoness, Three- ness, and so on, is shown,
e.g., by this passage, in which Aristotle takes a survey of various
possibilities of thought:
(2) As Ideas the Ideal Numbers are simple entities.
(3) In particular, they are not sets of units like the
Mathematical Numbers.

The authority for these items is Plato rather than Aristotle. When
analysing Plato’s statements on number in Appendix D we shall
find that Plato speaks of a kind of numbers that are Ideas and
that are not sets of units.
Assuming that these numbers are the Ideal Numbers the
postulation of which Aristotle imputes to Plato, I have in the
synopsis disregarded Aristotle’s contradictory statements.
(4) The notions of arithmetic are not defined for the Ideal
Numbers.

Under a certain hypothesis, the truth about the numbers must

rather be what Plato used to say, and “ the numbers [i.e., Ideal
Numbers] must not be associable with one another” .
The “inassociability” of Plato’s Ideal Numbers, which is here
stated, seems to mean that they do not stand in arithmetical
relations to one another (e.g., the relation ‘less than’) and that
arithmetical operations (e.g., addition) can not be performed
upon them.
(5) There is a relation of “priority” among the Ideal Numbers,
by which they are ordered in a series that runs parallel to the
series of Mathematical Numbers, ordered according to size.

We have already quoted a passage in which the Ideal Numbers

are characterized as “that which has a before and after” . This
may be compared with a passage from the Nicomachean
Ethics:
The men who introduced this doctrine [viz., the doctrine of
Ideas] did not posit Ideas of classes within which they
recognized priority and posteriority, which is the reason why
they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all
numbers.”
(6) The study of Ideal Numbers belongs to the general theory
of Ideas, Dialectic.

This is nowhere explicitly stated either by Plato or by Aristotle. But

neither of them ever intimates that the arithmetical Ideas should
in this respect have a position different from that of other Ideas.
III. The Mathematical Numbers are “intermediates” between
the Ideal Numbers and sensible things, or collections of
sensible things.

We have already quoted passages from Aristotle that confirm

this item. According to our interpretation, the “intermediacy”
implies the following two propositions:
(1) The Ideal Numbers are never perfectly exemplified in sense
experience.
(2) Mathematical Numbers are perfect instances of Ideal
Numbers.
 Appendix D
NUMBER IN THE DIALOGUES
In this appendix the author showed what support points II and
III in the synopsis of Plato’s philosophy of arithmetic receive from
his own treatment of number in the dialogues. Points I and IV-VII
have, the author thought, been sufficiently corroborated
already in chapter V.
The concept of Mathematical Numbers is apparently
assumed by Plato both in the Republic, the Philebus and the
Theaetetus, and in the Phaedo numbers conceived as Ideas are
contrasted with numbers conceived as Mathematical Numbers.
 1) REPUBLIC 525 c— 526

In book VII of the Republic Socrates explains philosophical

arithmetic in the following manner:
“And, further, I [Socrates] said, it occurs to me, now that the study
of logistic has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and
that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for
the sake of knowledge and not for huckstering.
In what respect? he [Glaucon] said.
Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it
strongly directs the soul upwards and compels it to discourse about
pure numbers, never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the
discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies.
 This passage begins as what seems to be merely a description of
actual arithmetical practice in Plato’s days.
We have seen in chapter II that fractions were not admitted into
pure arithmetic by contemporary Greek mathematicians (save as
relations between integers).
“On pp. 78-80, we have already had occasion to consider the
argument in book VII of the Republic which leads up lo the passage
here discussed.
Although it is not said by Socrates in so many words, this line of
argument clearly implies that the only perfect instances of the
number concepts are sets of ideal units or, in Aristotle’s terminology,
Mathematical Numbers.
It would be an overstatement to say that this argument of the
Republic definitely confirms also propositions III in our synopsis. The
notion of Ideal Numbers is not explicitly recognized in the Republic
and, in default of that notion, Socrates is here unable to make his
argument quite clear.
 2. PHILEBUS 56 C-E.

In the Philebus we read:

“Socrates. And let us take those arts, which just now we spoke of as primary,
to be the most exact of all.
Protarchus. I take it you mean arithmetic, and the other arts which you
mentioned in association with it just now.
Soc. To be sure. But ought we not, Protarchus, to recognise these themselves
to be of two kinds? What do you think? Prot. What two kinds do you mean?
Soc. To take first arithmetic, ought we not to distinguish between that of the
ordinary man and that of the philosopher?
Prot. On what principle, may I ask, is this discrimination of two arithmetics to
be based?
 Soc. There is an important mark of difference, Protarchus. The
ordinary arithmetician, surely, operates with unequal units: his
‘two’ may be two armies or two cows or two anythings from the
smallest thing in the world lo the biggest; while the philosopher
will have nothing to do wlith him, unless he consents to make
every single one of his infinitely many units precisely the same as
every other.
Prot. Certainly you are right in speaking of an important
distinction amongst those who concern themselves with number,
which justifies the belief that there are two sciences.”
 This passage cannot, I think, he fully understood unless one
keeps in mind the ambiguity of the word “unit” as used in the
common Greek definition of number.
When Socrates says that the units of philosophical arithmetic
are all absolutely equal, whereas those of popular arithmetic are
unequal, he appears to be using the term “unit” just in that
ambiguous manner.
The emphasis upon the fact that what the ordinary
arithmetician counts may be anything “from the smallest thing in
the world to the biggest”, indicates that it is primarily the
inequality in sense, that Socrates is here interested in pointing out.
 3. THEAETETUS 198 a-d.

In their discussion as to how false opinion may arise, Socrates

and Theaetetus have arrived at the preliminary result that false
opinion belongs to the union of thought and perception, i.e.,
that error means mistaking an object perceived through the
senses for a distinct object not perceived but merely thought of.
According to this hypothesis, false opinion cannot consist in the
confusion of two distinct objects that both are merely thought
of. But here Socrates finds a new difficulty:
 “Soc. ‘Then,’ he [a supposed critic] will say, ‘according to
that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is
merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely
thought of?’ Come now, it is for you lo answer.
Theaetet. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the
eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could
never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his
mind.
In view of this counter-example the hypothesis that false
opinion is confusion of thought and perception is abandoned.
 As a more satisfactory solution of the problem Socrates suggests
that man’s mind is like an aviary, that to learn something is like putting a
bird into the aviary, that to possess knowledge of something is like
having a bird therein, and that finally there is a kind of knowing that is
analogous to catching a bird that is already imprisoned in the aviary
and holding it in one’s hand. In the last mentioned process error may
arise, since one may catch the wrong bird.
Finally, Socrates explains the possibility of mistakes in pure arithmetic.
In this passage from the Theaetetus two types of things are
contrasted with each other, viz. numbers in the abstract, or the
numbers which the arithmetician has in his mind, and such external
objects as possess number, e.g., seven men and five men. The numbers
in the abstract, of which Socrates speaks here, are clearly not the Ideal
Numbers; they figure in arithmetical computations, which Ideal
Numbers do not.
 Here Socrates considers the process of estimating how great
an abstract number is as analogous to the process of counting a
set of external objects. When we count, e.g., three objects, A, B,
C, we point first at A and say “one”, then at B and say “ two”,
then at C and say “three”, and finally conclude that they are
three. I.e., we create a one-to-one correspondence between
the objects and an initial segment of the series of positive
integers:
A B C
1 2 3
 4. PHAEDO 101 b-d.

The concept of Ideal Numbers, in the sense of Number Ideas,

seems to be a necessary consequence of the general theory of
Ideas. In the dialogues there is, however, only one passage
where the concept is discussed at any length. That is in the
Phaedo. When telling his interlocutor, Cebes, how he has arrived
at his present philosophical outlook, Socrates explains his early
puzzles about explanation or causation. Once he thought he
knew the “why’s” of the various phenomena, lie thought he
knew, e.g., that a great man was taller than a small man “by a
head” :
 And, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten
were more than eight because two had been added to the
eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-
cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length.
This new method is the method of explanation made possible
by the theory of Ideas. After a critique of Anaxagoras, Socrates
goes on to outline this method.
The assumption that the greater man is greater by reason of
the head is now seen to be a monstruous absurdity. The simple
truth is that the greater man is greater “by, and by reason of,
Greatness” and the less is less only “by, and by reason of
Smallness
 If Socrates does reject the notion of Mathematical Numbers
in the Phaedo, this rejection was, it might be said, merely
intended to make us aware of one such difficulty that should
help us from falling into dogmatic slumber.
If this interpretation is correct, the passage from the Phaedo
which we are discussing not only recognizes the existence of
Mathematical as well as Ideal Numbers, but also asserts that Ihe
former partake of the latter. Thus, we have found part of what is
stated under III and IV in our synopsis confirmed by Plato's own
words.
 In addition to the proposition that Mathematical Numbers
partake of Ideal Numbers, III and IV contain the proposition that
nothing but Mathematical Numbers truly partake of Ideal
Numbers. This proposition is not found in the Phaedo. It is,
however, implied by the passage from the Republic discussed
on pp. 78-80.
Thank you very much!!!

 End