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    802.11 Security - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) : by Shruthi B Krishnan

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    Ananyaja Debadipta
    This document summarizes a presentation on the 802.11 wireless security standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It describes the goals of WEP including confidentiality, data integrity, and access control. It then outlines several major security flaws in WEP, including vulnerabilities in the use of keys and initialization vectors, the integrity check value method, and attacks against the underlying RC4 encryption algorithm. It concludes that WEP is insecure and cannot provide reliable security for wireless networks.

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    802.11 Security - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) : by Shruthi B Krishnan

    Uploaded by

    Ananyaja Debadipta
    41 views19 pages
    This document summarizes a presentation on the 802.11 wireless security standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It describes the goals of WEP including confidentiality, data integrity, and access control. It then outlines several major security flaws in WEP, including vulnerabilities in the use of keys and initialization vectors, the integrity check value method, and attacks against the underlying RC4 encryption algorithm. It concludes that WEP is insecure and cannot provide reliable security for wireless networks.

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    This document summarizes a presentation on the 802.11 wireless security standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It describes the goals of WEP including confidentiality, data integrity, and access control. It then outlines several major security flaws in WEP, including vulnerabilities in the use of keys and initialization vectors, the integrity check value method, and attacks against the underlying RC4 encryption algorithm. It concludes that WEP is insecure and cannot provide reliable security for wireless networks.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    41 views19 pages

    802.11 Security - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) : by Shruthi B Krishnan

    Uploaded by

    Ananyaja Debadipta
    This document summarizes a presentation on the 802.11 wireless security standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It describes the goals of WEP including confidentiality, data integrity, and access control. It then outlines several major security flaws in WEP, including vulnerabilities in the use of keys and initialization vectors, the integrity check value method, and attacks against the underlying RC4 encryption algorithm. It concludes that WEP is insecure and cannot provide reliable security for wireless networks.

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    802.

    11 Security –
    Wired Equivalent
    Privacy (WEP)
    By
    Shruthi B Krishnan
    Agenda for the presentation

     Introduction
     802.11 Wireless LAN – brief description
     Goals of WEP
     Confidentiality in WEP
     Data Integrity in WEP
     Access Control in WLANs
     Security loopholes and attacks on WEP
     Lessons to be learnt
    Introduction

     History of wireless technology


     Inception of wireless networking took place at the University of
    Hawaii in 1971. It was called ALOHAnet.
     Star topology with 7 computers
     Spanned 4 Hawaiian islands with the central system in Oahu
     In 1997, world’s first WLAN standard– 802.11– was approved
    by IEEE
     Wired Equivalent Privacy – security standard proposed by
    802.11
     Has many loopholes and has been completely broken
    802.11 Wireless LAN – brief description
    Distribution system

    Access Points

    Wireless Medium

    Mobile stations

    Mobile stations

     Stations
     Wireless medium
     Access Points
     Distribution System
     Basic Service Set (BSS)
     Extended Service set (ESS)
    802.11 Wireless LAN – brief description (cont’d)
    Network services
     Distribution System services
     Association
     Disassociation
     Reassociation

     Station services
     Authentication
     Deauthentication
     Privacy

    Inside the
    Outside the
    network
    network
    Successful Association/
    Successful Authentication Reassociation

    Deathentication Disassociation

    Authenticated and
    Unauthenticated and Authenticated and Associated
    Unassociated Unassociated
    Goals of WEP

     Confidentiality
     Uses stream cipher RC4 for encryption

     Data Integrity
     Uses cyclic redundancy check

     Access control
     Shared key authentication
    Confidentiality in WEP

     One-time pad vs Stream ciphers


     Perfect randomness is compromised for practicality
     RC4 algorithm used for encryption of data frames

    Plaintext

    + Ciphertext

    KEY Keystream

    IV
    Confidentiality in WEP – (cont’d)
    WEP keys and Initialization vector (IV)

     Shared secret key


     Shared among all users
     Changed infrequently
     Original standard – 40 bit key. Later implementations used 104 bit key
     WEP uses set of up to 4 keys
     Key distribution problems
     Initialization vector
     24 bits
     Prepended with the secret key
     Need to be random to prevent key reuse or IV collision
     IV sent in clear
    Data Integrity in WEP

     Computes Integrity Check Value (ICV)

     ICV is appended with data frame and encrypted

     CRC-32 algorithm used


     Efficient
    in capturing data tampering
     Cryptographically insecure
    Confidentiality and data integrity in WEP

    40 or 104 bit
    key
    Plaintext CRC-32

    IV RC4

    Keystream Plaintext ICV

    Plaintext ICV

    Frame Header IV Plaintext ICV

    3 pad Key 4 bytes


    bytes index
    Access Control in WLANs

     Open System Authentication

     Shared key authentication

    Request for access

    Challenge text, R

    Encrypt R using WEP


    Mobile station Access Point
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP
    Attacks on shared key authentication
    Request for access

    Challenge text, R1

    Encrypt R1 using WEP (C1)


    Good guy Access Point

    Keystream = R1 + C1

    Request for access

    Challenge text, R2

    Encrypt R2 using WEP (C2 = Keystream +R2)


    Bad guy Access Point
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP - (cont’d)
    Attacks due to keystream reuse
    Plaintext

    Plaintext
    Ciphertext
    +

    + Keystream +

    Ciphertext + Plaintext

    Plaintext

     Improper IV management
     IV-space is small
     Implementation dependent
     Sent in clear

     Recovery of plaintexts

     Decryption dictionary attacks


     Independent of keysize
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP - (cont’d)
    Attacks due to CRC

    Δ = Plaintext + Plaintext

    Δc = ICV + ICV

    Plaintext ICV

    Δ + + Δc

    Plaintext ICV

     CRC is good for message authentication, but bad for security


     Both CRC checksum and RC4 are linear and can be easily manipulated
     CRC is unkeyed
     Attacker can inject messages into the system
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP - (cont’d)
    Attacks exploiting the Access Points

    Mobile station Access Point

    Attacker
    Change
    destination
    address
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP - (cont’d)
    Attacks exploiting the Access Points

    TCP ACK

    Message
    Mobile station with flipped
    Access Point
    bits

    Intercepted
    ciphertext with
    flipped bits TCP ACK

     Access points can be used to monitor TCP/IP traffic


     Recipient send an ACK only if TCP checksum is correct
    Attacker
     TCP checksum remains unaltered if Pi ex-OR Pi+16 is 1.

    Modify any Pi and


    Pi+16
    Security loopholes and attacks on WEP - (cont’d)
    Attacks on RC4 used by WEP
     Research by Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir
     First byte of plaintext has to be known. For WEP implementations, it is
    0xAA
     Set of weak keys that correspondingly reveal some part of the secret key
     Format of weak IVs
     First byte (B) can range from 0x03 to 0x07
     Second byte has to be 0xFF
     Third byte (N) can be any known value between 0 & 255.
     Probability to find a byte of secret key for 60 different values of N is
    non-negligible
     Several successful experiments based on this attack
     Popular key-recovery programs like Airsnort use this analysis
    Lessons learnt from the failure of WEP

     Key shared by all users of the system


     Key is changed infrequently
     No Perfect forward secrecy
     Manual key management
     Key reuse due to non-random IVs
     Random IVs are not insisted upon
     Short IVs
     No protection for replay attacks
     Use of unkeyed CRC instead of SHA1-HMAC
     Encryption cipher used was weak
     WEP was not publicly reviewed before it became a standard
    WEP is insecure!!
    References
     The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) website
    http://www.ieee.org

     802.11Wireless Networks- The Definitive Guide


    By Matthew S. Gast, O’REILLY Publications.

     History of wireless
    http://www.ac.aup.fr/a38972/final_projectIT338/history.html

     Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11


    By Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner
    http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html

     Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4


    By Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir
    http://www.crypto.com/papers/others/rc4_ksaproc.pdf

     Unsafe at any key size: an analysis of the WEP encapsulation


    By J. Walker
    http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/0-362.zi%p

     Your 802.11 Wireless Network has No Clothes


    By William A. Arbaugh, Narendar Shankar, Y.C. Justin Wan,
    Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland
    http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.pdf

     Popular WEP cracking software


    http://airsnort.sourceforge.net/
    http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack/

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