Fukushima Poster Final

Safeguards at Post-Accident Facilities ID: 239
- Case of Fukushima Daiichi Site -

Osamu Aruga, Toshimitsu Ishii, Toshihide Kabuki, Masaru Shigeyama
Gary Dyck, Bruno Chesnay, Vladimir Nizhnik
Nuclear Regulation Authority and International Atomic Energy Agency
osamu_aruga01@nsr.go.jp
ABSTRACT OUTCOME
• The accident at Fukushima Daiichi (F1) Nuclear Power Station (NPS) had a MAJOR TOPICS DISCUSSED BY YEAR
major impact on safeguards (SG) implementation at the site. Topics discussed at the FTF and associated subgroups have been diverse
• JSGO/NRA and IAEA formulated Fukushima Task Force (FTF) in order to and changed substantially, which were administrative and technical. (Table
develop a holistic approach to SG implementation measures. 2)
• As a result of close collaboration under the FTF, all fuels except in the
SAFEGUARDS MEASURES APPLIED
Units 1-3 have been successfully re-verified and back to normal IS regime.
New measures applied as a result of discussion are summarized below:
• The paper analyzes the evolving discussion at the FTF and summarizes the
• C/S: To confirm absence of fuels removal and gain assurance of NM
main lessons learned for SG implementation at post-accident facilities.
non-diversion Open-Air Spent Fuel Monitor (OASM) is installed;
BACKGROUND • Short Notice Operational Support (SNOS): SNOS activity enables the
• Right before the earthquake, the Units 1-3 were under operation and the IAEA to confirm consistency of operational activities declared by facility
operator and to provide additional assurances of non-diversion; and
Units 4-6 were shut down for periodical safety inspections. (Figure 1)
• Earthquake, tsunami and accident at F1 NPS had a major impact on SG • Provision of Information: Information on operational status and other
implementation at the site due to physical damage on facilities and information on updated status and planned activities is shared.
equipment, and inaccessibility to the site and nuclear material. LESSONS LEARNED
• The first inspection at F1 after the earthquake was performed in October Lessons learned from SG implementation at F1 are summarized below:
2011 and made the situation there. (Table 1) • Important Factors: Sharing the goals, sufficient and timely information
• In March 2012, the FTF was established in order to develop a holistic and developing trust; and
approach to SG implementation measures; to monitor recovery of SG; to • Good Practice from FTF Experience: Recording result of discussion,
facilitate discussion of SG issues; and to consider possible approaches to having meetings regularly and providing supplemental information.
long-term SG challenges at F1.
• The FTF is headed by directors of SGOA/IAEA and JSGO/NRA, held Table 2. Major topics discussed by year
biannually, attended by the facility operator, technical support Topics 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Administrative Cost sharing
organization and relevant institutes. C/S at Neutron monitor and camera at gate
• SG Equipment Subgroup and Damaged Cores Subgroup are under FTF. Boundary Traffic routing and gate sealing
Remote data transmission
C/S at Site
Hill top camera
Camera inside of Unit 3 and 4
C/S at Unit
Sharing of operator cameras data
Access Short Notice Operational Support
NM Transfers Tagging of empty casks
within Site Spent fuel transfers schedule
Unit 4, 5, 6 and Cask Custody Area
Re-
DCVD / training / joint use
verification
Re-application of RII* regime
Recovery plan
NDA options
Damaged Core
Debris / samples accounting and analysis
Investigation of inside PCV (incl. robots)
New action form
Information Revision of DIQ
AP declarations
Operator’s Gamma dose measurement
Figure 1. Reactor units and other buildings at the site of F1 NPS Activity Domed cover / FHM at Unit 3
Table 1. Result of the first inspection after the earthquake * RII – Random Interim Inspection
Unit/Building Core Spent Fuel Pond etc.

Unit 1-3 Not accessible Not accessible CONCLUSION
Unit 4 No fuel assemblies Not accessible • Implementation of SG at F1, a post accident facility, has been an
Unit 5 C/S failed C/S failed (ALIS not working)
(seal detached) ALIP installed unprecedented challenge for the SG community.
Unit 6 C/S maintained C/S failed (ALIS not working) • Over the course of the successful and progressive reapplication of SG at
(seal attached) ALIP installed F1, FTF played the central role in information exchange, decision making
CSFS N/A C/S failed (ALIS not working)
and time keeping of its implementation.
ALIP installed
CCB N/A C/S maintained • To tackle the remaining issues at F1, the JSGO and the IAEA will keep
working closely through the FTF in collaboration with the relevant parties
METHODS in Japan.
METHODS
In this study, in addition to previous study, all meeting minutes of FTFs and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
subgroups were analyzed in view of topics discussed and SG measures • We would like to thank all concerned parties of FTF, including IAEA, LANL,
applied as a result of FTF. Then, lessons learned are drawn from the TEPCO, NDF, IRID, JAEA and JSGO.

Fukushima Poster Final

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Fukushima Poster Final

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Fukushima Poster Final

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Safeguards at Post-Accident Facilities ID: 239

- Case of Fukushima Daiichi Site -

Unit/Building Core Spent Fuel Pond etc.

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.