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Lessons Learned in Combat

The document discusses lessons learned from military engagements between Philippine government counter-insurgency forces and the New People's Army (NPA) insurgency based on an analysis of NPA documents. It outlines tactical lessons like using cover and fire effectively, monitoring enemy movements, and maintaining secrecy. It also discusses the importance of intelligence gathering, ideological and tactical preparation, relying on mass support, and properly briefing troops. The goal is to integrate these lessons to improve military preparedness.

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Akira Sendo
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
172 views49 pages

Lessons Learned in Combat

The document discusses lessons learned from military engagements between Philippine government counter-insurgency forces and the New People's Army (NPA) insurgency based on an analysis of NPA documents. It outlines tactical lessons like using cover and fire effectively, monitoring enemy movements, and maintaining secrecy. It also discusses the importance of intelligence gathering, ideological and tactical preparation, relying on mass support, and properly briefing troops. The goal is to integrate these lessons to improve military preparedness.

Uploaded by

Akira Sendo
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Lesson Learned

In Combat
Introduction
Based on their manual, the NPA is
closely studying the operations, strategy
and tactics of the government counter-
insurgency forces. Aside from familiarizing
themselves with “enemy” operations,
strategy and tactics, the
cont…
NPA is developing and instituting
counter-doctrines and measures to block
and minimize the damage of such
operations against its forces.
cont…
This is a continuing effort and a sustained
application of a dialectical process of
combining theory and practice by NPA units,
wherein they integrate insights gained from
their own experiences and those delivered
from study of their enemy.
cont…
In consonance with their practice of
criticism and self-criticism, and dialectical
integration of theory and practice, NPA units
regularly review and critique of their past,
military actions to draw valuable lessons.
cont…
Government counter insurgency forces
manage to recover a classified NPA
document entitled “A collection of Some
Military Actions of NPA in Mindanao”
prepared by the Mindanao Commission
(CPP/NPA).
cont…
This collection contains detailed study
of operations conducted by NPA units
against government forces from the NPA’s
own perspective
cont…
In effect, this is direct from the “horse
mouth” so to speak.

The best representative battle for each


tactics or case shall be selected and will be
presented for study.
What is Lesson’s Learned
Lesson’s Learned – is a validated
knowledge and experience derived from
observations and historical study of
military training
con…
exercises and combat operations that leads
to a change in behavior at either the tactical
(SOP) operation or strategic level.
Steps a lesson has to go through
before it can be considered to be
“learned”.
• Reflect on experience. Think back (and
discuss as a team) what happened.
• Identify learning points. Where there was a
difference between what was planned, and
what actually happened? Either positive or
negative difference.
• Analyze. Why there was a difference?
What were the root causes?
Steps a lesson has to go through
before it can be considered to be
“learned”.
• Generalize. What is the learning point?
What should be done in future activity to
avoid the pitfall, or repeat the success? At
this stage we have a lesson identified
It will be a useful lesson. If others can
learn from it, and for others to learn
from it, it needs not to be instructional.
What makes a good Lesson?
• A lesson needs to be specific enough
that you can learn from it.
• It needs to be actionable – people need
to be able to take action.
• Finally it needs to be a recommendation
rather than an observation.
What makes a good Lesson?
• Take Action. A lesson needs to be
accompanied by an action if it is to be
considered learned. A procedure, a
policy an order, etc. needs to be
changed. Then this changed needs to
be
communicated, so working practices can
be changed as a result. If nothing
changes, nothing has been learned.
Lessons Learned by the
Insurgents from Experience

• That the fire and maneuver are


effective in places where there are no
chances of cover. Because there is no
cover the burst of fire is the only means
that can be used as cover.
cont…
In order to choose the right time, or to
take advantage of the weakness of the
enemy, it is necessary to monitor closely
the enemy movements especially their
foot patrols.
cont…
They should be followed up closely in
order to determine and take advantage of
the good opportunity in ambushing them.
• In the clearing, avoid being lax or
complacent. Make sure that the assault/
maneuver force remains.  
cont…
•  In the course of the fighting, there
may be a time to be noisy and the time
to be silent to enable the commanders
to see or assess the real situations at
every stage of the fight.
cont…
If there is a great noise, the commanders
could not be heard, the
situation could not be easily accessed and
there is the possibility for the remaining
force of the enemy to know our position
and locations.
cont…
• If a large force is being used, for example
a company size, there is a need of
uniforms and countersigns.
cont…
• Upon the surrender of the remaining force
of the enemy, it is important to know how to
decide on the right occasion and the right
time to avoid being complacent and the
danger deceived by the
cont…
enemy even if the surrender is important as
a point of neutralizing them
• The enemy will only surrender when he
has no more decision to fight and the
reinforcement seems hopeless.
cont...
For as long as he is determined to fight
and has hope for reinforcement, he still
can make deceptions and this should be
watched out.
• The NPA are aware that police/military
personnel, as a matter of SOP,
cont…
do not take the same route they use in
entering an area when they go back.
• In entering into and exiting from an
operational area, we should continue the
SOP of not using the same route.
However, usually travelled routes I NPA
infiltrated
cont…
However, usually travelled routes I NPA
infiltrated influenced area should be cleared
of possible ambush
sites prior to tactical use. If clearing is
impossible or otherwise more difficult, the
routes other than usual should be used.
cont…
• The NPA uses intelligence operatives to
continuously monitor the movements of a
targeted military unit up to the last moment
possible prior to engagement.
cont…
• In areas where the NPA has already
established a mass base, the civilian
supporters/sympathizers are used in
information gathering that results in highly
accurate intelligence of police/military
movements.
cont…
In these areas, all movements of police/
military personnel should be considered
tactical and total preparation against
ambush should be made.
cont…
• Secrecy discipline is a must when dealing
with our route ad schedule of movement.
If necessary, diversionary tactics should
be employed.
cont…
• In our preparation and conduct of
operations against the insurgents, high
consideration should be given to the
presence of civilians. Civilian casualties
should be taken care of and possible
assistance should be extended.
cont…
• Simple actions like this are worth more than
thousands of pieces of propaganda
materials. “Baits” are used by the NPA such
as liquidation of government supporters in
many NPA-initiated encounters.
cont…
• Therefore, when planning for operations
based on information or request for
assistance arising from this kind of
incident, all movements to and from the
target area should be tactical and
preparations against
cont…
• possible ambush should be totally
maximized even if in the face of strong
information that the people in the area are
considered “mass base” of the insurgents,
they should be treated as innocent
civilians.
cont…
• It is for the police/military to exercise
proper counter-intelligence measures to
prevent leakages of its tactical plans
particularly troop movements considering
the use by the NPA of the “masa” for
information gatherings.
cont…
• Poor training attitude and weal
indoctrination cause problems in some
NPA fronts. Similarly, these factors
contribute to the weakness of some of our
combat units. Given enough firepower and
good, a well-trained
cont…
• police/military personnel who is willing to
fight can hold this ground against a
numerically stronger insurgent force.
• Beware of the NPA play of deploying
themselves and acting as military/police
personnel in the conduct of raids.
cont…
NPA elements have also been using an
old highly effective technique of feinting
the true direction of their withdrawal to
evade or at least delay contact with
pursuing troops.
cont…
• Using intelligence principle of cover, the
NPA can case the interior of the municipal
building under the pretext of securing
residence certificate.
cont…
• Aside from rehearsals and other tactical
preparations, the insurgents undergo
ideological preparations prior to dispatch.
This would also apply to our troops to instill
strong motivation to carry on a fight that
would result to better combat discipline.
cont…
• Where the NPA has no reliable and
strong mass base, the insurgents cannot
obtain accurate and timely intelligence
about the government troops.
Consequently, it is in these areas where
they cannot
cont…
• successfully launch a tactical offensive.
The support of the civilians therefore
spells the difference.
cont…
• Timing of tactical operation with an
impending inclement weather can be great
help or advantage to the security of the
attacking force.
• The principle of fire and maneuver when
properly executed and
cont…
observed is very effective in closing in with
enemy fortified position.
• Troops deployed for any mission be it
administrative or operations, should be
briefed prior to departure following the
OPORD format giving
emphasis on current situation in the area
and their tasking. Should there be
changes in the task organization; the
relieving personnel should be briefed to
acquaint them of their task.
• “The purpose of collecting, identifying,
analyzing, disseminating and integrating
lessons learned and critical operation
information and knowledge is to sustain,
enhance, and increase the army’s
preparedness to conduct current and future
operation.”
End of Presentation

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